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ODGERS
ON THE
COMMON LAW
OF ENGLAND

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THIRD EDITION.

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ODGERS ON THE COMMON LAW.

VOL. II.



BOOK IV.

CONTRACTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

WE now reach the obligations which persons incur by voluntarily entering into contracts.

The first step towards a contract is the compact. The two essential elements of a compact are—

(i) that both parties should mean, and agree to, the same thing;

(ii) that each should, by word or conduct, inform the other that he or she does so agree.

But this compact does not necessarily create any obligation. Without something more it is often no contract. A CONTRACT is such a compact as the State will enforce (a). And the State will not as a rule do so without some additional formalities or conditions. In most cases it requires that there should be some consideration for the promise, in others that the terms should be stated in writing or in a writing under seal, or that the document should be stamped or registered. The State requires these additional formalities for three reasons—

(a) If the parties have expressly excluded the jurisdiction of the Courts, the contract will be unenforceable: *Rose & Frank Co. v. Crompton Bros.*, [1925] A. C. 445.

(i) to distinguish the concluded bargain from the preliminary negotiation;

(ii) to preserve a clear record of the transaction;

(iii) to raise revenue by means of the stamps.

If these formalities are absent, the State will not enforce the bargain, which is then no contract, but only a *nudum pactum*. In England, as a rule, the State requires either that the contract should be under seal, or that the person on whom the burden of the contract will rest should receive some valuable consideration.

Unenforceable Contracts.

A contract imposes no obligation upon parties, unless it be a contract recognised as valid by the law. Generally speaking, the rule is that people may contract as they please. But the State interferes to prohibit the making of certain kinds of contracts, or to annul them if made. "Occasionally there occur in the course of experience cases in which it is found desirable to depart from that general principle—cases of particular inconvenience in particular trades or employments, and with reference to particular classes (*aa*): for instance, in the case of seamen, whose contracts are the subject of special legislative provision," which has been made with the object of "affording protection to a class of persons not very able to protect themselves" (*b*).

Even where the Legislature does not expressly interfere to prohibit contracts, acknowledged principles of law may operate in such a manner as materially to vary or qualify them. For instance, if a man, in consideration of an immediate loan of £50, binds himself in a penalty of £100 to repay the £50 within a year and makes default, the law requires him to pay only the £50 with reasonable interest. In such cases the law assumes to regulate, and may to some extent overrule, the contract into which the parties have entered.

Again the State will not enforce a contract obtained by fraud, violence or undue influence, or an illegal or immoral contract, or a contract which it deems contrary to public

(*aa*) See the Truck Act, 1831 (1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37, amended by 50 & 51 Vict. c. 46 and 59 & 60 Vict. c. 44), and Chap. XII., Master and Servant, *post*, p. 213.

(*b*) *Per* Maule, J., in *Sharman v. Sanders* (1853), 13 C. B., at p. 176.

policy, such as a betting or wagering contract, or a contract by an occupier of land that he will not avail himself of the provisions of the Ground Game Act, 1880, or any agreement to assign or charge an old age pension. The State also refuses to enforce an unfair bargain made with an expectant heir (c); nor will it attach legal consequences to mere social agreements (d), such as arise out of offers of hospitality, or to words obviously spoken in jest.

Moreover, the State regards certain classes of persons as wholly or partly unable to contract (e). Every contract is founded on consent, and consent involves the existence of a physical and moral power of assenting, as well as a deliberate and free exercise of such power. The absence of any of these essentials in either of the parties renders him incapable of binding himself by a contract. Some persons may be temporarily disabled by lunacy or excessive drunkenness, and their minds are then incapable of forming an agreement. This, however, does not of itself render the contract unenforceable. Let us assume that a lunatic orders goods, which he desires to possess and for which he is willing to pay. The tradesman from whom he orders these goods is perfectly willing to sell them to him at the price named; their two minds therefore are at one. The law will enforce this contract against the lunatic or his estate, unless it can be shown that the tradesman knew that the defendant was insane at the time when he ordered the goods; it is not enough for the defendant or his representatives to prove that he was in fact insane at the date of the contract (f). Moreover, if a tradesman, knowing a man to be a lunatic supplies him with "necessaries" (g), he can recover their value. So too a contract made with a drunken man will be enforced, unless at the time of making the contract he was obviously so drunk as to be incapable of dealing with any matter of business.

(c) See Chaps. V. and VI., *post*, pp. 61—90.

(d) *Balfour v. Balfour*, [1919] 2 K. B. 571; cf. *Rose & Frank Co. v. Crompton Bros.*, [1923] 2 K. B. 261; [1925] A. C. 445.

(e) See Book VI., The Law of Persons.

(f) *Beavan v. M'Donnell* (1854), 9 Exch. 309; *York Glass Co. v. Jubb* (1925), 42 T. L. R. 1.

(g) As to what are necessaries, see *post*, pp. 738.

So too a contract made by an infant cannot be enforced against him, unless the Court be satisfied that the contract was for the benefit of the infant. Thus "a contract made by an infant for any goods other than necessaries is altogether void" (h). A defendant, who has pleaded infancy, need not show that the plaintiff knew that he was an infant or in any way took advantage of his youth or inexperience. And although as a rule all contracts must be mutual, an infant can always sue upon a contract made with him in proper form, whether he himself could be sued on it or not (i). Moreover, no action can be brought upon a promise made after full age to pay a debt contracted during infancy, or upon a ratification made after full age of a promise or contract made during infancy, whether there was or was not any new consideration for such promise or ratification made after full age (k). There are, however, certain contracts of which ratification by an infant will be implied, unless he repudiates them before or within a reasonable time after he attains his majority (l).

At common law a married woman could not contract with her husband, nor with any one else except as agent for her husband. But this absurdity has been remedied by the various Married Women's Property Acts (m); and now any woman married since January 1, 1883, can possess separate property over which her husband has no control, and may contract so as to bind such separate property. So can a woman married before 1883, in respect of property the title to which has vested in her since January 1, 1883. She can sue and be sued on such contracts as though she were a single woman. Indeed, if the contract be made since December 5, 1893, it is wholly immaterial whether at the date of the contract she had any separate property or not.

(h) Infants Relief Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 62), s. 1; see also section 2, Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), and section 22, sub-section 2, Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61).

(i) An infant cannot however obtain a decree for specific performance of such a contract: *Flight v. Bolland* (1828), 4 Russ. 298.

(k) *Ibid.*, s. 2.

(l) *Edwards v. Carter*, [1893] A. C. 360. An infant's signature to a contract may be valid for other purposes though his own contract be avoided: *Laxon, In re*, [1892] 3 Ch. 555. A case in point is *Steinberg v. Scala*, [1923] 2 Ch. 452.

(m) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63; 7 Edw. 7, c. 18.

Should an action be successfully brought against her for damages for breach of contract, the judgment against her can be enforced, subject to restraint on anticipation (*n*), against any separate property of which she is possessed at the date of judgment. At the same time her husband remains liable as at common law for any contract which she makes as his agent under any authority from him express or implied.

Again, the State will not enforce certain contracts made by or with special classes of persons. Thus, on grounds of public policy a non-resident alien enemy will not be allowed to sue (though he may be sued) in our Courts on any contract which he has made, unless he has obtained special licence so to do from the Crown (*o*). But an alien enemy resident here by permission of the Crown, even when interned, may sue (*p*). A convicted felon cannot bring an action or make a valid contract while he is undergoing his sentence; but he can do so when he is out on "ticket of leave." The administrator of a convict's property, however, has "absolute power to let, mortgage, sell, convey or transfer any part of such property as to him shall seem fit" (*q*). The rulers of foreign States are outside the jurisdiction of English Courts. Unless they consent to submit themselves to it, they cannot be sued here (*r*). If they do sue, they subject themselves to any counterclaim which is really a defence, but not to a pure crossclaim.

A barrister cannot sue to recover a fee for professional services; for it is an *honorarium*. So, too, at common law the professional services of a physician raised no implied contract to pay for them. But since 1858 (*s*) such a

(*n*) *Brown v. Dimpleby*, [1904] 1 K. B. 28.

(*o*) See *Porter v. Freudenberg*, [1915] 1 K. B. 857; *Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Moffitt*, [1915] 1 Ch. 58. The test of capacity in such cases is residence, not nationality, *Scotland v. S. A. Territories* (1917), 33 T. L. R. 255; except possibly in the case of companies: *Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co.*, [1916] 2 A. C. 307. (*p*) *Schaffenius v. Goldberg*, [1916] 1 K. B. 284.

(*q*) Forfeiture Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23), s. 12; and see *Carr v. Anderson*, [1903] 1 Ch. 90.

(*r*) *Mighell v. Sultan of Johore*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149; and see *Imperial Japanese Government v. P. & O. Navigation Co.*, [1895] A. C. 644; *South African Republic v. La Compagnie, &c.*, [1897] 2 Ch. 487; [1898] 1 Ch. 190. As to the accredited representatives of a foreign State, see *Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Lim.*, *In re*, [1914] 1 Ch. 139.

(*s*) See 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 31, and 49 & 50 Vict. c. 48, s. 6.

contract is implied. The by-laws of the Royal College of Physicians, made under statutory authority, prohibit its Fellows from taking advantage of this provision.

Classification of Contracts.

Contracts may be classified in many different ways. First as to form. Recognisances (*t*) are the only contracts of record, properly so called. Others are under seal; these are called "specialty" contracts. The great majority of contracts are "simple contracts" (*u*), *i.e.*, not "of record" or under seal. These may be made in writing, or by word of mouth, or by implication of law from the conduct of the parties. All simple contracts require some consideration to support them (*x*).

Again, most contracts are express—though many are implied. An express contract is one the terms of which are, at the time of making it, written down or declared in so many words. It may be of record, or by deed, or in writing, or by word of mouth. A contract, on the other hand, is implied (*y*) when the Court can reasonably infer from the conduct of the parties that they intended to create or incur an obligation which would be enforceable at law. In such a contract the law implies the obligations of the parties from their acts; whereas in an express contract the parties themselves determine the obligations which shall fall on each respectively. Sometimes, however, the law will imply additional terms in an express contract; for the parties do not write down the whole of their bargain: they leave customary incidents to be incorporated by implication (*z*). But no term will be implied as to any matter expressly dealt with in the contract and still governed by it (*a*).

Thus, if A employs B to do something for him without any

(*t*) See Vol. 1, p. 203.

(*u*) In old cases, simple contracts are often called "parol contracts," though in many cases they were in writing, but this is due to the fact that formerly specialty contracts were the only ones usually made in writing.

(*x*) See *post*, pp. 31—37.

(*y*) There are many contracts or terms implied by statute.

(*z*) See, for instance, *ante*, Vol. 1, pp. 84—88.

(*a*) See Chapter XVI., *post*, p. 303.

agreement as to B's remuneration, the law implies that A has undertaken to pay him as much as his labour deserves; and a reasonable amount may be recovered from A just as surely as if A had entered into a written agreement to that effect. If A desired that the work in question should be done for a fixed sum, he ought to have had an express agreement specifying this, and so defining his liability. Again, if C by a written agreement employs D as his agent in a certain transaction or requests him to do any act apparently legal and D does that act without negligence, the law will imply an undertaking by C to indemnify D against all losses, damages and expenses properly incurred by him in the transaction; this undertaking need not be set out in the written agreement (b).

Where one man avails himself of the benefit of services done for him by another, although without his express authority or request, the law will sometimes imply an original contract (c).

Thus where no price for the article sold is fixed by the contract, the law will insist on the payment of a reasonable price, its market value or what it is fairly worth (d). But where a definite price is stated, then in the absence of fraud that price must be paid even though it appears to be inadequate or excessive. — Again, where a written agreement for the sale of goods is silent as to the time of delivery, the law will imply a promise to deliver within a reasonable time, and parol evidence of an agreement to take them away immediately is inadmissible (e). So where a contract of sale is silent as to time of payment, the law will presume that the parties intended that the goods should be paid for on delivery (f). On the other hand, where plans and a specification for the execution of certain work are prepared for the use of those who are asked to tender for its execution, the person asking for the tenders does not enter into any implied warranty that the work can be successfully executed according to such plans and specification (g).

The term "implied contract" has been extended by many writers so as to include certain obligations which the Court enforces without any regard to the intentions of the parties, and indeed often in direct conflict with their known or probable wishes. But it is confusing to use one term to cover two very different classes of obligation: an actual but tacit contract and an obligation which the law imposes upon a man against his will. It is of the essence of every contract that the parties to be bound by it should by words or conduct consent to its stipulations. We have therefore thought it better to classify those obligations which the law imposes *in invitum* under their ancient name of *quasi-contracts* (h). In a *quasi-contract*

(b) See *Dugdale v. Lovering* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 196, 201; *Cory & Son v. Lambton and Hetton Collieries* (1916), 86 L. J. K. B. 401.

(c) *National Motor Mail Coach Co., In re*, [1908] 2 Ch. 515, overruling *English and Colonial Produce Co., In re*, [1906] 2 Ch. 435; see *post*, pp. 35—36.

(d) Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 8, sub-s. 2; and see *post*, p. 142.

(e) *Greaves v. Ashlin* (1813), 3 Camp. 425.

(f) *Ford v. Yates* (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 549; Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 28.

(g) *Thorn v. Mayor, &c., of London* (1876), 1 App. Cas. 120, 128.

(h) See Chap. XVI., *post*, p. 303.

the circumstances may be entirely inconsistent with any actual agreement in fact or with any promise which could reasonably be inferred from conduct of the parties. A *quasi*-contract therefore is not a contract at all; but it is convenient to treat it as though it were one, and the Courts enforce the duty which the law implies from the circumstances of the case. Thus, if A pays B money by mistake, it is clearly B's duty to repay it, and this obligation will be enforced just as though it arose out of a contract, although B never promised or intended to repay the money to A, and there is no consideration for the repayment.

When there are two or more persons on one side of a contract, the question arises whether their liability is joint, or several, or joint and several. Joint liability is the case where the parties on the same side are only liable together. Several liability is when each of such parties is liable independently of the other. Joint and several liability is a combination of the two. The answer to this question turns primarily on the language of the contract itself. Still, it is a question of the intention of the parties, and the Judge will not confine his attention to their words; he will also have regard to all the surrounding circumstances, including the respective interests of the parties (*i*). Thus a contract made by the executors of a will with reference to the testator's estate, by the trustees of a settlement with reference to the trust fund, or by the partners in a firm with reference to the business of the firm, will generally be construed a joint and not a several contract, unless the language of the contract negatives this construction. The distinction is one of considerable importance, as, on the death of one joint contractor, his rights or liabilities pass to the survivors and not to his personal representatives. Moreover, if persons are jointly liable, they must all be sued together; a judgment against one joint contractor, even though unsatisfied, is a bar to any action against the others; and a release given to one joint contractor releases all. On the other hand, when the contract binds two or more persons severally, a judgment against one is no bar to an action against another (*k*).

(i) *Read v. Price*, [1909] 1 K. B. 577.

(k) *Per Swinfen Eady, L.J.*, in *Isaacs v. Salbstein*, [1916] 2 K. B., at p. 151.

A contract, as a rule, confers on the parties to it merely a *jus in personam*—a right to recover damages or obtain other relief, in case the contract is broken. But in some cases it also confers a real right. Thus, as soon as a contract for the sale of ascertained existing goods is legally completed, the property in them passes to the purchaser. So a lease or other agreement for a tenancy, if sufficient in law, confers on the tenant a right to the exclusive possession of the premises, as soon as he has entered upon them.

A contract may be put an end to by performance, or by a new contract, or in most cases by simple rescission. A contract under seal can in strict law be rescinded only by release under seal. A simple contract, whether in words or in writing, can always be rescinded by a subsequent parol agreement (*l*). But a written contract cannot be varied by a parol agreement if the contract be one of those which are required by law to be in writing (*m*). The termination of a contract does not, as a rule, affect any vested right of action. Thus, when a lease is determined by the expiration of the term, the landlord can still sue for rent in arrear. Or, if during the term the landlord assign his reversion to another, he still retains his right to sue for rent in arrear at the date of the assignment, unless he has specially stipulated to assign this rent also. Lastly, the right to sue on a contract may be barred by lapse of time or by the bankruptcy of the person liable.

In the following chapters we shall deal more fully with the various classes of contracts which occur in daily life :—

(i) Contracts of record.

(ii) Contracts under seal.

(iii) Simple contracts, whether written, oral or implied.

(iv) Void, voidable and illegal contracts.

(*l*) *Vezey v. Rashleigh*, [1904] 1 Ch. 634; *Morris v. Baron*, [1918] A. C. 1; and see *post*, p. 106.

(*m*) *Goss v. Lord Nugent* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 58.

CHAPTER II.

CONTRACTS OF RECORD AND UNDER SEAL.

A RECORD is a memorial of some legal proceeding which has been written on parchment and enrolled in the proper office. The only contracts of record met with in modern times are a recognisance and a security bond given for the due administration of an intestate's estate. A person who enters into a recognisance verbally acknowledges that he owes the Crown a certain sum of money, such indebtedness to cease upon his complying with the condition enjoined by the Court. Recognisances are entered into to secure many different objects. Thus, if a man uses language or does acts the natural consequence of which is that breaches of the peace will be committed, the justices may order him to enter into recognisances to be of good behaviour (*a*). In other cases, a prosecutor or a witness in a criminal case is "bound over" to appear at the trial; or a person after conviction binds himself to appear and receive judgment at some later time if called upon, and in the meantime to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour, &c. (*b*). A contract of record proves itself; no further evidence is necessary. It can be enforced by a writ of *scire facias*.

Judgments of Courts of record are also sometimes spoken of as contracts of record (*c*). But they are not really contracts, for they are not founded on any agreement. A judgment is an act of the Court which imposes on one party, whether he be willing or unwilling, an obligation to do something, *e.g.*, to pay money to another. This is an obligation "of record," for it derives its binding effect from the fact that it is the order of the Court and can only be proved by the record or an official copy of it.

(*a*) See Vol. 1, p. 203, and *Wise v. Dunning*, [1902] 1 K. B. 167.

(*b*) See *post*, p. 446.

(*c*) As to foreign judgments, see *post*, pp. 311—314.

A judgment, even if it be a judgment by consent or default (*d*), has the following effect:—

(i) The original contract “ merges in,” or is extinguished by, the judgment. Even where the original cause of action was on a bond or deed, the debt due under such instrument becomes “ by judicial proceeding and act in law . . . transformed and metamorphosed into a matter of record ” (*e*), and it is upon the judgment only, so long as it remains in force and unreversed, that the plaintiff can sue.

(ii) A judgment binds the land of the judgment debtor, but not until it is taken in execution (*f*),

(iii) Further, a judgment works an estoppel, *i.e.*, it is final as between the parties to it and all who claim under them: the same matter cannot again be litigated between them, for it is *res judicata*. But a judgment will not estop one who is neither a party nor privy to it, for he has had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses called upon the trial or to dispute the conclusions drawn from the evidence there offered (*g*).

A judgment may however be impeached, if the Judge who tried the case was disqualified by reason of pecuniary interest in the subject-matter before the Court, or if the judgment was obtained by fraud. “ Fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Lord Coke says it avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal ” (*h*). On proof of such fraud the Court can and will set aside its own judgment (*i*); but until so set aside, it effects an estoppel.

(*d*) *South American and Mexican Co., In re; Bank of England, ex parte*, [1895] 1 Ch. 37; *Law v. Law*, [1905] 1 Ch. 140. As to the effect of a judgment in an action in which the Court had no jurisdiction, see *Joint Committee of River Ribble v. Croston U. D. C.*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 251; *Toronto Ry. v. Toronto Corporation*, [1904] A. C., at p. 815. As to setting aside the judgment, see *Wilding v. Sanderson*, [1897] 2 Ch. 534.

(*e*) *Higgins's Case* (1606), 6 Rep. 45.

(*f*) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112. As to registration, see 51 & 52 Vict. c. 51.

(*g*) *Concha v. Concha* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 541.

(*h*) *Per cur.* in *The Duchess of Kingston's Case* (1776), 2 Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 762. See *Cole v. Langford*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 36; *Birch v. Birch*, [1902] P. 130. The rule applies to a judgment by default: *Wyatt v. Palmer*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 106.

(*i*) See the remarks of Lord Denman, C.J., in *Philipson v. Earl of Egremont* (1844), 6 Q. B., at p. 605.

" If there be a breach of contract or wrong done, or any other cause of action by one against another, and judgment be recovered in a Court of record, the judgment is a bar to the original cause of action, because it is thereby reduced to a certainty, and the object of the suit attained, so far as it can be at that stage; and it would be useless and vexatious to subject the defendant to another suit for the purpose of obtaining the same result. . . . The cause of action is changed into matter of record, which is of a higher nature, and the inferior remedy is merged in the higher. This appears to be equally true where there is but one cause of action, whether it be against a single person or many. The judgment of a Court of record changes the nature of that cause of action, and prevents its being the subject of another suit, and the cause of action, being single, cannot afterwards be divided into two " (*k*). Thus a judgment against one of two joint debtors is, except in the cases provided for by Order XIII., r. 5, Order XIV., r. 5 and Order XXVII., r. 5 (*l*), a bar to an action against the other, even though it remains unsatisfied by the original defendant (*m*). This bar is not removed, even if the joint contractor, against whom judgment has been recovered, consents to the judgment being set aside (*n*). In an action, however, against one of several joint contractors, a defence by way of estoppel based on a judgment entered in favour of another co-contractor must show that the former action was successfully resisted on some ground available in common to all the joint contractors (*o*). Further, for such a defence to succeed, the cause of action to which it is pleaded must be the same as that in respect of which the judgment was recovered—*e.g.*, an unsatisfied judgment against one joint contractor on a cheque given by him alone for the joint debt is not a bar to an action against the other joint contractor on the original joint contract (*p*). But where there is no joint contract nor the relation of principal and agent, an unsatisfied judgment against one person for the price of goods sold is not a bar to a subsequent action against another person who happens also to be liable (*q*).

A contract under seal is a contract in writing, the execution of which is accompanied by certain formalities, which not merely indicate the assent of the contracting parties, but give to their contract peculiar force and efficacy. A contract under seal is often called a

(*k*) *Per cur.* in *King v. Hoare* (1844), 13 M. & W., at p. 504.

(*l*) See *Goldrei v. Sinclair*, [1918] 1 K. B. 180, at p. 188; *Parr v. Snell*, [1923] 1 K. B. 1.

(*m*) *Brinsmead v. Harrison* (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 547.

(*n*) *Hammond v. Schofield*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 453.

(*o*) *Phillips v. Ward* (1863), 2 H. & C. 717.

(*p*) *Wegg Prosser v. Evans*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 108.

(*q*) *Isaacs v. Salbstein*, [1916] 2 K. B. 139.

“specialty,” and a promise contained in it is a “covenant.”

Any instrument under seal, which is made between private persons, is called a deed. It is said to be unilateral when it imposes an obligation on one person only; it is called bilateral when both parties to it are reciprocally bound.

A deed is distinguished from a simple contract in writing by the formalities of sealing and delivery.

Prior to the Statute of Frauds, signing was not essential to a deed which had been executed by sealing and delivery. Prior to 1926, the absence of the signature of a party to a deed, the subject-matter of which comes within the operation of that statute, was immaterial, for the object of that enactment was “to prevent matters of importance from resting on the frail testimony of memory alone.” It was not intended to apply to instruments already authenticated by a ceremony of a higher nature than a signature or mark (*r*). Since January 1, 1926, however, a signature is required except in the case of corporations (*s*).

Delivery is essential to the due execution of a deed (*t*). If executed after the day on which it purports to bear date, it takes effect from the day of delivery and not from the day of the date (*u*).

The usual practice in delivering a deed is to place the finger upon the seal or wafer and to repeat the formula, “I deliver this as my act and deed.” But delivery without words is sufficient; and so is any act or words which show an intention to treat the instrument as a presently binding deed.

Delivery to a third person for the use of the party in whose favour the deed is made, provided the grantor parts with all control over the instrument, will make the deed effectual from the instant of such delivery; for the law will presume, if nothing appear to the contrary, that a man will accept what is for his benefit.

A deed may be delivered as “an escrow,” *i.e.*, it may be delivered to a stranger to be kept by him until certain specified conditions be performed, and then to be delivered to the other party to the deed. If in fact the deed is so delivered to a stranger, it will not take effect as a deed until the condition be performed, although the delivery is

(*r*) *Per Rolfe, B.*, in *Cherry v. Heming* (1849), 4 Exch. 636, 637.

(*s*) See sections 73, 74 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 20). This Act will be cited in the following pages as L. P. A., 1925.

(*t*) In the case of a body corporate, the fixing their common seal to the deed is tantamount to a delivery. See *Xenos v. Wickham* (1866), L. R. 2 H. L. 296.

(*u*) See *Powell v. London and Provincial Bank*, [1893] 2 Ch. 555.

in form absolute. The condition must not be the grantor's own death (*x*), since the provisions of the Wills Act would be thereby defeated. But, under the common law at all events, if a deed was executed and delivered by the one party to the other, it could not operate as an escrow. Such a delivery was absolute. There cannot be a partial execution or delivery of a deed (*y*).

It was a rule of the common law that contracts by corporations must be made under the seal of the corporation or by a person authorised under seal, or must be ratified by seal (*z*). "The seal is the only authentic evidence of what the corporation has done, or agreed to do. . . . Either a seal, or some substitute for a seal, which by law shall be taken as conclusively evidencing the sense of the whole body corporate, is a necessity inherent in the very nature of a corporation" (*a*).

Numerous exceptions have been engrafted on this rule; so that now a seal is no longer required in cases of minor contracts of daily necessary occurrence (*b*), or where there is a paramount convenience such as to amount almost to a necessity in carrying out the objects for which the corporation was established (*c*).

Thus, as a general rule, an inferior servant can be engaged even by a non-trading corporation by parol. But this does not apply to all servants; for it has been held that the contract for the engagement of a clerk to a master of a workhouse by a board of guardians must be under seal (*d*). Again, no formal contract under seal will be required when the transaction is incidental to the objects and daily business of the corporation; as, for instance, if it is a contract to repair the premises of the corporation, and the contract has been executed (*e*), or to buy or sell such goods as the corporation is

(*x*) *Foundling Hospital v. Crane*, [1911] 2 K. B. 367. As to whether a document be an escrow or a complete deed, see *London Freehold, &c., Co. v. Suffield*, [1897] 2 Ch. 608.

(*y*) *Wilkinson v. Anglo-Californian Gold Mining Co.* (1852), 18 Q. B. 728; *Exchange Bank of Yarmouth v. Blethen* (1885), 10 App. Cas. 293.

(*z*) *Arnold v. Mayor of Poole* (1842), 4 M. & G. 860; *Mayor of Oxford v. Crow*, [1893] 3 Ch. 535.

(*a*) *Per cur.* in *Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton* (1840), 6 M. & W., at p. 823.

(*b*) *Nicholson v. Bradfield Union* (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 620; *Lawford v. Billericay R. D. C.*, [1903] 1 K. B. 772.

(*c*) See *Church v. Imperial Gas Light Co.* (1838), 6 A. & E. 846, 861.

(*d*) *Austin v. Bethnal Green Guardians* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 91; and see *Dyte v. St. Pancras Guardians* (1872), 27 L. T. 342.

(*e*) *Sanders v. St. Neot's Union* (1846), 8 Q. B. 810.

formed to buy and sell (*f*), or to purchase goods for the ordinary and regular purposes of the corporation (*g*).

So when the nature of the contract is outside the expressed objects and daily business of the corporation—as in the case of a contract for the purchase of goods which are not such as those in which the corporation usually deals (*h*).

A corporation will, however, be bound by a contract not under seal of which it has received the benefit (*i*). Thus, where goods which a corporation has purchased by parol contract have been received and used by it, or after work has been done for the corporation and adopted by it, the objection that the contract was not under seal cannot be taken (*e*). Moreover, the equitable doctrines of acquiescence and part performance apply to contracts by corporations as much as to those by private individuals (*k*).

Local authorities, whether actual corporations or not, are bound by statute to make their contracts in prescribed forms. Thus by the Public Health Act, 1875 (*l*), “every contract made by an urban authority, whereof the value or amount exceeds £50, shall be in writing and sealed with the common seal of such authority.”

The House of Lords has held that this section is imperative, and that consequently the authority was not bound by a contract not under seal, although made by an agent appointed under seal and although it had received the full benefit of it (*m*); but the requirements of the statute can be complied with after the work has been commenced, and before it is finished (*n*).

All trading companies are now governed by the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (*o*), unless they be—

(i) companies created by special Acts of Parliament, which invariably incorporate the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (*p*); or

(ii) companies created by letters patent, usually known as “chartered companies,” whose powers to make contracts are substantially those given to a corporation by the common law; or

(iii) joint stock banking companies formed under the special Acts relating to banks (*q*).

(*f*) *Church v. Imperial Gas Light Co.*, *supra*.

(*g*) *South of Ireland Colliery Co. v. Waddle* (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 617.

(*h*) *Copper Miners' Co. v. Fox* (1851), 16 Q. B. 229.

(*i*) *Melbourne Banking Corporation v. Brougham* (1879), 4 A. C. 156, at p. 169.

(*k*) *Laird v. Birkenhead Ry. Co.* (1859), Johns. 500; cf. *Crook v. Corporation of Seaford* (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 551; and see *Mayor of Kidderminster v. Hardwick* (1873), L. R. 9 Ex. 13; *Lawford v. Billericay R. D. C.*, [1903] 1 K. B. 772; *Nixon v. Erith U. D. C.*, [1924] 1 K. B. 819.

(*l*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 174.

(*m*) *Young v. Mayor of Leamington* (1883), 8 App. Cas. 517; but see *Att.-Gen. v. Gaskill* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 537; *Higgins, Lim. v. Corporation of Northampton*, [1927] Ch. 128.

(*n*) *Melliss v. Shirley, &c.*, *Local Board of Health* (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 911.

(*o*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69.

(*p*) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16; see section 97, which, however, is frequently modified by the company's special Act.

(*q*) Country Bankers Act, 1826 (7 Geo. 4, c. 46); Bank Charter Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c. 113), s. 47; Joint Stock Banking Companies Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 49), s. 12.

The Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, requires that all contracts made by any company within its operation shall be in accordance with section 76, which is cited in Book VI., Chap. VI. This large class of corporations is in the same position as any individual in regard to necessity for sealing.

Many railway and other statutory companies have Acts which contain provisions as to the mode of making contracts. By the Law of Property Act, 1925 (*r*), however, it is enacted that "The board of directors, council or other governing body of a corporation aggregate may, by resolution or otherwise, appoint an agent either generally or in any particular case, to execute on behalf of the corporation any agreement or other instrument not under seal in relation to any matter within the powers of the corporation."

The following transfers, &c., are required by law to be in the form of a deed. Most of them are conveyances rather than contracts, but they often contain reciprocal undertakings by the parties, which, being included in a deed, are covenants:—

- (i) Leases of land for more than three years (*s*).
- (ii) Transfers of shares in companies incorporated under the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (*t*).
- (iii) Transfers of a British ship or of any share therein (*u*).
- (iv) Certain contracts made by registered industrial and provident societies (*x*).

All conveyances (*y*) must also be under seal. So by the common law all remainders, reversions, advowsons, rentcharges, *profits a prendre*, easements and all other incorporeal hereditaments can only be created or transferred by deed.

Every deed must state with precision the parties to it and its subject-matter. Thus in every grant there must be a grantor, a grantee and a thing granted; in every lease, a lessor, a lessee and a thing demised. The parties must be able to contract, and their

(*r*) L. P. A., 1925, s. 74. The wording suggests that such agent may execute without seal documents which under the common law require a seal. This result was probably not intended, but the provision seems otherwise purposeless, as an agent has these powers under the existing law. In Scotland the signature of an agent *per pro* the corporation will bind it.

(*s*) L. P. A., 1925, ss. 52—54.

(*t*) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 14.

(*u*) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 24.

(*x*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 39, s. 35.

(*y*) For the wide meaning of conveyances, see now L. P. A., 1925, ss. 51, 52 and 205.

object in contracting must be neither illegal nor immoral. Most deeds commence with "recitals"—clauses stating certain facts, or setting out briefly the contents of pre-existing documents. Then come the "operative words,"—*i.e.*, the words which actually convey or demise the property—and next the covenants whereby each party binds himself to do or to refrain from doing certain things. For example, there may be covenants for quiet enjoyment or for payment of rent or for repair of premises (*z*). Particular words are unnecessary. A recital in a deed may amount to a covenant where it appears to have been the intention of the parties that it should do so (*a*).

Covenants are divisible into three classes:—1. Independent covenants, where either party may recover damages for breach of the covenants in his favour, and it is no answer to allege a breach of the covenants on the part of the plaintiff. 2. Covenants conditional and dependent, where the performance of one covenant depends on the prior performance of another (*b*). 3. Covenants, sometimes called concurrent, which are mutual conditions to be performed at the same time. In these, if one party, A, is ready and offers to perform his part, and the other, B, neglects or refuses to perform his, A has fulfilled his engagement and can therefore sue B for his default, even though neither be obliged to do the first act.

Covenants are also classified as real, personal or collateral. A covenant real is one annexed to an estate and to be performed on it; a covenant personal, one whereof some person in particular shall have the benefit, or whereby he shall be charged, or one which is to be performed personally by the covenantor alone. The term "collateral" (usually opposed to the term "real" as defined above) means that the thing covenanted to be done is "merely collateral to the land, and doth not touch or concern the thing demised in any sort" (*c*), or not so immediately as to pass with it to an assignee. Such a covenant is also said to be "in gross."

Certain covenants are said to "run with the land"—that is, they pass with it from assignor to assignee (*d*).

A bond is a contract under seal, whereby one person, called the obligor, binds himself to pay another, called the obligee, a specified sum of money on a particular day. A clause is usually added to the effect that, if the obligor does a certain act or thing within the time named for the payment of the amount mentioned by the bond, the money shall cease to be payable and the bond shall become of no effect;

(*z*) See Landlord and Tenant, *post*, p. 228.

(*a*) *Lay v. Mottram* (1865), 19 C. B. (N.S.) 479; see also L. P. A., 1925, s. 56.

(*b*) See notes to *Pordage v. Cole*, 1 Wms. Saund., ed. 1871, pp. 550—556.

(*c*) *Spencer's Case* (1583), 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 63.

(*d*) See *post*, p. 119.

otherwise it shall remain in full force. This clause is called the condition of the bond. If a bond has no such condition attached to it, it is known as a "single bond"; but such bonds are rare. A bond must be sealed and delivered to the obligee. It requires no consideration to support it. If there was a previous simple contract debt, it merges in the bond.

If the condition in or annexed to the bond is not performed, the bond is forfeited. In that case the entire penalty named therein was formerly recoverable by law. Now, however, by virtue of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3, ss. 12 and 13, in the case of a bond conditioned for the payment of money, the payment of the principal sum due with interest and costs will be a full satisfaction and discharge, even though an action has been commenced on the forfeited bond. Also by 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, s. 8, damages and costs of suit only are recoverable in an action upon a bond executed by way of security for the performance of covenants contained in any deed or indenture. The distinction between a bond under the statute of Anne and a bond under the statute of William must be carefully observed, as the procedure in the two cases is different.

At common law the breach of a stipulation as to the date by which a contract should be performed was held to be a breach of the contract. Time was regarded as of the "essence of the contract." Equity, however, inclined to substitute for the particular date a reasonable time for performance. Such stipulations are now, by the Judicature Act, to receive "the same effect by way of defence, as the Court of Chancery ought formerly to have given" (e). Mercantile contracts, save in respect of time for payment, are an exception to this rule (f).

A contract under seal duly executed and delivered may acquire the following properties, which do not attach to a simple contract in writing:—

- (i) It may work a merger.
- (ii) It operates by way of estoppel.
- (iii) It requires no consideration to support it (g).

(e) Section 38 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49). This Act will be cited in the following pages as the Judicature Act, 1925.

(f) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 10. As to whether a sum stipulated to be payable in the event of non-performance of a contract be a penalty or liquidated damages, see *post*, pp. 682—684.

(g) Except in the case of contracts in restraint of trade.

(iv) It may in some cases bind the heir of the covenantor or obligor.

At common law a contract under seal could be discharged only by an instrument under seal, by the judgment of a Court of competent authority or by Act of Parliament. But it can now, like any other contract, be rescinded by any agreement, written or parol, which is made for valuable consideration (*h*), or it can be impeached on the ground of fraud or illegality.

(i) A deed effects a merger. Being of a higher nature than a simple contract, it will, if given in relation to the same subject-matter, altogether swallow up the latter and extinguish any right of action which might have been founded upon it. Thus the acceptance of a bond for a simple contract debt causes the debt to merge in the higher security (*i*). So, if a man covenants to pay a sum actually due, the remedy for non-payment is upon the covenant, and not upon the original cause of action. "Where a debt is secured by a bond, covenant or other specialty, there the obligation by simple contract is gone: the lesser security is merged in the greater" (*k*).

But this rule is subject to some qualifications; *e.g.*, a bond given for a limited sum will not operate to merge a debt of indefinite amount. The contract under seal of a surety will not by operation of law extinguish the simple contract debt of the principal. If one maker of a joint and several promissory note executes to the holder a mortgage to secure the amount and covenants therein to pay it, another maker is not thereby discharged. And, generally, where on the face of an instrument under seal the intention of the parties appears to have been that the original debt secured thereby should continue to exist, or that the security (if any) previously given should remain in force, effect will be given to their intention.

(ii) A deed is a "solemn and authentic act"; therefore a man will be estopped from denying that which he has asserted in a deed. If, however, a recital in a deed is the statement of one party only, the estoppel is confined to that party (*l*). An estoppel by deed extends to persons claiming under the party who is estopped. The recitals in a deed will not estop a party in an action which is not founded on the deed but only collateral to it (*m*).

Further, to operate as an estoppel the deed must be certain. "The law of estoppel by deed is as old as the hills. It can only be effected by what is express and clear—by a statement by which the

(*h*) See *post*, p. 106.

(*i*) *Owen v. Homan* (1851), 3 Mac. & G. 378.

(*k*) *Per cur.* in *Middleditch v. Ellis* (1848), 2 Exch., at p. 626.

(*l*) See *Stroughill v. Buck* (1850), 14 Q. B., at p. 787.

(*m*) *Morgan, Ex parte; Simpson, in re* (1876), 2 Ch. D. 72, 89.

parties mean to bind themselves in making their contract" (n). Moreover, there is nothing in the rules relating to estoppels to prevent a deed from being impeached on the ground of fraud or illegality—though a man will never be allowed to set up his own fraud or his own illegal conduct in answer to an action on the deed (o).

(iii) A deed requires no consideration to support it. Where a contract has been duly executed by signing, sealing and delivery, the solemnity of the instrument dispenses with the necessity of consideration (p). Nevertheless, a deed is always impeachable for fraud, and fraud may be inferred from want of consideration (q). Moreover, when the issue is as to the effect of the deed upon the rights of third persons, absence of consideration will be strong evidence of collusive dealing and of intention to defraud.

A deed made without consideration or founded merely on considerations of relationship or natural love and affection is called a voluntary deed; and such deeds made with intent to defraud creditors or subsequent purchasers are voidable. Prior to 1926 a conveyance to a stranger without consideration or declaration of any use or trust was, apart from statute law and in the absence of any indication of a contrary intention, presumed to have been made for the use of the grantor, but after 1925 "no resulting trust to the grantor will be implied in a voluntary conveyance merely because the property is not expressed to be conveyed for the use or benefit of the grantee" (r).

Apart from fraud or illegality in the circumstances or anything contrary to statute, the mere want of consideration for a bond or covenant will, in a Court of law, be wholly immaterial. Hence, a deed founded on no consideration or on a past consideration is good, though a deed executed with a view to carrying out an illegal or even an immoral future purpose is void (s).

(iv) Another characteristic of a contract under seal is that it binds the real and personal estate of the person making it in so far as no contrary intention is expressed in the document (t). In the administration of the estate of a deceased insolvent person a creditor, the payment of whose debt is secured by any deed, bond or covenant, has no longer priority over any simple contract creditor (u).

The defences available in answer to an action brought upon a covenant contained in a deed include:—

(n) *Per* Bowen, L.J., in *Onward Building Society v. Smithson*, [1893] 1 Ch., at p. 14.

(o) See *Gascoigne v. Gascoigne*, [1918] 1 K. B. 223, and *post*, p. 65.

(p) To this general rule there is one exception—a covenant in restraint of trade.

(q) *Morley v. Loughnan*, [1893] 1 Ch. 733.

(r) L. P. A., 1925, ss. 172, 173, repealing 27 Eliz. c. 4 and the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 21).

(s) See *post*, p. 75.

(t) L. P. A., 1925, s. 80, sub-s. 1.

(u) Administration of Estates Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 23), s. 34.

(a) That the defendant never executed the deed. This was formerly known as a plea of *non est factum*—"I never made the deed."

(b) That he was induced to execute the deed by fraud.

(c) That the object of the deed was illegal.

(d) That the deed has been altered in some material particular.

(e) That the contract under seal has been released or discharged or is barred by a Statute of Limitation.

(a) A man sued upon a deed may plead "I never made it," if the deed, though sealed or signed by him, was executed under a total misapprehension as to its nature and in the genuine belief that he was signing a document of a totally different kind.

In *Thoroughgood's Case* (x) it was held that, if an illiterate man has a deed read over to him falsely, and he then seals and delivers the parchment, that parchment is nevertheless not his deed. If a grantor or covenantor be deceived or misled as to the actual contents of the deed, the deed does not bind him (y). If a deed be delivered, and a blank left therein be afterwards improperly filled up (at least, if that be done without negligence on the part of the grantor), it is not the deed of the grantor (z).

But it is otherwise if the party knew that he was executing a deed, and that it dealt with the property to which it in fact relates (a). Thus, where an illiterate man was induced by his solicitor to execute a deed which he knew to relate to his property, he was held to be bound by the deed, which was in fact a mortgage of his property. He did not know the contents of the deed and he never meant to execute a mortgage, but he knew that it was a deed connected with his property; therefore he could not say, "It is not my deed" (b).

(b) Fraud is a good defence to an action on a contract under seal. Where a party has been induced to execute a deed by fraud, he may either sue or counterclaim to have the deed declared void and delivered up to him.

(c) It is also a good defence to an action on a contract under seal that it was executed for an illegal consideration. In *Collins v. Blantern* (c) the plaintiff sued on a bond intended to secure to him the repayment of £350. He had advanced the money in order to

(x) (1583), 2 Rep. 9; and see *Pigot's Case* (1614), 11 Rep. 26 b.

(y) See *Edwards v. Brown* (1831), 1 C. & J. 307, 312.

(z) *Swan v. North British Australasian Co.* (1863), 2 H. & C. 175. Cf. *Foster v. Mackinnon* (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 704, and *Lewis v. Clay* (1897), 67 L. J. Q. B. 224.

(a) See the remarks of A. L. Smith, L.J., in *Onward Building Society v. Smithson*, [1893] 1 Ch., at p. 15.

(b) *King v. Smith*, [1900] 2 Ch. 425. See *Bagot v. Chapman*, [1907] 2 Ch. 222; *Howatson v. Webb*, [1908] 1 Ch. 1.

(c) (1767), 1 Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), 412. See the notes to this case.

settle a criminal prosecution. The bond was therefore held to be void. "This," observed Lord Wilmut, C.J., "is a contract to tempt a man to transgress the law, to do that which is injurious to the community: it is void by the common law, and the reason why the common law says such contracts are void is for the public good. You shall not stipulate for iniquity. All writers upon our law agree in this—no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of Justice. Whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he hath once paid the money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, he shall not have the help of a Court to fetch it back again" (d).

In *Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Turner* (e), a defence, pleaded to an action on a covenant for rent due under a lease, alleging that the premises in question were demised to the defendant for an unlawful purpose, was held to be good. "A Court of law," said Tindal, C.J., "will not lend its aid to enforce the performance of a contract which was entered into by both the contracting parties for the express purpose of carrying into effect that which is prohibited by the law of the land. And we think, both from authority and reason, this objection must be allowed to prevail. That no legal distinction can be supported between the application of this objection to parol contracts and to contracts under seal appears the necessary inference from the cases of *Collins v. Blantern* and *Paxton v. Popham* (f), in both of which cases the principle above laid down was acted upon by the Court, and in each of which the action was upon a bond; and it would, indeed, be inconsistent with reason and principle to hold, that, by the mere ceremony of putting a seal to an instrument, that is, by the voluntary act of the parties themselves, a contract which was void in itself on the ground of its being in violation of the law of the land should be deemed valid, and an action be maintainable thereon in a Court of justice."

It does not follow, however, that a deed tainted with illegality is necessarily void as between all parties and for all purposes (g). A conveyance made with the object of contravening a particular statute may be invalidated thereby so far as that object is concerned, and yet may remain effectual against the grantor. Thus a conveyance made for the mere purpose of conferring a vote has been held void only to the extent of preventing the right of voting from being acquired, but valid between the parties to pass an interest in the land. Although the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5 rendered void a

(d) (1767), 1 Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 417. And see *Higgins v. Pitt* (1849), 4 Exch. 312; *Mallalieu v. Hodgson* (1851), 16 Q. B. 689, and cases there cited.

(e) (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 666, 675; (1840), 6 Bing. N. C. 324, with which compare *Feret v. Hill* (1854), 15 C. B. 207, where the plaintiff had been forcibly expelled by the defendant from premises held under a written agreement into which the defendant had been induced to enter by the plaintiff's misrepresentations: ejectment was held maintainable, inasmuch as an interest in the demised premises had actually passed by the agreement. And see the remarks of Maule, J., *ibid.*, at p. 213, and the judgment in *Fisher v. Tully* (1878), 3 App. Cas., at p. 639.

(f) (1808), 9 East, 408.

(g) See *Waugh v. Morris* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 202.

transfer of property made by an insolvent person in fraud of his creditors, nevertheless such an assignment may be binding as between the transferor and transferee (*h*).

(*d*) In order to prevent the possibility of fraud, the law formerly held that any alteration of a deed after execution by or with the consent of one party and without the consent of the others, even in a part that was not material, would make the deed void (*i*). Now, however, an immaterial alteration so made will not avoid a deed (*k*); though it is otherwise if the alteration be material and contrary to the apparent intention of the original. If after the execution of the deed a material alteration be intentionally made in it by a stranger without the consent of any party, it seems that the party in whose custody the deed was will not be allowed to put it in evidence in support of any right or title which he claims to have vested in him under the deed since the date of the alteration (*l*).

In *Ellesmere Brewery Co. v. Cooper* (*m*), B, C, D and E consented to become sureties for A and executed a joint and several bond of suretyship, by the terms of which the liability of B and C was limited to £50 each, and that of D and E to £25 each. B executed the bond after three other sureties had done so, and expressly limited his liability to £25 by adding to his signature the words "£25 only." This he did in good faith. In an action against the sureties on default by A it was held that adding the words made a material alteration in the bond, so that C, D and E were thereby discharged from their obligation; and that as B—the last surety who had signed the bond—had only executed it as a joint and several bond, he also was not bound by it.

(*e*) It is no longer law that a contract under seal can only be discharged by a formal release under seal. On the contrary, it can now be rescinded by any subsequent agreement, written or parol, made between the parties for valuable consideration. An agreement made by a creditor for good consideration that he will not sue on a bond will be an answer to an action on the bond. "Such an agreement, unless there is some reason for not enforcing it, has in equity the effect of a release" (*n*).

Again, the obligation created by a specialty may of course be discharged by an express statute. Bonds and specialty debts were by the common law presumed to have been satisfied after twenty years had passed without any payment or acknowledgment (*o*) of indebtedness thereunder; and the same number of years has now been fixed by statute as the period of limitation in the case of an

(*h*) *Bessey v. Windham* (1844), 6 Q. B. 166. L. P. A., 1925, s. 172, repeals 13 Eliz. c. 5, but this point is not affected.

(*i*) *Pigot's Case* (1614), 11 Rep. 26 b.

(*k*) *Bishop of Crediton v. Bishop of Exeter*, [1905] 2 Ch. 455.

(*l*) *Pigot's Case* (1614), 11 Rep. 26 b, 27 a; *Robinson v. Mollett* (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 802, 813; but see the judgment of Lord Herschell in *Lowe v. Fox* (1887), 12 App. Cas., at p. 216.

(*m*) [1896] 1 Q. B. 75.

(*n*) *Per Lindley, L.J.*, in *Edwards v. Walters*, [1896] 2 Ch., at p. 168.

(*o*) As to acknowledgment, see *Spencer v. Hemmerde*, [1922] 2 A. C. 507.

action based upon any such debt (p). In this respect contracts under seal differ from simple contracts, actions upon which are, as a rule, barred as soon as six years have elapsed from the date at which the cause of action accrued. The statute, however, will not affect the rights of parties in case of fraud (q).

(p) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3.

(q) *Oelkers v. Ellis*, [1914] 2 K. B. 139.

CHAPTER III.

SIMPLE CONTRACTS.

A SIMPLE contract is one which is (i) in writing not under seal, or (ii) in words, or (iii) implied from the conduct of the parties, or (iv) partly in writing and partly in words or implied from conduct.

There is no contract until both parties have agreed on its terms (a). A contract is based on the mutual consent of the parties, and therefore can have no binding force as long as the negotiations are still open.

Thus, where A telegraphed, "Will you sell us Bumper Hall Farm? Telegraph lowest cash price," and B replied, "Lowest price £900," whereupon A telegraphed accepting the property at the price, it was held that the mere statement of the lowest price at which the vendor would sell contained no implied contract to sell at that price to the persons making the inquiry, and that there was no completed contract (b). So, too, if A applies for an absolute and unqualified allotment of shares in a projected company, and the letter of allotment contains the qualification that the shares are not transferable, the offer and the acceptance, not being *ad idem*, will together fail to establish a binding contract (c). And generally "where a contract is to be made out by an offer on one side and an acceptance on the other (d), if the answer is equivocal, or anything is left to be done, the two do not constitute a binding contract" (e).

Where, moreover, the existence and nature of a contract are to be gathered from correspondence between the parties, the whole of that which passed between them must be taken into consideration (f), and must show an

(a) Though two parties are necessary, the rule laid down in *Napier v. Williams*, [1911] 1 Ch. 361, that if one person is interested both as covenantor and covenantee the covenant is wholly void, has been modified by L. P. A., 1925, s. 82.

(b) *Harvey v. Facey*, [1893] A. C. 552.

(c) *Duke v. Andrews* (1848), 2 Exch. 290.

(d) See *English and Foreign Credit Co. v. Arduin* (1871), L. R. 5 H. L. 64.

(e) *Per Grove, J.*, in *Appleby v. Johnson* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P., at p. 163.

(f) *Hussey v. Horne-Payne* (1879), 4 App. Cas. 311.

unqualified acceptance of the offer made, into which no new term, unless assented to, can be introduced (*g*). The fact that the parties agree to clothe their contract subsequently in more formal language will not necessarily make the contract incomplete (*h*). If a man accepts an offer, for example, for the sale of a freehold, "subject to my solicitor's approval," such words may go to show that negotiations are still open, or on the other hand they may be merely a safeguard that the title be investigated in the ordinary way (*i*).

Mercantile contracts are naturally often contained in letters. If A makes an offer by letter to B, and B accepts unconditionally, the contract is complete when B's letter is posted, even if it never reaches A (*k*). But A cannot withdraw his offer by posting a subsequent letter which does not reach B until after A's first letter has arrived and been answered and the answer posted (*l*).

"An uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes, no revocation at all" (*m*). Thus where the defendant applied for shares in the plaintiff company, and the company allotted the shares to the defendant and duly addressed to him and posted a letter notifying the allotment, which letter the defendant never received, it was nevertheless held that he had become a shareholder in the company when the letter was posted (*n*). There might be a question as to whether the post was the natural means of communicating an acceptance. In *Henthorn v. Fraser* Lord Herschell says (*o*), "Where the circumstances are such that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind, the post might be used as a means of communicating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is com-

(*g*) As to effect of a covering letter introducing a new term, see *Maconchy v. Trower*, [1894] 2 Ir. R. 663.

(*h*) See *Rossiter v. Miller* (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1124, and the remarks of Kay, J., in *Bristol Aerated Bread Co. v. Maggs* (1890), 44 Ch. D., at pp. 625, 626; and of North, J., in *Bellamy v. Debenham* (1890), 45 Ch. D., at pp. 492—495.

(*i*) See the remarks of Lord Cairns, L.C., in *Hussey v. Horne-Payne* (1879), 4 App. Cas., at pp. 321, 322; and *Lloyd v. Nowell*, [1895] 2 Ch. 744. See also *Chillingworth v. Esche*, [1924] 1 Ch. 97.

(*k*) *Dunlop v. Higgins* (1848), 1 H. L. Cas. 381, 398; *Household Fire Insurance Co. v. Grant* (1879), 4 Ex. D. 216. The dissenting judgment of Bramwell, L.J., in this last case should be carefully studied.

(*l*) *Byrne v. Van Tienhoven* (1880), 5 C. P. D. 344; approved in *Henthorn v. Fraser*, [1892] 2 Ch. 27.

(*m*) *Per Lush, J.*, in *Stevenson v. Maclean* (1880), 5 Q. B. D., at p. 352; approved in *Henthorn v. Fraser*, *supra*.

(*n*) *Household Fire Insurance Co. v. Grant* (1879), 4 Ex. D. 216.

(*o*) [1892] 2 Ch., at p. 33; and see the remarks of Bowen, L.J., in *Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 269.

plete as soon as it is posted." "Posting an acceptance of an offer may be sufficient where it can be fairly inferred from the circumstances of the case that the acceptance might be sent by post" (p). There is, however, no valid acceptance in such a case unless the letter is actually posted. It is not enough merely to give the letter to anyone, even a postman, to post (q).

A contract is not complete and binding unless there is mutuality between the parties. There are, however, a few cases in which a contract is valid although it can be enforced against one only of the contracting parties.

For example, the contract of an infant is in most cases voidable at his election, though binding upon any adult who contracts with him. So a man who executes a guarantee assumes liability, without having any power to compel the party to whom such security is given to supply the goods, or to extend the credit in pursuance of the terms of the guarantee. Thus, where A says to B, "If you will employ C as your agent for a week, I will be responsible for all such sums as he shall receive during that time and neglect to pay over to you," B is not bound to employ C at all; but if he does employ him, then the guarantee attaches and becomes binding upon A.

And whenever a contract is unilateral or one-sided only, the party who makes the promise is bound by it, while the party to whom the promise is made is under no obligation whatever. Thus, where A has for valuable consideration bound himself to sell goods to B on certain terms if B chooses to avail himself of the offer, A will be bound, but not B. It "is merely an offer which cannot be withdrawn, and does not connote an agreement to buy" (r). Where the plaintiff undertook for a period of twelve months to provide wagons, horses, &c., for the cartage of merchandise between Hatfield and Ware, and to convey all such as might be presented to him for conveyance between those places at a certain specified rate, and the defendants terminated the agreement before the expiration of twelve months, it was held that no action could be maintained, the contract containing no provision binding them to send any goods to the plaintiff for conveyance (s). A person, who tenders to supply goods in answer to an advertisement and whose tender is accepted, is bound to supply the goods as and when ordered, even though the other party is not bound to order any (t).

(p) *Per Kay, L.J.*, [1892] 2 Ch., at p. 36. As to remitting money by post, see *Mitchell-Henry v. Norwich Union Life Insurance Society*, [1918] 2 K. B. 67.

(q) See *London and Northern Bank, In re*, [1900] 1 Ch. 220.

(r) *Per Lord Herschell, L.C.*, in *Helby v. Matthews*, [1895] A. C., at p. 477. A hire-purchase agreement is not unilateral: *Wylde v. Legge* (1901), 84 L. T. 121.

(s) *Burton v. G. N. Ry. Co.* (1854), 9 Exch. 507.

(t) *G. N. Ry. Co. v. Witham* (1873), L. R. 9 C. P. 16.

Nearly every simple contract consists of an offer proceeding from one party and an acceptance by the other. The acceptance must be identical with the terms of the offer. An acceptance cannot impose on the offeror a variation of his offer. If A makes an offer which B accepts with a variation, his is not an acceptance of A's offer, but a counter-offer made by B to A (*u*). Acceptance of a conditional offer is no acceptance, though no objection be raised to the condition (*x*).

Where a time is named during which the offer shall remain open, the offeror is free to revoke it, unless there has been an acceptance within that time (*y*), but it would seem that the parties may validly agree for good consideration that it shall not be revoked within that time; if the offer has not been so revoked, the offeree may of course accept it within the time specified. Where no period is mentioned, acceptance must be made within a reasonable time (*z*).

An agreement by which one person secures the right to purchase something (for example, stocks or land) at a future time at a fixed price is called an option, and may be enforced if made for valuable consideration (*a*).

Acceptance of an offer must as a rule be notified to the offeror, either by words, writing or conduct. The offeror may, however, by express agreement dispense with any notice of acceptance, or he may intimate a particular mode of acceptance. Thus the performance by one party of his part of the contract may be made a sufficient notification that he has accepted the offer. For example, a company which owns automatic machines may intimate to the public that the placing of a penny in the slot is a sufficient acceptance of the company's offer without notification. "If," said Bowen, L.J. (*b*), "the person making the offer

(*u*) See *Felthouse v. Bindley* (1862), 11 C. B. (N.S.) 869.

(*x*) *Rossdale v. Denny*, [1921] 1 Ch. 57; *Coope v. Ridout*, *ibid.*, 291.

(*y*) *Dickinson v. Dodds* (1876), 2 Ch. D. 463.

(*z*) *Ramsgate Hotel Co. v. Montefiore* (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 109.

(*a*) See *Buitenlandsche Bankvereeniging v. Hildesheim* (1903), 19 T. L. R. 641.

(*b*) *Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B., at pp. 269, 270; and see *Powell v. Lee* (1908), 99 L. T. 284.

expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient to act on the proposal without communicating acceptance of it to himself, performance of the condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification. . . . This seems to me to be the principle which lies at the bottom of the acceptance cases, of which two instances are the well-known judgment of Mellish, L.J., in *Harris' Case* (c), and the very instructive judgment of Lord Blackburn in *Brogden v. Metropolitan Railway Co.*" (d). One may look at the offer itself to find out whether the offeror does intimate that the performance of a condition will be a sufficient acceptance of his offer without communication.

An offer need not be made to a definite person, but it must be accepted by a definite person. Advertisements offering a reward for the supply of information (as in *Williams v. Carwardine* (e), or offering to pay a sum of money to any person who after use of a carbolic smoke ball should catch influenza (f), are made to persons unspecified. But if any one knows of the offer and complies with its conditions, the offer is turned into a contract.

A question of some difficulty arises where a person who is not aware that any offer has been made yet complies with its conditions. Can he claim the promised remuneration, although he had no intention of earning it, or is knowledge of the offer essential to acceptance? There is only one English decision on the point (g). There an offer had been made for certain information which the plaintiff supplied, and he was allowed to recover the reward although he did not know that any reward had been offered when he gave the information. But the correctness of this decision has been much questioned. It was held in an American case (h) that such knowledge was essential; and in *Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.* Hawkins, J., referring to *Williams v. Carwardine* (e), said: "I presume that the offer had been brought to the knowledge of the plaintiff before the information was given. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand how it could be said that she was party to a contract, or gave the information in fulfilment of the condition" (i).

(c) (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 587.

(d) (1877), 2 App. Cas., at p. 690.

(e) (1833), 4 B. & A. 621.

(f) *Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.*, *supra*.

(g) *Gibbons v. Proctor* (1891), 64 L. T. 594.

(h) *Fitch v. Snedaker* (1868), 38 N. Y. 248.

(i) See the note which he appended to his judgment, [1892] 2 Q. B., at p. 489.

In general, where an offer is uncommunicated, it does not admit of acceptance. The offeror has no legal rights against the person to whom the offer purports to be made; the latter has had no opportunity to reject the offer.

An advertisement which merely in general terms invites persons to do business with the advertiser does not, as a rule, amount to an offer capable of being turned into a definite contract. It may be merely an invitation to make offers.

If A is an auctioneer and has advertised the sale of certain goods, he cannot be sued in contract by an intending purchaser who attends the sale and finds that A has withdrawn the goods which he wished to buy (*k*); A's announcement was not intended to define the terms of a binding offer. And if A advertises an offer to sell goods by tender, his offer cannot be turned into a binding contract to sell the goods to the highest bidder (*l*). Similarly, the announcement of a scholarship examination does not bind the advertiser to award the scholarship to the competitor who gains the highest marks (*m*).

Where offers are communicated upon printed forms, there may be doubt whether the acceptor was aware of all the conditions contained upon the form. For example, a telegraph form, or a cloak-room receipt, or a railway or steamship company's ticket may contain, in an unobtrusive position, special conditions which restrict the liability arising from the offer.

In general, where there is no fraud, the acceptance of a written or printed offer binds the acceptor to all the written or printed terms thereof in spite of his ignorance of them (*n*).

Thus, where a railway passenger deposited luggage in a cloak-room and received a ticket containing the words "subject to the conditions on the other side" (one of which was that the company would not be liable beyond the sum of £5 for loss or injury to the package), it was held that the depositor, who knew there were conditions on the back but did not read them, was bound by them (*o*).

(*k*) *Harris v. Nickerson* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 286.

(*l*) *Spencer v. Harding* (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 561.

(*m*) *Rooke v. Dawson*, [1895] 1 Ch. 480.

(*n*) See the remarks of Mellish, L.J., in *Parker v. S. E. Ry. Co.* (1877), 2 C. P. D., at p. 421.

(*o*) *Harris v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 515.

But if the printed form purports to be nothing more than a voucher or an unconditional receipt, a person who reasonably assumes that it contains nothing more will not be bound by any conditions which it may in fact contain, unless he either knows at the time of making the contract that it contained conditions, or unless the party issuing the document took reasonable steps to give him notice of the fact that it was only upon such conditions that business could be undertaken (*p*). In deciding whether the acceptor has notice of the terms and conditions, regard may be had to the class of person for whom the notice is intended (*q*).

Simple contracts differ from contracts under seal in this respect, that their validity depends not on their form, but on the presence of a consideration.

CONSIDERATION is something which the promisee does or forbears to do in return for the promise. A consideration "may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit, accruing to the one party, or some forbearance detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other" (*r*). "A prejudice to the promisee incurred at the request of the promisor may be a consideration as well as a benefit to the promisor proceeding from the promisee: but this must be a prejudice on entering into the contract, not a prejudice from the breach of it" (*s*). Unless consideration be present, there can be no valid simple contract.

"Consideration means something which is of some value in the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff. It may be some benefit to the defendant, or some detriment to the plaintiff, but, at all events, it must be moving from the plaintiff" (*t*). There must be no want of privity. "No stranger to the consideration can take advantage of a contract, though made for his benefit" (*u*).

(*p*) *Henderson v. Stevenson* (1875), L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 470; *Watkins v. Rymill* (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 178.

(*q*) See *Richardson v. Rowntree*, [1894] A. C. 217.

(*r*) *Per cur.* in *Currie v. Misa* (1875), L. R. 10 Ex., at p. 162.

(*s*) *Per cur.* in *Gerhard v. Bates* (1853), 2 E. & B., at pp. 487, 488.

(*t*) *Per Patteson, J.*, in *Thomas v. Thomas* (1842), 2 Q. B., at p. 859; *Dunlop v. Selfridge*, [1915] A. C. 847.

(*u*) *Per Wightman, J.*, in *Tweddle v. Atkinson* (1861), 1 B. & S., at p. 398. See, however, *Fleming v. Bank of New Zealand*, [1900] A. C. 577.

If B promises C to do something for C's son, C's son is a stranger to the consideration, in spite of the close relationship and natural affection between son and father (x). And "if I give a sum of money to my servant to pay a tradesman, the latter cannot maintain an action for money had and received against the servant" (y). So, where the articles of association of a company appointed A as permanent solicitor to the company, it was held that A could not sue the company for breach of contract in not employing him. "It is a matter between the directors and shareholders and not between them and the plaintiff" (z). If A wrongfully professing to be agent for B contracts with C, B cannot by ratification relieve A of his liability to C (a).

Consideration must be "of some value in the eye of the law." It need not be of great or obvious value. The Court will not inquire into its adequacy, but the flagrant inadequacy of a consideration may be some evidence of fraud.

If A hands over any property of his to B, his merely parting with possession is a sufficient consideration for any promise by B to do anything in relation to that property, even where the property handed over is a document of no value whatever (b). Again, if D deposits his goods with E as a bailee, D's parting with the possession of them is a sufficient consideration for E's promise to do work upon them or to take reasonable care of them. In cases of gratuitous bailment, the common law introduces into the contractual relationship of the parties the duty to use due care; D may, therefore, have a right of action for negligence against E (c). If F undertakes to do some work for G without reward, G cannot sue him if he refuses to do it; for the contract between F and G is void for want of consideration. Nevertheless, if F begins to do the work, G can then sue him if he does not use reasonable care in doing it (d).

Considerations are of infinite variety. "Wherever a man may do an act without a breach of any legal or moral obligation, that act may be a valid consideration for a promise to pay money to him" (e). The compromise of a claim may be a good consideration for a promise, though litigation may not have begun (f); but to

(x) *Tweddle v. Atkinson*, *supra*.

(y) *Per Parke, J.*, in *Baron v. Husband* (1833), 4 B. & Ad., at p. 612.

(z) *Eley v. Positive Life Assurance Co.* (1876), 1 Ex. D. 88; *per Lord Cairns, L.C.*, *ibid.*, at p. 90.

(a) *Kelner v. Baxter* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P. 174.

(b) *Bainbridge v. Firmstone* (1838), 8 A. & E. 743; *Brooks v. Haigh* (1840), 10 A. & E. 323.

(c) See *Turner v. Stallibrass*, [1898] 1 Q. B., at p. 60. As to bailments, see *Coggs v. Bernard* (1703), 1 Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), 191; and Vol. 1, pp. 646—652.

(d) *Else v. Gatward* (1793), 5 T. R. 143.

(e) *Per Lord Campbell, C.J.*, in *Hall v. Dyson* (1852), 21 L. J. Q. B., at p. 226; 17 Q. B. 785.

(f) *Cook v. Wright* (1861), 1 B. & S. 559.

make it so, the party forbearing must believe that he has a good case (g); it is immaterial that there was in reality no cause of action (h).

In *Lyth v. Ault and Wood* (i), the acceptance by a creditor of the sole liability of one of two joint debtors was held to be good consideration for an agreement to discharge the other debtor from liability. The contract here disclosed might at first seem a mere *nudum pactum*, for the creditor gets nothing in return for his relinquishment of his claim against such last-mentioned party. But the substituted liability was in its nature different from the original liability; therefore, since the Court will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration for a promise, the agreement in question would be unimpeachable from a strictly legal point of view. "The sole security of A may be a better thing than the joint security of A and B; for by accepting the sole security of A, instead of the joint security of both debtors, the creditor possesses a legal remedy against A during his lifetime, and against his assets after his death, and no security whatever against B. . . . Now these two securities are different things, and therefore a bargain to take the one for the other is good" (k). On the other hand, where the consideration for a promise by the defendant was stated to be a conveyance by the plaintiff of his interest in certain property, and it turned out that the plaintiff had no interest in that property, it was held that there was no consideration (l).

But although a Court of law will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration for a promise, it will inquire so far as to satisfy itself that the consideration is of some value. Natural love and affection, gratitude or any other similar motive is not enough.

Where A's executor agreed to allow A's widow to occupy a house in accordance with her late husband's express wish and subsequently refused to carry out his agreement, the widow failed in an action against the executor for breach of contract, as the desire of the executor to obey A's wish was no consideration. "Motive is not the same thing as consideration" (m).

A moral consideration, or the existence of a moral duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, is not in law sufficient consideration for a subsequent express promise.

(g) *Wade v. Simeon* (1846), 2 C. B. 548.

(h) See *Miles v. New Zealand, &c., Co.* (1885), 32 Ch. D. 266.

(i) (1852), 7 Exch. 669.

(k) Per Alderson, B., in *Lyth v. Ault* (1852), 7 Exch., at p. 674.

(l) *Kaye v. Dutton* (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 807.

(m) *Thomas v. Thomas* (1842), 2 Q. B. 851, 859; *Harburg v. Martin*, [1902] 1 K. B., at p. 787.

Thus the mere moral obligation on a father to maintain his child affords no inference of a promise to pay any debts which the son may contract; so that "if a father turns his son upon the world, the son's only recourse, in the absence of anything to show a contract on the father's part, is to apply to the parish, and then the proper steps will be taken to enforce the performance of the parent's legal duty" (*n*). If, indeed, a father does anything, from which it may be inferred that he has authorised his son to contract a debt, he may be liable in respect of the debt so contracted (*o*). But the law does not authorise a son to bind his father by his contracts (*p*). Nor is there any legal obligation on the personal representative of the mother of a bastard child to expend the assets of the deceased in the maintenance of the child (*q*).

If a man merely does what the law requires of him, or if he does what he is already bound to do under an existing contract, that is no consideration.

Two sailors deserted on a voyage, and the captain promised the remaining members of the crew that, if they would work the ship home, they should have the two men's wages divided amongst them; but before they sailed from London they had undertaken to do all they could under the emergencies of the voyage. The desertion was such an emergency, and there was therefore no consideration (*r*). The case would be otherwise if, after the desertion, the remaining sailors had undertaken additional and un contemplated risks. It has been held that the giving of information leading to the conviction of a felon is not a service which a constable is bound to render (*s*) and a promise of reward was enforced.

If a man is obliged to attend the Court as a witness under a *subpœna* (and is, therefore, entitled to be paid his conduct money and proper expenses), his attendance is no consideration for a promise to pay him an additional sum (*t*).

There is authority for holding that a promise made by A to B that he (A) will perform a promise previously made by him to C is a good consideration for a promise made by B to A, but this is doubtful (*u*).

(*n*) *Per* Jervis, C.J., in *Shelton v. Springett* (1851), 11 C. B., at p. 455.

(*o*) *Per* Lord Abinger, C.B., in *Mortimore v. Wright* (1840), 6 M. & W., at p. 487.

(*p*) See *Shelton v. Springett* (1851), 11 C. B., at p. 456.

(*q*) *Ruttinger v. Temple* (1863), 4 B. & S. 491.

(*r*) *Stilk v. Myrick* (1809), 2 Camp. 317; see *Harris v. Carter* (1854), 3 E. & B. 559; *Sisson v. West Ham Corporation* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 284.

(*s*) *England v. Davidson* (1840), 11 Ad. & E. 856; *Hartley v. Ponsonby* (1857), 7 E. & B. 872; see also *Liston v. Owners of S.S. Carpathian*, [1915] 2 K. B. 42.

(*t*) *Collins v. Godefroy* (1831), 1 B. & A. 950; see *Chamberlain v. Stoneham* (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 113; *Glasbrook Bros. v. Glamorgan C. C.*, [1925] A. C. 270.

(*u*) *Shadwell v. Shadwell* (1860), 9 C. B. (N.S.) 159; *Scotson v. Pegg* (1861), 6 H. & N. 295.

If A promises to do something for B in consideration of B's having already done something for A, such "past consideration" is no consideration for A's promise.

Thus an antecedent debt is not in itself consideration for a security subsequently given by the debtor (x). Again, in *Roscorla v. Thomas* (y) the plaintiff pleaded that, in consideration that he had at the defendant's request bought of the defendant a horse at a certain price, the defendant promised that the horse was sound and free from vice, &c., whereas the horse was not in fact free from vice. It was held that the past consideration was insufficient to support the subsequent alleged promise. "A consideration past and executed will support no other promise than such as would be implied by law" (z).

So, where an account has been stated between parties, and a balance ascertained to be due, the law implies a promise by the debtor to pay on request, so that any subsequent promise by him differing in its nature therefrom (e.g., to pay on a particular day named) would be *nudum pactum*, unless made upon a new consideration. Otherwise there might be two co-existing promises on one consideration (a).

There are, however, exceptions to the rule that a past consideration will not support a contract. Such a consideration is sufficient to support any negotiable instrument (b). Again, where A has requested B to do an act and he has done it, the request raises the inference of a promise to pay a reasonable sum in return for the performance; and any subsequent promise to pay a specified amount shows what sum is thought reasonable. "That promise may be treated either as an admission which evidences, or as a positive bargain which fixes the amount of, that reasonable remuneration on the faith of which the service was originally rendered" (c).

Where a man, having committed a murder, asked another man to work for his pardon and subsequently, in consideration of the work done, promised to reward him £100, it was held that the promise could be sued upon (d).

(x) *Wigan v. English and Scottish, &c., Association*, [1909] 1 Ch. 291, 303. But a forbearance to sue for it is.

(y) (1842), 3 Q. B. 234.

(z) *Per* Lord Denman, C.J., *ibid.*, at p. 237.

(a) See *Hopkins v. Logan* (1839), 5 M. & W., at p. 249.

(b) See *post*, p. 160.

(c) *Per* Bowen, L.J., in *Stewart v. Casey*, [1892] 1 Ch., at p. 116; and see *Scott v. Pattison*, [1923] 2 K. B., at p. 727.

(d) *Lampleigh v. Brathwait* (1616), 1 Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), 159. It is

Sometimes the law will dispense with the necessity for any antecedent request. For example, if A has been legally compelled to do what B was legally bound to do, then, although B never requested the performance, he must pay for it (e). Again, if A voluntarily does what B is legally bound to do (e.g., pays B's debts), and B thereupon promises to recoup him, such promise will be enforceable in law although it was made after the consideration for it had been performed (f).

Again, there are cases in which a man may be liable for work done or services rendered by another, although he never requested that other to do that work or perform those services and has never promised to pay him therefor. But such cases only occur where the person sought to be charged *voluntarily* adopts and takes advantage of the work or services. Thus, if goods which A has never ordered are left at his house, A may, if he thinks fit, reject the goods; but if, instead of doing so, he takes possession of the goods and uses them, he is bound to pay for them, although he has never promised so to do. This rule does not apply where the benefit of the work done cannot be rejected without A's rejecting his own property. Thus, if I mow A's lawn or repair the roof of his house without any instructions from him, I cannot compel him to pay me for my work, as he has no power to reject the benefit of my services (g). Or, as a great lawyer once put it: "One cleans another's shoes—what can the other do but put them on? Is that evidence of a contract to pay for the cleaning? The benefit of the service could not be rejected without refusing the property itself" (h).

It was laid down as a general rule in 1848 that "where the consideration was originally beneficial to the party

explained in later cases (*Kennedy v. Brown* (1863), 13 C. B. (N.S.) 677 and *Stewart v. Casey*, *supra*), that the promise should be regarded as evidence of earlier contract rather than as itself actionable.

(e) *Eastwood v. McNab*, [1914] 2 K. B. 361.

(f) See *Wing v. Mill* (1817), 1 B. & Ald. 104.

(g) *Forman v. Liddlesdale*, [1900] A. C. 190.

(h) Smith on Contracts (8th ed.), p. 201. It is important to observe that no request will be implied upon the mere fact of benefit without adoption. See Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), Vol. I., p. 166; *Ramsden v. Chessum* (1914), 110 L. T. 274; *Dakin v. Lee*, [1916] 1 K. B. 566; and the remarks of Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in *English and Colonial Produce Co., In re*, [1906] 2 Ch., at p. 443.

promising, yet if he be protected from liability by some provision of the statute or common law meant for his advantage, he may renounce the benefit of that law. And if he promises to pay the debt, which is only what an honest man ought to do, he is then bound by the law to pay it'' (i). A debt barred by the Statute of Limitations is unquestionably a sufficient consideration for every promise to pay it, whether absolute or conditional (k), and any promise to pay such a debt simply or by instalments, or when the party is able, will be supported by the past consideration.

In other cases, however, this rule does not apply. Thus since the passing of the Infants Relief Act, 1874 (l), no promise made by a person of full age to satisfy debts contracted during infancy is binding upon him. And since the Bankruptcy Act, 1849 (m), no promise made by a discharged bankrupt to pay a debt from which he is discharged will be binding upon him, unless it be made for a fresh and valuable consideration (n). It will be observed that in the first case the Statute of Limitations merely bars the remedy : it does not destroy the debt ; whereas a promise by an infant is now in most cases void *ab initio*, and a discharge in bankruptcy puts an end to all debts which were or might have been proved thereunder. ✍

(i) *Per* Parke, B., in *Earle v. Oliver* (1848), 2 Exch., at p. 90.

(k) Such promise, however, must be in writing and signed by the promisor or his agent : 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1 ; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 13. It is more usual, however, for the creditor to sue on the original debt now barred, and to rely upon the subsequent promise as an acknowledgment : see *post*, p. 472, and the judgment of Lush, J., in *Brown v. Mackenzie* (1913), 29 T. L. R. 310.

(l) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, s. 2.

(m) 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106.

(n) See *Jakeman v. Cook* (1878), 4 Ex. D. 26 ; *Barrow, Ex parte ; Andrews, in re* (1881), 18 Ch. D. 464.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTRACTS REQUIRED BY LAW TO BE IN WRITING.

OUR common law requires, as a general rule, that the best evidence shall be given of which the nature of the case admits. Thus, where an agreement between two parties has been wholly reduced into writing, that writing itself offers the best evidence which can be given for determining what the intentions of the parties really were, and what their reciprocal obligations are. "It is contrary to the rules of law to admit extrinsic evidence to show that the intention of a party executing a written instrument is different from that apparent on the face of the instrument itself" (a).

Hence, if there be a written contract between A and B, which is duly signed by them and was meant by them to constitute a complete statement of what they have agreed upon (b), evidence to show what passed between the parties, either before the written instrument was made or during the time that it was in a state of preparation and adjustment, is inadmissible to vary its effect, unless it is asserted that the contract be tainted with fraud or some other illegality. But in the absence of any statutory provision requiring writing or any particular form, the parties may make their contract partly in writing and partly by word of mouth. Even then evidence of the negotiations as such would not be admitted. Evidence is permitted only in order to establish the oral terms. They may also verbally or in writing add to or vary the terms of an existing contract in writing and thus make a new contract, consisting partly of the original written agreement and partly of the

(a) *Per Abbott, C.J., in Woodbridge v. Spooner* (1819), 3 B. & Ald., at p. 235.

(b) An invoice is only evidence of a contract, not a contract *per se*: *Holding v. Elliott* (1860), 5 H. & N. 117. As to a receipt, see *post*, p. 100.

terms verbally engrafted thereon, unless by doing so the contract would no longer be in the form required by statute. Whenever the law requires all the material terms of a contract to be in writing oral evidence is not admissible to prove any subsequent variation of those terms, although it is admissible to prove that the whole contract has been annulled (c).

The acceptor of a bill of exchange cannot set up an oral contract, entered into before acceptance of the bill, inconsistent with the contract appearing upon the face of it (d). Neither can a like contemporaneous agreement, incompatible with the bill, be set up to vary or restrain it. Thus evidence cannot be received of an oral agreement that a bill drawn payable at three months shall not be payable till the expiration of four months from its date. "It would be very dangerous to allow a party to alter in such a manner the absolute contract on the face of a bill of exchange; the effect of the cases is, that you are estopped from saying that you made any other contract than the absolute one on the face of the bill. A contract, which seeks by subsequent oral matter to discharge altogether the contract created by the bill and create a new one, is wholly different" (e).

Again, where a loan society advanced money upon the security of a joint and several promissory note, and at the same time a printed book of the society's rules was given to the defendant, who was one of the makers of the note, it was held that these rules could not be received in evidence to vary the express contract as stated on the face of the note (f).

It must be borne in mind, however, that the rule, which excludes evidence at variance with a written contract, does not apply when it is alleged that the contract was signed as the result of some mistake, misrepresentation or fraud (g). Evidence is also admissible to show that there was no contract at all (h), or that it was never reduced into writing, or that this is not the writing into which it was reduced. Evidence is also admissible to annex to a contract certain

(c) *Goss v. Lord Nugent* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 58; *Giraud v. Richmond* (1846), 2 C. B. 835; *Evans v. Roe* (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 138; *Vezey v. Rashleigh*, [1904] 1 Ch. 634; *Morris v. Baron*, [1918] A. C. 1.

(d) *New London Syndicate v. Neale*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 487.

(e) *Per Lord Abinger, C.B., in Adams v. Wordley* (1836), 1 M. & W., at p. 380.

(f) *Brown v. Langley* (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 466; and see *Maillard v. Page* (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 312, 319.

(g) *Wake v. Harrop* (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 451; *Pattle v. Hornibrook*, [1897] 1 Ch. 25; *De Lassalle v. Guildford*, [1901] 2 K. B. 215.

(h) *Pym v. Campbell* (1856), 6 E. & B. 370.

customary incidents which the parties had in their minds and took as a matter of course and therefore did not trouble to express in writing. But such customary incidents must not be inconsistent with the written terms (*i*). Evidence may be admitted in order to explain phrases, or to identify parties (*k*), or to prove oral agreements collateral to the written contract if they do not contradict it (*l*).

Some contracts are required by statute to be in writing. Where any such statute applies, it is clear that all the material terms of the contract must be set out in the writing (*m*).

The first of these statutes was the Statute of Frauds, passed, as the preamble states, "for prevention of many fraudulent practices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury" (*n*).

This statute requires that certain contracts therein specified shall be in writing, or shall be evidenced by some note or memorandum in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith. It must be borne in mind, however, that the Statute of Frauds "is a weapon of defence, not offence," and does not make any signed instrument a valid contract by reason of the signature, "if it is not such according to the good faith and real intention of the parties" (*o*).

Those portions of the Act which relate to parol conveyances of land, leases and assignments, to nuncupative wills, devises, declarations of trust and other matters which fall outside our subject, are here omitted. We have here to consider only the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds, which enacts that—

"No action shall be brought,
whereby to charge any executor or administrator

(*i*) See Vol. 1, pp. 84-88, and *Wigglesworth v. Dallison* (1779), 1 Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), 613; *Westacott v. Hahn*, [1917] 1 K. B. 605.

(*k*) See *Filby v. Hounsell*, [1896] 2 Ch. 737; *Plant v. Bourne*, [1897] 2 Ch. 281.

(*l*) See *Erskine v. Adeane* (1873), L. R. 8 Ch., at p. 766; *De Lassalle v. Guildford*, [1901] 2 K. B. 215.

(*m*) See *Rossiter v. Miller* (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1124, 1147.

(*n*) 29 Car. 2, c. 3.

(*o*) *Per cur.* in *Jervis v. Berridge* (1873), L. R. 8 Ch., at p. 360; and in *Hussey v. Horne-Payne* (1879), 4 App. Cas., at p. 323. For a case in which it was not allowed to be pleaded, see *North v. Loomes*, [1919] 1 Ch. 378.

upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate; or

whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person; or

to charge any person—upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; or

[upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them (p)]; or

upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof; unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised.” There are thus five distinct classes of contracts, in regard to which the agreement must be in writing and duly signed.

The agreement must be complete at the time the memorandum is made (q), but the memorandum may be made at any time before action brought to enforce the contract (r). The memorandum must sufficiently set out all the material terms of the agreement. What terms will be held material depends upon the circumstances of each particular case (s); but the memorandum must at the very least name or unmistakably identify the parties to and the subject-matter of the contract and the consideration for it (t).

Since the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (u), it is no longer necessary that the consideration for guarantees should be stated therein. In all other cases “it seems necessary for effect-

(p) L. P. A., 1925, s. 40, sub-s. 1, repeals these words in the Statute of Frauds and substitutes “upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land.”

(q) *Munday v. Asprey* (1880), 13 Ch. D. 855. See, however, *Smith v. Neale* (1857), 2 C. B. (N.S.) 67, cited on p. 43.

(r) *Grindell v. Bass*, [1920] 2 Ch. 487.

(s) See *Fitzmaurice v. Bayley* (1860), 9 H. L. Cas. 78.

(t) *Williams v. Jordan* (1877), 6 Ch. D. 517. To this end a letter and its envelope may be taken together as one document: *Pearce v. Gardner*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 688. A party need not be named, if he is otherwise clearly identifiable from the memorandum: see *Jarrett v. Hunter* (1886), 34 Ch. D. 182 (“the owner”); *Carr v. Lynch*, [1900] 1 Ch. 613 (“the person who paid £50”); *Stokes v. Whicher*, [1920] 1 Ch. 411.

(u) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 3.

ating the object of the statute that the consideration should be set down in writing as well as the promise; for otherwise the consideration might be illegal, or the promise might have been made upon a condition precedent, which the party charged may not afterwards be able to prove, the omission of which would materially vary the promise by turning that into an absolute promise which was only a conditional one: and then it would rest altogether on the conscience of the witness to assign another consideration in the one case, or to drop the condition in the other, and thus to introduce the very frauds and perjuries which it was the object of the Act to exclude, by requiring that the agreement should be reduced into writing" (x).

A receipt may be such a writing (y). Several documents, moreover, which on the face of them are connected together by internal references (which may be supplemented by parol identification), may be put in evidence as constituting an agreement or a memorandum or note thereof, which will satisfy the requirements of the statute (z). "The statute is not complied with unless the whole contract is either embodied in some writing signed by the party, or in some paper referred to in a signed document and capable of being identified by means of the description of it contained in the signed paper" (a). Even a repudiation may be a sufficient memorandum (b).

This written agreement or memorandum need be signed only by "the party to be charged therewith." In *Laythoarp v. Bryant* (c), the vendor of leasehold premises who had not signed the memorandum of sale was held entitled to sue the purchaser who had signed it. "It is said," observed Tindal, C.J., "that unless the plaintiff signs there is a want of mutuality. Whose fault is that? The defendant might have required the vendor's signature to the

(x) *Per* Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in *Wain v. Warlters* (1804), 5 East, 10; 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 367.

(y) *Shardlow v. Cotterell* (1881), 20 Ch. D. 90; *Auerbach v. Nelson*, [1919] W. N. 206.

(z) *Boydell v. Drummond* (1809), 11 East, 142; *Franco-British Ship Co. v. Cie. des Chargeurs Français* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 735.

(a) *Ridgway v. Wharton* (1857), 6 H. L. Cas. 238; cited in *Rossiter v. Miller* (1878), 3 App. Cas., at p. 1151. See *Oliver v. Hunting* (1890), 44 Ch. D. 205, where parol evidence was admitted to explain the circumstances under which a letter was written, and the evidence so admitted having connected the letter with a memorandum, the two were read together and held to constitute a sufficient memorandum within the Statute of Frauds.

(b) *Thirkell v. Cambi*, [1919] 2 K. B. 590.

(c) (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 735, 743.

contract; but the object of the statute was to secure the defendant's." Again, a written proposal containing the terms of a projected contract, signed by the defendant and assented to orally by the plaintiff, will satisfy the fourth section of the statute (*d*); so also will an oral acceptance of one of two alternative proposals which the defendant has written and signed (*e*). The insertion in a letter of the defendants' name by their authorised agent has been held to be a signature sufficient to satisfy the statute (*f*). The signature need not be at the foot or end of the memorandum; it may be anywhere, provided it governs every part of the instrument (*g*). A defendant has been held liable even when she signed only as a witness (*h*). It is a sufficient "signature" if the defendant uses paper on which his name is printed, provided the circumstances show that he meant that paper to be the memorandum of his agreement and intended to be bound by it as such (*i*). If these requirements are not complied with, the statute says, not that the contract is void, but that "no action shall be brought" on it. This distinction may be material (*k*).

We proceed now to deal with the five kinds of contracts to which section 4 applies. First, as to "any special promise" by an executor or administrator "to answer damages out of his own estate." As a rule, there is no reason why an executor should make himself personally liable for the debt of his testator; the only obvious consideration would be that the creditor released the estate or promised not to sue the estate for a certain time. "If a person indebted in one right, in consideration of forbearance for a particular time, promise to pay in another right, this convenience will be a sufficient consideration to warrant

(*d*) *Smith v. Neale* (1857), 2 C. B. (N.S.) 67, recognised in *Peek v. North Staffordshire Ry. Co.* (1863), 10 H. L. Cas. 473, 542.

(*e*) *Lever v. Koffler*, [1901] 1 Ch. 543.

(*f*) *Evans v. Hoare*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 593; *Grindell v. Bass*, [1920] 2 Ch. 487.

(*g*) *Caton v. Caton* (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 127.

(*h*) *Welford v. Beezley* (1747), 3 Atk. 503.

(*i*) *Schneider v. Norris* (1812), 2 M. & S. 286; *Cohen v. Roche* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 674.

(*k*) *Leroux v. Brown* (1852), 12 C. B. 801. See *Jones v. Victoria Graving Dock Co.* (1877), 2 Q. B. D., at p. 323; *Adams v. Clutterbuck* (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 403; and *post*, p. 59.

an action against him or her in the latter right'' (l). A proposal made and accepted in writing, which was not intended to operate as an unqualified promise, but to form a part only of a suggested arrangement which was not wholly acquiesced in by the other party, will not satisfy the statute (m).

Secondly, as to "any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person." The most usual form of such a promise is a guarantee—a promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some duty, in the event of the failure of another person who is primarily liable for such payment or performance (n). Hence in every guarantee three persons must be concerned: the creditor, the principal debtor and the surety. If the principal debtor is released by the contract, there is no guarantee.

The section does not require the contract itself to be in writing, but merely "some memorandum or note thereof" (o). Such memorandum or note must state all the material terms of the guarantee, *e.g.*, the names of the three persons concerned, the amount of the debt guaranteed and the time during which the guarantee is to continue. Where the guarantee is a "continuing" guarantee, *i.e.*, it relates to transactions or advances that may hereafter be made, a cause of action thereon arises as each item of an account (whether principal or interest) falls due and remains unpaid. The Statute of Limitations (p) begins to run in the guarantor's favour as to each item from that moment (q).

The special promise must, of course, be founded on a good consideration. But it is provided by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, that it shall not "be deemed invalid to support an action, suit or other proceeding to charge the person by whom such promise shall have been

(l) *Per Skynner*, L.C.B., in *Rann v. Hughes* (1778), 7 T. R. 350, n.

(m) *Hamilton v. Terry* (1852), 11 C. B. 954.

(n) See *Mallet v. Bateman* (1865), L. R. 1 C. P. 163. Compare *Wallace v. Gibson*, [1895] A. C. 354.

(o) *Hoyle, In re; Hoyle v. Hoyle*, [1893] 1 Ch. 84.

(p) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3.

(q) *Parr's Bank v. Yates*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 460.

made, by reason only that the consideration for such promise does not appear in writing or, by necessary inference, from a written document" (r). This statute thus enables a plaintiff to give evidence of the consideration for a guarantee, though the memorandum may not show that there was any.

The object of the party seeking to avail himself of the guarantee is to charge the defendant upon his promise "to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another." It has, therefore, no application where direct liability attaches to the guarantor, or where there has been an absolute transfer of liability to him from the original debtor. Where the individual whose debt is guaranteed ceases altogether, upon the so-called guarantee being given, to be liable, the transaction is not one which requires to be evidenced by writing within the Statute of Frauds. In *Birkmyr v. Darnell* (s), the distinction between a direct and a collateral liability is thus illustrated: "If two come to a shop and one buys and the other, to gain him credit, promises the seller, 'If he does not pay you I will,' this is a collateral undertaking and void without writing by the Statute of Frauds. But if he says, 'Let him have the goods, I will see you paid,' this is an undertaking as for himself, and he shall be intended to be the very buyer and the other to act but as his servant."

The circumstances must be looked at in order to determine whether a particular transaction does or does not amount to a guarantee within the Statute of Frauds. It will be a question of fact; the jury must determine to whom the credit was given. If it appears that the credit was given to the defendant—that is, if the goods, &c., were really sold to him—the statute does not apply. But if it appears that the person for whose use the goods were furnished is liable, and a sufficient promise in writing by the defendant to pay the debt is produced, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover, as the promise was collateral.

"If a man says to another, 'If you will at my request put your name to a bill of exchange, I will save you harmless,' that is not within the statute. It is not a responsibility

(r) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 3. And see *Birkmyr v. Darnell* (1704), 1 Salk. 27; 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 335.

(s) (1704), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 335; and see *Mountstephen v. Lakeman* (1871), L. R. 7 Q. B. 196, 202; (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 17.

for the debt of another. It amounts to a contract by one that if the other will put himself in a certain situation, the first will indemnify him against the consequences'' (t). A contract of indemnity may be sued on though verbal: not so a guarantee (u).

In the following cases it has been held or intimated by the Court that the statute would not apply:—

1. If A agree to accept C, a debtor of B, as his debtor in lieu of B, such an arrangement clearly involves a transfer of liability from B to C, and is very different from a guarantee by C as surety of B's debt to A (x).

2. The statute applies only to promises made to the person to whom another is already or is to become answerable. It must be a promise to be answerable for a debt of or a default in some duty by that other person towards the promisee (y).

3. If A undertake to B that C shall do a particular thing, no privity existing between B and C, the liability assumed by A will be direct, and not collateral (z).

4. Where A, a *del credere* agent (that is to say, a man who for a special commission makes himself answerable for the debt or default of a customer (a)), undertakes to be responsible to B for due payment of the purchase-money of goods to be sold through the agency of A, this undertaking does not fall within the statute, and need not be in writing: for, though the engagement thus entered into by A may terminate in a liability to pay the debt of another, that is not the immediate object for which the consideration is given (b). Such an agent does not guarantee the solvency of the third party, but only undertakes to indemnify his principal against his own inadvertence or misfortune, should he make contracts for him with persons unable or unwilling to perform them.

The clause applies, however, to promises to answer for the tortious default or miscarriage of another as well as for his breach of contract. Thus, where A had, without leave, ridden the plaintiff's horse and caused his death, a promise by the defendant to pay the plaintiff the damage which he had sustained, in consideration of the plaintiff forbearing to sue A, was held to be void because not in writing (c).

(t) *Per* Pollock, C.B., in *Batson v. King* (1859), 4 H. & N., at p. 740.

(u) See *Harburg India Rubber Co. v. Martin*, [1902] 1 K. B. 778; *Denton's Estate, In re*, [1904] 2 Ch. 178.

(x) *Gull v. Lindsay* (1849), 4 Exch. 45, at p. 52.

(y) *Guild v. Conrad*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 885; and see *Hoyle, In re*, [1893] 1 Ch. 84.

(z) *Hargreaves v. Parsons* (1844), 13 M. & W. 561.

(a) See *post*, p. 206.

(b) *Couturier v. Hastie* (1852), 8 Exch. 40 (reversed on other grounds: 5 H. L. Cas. 673). See *Sutton v. Grey*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 285; *Harburg India Rubber Co. v. Martin*, *supra*.

(c) *Kirkham v. Marter* (1819), 2 B. & Ald. 613.

By section 6 of the Statute of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828 (*d*) (commonly called Lord Tenterden's Act), it is provided that "no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon or by reason of any representation or assurance made or given concerning or relating to the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of any other person, to the intent or purpose that such other person may obtain credit, money or goods, unless such representation or assurance be made in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith." This section has now been held by the House of Lords to apply only to fraudulent representations (*e*). It will be observed that the writing must be "signed by the party to be charged therewith" himself; a signature by an agent will be insufficient (*f*).

Thirdly, as to "any agreement made upon consideration of marriage," we need only note that these words do not apply to a promise to marry; they are confined to promises to do something in consideration of marriage other than the performance of the contract of marriage itself (*g*). Thus it was held that a promise by the intended husband to the intended wife before marriage to settle her personal property on her could not be enforced unless it was evidenced by writing (*h*). The memorandum may be made after the marriage takes place (*i*).

Fourthly, as to "any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest therein" (*k*). Under certain circumstances, where there has been part performance of such a contract, equity will disregard the statutory requirements and let in parol evidence of the contract. Though the existence of such a principle has never been

(*d*) 9 Geo. 4, c. 14.

(*e*) *Banbury v. Bank of Montreal*, [1918] A. C. 626.

(*f*) *Swift v. Jewsbury* (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 301; *Hirst v. West Riding Union Banking Co.*, [1901] 2 K. B. 560.

(*g*) *Hammersley v. de Biel* (1845), 12 Cl. & F. 45; *Ungley v. Ungley* (1877), 5 Ch. D. 887 (see p. 48); *Johnstone v. Mappin* (1891), 60 L. J. Ch. 241; *Fickus, In re*; *Farina v. Fickus*, [1900] 1 Ch. 331.

(*h*) *Montacute v. Maxwell* (1720), 1 P. Wms. 618; 1 Str. 236.

(*i*) *Gregg v. Holland*, [1902] 2 Ch. 360. It need not name the payee in full: *Lindrea, In re* (1913), 109 L. T. 623.

(*k*) L. P. A., 1925, s. 40, sub-s. 1. See p. 41, n. (*p*).

in dispute, the decisions have been very conflicting as to what will amount to part performance sufficient to take the case out of the statute (l). The general rule is that the acts relied on "must be such as could be done with no other view or design than to perform the agreement" (m). "They must be such as are unequivocally referable to the agreement" (n). Payment of part, or even of the whole, of the purchase-money is not a sufficient part performance of the contract to exclude the operation of the statute (o); on the other hand, the admission of the plaintiff into possession of land, to which he had previously no title, is as a rule sufficient; for the only possible explanation for doing this is that it is the result of a contract (p). Notice of ejectment on behalf of the purchaser to tenants who gave up possession has been held to be a sufficient part performance (q). The continuance of a tenant in possession is not necessarily a sufficient part performance of a parol agreement for the purchase of the land from the landlord, for it is equally consistent with the continuance of his tenancy (r). So payment of rent in advance where the tenant has not taken possession of the premises is not a sufficient part performance (s). Payment of an increased rent (t), or the making of alterations and improvements on the part of the vendors at the purchaser's request (u), would be sufficient to exclude the statute.

Thus, where a father verbally promised to give his daughter a house as a wedding present, and immediately after her marriage put her and her husband into possession, it was held that, as the promise was clear, the possession took the case out of the statute (x).

(l) See the judgment of Lord Selborne in *Alderson v. Maddison* (1883), 8 App. Cas., at pp. 474—476; and *McManus v. Cooke* (1887), 35 Ch. D. 681.

(m) *Per* Lord Hardwicke, L.C., in *Gunter v. Halsey* (1739), Ambler, at p. 586.

(n) *Per* Baggallay, L.J., in *Alderson v. Maddison* (1881), 7 Q. B. D., at p. 178.

(o) See the remarks of Brett, L.J., in *Humphreys v. Green* (1882), 10 Q. B. D., at p. 160.

(p) See *Hodson v. Heuland*, [1896] 2 Ch. 428, followed in *Biss v. Hygate*, [1918] 2 K. B. 314.

(q) *Daniels v. Trefusis*, [1914] 1 Ch. 788.

(r) *Fabian v. Nunn* (1865), L. R. 1 Ch. 35.

(s) *Thursby v. Eccles* (1900), 70 L. J. K. B. 91; *Chaproniere v. Lambert*, [1917] 2 Ch. 356.

(t) *Fabian v. Nunn*, *supra*; *Müller & Aldworth v. Sharp*, [1899] 1 Ch. 622.

(u) *Dickinson v. Barrow*, [1904] 2 Ch. 339.

(x) *Ungley v. Ungley* (1877), 5 Ch. D. 887.

Again, where the defendant orally agreed with the plaintiff for the occupation of a piece of waste ground for three successive bank holidays at a fixed price, and entered on the ground on the first day and paid the agreed rent, it was held (*y*), when the defendant refused to occupy the land for the two other days, that the statute afforded him no defence to an action for the balance of the rent.

The words "lands, tenements or hereditaments" in the statute (*z*) were, no doubt, intended by the Legislature to mean the fee simple, and the words "any interest in or concerning them" to denote a chattel interest or some interest less than the fee simple. A great variety of interests in land have been held to fall within the statute. Thus the statute applies to an agreement to convey an equity of redemption (*a*); a contract under which the plaintiff, in consideration of a sum of money, agrees to surrender his tenancy and to procure the defendant to be accepted in his place (*b*); a contract to assign partnership assets including land (*c*), or to sell the building materials of a house standing on land (*d*); a contract for the acquisition of a lease of realty (*e*); a contract to advance money on the security of land (*f*); a contract to occupy furnished lodgings (*g*); provided that the executory contract if executed would have conferred such an interest or property in land as to give a right to maintain a possessory action (*h*). And a contract whereby the plaintiff agrees to let a house to the defendant, to sell him certain furniture and fixtures therewith, and to make certain alterations and improvements therein, the defendant on his part agreeing to take the house and to pay for the furniture, fixtures and alterations, is within the statute (*i*). So, where A, the tenant of certain premises for the residue of a term of years, agreed to sublet them to B for the residue of the term in consideration of B's paying a sum towards the dilapidations, this was held to be within the Act (*k*). So, too, a grant of a right to shoot over land and take away a part of the game killed is a grant of an interest in land within the statute (*l*). Where, indeed, anything is done which substantially amounts to a parting with an interest in land, or which relates to the sale of such an interest, the agreement is within the statute (*m*). A contract for investigating the title to

(*y*) *Smallwood v. Sheppards*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 627.

(*z*) The wording of the repealing statute (see p. 41, note (*p*)) is clearer, but does not appear to alter the law.

(*a*) *Massey v. Johnson* (1847), 1 Exch. 241.

(*b*) *Cocking v. Ward* (1845), 1 C. B. 858.

(*c*) *Gray v. Smith* (1889), 43 Ch. D. 208.

(*d*) *Lavery v. Pursell* (1888), 39 Ch. D. 508.

(*e*) *Horsey v. Graham* (1869), L. R. 5 C. P. 9.

(*f*) *Mounsey v. Rankin* (1885), 1 C. & E. 496.

(*g*) *Inman v. Stamp* (1815), 1 Stark. N. P. C. 12.

(*h*) See the remarks of Blackburn, J., in *Wright v. Stavert* (1860), 2 E. & E. at p. 729.

(*i*) *Vaughan v. Hancock* (1846), 3 C. B. 766.

(*k*) *Buttemere v. Hayes* (1839), 5 M. & W. 456.

(*l*) *Webber v. Lee* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 315.

(*m*) *Kelly v. Webster* (1852), 12 C. B. 283, 290.

land (*n*) has been held not to be within the statute; also a contract for the sale of shares in a railway company (*o*), or a waterworks company (*p*), or in a cost-book mining company (*q*). A contract to sell debentures which are expressed to be a charge on all the property of a company, which property, at the time the contract is made and at the time the debentures were issued, includes certain leaseholds, is a contract within the section (*r*). But the section does not apply unless the sale of land or of some interest in or concerning land is, by the terms of the contract, dealt with as part of the contract (*s*).

Things annexed to land according to our law become part of the soil and are subjected to the same incidents as the soil itself. Two classes call for mention. Firstly, growing produce of land, such as crops, fruit and the like; and secondly, fixtures.

Lord Coke carefully distinguished between land and the growing produce of the land. Upon the death of a tenant for life, although the land belonged to the reversioner, the growing crops went to the executor of the tenant for life as part of his personal estate. So "if a man be seised of land in right of his wife and soweth the ground and dieth, his executors shall have the corne"; but if his wife died before him, he should have it; for, although upon the death of the husband or wife the interest of the former in the land ceased, yet the growing corn was considered as part of his personal estate and belonged to him or his executors (*t*).

Thus, it has been held that a sale of growing produce of the earth reared by labour and expense, such as a crop of potatoes, in existence at the time of the contract whether in a state of maturity or not, is not a sale of an interest in or concerning land, but a contract for the sale of goods (*u*). But growing grass does not come into such a category, and therefore goes to the heir and not to the executor, and cannot be taken in execution under a writ of *fieri*

(*n*) *Jeakes v. White* (1851), 6 Exch. 873.

(*o*) *Bradley v. Holdsworth* (1838), 3 M. & W. 422.

(*p*) *Bligh v. Brent* (1836), 2 Y. & C. 268.

(*q*) *Watson v. Spratley* (1854), 10 Exch. 222; see the remarks of Maule, J., in *Toppin v. Lomas* (1855), 16 C. B. at p. 161.

(*r*) *Driver v. Broad*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 744.

(*s*) See *Boston v. Boston*, [1904] 1 K. B. at p. 127.

(*t*) Co. Litt. 55 b.

(*u*) See the remarks of Littledale, J., in *Evans v. Roberts* (1826), 5 B. & C. at pp. 840, 841.

facias (x). The same rule applies to growing fruit (y) and to growing trees (z), unless, indeed, it clearly appear from the terms or nature of the particular contract that the parties to it were dealing exclusively with the produce of the trees, when they should be cut down and severed from the freehold (a).

The rules as to tenants' fixtures attached to, but not parcel of, the freehold bear a very strong resemblance to those as to growing crops which are not the spontaneous produce of the earth, but are raised by the labour and expense of the occupier of the land. It has been held that such fixtures prior to severance are not chattels so as to come within section 17 of the Statute of Frauds (now section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893), and on the other hand, that the sale thereof is not a sale of an interest in land within the now repealed clause in section 4 of the statute, but is only a sale of the right to sever. But even whilst thus attached they may be treated for some purposes as chattels (b); for instance, in some cases they may be seized and sold in execution under a writ of *feri facias* (c), and will go to the executor. On the other hand, an action will not lie for tenants' fixtures before severance, nor can they be treated as goods sold and delivered in an action for their price (d). It is clear that a contract concerning an interest in land and fixtures must be in writing; but, when things annexed to the freehold are sold in contemplation of an immediate severance and the contract does not transfer any interest whatever in the soil or freehold (e.g., between an outgoing tenant at the expiration of his term and the incoming tenant under a new demise), or wherever the subject of the contract is in the view of the parties a mere chattel (as where fixtures have been appraised and valued under an oral agreement for their sale), it may reasonably be contended that the Statute of Frauds does not apply (e).

If, however, an entire agreement be made for the sale of real and personal estate, and the agreement as to the land be within the statute and void, it cannot be supported as to the personal property which was sold with it.

Fifthly, as to "any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making

(x) *Crosby v. Wadsworth* (1805), 6 East, 602; and see *Parker v. Staniland* (1809), 11 East, 362.

(y) *Rodwell v. Phillips* (1842), 9 M. & W. 501.

(z) *Ainslie, In re*; *Swinburn v. Ainslie* (1885), 30 Ch. D. 485; *Harrison, In re*; *Harrison v. Harrison* (1884), 28 Ch. D. 220.

(a) See remarks of Chitty, J., in *Lavery v. Pursell* (1888), 39 Ch. D., at pp. 515—517, explaining *Marshall v. Green* (1875), 1 C. P. D. 35. Goods now include emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale: Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 62.

(b) See the judgment of the Court in *Hallen v. Runder* (1834), 1 Cr. M. & R. at p. 275.

(c) *Poole's Case* (1703), 1 Salk. 368.

(d) *Lee v. Risdon* (1816), 7 Taunt. 188.

(e) *Lee v. Gaskell* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 700.

thereof.” If the agreement in question is to be performed upon a contingency, but is not expressly to be performed after the year, a note in writing is not necessary, as the contingency might happen within the year. But where it appears by the whole tenor of the agreement that it is to be performed after the expiration of the year, the agreement or a note of it must be in writing (f). The “space of one year” dates from the making of the agreement (g). The statute applies to such contracts only as are not to be performed on either side within the year (h).

Hence a contract for the maintenance of a child for “so long as the defendant shall think proper” was held by reason of the contingency not to be within the statute (i). On the other hand, a contract for a year’s service to commence at a future day is within the statute as being an agreement not to be performed within the year (k). So, too, a contract for service for more than a year subject to determination within the year upon the happening of a given event must be in writing (l). Moreover, if it appears from the nature of the contract that the parties contemplated that it would take more than a year to perform it, the mere circumstance that it is defeasible within the year will not take it out of the statute (m). A contract for the sale of goods is within the section (n).

Where the defendant had verbally promised to pay the plaintiff £300 a year by equal quarterly instalments for so long as she should maintain and educate their illegitimate children, the Court of Exchequer held that no writing was necessary, as such a promise could not fairly be described as one “not to be performed within a year from the making thereof.” This was affirmed on appeal,

(f) *Peter v. Compton* (1693), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 353, *Skinner* 353; *Boydell v. Drummond* (1809), 11 East, 142; *Eley v. Positive Assurance Co.* (1876), 1 Ex. D. 20, 88.

(g) *Smith v. Gold Coast Co.*, [1903] 1 K. B. 285, 538, where, however, it was held that a contract for a year’s service commencing on the day following the contract was outside the statute.

(h) *Donellan v. Read* (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 899; *Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co.* (1886), 32 Ch. D. 266, 276, 296; *McGregor v. McGregor* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 424.

(i) *Souch v. Strawbridge* (1846), 2 C. B. 808; discussed in *Scott v. Pattison*, [1923] 2 K. B. 723.

(k) *Bracegirdle v. Heald* (1818), 1 B. & Ald. 722; *Britain v. Rossier* (1879), 11 Q. B. D. 123 (where it was said that the equity of part-performance does not extend, and ought not to be extended, to contracts concerning any other subject-matter than land); and see *Cayme v. Allan, Jones* (1919), 35 T. L. R. 453; *Scott v. Pattison*, *supra*.

(l) *Dobson v. Collis* (1856), 1 H. & N. 81; *Hanan v. Ehrlich*, [1911] 2 K. B. 1056; [1912] A. C. 39.

(m) There being a clear intention not to perform within the year: *Reeve v. Jennings*, [1910] 2 K. B. 522.

(n) *Prested Miners Co. v. Garner*, [1911] 1 K. B. 425.

but on the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to recover as for "money paid at the defendant's request" (o).

If the whole of what the plaintiff has to do as the consideration for the defendant's promise is capable of being performed within a year, and no part of it is intended to be postponed until after the expiration of the year, the agreement is not within the section, although the performance by the defendant of his part of the agreement is or may be extended beyond that period (p). And where by the terms of a contract one party can perform his part of it within a year, a subsequent request by the other party that such performance should be postponed until after a year will not, if acceded to, bring the case within the section (q).

We now proceed to deal with contracts for the sale of goods. They do not fall within section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, unless they are not to be performed within a year. As a general rule such contracts may be made in writing either with or without seal, or by word of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by word of mouth, or may be implied from the conduct of the parties. Contracts for the sale of goods for the price of £10 or upwards, however, are within section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (r). This section enacts that "a contract for the sale of any goods of the value of £10 or upwards shall not be enforceable by action, unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract be made and signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf."

It repeats the repealed section 17 of the Statute of Frauds almost word for word, substituting "value" for "price" (s) and "enforceable by action" for "allowed to be good" and making a few other alterations which do not call for any remark. Subsection 2 runs:—"The provisions of this section apply to every such contract, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making

(o) *Knowlman v. Bluett* (1873), L. R. 9 Ex. 1, 307.

(p) *Smith v. Neale* (1857), 2 C. B. (N.S.) 67.

(q) *Bevan v. Carr* (1885), 1 C. & E. 499.

(r) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71.

(s) Cf. *Harman v. Reeve* (1856), 25 L. J. C. P. 257. The word "value" first appears in Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. 4, s. 14) s. 7.

or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery." This replaces section 7 of Lord Tenterden's Act.

In order, therefore, to show a good cause of action on a contract for the sale of goods of the value of £10 or upwards, the plaintiff must prove either—

- (i) an acceptance and actual receipt of part of the goods, or
- (ii) earnest, or
- (iii) a part payment, or
- (iv) a note or memorandum of the contract duly signed.

(i) "There is an acceptance within the meaning of this section when the buyer does any act in relation to the goods which recognises a pre-existing contract of sale, whether there be an acceptance in performance of the contract or not" (t). Any dealing with the goods which amounts to a recognition of the contract is an "acceptance" for the purposes of this section, though it may not be an acceptance in the sense that the buyer accepts the goods as a fulfilment of the contract. These two meanings must be carefully distinguished.

Thus, if the defendant bought wheat by sample and, after opening some of the sacks, rejected the wheat as not up to sample, his act in so doing would be one which recognised a pre-existing contract of sale (u). Where a purchaser received goods and took and examined samples therefrom, these were held to be "acts" of the kind to which the statute refers (x). So, also, where the purchaser received goods and kept them for a month and, without inspecting them or taking samples from them, tried to resell them, using for the purpose a sample given by the original seller (y).

Besides an acceptance, there must also be an actual receipt of at any rate part of the goods. Now a receipt implies delivery, which may be actual or constructive; the statutory words "actual receipt" signify delivery of the

(t) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 4, sub-s. 3.

(u) See *Page v. Morgan* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 228. (This was before the Sale of Goods Act.)

(x) *Abbott v. Wolsey*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 97. For the two meanings of "acceptance" see remarks on this case at p. 153, *post*. But see *Taylor v. Smith*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 65.

(y) *Taylor v. G. E. Ry. Co.*, [1901] 1 K. B. 774.

possession of the goods on behalf of the vendor to the purchaser, and the receipt of the possession by the purchaser (z). Many different acts may amount to a "constructive receipt." "Where goods are ponderous and incapable of being handed over from one to another, there need not be an actual delivery; but it may be done by that which is tantamount, such as the delivery of the key of a warehouse in which the goods are lodged, or by delivery of other *indicia* of property" (a). Indeed "the larger the bulk, the more impracticable it is that there should be a manual receipt; something there must be in the nature of constructive receipt, as there is constructive delivery" (b). If, however, there be no delivery, either actual or constructive, there can be no receipt. Suppose, for instance, that some act remains to be done by the purchaser, which must necessarily precede delivery, such as the selection and marking of growing timber; until this is done, there can be no delivery to, and consequently no receipt by, the purchaser (c).

(ii) Earnest is a distinct thing from part payment. It consists of any coin or thing of value given to denote that a bargain has been struck. Strictly speaking, it is not part of the price. The buyer loses the earnest if he fail to perform his part of the contract, and he is entitled to its return if the seller makes default (d) or has dealt fraudulently (e). It is essential that something should actually pass to the seller—merely passing a coin over his hand is not sufficient (f)—and that it was intended to bind the contract (g).

(iii) Part payment may be either an actual payment of money by the purchaser to the vendor, or a discharge or

(z) *Farina v. Home* (1846), 16 M. & W. at p. 123; cited by Crompton, J., in *Castle v. Swarder* (1861), 6 H. & N. at p. 838.

(a) *Per* Lord Kenyon, C.J., in *Chaplin v. Rogers* (1800), 1 East, at pp. 194, 195.

(b) *Per* Williams, J., in *Bushel v. Wheeler* (1844), 15 Q. B. at p. 445.

(c) *Acraman v. Morrice* (1849), 8 C. B. 449.

(d) See the judgment of Fry, L.J., in *Howe v. Smith* (1884), 27 Ch. D. at pp. 101, 102.

(e) *Alexander v. Webber*, [1922] 1 K. B. 642.

(f) *Blenkinsop v. Clayton* (1817), 7 Taunt. 597.

(g) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 4, sub-s. 1.

extinguishment of some debt due from the latter to the former. Though an agreement to set off a claim of the buyer against a part of the price may amount to part payment (*h*), the statute is not satisfied by the mere appropriation of a debt from seller to buyer, or of money in the seller's hands which belongs to the buyer (*i*). The part payment must be made before action brought, but acceptance of part payment need not be unqualified (*k*).

(iv) If the value of the goods sold amounts to £10 or upwards, and the plaintiff cannot prove either an acceptance and actual receipt of part of the goods, or an earnest, or a part payment, he cannot succeed without some "note or memorandum in writing."

The written memorandum need not be made at the time of the contract, provided it be made before action brought (*l*), but one made after action brought will not be sufficient to satisfy the statute (*m*). The parties, the property and the price must be either named or sufficiently identified in this memorandum, and it must give with sufficient certainty the terms of the contract actually made (*n*); for instance, a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant, together with the answer to it, will constitute a sufficient memorandum, if all the material terms of the contract then agreed to are expressed in them (*o*). The price of goods sold, if settled, must appear in the memorandum (*p*); whereas, if no particular price had been stipulated for, it would suffice to put down in writing the terms of the contract so far as concluded, and the law will imply that the purchaser was willing to pay a reasonable price for them (*q*). The names of both parties to the

(*h*) See *Walker v. Nussey* (1847), 16 M. & W. at p. 305.

(*i*) *Norton v. Davison*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 401.

(*k*) *Parker v. Crisp & Co.*, [1919] 1 K. B. 481.

(*l*) *Saunders v. Jackson* (1800), 2 Bos. & Pul. 238; *Grindell v. Bass*, [1920] 2 Ch. 48.

(*m*) *Lucas v. Dixon* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 357; *Bill v. Bament* (1841), 9 M. & W. 36.

(*n*) *Per* Lord Abinger, C.B., in *Johnson v. Dodgson* (1837), 2 M. & W. at p. 659; and see *Cox v. Hoare* (1907), 96 L. T. 719.

(*o*) *Bailey v. Sweeting* (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 150; *Wilkinson v. Evans* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 407.

(*p*) *Elmore v. Kingscote* (1826), 5 B. & C. 583.

(*q*) *Hoadly v. M'Laine* (1834), 10 Bing. 482. The value may be fixed by a jury under Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 14), s. 7.

contract (or some description sufficient to identify them) must appear in the memorandum, or in some writing sufficiently connected with it (*r*); the signature of the party "to be charged" upon the contract, though appended to a separate letter or document referring to and recognising the contract will be sufficient to satisfy the statute (*s*).

The signature to the memorandum may be that of the "agent in that behalf" of the party to be charged. These words include such agents as a traveller employed by a mercantile firm, an auctioneer or a broker, provided that they are acting within the scope of their authority in signing, even where there is no intention to bind the principal (*t*).

On the sale of goods by auction, the auctioneer usually acts as agent both for the buyer and for the seller (*u*), though he may in some exceptional cases render himself personally liable on the contract (*x*). The assent of both parties is necessary to make the contract binding; assent is signified on the part of the purchaser by bidding, on the part of the seller by the fall of the hammer. A bidder has a *locus pœnitentiæ*, and may retract his bidding before the hammer falls, but at the fall of the hammer the auctioneer becomes his agent (*y*). On the other hand, the owner of the chattel put up for sale may at any time before the contract is complete revoke the auctioneer's authority. Whether the auctioneer is agent for both parties or not will depend upon the facts of the particular case. An auctioneer properly complies with the requirements of the statute if, on a public sale of goods to the amount of £10 or upwards, he writes down in his sale book (containing a copy of the conditions of sale) the christian name and surname of the highest bidder as purchaser, and the amount of the purchase-money opposite to the lot purchased (*z*). When the auctioneer, or his clerk acting under his direction (with the assent of the purchaser (*a*) but not otherwise (*b*)), thus signs for the purchaser, the statute is satisfied, because there is "a note or memorandum in writing" of the "bargain," signed by the agent of the purchaser:

(*r*) See *Sarl v. Bourdillon* (1856), 1 C. B. (N.S.) 188.

(*s*) See the remarks of Patteson, J., in *Sievwright v. Archibald* (1851), 17 Q. B. at p. 114; and see *Leather Cloth Co. v. Hieronimus* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 140.

(*t*) *Sharman v. Brandt* (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 720; *Daniels v. Trefusis*, [1914] 1 Ch. 788; *North v. Loomes*, [1919] 1 Ch. 378.

(*u*) *Sims v. Landray*, [1894] 2 Ch. 318; *Van Praagh v. Everidge*, [1903] 1 Ch. 434.

(*x*) *Woolfe v. Horne* (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 355.

(*y*) *Warlow v. Harrison* (1859), 1 E. & E. 295.

(*z*) *Kenworthy v. Schofield* (1824), 2 B. & C. 945; *Peirce v. Corf* (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 210, 215, 217.

(*a*) *Bird v. Boulter* (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 443; *Sims v. Landray*, [1894] 2 Ch. 318.

(*b*) *Peirce v. Corf*, *supra*; *Bell v. Balls*, [1897] 1 Ch. 663.

the purchaser by bidding gave the auctioneer authority to sign the contract on his behalf. The contract between the parties is constituted by the conditions of sale and description of the lot, and cannot at the time of sale be varied by any oral statement of the auctioneer (c). If any alteration be required, it should be made in writing before the sale of the lot in question has commenced. It has been held that when the conditions of sale provided for resale in the event of default the auctioneer was not bound to resell at the purchaser's risk (d). Moreover, as soon as a sale by auction has taken place, and the deposit-money has been paid, the authority of the auctioneer is, as a rule, at an end. Hence, if any of the goods for sale be not sold at the auction, any subsequent sale, not at auction, must be treated as one by private contract, and a written agreement should be prepared accordingly and signed by the principals themselves. "No doubt an auctioneer at the sale is agent for both seller and buyer, so as to bind them by his signature; but the moment the sale is over the same principle does not apply, and the auctioneer is no longer the agent of both parties, but of the seller only, and the signature of the seller or his agent cannot bind the buyer" (e). Thus a seller is not bound by an auctioneer's unauthorised acceptance of payment by bill of exchange (f). One of the parties to a sale of goods of the price of £10 or upwards cannot act as an agent for the other party so as to bind him under the statute by signing for him a memorandum of the sale (g); hence, if an auctioneer brings an action in his own name to recover the price of goods sold by him at auction, he cannot rely on his own signature of the defendant's name in his sale book as a compliance with the statute (h).

He has authority to receive payment for the proceeds of sales of goods (i) to receive deposits on sales of land (k) and to give receipts. He should take payment in cash only, except where a cheque is usual. If he takes a cheque, he must use care and should not part with the goods sold until the cheque be cashed (l). He has a lien for his charges upon all goods or money in his possession (m). When acting for an undisclosed principal he does not warrant the right to sell (n).

A broker is an agent employed to make contracts between third persons in matters of trade, commerce or navigation for a pecuniary

(c) *Gunnis v. Erhardt* (1789), 1 H. Bl. 290. See *Hare and O'More's Contract, In re*, [1901] 1 Ch. 93.

(d) *Robinson v. Behar* (1926), 43 T. L. R. 66.

(e) *Per Pollock, C.B.*, in *Mews v. Carr* (1856), 1 H. & N. at p. 488.

(f) See *Sykes v. Giles* (1839), 5 M. & W. 645, 651; followed in *Williams v. Evans* (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 352.

(g) *Graham v. Musson* (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 603.

(h) *Farebrother v. Simmons* (1822), 5 B. & Ald. 333.

(i) *Williams v. Millington* (1788), 1 H. Bl. 81.

(k) *Sykes v. Giles* (1839), 5 M. & W. 645.

(l) *Farrer v. Lacey* (1885), 31 Ch. D. 42; *Pape v. Westacott*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 272.

(m) *Webb v. Smith* (1885), 30 Ch. D. 192.

(n) *Benton v. Campbell, Parker & Co.*, [1925] 2 K. B. 410.

compensation called "brokerage" or "commission." He is "lawfully authorised" to bind his principal (o). A broker who acts both for the vendor and for the purchaser of goods undoubtedly binds either of his principals by signing a note or memorandum in writing of the bargain concluded between them; though, if the broker is a party to the contract, he cannot sign it as agent for the other (p). He cannot sue in his own name on a contract made by him as broker (q). By the practice of stockbrokers in the City of London, when a contract of sale, made through the medium of a broker, is entered by the broker in his books and signed (r), such an entry constitutes the contract and binds the parties; for he is authorised by the one party to sell, and by the other to buy. When the broker has reduced the transaction to writing and signed it as their common agent, it binds them both as if both had signed it with their own hands.

It is further the practice for the broker to send what are called the bought and sold notes to his principals—the "bought note" to the buyer, and the "sold note" to the seller—to show that he has acted upon their instructions. Frequently he sends these notes without entering or signing any contract in his book. If the notes agree, they constitute a binding contract; but if there is any material variance between them, they are both nullities, and there is consequently, in the absence of part payment and part acceptance, no binding contract between the parties (s). A material alteration in the sold note made by the buyer without the knowledge or consent of the seller will prevent the former from suing on the contract (t). But where the broker was employed by the seller alone, a contract, effected by a note sent to and accepted by the purchaser, was not avoided by a variation in the note sent to the seller (u).

"The absence of a memorandum in writing, and of the other conditions mentioned in section 4, sub-section 1 of the Sale of Goods Act, does not make a contract void or even voidable. The contract is good. The only effect of the non-fulfilment of the statutory conditions is that it is unenforceable. And, the contract being good, all the legal consequences of a contract follow; so that, if the contract is for the sale of specific goods, the property in the goods

(o) *Thompson v. Gardiner* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 777. A broker cannot, however, delegate his authority without the consent of his principal.

(p) *Sharman v. Brandt* (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 720.

(q) *Fairlie v. Fenton* (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 169.

(r) A broker signing in that character may by local usage incur liability as principal: *Pike v. Ongley* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 708.

(s) *Sieveuright v. Archibald* (1851), 17 Q. B. 103. See *Caerleon Tin Plate Co. v. Hughes* (1891), 65 L. T. 118.

(t) *Mollett v. Wackerbarth* (1847), 5 C. B. 181.

(u) *McCaul v. Strauss & Co.* (1833), 1 C. & E. 106.

passes to the buyer. It may be asked, What happens if the buyer, after making the purchase, refuses to fulfil any of the statutory conditions which alone will make the contract enforceable against him? The property in the goods has passed to him, and it may be that he has received the goods themselves, yet he cannot be sued for the price. My answer is that the seller may call on the buyer to pay for the goods and, if he fails to comply, the seller may treat the contract as rescinded. The effect of such rescission would be to revest the property in the seller and to entitle him to resume possession'' (x).

(x) *Per* Bingham, J., in *Taylor v. G. E. Ry. Co.*, [1901] 1 K. B. at pp. 778, 779. On this rather difficult point see Pollock on Principles of Contract (9th ed.), p. 699 *et seq.*

CHAPTER V.

VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS.

SOME contracts are merely voidable at the instance of either of the parties. Other contracts are void *ab initio* (e.g., if their object is illegal or immoral or contrary to public policy), and then it is the duty of the Judge to stay the action of his own motion and without any reference to the wishes of the parties (*a*). Most wagering contracts are void and some also illegal.

A contract may be voidable because of a defect in the capacity of the parties—for example, the contract of an infant to which we have already referred in the first chapter of this Book. Some contracts, though lawfully made by persons of full capacity, are voidable on other grounds, such as fraud, misrepresentation and mistake.

A contract often contains a stipulation that it shall be void in a certain event; such a stipulation will be construed according to its natural meaning, subject to the general rule of law that no one shall take advantage of his own wrong, or (probably) of an event brought about by his own act or omission (*b*).

The consent of one or both parties to a contract may be given under such conditions as to make the consent unreal. Consent is unreal if procured by coercion or “duress.” This may be either duress by threats which cause fear of loss of life or limb, or duress by imprisonment where a man actually loses his liberty.

“The law so much discourages unlawful confinement that, if a man is under duress of imprisonment, which we have before explained to mean a compulsion by an illegal restraint of liberty, until he seals a bond or the like, he may allege this duress and

(a) See *North Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co.*, [1914] A. C., at p. 469; *Montefiore v. Munday Motor Co.*, [1918] 2 K. B. 241.

(b) *New Zealand Shipping Co. v. Société des Ateliers*, [1919] A. C. 1.

avoid the extorted bond. But if a man be lawfully imprisoned and, either to procure his discharge or on any other fair account, seals a bond or a deed, this is not by duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid it" (c).

"Duress of the person," whether by imprisonment or by threats, always vitiates consent (d), and therefore renders the contract voidable. It is more doubtful whether "duress of goods" would avoid a contract (e).

"Where goods are unlawfully detained, or an injurious act is about to be done to them, or some act which it was the duty of a party to do in respect of them be refused to be done unless money be paid, and the money be paid under protest as the only means of avoiding the immediate injury which would result . . . the money so paid may be recovered back" (f).

A contract made by a person under duress is voidable at his option. If the will of the contracting party is coerced, it does not matter whether the pressure be physical or moral (g).

"The plaintiff extorted a contract from a wife by threats of criminal proceedings against her husband, if she did not comply: those proceedings being such that, if taken, they would probably have resulted in the ruin of the husband and the disgrace of his wife and children" (h). "Pressure, which amounted to torture, was applied in order to coerce the defendant into signing the contract" (i). The Court therefore refused to enforce the contract so procured. "An English Court will not help him to enforce it, whatever may be the law of the country in which the contract was made" (k).

A contract may also be rescinded, if it has been obtained by any unconscientious use of power arising out of the circumstances of the contracting parties. Such a misuse of power is called "undue influence." Whenever "the

(c) 1 Bla. Com. 136.

(d) *Scott v. Sebright* (1886), 12 P. D. 21; *Ford v. Stier*, [1896] P. 1.

(e) See the remarks of Parke, B., in *Atlee v. Backhouse* (1838), 3 M. & W. at p. 650.

(f) *Per cur.* in *Glynn v. Thomas* (1856), 11 Exch. at pp. 878, 879; and see *per cur.* in *Wakefield v. Newbon* (1844), 6 Q. B. at p. 280.

(g) See *Kaufman v. Gerson*, [1904] 1 K. B. at p. 597.

(h) *Per Romer, L.J.*, *ibid.* at p. 599. (See the remarks of Bowen, L.J., in *Jones v. Merionethshire Building Society*, [1892] 1 Ch. at p. 186.)

(i) *Per Mathew, L.J.*, *ibid.* at p. 600.

(k) *Per Collins, M.R.*, *ibid.* at p. 598.

relative position of the parties is such as *prima facie* to raise this presumption, the transaction cannot stand unless the person claiming the benefit of it is able to repel the presumption by contrary evidence, proving it to have been, in point of fact, fair, just and reasonable. . . . It is sufficient for the application of the principle, if the parties meet under such circumstances as in the particular transaction to give the stronger party dominion over the weaker; and such power and influence are generally possessed, in every transaction of this kind, by those who trade upon the follies and vices of unprotected youth, inexperience and moral imbecility" (l).

Bargains with heirs, reversioners or expectants made in the life of the father are also viewed with suspicion (m). Any such bargain will be set aside, if it is shown that the parties dealt on unequal terms and that the agreement was unfair. In this connection the youth of the victim and the absence of proper professional advice are very important.

The remedy was originally equitable; but every Court has now power, by the Money-lenders Act, 1900 (n), to reopen bargains where the interest charged is excessive and the transaction harsh and unconscionable, and this whether the transaction could or could not have been impeached in equity. "There are two cases contemplated by the Act—one where the interest is excessive and the transaction harsh and unconscionable; the other where the interest is excessive and the transaction is such that, without the necessity of proving the transaction to be harsh and unconscionable, a Court of Equity would give relief" (o).

No rule can be stated as to what will be considered "excessive interest"; in one case 75 per cent. was held a reasonable rate, and no relief was given (p). There had been no misrepresentation or

(l) *Per* Lord Selborne, L.C., in *Earl of Aylesford v. Morris* (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. at p. 491.

(m) See the learned judgment of Lord Hardwicke in *Chesterfield v. Janssen* (1751), 1 Atk. at p. 353; 1 White and Tudor's L. C. (8th ed.), p. 303.

(n) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51, s. 1; and see 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 38.

(o) *Per* Lord Macnaghten, in *Samuel v. Newbold*, [1906] A. C. at p. 469, following *A Debtor, In re*, [1903] 1 K. B. 705.

(p) *Carringtons v. Smith*, [1906] 1 K. B. 79. See cases cited there, and *Kruse v. Seeley*, [1924] 1 Ch. 136.

pressure on the part of the lender, as the borrower fully understood the transaction and voluntarily agreed to pay the interest demanded.

Undue influence may be parental (*q*), spiritual (*r*) or professional—as where a solicitor induced a married woman, who had no independent advice, to convey some of her property to his own son (*s*). But if the undue influence be subsequently removed, and the agreement appears to have been confirmed by the subsequent conduct of the parties, the contract will stand.

Thus, where a patient made a gift to her doctor, and upheld the transaction after the confidential relation between the parties had ended, the gift was not disturbed (*t*).

Marriage is more than a contract, since status will be affected by it. The mere presence of fraud is not of itself sufficient to annul a marriage. If there was in fact consent, it is immaterial that such consent was induced by fraud; a marriage is annulled “not because of the presence of fraud, but because of the absence of consent” (*u*). Disparity in the condition or fortune of the consenting party to a marriage does not affect the reality of the consent (*x*).

As a general rule, however, fraud vitiates everything. Hence no contract obtained by fraud can be enforced against the party defrauded, although he may affirm it if, with full knowledge of the facts, he chooses so to do. A contracting party, who has been the victim of fraud, may either—

(i) apply to the Court to have the contract cancelled on that ground; or

(ii) he may elect to affirm the contract and may demand its completion or else damages for non-completion; or

(*q*) *De Witte v. Addison* (1899), 80 L. T. 207; *Powell v. Powell*, [1900] 1 Ch. 243 (step-mother and step-daughter).

(*r*) See *Allcard v. Skinner* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145; *Morley v. Loughnan*, [1893] 1 Ch. 736.

(*s*) *Willis v. Barron*, [1902] A. C. 271; and see *Wright v. Carter*, [1903] 1 Ch. 27.

(*t*) *Mitchell v. Homfray* (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 587; and see *Savery v. King* (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 627.

(*u*) *Per* Sir F. H. Jeune, President, in *Moss v. Moss*, [1897] P. at p. 269.

(*x*) See cases cited *ibid.*, at p. 269.

(iii) he may bring an action for damages for deceit, and this even if he has lost his right to avoid or affirm the transaction by delaying too long.

Where fraud has induced a vital mistake there may be no contract at all to be avoided (*y*), but ordinarily, "contracts which may be impeached on the ground of fraud are not void, but voidable only at the option of the party who is or may be injured by the fraud; subject to the condition that the other party, if the contract be disaffirmed, can be remitted to his former state" (*z*). If a man makes a promise which he never means to fulfil, that is a fraudulent promise, and it entitles the defrauded promisee to rescind the contract (*a*)—unless, indeed, an innocent third party has meanwhile acquired rights under it. If goods sold under a fraudulent contract of sale are pledged, the pledgee obtains a good title (*b*). Or if a man be induced by fraud to take shares in a company, and the company is wound up before he can disaffirm the contract, he loses his right to rescind, for the position of the parties has been altered (*c*). "Where one of two innocent parties must suffer from the fraud of a third, the loss should fall on the one who enabled the third party to commit the fraud" (*d*).

It is also a defence to any action brought on a contract that the plaintiff was guilty of fraud in procuring the defendant to enter into the contract. But it is no defence that the defendant was induced to enter into it by the fraud of some third person, if the plaintiff be innocent of all knowledge of or complicity in the fraud, and has obtained no benefit thereby, and is neither the principal nor the agent of the fraudulent person.

Thus, where a defendant was induced by the fraud of a solicitor to execute a mortgage deed containing the usual covenants, and an action was subsequently brought against him on those covenants by a transferee of the mortgage, it was held that he could not successfully plead either the fraud of the solicitor, or that the deed was not his deed (*e*).

(*y*) *Cundy v. Lindsay* (1878), L. R. 3 A. C. 459; *Baillie's Case*, [1898] 1 Ch. 110; *Jordan v. Street*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 641.

(*z*) *Per cur.* in *Urquhart v. Macpherson* (1878), 3 App. Cas. at pp. 837, 838.

(*a*) *Clough v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1871), L. R. 7 Ex. 26.

(*b*) *Babcock v. Lawson* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 394; (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 284; see Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 24, sub-s. 2, *post*, p. 150.

(*c*) *Oakes v. Turquand* (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 325; and see *General Railway Syndicate, In re*, [1900] 1 Ch. 365.

(*d*) *Per cur.* in *Babcock v. Lawson* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. at p. 401; cf. the remarks of Ashurst, J., in *Lickbarrow v. Mason* (1794), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), at pp. 734, 735; and *Commonwealth Trust v. Akotey* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 641; [1926] A. C. 72. But the rule is not universal: see the remarks of Vaughan Williams, L.J., in *Farquharson v. King*, [1901] 2 K. B. at p. 712.

(*e*) *Howatson v. Webb*, [1907] 1 Ch. 537; [1908] 1 Ch. 1.

In order to establish fraud, it must be shown—

(i) that a material misrepresentation was made which was false to the knowledge of the man who made it;

(ii) that it was intended to induce the person to whom it was addressed to act in some way;

(iii) that the latter was thereby deceived, and induced so to act; and

(iv) that he in consequence suffered damage.

The fraudulent misrepresentation may be either by words or by conduct. It must have been made either with knowledge of its falsehood (*f*), or with such reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity that the law holds the speaker to be as responsible as if he had asserted what he knew to be untrue (*g*). Mere carelessness in making statements does not found an action for deceit, unless there is a duty to be careful (*h*), nor does “the passive acquiescence of the seller in the self-deception of the buyer” (*i*). “Mere non-disclosure of material facts, however morally censurable, . . . would form no ground for an action for deceit or misrepresentation. There must be some active misstatement of fact, or at all events such a partial and fragmentary statement of fact, as that the withholding of that which is not stated makes that which is stated absolutely false” (*k*). A statement is not false if, though incorrect in detail, it is substantially correct (*l*).

To make a genuine statement of intention and afterwards to change one's mind is not actionable (*m*), though a false expression of present intention may be so (*n*). It has been held that a statement which is in fact true may amount to

(*f*) *Dickson v. Reuter's Telegraph Co.* (1877), 3 C. P. D. 1; *Derry v. Peek* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337. In certain cases it must have been made in writing—Statute of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828, s. 6.

(*g*) *Reese River Mining Co. v. Smith* (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 64, at p. 79; and see *Evans v. Edmonds* (1853), 13 C. B. at p. 786.

(*h*) See the remarks of Bowen, L.J., in *Low v. Bouverie*, [1891] 3 Ch. at p. 105; and *Le Lievre v. Gould*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 491.

(*i*) *Per Cockburn, C.J.*, in *Smith v. Hughes* (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. at p. 603.

(*k*) *Per Lord Cairns* in *Peek v. Gurney* (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. at p. 403; *Condogianis v. Guardian Assurance Co.*, [1921] 2 A. C. 125; *Beyfus v. Lodge*, [1925] Ch. 350.

(*l*) *Pawson v. Watson* (1778), 2 Cowp. 785.

(*m*) *Chadwick v. Manning*, [1896] A. C. 231.

(*n*) *Clough v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1871), L. R. 7 Ex. 26; and see the remarks of Bowen, L.J., in *Edgington v. Fitzmaurice* (1885), 29 Ch. D. at p. 483.

fraud, if intended to mislead (o); if a statement might be understood either in a true or in a false sense, the plaintiff must prove it was meant to be believed in the false sense (p). The defendant's motive for making the false statement is unimportant. If the defendant knowingly made a false representation, it is immaterial that he really believed that it would subsequently become true or that he acted for the best (q). The fraud may consist of a number of statements (e.g., in a company's prospectus), not in one specific statement only (r).

The fraud of an agent, acting within the scope of his employment, makes both principal and agent liable (s). This is so although the agent acted for his own private benefit, and not for the benefit of his principal, provided the agent was acting within the scope of his authority (t). An agent, acting outside the scope of his employment, is liable himself, but does not make his principal liable either in tort or contract (u). If an agent, acting within the scope of his authority, makes a material representation which he does not know to be false though his principal does, the principal, but not the agent, is liable in an action for fraud. In either case the contract can be set aside because of the material misrepresentation. "The principal and the agent are one, and it does not signify which of them made the incriminated statement or which of them possessed the guilty knowledge" (x).

Apart from fraud, the consent of a contracting party may have been procured by innocent misstatements or by

(o) See *Gluckstein v. Barnes*, [1900] A. C. at p. 250.

(p) *Glasier v. Rolls* (1889), 42 Ch. D. 436.

(q) *Polhill v. Walter* (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 114; and see *Pasley v. Freeman* (1789), 2 Smith, L.C. (12th ed.), p. 71.

(r) See the remarks of Lord Halsbury, L.C., in *Aaron's Reefs v. Twiss*, [1896] A. C. at p. 281. As to the liability of a director for misstatements contained in the prospectus of a company, see the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), s. 84.

(s) *Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank* (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 259; *Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.*, [1912] A. C. 716. As to partners, see *Cleather v. Twisden* (1883), 28 Ch. D. 340; *Oppenheimer v. Frazer*, [1907] 2 K. B. 50.

(t) *Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.*, [1912] A. C. 716; and see *Joseph Rand v. Craig*, [1919] 1 Ch. 1; *Central Motors v. Cessnock*, [1925] S. C. 796.

(u) *Udell v. Atherton* (1861), 7 H. & N. 172.

(x) *Per Lord Loreburn*, L.C., in *S. Pearson & Son v. Dublin Corpn.*, [1907] A. C., at p. 354, approved by Lord Halsbury, pp. 358, 359.

innocent withholding of information. Such innocent misrepresentation does not give rise to an action of deceit, though (like fraud) it may be a ground for rescinding the contract or for refusing specific performance of it (*y*).

In an action to set aside a contract on the ground that it was obtained by a misrepresentation made by the defendant, it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove merely that the defendant intended him to act upon the misrepresentation; he must also show that he was in fact misled by it (*z*). He need not, however, as in an action of deceit in tort, show that defendant knew his statement to be false. It is no defence to say that the plaintiff could have found out the truth (*a*), or that he was only in part induced by the falsehood (*b*). But the "puffing" of goods by salesmen can seldom found an action. The rule *caveat emptor* is of wide application.

Sometimes, as for example in a lease, parties stipulate that if one party breaks certain conditions in the contract, the other party shall be entitled to rescind the whole transaction. So in less formal contracts the parties may make the existence of their agreement depend upon the truth of matters which are either expressed or assumed in it. Such statements or promises are preliminary stipulations or "conditions," which form the basis of the contract; if they prove to be untrue or are unfulfilled, the party to whom they are made is entitled to be discharged, if he wishes, from his liabilities under the contract. There may also be terms in a contract which do not actually go to the root of it; these are usually called "warranties" and, if broken, do not discharge the contract, but support an action for damage sustained through their non-fulfilment. The question whether a representation is vital to the

(*y*) See the judgment of Cotton, L.J., in *Arkwright v. Newbold* (1881), 17 Ch. D., at p. 320; the cases cited in notes (*e*)—(*i*) on next page; and the judgment of Lord Bramwell in *Derry v. Peek* (1889), 14 App. Cas., at p. 347. Such misrepresentation can be penalised in damages only (1) as a breach of warranty of authority, *post*, p. 204; (2) under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, ss. 81 and 84.

(*z*) See the remarks of Cotton, L.J., in *Arkwright v. Newbold* (1881), 17 Ch. D., at p. 324.

(*a*) *Redgrave v. Hurd* (1881), 20 Ch. D. 1; and see *Smith v. Land, &c., Corp'n.* (1884), 28 Ch. D. 7.

(*b*) *Reese River Mining Co. v. Smith* (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 64.

contract or only subsidiary is a matter of interpretation according to the facts of each case (c).

Where by a charter-party it was agreed that the plaintiff's ship "now in the port of Amsterdam" should go to Newport and there load, and it afterwards appeared that the ship was not then in Amsterdam, it was held that the statement was intended by the parties to be a condition, the breach of which discharged the defendant from the contract, and that he had therefore acted within his rights in refusing to load the ship when she arrived at Newport (d).

It is difficult to define how far a party, who makes an innocent misstatement not amounting to a condition or a warranty and not embodied in the contract, is to be taken to know that such a misstatement actually induces the contract. Wherever it does so, the contract will not be specifically enforced (e), or it may be avoided (f) if repudiated promptly (g) and if the parties can be restored to a position as good as prior to the contract (h). Where it does not, the contract stands (i). In certain kinds of agreements (known as contracts *uberrimæ fidei*) the amplest good faith is required between the parties; each is bound to tell the other everything that might affect his judgment. Such are:—

(i) Contracts of insurance. In a contract of marine insurance there must be "no misrepresentation or concealment either by the insured or by any one who ought, as a matter of business and fair dealing, to have stated or disclosed the facts to him or to the underwriter for him" (k). So also with fire and life assurance (l), though life assurance differs in that it is not a mere contract of indemnity, but entitles the assured to receive the exact

(c) As to the distinction between a condition and a warranty, see the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 11, and *post*, pp. 142—145.

(d) *Behn v. Burness* (1863), 3 B. & S. 751.

(e) *Redgrave v. Hurd* (1881), 20 Ch. D. 1.

(f) *Newbigging v. Adam* (1886), 34 Ch. D. 582.

(g) *Sedden v. N. E. Salt Co.*, [1905] 1 Ch. 326.

(h) *Cie. Chemin de fer Paris-Orleans v. Leeston Shipping Co.* (1919), 36 T. L. R. 68.

(i) *Kennedy v. Panama, N. Z. and R. M. Co.* (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 580.

(k) *Per Lindley, L.J.*, in *Blackburn v. Vigors* (1886), 17 Q. B. D., at p. 578; and see the judgment in *Ionides v. Pender* (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B., at pp. 537, 538.

(l) *London Assurance Co. v. Mansel* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 363; *Joel v. Law Union, &c., Insurance Co.*, [1908] 2 K. B. 863.

sum for which he has insured (*m*). We shall deal more fully with contracts of insurance in a later chapter (*n*).

(ii) Contracts for sale of land. In these, “where the misdescription, although not proceeding from fraud, is in a material and substantial point so far affecting the subject-matter of the contract that it may reasonably be supposed that, but for such misdescription, the purchaser might never have entered into the contract at all, in such case the contract is avoided altogether, and the purchaser is not bound to resort to the clause of compensation” (*o*). But commendatory expressions, such as “mere flourishing description by an auctioneer,” will give the injured party no remedy (*p*).

(iii) Contracts for the allotment of shares. The promoters and directors of a company, when offering its shares to the public, “are bound to state everything with strict and scrupulous accuracy, and not only to abstain from stating as fact that which is not so, but to omit no one fact within their knowledge the existence of which might in any degree affect the nature, extent or quality of the privileges and advantages, which the prospectus holds out as inducements to take shares” (*q*).

The information which a prospectus must give is now defined in section 81 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (*r*). The Act is silent as to liability in case of non-compliance, but a person responsible may be liable to indictment for misdemeanour (*s*) or in damages by action on the case (*t*). Omission to give all prescribed particulars is not *per se* sufficient ground for rescission (*u*). By

(*m*) See *Dalby v. India, &c., Life Insurance Co.* (1854), 24 L. J. C. P. 2.

(*n*) See *post*, Chap. XV., p. 275.

(*o*) *Per Tindal, C.J.*, in *Flight v. Booth* (1834), 1 Bing. N. C., at p. 377. But the parties may provide for compensation in case of misdescription, and the injured party may sue on such a provision after the property has passed: *Palmer v. Johnson* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 351.

(*p*) *Dimmock v. Hallett* (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. 21, 27. But see *Smith v. Land, &c., Corporation* (1884), 28 Ch. D. 7; *Carlsh v. Salt*, [1906] 1 Ch. 385; *Yandle v. Sutton*, [1922] 2 Ch. 199.

(*q*) *Per Kindersley, V.-C.*, in *New Brunswick, &c., Ry. Co. v. Muggeridge* (1860), 1 Drew & Smale, at pp. 381, 382. See *Central Venezuela Ry. Co. v. Kisch* (1867), L. R. 2 H. L., at p. 113; *Peek v. Gurney* (1873), L. R. 6 H. L., at p. 403.

(*r*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69.

(*s*) *R. v. Hall*, [1891] 1 Q. B., at p. 753.

(*t*) *Thomson v. Clanmorris*, [1900] 1 Ch., at p. 727; *South of England, &c., Co., In re*, [1900] 1 Ch., at p. 577.

(*u*) *Wimbledon Olympia, In re*, [1910] 1 Ch. 630; *South of England, &c., Co., In re (supra)*.

section 84 of the same Act, a director is also liable personally to any one who has taken shares upon the strength of statements in the prospectus which were in fact untrue, unless the directors or other persons responsible for the prospectus show that they had reasonable grounds for believing the statements to be true (x).

So, also, in contracts between company promoters and the company, the promoters must "fully and fairly disclose to the company all material facts which the company ought to know" (y).

(iv) Contracts of suretyship and partnership, though not strictly contracts *uberrimæ fidei* (z), yet require, when once they have been actually entered into, full disclosure (a). Where there is any kind of fiduciary relationship between the parties, *e.g.*, if they are solicitor and client or guardian and ward, full disclosure is necessary in their contracts (b). So also in family arrangements for the settlement of family property.

A misrepresentation may, as we have seen in the case of fraud (c), give rise to a mistake so vital that there is *ab initio* no contract (d). Or the contracts arising from such misrepresentation may be only voidable (e). The consent of the contracting parties may also be unreal by reason of mistake. Cases of out-and-out mistake imply absence of consent and therefore of any contract, but in a normal case of misrepresentation, innocent or otherwise, the contract is only voidable. It is, however, no defence to an action on a contract that it was entered into under a mistake as to a general principle of law (f). But a mistake as to a private right at law may avoid an agreement—for example, if a man mistakenly agree to buy what was already his own property (g). And a mistake of mixed law and fact would have the same effect.

(x) The section re-enacts the provisions of section 3 of the Directors' Liability Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 64), passed in consequence of the decision in *Derry v. Peek* (1889), 14 A. C. 337; see *McConnel v. Wright*, [1903] 1 Ch. 546, at p. 558.

(y) *Per* Lindley, M.R., in *Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Syndicate*, [1899] 2 Ch., at p. 422.

(z) See the judgment of Fry, J., in *Davies v. London and Provincial Insurance Co.* (1878), 8 Ch. D., at p. 475.

(a) See, for example, *Phillips v. Foxall* (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 666.

(b) See *Dougan v. Macpherson*, [1902] A. C. 197.

(c) *Ante*, p. 65.

(d) *Couturier v. Hastie*, *post*, p. 267.

(e) As in *Newbigging v. Adam* (1886), 34 Ch. D. 582.

(f) *Powell v. Smith* (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 85; and see *Stewart v. Kennedy* (1890), 15 App. Cas. 108.

(g) *Cooper v. Phibbs* (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 149; *Holt v. Markham*, [1923] 1 K. B. 504.

Mistake as to a material fact will avoid a contract in three cases :—

(i) Mistake as to the subject-matter of the contract. The parties may be thinking of different things, or they may be mistaken as to the existence of the subject-matter of the contract.

Thus, where the plaintiff and the defendant contracted about a cargo "to arrive *ex* Peerless from Bombay," and there were two ships of that name, both arriving from Bombay, and the plaintiff understood the contract to refer to one and the defendant to the other, it was held that there was no contract, for the two minds were not *ad idem* (*h*). Here, if the contract had contained any such description as would identify one of the two ships, it would not have been avoided.

In *Couturier v. Hastie* (*i*) the parties agreed for the sale of a cargo of corn which, as they thought, was on the way to England. As a matter of fact before the date of the contract it had been unloaded and sold at Tunis, because it was heated. It was held that the contract was void. Similarly the contract would be void if the subject-matter existed, but was completely different from what the parties supposed it to be. Unless it be substantially different, the contract will stand (*k*).

Apart from fraud, "there is no legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake not induced by the vendor" (*l*). But a man, who knows of the mistake (or who reasonably ought to have known of it (*m*)) at the time of the contract, cannot insist upon the contract (*n*). A man is not entitled to "snap at an offer which he must perfectly well know to have been made by mistake" (*o*).

(ii) Mistake in the act of expressing the contract. A man is entitled to show, for example, that he wholly misunderstood the nature of the document which he signed, so that his mind did not go with his act.

Where an old and short-sighted man indorsed a bill of exchange on the assurance that it was a guarantee, and was afterwards sued on

(*h*) *Raffles v. Wichelhaus* (1864), 2 H. & C. 906. Cf. *Hodges v. Horsfall* (1829), 1 Russ. & M. 116; *Smidt v. Tiden* (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 446.

(*i*) (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 673; see *Strickland v. Turner* (1852), 7 Exch. 208 (an annuity for the life of a man already dead); and *Scott v. Coulson*, [1903] 2 Ch. 249.

(*k*) *Kennedy v. Panama, &c., Mail Co.* (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 580.

(*l*) *Per Blackburn, J.*, in *Smith v. Hughes* (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B., at p. 607. Cf. *Hill v. Balls* (1857), 2 H. & N. 299, 305; *Ward v. Hobbs* (1877), 4 App. Cas. 13.

(*m*) *Paget v. Marshall* (1884), 28 Ch. D. 255.

(*n*) *Webster v. Cecil* (1861), 30 Beav. 62.

(*o*) *Per James, L.J.*, in *Tamplin v. James* (1879), 15 Ch. D., at p. 221.

the bill by a stranger to whom it had been indorsed, it was held that the stranger, though innocent of fraud, could not recover on the bill (*p*). If an illiterate man signs a deed which is described to him as something which in fact it is not, the deed is void (*q*). If a man, without negligence, signs a promissory note under the mistaken impression that he is merely witnessing a document, he is not liable (*r*). Except in the case of a negotiable instrument the question of negligence is not material (*s*).

Mistakes of this kind frequently arise through the fraud of a third party, and sometimes also through carelessness, as where a telegraph clerk forwards a message with a mistake in it (*t*). In such a case there is no contract.

(iii) Mistake as to the identity of the parties. Such a mistake, if the identity of the party is a material consideration in inducing the agreement, avoids the contract.

Thus, if A succeeds X as a shopkeeper, and B deals with A mistaking him for X, with whom alone he means to contract, the contract is void (*u*). So where one Blenkarn, by imitating the signature of Blenkiron, induced some one to send him goods which were afterwards sold to a stranger, it was held that there was no contract, and that delivery of the goods had passed no property in them (*x*).

The remedies of a man who has entered into a contract under such a mistake are :—

(i) He can refuse to perform the contract and plead mistake if sued upon it.

(ii) On the same ground he can resist a claim for specific performance of the contract and counterclaim for its rescission (*y*).

(iii) If he has paid money under it, he may recover the money back (*z*). Money voluntarily paid under such mistake is deemed paid to the use of the person who pays

(*p*) *Foster v. Mackinnon* (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 704.

(*q*) *Thoroughgood's Case* (1583), 2 Rep. 9; and *ante*, p. 21.

(*r*) *Lewis v. Clay* (1898), 67 L. J. Q. B. 224. See *Howatson v. Webb*, [1908] 1 Ch. 1; *Bank of Ireland v. McManamy*, [1916] 2 Ir. R. 161.

(*s*) *Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co. v. Bragg*, [1911] 1 K. B. 489.

(*t*) *Henkel v. Pape* (1870), L. R. 6 Ex. 7; see also *Thornton v. Kempster* (1814), 5 Taunt. 786, where an agent of both parties made a similar mistake.

(*u*) *Boulton v. Jones* (1857), 2 H. & N. 564.

(*x*) *Cundy v. Lindsay* (1878), 3 App. Cas. 459; *Phillips v. Brookes*, [1919] 2 K. B. 243; *Said v. Butt*, [1920] 3 K. B. 497.

(*y*) *Paget v. Marshall*, *supra*.

(*z*) See *Kelly v. Solari* (1841), 9 M. & W. 54, 58; *Imperial Bank of Canada v. Bank of Hamilton*, [1903] A. C. 49.

it and is therefore recoverable, though money paid by compulsion of law, or with knowledge of the facts, but in ignorance of law, or by way of compromise is not (a).

Even where the parties are fully agreed, they sometimes express the terms of their agreement incorrectly. In such a case, if the true intention of the parties can be ascertained, the contract can be rectified (b).

Thus, if the parties enter into a written contract for the purchase and sale of a house which by a common error they misdescribe as No. 21, High Street, whereas it is really No. 23, either of them may apply to have the mistake in the written contract rectified, for their minds were *ad idem*; though, if one party thought he was selling No. 21 and the other thought he was buying No. 23, there would of course be no contract and neither could ask for rectification. The mistake must be mutual (c). Otherwise the proper course is to apply for rescission (d).

Again, mutual mistake as to the subject-matter of a contract may also cause the Court to consider impossibility of performance. Where A agreed with B to load a complete cargo of guano at a certain island and bring it to England at a certain rate of freight, and it was found that the island contained so little guano as to make the performance of the contract impossible, the impossibility was held to be no defence for A when sued by B on his undertaking (e). This case is hardly distinguishable from one in which the decision was otherwise. A tenant undertook to dig from certain ground not less than 1,000 tons of clay per year, paying a royalty of half-a-crown per ton to the landlord. There was not so much as 1,000 tons of clay in the ground: this was held to be a good defence against the landlord; "the covenant is applicable only if there be clay" (f).

Obvious physical or legal impossibility makes a contract no contract, because there is no consideration. We shall deal further with impossibility of performance in Chapter VII. (g).

(a) *Moore v. Fulham Vestry*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 399; *Rogers v. Ingham* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 351; and see *Taylor v. Metropolitan Ry. Co.*, [1906] 2 K. B. 55.

(b) *Craddock v. Hunt*, [1923] 2 Ch. 136; *United States v. Motor Trucks*, [1924] A. C. 196.

(c) *Forgione v. Lewis*, [1920] 2 Ch. 326.

(d) *May v. Platt*, [1900] 1 Ch. 616.

(e) *Hills v. Sughrue* (1846), 15 M. & W. 253.

(f) *Clifford v. Watts* (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 577, 588.

(g) *Post*, pp. 103-106.

CHAPTER VI.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS.

GREAT as is the freedom allowed to contracting parties, the law refuses to enforce certain contracts which are immoral or in violation of positive law, or opposed to public policy. For this purpose it is immaterial whether the contract be special or simple.

“ Notwithstanding the solemnity and force which the law ascribes to deeds and all the strictness with which, in general, it prohibits the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove that an instrument goes beyond, or does not fully contain, or incorrectly exhibits, the terms of the contract which it was written and signed for the purpose of expressing or recording, the rule is settled that a deed, *ex facie* just and righteous, may be vitiated and avoided by alleging and adducing extrinsic evidence to prove that it was founded on a consideration, or had a view or purpose, contravening law or public policy ” (a).

Either the consideration or the promise may be illegal. A consideration which is bad in part is bad altogether (b), whereas a promise which concerns several distinct and independent acts, of which some are legal and some are illegal, will be valid in regard to the former, void as to the latter (c).

A written agreement may be single and entire, founded on one entire consideration; it may be severable in its nature, and deal with matters which are unconnected with and independent of each other. “ In cases where the consideration is tainted by no illegality, but some of the conditions (if the contract in question be a bond) or promises (if it be a contract of any other description) are illegal, the illegality of those which are bad does not communicate itself to or contaminate those which are good, except where, in consequence of some peculiarity in the contract, its parts are inseparable or depen-

(a) *Per* Knight Bruce, L.J., in *Reynell v. Sprye* (1852), 1 De G. M. & G., at p. 672.

(b) *Waite v. Jones* (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 656, 662.

(c) See *Bank of Australasia v. Breillat* (1847), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 152, 201.

dent upon one another" (d). Where the act which is the subject of the contract may according to circumstances be lawful or unlawful, it will not be presumed that the contract was to do the unlawful act; the contrary is the proper inference (e).

We must also inquire whether the connection between the illegal transaction and the contract is sufficiently close to invalidate the latter, *e.g.*, whether the doing of an illegal act was contemplated by the contracting parties (f). Thus, if two parties agree to suppress a prosecution for felony one of them cannot maintain an action against the other for an injury arising out of the transaction in which they have both been illegally engaged (g). And where the plaintiff had at the request of the defendant published a libel and consented to defend an action brought against him for such publication, and the defendant therefore promised to indemnify the plaintiff from the costs of the action, this promise was held void (h).

Even where the contract is connected with the illegal transaction in part only, it may nevertheless be tainted thereby (i). But a taint in the original transaction will not necessarily vitiate every contract growing out of it: otherwise persons innocently contracting might suffer loss through an illegality to which they were no party and of which they had no notice. The test seems to be, Does the plaintiff require aid from the illegal transaction in order to establish his claim (j)? If so, his action will fail. But where the consideration and the matter to be performed are both legal, a plaintiff will not be precluded from recovering by an infringement of the law occurring in the performance of his promise which is collateral to and was not contemplated by the contract (k).

Where the contract is illegal, not only is the contract itself not enforceable, but no cause of action can arise out of it even indirectly.

(d) Note to *Collins v. Blantern* (1766), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 431. And see the remarks of Willes, J., in *Pickering v. Ilfracombe Ry. Co.* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P., at p. 250; and *Burdett, Ex parte; Byrne, in re* (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 310.

(e) *Per* Lord Abinger, C.B., in *Lewis v. Davison* (1839), 4 M. & W., at p. 657.

(f) See *Edgware Highway Board v. Harrow Gas Co.* (1874), L. R. 10 Q. B. 92; *Waugh v. Morris* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 202, 207.

(g) *Fivaz v. Nicholls* (1846), 2 C. B. 501.

(h) *Shackell v. Rosier* (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 634; and see *Smith v. Clinton* (1908), 99 L. T. 840; and *Skipper v. Kelly* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 258 (promise to marry on condition of obtaining divorce).

(i) *Collins v. Blantern* (1766), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.) 412.

(j) *Taylor v. Bowers* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 291; and see cases there cited.

(k) See the judgment of Lord Tenterden, C.J., in *Wetherell v. Jones* (1832), 3 B. & Ad., at pp. 225, 226; *Rosewarne v. Billing* (1863), 15 C. B. (N.S.) 316.

No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an illegal act to which he was a party.

Thus, money paid or goods delivered in pursuance of an illegal transaction cannot be recovered. If a party in order to make out his cause of action has to prove an illegal transaction to which he was a party, he must fail (*l*). It has, however, been held that when money has been subscribed for, but not applied to, an illegal purpose, the subscriber is entitled to an account (*ll*).

But this principle does not apply to contracts which are merely void. Thus money lent to pay gaming losses with the knowledge that it is to be so used is recoverable. Again, if an agent receives winnings for his principal and does not pay them over, the principal may sue him.

Certain contracts are expressly forbidden by statute. Thus the Ground Game Act, 1880 (*m*), which gives to every occupier of land the inseparable right to kill and take ground game thereon, provides that "every agreement, condition or arrangement, which purports to divest or alienate the right of the occupier" conferred by the Act, shall be void. Again, persons cannot contract themselves out of statutory benefits conferred on them by the Poor Law Officers Superannuation Act, 1896 (*n*), the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 (*o*), the Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 (*p*), and the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 (*q*). Sometimes contracts are prohibited under statutes which regulate trades and professions. Thus the sale of spirituous liquors (*r*), bread (*s*), game birds (*t*) and coal (*u*) is prohibited if it takes place under certain specified conditions. Further, doctors and solicitors cannot recover their fees unless they have qualified themselves in a specified way (*v*). Under the Money-lenders Acts, 1900 and 1911 (*w*), the

(*l*) *Taylor v. Chester* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 309; *Herman v. Teuchner* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 561.

(*ll*) *Greenberg v. Cooperstein*, [1926] 2 Ch. 657.

(*m*) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 47, s. 3.

(*n*) *Salford Union v. Dewhurst*, [1926] A. C. 619.

(*o*) 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, s. 3; amended by 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 42.

(*p*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 40, s. 6. See also 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 38, s. 21 and 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 70, s. 34.

(*q*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 50.

(*r*) 24 Geo. 2, c. 40, s. 12.

(*s*) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, s. 4.

(*t*) 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, ss. 4, 25.

(*u*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 21, s. 20.

(*v*) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 68, s. 12; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 32.

(*w*) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51; 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 38, and see *ante*, p. 63; and *Victorian Daylesford Syndicate v. Dott*, [1905] 2 Ch. 624; *Bonnard v. Dott*,

business agreements of an unregistered money-lender are illegal and void; the borrower may recover securities given to the money-lender under such agreements. The Truck Act, 1831 (x), forbids contracts for payment of wages otherwise than in money. The Children Act, 1908 (y), forbids the insurance of children at nurse for reward by their foster-parents. Advertisements of ready money bets on football (z), agreements relating to obtaining of honours (a) and some agreements relating to the carriage of goods by sea (b) have been forbidden by recent statutes.

An Act of Charles II. makes Sunday trading illegal (c). Contracts will not be enforced if completed on a Sunday and made within the course of a man's ordinary calling, "works of necessity and charity only excepted." The Courts, however, show little inclination to interpret strictly a statute upon which public feeling no longer lays much stress.

To promise to present a man to a vacant "benefice with cure of souls" for money or other valuable consideration is simony; such a contract is forbidden by statute (d). To "take, procure or accept the next avoidance of or presentation to any benefice with cure of souls" is a simoniacal contract and utterly void (e). A bond by a person presented to a living, promising to resign at a future date, was at common law illegal; but such bonds are now legalised under certain conditions (f).

If a statute renders a contract illegal, it makes no difference in law whether the statute has in view the

[1906] 1 Ch. 740; *Sadler v. Whiteman*, [1910] A. C. 514; *Cornelius v. Phillips*, [1918] A. C. 199, H. L.; *Vorst v. Goldstein*, [1924] 2 K. B. 372. But see the equitable case of *Lodge v. National Union Investment Co.*, [1907] 1 Ch. 300.

(x) 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37.

(y) 8 Edw. 7, c. 67, s. 7. See *post*, Chap. XV., Contracts of Assurance.

(z) 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 52.

(a) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 72.

(b) 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22, Sched., Art. III., (5).

(c) 29 Car. 2, c. 7. See *Phillips v. Innes* (1837), 4 Cl. & F. 234 (Sunday shaving not excepted from the statute); *Palmer v. Snow*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 725 (hairdresser not within the statute); *Bullen v. Ward* (1906), 93 L. T. 439 (fried fish shop outside the statute). But see *Amorette v. James*, [1915] 1 K. B. 124.

(d) 31 Eliz. c. 6, s. 5; and see *Mosse v. Killick* (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 300.

(e) 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 12, s. 2; and see *Walsh v. Bishop of Lincoln* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 518; *Benefices Act, 1898* (61 & 62 Vict. c. 48).

(f) 9 Geo. 4, c. 94.

protection of the revenue or any other object (g). The sole question will be, Does the statute mean to prohibit the contract? Such an intention may be manifested as well by the infliction of a penalty, as by express prohibitory words, for a penalty implies a prohibition (h).

If statutes do not purport to prohibit an act, but only impose penalties for revenue purposes, a contract to perform such an act will not be illegal (i). But "if two parties enter into an agreement, whereby it is stipulated that one of them shall be enabled to commit an act that is contrary to public policy and contrary to the provisions of an Act of Parliament, though not expressly prohibited thereby, except by the imposition of a penalty, the agreement is illegal and void" (j).

"I think," said Lord Esher, M.R. (k), "that this rule of interpretation has been laid down, that, although a statute contains no express words making void a contract which it prohibits, yet when it inflicts a penalty for the breach of the prohibition, you must consider the whole Act as well as the particular enactment in question, and come to a decision, either from the context or the subject-matter, whether the penalty is imposed with intent merely to deter persons from entering into the contract, or for the purposes of revenue, or whether it is intended that the contract shall not be entered into so as to be valid at law."

Other contracts which have been held illegal as contrary to public policy are marriage brokerage contracts (i.e., contracts to bring about a marriage for reward), and contracts not to marry (l). If A gives B a bond or grants him a lease in order to secure his help in arranging a marriage between A and X, the bond or lease will be set aside (m). A contract for reward to introduce another to persons of the opposite sex with a view to marriage is a marriage brokerage contract and illegal; and money paid under such a

(g) *Brightman v. Tate*, [1919] 1 K. B. 463; *Mahmoud and Ispahani, In re*, [1921] 2 K. B. 716; *Anderson v. Daniel*, [1924] 1 K. B. 138.

(h) *Cope v. Rowlands* (1836), 2 M. & W. 149, 157; *Johnson v. Hudson* (1809), 11 East, 180.

(i) *Smith v. Mawhood* (1845), 14 M. & W. 452; *Learoyd v. Bracken*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 114.

(j) *Per Maule, J.*, in *Ritchie v. Smith* (1848), 6 C. B., at p. 477. This decision was based on the view that the statute contravened was not passed for purposes of revenue only.

(k) *Melliss v. Shirley Local Board* (1885), 16 Q. B. D., at p. 451.

(l) A condition in a will in restraint of second marriage is not void: *Allen v. Jackson* (1875), 1 Ch. D. 399; nor is one in restraint of marriage with a particular person or with a member of a class: *Jenner v. Turner* (1880), 16 Ch. D. 188.

(m) See *Stribblehill v. Brett* (1703), 2 Vern. 445; *Keat v. Allen* (1707), 2 Vern. 588.

contract can be recovered by the person who paid it, although the other party to the contract has brought about introductions and has incurred expense in so doing (*n*). A promise made by a married man to marry another woman after the death of his present wife is void as being against public policy; it cannot, therefore, be enforced by action after the death of the wife (*o*). Illegal also are deeds and agreements made in contemplation of a future separation between husband and wife (*p*).

Contracts made with a view to compromising prosecutions for felonies or grave misdemeanours (*q*), or in any way perverting the course of justice, are also illegal (*r*). And generally "no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good" (*s*).

Thus, "when a bribe is given, or a promise of a bribe is made, to a person in the employ of another by some one who has contracted or is about to contract with the employer, with a view to inducing the person employed to act otherwise than with loyalty and fidelity to his employer, the agreement is a corrupt one and is not enforceable at law, whatever the actual effect produced on the mind of the person bribed may be" (*t*). If the contract is disadvantageous to the principal, he has two remedies:—

(i) he may recover from the agent the amount of the bribe as money had and received to his use;

(ii) he may recover from the agent and the person who has paid the bribe, jointly or severally, damages for any loss which he has sustained, without allowing for any deduction in respect of money recovered under the first head.

The bribery of agents is now a misdemeanour under the Preven-

(*n*) *Hermann v. Charlesworth*, [1905] 2 K. B. 123.

(*o*) *Wilson v. Carnley*, [1908] 1 K. B. 729; cf. *Skipp v. Kelly* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 258.

(*p*) But not deeds contemplating an immediate separation: *Hindley v. Earl of Westmeath* (1828), 6 B. & C. 200; *Besant v. Wood* (1879), 12 Ch. D. 605; *Harrison v. Harrison*, [1910] 1 K. B. 35; *Meyrick, In re*, [1921] 1 Ch. 311.

(*q*) See *ante*, pp. 21—22.

(*r*) See *Flower v. Sadler* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 572; *Jones v. Merionethshire Building Society*, [1892] 1 Ch. 173; *Windhill Local Board v. Vint* (1890), 45 Ch. D. 351; *R. v. Porter*, [1910] 1 K. B. 369.

(*s*) *Per* Lord Truro in *Egerton v. Earl Brownlow* (1853), 4 H. L. Cas., at p. 196. The changes in the doctrine of "public policy" are discussed in *Davies v. Davies* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 359, and in *Montefiore v. Munday Motor Co.*, [1918] 2 K. B. 241.

(*t*) *Per* Cockburn, C.J., in *Harrington v. Victoria Graving Dock Co.* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 551. Cf. *Shipway v. Broadwood*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 369.

tion of Corruption Acts, 1889 to 1916 (*u*). Contracts for the sale of public offices or the resignation of public officers and contracts for purchasing titles of honour are illegal at common law and in some cases also by statute (*x*).

Agreements which lead to abuse of legal process by encouraging speculative litigation are illegal. Such agreements come under the law of "maintenance" in cases where a man improperly promotes or takes part in actions between other persons, or under the law of "champerty" where the object of the maintainer is to obtain for himself a part of the land or money which is sought to be recovered in the action (*y*).

Thus, to give an indemnity for his costs to an informer who seeks to enforce a statutory penalty is illegal (*z*); but to assist a poor man from motives of charity (*a*), or to assist a relative, to maintain a suit, would not be maintenance. Nor is it champerty if a solicitor promises not to charge his client anything for costs (*b*). Nor, apparently, is it unlawful to give information which will lead to the recovery of property in consideration of receiving part of the property so to be recovered, provided that the recipient takes no steps himself towards the recovery (*c*). It is not necessary in all cases, "in order that the agreement should be held void, that it should amount strictly in point of law to champerty or maintenance so as to constitute a punishable offence" (*d*).

Since the object of the bankruptcy laws is to provide for a rateable distribution of the bankrupt's property amongst all his creditors, a promise by a trader in contemplation of bankruptcy to give any preference to a particular creditor, or to induce him to sign a composition deed, is illegal and void (*e*).

Lotteries are illegal; in the case of a competition held

(*u*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 69; 6 Edw. 7, c. 34; 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64. See *ante*, pp. 209-211. In *Lister v. Stubbs* (1890), 45 Ch. D. 1, it was decided that the bribed agent is the principal's debtor, not his trustee.

(*x*) *Parkinson v. College of Ambulance* (1924), 93 L. J. K. B. 1066; 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 72.

(*y*) See *Alabaster v. Harness*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 339; *British, &c., Conveyors v. Lamson*, [1908] 1 K. B. 1006, 1014; *Neville v. London "Express" Newspaper*, [1919] A. C. 368; and *ante*, pp. 226-227.

(*z*) *Bradlaugh v. Newdegate* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 1.

(*a*) *Harris v. Brisco* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 504.

(*b*) *Per Bovill, C.J.*, in *Jennings v. Johnson* (1873), L. R. 8 C. P., at p. 426.

(*c*) *Rees v. De Bernardy*, [1896] 2 Ch., at pp. 446, 447.

(*d*) *Per Romer, J.*, *ibid.*, at p. 446.

(*e*) See *ante*, p. 23, note (*h*).

to come within the statute against lotteries, it was decided that competitors were entitled to receive back their contributions, if notice of their claim was given before the money was paid away (f).

A wager is only void, and not in itself illegal. "Wagers, which were not against morality, decency or sound policy, were in olden days allowed as the foundation of actions at common law, probably without sufficient anticipation of the results which might follow" (g). "By common law wagers were not illegal, and the nature of a wager is such that from the point of view of jurisprudence there is ample consideration for a valid contract. The distinction which English law makes between wagering contracts and others is therefore entirely the creation of statute" (h).

Wagers which were "foolish," or which tended to annoy others, or to waste the time of the Court (i), or to outrage decency (k), were discountenanced at common law. The statute law interfered at first in respect of sums lost in playing at games or betting on the players. The Gaming Act, 1710 (l), declared that securities of all kinds, if wholly or partly given in consideration of gaming losses or to repay money knowingly advanced for such purposes, should be void. As an innocent person might thereby suffer by taking such securities without notice of their inherent illegality, the Act of 1835 (m) provided that such securities should thenceforth be taken to have been given on an illegal consideration. It is to be noted that the Acts of 1710 and 1835 dealt only with wagers on games and pastimes. In the case of these securities only the taint of illegality will attach to collateral transactions. The 1835 statute further provided (n) in effect that the loser could recover from the winner if he had actually paid any indorsee or assignee of the winner's security. A curious result was that later it was held (o) that anybody who had paid losses by cheque could

(f) See 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 1; *Barclay v. Pearson*, [1893] 2 Ch. 154; *Hawke v. Hulton*, [1909] 2 K. B. 93.

(g) Per Gorell Barnes, President, in *Hyams v. Stuart King*, [1908] 2 K. B., at p. 709; and see the remarks of Lord Campbell, in *Ramloll Thackoorseydass v. Soojunnull Dhondnull* (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C., at p. 310.

(h) Per Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in *Hyams v. Stuart King*, [1908] 2 K. B., at p. 712. For the history of the law of gaming contracts, see his judgment in *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B., at p. 758.

(i) *Eltham v. Kingsman* (1818), 1 B. & Ald. 683, 688. See the remarks of Bayley, J., in *Gilbert v. Sykes* (1812), 16 East, at p. 162.

(k) *Da Costa v. Jones* (1778), 2 Cowp. 729.

(l) 9 Anne, c. 14, s. 1 (extending to 16 Car.2, c. 7).

(m) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41, s. 1.

(n) Section 2.

(o) *Sutters v. Briggs*, [1922] A. C. 1; overruling *Nicholls v. Evans*, [1914] 1 K. B. 118.

recover. The section was accordingly repealed (p). But the *bona fide* holder for value of such securities could recover upon them, if after notice of the illegality he could successfully establish his own good faith and ignorance of the illegal origin (q).

The Gaming Act, 1845 (r), declared "all contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering" to be null and void. Though all wagers are void, they are not punishable in a criminal Court, but merely unenforceable in a civil Court (s).

In spite of this statute,* if one man lost a bet and got another man to pay the money on his behalf, an action to recover the money was held to lie (t). Where a man employed an agent to bet for him, and the bet was made and lost, the agent was held able to recover from his principal the money paid away under the bet (u). In this respect the law was changed by the Gaming Act, 1892 (x), which provided that "any promise to pay any person any sum of money paid by him under or in respect of any contract or agreement rendered null and void by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, or to pay any sum of money by way of commission, fee, reward or otherwise in respect of any such contract, or of any services in relation thereto or in connection therewith, shall be null and void, and no action shall be brought or maintained to recover any such sum of money."

Some subsequent decisions may well be considered here. In 1893 in *Tatam v. Reeve* (y), the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, paid certain sums to persons to whom the defendant had lost bets. These payments were held to be money paid "in respect of" a gaming contract within the Gaming Act, 1892; consequently the plaintiff could not recover them from the defendant. Similarly, where plaintiff and defendant betted in partnership, the plaintiff, who paid the losses and claimed contribution from the defendant, was held unable to recover (z). But a betting agent who has received money on behalf of his principal is not entitled to retain it (a). So money lent to enable the borrower to pay a gambling debt can be recovered by the lender (b).

(p) 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 19.

(q) For cases of security given abroad, see *Robinson v. Bland* (1760), 2 Burr. 1077; *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B. 746.

(r) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18.

(s) As to whether the Gaming Act must be pleaded, see *Scott v. Brown*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 724. But as to County Court practice see *Willis v. Lovick*, [1901] 2 K. B. 195.

(t) *Rosewarne v. Billing* (1863), 15 C. B. (N.S.) 316; *Pyke, Ex parte*; *Lister, in re* (1878), 8 Ch. D. 754.

(u) *Read v. Anderson* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 779. But in *Cohen v. Kittell* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 680, the Court dismissed an action against an agent for not making bets as directed.

(x) 55 Vict. c. 9.

(y) [1893] 1 Q. B. 44.

(z) *Saffery v. Mayer*, [1901] 1 K. B. 11. But the Betting Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), does not make a partnership of bookmakers illegal: *Thwaites v. Coulthwaite*, [1896] 1 Ch. 496; and income tax must be paid on the profits of a betting business: *Partridge v. Mallandaine* (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 276.

(a) *De Mattos v. Benjamin* (1894), 63 L. J. Q. B. 248; *Cheshire v. Vaughan*, [1920] 3 K. B. 240.

(b) *O'Shea, In re*, [1911] 2 K. B. 981.

Where A handed to B as stakeholder a sum of money to be paid to X if X should win a race against A, A, after losing, sought to claim the money back from B. It was held that section 1 of the Act of 1892 ("money paid by him") does not apply to money deposited to abide the result of a bet (c). Money lent for the purpose of gambling abroad in a country where such gambling is not illegal may be recovered in this country (d).

The defect of consideration in a gaming contract may sometimes be cured by the importation of a new and not illegal consideration.

Thus, where an action to recover a gaming debt had been dismissed, the creditor wrote to the debtor's club complaining of his conduct in not paying debts of honour; the debtor, in consideration of the letter being withdrawn, gave the creditor bills in satisfaction of his debt. It was held that "the bills were given for an altogether new consideration, which was not an illegal consideration. They were given, not to pay the gaming debt, but, as Romilly, M.R., said in *Bubb v. Yelverton* (e), to avoid the consequences of not having paid it" (f). Similarly, where a bookmaker sued the defendant for gambling debts, it was held that forbearance to sue at the defendant's request might constitute a new and valid consideration for the debt (g). The latest authority is to the contrary (gg). An agreement to refer gaming debts is not enforceable (h), unless there is also an agreement to accept the decision (hh).

Speculative dealings in stocks and shares generally fall outside the Gaming Acts of 1845 and 1892; they are not gaming and wagering contracts, unless there is no intention on the part of either party to deliver or take delivery of stocks and shares and also no obligation on either side so to do. "It is a legitimate commercial transaction to buy a commodity in the expectation that it will rise in value and with the intention of realising a profit by its resale. Such dealings are of everyday occurrence in commerce. The legal aspect of the case is the same whatever be the nature of the commodity, whether it be a cargo of wheat or the shares of a joint-stock company. Nor, again, do such purchases and sales become gaming contracts because the person purchasing is not possessed of the money required to pay for his purchases, but obtains the requisite funds in a large measure

(c) *O'Sullivan v. Thomas*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 698; followed in *Burge v. Ashley*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 744.

(d) *Quarrier v. Colston* (1842), 1 Phill. 147; *Saxby v. Fulton*, [1909] 2 K. B. 208. But see *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B. 746.

(e) (1870), L. R. 9 Eq., at p. 474.

(f) *Per Buckley, J.*, in *Broune, In re; Martingell, ex parte*, [1904] 2 K. B., at p. 135. And see *Goodson v. Baker* (1908), 98 L. T. 415.

(g) *Goodson v. Grierson*, [1908] 1 K. B. 761; and therefore the Court refused to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious (see *Kershaw v. Sievier* (1904), 21 T. L. R. 40). And see *Hyams v. Stuart King*, [1908] 2 K. B. 696 (but see the dissenting judgment of Fletcher Moulton, L.J.), followed in *Hodgkins v. Simpson* (1908), 25 T. L. R. 53; *Genforsikrings Aktieselskabet v. Da Costa*, [1911] 1 K. B. 137. Fletcher Moulton, L.J.'s view was accepted in *O'Connor v. Ralston*, [1920] 3 K. B. 451.

(gg) *Burrell v. Leven* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 407.

(h) *Lee v. Dalmeny* (1926), 43 T. L. R. 119.

(hh) *Hyde v. Tyler* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 442, 652.

by means of advances on the security of the stocks or goods he has purchased" (i).

Dealings in shares with members of the Stock Exchange are subject to such rules and such a course of practice as generally to exclude the operation of the Gaming Acts. Even "option dealings" are not in their nature gaming and wagering contracts (j). In a case where outside brokers were concerned, the jury were asked: "Notwithstanding these ostensible terms of business, was there a secret understanding that the stock should never be called for or delivered, and that differences only should be dealt with?" They answered, "Yes," and the Court (upheld by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords) declared the contracts consequently void (k). If the agreement is in fact an agreement to "pay differences," it will not be less a gaming contract because terms are inserted in it only to cloak the fact. Money due on such agreements cannot be recovered, but money deposited to provide for losses may be reclaimed if not appropriated to the purpose for which they were deposited (l).

Agreements to induce persons to believe in a false market value for shares are illegal (m).

Contracts between partners, masters and apprentices, employers and employees frequently contain covenants by which one party promises not to set up in business in opposition to the other within a defined area and for a defined period after the termination of the contract. These are called COVENANTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. With respect to such contracts the policy of the law has undergone considerable development under the changing conditions of commerce. If there is some consideration for the agreement, and if the agreement is reasonable—that is to say, if it fairly protects the party who seeks to enforce it without interfering with the public interest—the agreement will be enforced. Otherwise such contract, though sometimes referred to as merely void, is illegal under the common law.

In *Mills v. Dunham* (n) Lindley, L.J., observed:—"To treat a restraint of trade as *prima facie* bad, and throw upon the person supporting it the *onus* of showing that it is reasonable, is introducing a wholly unsound principle into the construction of docu-

(i) *Per* Lord Herschell in *Forget v. Ostigny*, [1895] A. C., at p. 323; and see *Thacker v. Hardy* (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 685.

(j) *Buitenlandsche Bankvereniging v. Hildesheim* (1903), 19 T. L. R. 641.

(k) *Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan*, [1896] A. C. 166. As to what is evidence of such a secret understanding, see *Gieve, In re*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 794.

(l) *Cronmire, In re; Waud, ex parte*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 383.

(m) *Scott v. Brown*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 724.

(n) [1891] 1 Ch., at p. 586.

ments. . . . You are to construe the contract, and then see whether it is legal."

The contract may specify the place where, or the persons with whom, or the time during which, trade is to be restrained. The legality of these restrictions is best illustrated by the case of *The Maxim-Nordenfelt Gun Co. v. Nordenfelt* (o). There the defendant, an inventor who traded in the making of guns and ammunition, sold his business to the plaintiff company upon the terms that for twenty-five years he should be restrained from making guns, ammunition, &c., and from carrying on any business likely to compete with the business carried on by the plaintiff company, but that he should not be restrained from dealing in explosives other than gunpowder, in torpedoes, submarines and certain other materials. Before the period of restraint expired the defendant attached himself to another firm which traded in guns and ammunition. Thereupon the plaintiff company sued for an injunction against him. It was held by the House of Lords that the covenant, though unrestricted as to space, was not, having regard to the nature of the business and the limited number of the customers (viz., the Governments of this and other countries), wider than was necessary for the protection of the company and was not injurious to the public interests of this country; that the covenant was therefore valid and might be enforced by injunction. Many such partial restraints on trade are perfectly consistent with public convenience and the general interest, and have been supported—such as the case of selling a shop with a covenant by the vendor not to carry on his former trade in the same place. This is in effect the sale of a goodwill, and offers an encouragement to trade by allowing men to dispose of the fruits of their industry. The vendor will not be entitled to canvass the customers of the old firm (p). The purchaser of a business, to whom is assigned all the beneficial interest and goodwill of the vendor in the business, is entitled to use the vendor's name to show that the business purchased was formerly the vendor's, but not so as to expose the vendor to liability (q). Again, a trader or professional man may take into his service a servant under a covenant that he will not carry on the same trade or profession within certain limits. Here the employer benefits by the security and freedom of choice of assistants which he obtains, while the public benefit in that the master does not withhold from the servant instruction in the secrets and experience of the trade from the fear of afterwards having a rival in the same business (r). But

(o) [1893] 1 Ch. 630; [1894] A. C. 535; and see *Mason v. Provident Clothing Co.*, [1913] A. C. 724; *Att.-Gen. of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co.*, *ibid.* 781; *North-Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co.*, [1914] A. C. 461; *Herbert Morris v. Saxelby*, [1916] 1 A. C. 688; *Horwood v. Millar's Timber Co.*, [1917] 1 K. B. 305.

(p) *Trego v. Hunt*, [1896] A. C. 7; *Fitch v. Dewes*, [1921] 2 A. C. 158. As to what is goodwill, see *Ginesi v. Cooper* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 596.

(q) *Thynne v. Shove* (1890), 45 Ch. D. 577.

(r) See *Mumford v. Gething* (1857), 7 C. B. (N.S.) 305; *Putsman v. Taylor* (1926), 43 T. L. R. 153.

he cannot impose a restriction merely to prevent competition or in such a way as to prevent the servant from earning his living. The covenants in the agreement may be severable. Where an employee engaged during the period of his employment not (1) to work, (2) to hold any interest in another firm, the latter covenant was enforced by injunction, but the former was not (rr).

A contract in restraint of trade must have some consideration to support it, whether it be under seal or not (s). The Court, however, will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration (t). It is satisfied if the contract is reasonable as between the parties. Whether the terms of a covenant are reasonable is a question for the Judge (u); the opinion of other persons in the trade is inadmissible (x).

As to time, the restriction need not be limited to the period during which the employer carries on his business. The goodwill of a trader's business may continue even after his death or retirement and become an asset in the hands of his personal representative or successor (y).

As to the extent of area over which the restriction is to be in force, the Court will consider whether the restraint is larger and wider than the protection of the party can possibly require; if so, it must be deemed unreasonable in law, and the contract creating it is altogether void (z). The Court will not enforce it even within limits which it would have deemed reasonable, for this would be making a fresh contract between the parties. The test of the validity of a covenant in restraint of trade, whether limited or unlimited in the area of its application, is whether it be reasonable (a). Sometimes the area may be held to be too large (b); sometimes an unlimited restriction will be valid,

(rr) *Rely a Bell Burglar, &c., Co. v. Eisler*, [1926] Ch. 609.

(s) See *Mitchel v. Reynolds* (1711), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.) 458.

(t) *Hitchcock v. Coker* (1837), 6 A. & E. 438, 457.

(u) *Dowden v. Pook*, [1904] 1 K. B. 45.

(x) *Haynes v. Doman*, [1899] 2 Ch. 13.

(y) See *Hitchcock v. Coker* (1837), 6 A. & E., at p. 454; *Maxim v. Nordenfelt*, [1893] 1 Ch. 630, 666; *Forster v. Suggett* (1918), 35 T. L. R. 87.

(z) *Dowden v. Pook*, [1904] 1 K. B. 45; *Lamson Pneumatic Tube Co. v. Phillips* (1905), 91 L. T. 363; *Attwood v. Lamont*, [1920] 3 K. B. 571. Where distance is specified, it must be measured in a straight line from point to point: *Mouflet v. Cole* (1872), L. R. 8 Ex. 32.

(a) *Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Gun Co.*, [1894] A. C. 535; *Dubowski v. Goldstein*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 478.

(b) *Hooper v. Willis* (1906), 94 L. T. 624; *British R. C. E. Co. v. Schelff*, [1921] 2 Ch. 563; *Mulligan v. Carr*, [1925] 1 Ir. R. 169.

if reasonably necessary for the protection of the party contracting (c). Or the covenant may restrain the other party from doing business with a particular class of persons: for example, a solicitor's articulated clerk might validly be restrained from acting for the solicitor's existing clients (d).

Much depends on the nature of the trade or profession, the number of persons residing in the neighbourhood, the mode in which the trade or profession is usually carried on, and other matters with which the Court cannot always be conversant. The interest of the party claiming protection has been held to extend very widely. Thus contracts between professional men have been supported where the area of exclusion was greater than the area of the plaintiff's practice. The Court will only refuse to enforce the contract where so wide a restriction is "plainly and obviously unnecessary." In *Horner v. Graves* (c) the area of exclusion from practice as a dentist was a circle round York of the diameter of 200 miles; this restriction was held to be too large. In *Price v. Green* (f) a covenant not to carry on a certain trade "within the cities of London or Westminster, or within the distance of 600 miles from the same respectively," was held to be divisible—good so far as it related to London and Westminster, but void as to the other part. And in *Tallis v. Tallis* (g), a covenant by which the defendant restricted himself from carrying on the business of a canvassing publisher in London and within 150 miles of the General Post Office, or in Liverpool or Manchester, or within a like distance of either of those towns, was held to be a not unreasonable restriction upon a man carrying on such a business.

Later cases have carried this even further. Thus in *Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorstont* (h), the defendant was held bound by his covenant not to carry on directly or indirectly, or allow others to carry on, in any part of Europe, the manufacture or sale of productions manufactured by the process sold by him to the plaintiffs. And in *Rousillon v. Rousillon* (i), it was decided by Fry, J., that there is no absolute rule that a covenant in restraint of trade is void, even though unlimited in extent. The question in each case is whether the restraint extends further than is necessary for the

(c) *Mills v. Dunham*, [1891] 1 Ch. 576; *Badische Anilin Fabrik v. Schott*, [1892] 3 Ch. 447; *Nordenfellt v. Maxim-Nordenfellt Co.*, *supra*.

(d) See *Nicholls v. Stretton* (1847), 10 Q. B. 346; *May v. O'Neill* (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 660; *Fitch v. Dewes*, [1921] 2 A. C. 158. Compare *Dubowski v. Goldstein*, *supra*.

(e) (1831), 7 Bing. 735, 744; and see *Mallan v. May* (1843), 11 M. & W. 653, 667; (1844), 13 M. & W. 511.

(f) (1847), 16 M. & W. 346. See *Rogers v. Maddocks*, [1892] 3 Ch. 346; *William Robinson v. Heuer*, [1898] 2 Ch. 451; *Hooper v. Willis* (1905), 21 T. L. R. 691; *Great Western, &c., Dairies v. Gibbs* (1918), 34 T. L. R. 344.

(g) (1853), 1 E. & B. 391; see *Welstead v. Hadley* (1904), 21 T. L. R. 165.

(h) (1869), L. R. 9 Eq. 345. But see the remarks of Cotton, L.J., in *Davies v. Davies* (1887), 36 Ch. D., at p. 385.

(i) (1880), 14 Ch. D. 351; but see *Ropeways v. Hoyle* (1919), 35 T. L. R. 285.

reasonable protection of the covenantee. If it does not do that, the performance of the covenant will be enforced, even though the restriction be unlimited as to space. Thus, an agreement by a defendant not to represent any other champagne house for two years after leaving the plaintiff's, nor to establish himself or associate himself with other persons or houses in the champagne trade for ten years after that date, was held good (*k*).

A contract which tends to promote immorality cannot be made the foundation of an action by either party to it. For instance, an agreement with a view to future illicit cohabitation is illegal and void (*l*); the hire of a carriage (*m*), or the rent of lodgings (*n*), to enable a woman of loose character to attract or to consort with men, cannot be recovered; a printseller cannot recover the price of libellous or indecent prints delivered to the defendant (*o*). Generally "if a person makes a contract with the knowledge that another intends to apply its subject-matter to an immoral purpose, he cannot recover upon it" (*p*). "A contract lawful in itself . . . is illegal if it be entered into with the object that the law should be violated" (*q*).

Past cohabitation or previous seduction is not a good consideration for a parol promise. Neither is it an illegal consideration; it is no consideration at all. Inasmuch, however, as an instrument under seal does not require a consideration to support it, a bond given for the maintenance of a woman, founded on past cohabitation, would be good (*r*); but "it by no means follows that a covenant to pay a sum of money tainted with illegality can be enforced" (*s*). Thus if an agreement be made to pay a sum of money in consideration of future cohabitation and after cohabitation the money remains unpaid, a bond given to secure that money cannot be enforced (*t*). So an agreement made before marriage that the parties after marriage should be at liberty to live apart is against public policy,

(*k*) *Rousillon v. Rousillon*, *supra*.

(*l*) *Walker v. Perkins* (1764), 3 Burr. 1568; *Ayerst v. Jenkins* (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 275.

(*m*) *Pearce v. Brookes* (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 218.

(*n*) *Appleton v. Campbell* (1826), 2 Car. & P. 347; and see *Feret v. Hill* (1854), 15 C. B. 207; *Bowman v. Secular Society*, [1917] A. C. 406.

(*o*) *Fores v. Johnes* (1802), 4 Esp. 97; and see *Poplett v. Stockdale* (1825), R. & M. 337.

(*p*) *Per Mellor, J.*, in *Taylor v. Chester* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B., at p. 311.

(*q*) *Per cur.* in *Waugh v. Morris* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B., at p. 207; cf. *Burrows v. Rhodes*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 816.

(*r*) *Vallance v. Blagden* (1884), 26 Ch. D. 353.

(*s*) *Per cur.* in *Fisher v. Bridges* (1854), 3 E. & B., at p. 650.

(*t*) *Ibid.* And see the remarks of Lord Selborne in *Ayerst v. Jenkins* (1873), L. R. 16 Eq., at p. 282.

and therefore void (u). But the Courts are very chary about relying upon public policy as a reason for their decisions. It "is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you" (x).

Generally, in the words of Lord Ellenborough, "where ever the tolerating of any species of contract has a tendency to produce a public mischief or inconvenience, such a contract has been held to be void" (y). Nevertheless "it must not be forgotten," said Jessel, M.R., "that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because, if there is one thing more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract" (z). The principles as to what is against public policy are settled and no Judge will invent new principles merely to avoid coming to a decision which he disapproves.

(u) *Dagg v. Dagg* (1882), 7 P. D. 17; *Brodie v. Brodie*, [1917] P. 271.

(x) *Per Burrough, J.*, in *Richardson v. Mellish* (1824), 2 Bing., at p. 252; cited with approval by Kekewich, J., in *Davies v. Davies* (1887), 36 Ch. D., at p. 364. For a case in which an agreement clearly contrary to the interests of the State was held lawful, see *Rawlings v. General Trading Co.*, [1921] 1 K. B. 635.

(y) *Gilbert v. Sykes* (1812), 16 East, at pp. 156, 157.

(z) *Printing, &c., Co. v. Sampson* (1875), L. R. 19 Eq., at p. 465.

CHAPTER VII.

BREACHES OF CONTRACT : PERFORMANCE AND DISCHARGE.

THE breach or neglect by one party of his obligation under a contract at once confers a right of action on the other for at least nominal damages. But it does not necessarily dissolve the contract or release the parties from performing their respective duties under it.

In an ordinary action for breach of contract the plaintiff must, as a rule, prove four things :—

(i) The contract.

(ii) The performance by the plaintiff of his part of the contract—or readiness to perform his part, as the case may be.

(iii) A breach of the contract by the defendant.

(iv) Any damage, other than nominal, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the breach.

(i) In the first place the plaintiff must prove the contract on which he sues. If the contract is not under seal, he must also prove that he gave consideration for it. If the contract is in writing, the original must, as a rule, be produced (*a*). If the defendant has pleaded the Statute of Frauds (*b*) or the Sale of Goods Act (*c*), the plaintiff must prove either that the contract does not fall within the statute pleaded, or that its provisions have been complied with. If the defendant has pleaded a Statute of Limitation, the plaintiff must show that his cause of action accrued or has been revived within the prescribed period (*d*). If the defendant has pleaded the non-performance of any condition precedent (*e*), the plaintiff must establish that all times have

(a) See *post*, p. 91.

(b) L. P. A., 1925, s. 40, sub-s. 1, *ante*, p. 41.

(c) See Chapter IV., *ante*, pp. 38 *et seq.*

(d) See further, as to the Statutes of Limitation, *post*, pp. 463 *et seq.*

(e) Order XIX., r. 14.

elapsed and that all things have happened which were necessary preliminaries to the defendant's becoming liable on the contract. Where there is a special contract still "open" between the parties (*i.e.*, not yet fully performed and still binding on them), no action in relation to the matter can as a rule be brought except upon that contract. In some cases, however, as we shall see, the conduct of the defendant may give the plaintiff a right to rescind the contract or to regard it as rescinded by the defendant; and then the plaintiff may, if he thinks fit, sue upon a new contract, which is implied by law from the circumstances. In that case the plaintiff must set out in his Statement of Claim and prove at the trial the facts from which this new contract should be implied (f).

(ii) Where, under the contract, each party is bound to do something, the plaintiff must, as a rule, perform his part of the contract before he can sue the defendant for omitting to perform his part. Where, for instance, a man contracts to do a piece of work for a lump sum, he can recover nothing till that work is done, even though the non-completion be due to no fault of his. It is one entire contract, and the remuneration promised on completion cannot be apportioned as the work proceeds. If payment is required as the work proceeds, the parties must so provide.

In other cases, however, it may be necessary to inquire whether the performance due under the contract is or is not divisible. This is a question which it is not always easy to answer. It must be solved, not by technical rules, but by ascertaining the intention of the parties. Their intention must, of course, be deduced primarily from the language which they have used in framing their contract. The parties may have stipulated that the performance of some apparently trivial matter shall be a condition precedent, so that non-performance of it shall discharge the contract. "Or they may have intended that the performance of some matter apparently of essential importance, and *prima facie* a condition precedent, is not really vital, and may be com-

(f) Order XIX., rr. 20, 24, and Order XXI., r. 3.

pensated for in damages. And if they sufficiently expressed such an intention, it will not be a condition precedent'' (g). If it is provided by the contract that the breach of a particular clause in it shall avoid the whole contract, it will have that effect. But the Judge will look, not only at the expressed terms of the contract, but also at the nature of the services to be rendered, at the usual incidents of contracts of this class and at all other surrounding circumstances that are material. He then decides whether the parties did or did not intend that performance of, or readiness to perform, one side of the contract should be a condition precedent to the right to demand performance of the other side. If it was so intended, no action lies without proof of complete performance or readiness completely to perform. Often, however, the Judge may come to the conclusion* that the parties did not intend their mutual promises to be so interwoven and involved, but that they made two wholly distinct and collateral promises, which might be independently performed. In that case each can sue if the other breaks his promise without proving the performance of his own promise.

Thus, if A agrees to sell goods to B for £50, and B agrees to pay A £50 for them, these two promises make one contract, which is entire and indivisible. But if a lease contains a covenant by the tenant to pay the rent on the usual quarter days, and also a covenant by the landlord to insure the demised premises, the landlord can sue for any arrears of rent without proving that he has insured; for the covenants here are independent of each other (h).

So with contracts for work and labour done. Whenever the nature of the job is such that the work will be of little or no value to the other party until it is finished, there the plaintiff cannot, in the absence of a special agreement, recover any remuneration until the job is finished. "If a man engages to carry a box of cigars from London to Birmingham it is an entire contract, and he cannot throw the cigars out of the carriage half-way there and ask for half the money; or if a shoemaker agrees to make a pair of shoes, he cannot offer you one shoe and ask you to pay one-half the price" (i).

(g) *Per cur.* in *Bettini v. Gye* (1876), 1 Q. B. D., at p. 187.

(h) As to when words in a lease amount to a qualification of the lessee's covenant and when to an independent stipulation by the lessor, see *Westacott v. Hahn*, [1918] 1 K. B. 495.

(i) *Per Jessel, M.R.*, in *Hall, In re* (1878), 9 Ch. D., at p. 545.

So if the plaintiff has agreed to build for A a stable for £200, and stops work before he has roofed the building in, he can recover nothing, as he promised to build a stable, not walls (*k*). The whole object of the contract was to have a stable in a completed state; hence A may insist on his right and refuse to make any payment until the work is finished. It is, however, usual in building contracts to insert an express clause entitling the builder to receive from time to time under a certificate of the architect 80 per cent. of the value of the work done. For each such instalment the builder can sue separately; the remaining 20 per cent. is left in the hands of the building owner and is called "retention money."

The rule that a plaintiff must complete his part of a contract before he can sue the defendant for the non-performance of his part is illustrated by several decisions. Thus a man, who contracted to make certain old chandeliers complete for ten pounds, was held unable to recover anything when his services, though valuable, had not yet made the goods complete (*l*). And where a man agreed to serve as second mate on a voyage for a lump sum, and died before the voyage was over, his executors were unable to recover anything on a *quantum meruit* (*m*). A servant dismissed for good cause cannot recover from his master in respect of the current period of service left incomplete by the dismissal (*n*).

But to this *prima facie* rule there are many exceptions, in which an action will lie although there has been only a partial performance on the part of the plaintiff. The general rule is that a party, who has omitted or refused fully to perform his contract, cannot claim to be paid even for the portion which he has performed, unless he was prevented by the other party from doing the whole, or unless there is a provision in the contract or a custom of the trade entitling him so to do (*o*).

So, too, it is possible that performance of the contract by a third party may be equivalent to performance by the contractor himself, but not in the case of contracts involving special personal qualifications in the contractor.

The contractor "cannot vouch the capacity of another to perform that which the other party to the contract might, however,

(*k*) *Sumpter v. Hedges*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 673.

(*l*) *Sinclair v. Bowles* (1829), 9 B. & C. 92.

(*m*) *Cutter v. Powell* (1795), 6 T. R. 320. But see *O'Neil v. Armstrong*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 418. The system of payment of seamen is now quite different.

(*n*) See *post*, pp. 216.

(*o*) *Roberts v. Havelock* (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 404, at p. 406. A somewhat extreme case is *Vigors v. Cook*, [1919] 2 K. B. 475.

unreasonably, insist was what alone he undertook to pay for, namely, work to be executed by the party himself. If, for instance, he had ordered a painting from some unknown artist of his own choice, he could not be compelled to accept instead of it the work of another artist, however eminent" (p). But where there is a contract for the supply of coal or other materials, if the merchant gets what he is entitled to under the contract, and it does not matter who in fact supplies the materials, the other party may perform its obligations by another hand (q). Thus, where the British Waggon Company agreed to let railway waggons to Lea & Co. for a term of years at a certain rent and to repair the waggons, and subsequently assigned their business to another company who duly kept the waggons in repair, it was held that the British Waggon Company "fulfilled its obligations under the contract by finding a new company (assignee of the contract) able and willing to execute the repairs which the old company contracted to perform" (r).

Again, where work has been done or goods supplied under a special agreement, but not in accordance with it, compensation may be claimed if the defendant has retained and enjoyed the benefit of the plaintiff's work or goods; for by so doing he has ratified the substitution. Moreover, if there be a contract void for want of writing under the Statute of Frauds, from the part performance of which by the plaintiff the defendant derives a benefit, he is often liable, not upon the original contract, but upon a fresh agreement implied by law in substitution for it. He must pay for the benefit which he has received (s); or, in the language of the old pleaders, he is liable on a *quantum meruit*—that is, for "so much as the plaintiff has earned." So, too, in spite of the rule that a corporation is only bound by a contract under seal (t), it is now clear law that, where a plaintiff is employed by a corporation under a parol contract or one in writing merely, the corporation will be liable on a *quantum meruit*, if the plaintiff has fully performed his part of it and the corporation has accepted the

(p) *Per* Collins, M.R., in *Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers*, [1902] 2 K. B., at p. 669.

(q) See the remarks of Cozens-Hardy, L.J., *ibid.*, at pp. 678, 679.

(r) *British Waggon Co. v. Lea & Co.* (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 149; cited with approval by Cozens-Hardy, L.J., [1902] 2 K. B., at p. 679.

(s) *Mavor v. Pyne* (1825), 3 Bing. 285; *Pulbrook v. Lawes* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 284, at p. 289; *Scott v. Pattison*, [1923] 2 K. B., at p. 727.

(t) See *ante*, p. 14.

benefit of such performance—and this although the original contract cannot be enforced by either party (*u*).

Where the defendant had verbally promised to pay the plaintiff £300 a year by equal quarterly instalments for so long as she should maintain and educate their children, it was held that he was liable as to periods which had gone by, although the contract was not in writing; for his children had been maintained and educated by the plaintiff at his request (*x*).

Where goods which a corporation has contracted by parol to buy have been received by it, or after work is done and adopted for the purposes of the corporation, the objection that the contract was not under seal cannot be taken (*y*).

But the right of action upon a *quantum meruit* cannot arise so long as the original contract is still “open,” *i.e.*, is unperformed and still binding on the parties to it (*z*). Where the contract is entire, the plaintiff cannot so recover unless—

(a) the defendant has prevented the plaintiff from performing his part of the contract, or has made such default in the performance of his own part as will exonerate the plaintiff from performing his part; or

(b) the plaintiff has done extra work of which the defendant has adopted the benefit, in which case there is deemed to be an implied contract to pay for the extra work.

Where an author contracted to write a book on Ancient Armour for a series which the publishers subsequently abandoned, it was held that, as the defendants had broken the special contract, he might succeed on a *quantum meruit* (*a*). “If a man agrees to deliver me one hundred quarters of corn and, after I have received ten quarters, I decline taking any more, he is at all events entitled to recover against me the value of the ten that I have received” (*b*).

(iii) Next the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has broken his contract. If the contract has not named any

(*u*) Except, of course, where there is an express statutory provision to the contrary, as in the case of contracts by urban authorities; see *Young v. Mayor, &c., of Leamington* (1883), 8 App. Cas. 517.

(*x*) *Knowlman v. Bluett* (1873), L. R. 9 Ex. 1, 307.

(*y*) *Sanders v. St. Neots Union* (1846), 8 Q. B. 810; *Lawford v. Billericay R. D. C.*, [1903] 1 K. B. 772; *Douglass v. Rhyl U. D. C.*, [1913] 2 Ch. 407.

(*z*) But the term *quantum meruit* is also used more widely. See *Dakin v. Lee*, [1916] 1 K. B. 566, where the work was done under the contract, and the remarks of Salter, J., in *Scott v. Pattison*, [1923] 2 K. B., at p. 727.

(*a*) *Planché v. Colburn* (1831), 8 Bing. 14; and see *Ogdens v. Nelson*, [1905] A. C. 109.

(*b*) *Per Best, C.J.*, in *Mavor v. Pyne* (1825), 3 Bing., at p. 288.

time within which the defendant must perform his part, he is allowed a reasonable time for such performance, and no action will lie until such reasonable time has elapsed. What is reasonable is always a question of fact in each case. Even if a date be fixed by the contract for the performance of his promise, still it may be a question whether that date can be rigidly insisted upon. Time is not always of the essence of a contract, as, for instance, in a contract for the sale of land; but an express stipulation as to time will be given effect to (c); and in the case of a contract for the sale of a public-house as a going concern time is of the essence of the contract (d). The equitable rule which ordinarily regarded time as not essential was extended to the common law by the Judicature Act, 1873 (e), but to apply this principle "to mercantile contracts would be dangerous and unreasonable" (f). Even, however, in the case of mercantile matters time of payment is not of the essence of the contract "unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract" (g).

Even where time is not originally of the essence of the contract, the law grants protection against unreasonable delay in performance. Where one party has omitted to perform his promise, the other may give him notice that if he does not do so by a certain date he will treat the delay as a breach of contract. But the date fixed must be one which under all the circumstances of the case allows a reasonable time for the completion of what remains to be done (h).

Whether the defendant's conduct amounts to a breach of his contract must depend upon the nature of the contract and the circumstances of the particular case. If the plaintiff can show that the defendant has unequivocally announced that, when the time comes for performance, he will break the contract, the plaintiff is discharged and

(c) *Hudson v. Temple* (1860), 29 Beav. 536.

(d) *Day v. Lühke* (1868), L. R. 5 Eq. 336; *Cowles v. Gale* (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 12.

(e) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66.

(f) *Per Cotton, L.J.*, in *Reuter v. Sala* (1879), 4 C. P. D., at p. 249; *Hartley v. Hyman*, [1920] 3 K. B. 475; and see *post*, p. 143.

(g) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 10, sub-s. 1.

(h) *Stickney v. Keeble*, [1915] A. C. 386.

entitled at once to treat the contract as broken and to sue for the breach of it. Or, if he prefers, he may wait till the day fixed for performance, thus giving the defendant a *locus pœnitentiæ*. In the latter case, however, the contract remains in existence for the benefit and at the risk of both parties; so that, should it from any other cause be discharged before the day fixed for performance, the defendant will be released from liability (i).

Where one party has elected not to perform the contract on his part, it is competent for the other party to say: "I take you at your word: the agreement shall be put an end to altogether, I retaining my right to sue you for the breach" (j). So where there is renunciation during the course of performance, the other party is discharged and entitled to sue at once for breach of contract (k).

A traveller engaged a courier for a period beginning on June 1. Before that date he told the courier he should not require his services. It was held that the courier's right of action accrued at once, and he need not wait till June to sue (l). A man made a promise to marry a woman upon the death of his father; he renounced the promise while his father was still alive. It was held that the woman could sue immediately without waiting for the father's death (m). A similar right of action accrued immediately where a man promised to marry X on a certain date, and married Y before that date arrived (n).

A railway company, having contracted to purchase 3,900 tons of railway chairs at a fixed price, gave notice to the vendor, after he had supplied less than half the amount, that they would not require any more. It was held that he could sue without actual delivery of the whole, and need only show that he was willing to have made full performance (o).

(iv) It is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that he has sustained any actual loss through the defendant's breach of contract. Breach of contract is always a cause of action, irrespective of damage; consequently the plaintiff

(i) *Avery v. Bowden* (1855), 5 E. & B. 714.

(j) See *General Billposting Co. v. Atkinson*, [1908] 1 Ch. 537, at p. 545; [1909] A. C. 118; *Bradley v. Newsom*, [1919] A. C. 16, at p. 53.

(k) See *Boston Deep Sea, &c., Co. v. Ansell* (1888), 39 Ch. D. 339, 365.

(l) *Hochster v. De la Tour* (1853), 2 E. & B. 678.

(m) *Frost v. Knight* (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 111.

(n) *Short v. Stone* (1846), 8 Q. B. 358.

(o) *Cort v. Ambergate Ry. Co.* (1851), 17 Q. B. 127; *British and Beningtons v. N. W. Cachar Tea Co.*, [1923] A. C. 48.

can recover nominal damages for the mere breach, even if he has suffered no loss thereby. But if he can prove that he has suffered loss from the breach, he will recover substantial damages (*p*). In this case the plaintiff must specifically allege such special damage in his pleading and prove it at the trial.

The parties may have stipulated that a specific sum shall be recoverable in the event of a breach of contract. This sum may represent "liquidated damages"; that is to say, the parties may agree that it shall stand in place of the amount which a jury might assess, and the jury cannot at the trial award a larger or smaller amount. Or it may be a "penalty," in which case the plaintiff can recover only for such damage as he can prove that he has suffered, which may be much less than the amount of the penalty (*q*). The fact that the parties may in their contract have described a sum as either "liquidated damages" or "penalty" is by no means conclusive of its character.

Defences to an Action of Contract.

A great variety of defences are open to a defendant in an action of contract. We will assume that the plaintiff has established a *prima facie* case; we will also assume that the contract on which he relies is neither void on the ground of illegality nor voidable on the ground of fraud or of want of capacity in either party (*r*). Apart from these, the most usual and obvious defences are—

(i) that the defendant has fully performed his part of the contract;

(ii) that it was impossible for the defendant to perform his part of the contract;

(iii) that the plaintiff has prevented the defendant from performing his part of the contract;

(iv) that the contract was, before any breach of it, rescinded by mutual consent, or varied by a new agreement between the parties, or determined by operation of law;

(*p*) See *post*, pp. 672 *et seq.*

(*q*) See 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, s. 8; and *post*, pp. 682 *et seq.*

(*r*) As to Coverture, Infancy, Lunacy, see *post*, Book VI., Chapters I.—III.

(v) that before any breach on the part of the defendant the plaintiff exonerated and discharged him from performing his part of the contract by making default in performing his own part, or otherwise by his conduct divesting himself of any right to sue thereon;

(vi) that after the breach of contract on which the plaintiff sues had been committed by the defendant the plaintiff released or discharged his right of action thereon—

(a) by a release under seal, or

(b) by an accord and satisfaction.

It will be necessary to deal in detail with each of the above defences. The defendant may also, of course, plead a set-off or counterclaim (s).

(i) It is a defence to any action on a contract that the defendant has fully performed his part of it. The burden of proving this lies on the defendant. What amounts to a performance will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case (t).

Where the defendant's obligation under the contract is merely to pay the plaintiff a sum of money and he holds a written receipt for the full amount payable, the receipt is *prima facie* evidence of the payment. But a receipt is not conclusive evidence of payment, nor does it act as an estoppel. A man who has given a receipt may show that he gave it by mistake or in consequence of fraud or subject to a condition which has not yet been performed (u).

In writing a receipt, any form of words will suffice which shows that the debtor is discharged; the mere signature of the vendor attached to a bill or invoice may be enough (v). But where the receipt is for £2 or upwards (subject to certain exceptions), the receipt must bear a twopenny stamp, which must be cancelled by the person who receives the money at the time of giving the receipt. The creditor is liable to a fine of £10 if he does not on request give the debtor a stamped receipt upon payment of such sum (x). The

(s) See *post*, p. 653.

(t) See *ante*, pp. 92—95.

(u) See *Lee v. Lancs. and Yorks. Ry. Co.* (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 527.

(v) See *Spawforth v. Alexander* (1798), 2 Esp. 621.

(x) See the Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 103; Finance Act, 1920, s. 34. Receipts for wages, &c., are exempted by Finance Act, 1924, s. 36.

fact of payment may be proved orally, whether or not a written receipt exists, and whether or not that receipt be duly stamped (*y*).

In *Att.-Gen. v. Carlton Bank* (*z*), the Court discussed the definition of "receipt," and excluded "entries intended merely for the regulation of book-keeping" which "are not regarded as documents of acquittance to the clerk who hands over the money, and are not retained by him."

A barrister's receipt for fees over £2 must be stamped (*a*), although he cannot bring an action to recover them.

Sometimes, where the defendant's case is that he has paid the debt, or part of the debt, for which he is now sued before the action was brought, questions may arise as to the appropriation of payments. One man may owe another different debts contracted at different times, for different considerations and secured in different ways. For example, A may owe B money on a mortgage, and on a bill of exchange, and as a joint debtor, and as a debtor with a surety who is liable on his default. Then, if A pays B a sum which is not enough to extinguish all his debts, A has the right to "appropriate" the payment to the satisfaction of any particular debt. Either before or during his payment over of the money to B, A may say "This is for the mortgage debt," or "This is for the debt which I owe jointly with X," or "for the debt for which Z is my surety." The creditor would perhaps much prefer another debt (*e.g.*, a debt for which he has only the debtor's personal security) to be paid off first; but he cannot prevent the debtor from applying the payment to satisfy any particular debt, so long as the debtor notifies his intention before or at the time of payment (*b*). The appropriation by the debtor may be express, or it can be inferred from his conduct, or from other circumstances which clearly indicate his intention (*c*).

But, where the money is paid over generally without any appropriation by the debtor, the creditor may apply it to any debt he pleases, the amount of which is agreed and

(*y*) *Rambert v. Cohen* (1803), 4 Esp. 213; *Maugham v. Hubbard* (1828), 8 B. & C. 14.

(*z*) [1899] 2 Q. B. 158, 165.

(*a*) *General Council of the Bar v. Inland Revenue*, [1907] 1 K. B. 462.

(*b*) See *Mayfield v. Wadsley* (1824), 3 B. & C. at p. 362.

(*c*) *Newmarch v. Clay* (1811), 14 East, 239.

ascertained, even to one barred by the Statute of Limitations (*d*). The creditor is not obliged to do so at the time he receives the money; he may appropriate it up to the very last moment (*e*), even while giving evidence in the witness-box (*f*).

The creditor may make his appropriation either by express words or by any method which clearly shows his intention. If he does so by a private entry in his own books uncommunicated to the debtor, he can afterwards change his mind and apply it to some other debt. But once he has signified his appropriation to the debtor, he cannot afterwards change it (*g*). Naturally, the creditor will generally apply the payment to satisfy the oldest unsecured simple contract debt for which the debtor alone is liable, because that will soonest become statute barred.

In the absence of circumstances indicating intention, the law will not apply money, which has been paid generally, towards the discharge of a secured debt in favour of a surety (*h*). But a creditor may not, when there is a legal debt unpaid, appropriate the payment to one which is not a legal debt (*i*).

If neither debtor nor creditor appropriate the money paid to any specific debt, the law will apply the payment first to discharge any interest that may be due, and next to satisfy the outstanding debts in order of date, commencing with the oldest, unless there are circumstances to show that such was not the intention of the parties (*k*). There may be circumstances to show that the creditor reserved his right to appropriate (*l*).

Sometimes the TENDER or offer of performance is a sufficient discharge of the contract. Thus, if a man con-

(*d*) *Mills v. Fowkes* (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 455.

(*e*) *Per* Lord Macnaghten, in *The Mecca*, [1897] A. C., at p. 294.

(*f*) *Seymour v. Pickett*, [1905] 1 K. B. 715; and see *Philpott v. Jones* (1834), 2 A. & E. 41.

(*g*) *Friend v. Young*, [1897] 2 Ch. 421.

(*h*) *Sherry, In re* (1884), 25 Ch. D. 692.

(*i*) *Wright v. Laing* (1824), 3 B. & C. 165; *Keeping v. Broom* (1895), 11 T. L. R. 595; but see *contra*, *Philpott v. Jones* (1834), 2 A. & E. 41.

(*k*) *Clayton's Case* (1816), 1 Mer. 572. See the remarks of Blackburn, J., in *City Discount Co. v. McLean* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P., at p. 701; and *Hooper v. Keay* (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 178.

(*l*) *The Mecca*, [1897] A. C. 286.

tracts to deliver goods and tenders them according to the contract, he is discharged; for he has done all in his power to perform his contract. If the goods are refused, he can bring an action for the non-acceptance of them, and he has a good defence to an action for non-delivery (*m*). So if a man is liable to pay a definite sum of money (*n*), he will be discharged if before action brought he tenders to the plaintiff that sum of money, or subsequently, when sued, pays the money into Court with a plea of tender. Tender will prevent the further accrual of interest on the sum due (*o*).

Such tender must be for the whole amount due. Tender of a larger sum may be good, but the debtor cannot ask for change. An offer of five pound notes of the Bank of England is valid for any sum above £5; current gold coins of the realm and currency notes are good tender to any extent, but a man need not accept more than forty shillings in silver money, nor more than a shilling in copper (*p*). Giving a cheque is payment only if the cheque be honoured; in the absence of a special agreement, such payment is conditional, but not so as to release a security (*q*). Till the cheque has been presented and dishonoured (if the debtor does not previously stop the cheque), it suspends the right of action on the debt (*r*). Where a bill of exchange was offered and taken in payment of rent, it was held to be evidence of an agreement not to distrain until the bill fell due (*s*).

(ii) Contracts which are physically impossible, or patently absurd, are void. The parties would be held not to have seriously intended to make a valid contract. But since no man is obliged to make an absolute promise, an absolute promise if made may be held to bind him.

Thus a tenant, who covenants to repair or to pay rent, is not discharged from his contract if the premises are accidentally destroyed, or if the King's enemies keep him out of possession.

(*m*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 37; see *post*, p. 153.

(*n*) A plea of tender cannot strictly be pleaded to actions for unliquidated damages, whether in contract or in tort: *Davys v. Richardson* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 202, unless there be some special statutory provision enabling a defendant to tender amends.

(*o*) *Dent v. Dunn* (1812), 3 Camp. 296; *Griffiths v. School Board of Ystradygjedwg* (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 307.

(*p*) 33 Vict. c. 10, s. 4; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98; 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 14.

(*q*) *Eichholz v. Defries*, [1909] 2 Ch., at p. 428.

(*r*) *Charles v. Blackwell* (1877), 2 C. P. D. 151, at p. 158; *Elliott v. Crutchley*, [1903] 2 K. B. 476; [1904] 1 K. B. 565; [1906] A. C. 7.

(*s*) *Palmer v. Bramley*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 405; but see *Eichholz v. Defries*, *supra*, at p. 429.

"When the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract, and therefore if the lessee covenant to repair a house, though it be burnt by lightning or thrown down by enemies, yet he ought to repair it" (t).

If a merchant makes an absolute contract to load a certain cargo in a certain place and time, it is no defence for him to plead that performance became impossible through frost (u), or a dock strike (x), or an epidemic (y).

It is essential to consider whether the parties to a contract have impliedly agreed that its performance shall be conditional upon the continuance of the possibility of performance, or whether they have contracted absolutely and run the risk of impossibility of performance. In the latter alternative, the promisor is taken to have warranted the possibility of performance, there being apparently no general legal presumption that impossibility shall excuse him.

In some cases contracts will be discharged if, after they are made, it becomes impossible to perform them, provided that the impossibility is not created through the default of one of the parties. If the parties contract on the basis of the continued existence of a particular thing, the destruction of that thing may discharge them if it happens through the fault of neither. Contracts to give personal services are discharged, if death or incapacitating illness renders it impossible to perform them.

Where A contracted to let B a hall for the purposes of an entertainment, and the hall was accidentally burnt down before the time fixed, it was held that the contract was at an end (z). Where a man contracts to sell specified goods, if they have at the time without his knowledge already ceased to exist, the contract is void

(t) *Paradine v. Jane* (1648), Aleyn, 26, 27; *Redmond v. Dainton*, [1920] 2 K. B. 256; *Matthey v. Curling*, [1922] 2 A. C. 180; *Sargent v. Paterson* (1923), 39 T. L. R. 378.

(u) *Kearon v. Pearson* (1861), 31 L. J. Ex. 1.

(x) *Budgett v. Binnington*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 35.

(y) *Barker v. Hodgson* (1814), 3 M. & S. 267. It is difficult to distinguish the decisions in *Hills v. Sughrue* (1846), 15 M. & W. 253, and in *Clifford v. Watts* (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 577. See *ante*, p. 74.

(z) *Taylor v. Caldwell* (1863), 3 B. & S. 826. For discussions as to the circumstances in which a condition will or will not be implied, see *Tamplin v. Anglo-American P.P. Co.*, [1916] 2 A. C. 397; *Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co.*, [1918] A. C. 119, and *Bank Line v. Capel*, [1919] A. C. 435.

under the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (a). And if after such a contract "the goods, without any fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk passes to the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided" (b).

A contract to play the piano at a concert or to sing in an opera would fall under this rule, for it is "a contract to perform a service which no deputy could perform, and which in case of death could not be performed by the executors of the deceased." Consequently, "by virtue of the terms of the original bargain, incapacity of body or mind in the performer, without default on his or her part, is an excuse for non-performance. Of course the parties might expressly contract that incapacity should not excuse, and thus preclude the condition of health from being annexed to their agreement" (c).

A contract to marry is discharged when performance becomes impossible through the death of one of the parties. Serious illness of one party would seem to excuse the other; "it would be most mischievous," said Lord Kenyon, "to compel parties to marry who can never live happily together" (d). Nevertheless, where the defendant in an action for breach of promise to marry pleaded that since the promise he had become totally unfit for marriage by reason of dangerous illness of the lungs, the Judges held that this was no defence, as the plaintiff might desire the position in life of his wife or widow (e).

When the illness of King Edward VII in 1902 made it impossible to carry out the coronation arrangements, several cases came before the Courts in which the parties had agreed to let and hire rooms and seats for viewing the procession. The decision cited above (f), where a contract for hiring a hall was discharged by the accidental burning of the hall, was followed in these cases; and it was held that no action lies where "a state of things or condition expressed in the contract and essential to its performance perishes or fails to be in existence at that time" (g). Though the actual agreement was for the letting of a room and such letting was not made impossible by the King's illness, it was held that the contract was impliedly conditional on the procession taking place (h). Since therefore neither plaintiff nor

(a) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 6.

(b) *Ibid.*, s. 7. As to when the risk passes, see section 20, *post*, p. 149.

(c) *Per* Bramwell, B., in *Robinson v. Davison* (1871), L. R. 6 Ex., at p. 277.

(d) *Atchinson v. Baker* (1797), Peake, Add. Cas., at p. 105.

(e) *Hall v. Wright* (1858), E. B. & E. 746.

(f) *Taylor v. Caldwell* (1863), 3 B. & S. 826.

(g) *Per* Vaughan Williams, L.J., in *Krell v. Henry*, [1903] 2 K. B., at p. 754.

(h) See also *Civil Service Society v. General Steam Navigation Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 756; *Chandler v. Webster*, [1904] 1 K. B. 493; discussed in *Cantiare San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding*, [1924] A. C. 226, 247.

defendant could recover on the avoided contract, each had to bear the loss which he had himself incurred (i). But where the contract appeared to contemplate the risk of supervening impossibility, it was not discharged (j). Many cases of frustration of contract also arose in connection with the Great War (k).

Cases of impossibility of performance are sometimes also covered by the law applicable to contracts made under the mutual mistake of the parties (l).

(iii) *A fortiori* it will be a defence to an action for breach of contract, if the defendant can show that the plaintiff himself rendered it impossible for the defendant to perform his part of it, or in any other way prevented him from doing so. There may be many valid excuses for this kind of non-performance, *e.g.*, if the defendant undertook to paper the plaintiff's house and the plaintiff subsequently locked the doors so that the defendant could not enter the premises.

(iv) Again, it is always open to a defendant to show that the contract upon which he is sued had come to an end before the date of his alleged breach of it. And he may show this either by proving—

(a) that the contract had been rescinded as a whole; or

(b) that a new agreement had been made between the parties, altering the original contract in such a way as to justify the defendant in what he had done or omitted to do; or

(c) that the contract had been determined by operation of law.

The parties to a contract may always agree to rescind it. A parol agreement to rescind it will bind them, even though the contract is in writing and is required by law to be in writing (m). A contract cannot, of course, be

(i) *Elliot v. Crutchley*, [1906] A. C. 7.

(j) *Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton*, [1903] 2 K. B. 683.

(k) *E.g.*, *Bank Line v. Capel*, [1919] A. C. 435.

(l) *Scott v. Coulson*, [1903] 2 Ch. 249.

(m) *Vezey v. Rashleigh*, [1904] 1 Ch. 634; *British and Beningtons v. N. W. Cachar Tea Co.*, [1923] A. C. 48.

rescinded without the consent of both parties. The consideration for the consent of each party is his release by the other from all future obligation under the contract. But in the absence of express stipulation the rescission of a contract will not affect a vested right of action for a previous breach of it.

Again the parties to a contract may at any time before breach of it add to, subtract from or vary the terms of it by a new contract. The substituted contract forms a good defence to an action brought for a subsequent breach of any term of the previous contract which has been altered or put an end to by the new one, and it is not necessary for the defendant to allege that the substituted agreement has been performed or satisfied (*n*). But if the original contract was of a kind required by law to be in writing, the agreement varying it must also be in writing, otherwise the parties would be bound by a contract partly in writing and partly oral (*o*). And if a contract has been validly assigned the assignor is usually discharged from further performance, the duty of which falls upon the assignee.

The terms of the contract may provide for its determination by some prescribed method. It may stipulate that in certain events the parties shall be released. There may be a "condition precedent"—a stipulation that the contract shall not be binding unless a certain provision in it be fulfilled; or there may be a "condition subsequent," so that the contract remains binding until a certain event occurs. For example, when a charterparty expressly excepts certain risks by fire or war, the contract will be discharged in the event of a fire or a war breaking out. Similarly a contract may expressly provide for its own discharge at the option of one of the parties—for example, if an employer engages a workman under an agreement which provides that the period of service may be ended on a month's notice.

Formerly at common law, as we have seen (*p*), a contract under seal could be discharged only by a deed, but it is now a good defence to an action on a deed to plead a verbal agreement, made for good consideration, to discharge the original obligation.

A contract may also be discharged—so far as its original parties are concerned—by novation, where a new debtor takes over the

(*n*) See *Patmore v. Colburn* (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 65; and *post*, pp. 112—113.

(*o*) *Goss v. Lord Nugent* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 58, 65; *Morris v. Baron*, [1918]

A. C. 1.

(*p*) *Ante*, p. 19.

liability of the old debtor and is accepted by the creditor in place of, and to the release of, the old debtor. A novation must be distinguished from an assignment of a contract; the latter will be dealt with in the next chapter. "Novation, as I understand it," said Lord Selborne (*q*), "means this—that there being a contract in existence, some new contract is substituted for it, either between the same parties (for that might be) or between different parties, the consideration mutually being the discharge of the old contract. A common instance of it in partnership cases is where upon the dissolution of a partnership the persons who are going to continue in business agree and undertake, as between themselves and the retiring partner, that they will assume and discharge the whole liabilities of the business, usually taking over the assets; and if in that case they give notice of that arrangement to a creditor (*r*), and ask for his accession to it, there becomes a contract between the creditor who accedes and the new firm to the effect that he will accept their liability instead of the old liability, and on the other hand that they promise to pay him for that consideration."

And apart from novation the parties may by express subsequent agreement vary some of the terms of the original contract, leaving the rest still in force. Any term in the original contract, which is inconsistent with those subsequently added, will no longer bind the parties. There is one exception—a verbal agreement to vary the terms of a contract will be invalid if the contract when so varied is of such a nature that it is required by law to be in writing (*s*).

But if one party merely allows the other party additional time for performance, this will not amount to a new contract and need not therefore be in writing (*t*).

A contract may also be determined by operation of law. Thus, if a bankrupt obtains an order of discharge, he is released from all liabilities provable under the bankruptcy (*u*). Again, the doctrine of merger may determine a contract, as, for instance, where a right of action on a simple contract is extinguished in a specialty or by judgment recovered (*x*). So, too, a change in the law may discharge a party from liability under his contract.

For example, a lessor covenanted that neither he nor his assigns would build any other than ornamental buildings upon his land

(*q*) *Scarf v. Jardine* (1882), 7 App. Cas., at p. 351.

(*r*) See the Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 39), s. 17, sub-s. 3; and *post*, p. 211.

(*s*) *Goss v. Lord Nugent* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 58; *Mercantile Bank of Sydney v. Taylor*, [1893] A. C. 317; *Vezey v. Rashleigh*, [1904] 1 Ch. 634; *Morris v. Baron*, [1918] A. C. 1.

(*t*) *Hickman v. Haynes* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 598, 606.

(*u*) See *post*, Book VI., Chapter IV., Bankruptcy.

(*x*) See *ante*, pp. 10, 11.

adjacent to the land leased. An Act of Parliament empowered a railway company to take the adjacent land for the purposes of its undertaking, and a railway station was built upon it. The taking of the land under the statute discharged the lessor from his covenant (y).

A declaration of war may have similar effect, since certain trading contracts may thus become contracts with the King's enemies (z).

The law looks with disfavour upon any alteration of a written agreement; it will not therefore permit a plaintiff, who has intentionally altered a contract in a material particular without the consent of the other party, to enforce it against that other party, even though the original words are still legible (a). Again, if the written contract is in the custody of the plaintiff, and he either permits a stranger to alter it or by his negligence puts it in the power of a stranger to alter it, he can no longer sue upon that contract, either in its original or in its altered form. If, however, the alteration be made by a stranger against the will and in fraud of the party who had the custody of the document, the better opinion is that the contract is not invalidated and that either party can sue upon it (b). The rights of the defendant under the contract will not be affected by any alteration made without his consent either by the plaintiff or by any one else.

If the alteration be made inadvertently, *e.g.*, if the seals were accidentally torn off a deed (c), the agreement will remain good in its original form. Nor will an alteration to which the parties consent, for the purpose of correcting a mistake in the document, make the contract void (d). But if the plaintiff has the custody of the contract and without the consent of the defendant intentionally makes a material alteration in it, this will avoid the contract as against the defendant, even though the alteration was made in good

(y) *Baily v. De Crespigny* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 180.

(z) *Esposito v. Bowden* (1857), 7 E. & B. 763; *Ralli v. Campania Naviera*, [1920] 2 K. B. 287; *Badische Bayer Co., In re*, [1921] 2 Ch. 331; and see section 34, Partnership Act, 1890, and *ante*, p. 5.

(a) *Pigot's Case* (1614), 11 Rep. 26 b, as limited by *Aldous v. Cornwell* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 573; and see *Crediton (Bishop) v. Exeter (Bishop)*, [1905] 2 Ch. 455.

(b) See the remarks of Lord Herschell in *Lowe v. Fox* (1887), 12 App. Cas. at p. 217.

(c) *Argoll v. Cheney* (1625), Palmer, 402. See *Henfree v. Bromley* (1805), 6 East, 309.

(d) See *Howgate's Contract, In re*, [1902] 1 Ch. 451.

faith and under a mistake of law as to the legal effect of the document (e).

Where a promissory note "I promise to pay E A the sum of £125" was altered so as to run "On demand I promise to pay," &c., the alteration was held immaterial and the contract was not discharged (f). But alteration of the number of a Bank of England note was held to invalidate the note (g). A material alteration will not avoid a bill as against a holder in due course, "if the alteration is not apparent" (h).

(v) We have already (i) dealt with the case in which one party to a contract has unequivocally announced his intention of not performing his part of it. It is seldom that the plaintiff says in so many words, "I am not going to keep my promise," but it often happens that as a matter of fact he does not keep it. The question then arises, How long must this state of things continue? Must the defendant submit to repeated breaches of contract which disarrange his business and prevent him from carrying out his contracts with others? There must come a time when the defendant will be entitled to say to the plaintiff "I can no longer go on like this; I shall have nothing more to do with you; I renounce my contract with you; I will make a fresh contract with somebody else to supply the goods or to do the work which you neglect to do."

It is upon the facts of each case than it is decided whether there has been such a non-performance as discharges the agreement. The non-performance by the plaintiff of his part of the contract will only discharge the defendant from his obligation when such non-performance "goes to the root of the contract." In that case, if the plaintiff has shown by his conduct that he does not mean to perform his part of the contract, the defendant has a right to say, "I am not going to perform mine, when that which is the root of the whole contract and the substantial consideration for my performance is defeated by your miscon-

(e) *Bank of Hindustan, &c. v. Smith* (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 241.

(f) *Aldous v. Cornwell* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 573.

(g) *Suffell v. Bank of England* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 555.

(h) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 64. See *Leeds and County Bank v. Walker* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 84; and *post*, p. 188.

(i) See *ante*, p. 98.

duct" (k). Or, in the language of Lord Coleridge, C.J. (l), "the true question is whether the acts and conduct of the party evince an intention no longer to be bound by the contract. . . . Where by the non-delivery of part of the thing contracted for the whole object of the contract is frustrated, the party making default renounces on his part all the obligations of the contract." In other cases the plaintiff's non-performance merely gives the defendant a right to compensation, which will be ground for a cross-action or counterclaim.

Under the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (m), a purchaser of goods is not bound to accept delivery of them by instalments, unless it has been so agreed. In cases where the contract provides for the delivery of goods or the payment of their price by instalments, the non-delivery or non-payment of one instalment is generally not sufficient to discharge the other party wholly from the contract (n). Where there is a contract for delivery by instalments to be separately paid for, and where default is made either by the seller in delivery or by the buyer in payment, the decisions have varied. Sometimes it has been held that there has been a severable breach giving rise to a claim only for compensation (o); in other cases failure to deliver a first instalment (p) or failure to accept instalments (q) has been held to discharge the contract, according to the view of the Court that the failure has not, or has, gone to the root of the contract.

Again, if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff has absolutely assigned the contract, he will have a good defence to the action; for the plaintiff has voluntarily divested himself of his right of action. So, too, the plaintiff's right of action may be suspended by his accepting a bill of exchange or promissory note in payment of the debt; he cannot sue during the currency of that bill or note. Or the defendant may be in a position to contend that the

(k) See the remarks of Lord Blackburn in *Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor* (1884), 9 App. Cas. at pp. 443, 444.

(l) *Freeth v. Burr* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. at pp. 213, 214; *Payzu v. Saunders*, [1919] 2 K. B. 581.

(m) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 31; see *post*, p. 152.

(n) *Freeth v. Burr* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 208; and see *Jonassohn v. Young* (1863), 4 B. & S. 296.

(o) *Simpson v. Crippin* (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 14; *Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co.*, [1905] 2 K. B. 543; *Taylor v. Oakes* (1922), 127 L. T. 267.

(p) *Hoare v. Rennie* (1859), 5 H. & N. 19.

(q) *Honck v. Muller* (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 92.

plaintiff is estopped from bringing the action either by deed or by conduct, or that the plaintiff had for good consideration agreed to forbear from suing the defendant either absolutely or for a specified period (*r*).

(vi) We have already dealt with the case in which the original contract is terminated by a new agreement before any breach of it has been committed. Different considerations apply to any new agreement or rescission after a breach of the original contract has been committed. Immediately on such a breach a right of action vests in the plaintiff, which can only be discharged by an accord and satisfaction or by an express release under seal (*s*).

When there has been a breach of the contract and a right of action has consequently accrued to one party the other party may offer a different performance or other amends (*t*), which, if accepted and executed, will discharge his liability under the contract. This is called ACCORD AND SATISFACTION; accord without satisfaction is no defence, nor is satisfaction without accord.

When the parties before any breach agree to cancel or modify their contract, the release of one party is, as we have seen, a sufficient consideration for the release of the other. But an accord after breach stands on a different footing; for then the defendant cannot be discharged from liability without his giving some further consideration, unless he be released under seal (*u*). A subsequent rescission of the contract will not affect a right of action for breaches already committed, unless this is one of the express terms of the agreement for rescission.

Where performance is to be by payment of money, payment of a smaller sum is not in itself satisfaction of the liability; there must be some consideration for relinquishing the balance.

“According to English common law, a creditor might accept anything in satisfaction of his debt except a less amount of money. He might take a horse, or a canary, or a tomtit, if he chose, and that was accord and satisfaction; but, by a most extraordinary

(*r*) See *Foakes v. Beer* (1884), 9 App. Cas. 605.

(*s*) There is one exception—the holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note can waive his rights without any consideration, provided either that the bill be delivered up to the acceptor or that the waiver be expressed in writing: 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 62, and see *post*, p. 188. The right may also be lost by lapse of time, *ante*, p. 23.

(*t*) See, for instance, *Boosey v. Wood* (1865), 3 H. & C. 484.

(*u*) *Foster v. Dawber* (1851), 6 Exch. 839.

peculiarity of the English common law, he could not take 19s. 6d. in the pound: that was *nudum pactum*. Therefore, although the creditor might take a canary, yet, if the debtor did not give him a canary together with his 19s. 6d., there was no accord and satisfaction; if he did, there was accord and satisfaction" (x).

But payment of a smaller sum at an earlier date than the date agreed, or in a different place (y), or by a third party (z), may be a valid satisfaction. And a negotiable instrument for a less amount may be a good discharge (a), if given and accepted for the purpose (b). Where several creditors agree with a debtor to accept a composition for the money he owes them, this also will be a good discharge (c).

An accord and satisfaction is now a good defence to any action brought on a contract, even if it be under seal (d).

(x) *Per* Jessel, M.R., in *Couldery v. Bartrum* (1881), 19 Ch. D. at p. 399.

(y) See *Pinnel's Case* (1602), 5 Rep. 117; *Foakes v. Beer* (1884), 9 App. Cas. 605, followed in *Underwood v. Underwood*, [1894] P. 204.

(z) *Hirachand v. Temple*, [1911] 2 K. B. 380, commented on by Scrutton, L.J., in *Société des hôtels Le Touquet v. Cummings*, [1922] 1 K. B. 451 at p. 460.

(a) *Goddard v. O'Brien* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 37; *Bidder v. Bridges* (1887), 37 Ch. D. 406.

(b) But see *Day v. McLea* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 610; *Nathan v. Ogdens* (1906), 94 L. T. 126. If nothing is said to the contrary, the remedy by action is suspended; *Allen v. Royal Bank of Canada* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 625.

(c) *Good v. Cheeseman* (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 328; *Dane v. Mortgage Insurance Corporation*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 54.

(d) *Steeds v. Steeds* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 537.

CHAPTER VIII.

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTS AND OTHER CHOSSES IN ACTION.

No one can sue on a contract unless he be either an original party to it, or the lawful assignee of an original party. The benefit of most contracts can now be assigned to a stranger without the consent of the party burdened by it (a). The burden of a contract, as a rule, cannot be assigned without the consent of the party entitled to the benefit of it, unless some benefit be assigned along with the burden (b).

This is now clear law. But at common law only the original parties to a contract could sue upon it. The rule was that a chose in action could not be validly assigned; and the right to sue on a contract was a chose in action.

It is necessary in the first place to discuss the meaning of the phrase "chose in action."

Choses in Action.

"It is difficult to find out the exact meaning of the expression 'chose in action'; . . . it is impossible, I think, to look into the authorities upon this subject without seeing that the meaning attributed to the expression has been expanded from time to time. . . . We all know that our law has not been put into a very scientific shape, and there is often considerable difficulty in determining in what sense a particular expression, such as 'chose in action,' is used" (c).

(a) *Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coombs*, [1901] 2 Ch. 608.

(b) *Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers*, [1903] A. C. 414; *Kemp v. Baerselman*, [1906] 2 K. B. 604.

(c) *Per Lindley, L.J.*, in *Colonial Bank v. Whinney* (1885), 30 Ch. D. at pp. 282, 284. And see the remarks of Cotton, L.J., *ibid.*, at pp. 276, 277, and of Lord Blackburn, 11 App. Cas. at pp. 439, 440.

At first the phrase had a definite meaning, namely, a present right to take proceedings in a Court of law to recover a debt or damages. In this sense it was opposed to chattels in possession, which were tangible personal property, capable of being stolen or taken in execution. The term is thus defined in "Termes de la Ley":—"Things in action is when a man hath cause, or may bring an action for some duty due to him, as an action of debt upon an obligation, annuity or rent, action of covenant, or ward, trespass of goods taken away, beating or such like, and because that they are things whereof a man is not possessed, but for recovery of them is driven to his action, they are called things in action" (d). So, in March's translation of Brooke's Abridgement the phrase is thus referred to:—"A thing in action, which is personal; as debt, and dammages and the like" (e). A right of action to recover unliquidated damages, whether in contract or in tort, was as much a chose in action as a debt for a fixed amount. But in either case the right had to be vested; the mere possibility that A might hereafter do or omit to do something which would give B a cause of action against him was not a chose in action. This right to bring an action was strictly personal. Only the person who had the right could sue on it; only the person liable could be sued.

As the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery arose and extended, there came to be equitable choses in action—rights, that is, to sue in equity for relief which could not be obtained in a Court of common law. Thus, a legacy was called an equitable chose in action, because, if the executor withheld payment, the only remedy of the legatee was in equity; no action would lie at law for a legacy. There was this marked distinction between legal and equitable choses in action: the former were not transferable at common law, but the latter were assignable from one person

(d) Ed. 1641, p. 59. This work, which is of considerable authority, was first published in 1527 under the title *Exposiciones Terminorum Legum Anglorum*. It was probably written by John Rastell the printer, whose son William was a Judge of the Queen's Bench in 1558.

(e) Ed. 1651, p. 51. This abridgment was written by Sir Robert Brooke or Broke, who was appointed Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in 1554. He cites 2 Hen. VII. 8; but this cannot be taken to be an absolute authority for the definition.

to another, and the assignee might sue in equity in his own name (f). Thus the right in equity of a lessee or his assigns to be relieved against a forfeiture is a chose in action (g).

Originally, then, the term "chose in action" was applied only to a debt, to a claim for damages, to any right to take proceedings either at law or in equity to obtain some other judicial relief, and to any document (such as a bond, bill, promissory note or agreement) which was mere evidence of such a right (h). It did not include any other incorporeal right or property; and, of course, it included no tangible personal property. It was practically identical with what we now call a right of action. "There was formerly no such thing as an incorporeal chattel personal" (i). But in more modern times there sprang up several species of incorporeal personal property, which were unknown to our ancestors, such as consols, stocks, shares, debentures, &c. All these, probably for want of a better classification, are usually called choses in action. The category of choses in action has in fact been so enlarged that it now includes practically every personal chattel not in possession.

Thus any annuity is a chose in action (k), unless it be charged on land, when it becomes a chattel interest in realty (l). Stock was spoken of as a chose in action by Lord Thurlow, L.C., as early as 1790 (m), consols were so treated by Sir William Grant, M.R., in 1803 (n), and shares by the Court of Queen's Bench in 1839 (o). Even a ticket in a Derby sweepstake was held in 1845 to be a chose in action (p). In 1869, in 1883, and again in 1914, things in action were in the Bankruptcy Acts of those years included in the different kinds of property divisible among the creditors of a bankrupt: and the House of Lords decided, in *Colonial Bank v. Whinney* (q), that shares were things in action within the

(f) As to assignments in equity, see *post*, p. 121.

(g) *Howard v. Fanshawe*, [1895] 2 Ch. 581. A mortgagor's equity of redemption, however, is not a chose in action; it is an estate in the land and can be dealt with accordingly: *Casborne v. Scarfe* (1737), 1 Atk. 603; *Tarn v. Turner* (1888), 39 Ch. D. at p. 460.

(h) As to larceny of a chose in action, see Vol. 1, p. 341.

(i) *Per* Cotton, L.J., in *Colonial Bank v. Whinney* (1885), 30 Ch. D. at p. 275.

(k) *Priddy v. Rose* (1817), 3 Mer. 86; *Norcutt v. Dodd* (1841), Cr. & Ph. 100.

(l) *Wiltshire v. Rabbits* (1844), 14 Sim. 76.

(m) *Dundas v. Dutens* (1790), 1 Ves. Jun. at p. 198.

(n) *Wildman v. Wildman* (1803), 9 Ves. at p. 176.

(o) *Humble v. Mitchell* (1839), 11 A. & E. 205; and see *Agra Bank, Ex parte* (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. at p. 558.

(p) *Jones v. Carter* (1845), 8 Q. B. 134.

(q) (1886), 11 App. Cas. 426.

meaning of the Bankruptcy Act then in force. "I think," said Lord Blackburn, "it was hardly disputed that, in modern times, lawyers have accurately or inaccurately used the phrase 'choses in action' as including all personal chattels that are not in possession" (r). And it has now been held that a claim to compensation in respect of lands injuriously affected in the lawful exercise of statutory powers is a chose in action, although no action would lie to recover such compensation (s).

Even in dealing with matters which were originally "choses in action" at common law—such as debts and claims for damages—the phrase has acquired a new meaning. A debt is now regarded as property, as a kind of asset; and, when so regarded, it is now called a chose in action, whether the money be now payable or not, whether an action would lie for it or not. In other words, there can now be a chose in action where there is as yet no right of action.

Thus, if A owes B money, but the time for payment has not yet arrived, this is a good debt, although it is one which is not yet payable. It is a chose in action although B has not at present any right to sue for it (t). As soon as the time for payment has passed, he will have both a chose in action and a right of action.

Assignment of Choses in Action at Common Law.

At common law a chose in action could not be granted or transferred to a stranger, so as to enable the transferee to sue upon it. It has been said that this rule was made in order to prevent "maintenance, suppression of rights and stirring up of suits; and therefore nothing in action, entrie or re-entrie can be granted over; for so, under colour thereof, pretended titles might be granted to great men, whereby right might be trodden down and the weak oppressed, which the common law forbiddeth" (u). But this was a result of the rule rather than its cause. The

(r) *Colonial Bank v. Whinney* (1886), 11 App. Cas. at p. 440.

(s) *Dawson v. G. N. and City Ry. Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 260.

(t) See *Brice v. Bannister* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 569; *West v. Newing* (1900), 82 L. T. 260.

(u) Co. Litt. 214 a; and see *Lampet's Case* (1612), 10 Rep. 46 b, 48 a.

rule was but the logical consequence of the strict view taken by civilians of the nature of a contract; they held that the obligation imposed by a contract could rest only on the original contracting parties, who alone were regarded as being *in vinculo juris*. The rule applied to specialities as well as to simple contracts. No one could become the creditor or debtor of another without his consent.

“ There is no doubt as to the law that if one person is indebted to another he cannot become under an obligation to a third party without the agreement of all three ” (c). “ A bond is not assignable at common law so as to enable the assignee to sue upon it in his own name ” (d).

This was the rule of the common law which has now been almost entirely superseded. But it still remains the law that a chose in action, which is not assignable, cannot be made so by the express contract and intent of the parties. It is not competent for them to attach to their engagements qualities not recognised by law as inherent in them. Thus a mere contract for the payment of money cannot be endowed with a negotiable quality at the mere will of the parties to it; nor can a deed be rendered transferable and negotiable like a bill of exchange or an exchequer bill (e).

To this rule, which forbade the assignment of choses in action, certain exceptions existed at common law, and many others were made by the law merchant, by the rules of equity and by legislation. For instance, the Courts of law were not bold enough to tie up the property of the Crown, or to prevent it from being transferred, so that the transferee might sue for it in his own name (f). Again, an assignment of a chose in action might occur at common law in the event of marriage, of bankruptcy or of death. Where a covenant runs with the land, the right to sue upon it passes from assignor to assignee of the term or reversion, though in this case the common law attempted to disguise the fact by creating a fictitious kind of privity, which it termed privity of estate (g).

(c) *Per* Bramwell, B., in *Noble v. National Discount Co.* (1860), 5 H. & N. at p. 228.

(d) *Per* Martin, B., in *Young v. Hughes* (1859), 4 H. & N. 84.

(e) See *Dixon v. Bovill* (1856), 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 1; *Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 374; *London and County Banking Co. v. London and River Plate Bank* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 232; (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 535.

(f) “ *Termes de la Ley* ” (ed. 1641), Chose in Action, p. 59.

(g) See *post*, p. 251.

We must pause here to explain the meaning of the phrase "a covenant which runs with the land." If land was demised by a lease under seal, the lessor could always sell his estate subject to the lease, and the tenant could assign his interest in the term, unless this was expressly forbidden by the lease. At common law, though an estate was assignable, a contract was not; hence it followed that the assignee was not bound by the covenants contained in the lease. To remedy this state of affairs, the statute of 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, was passed, which gave the assignee of the reversion the same rights against the tenant and his assigns as the original landlord had, and also gave to the tenant and his assigns the same remedies against the reversioner and his assigns as they would have had against the original landlord (*h*). This statute was construed to refer only to covenants which related to the subject-matter of the demise. These were said to "run with the land." The rules on the subject were laid down in *Spencer's Case* (*i*), but these rules have been modified by the Law of Property Act, 1925 (*k*).

Where a landlord covenanted to supply the demised premises with water, it was held that the covenant ran with the land and with the reversion (*l*). A covenant by a lessee of a beerhouse to conduct and manage the business in such proper and orderly manner as to afford no pretext whereby the licence might be, or be in danger of being, suspended, discontinued or forfeited, runs with the land (*m*). But if the covenant, though concerning the land demised, was one relating to something not in being at the date of the covenant, it would not prior to 1926 bind the assignee; such, for instance, as a covenant to pay a share of the expense of subsequently making a new road to lead to the demised premises (*n*).

A covenant not to assign without the leave of the landlord runs with the land, and applies to a reassignment to the original lessee (*o*). On an assignment by a tenant privity of estate between him and the landlord ceases, yet privity of contract still exists between them, and consequently the original tenant still remains liable to the landlord on all express covenants. But if the assignee of a term part with his interest to another, he is liable only for breaches of covenants running with the land committed while he held it, since his liability arose from his connection with the land which has now ceased. But whilst the assignee is in possession

(*h*) Sections 1, 2; see also 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, ss. 10—12. These statutes are now repealed. The law as to covenants is contained in L. P. A., 1925, ss. 76—80; see also section 141.

(*i*) (1583), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 62, and notes, *ibid.*, 68.

(*k*) L. P. A., 1925, s. 79, sub-s. 1.

(*l*) *Jourdain v. Wilson* (1821), 4 B. & Ald. 266.

(*m*) *Fleetwood v. Hull* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 35.

(*n*) See *Doughty v. Bowman* (1848), 11 Q. B. 444; *Minshull v. Oakes* (1858), 2 H. & N. 793. But now see L. P. A., 1925, s. 79, sub-s. 1, cited *supra*.

(*o*) *Williams v. Earle* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 739; *McEacharn v. Colton*, [1902] A. C. 104.

of an interest in the land, he is bound to pay the rent and perform the covenants.

With these exceptions, then, no chose in action could at common law be assigned or granted over to another. Any attempt to assign such a chose in action was invalid at law; the assignee could not sue in a Court of common law on the assignment in his own name; and if the debtor paid the assignee, he could be compelled to pay the debt over again to the assignor (*p*). The law merchant, however, permitted negotiable instruments to be freely assigned; the acceptor or indorser of a bill of exchange was always liable to be sued by the holder of the bill with whom he had never contracted. And scrip issued in this country by the agent of a foreign Government, entitling the holder, on payment of the instalments, to receive from that agent definite bonds of the foreign Government, has been held to be negotiable by international custom and to pass by delivery to a *bona fide* holder for value (*q*). So, too, Parliament has from time to time rendered certain choses in action assignable.

Promissory notes, if not freely negotiable before, were rendered so by the statutes 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, and 7 Anne, c. 25. The sheriff was allowed to assign a bail-bond to a purchaser, who could then sue both the principal and the bail thereunder in his own name (4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 20). Replevin bonds (11 Geo. 2, c. 19); mortgage bonds of a company (8 & 9 Vict. c. 17, s. 45); bills of lading, if endorsed (18 & 19 Vict. c. 111); East India bonds (51 Geo. 3, c. 64, s. 4); mortgage debentures issued by land companies under the Mortgage Debenture Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 78); debts and things in action of companies (Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89); choses in action of bankrupts (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 22); and transferable debentures under the County Debentures Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 35), were subsequently made assignable. By 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144, policies of life assurance may be legally assigned, either by indorsement of the policy, or by a separate instrument in the form provided by the Act. And by 31 & 32 Vict. c. 86, policies of marine insurance may similarly be

(*p*) *Cuxon v. Chadley* (1824), 3 B. & C. 591.

(*q*) *Goodwin v. Roberts* (1876), 1 App. Cas. 476; *Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank* (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 194; *Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank, Ltd.*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 658; *Edelstein v. Schuler*, [1902] 2 K. B. 144. But post-office orders have been held not to fall within the rule laid down in *Goodwin v. Roberts*, *supra*. And see *Fine Art Society v. Union Bank of London* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 705.

assigned by indorsement in statutory form. In all these cases, the assignee could sue at law in his own name.

In all other cases the common law remained unaltered till 1875. Thus an ordinary simple contract debt could not, before the Judicature Act, be legally assigned, nor could the benefit or burden of a covenant in a deed, apart from an interest in realty. The only way in which such a debt could be transferred at common law was by a new contract, in which all three parties—assignor, assignee and debtor—took part. And this new contract required consideration to support it; the debtor had to be released by the assignor, and to consent expressly in consideration of such release to become liable to the assignee. This was a novation, not an assignment.

In Equity.

In equity, however, a different practice prevailed. The Court of Chancery from a very early period recognised as valid, and carried into effect, assignments of a chose in action and even of a mere naked possibility (provided they were made for valuable consideration (*r*)).

Thus a mere expectancy, such as that of an heir at law to the estate of an ancestor (*s*), or the interest which a person may take under the will of another then living (*t*), was always assignable in equity for valuable consideration, and when the expectancy fell into possession the assignment would be enforced unless public policy or some other rule of equity forbade. The same rule prevailed, and still prevails, in equity in the case of non-existing property to be hereafter acquired, such as freight not yet earned (*u*), future patent rights (*x*), or machinery yet to be erected (*y*). But the claim of such an assignee will always be postponed to the right of a *bona fide* purchaser, who secures the legal title (*z*), and is subject also to

(*r*) *Anon.* (1673), Freem. Ch. 145; *Squib v. Wyn* (1717), 1 P. Wms. 378.

(*s*) *Hobson v. Trevor* (1723), 2 P. Wms. 191.

(*t*) *Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield* (1629), 1 Ch. R. 29; *Musprat v. Gordon* (1792), 1 Anst. 34; *Bennett v. Cooper* (1846), 9 Beav. 252.

(*u*) *Lindsay v. Gibbs* (1856), 22 Beav. 522.

(*x*) *Printing, &c., Co. v. Sampson* (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 462.

(*y*) *Holroyd v. Marshall* (1862), 10 H. L. Cas. 191.

(*z*) *Joseph v. Lyons* (1884), 15 Q. B. D. 280; *Hallas v. Robinson* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 288.

the title of the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy in case the bankruptcy occurs before the expectancy falls into possession (a).

But equity could not wholly disregard the law in this matter. If the assignor had given a power of attorney authorising the assignee to sue for the debt in the name of the assignor, and that course was adopted, the judgment would bind the assignor, as it would stand in his name, and be a good discharge to the debtor at law as well as in equity.

But if the assignee sued in his own name in equity, the decree in his favour was no bar to an action by the assignor at common law. If the chose in action was of a purely equitable nature, this would not matter, as the assignor could never sue for it at law. But in all other cases the equity Judges required the assignee to bring the assignor before the Court, so that he should be bound by their decree. If he would not consent to join as a co-plaintiff with the assignee, he was made a defendant; but he had to be a party to the proceedings on one side or other of the record, otherwise the unfortunate debtor might be compelled to pay the debt over again.

Under the Law of Property Act (b).

There being this conflict between law and equity, a provision curiously limited was inserted in the Judicature Act, 1873. It did not wholly supersede the common law, nor establish the equitable procedure, but created a new practice of its own. The wording, though not the effect, of section 25, sub-section 6 of that Act has been somewhat altered by section 136 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, which repealed section 25, sub-section 6, and runs:—

Section 136.—“ Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in

(a) *Hall, Ex parte* (1879), 10 Ch. D. 615; *Nichols, Ex parte* (1883), 22 Ch. D. 782; *Wilmot v. Alton*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 17; but see *Rawlings, Ex parte* (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 193.

(b) It must be remembered throughout this chapter that wherever the Judicature Act, 1873, is referred to, the statutes now in force are the L. P. A., 1925, and Judicature Act, 1925.

writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or chose in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice the legal right to such debt or thing in action, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor: provided that, if the debtor, trustee or other person liable in respect of such debt or thing in action has notice that the assignment is disputed by the assignor or any one claiming under him, or of any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or thing in action, he may, if he thinks fit, either call upon the persons making claim thereto to interplead concerning the same, or pay the debt or other thing in action into Court under the provisions of the Trustee Act, 1925."

This section, it will be observed, affects procedure rather than the substantive law; "it does not give new rights, but only affords a new mode of enforcing old rights" (c). It makes nothing an assignment which was not an assignment before (d). On the other hand, many an assignment which was valid in equity before the 1873 Act is not within the scope of this section, and therefore can only be enforced in the manner usual in Courts of equity before the Act. In other words, there must be good consideration for the assignment, and the assignor must be joined, either as a plaintiff or a defendant (e). In cases which do fall within the section, all former equities remain; the assignee has the benefit of a new procedure at law; but none of the rights of the debtor or of the assignor are restricted or destroyed (f).

The language of the section should be carefully noted, so that the plaintiff may know which procedure to adopt:—

(1) The section deals only with absolute assignments "not purporting to be by way of charge only."

(2) To be within the statute, the assignment must be of some "debt or other legal thing in action."

(3) It was essential to the validity of an equitable assignment before the Act (and it still remains essential in all

(c) *Per cur.* in *Walker v. Bradford Old Bank* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. at p. 515.

(d) *Schroeder v. The Central Bank* (1876), 34 L. T. 735.

(e) See *Turquand v. Fearon* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 280; *Steel Wing Co., In re*, [1921] 1 Ch. 349, and see *post*, p. 139.

(f) *Hudson v. Fernyhough* (1889), 61 L. T. 722.

cases not within this section) that the assignment should be for valuable consideration; without such consideration there was no ground for the interference of a Court of equity. But if the plaintiff is proceeding under the section, it is not necessary that there should be any consideration for the assignment (*g*).

(4) To bring the case within the section, the assignment must be in writing, and express notice thereof must be given in writing to the debtor or holder of the fund. The assignee must prove both, or he will establish no cause of action (*h*). In equity (apart from the Statute of Frauds (*i*)), a verbal assignment, if clearly proved, was formerly and still is sufficient, provided the assignor be made a party to the action and the assignment be for valuable consideration (*k*). So also a verbal notice to the debtor is quite sufficient to make the assignment good in equity (*l*). But to be within the section both assignment and the notice of it must be in writing.

(5) Again, an assignment under the Act resembles an equitable assignment, and differs from the transfer of a negotiable instrument under the law merchant in this—that the assignee takes subject to all set-offs and equities which would avail against the assignor, not merely at the date of the assignment, but until notice is given to the debtor or holder of the fund (*m*).

What is an Absolute Assignment within the Section.

The assignment must be absolute; it must not purport to be “by way of charge only.” Whether it is an absolute assignment or not depends upon the true construction of the instrument. “In every case of this kind, all the terms of the instrument must be considered; and, whatever may be the phraseology adopted in some particular

(*g*) *Lee v. Magrath* (1882), 10 L. R. Ir. 45, 313; *Harding v. Harding* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 442.

(*h*) *Read v. Brown* (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 128.

(*i*) As to which see *Hall, Ex parte* (1879), 10 Ch. D. 615.

(*k*) *Field v. Megaw* (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 660.

(*l*) *Agra Bank, Ex parte* (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 555.

(*m*) *Walker v. Bradford Old Bank* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 511.

part of it, if on consideration of the whole instrument it is clear that the intention was to give a charge only, then the action must be in the name of the assignor; while, on the other hand, if it is clear from the instrument as a whole that the intention was to pass all the rights of the assignor in the debt or chose in action to the assignee, then the case will come within section 25 (n), and the action must be brought in the name of the assignee" (o). It will be held that the instrument creates a charge only, though general words be used, if, when the whole is looked at, it appears that what was intended was only to assign so much of the debt or chose in action as would provide security for a lesser debt due from the assignor to the assignee (p). "By a charge the title is not transferred, but the person creating the charge merely says that out of a particular fund he will discharge a particular debt" (q). But a document will be held an absolute assignment whenever it is clear from the terms of it that the intention of the parties was to transfer to the assignee complete control of the fund, and to put him for all purposes in the position of the assignor with regard to it (r).

It is submitted that the following are the tests which determine whether an assignment is or is not an "absolute assignment" within the section:—

1. Has the assignor divested himself of all right to sue for the debt or other chose in action and transferred that right to the assignee? If the assignor can still sue the debtor or holder of the fund, the assignment is not absolute. It would be manifestly unfair to leave the debtor exposed to attack from two quarters.

2. Does the assignment entitle the assignee to receive the money, and will his receipt be a good discharge for it?

3. Will the assignment when perfected by notice prevent the debtor or holder of the fund from paying any

(n) Now L. P. A., 1925, s. 136.

(o) *Per Mathew, L.J.*, in *Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co.*, [1902] 2 K. B. at p. 193.

(p) *Mercantile Bank of London v. Evans*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 613; *Jones v. Humphreys*, [1902] 1 K. B. 10.

(q) *Per Day, J.*, in *Burlinson v. Hall* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. at p. 350.

(r) *Comfort v. Betts*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 737; *Hoffe's Estate Act, In re* (1900), 82 L. T. 556. But see *Sheward, In re*, [1893] 3 Ch. 502.

one but the assignee; and can the debtor safely pay the assignee without inquiring into the state of the accounts between the assignor and the assignee (s)?

4. Is the debtor or holder of the fund bound to pay the assignee the whole debt or so much of it as has been definitely assigned? If he has a right, notwithstanding the assignment, to have accounts taken between himself and the assignor before making any payment to the assignee, the assignment is by way of charge only and not an absolute assignment within the section (t).

No special form of words is necessary; any words will suffice which show a clear intention to transfer a chose in action, or which distinctly appropriate a specific portion of a specified fund, to or to the use of the assignee (u). The language must be sufficiently imperative to make it the duty of the debtor or holder to pay the money, when the time for payment arrives, to the assignee and not to the assignor. But a mere suggestion to the debtor or holder, leaving him free to exercise his discretion as he thinks best, will not be sufficient (x).

It is not enough to mention a particular fund: there must be a clear intention to deal with it so as to benefit the assignee. Thus, merely informing a creditor that he will be paid as soon as a certain fund comes to hand is no assignment of that fund (y). A promise to pay money when the person promising shall be paid a debt due to him from a third person is no assignment of that debt (z). Drawing a bill of exchange on a merchant, or a cheque payable at a particular bank, is no assignment of any portion of the drawer's balance in the hands of that merchant or at that bank (a). Moreover, the debt or fund assigned must be clearly indicated; so that there will be no difficulty hereafter in identifying the property, an interest in which is transferred (b). Choses in action, which are

(s) See *Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co.*, [1902] 2 K. B. at p. 198.

(t) See the judgment of Vaughan Williams, L.J., in *Mercantile Bank of London v. Evans*, [1899] 2 Q. B. at p. 617.

(u) *Rodick v. Gandell* (1852), 1 De G. M. & G. 763, 776; *Gorrings v. Irwell Co.* (1886), 34 Ch. D. 128.

(x) *Watson v. Duke of Wellington* (1830), 1 Russ. & M. 602. Documents commencing, "I hereby authorise you to pay," &c., were held sufficient in *Lett v. Morris* (1831), 4 Sim. 607; *Diplock v. Hammond* (1854), 5 De G. M. & G. 320; and *M'Gowan v. Smith* (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 8.

(y) *Malcolm v. Scott* (1843), 3 Hare, 39; *Jones v. Starkey* (1852), 16 Jur. 510.

(z) *Field v. Megaw* (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 660.

(a) *Schroeder v. Central Bank* (1876), 34 L. T. 735; *Brown, Shipley & Co. v. Kough* (1885), 29 Ch. D. 848.

(b) *Percival v. Dunn* (1885), 29 Ch. D. 128.

not yet vested in the assignor, can be assigned as completely as any other debt if words sufficiently clear be used; the document must purport by its own force to convey an interest in them to the assignee, leaving nothing to be done by either assignor or assignee to complete the title of the latter when they come into existence (c).

Again, to bring the case within the section the assignment must be "in writing under the hand of the assignor," and express notice of it in writing must be "given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action." That the writing is under seal is immaterial (d).

If the document relied on as an assignment be addressed by the assignor neither to his creditor nor to his debtor or the holder of the fund, but only to some agent of his own, such as his solicitor, rent collector, bailiff or steward, then this is not an assignment, so long, at all events, as it remains unknown to the assignee. Till then, it is like a power of attorney, or the appointment of a receiver (e). Such an "order to pay" is a mere mandate from a principal to his own agent and gives the creditor no specific charge on that fund. Until it is communicated to the creditor and assented to by him, it may be revoked, but not afterwards. The bankruptcy or death of the principal operates as such a revocation. After such communication the money is "fixed" in the agent's hands, and the order cannot be countermanded (f).

It is not necessary that there should be any consideration for an absolute assignment under the Act (g); nor is it necessary that the assignee should take any beneficial interest for himself; the motive for which the assignment is made is immaterial (h). Hence an assignment of a debt

(c) *Irving, In re* (1877), 7 Ch. D. 419; *Tailby v. Official Receiver* (1888), 13 App. Cas. 523; overruling *Belding v. Read* (1865), 3 H. & C. 955; and *D'Espineuil, In re* (1882), 20 Ch. D. 758; but see *International Fibre Syndicate v. Dawson* (1901), 84 L. T. 803.

(d) *Marchant v. Morton, Down & Co.*, [1901] 2 K. B. 829.

(e) *Rodick v. Gandell* (1852), 1 De G. M. & G. 763; *Bell v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1852), 15 Beav. 548.

(f) *Fitzgerald v. Stewart* (1831), 2 Russ. & M. 457; *Palmer v. Culverwell* (1902), 85 L. T. 758.

(g) *Westerton, In re*, [1919] 2 Ch. 104.

(h) *Wiesener v. Rackow* (1897), 76 L. T. 448; *Fitzroy v. Cave*, [1905] 2 K. B. 364.

or legal chose in action may be absolute within the Judicature Act, although a trust is thereby created in respect of the proceeds of such debt or chose in action in favour of the assignor (*i*). So a deed, by which debts are assigned to the plaintiff upon trust that he should receive them and out of them pay himself a sum due to him from the assignor and then pay the surplus to the assignor, is an absolute assignment within the section (*k*). A mortgage, made in the form of an assignment, is an absolute assignment within the section, although it contains a proviso for redemption and reconveyance upon repayment; for full dominion over the property is transferred to the mortgagee immediately upon the execution of the deed (*l*).

What may be assigned.

The section applies only to an assignment of "any debt or other legal thing in action." The word "legal" was probably inserted because equitable choses in action were already assignable, but it would have been better omitted; as now since the fusion of law and equity it is somewhat difficult to define "a legal thing in action." The phrase clearly is not restricted to those choses in action which could be assigned at law before the Act was passed. The Courts now tend towards the view expressed in *King v. Victoria Insurance Co.* (*m*), where the Supreme Court of Queensland held that identical words in their Colonial Act included "all rights, the assignment of which a Court of law or equity would before this Act have considered lawful," and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council did "not express any dissent" from this view. This view was accepted in *Torkington v. Magee* (*n*) and *Pain, In re* (*o*).

(*i*) *Comfort v. Betts*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 737; and see *Palmer v. Culverwell* (1902), 85 L. T. 758.

(*k*) *Burlinson v. Hall* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 347; *Ibberson v. Neck* (1886), 2 T. L. R. 427.

(*l*) *Tancred v. Delagoa Bay Ry. Co.* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 239, overruling *National Provincial Bank v. Harle* (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 626; and see *Durham v. Robertson*, [1898] 1 Q. B. at p. 772; *Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co.*, [1902] 2 K. B. at p. 195.

(*m*) [1896] A. C. 250, at pp. 254, 256.

(*n*) [1902] 2 K. B. 427.

(*o*) [1919] 1 Ch. 38.

Choses in action not assignable under the Act would in this view only be such as are excluded on grounds of public policy (*p*), or because a personal element is involved. The question has, however, been discussed in many cases.

In *Cronk v. M'Manus* (*q*) Denman, J., held that a mere equity of redemption was not a legal chose in action. A promise by a lender to make further advances to the borrower is not a legal chose in action (*r*). But in *Dawson v. G. N. & City Ry. Co.* (*s*) the Court of Appeal decided that a claim to compensation in respect of lands injuriously affected in the lawful exercise of statutory powers was a legal chose in action, although no action would lie to recover such compensation.

The Court of Appeal in *May v. Lane* (*t*) expressed the opinion (*obiter*) that the right to bring an action for unliquidated damages, whether in tort or contract, was not a legal chose in action within this section and therefore not assignable. In *Dawson v. G. N. & City Ry. Co.* (*u*), in the Court below Wright, J., after referring to *May v. Lane*, said: "There are no doubt some expressions in the judgments of the Lords Justices in the case of the *Colonial Bank v. Whinney* (*x*) which seem to approve a statement in Williams on Personal Property to the effect that a right to damages for a tort may be a legal chose in action; but the decision of the Court of Appeal in that case was reversed in the House of Lords (*y*), and it is difficult to suppose that it was intended by section 25 of the Judicature Act to make all rights as to damages—for example, for libel or assault—assignable under that section." These remarks were also *obiter*, and the Judges of the Court of Appeal, who reversed his decision, were silent on this point. It is clear, however, from the extracts cited (*z*) from "*Termes de la Ley*" and Brooke's Abridgement that a right of action for unliquidated damages in an action either of contract or of tort was a chose in action at common law; and there is nothing in the Judicature Act to alter this: it merely makes "any legal chose in action" assignable. Of course, if the assignment of a legal chose in action be tainted with maintenance, it is invalid (*a*). The House of Lords has decided that a claim for unliquidated damages for a breach of contract is a thing in action, which passes on bankruptcy to the trustee and is assignable by him to a third person (*b*).

(*p*) See *post*, p. 131.

(*q*) (1892), 8 T. L. R. 449.

(*r*) *Western Wagon Co. v. West*, [1892] 1 Ch. 271; *May v. Lane* (1894), 64 L. J. Q. B. 236.

(*s*) [1905] 1 K. B. 260.

(*t*) (1894), 64 L. J. Q. B. at pp. 237, 238.

(*u*) [1904] 1 K. B. at p. 281.

(*x*) (1885), 30 Ch. D. 261.

(*y*) (1886), 11 App. Cas. 426.

(*z*) *Ante*, p. 115.

(*a*) See *post*, p. 132.

(*b*) *Ogdens v. Weinberg* (1906), 95 L. T. 567.

The duty of performing a contract cannot be assigned without the consent of the other party, whenever its performance involves personal skill, knowledge or supervision which is not capable of being rendered by every one, *e.g.*, a contract to publish a book (*c*). Thus, where the defendant agreed to supply K, a cake manufacturer, for one year with all the eggs which he would require for his business, and K during the year transferred his business to a company, it was held that the contract was with K personally and that the defendant was not bound to supply any more eggs either to K or to the new company (*d*). But it has been held in Scotland that a company, which had entered into a contract to pave certain streets and maintain the surface in good condition for a term of years, was entitled to assign the execution of the contract as in such contract there was no *delectus personæ* (*e*). And an author can assign the copyright of a book which is not yet finished, and such an assignment may be in the form of an agreement to assign (*f*).

The presence in a contract of an express condition, that it "shall not be assignable in any case whatever," will not prevent an assignment of the beneficial interest thereunder (*g*). The question what effect must be given to an express promise by an assignor that he will not create any prior charge on the property assigned is discussed in *Brunton v. Electrical Engineering Corporation, English and Scottish Co. v. Brunton*, and *Robson v. Smith* (*h*). A provision in a policy preventing assignment, except on conditions, is good and prevents the policy being assigned except in conformity with those conditions (*i*).

A debt not yet due or payable is clearly assignable, if apt words be used, not merely in equity, but also at law under the Judicature Act, *e.g.*, rent not yet due (*k*), or retention-money not yet payable under a building contract (*l*).

But the assignment of an undefined portion of a future debt is not a good assignment within the Judicature Act,

(*c*) *Griffith v. Tower Publishing Co.*, [1897] 1 Ch. 21; *Dr. Jaeger's Co. v. Walker* (1897), 77 L. T. 180; *International Fibre Syndicate v. Dawson* (1901), 84 L. T. 803.

(*d*) *Kemp v. Baerselman*, [1906] 2 K. B. 604, distinguishing *Tolhurst v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers*, [1903] A. C. 414.

(*e*) *Asphaltic Co. v. Glasgow Corporation*, [1907] S. C. 463.

(*f*) *Ward, Lock & Co. v. Long*, [1906] 2 Ch. 550. As to an assignment of musical copyright, see *Jude's Musical Compositions, In re*, *ibid.*, 595.

(*g*) *Turcan, In re* (1888), 40 Ch. D. 5.

(*h*) [1892] 1 Ch. 434; [1892] 2 Q. B. 700; [1895] 2 Ch. 118, respectively.

(*i*) *Laurie v. West Hartlepool T. I. A. and David* (1899), 4 Com. Cas. 322; and see *Stokell v. Heywood*, [1897] 1 Ch. 459.

(*k*) *Southwell v. Scotter* (1880), 49 L. J. Q. B. 356; *Knill v. Prowse* (1884), 33 W. R. 163.

(*l*) See *ante*, p. 94; *Brice v. Bannister* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 569; *Buck v. Robson* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 686; *Moss, Ex parte* (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 310; *Drew v. Josolyne* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 590.

and it is now very doubtful whether a definite portion of a future unascertained, but ascertainable, debt can be assigned under the statute (*m*). "I think there is no doubt that an absolute assignment of future debts may be a good assignment for the purposes of the section; and I also think that an absolute assignment of a definite sum out of a future debt may possibly be within the section. But I think that an assignment of an undefined portion of future debts will not come within it" (*n*).

An assignment of a man's property, present and future, may be invalidated as an act of bankruptcy. But an assignment which affects one species of property only is valid (*o*). An assignment after bankruptcy petition, but before appointment of a receiver, is protected by section 45 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (*p*). Again, public policy forbids that effect should be given to assignments of pensions and salaries of public officers, payable to them for the purpose of keeping up the dignity of their office, or of assuring a due discharge of their official duties (*q*). Thus the pay of an officer in the Army prior to payment (*r*), and the salary of a Judge, have been held not assignable; but the better opinion is that such assignments are valid when the office is a sinecure or the duties have ceased (*s*). Again, it is expressly provided that old age pensions cannot be assigned under any circumstances (*t*).

On similar principles of public policy the Court will not

(*m*) So long as the decision of Lord Coleridge, C.J., in *Brice v. Bannister* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 569, remained unquestioned, it appeared to be clear that a portion of any debt could be assigned, and this decision was followed in *Moss, Ex parte* (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 310; *Drew v. Josolyne* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 590; and in *Alexander v. Steinhardt*, [1903] 2 K. B. 208; see, however, *Durham v. Robertson*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 765, 774; *Jones v. Humphreys*, [1902] 1 K. B. 10, 13, 14; *Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co.*, [1902] 2 K. B. 190, 195; and in *Torkington v. Magee, ibid.*, 427, 434; a part of a judgment debt, however, cannot be effectually assigned: *Forster v. Baker*, [1910] 2 K. B. 636, followed in *Steel Wing Co., In re*, [1921] 1 Ch. 349, a decision difficult to reconcile with *Pain, In re*, [1919] 1 Ch. 38. The assignment of part of a debt is a good equitable assignment: *Bank of Liverpool v. Holland* (1926), 43 T. L. R. 29.

(*n*) *Per* Lord Alverstone, C.J., in *Jones v. Humphreys*, [1902] 1 K. B. at p. 13.

(*o*) See the remarks of Lord Watson, in *Tailby v. Official Receiver* (1888), 13 App. Cas. at p. 535.

(*p*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59; and see *Dunkley, In re*, [1905] 2 K. B. 688. As to the trustee's position as assignee, see *Wallis, In re*, [1902] 1 K. B. 719.

(*q*) *Jones v. Coventry*, [1909] 2 K. B. 1029.

(*r*) *Stone v. Lidderdale* (1795), 2 Anst. 533.

(*s*) *Arbuthnot v. Norton* (1846), 5 Moo. P. C. C. 219; *Grenfell v. Dean and Canons of Windsor* (1840), 2 Beav. 544, 550.

(*t*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 40, s. 6. See *ante*, p. 77.

give effect to assignments which partake of the nature of champerty or maintenance, or of the buying of pretended titles (u). A sale and assignment by a client to his solicitor *pendente lite* of the subject-matter of the action is invalid (x). A mortgage of such subject-matter *pendente lite* is not necessarily invalid; but it may be tainted with champerty (y). Since choses in action are now attachable (z), an assignment of them may be voidable under L. P. A., 1925, s. 172, as tending to defeat, hinder or delay creditors. If the effect, not necessarily the object, of the assignment is to defeat, hinder or delay one particular creditor only, the assignment will be voidable under the statute (a).

Lastly, an assignment may in some cases be invalid, as an unregistered bill of sale (b).

Notice.

The statute requires that notice in writing be given to the "debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or thing in action." The notice may be given by either the assignor or assignee, or by the executors of the assignee after his death, who will then be entitled to sue for the debt in their own names (c). The usual course is for the assignment to be addressed by the assignor to the assignee, and to be retained by the assignee, who addresses a separate document to the holder of the fund, giving him notice of the assignment. But this is not necessary. If the assignor thinks fit to part with the document constituting his title and to forward it to the debtor, so as to make the one document both assignment and notice of assignment,

(u) *Stevens v. Bagwell* (1808), 15 Ves. 139; *Fitzroy v. Cave*, [1905] 2 K. B. 364. See *ante*, p. 78.

(x) *Simpson v. Lamb* (1857), 7 E. & B. 84; *Davis v. Freethy* (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 519.

(y) *James v. Kerr* (1888), 40 Ch. D. 449.

(z) Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), ss. 60 *et seq.*

(a) *Edmunds v. Edmunds*, [1904] P. 362. The assignment was void under the repealed statute, 13 Eliz. c. 5. It is now only voidable.

(b) *Church v. Sage* (1892), 67 L. T. 800; *London and Yorkshire Bank v. White* (1895), 11 T. L. R. 570.

(c) *Bateman v. Hunt*, [1904] 2 K. B. 530.

this will be equally efficacious. Or again, the assignor may address the document which constitutes the assignment to the holder of the fund and forward it to him, directing him to pay the money in accordance therewith; and this will be sufficient, both in equity and under section 136 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, if the document subsequently be shown or otherwise made known to the assignee (*d*). But in such a case care must be taken not to word the document so as to make it an informal bill of exchange, which, if not properly stamped, would be wholly inadmissible in evidence (*e*). The statute does not fix any limit of time within which notice must be given. Hence a notice in writing, given by the assignee after the death of the assignor, will be sufficient (*f*).

No special form of words is required. But the notice must state the date of the assignment correctly, otherwise it will be invalid (*g*).

An assignment otherwise complete is binding as between assignor and assignee, although no notice has been given to the debtor or holder of the fund. And all persons claiming through or under the assignor will be equally bound by such an assignment, such as a judgment creditor of the assignor (*h*), or a creditor who has obtained a garnishee order even without notice of the assignment (*i*). Still there are many reasons why an assignee should never omit or delay to give notice of the assignment to the debtor or holder of the fund:—

1. He cannot sue the debtor or holder till such notice has been given; if he desires to sue in his own name without making the assignor either a co-plaintiff or a defendant, he must give notice in writing.

2. If such notice be not given, the debtor or holder may

(*d*) *Wigan v. Law Life Assurance Association*, [1909] 1 Ch. 291.

(*e*) *Shellard, Ex parte* (1873), L. R. 17 Eq. 109.

(*f*) *Walker v. Bradford Old Bank* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 511. Even if the debtor be illiterate a written notice is necessary: *Hockley v. Goldstein* (1920), 90 L. J. K. B. 111.

(*g*) *Stanley v. English Fibres Industries* (1899), 68 L. J. Q. B. 839.

(*h*) *Beavan v. Lord Oxford* (1855), 6 De G. M. & G. 507.

(*i*) *Pickering v. Ilfracombe Ry. Co.* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 235; *Scott v. Lord Hastings* (1858), 4 K. & J. 633; *Badeley v. Consolidated Bank* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 238.

pay the money to the assignor; and such payment before notice would be an answer to any proceeding by the assignee, though the assignor can be compelled to pay over to the assignee the money which he has so received (*k*). But as soon as notice of the assignment is given to the debtor or holder of the fund, he can no longer make any payment to the assignor (*l*).

3. The assignee takes subject to all equities which bind the assignor at the date of the notice: hence "the effect of not giving it is to let in all equities which may exist or be created prior thereto," though not binding at the date of the assignment (*m*).

4. Debts due or growing due to a bankrupt in the course of his business are "goods and chattels" within the reputed ownership clause of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (*n*). Notice of assignment is therefore necessary to take such a debt out of the apparent possession of the bankrupt; and such notice must be given prior to the date of the petition. No other choses in action, however, are now within the clause (*o*), and the bankruptcy rules as to reputed ownership are not imported into the winding-up of companies (*p*).

5. The assignee of a chose in action is expected in equity to do all he can to complete his title, if only for the protection of innocent third persons. If he neglects to take any step obviously in his power (such as giving notice), and thereby enables the assignor to make a subsequent assignment of the same chose in action to a purchaser for value, who takes without notice, his claim will be postponed to that of the subsequent assignee. So if there be more than one assignment of the same chose in action, the assignee who first gives notice to the holder of the fund will obtain priority (*q*). There is one exception: equitable charges on shares in registered companies have priority in order of

(*k*) *Patrick, In re*, [1891] 1 Ch. 82.

(*l*) *Liquidation Estates Purchase Co. v. Willoughby*, [1898] A. C. 321.

(*m*) *Per cur.* in *Walker v. Bradford Old Bank* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. at p. 517. The law is otherwise in New York: *Kelly v. Selwyn*, [1905] 2 Ch. 117.

(*n*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, s. 38. See *Rutter v. Everett*, [1895] 2 Ch. 872.

(*o*) See *Colonial Bank v. Whinney* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 426.

(*p*) *Gorringe v. Irwell* (1886), 34 Ch. D. 128.

(*q*) *Johnstone v. Cox* (1880), 16 Ch. D. 571; *Kelly v. Selwyn*, [1905] 2 Ch. 117.

date, irrespective of notice; for “any such notice, if given, would be absolutely inoperative to affect the company with any trust” (r).

For these reasons it is always prudent for the assignee, so far as the nature of the property admits, to put his mark on it, to show that it belongs to him and no longer to his assignor. If a trust fund be assigned, notice should be given to the trustee; if a debt, to the debtor; if a policy of assurance, to the office. Where stock held in trust is assigned, a *distringas* should be obtained. Where the chose in action is a fund in Court, the assignee should obtain a stop order, otherwise he will be postponed to a subsequent assignee who obtains one (s). But if notice was given to the trustee while he held the fund, there is no necessity for the assignee to obtain a stop order on the fund being subsequently paid into Court; his title was completed on his giving the notice to the trustee (t). Where notice of an assignment of an equitable interest has been given to all the then existing trustees, the assignee is under no obligation to give any further notice, and is consequently entitled to priority over a subsequent assignee who has taken his assignment after the death or retirement of all those trustees and given notice of it to the new trustees (u). There is apparently only one case in which a debtor need pay no attention to a notice of assignment, and that is where he has already given to his creditor a negotiable instrument in payment of the debt (x).

Rights of the Parties after an Assignment.

If the assignment be given under seal or for valuable consideration, it is binding at once on the assignor, and cannot be revoked by him (y); it binds also the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy and any execution creditor of his (z). The assignment is completed as soon as the writing is posted, although the assignor become bankrupt before it is received (a). Then, as soon as notice of the assignment is given to the debtor or the holder of the fund, it binds him too; it “fixes the money in his hand”; he can no longer pay

(r) *Société Générale de Paris v. Walker* (1885), 11 App. Cas. 20, 30.

(s) *Mutual Life Assurance Society v. Langley* (1886), 32 Ch. D. 460; *Montefiore v. Guedalla*, [1903] 2 Ch. 26.

(t) *Livesey v. Harding* (1856), 23 Beav. 141; *Holmes, In re* (1885), 29 Ch. D. 786.

(u) *Wasdale, In re*, [1899] 1 Ch. 163.

(x) *Bence v. Shearman*, [1898] 2 Ch. 582.

(y) *Fortescue v. Barnett* (1834), 3 Myl. & K. 36.

(z) *Gorringe v. Irwell* (1886), 34 Ch. D. 128.

(a) *Alexander v. Steinhardt*, [1903] 2 K. B. 208.

the debt to the assignor, or hand over the fund to him, without first satisfying the assignee. If there was no consideration for the assignment and it was not under seal, it can still be revoked (*b*); but till it is revoked, it is valid and binding on the debtor or holder of the fund; any payment made by him in compliance with it is a good payment as against the assignor. There is no need of any express acceptance of the assignment by the holder of the fund; he need not attorn to the assignee or enter into any contract to hold the fund for him (*c*). For it is unnecessary for a man to promise expressly to do what he is bound to do (*d*); and the holder must pay the money over to the assignee, even though the assignee refuses to indemnify him. If after notice he pays the assignor, he can be compelled to pay the assignee over again.

The assignee of a chose in action, not transferable at common law, always took in equity subject to any defences which the debtor or holder would have had against the assignor; and by the express words of the statute a similar liability attaches in the case of an assignment under the Law of Property Act. The assignee takes subject to the state of accounts between the assignor and the debtor.

Thus, if a bond be void as against the assignor it is void when in the hands of an assignee (*e*). So a contract of sale, obtained by misrepresentation, and therefore voidable as between the purchaser and the assignor, will be equally voidable as between the purchaser and the assignee; and the purchaser can recover from the assignee any moneys which he paid to the assignee before he elected to avoid the contract (*f*). If a release for the debt be given by the assignee to the debtor after he has himself assigned over, but before notice of such sub-assignment, payment to the assignee is good against the sub-assignee (*g*). The assignee of a legacy or of a share in a residuary personalty, although for value and without notice, takes subject to the testator's debts (*h*). If the debt be payable only on a certain condition, the condition binds the assignee (*i*). The debtor

(*b*) *Wigan v. Law Life Assurance Association*, [1909] 1 Ch. 291.

(*c*) *Yeates v. Groves* (1791), 1 Ves. Jun. 280; *Burn v. Carvalho* (1839), 4 Myl. & Cr. 690, 703; *Bell v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1852), 15 Beav. 548.

(*d*) *William Brandt's Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co.*, [1905] A. C. 454.

(*e*) *Turton v. Benson* (1718), 1 P. Wms. 496.

(*f*) *Fleming v. Loe*, [1901] 2 Ch. 594; reversed on the facts, [1902] 2 Ch. 359.

(*g*) *Stocks v. Dobson* (1853), 4 De G. M. & G. 11.

(*h*) *Hooper v. Smart* (1875), 1 Ch. D. 90.

(*i*) *Tooth v. Hallett* (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. 242; *Drew v. Josolyne* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 590.

or holder of the fund, if sued by the assignee, may set off or counterclaim against him any matter which he could have set off or counterclaimed against the assignor (*k*).

This rule, that "the assignee of a chose in action takes subject to all rights of set-off and other defences which were available against the assignor," is subject to this limitation, "that after notice of an assignment of a chose in action, the debtor cannot, by payment or otherwise, do anything to take away or diminish the rights of the assignee as they stood at the time of the notice" (*l*). "It would be quite unreasonable that the assignee, who has given notice of the assignment, should be held affected by transactions taking place behind his back with the assignor" (*m*). But this will not prevent the debtor from availing himself of any set-off which arises, without any fresh act on his part, after notice of assignment given out of the same contract or transaction as gave rise to the debt assigned. He is entitled to have all accounts under that one contract taken together once for all, whether there has been an assignment or not (*n*); and if he can show that, when such accounts are properly taken, there will be no balance in favour of the assignor, he will not be compelled to make any payment to the assignee. The law on this point may be thus stated:—

1. Any set-off which the debtor or holder of the fund had against the assignor at the moment he received notice of the assignment is good against the assignee, whether it arises out of the same contract or any other (*o*).

2. The defendant may also avail himself of any set-off or counterclaim which accrues to him after notice, if it arises out of the same contract or transaction as that on which he is sued (*p*).

(*k*) *Rolt v. White* (1862), 31 Beav. 520; *Young v. Kitchin* (1878), 3 Ex. D. 127.

(*l*) *Per James, L.J.*, in *Roxburghe v. Cox* (1881), 17 Ch. D., at p. 526; and see *Milan Tramways, In re* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 122; (1884), 25 Ch. D. 587.

(*m*) *Per Lord Herschell* in *Liquidation Estates Co. v. Willoughby*, [1898] A. C., at p. 331; and see *Bristow, In re*, [1906] 2 Ir. R. 215.

(*n*) *Bergmann v. Macmillan* (1881), 17 Ch. D. 423.

(*o*) *Biggerstaff v. Rowatt's Wharf*, [1896] 2 Ch. 93.

(*p*) *Government of Newfoundland v. Newfoundland Ry. Co.* (1888), 13 App. Cas. 199.

3. But the defendant cannot raise against the assignee any set-off or counterclaim which arises after notice out of an independent contract, whether made before or after notice of assignment (q), nor can he make a claim of a personal character against an innocent assignee though the claim arose in connection with the subject-matter of the assignment (r).

4. The defendant can only use such set-off or counterclaim for his own protection; he cannot recover any money from the assignee. If the amount of the set-off or counterclaim exceeds the amount of the debt assigned, the assignee can recover nothing: he must sue the assignor for the balance (s).

Equitable Assignments since the Judicature Act.

A document, which is not an absolute assignment within the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 6, or the Law of Property Act, 1925, s. 136, may yet be a valid equitable assignment under the rules that existed before the Judicature Act came into operation in 1875; for the former equity is not destroyed by the modern statute; they remain side by side distinct and separate things. "It is plain that every equitable assignment, in the wide sense of the term as used in equity, is not within the enactment" (t). "Why that which would have been a good equitable assignment before the statute should now be invalid and inoperative because it fails to come up to the requirements of the statute, I confess I do not understand. The statute does not forbid or destroy equitable assignments or impair their efficacy in the slightest degree. . . . An equitable assignment does

(q) See *Watson v. Mid-Wales Ry. Co.* (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 593; *Milan Tramways Co., In re* (1884), 25 Ch. D. 587; *Asphaltic Wood Pavement Co., In re* (1885), 30 Ch. D. 216. Special rules apply in the case of an assignment by a defaulting trustee; they will be found in the judgment of Stirling, J., in *Doering v. Doering* (1889), 42 Ch. D. 203. And see *Moss Bay Hematite Co., In re* (1892), 8 T. L. R. 475; *Nelson v. Roberts* (1893), 69 L. T. 352; and *Christie v. Taunton*, [1893] 2 Ch. 175.

(r) *Stoddart v. Union Trust*, [1912] 1 K. B. 181, at p. 193.

(s) *Young v. Kitchin* (1878), 3 Ex. D. 127, approved in *Government of Newfoundland v. Newfoundland Ry. Co.* (1888), 13 App. Cas. 199.

(t) *Per Chitty, L.J.*, in *Durham v. Robertson*, [1898] 1 Q. B., at p. 771; cited with approval by Cozens-Hardy, L.J., in *Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co.*, [1902] 2 K. B., at p. 196.

not always purport to be an assignment nor use the language of an assignment. It may be addressed to the debtor. It may be couched in the language of command. It may be a courteous request. It may assume the form of mere permission. The language is immaterial if the meaning is plain. All that is necessary is that the debtor should be given to understand that the debt has been made over by the creditor to some third person. If the debtor ignores such a notice, he does so at his peril. If the assignment be for valuable consideration and communicated to the third person, it cannot be revoked by the creditor or safely disregarded by the debtor'' (u).

The distinction between the two modes of procedure has been already pointed out (x). If the assignment is not in writing, or if no notice of it has been given in writing, the assignee may still sue on it as an equitable assignment. But he must show a consideration, and strictly he must join the assignor either as a co-plaintiff or as a defendant (y).

But the mere fact that a contract made between A and B refers to C, or was entered into for the benefit of C, does not render C an assignee of the contract or entitle him to sue on it (z). Thus, if A orders goods from B to be delivered to C, C cannot bring an action for the goods if they be not delivered, nor is he liable for the price if they be delivered (a). So, if A engages B at a salary which he says will be paid by C, B has no right of action against C, unless A was C's agent and had authority to pledge his credit (b). But there are cases, as we have seen (c), in which the negligent performance of a contract may entitle a third person to bring an action of tort, not of contract, if the contract was entered into with special reference to such third person.

(u) *Per* Lord Macnaghten, in *William Brandt's Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co.*, [1905] A. C., at pp. 461, 462.

(x) See *ante*, p. 122.

(y) *Performing Right Society v. London Theatre of Varieties*, [1924] A. C. 1.

(z) *Cavalier v. Pope*, [1906] A. C. 428; *Cameron v. Young*, [1908] A. C. 176, *post*, p. 237.

(a) But see remarks at p. 36, *ante*.

(b) *Crocker v. Plymouth Corporation*, [1906] 1 K. B. 494; *Boston Fruit Co. v. British, &c., Insurance Co.*, [1906] A. C. 336.

(c) Vol. 1, pp. 646—670.

CHAPTER IX.

CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS.

A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF GOODS differs from other contracts in this important particular, namely, that the property in the goods may pass from the seller to the buyer by the force of the contract itself. A contract of sale may therefore be one of two different things, *viz.*, an AGREEMENT TO SELL, where the property does not pass but is only agreed to be transferred, and a SALE, where the property passes by the contract. It is not necessary in order to transfer the ownership of the goods (as it was under the law of Rome) that the goods should have been delivered to the buyer.

“ A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller transfers, or agrees to transfer, the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration called the price.”

“ Goods ” include all chattels personal other than things in action and money, emblements and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. The goods may be either “ specific,” *i.e.*, identified and agreed upon at the time the contract is made, or “ unascertained,” *i.e.*, defined by description only. This latter class includes “ future goods,” *i.e.*, such as are to come into existence or be acquired by the seller after the contract is made (a).

“ A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer, the contract is called a sale; but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time, or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement to sell. An agreement to sell becomes a sale

(a) These definitions are taken from sections 1 and 62, sub-section 1, of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71).

when the time elapses, or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred ” (a).

With the formalities required in a contract for the sale of goods we have already dealt (b). The main provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (c), affecting other matters connected with a contract for the sale of goods are set out in the following pages.

The law relating to the sale of goods has been codified by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (c). But it leaves untouched—

- (i) the rules of bankruptcy relating to contracts of sale;
- (ii) the rules of the common law, including the law merchant, except where they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, more particularly the rules relating to the law of principal and agent, and to the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake or other invalidating cause;
- (iii) the enactments relating to bills of sale, and other enactments affecting the sale of special classes of goods, such as the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, or the Dangerous Drugs Acts.
- (iv) It also expressly excludes from its operation any transaction in the form of a contract of sale which is intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge, charge or other security (d);
- (v) and lastly, “ capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law concerning capacity to contract and to transfer and acquire property. Where necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant, or to a person who by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he must pay a reasonable price therefor.” “ Necessaries ” are goods of a kind suitable to the condition in life of the person who orders them, and actually required in the quantities ordered at the time of the order (e).

Goods which form the subject of a contract of sale may, as we have seen, “ be either existing goods owned by the seller, or goods to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of the contract,” which are called “ future goods.” It may be that the contract is “ for the sale of goods, the acquisition of which by the seller depends upon a contingency which may or may not happen,” as, for example, where the subject-matter is a crop not sown at the date of the contract. If by the contract “ the seller purports to effect a present sale of future goods, the contract operates as an agreement to sell ” (f). If specific goods,

(b) See *ante*, pp. 53—60.

(d) See section 61.

(f) Section 5.

(c) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71.

(e) Section 2.

which are the subject-matter of a contract of sale, "have without the seller's knowledge perished at the time when the contract is made, the contract is void" (g). If specific goods, which are the subject-matter of an agreement to sell, perish subsequently to the making of the contract, "without any fault on the part of either seller or buyer before the risk passes to the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided" (h).

"The price in a contract of sale may be fixed by the contract or may be left to be fixed in manner thereby agreed, or may be determined by the course of dealing between the parties." In the absence of any such determination of the price "the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular case" (i).

"The omission of the particular mode or time of payment, or even of the price itself, does not necessarily invalidate a contract of sale. Goods may be sold, and frequently are sold, when it is the intention of the parties to bind themselves by a contract which does not specify the price or the mode of payment, leaving them to be settled by some future agreement or to be determined by what is reasonable under the circumstances" (j).

"Where there is an agreement to sell goods on the terms that the price is to be fixed by the valuation of a third party, and such third party cannot or does not make such valuation, the agreement is avoided; provided that, if the goods or any part thereof have been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer, he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Where such third party is prevented from making the valuation by the fault of the seller or buyer, the party not in fault may maintain an action for damages against the party in fault" (k).

Contracts of sale may embody several terms, either express or implied, some of which may be of vital, others only of subsidiary, importance. A breach of a term of subsidiary importance gives the aggrieved party a right to

(g) Section 6, adopting the law as laid down in *Couturier v. Hastie* (1852), 5 H. L. Cas. 673. The section is qualified by usage. See section 55 and *Manbre Saccharine Co. v. Corn Products*, [1919] 1 K. B. 198.

(h) Section 7. "Fault" is defined to be "wrongful act or default": section 62, sub-section 1. See *Nickoll v. Ashton*, [1901] 2 K. B. 126.

(i) Section 8.

(j) *Per cur.* in *Valpy v. Gibson* (1847), 4 C. B., at p. 864.

(k) Section 9.

sue for damages for the breach of that term only; but a breach of a term of vital importance gives the aggrieved party the right to repudiate the contract, or to sue for damages for the breach of the contract as a whole as distinct from damages for the breach of a term. The former term is called a WARRANTY; the latter, a CONDITION (l). A warranty in a contract of sale " means an agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale, but collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages, but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated " (m).

The question whether an affirmation made by the vendor at the time of sale constitutes a warranty depends on the intention of the parties to be deduced from the whole of the evidence; and the circumstance that the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the purchaser is ignorant, though evidence of intention, is not conclusive of the question (n).

Contracts for the sale of goods often contain conditions as to time of payment or time of delivery; in such cases; " unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract, stipulations as to time of payment are not deemed to be of the essence of a contract of sale. Whether any other stipulation as to time is of the essence of the contract or not depends on the terms of the contract " (o).

" The case of any condition or warranty, fulfilment of which is excused by law by reason of impossibility or otherwise," is not affected by the Act (p).

In certain cases the breach of a condition may be treated as a breach of warranty.

" (a) Where a contract of sale is subject to any condition to be fulfilled by the seller, the buyer may waive the condition, or may elect to treat the breach of such condition as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for treating the contract as repudiated. . . .

(c) Where a contract of sale is not severable, and the buyer has accepted the goods, or part thereof, or where the contract is for specific goods, the property in which has passed to the buyer, the breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be

(l) These expressions are defined by the Act, and the Court will determine in each case whether the term is a condition or a warranty. The fact that the parties have so called it is not conclusive: the exact legal effect depends upon the construction of the contract. Section 11, sub-section 1 (b).

(m) Section 62.

(n) *Heilbut v. Buckleton*, [1913] A. C. 30.

(o) Section 10. See *Kidston v. Monceau Ironworks* (1902), 86 L. T. 556; and *ante*, p. 93.

(p) Section 11, sub-section 3.

treated as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the contract as repudiated, unless there be a term of the contract express or implied to that effect" (q).

"In a contract of sale, unless the circumstances of the contract are such as to show a different intention, there is—

(1) An implied condition on the part of the seller that in the case of a sale he has a right to sell the goods, and that in the case of an agreement to sell he will have a right to sell the goods at the time when the property is to pass (r);

(2) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods;

(3) An implied warranty that the goods shall be free from any charge or incumbrance in favour of any third party, not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract is made (s). But a condition attached to a contract of sale will not run with the goods, *e.g.*, a condition that they shall not be sold under a specified minimum price cannot be enforced against subsequent purchasers from the buyer (t).

"Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied condition that the goods shall correspond with the description; and if the sale be by sample as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with the description" (u).

"Subject to the provisions of the Act and of any statute in that behalf (v), there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale, except as follows :—

(q) Section 11, sub-section 1. As to remedy for breach of warranty, see section 53, and *Wallis v. Pratt*, [1911] A. C. 394.

(r) But see *Payne v. Elsdon* (1900), 17 T. L. R. 161 (where an auctioneer sold under a bad distress warrant); *Niblett v. Confectioners' Materials Co.*, [1921] 3 K. B. 387 (where goods sold bore a name infringing a registered trademark); and *Rowland v. Divall*, [1923] 2 K. B. 500 (stolen motor-car).

(s) Section 12.

(t) See *Taddy v. Sterious*, [1904] 1 Ch. 354; *McGruther v. Pitcher*, [1904] 2 Ch. 306; *Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Selfridge*, [1915] A. C. 847, at p. 852.

(u) Section 13. See *Vigers v. Sanderson*, [1901] 1 K. B. 608; *Moore v. Landauer*, [1921] 2 K. B. 529.

(v) *E.g.*, the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 25), s. 17; and Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 27). See *Pulling v. Lidbatter*, [1924] 2 K. B. 114.

(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose (*w*), provided that in the case of a contract for the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name there is no implied condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose;

(2) Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality; provided that if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed (*x*);

(3) An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade (*y*);

(4) An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied by this Act unless inconsistent therewith " (*z*).

And independently of any express or implied condition or warranty, if the seller of goods knows them to be dangerous and the buyer to be presumably ignorant of the danger, it is his duty to warn the buyer of their dangerous character (*a*).

(*w*) Section 14, sub-section 1; *Randall v. Newson* (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 102 (carriage-pole). See *Preist v. Last*, [1903] 2 K. B. 148 (hot-water bottle); *Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 608 (milk for household consumption); *Manchester Liners v. Rea*, [1922] 2 A. C. 74 (coal); *Baldrey v. Marshall*, [1925] 1 K. B. 260 (motor-car); and *Thomson v. Sears* (1926), Sc. L. T. 221.

(*x*) *Jones v. Just* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 197; *Drummond v. Van Ingen* (1887), 12 App. Cas. 284; see also *Thornett v. Beers*, [1919] 1 K. B. 486; and *Sumner v. Webb*, [1922] 1 K. B. 55.

(*y*) *Jones v. Bowden* (1813), 4 Taunt. 847; *Baldrey v. Marshall*, [1925] 1 K. B. 260.

(*z*) Section 14. *Bigge v. Parkinson* (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 301.

(*a*) *Clarke v. Army and Navy Co-operative Society*, [1903] 1 K. B. 155; *Bates v. Batey*, [1913] 3 K. B. 351.

In the case of a contract for sale by sample, *i.e.*, a contract in which there is a term either express or implied to that effect, the following are implied conditions:—

- “(1) That the bulk shall correspond with the sample;
- (2) That the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample;
- (3) That the goods shall be free from any defect, rendering them unmerchantable, which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample” (b).

At what moment does the ownership of the goods pass from the seller to the buyer? Such transfer generally, but not necessarily, takes place as soon as the contract is made. But there are distinctions which must be observed between specific and unascertained, and between existing and future, goods. “Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained” (c). But “where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it should pass” (d). The Act has laid down rules (e) for ascertaining the intention of the parties, unless the true construction of the contract makes other provision, as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer:—

Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of *specific goods in a deliverable state*, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed (f).

When “goods are sold upon credit, and nothing is agreed upon as to the time of delivering the goods, the vendee is immediately

(b) Section 15. See *Drummond v. Van Ingen*, *supra*; *Wren v. Holt*, [1903] 1 K. B. 610 (arsenic in beer).

(c) Section 16.

(d) Section 17, sub-section 1. See *Seath v. Moore* (1886), 11 App. Cas., at p. 370; followed in *Reid v. Macbeth*, [1904] A. C. 223.

(e) Section 18.

(f) See the remarks of Blackburn, J., in *Sweeting v. Turner* (1871), L. R. 7 Q. B. at p. 313; and of Parke, B., in *Dixon v. Yates* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. at p. 340.

entitled to the possession, and the right of possession and the right of property vest at once in him " (g). " If a vendor agrees to sell for a deferred payment, the property passes, and the vendee is entitled to call for a present delivery, without payment " (h). " The sale of a specific chattel on credit, though that credit may be limited to a definite period, transfers the property in the goods to the vendee, giving the vendor a right of action for the price and a lien upon the goods, if they remain in his possession, till that price be paid " (i).

Rule 2. Where there is a contract for the sale of *specific goods* and the *seller is bound to do something to the goods* for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the property does not pass until such thing is done and the buyer has notice thereof (j).

Rule 3. Where there is a contract for the sale of *specific goods in a deliverable state*, but the *seller is bound to weigh, measure, test or do some other act or thing with reference to the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price*, the property does not pass until such act or thing is done and the buyer has notice thereof (k).

Rule 4. When goods are delivered to the buyer *on approval* or " *on sale or return* " or other similar terms, the property therein passes to the buyer :—

- (a) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or does any other act adopting the transaction :
- (b) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the seller but retains the goods without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return of the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact.

A buyer of goods, who has used or sold a portion of them after discovering that they are not in accordance with the contract, cannot repudiate the contract and recover back the price of the goods (l). The seller may, however, have acquiesced in the buyer's

(g) *Per cur.* in *Bloxam v. Sanders* (1825), 4 B. & C., at p. 948.

(h) *Per Wilde, C.J.*, in *Spartali v. Benecke* (1850), 10 C. B., at p. 216.

(i) *Per cur.* in *Martindale v. Smith* (1841), 1 Q. B., at p. 395.

(j) See *Seath v. Moore* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 350.

(k) See *Laing v. Barclay*, [1908] A. C. 35.

(l) *Harnor v. Groves* (1855), 15 C. B. 667.

thus dealing with the goods. The general rule is that "a buyer cannot return a specific chattel except it be in the same state as when it was bought" (m).

If a man pledges goods received "on sale or return," the pledging is an act adopting the transaction; consequently the property passes (n). Any act inconsistent with the return of the goods would have this effect.

Where, however, jewellery was delivered on approbation, but "to remain the property of W" (the plaintiff) "until settled for," it was held that the property in the goods had not passed out of the plaintiff. The goods had not been delivered "on sale or return or other similar terms" within the meaning of the Act (o).

Rule 5.—(i) Where there is a contract for the sale of *unascertained or future goods by description*, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are *unconditionally appropriated* to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer. Such assent may be express or implied and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made (p).

(ii) Where, in pursuance of the contract, the seller *delivers the goods to the buyer, or to a carrier or other bailee or custodier* (whether named by the buyer or not) for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, and does not reserve the right of disposal, he is deemed to have unconditionally appropriated the goods to the contract (q).

Sometimes the right of disposal is specially reserved to the seller. "Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller may, by the terms of the contract or appropriation, reserve the right of disposal of the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled. In such case, notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to the buyer, or to a carrier or other bailee or custodier for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, the property in the goods does not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the seller are fulfilled. Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of

(m) *Per* Bramwell, B., in *Head v. Tattersall* (1871), L. R. 7 Ex., at pp. 11, 12.

(n) *Kirkham v. Attenborough*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 201.

(o) *Weiner v. Gill*, [1906] 2 K. B. 574, explained and distinguished in *Weiner v. Harris*, [1910] 1 K. B. 285; see also *Edwards v. Vaughan* (1910), 26 T. L. R. 545; *Kempler v. Bravingtons* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 519.

(p) As to the sale of the component parts of a machine to be subsequently erected on the purchaser's premises, see *Pritchett Co. v. Currie*, [1916] 2 Ch. 515.

(q) See *Wait v. Baker* (1848), 2 Exch., at p. 7.

lading the goods are deliverable to the order of the seller or his agent, the seller is *prima facie* deemed to reserve the right of disposal. Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer for the price, and transmits the bill of exchange and bill of lading to the buyer together to secure acceptance or payment of the bill of exchange, the buyer is bound to return the bill of lading if he does not honour the bill of exchange, and if he wrongfully retains the bill of lading the property in the goods does not pass to him " (r).

The risk *prima facie* passes with the property. " Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the property therein is transferred to the buyer, the goods are at the buyer's risk, whether delivery has been made or not. If, however, delivery has been delayed through the fault of either party, the goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for such fault " (s).

The general rule of law is that no one can transfer a better title than he himself has. " Where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell " (t).

To this rule there are exceptions:—

" Where goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the market, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without

(r) Section 19.

(s) Section 20. The section does not " affect the duties or liabilities of either seller or buyer as a bailee or custodian of the goods of the party "; see *Shaw v. Symmons*, [1917] 1 K. B. 799.

(t) Section 21, sub-section 1. The Act does not, however, affect the provisions of the Factors Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 45), or any enactment enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof, such as the Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 111), the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31), the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, s. 38), and Innkeepers Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 38). Further, the Act does not affect the validity of any contract of sale under any special common law or statutory power of sale or under the order of a Court of competent jurisdiction; *Sims v. Midland Ry.* (1912), 18 Com. Cas. 44 (sale by carrier); *Jones Bros. v. Woodhouse*, [1923] 2 K. B. 117 (sale by sheriff); *Willetts v. Chaplin* (1923), 39 T. L. R. 222 (sale by warehouseman).

notice of any defect or want of title on the part of the seller ” (u).

“ Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of the seller’s defect of title ” (v).

“ Where goods have been stolen, taken, obtained, extorted, embezzled, converted or disposed of, or knowingly received, and the offender is prosecuted to conviction, the property in the goods so stolen reverts in the person who was the owner of the goods or his personal representative, notwithstanding any intermediate dealing with them, whether by sale in market overt or otherwise ”; but “ where goods have been obtained by fraud or other wrongful means not amounting to larceny, the property in such goods shall not revert in the person who was the owner of the goods, or his personal representative, by reason only of the conviction of the offender ” (w).

“ Where a person having sold goods continues or is in possession of the goods, or of the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same ” (x).

“ Where a person having bought or agreed to buy goods obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or the documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that

(u) Section 22. Horses are not within the section; 2 & 3 Phil. and Mary, c. 7, ss. 2, 4, and 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 1. All shops in the City of London are market overt, but a show-room as distinct from the shop is not market overt: *Hargreave v. Spink*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 25.

(v) Section 23. See in illustration *Nanka Bruce v. Commonwealth Trust*, [1926] A. C. 77. But where there is no contract between the parties and no title has passed to the person who has obtained possession of the goods, this section does not apply. Thus, in *Cundy v. Lindsay* (1878), 3 App. Cas. 459, Blenkarn never acquired any title to the goods, as Messrs. Lindsay believed that they were selling the goods to Blenkiron & Co.; hence the innocent purchasers from Blenkarn also acquired no title, and were compelled to restore them to Messrs. Lindsay. Cf. *Phillips v. Brooks*, [1919] 2 K. B. 243; *Folkes v. King*, [1923] 1 K. B. 282; *Heap v. Motorists' Advisory Co.*, *ibid.* 577.

(w) Section 24 extended by section 45 of the Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50), which enables the Court to order restitution. See *Helby v. Matthews*, [1895] A. C. 471.

(x) Section 25, sub-section 1. See *Nicholson v. Harper*, [1895] 2 Ch. 415.

person, or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title, under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of any lien or other right of the original seller in respect of the goods, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods or documents of title with the consent of the owner" (y).

With regard to the performance of the contract, "it is the duty of the seller to deliver the goods, and of the buyer to accept and pay for them in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale" (z). "Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions, that is to say, the seller must be ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for the price, and the buyer must be ready and willing to pay the price in exchange for the possession of the goods" (a).

The following rules apply as to delivery. In the absence of any expressed or implied agreement to the contrary, the place of delivery is the seller's place of business, if he has one; if not, his residence, except where the goods are at the time of making the contract to the knowledge of the parties in some other place, which in such case is the place of delivery. It may be that under the contract the seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer. In such case, if no time is fixed within which the seller shall send the goods to the buyer, he must do so within a reasonable time. "Where the goods at the time of sale are in the possession of a third person, there is no delivery by seller to buyer unless and until such third party acknowledges to the buyer that he holds the goods on his behalf. Demand or tender of delivery may be treated as ineffectual unless made at a reasonable hour. What is a reasonable hour is a question

(y) Section 25, sub-section 2. See *Belsize Motor Co. v. Cox*, [1914] 1 K. B. 244; *Whiteley v. Hilt*, [1918] 2 K. B. 808. A conditional agreement comes within this sub-section: *Marten v. Whale*, [1917] 2 K. B. 480. The term "mercantile agent" has the same meaning as in the Factors Acts. See *Hugill v. Masker* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 364. As to whether a person in possession of goods under a hire-purchase agreement, who disposes of the goods or any part of them the subject of such agreement, is within the section depends upon the terms of the agreement: see *McEntire v. Crossley*, [1895] A. C. 457.

(z) Section 27.

(a) Section 28. See *E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Biddell*, [1912] A. C. 18; *Orient Co. v. Brekke*, [1913] 1 K. B. 531.

of fact. Unless otherwise agreed, the expenses of and incidental to putting the goods into a deliverable state must be borne by the seller " (b).

If the seller deliver to the buyer a wrong quantity of goods, whether too small or too large, the buyer may reject the whole, or he may retain the whole (or in the case where the quantity delivered is larger than that contracted for, he may retain the exact quantity and reject the rest), paying for the quantity retained at the contract rate (c). Further, should the goods delivered be mixed with goods of a different description from those the seller contracted to sell, the buyer may reject the whole or retain such as are in accordance with the contract (d). These rights are, however, subject to any usage of trade, special agreement or course of dealing between the parties.

" Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound to accept delivery thereof by instalments. Where there is a contract for goods to be delivered by stated instalments, which are to be separately paid for, and the seller makes defective deliveries in respect of one or more instalments, or the buyer neglects or refuses to take delivery of or pay for one or more instalments, it is a question in each case, depending on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case, whether the breach of contract is a repudiation of the whole contract, or whether it is a severable breach giving rise to a claim for compensation, but not a right to treat the whole contract as repudiated " (e).

" Where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier, whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, is *prima facie* deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer." If the seller deliver the goods to a carrier, he must, unless otherwise agreed, make such contract with the carrier as, having regard to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the case, is reasonable, and, further if the goods are to be carried by sea under circumstances under which it is usual to insure, he must, unless otherwise agreed, give the buyer notice enabling him to insure the goods (f). " Where the seller agrees to deliver the goods at his own risk at a place

(b) Section 29. The operation of the issue or transfer of documents of title to goods is not affected by the section. As to these, see the Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 111), and the Factors Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 45).

(c) Section 30, sub-sections 1 and 2; and see *Harland & Wolff v. Burstall* (1901), 84 L. T. 324; *Behrend v. Produce Brokers*, [1920] 3 K. B. 530.

(d) Section 30, sub-section 3; and see *Aitken v. Boullen* (1908), S. C. 490.

(e) Section 31. See *Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor* (1884), 9 App. Cas. 434; *British and Beningtons v. N. W. Cachar Tea Co.*, [1923] A. C. 48. But the law is really the same whether the contract is an instalment contract or not.

(f) Section 32. The section does not apply to a c.i.f. contract entered into in time of peace nor to insurance against war risks: *Law & Bonar v. British American Tobacco Co.*, [1916] 2 K. B. 605. Section 32, sub-section 3, applies to a contract for the sale of goods f.o.b.: *Wimble v. Rosenberg*, [1913] 3 K. B. 743.

other than that where the goods are when sold, the buyer must nevertheless, unless otherwise agreed, take any risk of deterioration in the goods necessarily incidental to the course of transit" (g).

As to ACCEPTANCE, the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods, when—

(i) he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them; or

(ii) after delivery to him he does any act in relation to them inconsistent with the ownership of the seller; or

(iii) he retains the same without intimating within a reasonable time that he rejects them (h).

The word "accept" in sections 27, 34, 35 and 36 does not bear the same meaning as the phrase "accept and actually receive" in section 4, which we have already discussed (i). Thus in *Abbott v. Wolsey* (k) damages were recovered from the defendant for not accepting the goods sold, although at the same time it was held that there had been a sufficient acceptance by him to satisfy section 4.

The buyer is not deemed to have accepted goods which he has not examined previously to delivery, "unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract. Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders delivery of goods to the buyer, he is bound on request to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract" (l). A buyer, who has the right to refuse to accept goods delivered to him, is not bound to return them to the seller; "it is sufficient if he intimate to the seller that he refuses to accept them" (m).

"When the seller is ready and willing to deliver the goods and requests the buyer to take delivery, and the buyer does not within a reasonable time after such request take delivery of the goods, he is liable to the seller for any loss occasioned by his neglect or refusal to take delivery, and also for a reasonable charge for the care and custody of the goods"; but this does not "affect the rights of the seller where the neglect or refusal of the buyer to take delivery amounts to a repudiation of the contract" (n).

(g) Section 33.

(h) Section 35.

(i) *Ante*, p. 53.

(k) [1895] 2 Q. B. 97, cited *ante*, p. 54.

(l) Section 34.

(m) Section 36.

(n) Section 37. As to repudiation, see section 31. The seller's course would appear to be to proceed under section 57.

Rights of unpaid seller.—“The seller of goods is deemed to be an unpaid seller within the meaning of this Act:—

(a) When the whole of the price has not been paid or tendered.

(b) When a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument has been received as conditional payment, and the condition on which it was received has not been fulfilled by reason of the dishonour of the instrument or otherwise” (o).

“Subject to the provisions of this Act (p), and of any statute in that behalf (q), notwithstanding that the property in the goods may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller of goods, as such, has by implication of law:—

(a) A lien on the goods or right to retain them for the price while he is in possession of them;

(b) In case of the insolvency of the buyer, a right of stopping the goods *in transitu* after he has parted with the possession of them;

(c) A right of re-sale as limited by this Act.

Further, where the property in goods has not passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller has, in addition to his other remedies, a right of withholding delivery similar to and co-extensive with his rights of lien and stoppage *in transitu* where the property has passed to the buyer” (r).

As to the lien mentioned above, “the unpaid seller of goods who is in possession of them is entitled to retain possession of them until payment or tender of the price in the following cases, namely:—

(a) Where the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit;

(b) Where the goods have been sold on credit, but the term of credit has expired;

(c) Where the buyer becomes insolvent” (s).

“Where an unpaid seller has made part delivery of the

(o) Section 38.

(p) See section 43, *post*, p. 155, and sections 47 and 55.

(q) Cf. the Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 111), and the Factors Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 45).

(r) Section 39.

(s) Section 41. An agent, bailee or custodian for the buyer is in the same position.

goods, he may exercise his right of lien or retention on the remainder, unless such part delivery has been made under such circumstances as to show an agreement to waive the lien or right of retention ” (t).

* “ The unpaid seller of goods loses his lien or right of retention thereon—

(a) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee or custodier for the purpose of transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal of the goods ;

(b) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods ;

(c) By waiver thereof.

The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien or right of retention thereon, does not lose his lien or right of retention by reason only that he has obtained judgment or decree for the price of the goods ” (u).

Stoppage *in transitu* is a remedy given, when the buyer becomes insolvent (x), to the unpaid seller, who has parted with the possession of the goods. It is, in fact, a right so long as the goods are in course of transit to resume possession of them and to retain them until payment or tender of the price (y), though it does not rescind the contract between the carrier and the purchaser, or revest the property in the goods in the vendor (z). “ Goods are deemed to be in course of transit from the time when they are delivered to a carrier by land or water, or other bailee or custodier, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, until the buyer or his agent in that behalf takes delivery of them from such carrier or other bailee or custodier. If the buyer or his agent in that behalf obtains delivery of the goods before their arrival at the appointed destination, the transit is at an end. If, after the arrival of the goods at the destination the carrier or other bailee or custodier acknowledges to

(t) Section 42.

(u) Section 43. “ Custodier,” “ right of retention ” and “ decree ” are Scotch terms.

(x) *I.e.*, has ceased to pay or cannot pay his debts when they become due, whether he has committed an act of bankruptcy or not : see section 62, subsection 3.

(y) Section 44.

(z) *Booth Steamship Co. v. Cargo Fleet Iron Co.*, [1916] 2 K. B. 570.

the buyer or his agent that he holds the goods on his behalf the transit is at an end and it is immaterial that a further destination for the goods may have been indicated by the buyer. If the goods are rejected by the buyer and the carrier or other bailee or custodian continues in possession of them, the transit is not deemed to be at an end, even if the seller has refused to receive them back. When goods are delivered to a ship chartered by the buyer, it is a question depending on the circumstances of the particular case whether they are in the possession of the master as a carrier or as agent to the buyer. Where the carrier or other bailee or custodian wrongfully refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer or his agent the transit is deemed to be at an end. Where part delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer or his agent, the remainder of the goods may be stopped *in transitu*, unless such part delivery has been made under such circumstances as to show an agreement to give up possession of the whole of the goods" (a).

The Act provides that "the unpaid seller may exercise his right of stoppage *in transitu* either by taking actual possession of the goods, or by giving notice of his claim to the carrier or other bailee or custodian in whose possession the goods are. Such notice may be given either to the person in actual possession of the goods or to his principal. In the latter case the notice, to be effectual, must be given at such time and under such circumstances that the principal, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, may communicate it to his servant or agent in time to prevent a delivery to the buyer. When notice of stoppage *in transitu* is given by the seller to the carrier, or other bailee or custodian in possession of the goods, he must re-deliver the goods to, or according to the directions of, the seller. The expenses of such re-delivery must be borne by the seller" (b).

"Subject to the provisions of the Act, the unpaid seller's right of lien or retention or stoppage *in transitu* is not affected by any sale or other disposition of the goods which the buyer may have made, unless the seller has assented thereto. Provided that where a document of title to goods has been lawfully transferred to any person as buyer or owner of the goods, and that person transfers the

document to a person who takes the document in good faith and for valuable consideration, then, if such last-mentioned transfer was by way of sale, the unpaid seller's right of lien or retention or stoppage *in transitu* is defeated, and if such last-mentioned transfer was by way of pledge or other disposition for value, the unpaid seller's right of lien or retention or stoppage *in transitu* can only be exercised subject to the rights of the transferee" (c).

As a general rule, "a contract of sale is not rescinded by the mere exercise by an unpaid seller of his right of lien or retention or stoppage *in transitu*. But where an unpaid seller who has exercised his right of lien or retention or stoppage *in transitu* re-sells the goods, the buyer acquires a good title thereto as against the original buyer. So, too, where the goods are of a perishable nature, or where the unpaid seller gives notice to the buyer of his intention to re-sell, and the buyer does not within a reasonable time pay or tender the price, the unpaid seller may re-sell the goods and recover from the original buyer damages for any loss occasioned by his breach of contract. Again, where the seller expressly reserves a right of re-sale in case the buyer should make default and, on the buyer making default, re-sells the goods, the original contract of sale is thereby rescinded, but without prejudice to any claim the seller may have for damages" (d).

Remedy on Breach.—If the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, or if the price is by the contract payable on a fixed day irrespective of delivery and the buyer wrongfully fails to pay the price, the seller may recover the same in an action against the buyer (e). If the buyer wrongfully fails to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may recover damages in an action against the buyer for not accepting them (f).

Where the seller wrongfully fails to deliver, the buyer

(c) Section 47. See *Kemp v. Falk* (1882), 7 App. Cas. 573; *Ant. Jurgens Margarinefabrieken v. Louis Dreyfus & Co.*, [1914] 3 K. B. 40.

(d) Section 48. A seller may also resell as an agent of necessity: *Prager v. Blatspiel*, [1924] 1 K. B. 566.

(e) Section 49.

(f) Section 50.

may recover, in an action for non-delivery, the damages directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach of contract (g).

In actions for non-delivery, "where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of damages is *prima facie* to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to have been delivered, or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of refusal to deliver" (h). Corresponding rules define the measure of damages in an action against the buyer for not accepting goods (i). If the seller was by the contract bound to deliver specific or ascertained goods, "the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that the contract shall be specifically performed, without giving the defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages" (k).

"Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller or where the buyer elects, or is compelled, to treat any breach of a condition on the part of the seller as a breach of warranty, the buyer is not by reason only of such breach of warranty entitled to reject the goods; but he may (a) set up against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price; or (b) maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty. The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the breach of warranty. In the case of breach of warranty of quality such loss is *prima facie* the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty. The fact that the buyer has set up the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price does not prevent him from maintaining an action for the same breach of warranty if he has suffered further damage" (i).

(g) Section 51, sub-section 2. This is an application of the rule in *Hadley v. Baxendale* (1854), 9 Exch. 341; see also *Hammond v. Bussey* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 79.

(h) Section 51, sub-section 3. See *Sharpe v. Nosawa*, [1917] 2 K. B. 814. As to contracts for delivery by instalments, see *Roper v. Johnson* (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 167; *Brown v. Muller* (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 319; *Johnstone v. Milling* (1886), 16 Q. B. 460.

(i) Section 50, sub-sections 2, 3. For the measure of damages in cases where the buyer has delayed in taking delivery after request, see section 37 *ante*, pp. 153, 154.

(k) Section 52.

The Act provides as follows with regard to sales by auction:—
“Where goods are put up for sale by auction in lots, each lot is *prima facie* deemed to be the subject of a separate contract of sale. A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner. Until such announcement is made, any bidder may retract his bid. Where a sale by auction is not notified to be subject to a right to bid on behalf of the seller, it shall not be lawful for the seller to bid himself or to employ any person to bid at such sale, or for the auctioneer knowingly to take any bid from the seller or any such person. Any sale contravening this rule may be treated as fraudulent by the buyer. A sale by auction may be notified to be subject to a reserved or upset price, and a right to bid may also be reserved expressly by or on behalf of the seller. Where a right to bid is expressly reserved, but not otherwise, the seller or any one person on his behalf may bid at the auction” (m).

(l) Section 53. In *Chapman v. Withers* (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 824, a horse sold with a warranty was killed through no fault of the buyer, and the buyer successfully sued for breach of warranty, though he could not comply with a condition of the sale that the horse should be returned by an agreed time if the buyer contended it did not correspond with the warranty. As to recovery of special damage, see *Bostock v. Nicholson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 725; *Gedding v. Marsh*, [1920] 1 K. B. 688; *Pimmock v. Lewis & Peat*, [1923] 1 K. B., at p. 697.

(m) Section 58. As to an auctioneer's authority, see *ante*, p. 57.

CHAPTER X.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

“ A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT is one the property in which is acquired by every person who takes it *bona fide* and for value, provided that the instrument is such and in that state that the true owner could transfer the contract or engagement contained therein by simple delivery of the instrument ” (a). Thus, if the instrument be payable to “ A B or bearer,” the property in it will pass from hand to hand with the instrument, and any one who is lawfully in possession of it for value can sue upon it. But if the instrument be payable to “ A B. or order ” and it has not yet been indorsed by A B, no third person can sue upon it, although he may be lawfully in possession of it. Until it has been so indorsed the right to enforce the contract contained in it cannot be transferred to a stranger by simple delivery of the instrument.

A negotiable instrument therefore differs from an ordinary chose in action in that—

(i) no notice of transfer is necessary to complete the holder's title to sue upon it, and

(ii) it is not liable to be defeated by defences which might have prevailed against the transferor, if it changes hands before payment.

It differs, as a rule, from an ordinary simple contract in three respects :—

(i) Consideration will be presumed until the contrary appears.

(ii) Any antecedent debt or liability is deemed valuable consideration, whether the payment be due on demand or

(a) This is the definition given by Judge Willis in his book on *Negotiable Securities*, 3rd ed., p. 6. For the distinction between “ negotiable ” and “ assignable ” see the remarks of Blackburn, J., in *Crouch v. Crédit Foncier* (1878), L. R. 8 Q. B. at p. 381.

at a future time. In other words, no fresh advance need be made, or any other fresh consideration, such as a forbearance to sue, given, at the time the instrument is drawn up between the parties. Past consideration will not support an ordinary simple contract.

(iii) If there be any fresh consideration, it is immaterial from whom it moves; whereas in the case of an ordinary simple contract the consideration must have moved from the plaintiff.

The negotiable instruments which are in most frequent use are bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques. The law relating to these has been codified, and in some respects altered, by the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (*b*).

These instruments were unknown to the common law; they owe their origin to the Law Merchant, *i.e.*, to that body of mercantile customs which foreign merchants in the Middle Ages appear to have accepted and to have declared to be binding upon themselves in all the great cities of Europe.

Bills of exchange were brought into mercantile use in Europe by Italian merchants as early as the fourteenth century, though the first case reported in England as to a bill of exchange appears in the year 1603 (*c*). At first their use was confined to foreign bills between English and foreign merchants; but our Courts subsequently recognised the negotiability of bills of exchange between English traders, and finally of bills of all persons whether traders or not. Promissory notes were also in use in this country in the seventeenth century; but their negotiable character was not fully established until the passing of the statute 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9 (*d*). Cheques are instruments of a more modern date; they are now regarded as a species of bills of exchange.

Bills of Exchange.

According to the statutory definition “a bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring

(*b*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61. Throughout this chapter, whenever sections are quoted without specifying any Act, the reference is to sections of this Act. Two short Acts have been passed since 1882: the Bills of Exchange (Crossed Cheques) Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 17), which amends section 82, and the Bills of Exchange (Time for Noting) Act, 1917 (7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 48), which amends sub-section 4 of section 51 of the Act of 1882.

(*c*) *Martin v. Boure* (1603), Cro. Jac. 6.

(*d*) See the judgment of Lord Holt, C.J., in *Buller v. Crips* (1703), 6 Mod. at pp. 29, 30.

the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a certain sum in money to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer" (e).

An ordinary form of bill of exchange will run as follows:—

£100.

London, July 1, 1919.

[Three] months after date [or On demand, or At sight, or At [ten] days after sight] pay C D or order [or bearer, or to my order] one hundred pounds. . A.B.

To E F, Merchant, of —.

In this case A B is called the drawer, E F. the drawee and C D the payee. The bill must be in writing: it need not be dated (unless the date is required in order to fix the day for payment); it need not contain the words "value received," or specify the value given; it need not specify the place where it is drawn or the place where it is payable (f).

It must be an unconditional order in writing. An order to pay out of a particular fund is not a bill; "but an unqualified order to pay, coupled with (i) an indication of a particular fund out of which the drawee is to reimburse himself, or a particular account to be debited with the amount, or (ii) a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the bill, is unconditional" within the meaning of the Act (g). "Please let bearer have £100 and you will much oblige me" (h), and "We authorise you to pay" (i), have been held not to be bills.

The order must be to pay on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time. "A bill is payable 'on demand' which is expressed to be payable on demand, at sight, on presentation, or in which no time for payment is expressed" (k). A bill is payable "at a future determinable time" when it is "expressed to be payable at a

(e) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 3, sub-s. 1.

(f) Section 3, sub-section 4.

(g) Section 3, sub-section 3.

(h) *Little v. Slackford* (1828), 1 M. & M. 171; cf. *Roberts v. Marsh*, [1915] 1 K. B. 42.

(i) *Hamilton v. Spottiswoode* (1849), 4 Exch. 200.

(k) Section 10 (i). The words "at sight" used by themselves merely mean "on demand."

specified period after date or sight, or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event which is certain to happen, though the time of its happening may be uncertain" (l).

Thus a bill drawn (i) "three months after date," or (ii) "three months after sight," or (iii) "three months after the death of A," would be valid, for each is payable on the occurrence of a definite event. But an instrument expressed to be payable on a contingency is not a bill, and the happening of the event does not cure the defect (m). "Pay C or order £100 when I marry D" (n), or "when I am in good circumstances" (o), or "ninety days after sight or when realised" (p), are invalid orders to pay. But the following are valid, being payable at a determinable future time:—"Pay one year after my death" (q), or "two months after the ship X is paid off" (r).

The order must be for the payment of a sum certain in money. Therefore an order to deliver goods, or to pay money and do some other act in addition, or as an alternative, is not a bill (s). But the sum payable will be certain, although it is required to be paid with interest, or by stated instalments with or without a provision that upon default in payment of any instalment the whole shall become due, or according to a rate of exchange indicated by, or to be ascertained according to, the directions of the bill (t).

It is essential to the validity of the bill that the drawee or drawees should "be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty"; if not, the payee would not know to whom he should present the bill for acceptance (u). "A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees whether they are partners or not; but an order addressed to two or more drawees in the alternative, or to two or more drawees in succession, is not a bill of exchange" (x). "Where a bill is not payable to bearer, the payee must be named or otherwise indicated therein

(l) Section 11.

(m) Section 11.

(n) *Pearson v. Garret* (1693), 4 Mod. 242.

(o) *Tootell, Ex parte* (1798), 4 Ves. 372.

(p) *Alexander v. Thomas* (1851), 16 Q. B. 333.

(q) *Roffey v. Greenwell* (1839), 10 A. & E. 222.

(r) *Colehan v. Cooke* (1742), Willes, 393.

(s) Section 3, sub-section 2.

(u) Section 6, sub-section 1.

(t) Section 9, sub-section 1.

(x) Section 6, sub-section 2.

with reasonable certainty ” (y). An instrument payable “ to ——— order ” is construed to mean payable “ to my order,” i.e., to the drawer’s order (z).

The person to whom the bill is addressed (the drawee) may “ accept ” the bill by signifying his assent to the order of the drawer. He accepts by signing his name across the face of the bill, thus, “ Accepted, E.F.” or simply “ E.F.” The acceptance “ must be written on the bill, and signed by the drawee ”; it will be invalid if it expresses “ that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money ” (a). As soon as the drawee accepts the bill, he is called the acceptor. A bill, however, is “ complete ” before it has been accepted (b).

“ Where in a bill drawer and drawee are the same person, or where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to contract, the holder may treat the instrument at his option either as a bill of exchange or as a promissory note ” (c). “ Where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill may be treated as payable to bearer ” (d). A bill may be so treated where the person named as payee (and to whose order the bill is made payable on the face of it) is a real person but has not, and never was intended by the drawer to have, any right upon it or arising out of it. This is so, though the so-called bill is really nothing more than a document in the form of a bill manufactured by a person who forges the signature of the named drawer, obtains by fraud the signature of the acceptor, forges the signature of the named payee and presents the document for payment, both the persons named as drawer and drawee being entirely ignorant of the circumstances.

In *Bank of England v. Vagliano* (e), a clerk of the defendants forged advice letters and drafts and obtained payment of the latter, and appropriated the money. He prepared the drafts by filling

(y) Section 7, sub-section 1.

(z) *Chamberlain v. Young*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 206.

(a) Section 17. See *Russell v. Phillips* (1850), 14 Q. B. 891.

(b) *National Park Bank v. Berggren* (1914), 110 L. T. 907.

(c) Section 5, sub-section 2.

(d) Section 7, sub-section 3.

(e) [1891] A. C. 107.

in, as the name of the drawer, that of a foreign correspondent of the defendants and, as the name of the payee, that of a foreign firm, which was a correspondent of the defendants, and then procured the acceptance of his employers, the defendants, to these drafts. The House of Lords held that Vagliano Brothers, and not the Bank of England, must bear the loss, on the ground that the named payee was a fictitious or non-existing person within the meaning of the section, and that therefore the documents might be treated as payable to bearer.

This decision was approved in *Clutton v. Attenborough* (f); it has been discussed in *Vinden v. Hughes* (g), where a clerk fraudulently inserted the name of a genuine customer, stole the cheque and appropriated the proceeds, his firm supposing the cheque to be drawn in the ordinary course of business. In this case Warrington, J., held that the customer's name was not the name of a fictitious person within the meaning of the Act.

So in *Macbeth v. North and South Wales Bank* (h), A, induced by the fraud of W, drew a cheque to the order of K, an existing person, and intended him to be the payee; W forged K's indorsement and paid the cheque into his own account at his bankers, who received the amount of the cheque from A's bank. It was held that A, the drawer, could recover the amount of the cheque from W's bankers, the payee not being held to be a "fictitious" person.

ACCEPTANCE may be general or qualified. To write "Accepted, E.F." or "E.F." is to make a general acceptance. To insert words which unmistakably vary the effect of the bill as drawn is to make a qualified acceptance (i). For example, acceptances are qualified if made conditionally ("if sufficient funds"), or partially ("as to £25 only"), or locally (at a particular place only); or there may be a qualification as to time, or as to the acceptance of other drawees (k). The holder may refuse a qualified acceptance, and treat the bill as dishonoured (l).

"A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE is a holder who has taken a bill, complete and regular on the face of it, under the following conditions, namely:—

(a) That he became the holder of it before it was over-

(f) [1897] A. C. 90, 95; see also *Robinson v. Midland Bank* (1924), 41 T. L. R. 170, 402.

(g) [1905] 1 K. B. 795, followed in *Macbeth v. North and South Wales Bank*, [1906] 2 K. B. 718; [1908] A. C. 137; *Goldman v. Cox* (1924), 40 T. L. R. 744.

(h) See last note.

(i) See *Meyer v. Decroix*, [1891] A. C. 520.

(k) Section 19.

(l) Section 44.

due, and without notice that it had been previously dishonoured, if such was the fact :

- (b) That he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that at the time the bill was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person who negotiated it.

In particular the title of a person who negotiates a bill is defective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained the bill, or the acceptance thereof, by fraud, duress or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud " (m).

" Every holder of a bill is deemed to be a holder in due course," and so the *onus* lies on the party liable to prove that the acceptance, issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill was defective owing to fraud, duress, undue influence, &c. If he succeeds in so doing, the holder must prove that he gave value for the bill, and gave such value in good faith (n). A holder in due course without notice of any defect in the title of the person from whom he takes the bill gets a good title thereto. But a holder in due course without notice under a forged indorsement gets no title whatever; he cannot enforce payment against any party to the instrument.

From the definition of a holder in due course we see that, in order to become such a holder, the bill taken must be " complete and regular on the face of it " at the time at which it is taken, *i.e.*, it must be in such a condition that the property in it can be acquired by the person taking.

A good illustration of this is seen in the case of *Whistler v. Forster* (o). There a man *bona fide* and for value took from X a cheque payable to X or his order, but forgot to notice that X's indorsement was not on the cheque. He then learnt that X had obtained the cheque by fraud, and after that obtained X's indorse-

(m) Section 29, sub-sections 1 and 2.

(n) Section 30, sub-section 2; see *Tatam v. Haslar* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 345; and *Talbot v. Von Boris*, [1911] 1 K. B. 854.

(o) (1863), 14 C. B. (n.s.) 248.

ment. It was held that when he first took the cheque it was not complete and regular on the face of it, and therefore that he was not a holder in due course, and that he could not recover because, although he had given value in good faith for it, he had notice of the defect in title of X, who negotiated it. The indorser of a bill not complete and regular on the face of it is not liable (p).

Again, to satisfy the definition the holder of the bill must have taken it before it became overdue. The consequences of taking a negotiable instrument when it is overdue are dealt with later (q), but we may say here that by so doing the person taking it holds it subject to any defect of title in the transferor. If the bill, although not overdue, has been dishonoured, then the person taking it does so subject to any defect of title attaching to it when dishonoured.

To be a holder in due course the person taking the bill must have taken it for value. For if he gives no value whatsoever for the bill, it is a gift and he cannot claim the instrument as against the true owner who may have been defrauded. It does not matter how small the amount given be, provided it be given in good faith. Its smallness, however, may tend to show that it was not given in good faith; for instance, that the person taking the bill knew or had a suspicion that the title of the person from whom he took it was defective. Again, even if the holder be negligent in taking the bill, he will not be deprived of his property in it, if he took it *bona fide*, though gross negligence may also be evidence of bad faith.

“Honest acquisition confers title . . . negligence of the holder makes no difference in his title. However gross the holder’s negligence, if it stop short of fraud, he has a title” (r). “Negligence or carelessness, when considered in connection with the surrounding circumstances, may be evidence of *mala fides*” (s).

The fact that the circumstances under which the holder took the bill ought to have caused him to suspect, or would have caused any reasonable man to suspect, that something was wrong will not

(p) *Jenkins v. Coomber*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 168; *Shaw v. Holland*, [1913] 2 K. B. 15.

(q) See *post*, p. 176.

(r) *Per Byles, J.*, in *Swan v. North British Australasian Co.* (1863), 2 H. & C. at pp. 184, 185.

(s) *Per Baggallay, L.J.*, in *Gomersall, In re* (1875), 1 Ch. D. at p. 146.

alone prevent him from being a *bona fide* holder. The question is not whether he *ought* to have suspected, but whether he *did* suspect. On this point the following passage from the judgment of Lord Blackburn in *Jones v. Gordon* (t) clearly states the law: "I consider it to be fully and thoroughly established that, if value be given for a bill of exchange, it is not enough to show that there was carelessness, negligence or foolishness in not suspecting that the bill was wrong, when there were circumstances which might have led a man to suspect that. All these are matters which tend to show that there was dishonesty in not doing it, but they do not in themselves make a defence to an action upon a bill of exchange. I take it that in order to make such a defence . . . it is necessary to show that the person who gave value for the bill, whether the value given be great or small, was affected with notice that there was something wrong about it when he took it. I do not think it is necessary that he should have notice of what the particular wrong was. If a man, knowing that a bill was in the hands of a person who had not right to it, should happen to think that perhaps the man had stolen it, when if he had known the real truth he would have found, not that the man had stolen it, but that he had obtained it by false pretences, I think that would not make any difference if he knew that there was something wrong about it and took it. If he takes it in that way, he takes it at his peril. But then I think that such evidence of carelessness or blindness as I have referred to may with other evidence be good evidence upon the question which, I take it, is the real one, whether he did know that there was something wrong in it. If he was . . . honestly blundering and careless, and so took a bill of exchange or a bank-note when he ought not to have taken it, still he would be entitled to recover. But if the facts and circumstances are such that the jury, or whoever has to try the question, come to the conclusion that he was not honestly blundering and careless, but that he must have had a suspicion that there was something wrong, and that he refrained from asking questions, not because he was an honest blunderer or a stupid man, but because he thought in his own secret mind, 'I suspect there is something wrong, and if I ask questions and make further inquiry, it will no longer be my suspecting it, but my knowing it, and then I shall not be able to recover,' I think that is dishonesty."

There is some conflict of opinion as to whether the payee of a promissory note, who gives value in good faith for it, is a holder in due course. Section 29 of the Act of 1882 contains the words "at the time the bill was negotiated to him." In *Lewis v. Clay* (u), Russell, C.J., expressed his opinion (*obiter*) that a *bona fide* payee for value of a note was not a holder in due course, because he was one of the immediate parties to the note and not a person to whom the note had been negotiated after its completion by and as between

(t) (1877), 2 App. Cas. at pp. 628, 629.

(u) (1897), 14 T. L. R. 149, 150.

the immediate parties. This opinion was followed by the Divisional Court in *Herdman v. Wheeler* (x), but the Judges then said that they were not prepared to hold that a payee of a note could never be a holder in due course. And in *Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke* (y), although two members of the Court of Appeal based their judgment on another ground and it was unnecessary to decide whether the payees of promissory notes were holders in due course, Fletcher Moulton, L.J., rested his decision also on the ground that they were holders in due course.

A bill is negotiated (z) or transferred to third parties in various ways. If the bill be payable to bearer, it may be transferred by mere delivery to such third party with intention of passing the property therein (a). But the party so transferring the bill is not liable on it himself; his signature is essential if he is to be made liable on the bill (b). Nor is he liable on the consideration for which he transferred the bill, should it be dishonoured. But he is not altogether free from liability, for by so transferring the bill he warrants his title and also that the bill is what it purports to be (c). He is in this respect in the position of an ordinary vendor. If the bill be payable to order, it is negotiated by the holder indorsing it and delivering it to the indorsee. If he transfers such a bill for value without indorsing it, the transferee only gets such title as the transferor had in the bill, but has the right to have the transferor's signature thereto (d).

An indorsement may be either "in blank" or "special" (e). An indorsement in blank specifies no indorsee, and a bill so indorsed becomes payable to bearer. But any subsequent holder of a bill thus indorsed in blank can convert the blank indorsement into a special indorsement by writing above the indorser's signature a direction

(x) [1902] 1 K. B. 361, 371.

(y) [1907] 1 K. B. 794; and see *Smith v. Prosser*, [1907] 2 K. B. 735.

(z) Note that the terms "negotiate" and "negotiation" mean assign and assignment, and "negotiability" means assignability with the added quality that the assignor may have no right to the bill. The use of these terms must be distinguished from their use in connection with the discussions, &c., leading up to the formation of a contract.

(a) Section 31, sub-section 2.

(b) Section 23.

(c) *Gurney v. Womersley* (1854), 24 L. J. Q. B. 46.

(d) Section 31, sub-section 4; and see *Day v. Longhurst*, [1893] W. N. 3.

(e) Section 32, sub-section 6.

to pay the bill to or to the order of himself or some other person. A special indorsement is one which specifies the person to whom, or to whose order, the bill is to be payable.

Again, on transferring the bill the transferor may indorse the bill "restrictively." A restrictive indorsement is one which prohibits the further negotiation of the bill, *e.g.*, "pay X only," or which authorises the indorsee to deal with the bill only in a certain way, *e.g.*, "pay D or order for collection" (f). Such indorsee can receive payment of the bill, and sue any party thereto that his indorser could have sued, but he can only transfer his rights as indorsee if expressly authorised to do so by the restrictive indorsement.

If the indorser has indorsed the bill "conditionally," the condition may be ignored by the payer, who may pay the indorsee without troubling whether as between such indorsee and indorser the condition has been fulfilled (g).

The position of the indorser of a bill of exchange may be said to be analogous to that of a surety for the acceptor. If the acceptor of the bill has deposited any securities with the holder, the indorser, who pays the bill on failure of the acceptor to meet his liability thereon, is entitled to such securities. But in order to render an indorser liable on the bill when it has been dishonoured by non-acceptance or non-payment by the drawee, notice of such dishonour must be given to him. If not, he will be discharged from liability (h). An indorser, however, may insert in the bill an express stipulation negating or waiving as regards himself the necessity for any notice of dishonour.

If a bill be payable "to order," the indorsement "must be written on the bill itself and signed by the indorser"; otherwise it will not be negotiable (i). Such indorsements are nearly always placed on the back of the bill or, if there be no room on the back of the bill, on an allonge (a slip of paper attached to the bill); but an indorsement on the face of the bill would be perfectly valid (k). The simple signature of the indorser without any other

(f) Section 35.

(g) Section 33. If such condition has not been fulfilled the indorsee would hold the proceeds in trust for the indorser.

(h) For cases when no notice to indorsers is necessary, see *post*, p. 177.

(i) Section 32, sub-section 1.

(k) *Young v. Glover* (1857), 3 Jur. (n.s.) 637.

words is sufficient (i). An express promise, even though in writing, to indorse a bill is not an indorsement. Again, to be valid an indorsement must be of the entire bill; partial indorsement, *e.g.*, "Pay A B £100 of the within £200," is insufficient. If the bill is payable to order of two or more payees who are not partners, all must indorse unless one has authority to indorse for the others. Should the payee's name be wrongly spelt he may indorse the bill as he is therein named, adding, if he think fit, his proper signature (l).

Although, as we have seen, any indorser by placing his name on the bill becomes liable upon it to the holder, he may insert a stipulation negating or limiting such liability, *e.g.*, he can indorse the bill to D thus, "Pay D or order without recourse to me," or "Pay D or order *sans recours*" (m).

"The drawer of a bill and any indorser may insert therein the name of a person to whom the holder may resort in the case of need, that is to say, in case the bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance or non-payment. Such person is called the *referee in case of need*. It is in the option of the holder to resort to the referee in case of need or not as he may think fit" (n). Before doing so, however, he must protest, or note for protest, the bill for such non-acceptance or non-payment.

The "protest" of a bill of exchange is a formal instrument sealed by a notary, attesting the presentment of the bill and its dishonour. After presentment and dishonour, the notary "notes" the bill by writing on it his initials and charges, the date and a reference to his books. The protest includes a copy of the bill and gives details of the demand and answer, &c.

Unless a foreign bill be protested for dishonour, the drawer and indorsers are discharged. It is not necessary to note or protest an inland bill for dishonour, though evidence of due presentment is thus obtained.

Where a bill is payable "to bearer" and therefore transferable by delivery, and loss occurs by theft or accident, the thief or finder may confer a title by transferring it. On the other hand, where a bill is payable "to order," and therefore transferable by indorsement only, he cannot confer such title except as against himself: for if indorsement is necessary to the transfer of a bill, the indorsement will convey no title except as against the person making it, unless made by one who has a right to make the transfer.

When a bill of exchange has been indorsed to a third

(l) Section 32, sub-sections 2, 3 and 4.

(m) Section 16. The indorser thus passes his interest without incurring liability.

(n) Section 15.

person, we have two new characters, indorser and indorsee. The first indorsement can only be made by the payee, who afterwards is always called the indorser. But each subsequent indorsee will also become an indorser, as soon as he in his turn indorses the bill to a fresh indorsee. A transfer by indorsement vests in the indorsee a right of action against all the parties whose names are on the bill in case of default of acceptance or payment. Every indorser of a bill is in the nature of a new drawer, and is liable to every succeeding holder in default of acceptance by the drawee or of payment if the drawee has accepted the bill. Once the drawee has accepted the bill, he is primarily liable as acceptor to any holder in due course; the drawer and each subsequent indorser is collaterally liable to the holder, provided he takes the steps required by law.

In the contract created by a bill of exchange the acceptor is regarded as the principal contractor; his engagement is that he will pay the bill according to the tenor of his acceptance (o), although he need not take precautions to prevent the fraudulent alteration of the bill after acceptance (p). But he "is precluded from denying to a holder in due course:—

(1) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature and his capacity and authority to draw the bill.

(2) In the case of a bill payable to the drawer's order, the then capacity of the drawer to indorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement.

(3) In the case of a bill payable to the order of a third person, the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement" (q).

Should the drawee make default in accepting the bill, an immediate right of recourse (subject to the provisions of the Act as to acceptances for honour (r)) accrues to the holder against the drawer and indorsers. No presentment for payment is necessary; the holder can sue the drawer at once for the full amount of the

(o) Section 54, sub-section 1.

(p) See *Scholfield v. Earl of Londesborough*, [1896] A. C. 514.

(q) Section 54, sub-section 2.

(r) As to acceptance and payment for honour *supra* protest, see sections 65, 68.

bill (s). The effect of the refusal to accept is that the drawee says to the holder, "I will not pay your bill; you must go back to the drawer, and he must pay you."

"The drawer of a bill, by drawing it, engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and paid according to its tenor, and that, if it be dishonoured, he will compensate the holder or any indorser who is compelled to pay it, provided that the requisite proceedings on dishonour be duly taken. He is further precluded from denying to a holder in due course the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse" (t).

The indorsers are looked upon as in a way his sureties, for the indorser only engages that "he will compensate the holder, or a subsequent indorser who is compelled to pay the bill," if on due presentment it is dishonoured by the acceptor, provided that the requisite proceedings on dishonour be duly taken. "He is further precluded from denying to a holder in due course the genuineness and regularity in all respects of the drawer's signature and all previous indorsements, and to his immediate or subsequent indorsee that the bill was at the time of his indorsement a valid and subsisting bill, and that he had then a good title thereto" (u).

"An ACCOMMODATION PARTY to a bill is a person who has signed a bill as drawer, acceptor or indorser without receiving value therefor and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. An accommodation party is liable on the bill to a holder for value; and it is immaterial whether, when such holder took the bill, he knew such party to be an accommodation party or not" (x). Where there is an accommodation party, the bill is called an accommodation bill. The mere payment of commission to a party for the use of his name does not amount to value received for the bill; the bill may therefore in such a case be an accommodation bill (y). When a holder for value

(s) Section 43, sub-section 2.

(t) Section 55, sub-section 1.

(u) Section 55, sub-section 2.

(x) Section 28, sub-sections 1 and 2.

(y) *Overend v. Oriental Financial Corporation* (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 348.

becomes aware that a party to a bill is an accommodation party, the ordinary rules of suretyship apply (z).

An accommodation party can use any defence which was available for the party accommodated; he has a right to be indemnified by the latter against liability on the bill and against the costs of the proceedings taken thereon (a).

“Where a person signs a bill otherwise than as drawer or acceptor, he thereby incurs the liabilities of an indorser to a holder in due course” (b). And any person who places his name upon a bill, whether as drawer, acceptor or indorser, will thereby render himself personally liable to a holder in due course, unless he makes it quite clear that he signs his name merely as agent for some one else or in a representative character. “But the mere addition to his signature of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character, does not exempt him from personal liability” (c).

“Is it not a universal rule,” said Lord Ellenborough, C.J. (d), “that a man who puts his name to a bill of exchange thereby makes himself personally liable, unless he states upon the face of the bill that he subscribes it for another, or by procuration of another, which are words of exclusion? Unless he says plainly, ‘I am the mere scribe,’ he is liable.”

Where a bill is accepted or indorsed *per procurationem*, the signature “operates as notice that the agent has but a limited authority to sign. The principal is only bound by such signature if the agent in so signing was acting within the actual limits of his authority” (e). The addition to the signature of the words “by procuration” (*p.p.*, *per proc.*, &c.) puts the taker of the bill or cheque upon inquiry as to the extent of the agent’s authority (f).

If the agent has authority, a *bona fide* holder for value may recover although the authority be abused (g). But notice to the holder that an authority is being exceeded will be inferred in some circumstances (h).

(z) *Rouse v. Bradford Banking Co.*, [1894] A. C. 586; *Goldfarb v. Bartlett*, [1920] 1 K. B. 639.

(a) *Hammond v. Bussey* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 79.

(b) Section 56. As to the liabilities of persons indorsing as co-sureties, see *Macdonald v. Whitfield* (1883), 8 App. Cas. 733; *Godsell v. Lloyd* (1911), 27 T. L. R. 383.

(c) Section 26, sub-section 1.

(d) *Leadbitter v. Farrow* (1816), 5 M. & S. at p. 349.

(e) Section 25.

(f) See *Morison v. London County and Westminster Bank*, [1914] 3 K. B. 356, at pp. 382, 383.

(g) *Bryant, Powis & Co. v. Banque du Peuple*, [1893] A. C. 170; see also *Jacobs v. Morris*, [1902] 1 Ch. 816.

(h) *Morison v. Kemp* (1912), 29 T. L. R. 70.

“The signature of the name of a firm is equivalent to the signature by the person so signing of the names of all persons liable as partners in that firm” (i). In the case of a limited company “a bill of exchange or promissory note shall be deemed to have been made, accepted or indorsed on behalf of a company, if made, accepted or indorsed in the name of the company, or by or on behalf or on account of the company by any person acting under its authority” (k). Any such person signing any bill, note, indorsement or cheque without mentioning the correct name of the company (with the addition of the word “limited” (l)) is personally liable to the holder on the bill, unless the company duly pays, and is further liable to a penalty of £50 (m).

A bill may be transferred by indorsement either before or after acceptance, and either before or after it has arrived at maturity. “Where a bill which is not overdue has been dishonoured, any person who takes it with notice of the dishonour takes it subject to any defect of title attaching thereto at the time of dishonour, but this does not apply to a holder in due course. If an overdue bill is negotiated, it can only be negotiated subject to any defect of title affecting it at its maturity, and thenceforward no person who takes it can acquire or give a better title than that which the person from whom he took it had” (n).

“A bill payable on demand is deemed to be overdue when it appears on the face of it to have been in circulation for an unreasonable length of time; what is an unreasonable length of time is a question of fact” (o). Since this provision applies also to cheques (p), any one who takes a

(i) Section 23, sub-section 2, and see *post*, p. 211.

(k) Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), s. 77.

(l) *Penrose v. Martyr* (1858), 8 E. B. & E. 499; *Stacey v. Wallis* (1912), 28 T. L. R. 209.

(m) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, s. 63; and see *Dey v. Pullinger Engineering Co.*, [1921] 1 K. B. 77; dissenting from *Premier Industrial Bank v. Carlton Co.*, [1909] 1 K. B. 106.

(n) Section 36, sub-sections 2 and 3. For an instance of this rule, see *Holmes v. Kidd* (1858), 3 H. & N. 891.

(o) Section 36, sub-section 5.

(p) See section 73.

“ stale ” cheque does so at his peril. It does not apply to promissory notes (q).

A bill payable otherwise than on demand becomes due under ordinary circumstances on the fourth day inclusive, or on the third day exclusive, of that on which the bill is expressed to be payable. Three “ days of grace ” are allowed in addition to the time fixed by the bill, unless the bill be payable on demand or unless the bill provides otherwise (r). Until the last day of grace expires, the holder of a bill, in respect of which payment has been refused, has no cause of action (s).

Immediately it becomes due the holder should present it, or cause it to be presented, to the acceptor for payment. If on presentment payment is refused, then notice of dishonour must be given to every party (other than the acceptor) whose name appears upon the bill, and against whom the holder may wish to secure a remedy.

DISHONOUR.—A bill may be dishonoured in two ways (t)—(i) By non-acceptance, when after due presentment acceptance is refused or cannot be obtained, or when, if presentment is excused, the bill is not accepted; (ii) by non-payment, when after due presentment payment is refused or cannot be obtained or, if presentment is excused, the bill is overdue and unpaid.

When a bill of exchange has been presented and dishonoured either by non-acceptance or non-payment, an immediate right of recourse (subject to the provisions of the Act as to acceptance for honour (u)) accrues to the holder against the drawer and all other prior parties to the bill (x). In the case of non-acceptance, no subsequent presentment for payment is necessary, nor any notice of subsequent dishonour by non-payment, unless in the meantime the bill has been accepted. In any case notice must be given to the drawer, and to each indorser of the bill

(q) Section 86, sub-section 3.

(r) Sections 14, 72, sub-section 5.

(s) *Kennedy v. Thomas*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 759.

(t) Sections 43 (sub-section 1), 47 (sub-section 1).

(u) See sections 65—68.

(x) Sections 43 (sub-section 2), 47 (sub-section 2).

whom the holder intends to make liable upon it, but not to the acceptor (*y*); and any holder or indorser to whom such notice is not given (unless the indorser has waived the right) will be discharged, subject to this, that where the bill has been dishonoured by non-acceptance and due notice of dishonour has not been given, the rights of the holder in due course subsequent to the omission will not be prejudiced thereby (*z*).

Notice of dishonour must be given in accordance with the rules contained in section 49 of the Act. Their effect may be briefly summarised as follows:—Notice must be given by or on behalf of the holder or any indorser then liable on the bill, and when given enures for the benefit, in the one case, of subsequent holders and all prior indorsers who have a right of recourse against the party to whom it is given, in the other, for that of the holder and all indorsers subsequent to the party to whom it is given. Notice may be given orally or in writing, or by both combined; no special form is necessary if the bill is sufficiently identified and the fact of dishonour clearly intimated. The return of a dishonoured bill to the drawer or an indorser is sufficient notice. In case of death, notice may be given to the personal representative: if the party be bankrupt, either to him personally or to his trustee. Where there are two or more drawers or indorsers not being partners, notice must be given to each, unless one has authority to receive it on behalf of all.

Further, this notice must be given within a reasonable time: what is a reasonable time for this purpose is explained in the Act (*a*). If the parties reside in the same place, notice must be sent so as to arrive on the next day; if in different places, it should be sent off on the day following the dishonour, if there is a convenient post: if not, by the next post thereafter. Each party receiving notice has the same time to send it on to his antecedent party: so has a principal receiving notice from his agent. The notice is deemed given when posted, in spite of any miscarriage of the post office (*b*).

“Delay in giving notice of dishonour will be excused where the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the party giving notice and not imputable to his default, misconduct or negligence; when, however, the cause of delay ceases to operate, the notice must be given with reasonable diligence” (*c*). It must, of course, be given before the writ is issued, as the *onus* lies upon the plaintiff to show that his right of action was complete before the commencement of the suit (*d*).

(*y*) Section 52, sub-section 3.

(*z*) Section 48.

(*a*) Section 49, sub-section 12, and see 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 48.

(*b*) Cf. *Woodcock v. Houldsworth* (1846), 16 M. & W. 124.

(*c*) Section 50, sub-section 1.

(*d*) *Castrique v. Bernabo* (1844), 6 Q. B. 498.

Notice of dishonour will, however, be dispensed with in cases where "after the exercise of reasonable diligence due notice cannot be given to or does not reach the drawer or indorser sought to be charged"; or by waiver express or implied either before or after the time when notice should be given. It will also be dispensed with as regards the drawer: "(1) where drawer and drawee are the same person; (2) where the drawee is a fictitious person or without the capacity to contract; (3) where the drawer is the person to whom the bill is presented for payment; (4) where the drawee or acceptor is as between himself and the drawer under no obligation to accept or pay the bill; (5) where the drawer has countermanded payment" (e).

The position of the indorser of a bill differs from that of a drawer. The indorser is not presumed to know anything about the arrangement between the drawee and drawer. As regards the indorser, therefore, notice (save as mentioned above) will only be dispensed with (1) where he knew at the time of indorsement that the drawee was a fictitious person or without the capacity to contract; (2) where he is himself the person to whom the bill is presented for payment; or (3) where the bill was accepted or made for his accommodation (e).

Knowledge of the probability however strong that the bill will be dishonoured cannot operate as a notice of dishonour or dispense with it (f). Nor will mere knowledge of the fact that the bill has been dishonoured be equivalent to notice, for "notice means something more than knowledge" (g). Besides, it is quite competent to the holder of a bill to give credit to the acceptor, and the effect of this would be to discharge the parties collaterally liable on the bill. A notice of dishonour must accordingly be given by the holder as an intimation that he intends to charge the persons to whom he gives such notice, and not merely to look to the acceptor. Any drawer or indorser, to whom notice of dishonour is not given, is discharged not only from his liability on the bill, but also from any liability as regards the debt or consideration in respect of which it was given (h). Failure to give notice will not, however, prejudice the rights of any subsequent holder in due course (i).

If it "is, or on the face of it purports to be, (i) both drawn and payable within the British Islands (including the Channel Islands and Isle of Man), or (ii) drawn within the British Islands upon some person resident therein," it is what is called an "inland bill"; otherwise it is a "foreign" bill. Unless the contrary appear, the holder may treat it as an inland bill (k).

(e) Section 50, sub-section 2.

(f) *Caunt v. Thompson* (1849), 18 L. J. C. P. 125.

(g) *Per Rolfe, B.*, in *Allen v. Edmundson* (1848), 2 Exch. at p. 725.

(h) *Peacock v. Pursell* (1863), 14 C. B. (N.S.) 728.

(i) Section 48.

(k) Section 4.

Foreign bills are usually drawn in parts—three or even more—which circulate together, or of which one or more parts may be circulated whilst another is forwarded for acceptance. Each part, however, should specify or refer to the other parts of the set, and express that payment of it is conditional on the other parts of like “tenor and date” as itself remaining unpaid at maturity (*l*).

Where a bill of exchange drawn in one country is payable in another, its validity in respect of its form is determined by the law of the place of issue. An acceptance, or other subsequent contract, is governed by the law of the place where such contract is made. The duties of the holder in respect of presentment, protest, notice of dishonour, &c., are governed by the law of the place where those proceedings occur (*m*).

Cheques.

“A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand” (*n*). It needs no acceptance. The bank (the drawee) does not “accept” it, but pays it on presentment: no days of grace are allowed. Cheques are not made for circulation; they should be presented within a reasonable time. The question what is a reasonable time is determined by the circumstances of the case, the nature of the cheque and by the usage of trade and of bankers (*o*).

A cheque may, nevertheless, be presented for payment up to the moment at which it becomes barred by the Statute of Limitations (*p*), and unless the bank has meanwhile failed, the drawer is not discharged by the holder’s neglect to present it in due time.

The drawer or any holder of a cheque may “cross” it generally, by drawing across the face of it two parallel transverse lines, with or without the words “& Co.” To cross a cheque specially, the name of a bank is added between the two lines. A general crossing directs the bank on which the cheque is drawn to pay it only to a bank; a special crossing to pay it only to *the* bank specified. The banker on whom a crossed cheque is drawn is liable to the true owner if the cheque is not paid as directed and if loss

(*l*) As to bills drawn in a set, see section 71.

(*m*) See section 72, sub-sections 1, 2, and 3.

(*n*) Section 73.

(*o*) Section 74, sub-section 2; see *ante*, p. 175.

(*p*) See *Bethell, In re* (1887), 34 Ch. D. 561.

results (q). The words "not negotiable" may also be added as part of the crossing, and then no one who takes the cheque can have, or can give, a better title than the person had from whom he took it (r).

The crossing of a cheque is a material part of it, and must therefore not be obliterated, added to or altered (s).

In relation to all money deposited generally in a bank, the bank is the debtor of its customer and must pay his cheques, if it has sufficient funds in hand (t). It will be liable to an action at the suit of any customer whose cheques it has improperly dishonoured—and this without proof of any special damage (u). A bank is allowed a reasonable time in which to satisfy itself that the signature to a cheque is genuine (x); and the time allowed for collection of a cheque may depend on custom (y).

A bank must bear the loss itself, if it pays a cheque on which the drawer's signature has been forged (z), or a cheque fraudulently altered, unless in the latter case the fraud was assisted by the culpable negligence of the drawer, *e.g.*, in so drawing a cheque as to leave spaces which assist forgery (a).

The authority of a bank to pay a customer's cheques is determined by notice of his death. Consequently a gift *mortis causa* by cheque is void, unless the cheque be cashed or presented for payment before the donor's death (b), or negotiated for value to a third person (c); but such a gift of another person's cheque would not be void (d). The bank's authority to pay cheques is also determined by countermand of payment ("stopping the cheque"), or if a receiving order is made against the customer (e).

(q) See sections 76—82, and the Bills of Exchange (Crossed Cheques) Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 17).

(r) Section 81; and see the remarks of Lord Brampton in *G. W. Ry. Co. v. London and County Bank*, [1901] A. C. at p. 422.

(s) Section 78, and see section 1, sub-section 3 (c) of the Forgery Act, 1913 (3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 27).

(t) See *Derbyshire, In re*, [1906] 1 Ch. 135.

(u) See *Fleming v. Bank of New Zealand*, [1900] A. C. 577.

(x) See *Marzetti v. Williams* (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 415; *Roberts v. Tucker* (1851), 16 Q. B. 560.

(y) *Forman v. Bank of England* (1902), 18 T. L. R. 339.

(z) The bank is not liable where only the indorsement has been forged. It may be liable for the negligence of its employees in dealing with crossed cheques: *Ladbroke v. Todd* (1914), 111 L. T. 43; *Ross v. London County, Westminster and Parr's Bank*, [1919] 1 K. B. 678.

(a) See *Young v. Grote* (1827), 4 Bing. 253; *Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Marshall*, [1906] A. C. 559; *London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan*, [1918] A. C. 777.

(b) *Beaumont, In re*, [1902] 1 Ch. 889.

(c) *Rolls v. Pearce* (1877), 5 Ch. D. 730: distinguishing "order" from "bearer" cheques. But section 75 covers both.

(d) *Clement v. Cheesman* (1884), 27 Ch. D. 631.

(e) Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59), s. 46. As to the effect of a garnishee order, see *Rogers v. Whiteley*, [1892] A. C. 118; *Edmunds v. Edmunds*, [1904] P. 362.

Promissory Notes.

“ A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person, or to bearer ” (f).

The ordinary form of a promissory note is as follows :—
£100. London, January 1, 1920.

[Three] months after date [*or On demand, or At sight or At [ten] days after sight*], I promise to pay C D or order [*or bearer*] One Hundred Pounds. A B.

A B, the person signing the instrument, is called the maker; C D, the person to whom it is made payable, the payee. If the note is transferred by indorsement, the immediate parties to such transfer are, as in the case of a bill, termed the indorser and indorsee. There may be more than one maker of a note. If so, the makers will be jointly, or jointly and severally, liable according to its tenor. A note running “ I promise to pay,” signed by two or more persons, is deemed to be their joint and several note (g).

In a bill of exchange there are usually three original parties, the drawer, the payee and the drawee, who, after acceptance, becomes the acceptor. In a promissory note there are but two original parties, the maker and the payee. In a bill of exchange the acceptor is, in contemplation of law, the primary debtor to the payee, and the drawer is but collaterally liable. In a promissory note the maker is, in contemplation of law, the primary debtor. When a negotiable note has been indorsed by the payee, there is a striking resemblance in the relations of the parties upon both instruments, although they are not in all respects identical. The first indorser of a note stands in the same relation to the subsequent parties to it as the drawer of an accepted bill payable to drawer’s order. The maker of the note is under the same liabilities as the acceptor of a bill (h). The rules as to the rights and liabilities of parties to inland bills will therefore determine the mutual obligations of the parties to promissory notes. As a note is like an accepted bill, the provisions for presentment and acceptance do not apply. A “ note is inchoate and incomplete until delivery thereof to the payee or bearer ” (i).

(f) Section 83, sub-section 1.
(h) Section 89.

(g) Section 85, sub-sections 1 and 2.
(i) Section 84.

No particular form of words is necessary to constitute a promissory note. "An instrument in the form of a note payable to maker's order is not a note within the meaning of the Act, unless and until it is indorsed by the maker" (k). Where an instrument is so framed as to cause doubt whether it is a bill of exchange or a promissory note, the holder will at his election be entitled to treat it as either (l); the man who drafted the document is answerable for the ambiguity of his language (m). If the note contains a promise to do anything else besides pay money, it is not a promissory note within the meaning of the Act (n). But a document promising to pay money is not always a promissory note (o). "A note is not invalid by reason only that it contains also a pledge of collateral security with authority to sell or dispose thereof" (p).

A note, however, must be unconditional. If its terms allow time to be given to sureties, it is not a promissory note. But a joint promise is none the less a promissory note if its terms express "that no time given to, or security taken from, or composition or arrangement entered into with, either party" shall prejudice the rights of the holder as against any other party (q).

"The maker of a promissory note, by making it, engages that he will pay it according to its tenor and is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse" (r). "Where a promissory note is in the body of it made payable at a particular place, it must be presented for payment at that place, in order to render the maker liable (s). In any other case, presentment for payment is not necessary in order to render the maker liable" (t).

Demand or presentment is not, under ordinary circumstances, necessary as against the maker of a note. A

(k) Section 83, sub-section 2.

(l) See section 5, sub-section 2.

(m) See *Peto v. Reynolds* (1854), 9 Exch. 410; affirmed 11 Ex. 418 (Ex. Ch.).

(n) See *Mortgage Corporation v. Commissioners* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 352; *British India Steam Co. v. Commissioners* (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 165 (a debenture); *Speyer v. Commissioners*, [1907] 1 K. B. 246; affirmed [1908] A. C. 92 (marketable securities).

(o) *Provincial Bank of Ireland v. Fisher*, [1918] 2 I. R. 521.

(p) Section 83, sub-section 3. *Fancourt v. Thorne* (1846), 9 Q. B. 312.

(q) *Kirkwood v. Carroll*, [1903] 1 K. B. 531, overruling *Kirkwood v. Smith*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 582.

(r) Section 88; and see *Bank of Montreal v. Exhibit and Trading Co.* (1906), 22 T. L. R. 722.

(s) Even though such place was named merely in order to give the Court jurisdiction: *Josolyne v. Roberts*, [1908] 2 K. B. 349. But in absence of a stipulation under section 52, sub-section 2; the maker is not discharged by failure to present at such place on date of maturity: *Gordon v. Kerr* (1898), 35 Sc. L. R. 469.

(t) Section 87, sub-section 1.

promissory note, even when payable on demand, is a present debt and is payable without any demand. Accordingly the Statute of Limitations will begin to run from the date of such a note; the case is similar to that of money lent, repayable on request—where no demand or request is necessary before bringing the action, because the debt arises instantly on the loan being made.

The indorser of a promissory note can only be charged when presentment to the maker has been made and due notice of dishonour has been given. The fact that the holder has reason to believe that the note on presentment will be dishonoured (*e.g.*, because the maker is bankrupt or has declared that he will not pay it) will not dispense with the necessity for its presentment (*u*). “Where a note is in the body of it made payable at a particular place, presentment at that place is necessary in order to render an indorser liable; but when a place of payment is indicated by way of memorandum only,” the indorser will be rendered liable either by presentment to the maker there or elsewhere, if sufficient in other respects (*x*).

“Where a note payable on demand has been indorsed, it must be presented for payment within a reasonable time of the indorsement. If it be not so presented the indorser is discharged. In determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and the facts of the particular case” (*y*). If in such a case the note is negotiated, “it is not deemed to be overdue, for the purpose of affecting the holder with defects of title of which he had no notice, by reason that it appears that a reasonable time for presenting it for payment has elapsed since its issue” (*z*).

Bills of exchange and promissory notes (other than bank notes) must be stamped according to the statutory scale of duties in force (*a*).

(*u*) Section 46, sub-section 2.

(*x*) Section 87, sub-section 3. For meaning of “body of note,” see *Stevenson v. Brown* (1902), 18 T. L. R. 268.

(*y*) Section 86, sub-sections 1 and 2.

(*z*) Section 86, sub-section 3. See *Glasscock v. Balls* (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 13.

(*a*) See 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97, s. 55; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 38.

Bank Notes.

A bank note is a promissory note made by a banker, payable to bearer on demand.

Such banks as in 1844 lawfully issued their own notes and have since continued the issue may still do so (b). Their number, through amalgamations and other causes, is decreasing. Apart from them, the Bank of England enjoys a monopoly of issuing notes. For all sums of five pounds or more the notes of the Bank of England constitute legal tender, except by the Bank itself or its branches (c); notes of other banks are legal tender, unless objected to when tendered (d). Bank notes are universally treated as cash, and are paid and received as such. A *bona fide* holder of a bank note for value is entitled to retain it as against a former owner from whom it has been stolen (e). The *bona fide* holder for value without notice of any defect in title may recover upon a bank note, although he may at the time have had the means of knowing that the party from whom he received the note had no title, and although he neglected to avail himself of such means (f). But if, when the circumstances are suspicious, he deliberately avoids making inquiries, this may be evidence of bad faith (g). If a note be stopped, the bank may delay payment while it makes the necessary inquiries (h).

A Bank of England note is avoided if it be altered in any material particular, for example, in its amount or in its date or number. The recipient of a note thus avoided, or of a note entirely forged, can recover the money or other value which formed the consideration for the note, for the payment was made under a mistake of fact and without consideration (i).

(b) See Bank Charter Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c. 32), ss. 10, 12.

(c) See Bank of England Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98), s. 6; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 37, s. 6, and c. 38, s. 15.

(d) *Polglass v. Oliver* (1831), 2 Cr. & J. 15.

(e) See *Miller v. Race* (1758), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 525.

(f) *Raphael v. Bank of England* (1855), 17 C. B. 161; and see Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), s. 90.

(g) Cf. *Jones v. Gordon* (1877), 2 App. Cas. 616.

(h) *Solomons v. Bank of England* (1791), 13 East, 135.

(i) *Jones v. Ryde* (1814), 5 Taunt. 488.

Defences.

There are a number of defences open to a defendant who is sued upon a bill of exchange or promissory note. We propose to deal especially with the following:—

- (i) Absence or illegality of consideration.
- (ii) Payment.
- (iii) Loss of the instrument.
- (iv) Material alteration.
- (v) Other facts which operate as a discharge.

(i) A bill or note *prima facie* imports consideration; and “every party whose signature appears on a bill is, *prima facie*, deemed to have become a party thereto for value” (*k*). The defendant may rebut this presumption by proving that either the bill itself or the acceptance of it was obtained without consideration. He will also have a defence if he can show that the bill or the acceptance of it was obtained by fraud, duress or other unlawful means, *e.g.*, that the consideration was illegal, or that the bill had been negotiated in breach of faith or under such circumstances as amount to fraud.

In all these cases the holder’s title is defective (*l*).

The *onus* of proving absence or illegality of consideration lies in the first instance upon the party asserting it. But if “in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved that the acceptance, issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill is affected by fraud, duress or illegality, the burden of proof is shifted, unless and until the holder proves that, subsequent to the alleged fraud or illegality, value has been given for the bill, and given in good faith” (*m*). The defence of “no consideration” as to part only of a bill or note is a defence *pro tanto* as against an immediate party, though not against a holder in due course. For instance, by way of answer to an action upon such instrument, a man might say that in adding up an account he erroneously supposed himself to be indebted to the plaintiff in £100, whereas in truth £10 only was due. That in the case of a bill or note, given to discharge the supposed balance of £100, would be a good defence except as to £10, but not if the bill or note had passed into the hands of a stranger.

(*k*) Section 30, sub-section 1.

(*l*) Section 29, sub-section 2; and *ante*, pp. 166-167.

(*m*) Section 30, sub-section 2; and see *Tatam v. Haslar* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 345.

(ii) Payment of a bill discharges the drawee or acceptor if made in due course. It must be "made at or after the maturity of the bill to the holder thereof, in good faith, and without notice that his title to the bill is defective" (n). "A thing is deemed to be done in good faith, within the meaning of the Act, where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not" (o).

A bill is not discharged by payment by the drawer or an indorser. If, for example, the drawer pay a bill payable to or to the order of a third party, he can enforce payment of it against the acceptor: he cannot, however, re-issue the bill. Further, "where a bill is paid by an indorser, or where a bill payable to the drawer's order is paid by the drawer, the party paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards the acceptor or any antecedent parties, and he may, if he thinks fit, strike out his own and any subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate the bill" (p).

"Where an accommodation bill is paid in due course by the party accommodated, the bill is discharged" (q).

(iii) Where a bill of exchange has been lost before falling due and not afterwards recovered, the question whether or not a remedy upon the instrument can be enforced at common law will depend upon the nature of the bill and the form in which the defence is presented (r). If the bill be originally negotiable, i.e., payable "to C D" or "C D or order," or "to bearer," the acceptor is not bound to pay the bill to any one suing as holder who refuses or is unable to deliver up the bill (s).

By the custom of merchants "the holder of the bill shall present the instrument at its maturity to the acceptor, demand payment of its amount, and, upon receipt of the money, deliver up the bill. The acceptor paying the bill has a right to the possession of the instrument for his own security, and as his voucher and discharge *pro tanto* in his account with the drawer" (t). The rule is the same under the statute, which provides that "where the holder of a bill presents it for payment, he shall exhibit the bill to the person from whom he demands payment, and when a bill

(n) Section 59, sub-section 1.

(o) Section 90.

(p) Section 59, sub-section 2.

(q) Section 59, sub-section 3.

(r) *King v. Zimmerman* (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 466.

(s) *Hansard v. Robinson* (1827), 7 B. & C. 90; *Ramuz v. Crowe* (1847), 1 Exch. 167.

(t) *Per cur.* in *Hansard v. Robinson* (1827), 7 B. & C. at p. 94.

is paid the holder shall forthwith deliver it up to the party paying it" (u). The loss of a negotiable bill, given on account of a debt, has been held to be an answer to an action for the debt as well as to one on the bill (x). Apparently an action will lie where a bill is proved to have been destroyed (y). The defence of loss could not be pleaded in the case of a non-negotiable instrument (z).

It is provided by the Act that "where a bill has been lost before it is overdue, the holder may apply to the drawer to give him another bill of the same tenor, giving security, if required, to indemnify the drawer" against all claims on the bill so lost; in case of refusal he can compel the drawer to give such duplicate bill. Further "in any action or proceeding upon a bill, the Court or a Judge may order that the loss of the instrument shall not be set up, provided an indemnity be given to the satisfaction of the Court or Judge against the claims of any other person upon the instrument in question" (a). Protest may be made on a copy of a bill lost or destroyed (b). A loss or destruction does not excuse the giving of notice of dishonour (c).

(iv) "Where a bill or acceptance is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable on the bill, the bill is avoided except as against a party, who has himself made, authorised or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers" (d). This will be so whether the alteration is made by the holder himself or by a stranger; for "no man shall be permitted to take the chance of committing a fraud without running any risk of losing by the event when it is detected" (e). And again, "a party who has the custody of an instrument made for his benefit is bound to preserve it in its original state." If he omits to do so and thus loses

(u) Section 52, sub-section 4.

(x) *Crowe v. Clay* (1854), 9 Exch. 604. But there may be relief in equity: *Rolt v. Watson* (1827), 4 Bing. at p. 274.

(y) *Wright v. Maidstone* (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 623. This case distinguishes a lost from a destroyed note and does not refer to *Crowe v. Clay*, *supra*.

(z) *Wain v. Bailey* (1839), 10 A. & E. 616.

(a) Sections 69, 70.

(b) Section 51, sub-section 8.

(c) *Thackray v. Blackett* (1812), 3 Camp. 164.

(d) Section 64, sub-section 1, *ante*, pp. 109, 110; and see the notes to *Master v. Miller* (1793), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.) 837.

(e) *Per* Lord Kenyon, C.J., in *Master v. Miller* (1793), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 813.

his remedy, he "has no right to complain, since there cannot be any alteration except through fraud or laches on his part" (f).

The following alterations, in particular, are declared material by the Act: "any alteration of the date, the sum payable, the time of payment, the place of payment and, where a bill has been accepted generally, the addition of a place of payment without the acceptor's assent" (g). And it has also been held that the alteration of the number of a bank note (h), and the addition of a maker to a joint and several note (i), are material alterations.

An immaterial alteration will not affect the validity of an instrument (k). And it is further provided by the Act that "where a bill has been materially altered, but the alteration is not apparent, and the bill is in the hands of a holder in due course, such holder may avail himself of the bill as if it had not been altered, and may enforce payment of it according to its original tenor" (l).

(v) A bill will also be discharged in the following cases:—

- (a) If the acceptor is or becomes the holder of it at or after maturity in his own right (m).
- (b) If the holder, at or after maturity, unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor. Such renunciation, in order to operate as a discharge, must be made in writing, or the bill must be delivered up to the acceptor (n). Similarly a contemporaneous agreement for renewal must be in writing, otherwise it is inadmissible as evidence, for it contradicts a written document (o). The holder may renounce

(f) *Per cur.* in *Davidson v. Cooper* (1844), 13 M. & W. at p. 352.

(g) Section 64, sub-section 2.

(h) *Suffell v. Bank of England* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 555; *Leeds and County Bank v. Walker* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 84; and see *ante*, p. 110.

(i) *Gardner v. Walsh* (1855), 5 E. & B. 83.

(k) *Aldous v. Cornwell* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 573.

(l) Section 64, sub-section 1.

(m) Section 61.

(n) See *George, In re*; *Francis v. Bruce* (1890), 44 Ch. D. 627; *Edwards v. Walters*, [1896] 2 Ch. 157; *Dickinson v. Lucas* (1909), 101 L. T. 27.

(o) *New London Credit Syndicate v. Neale*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 487; *Hitchings v. Northern Leather Co.*, [1914] 3 K. B. 907.

his rights against any party to the bill before, at or after maturity; but it is provided that this shall not affect the rights of a holder in due course, without notice of the renunciation (*p*). The holder of a bill may contract with the acceptor not to enforce his remedies against him, and may at the same time reserve his rights against those who are liable in the second degree, so that the latter will not be discharged (*q*); their rights are, however, preserved against the acceptor.

- (c) An intentional cancellation by the holder or his agent, if apparent on the bill, will discharge it. Such cancellation, applied to the signature of any party to the bill, will discharge all parties to whom the party whose signature is so cancelled would have been liable. An unintentional, mistaken or unauthorised cancellation is inoperative, but the *onus* of proof will lie upon the person who alleges such want of intention or authority (*r*).

The rules as to capacity to incur liability on bills and notes are the same as those which govern other contracts (*s*). Thus an infant cannot make a valid acceptance, even for necessities, though he may be successfully sued on the consideration (*t*). A corporation has power to contract by bill where, upon a fair construction of its memorandum and articles or other instrument under which it is constituted, it appears that such power was intended to be given (*u*).

Other Negotiable Instruments.

In addition to the examples of negotiable instruments already discussed, there are many others. Thus bankers' circular notes (unless restrictively indorsed) (*x*), India

(*p*) Section 62.

(*q*) *Muir v. Crawford* (1875), L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 456; and see *Bateson v. Gosling* (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 9.

(*r*) Section 63.

(*s*) Section 22, sub-section 1.

(*t*) *Soltykoff, In re*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 413.

(*u*) *Peruvian Ry. Co. v. Thames Insurance Co.* (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 617; and see 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, s. 77.

(*x*) *Confians Quarry Co. v. Parker* (1867), L. R. 3 C. P. 1.

bonds (y) and Exchequer bills in blank (z); foreign or Colonial Government bonds (a), stock (b) and scrip payable to bearer (c); American railway bonds payable to bearer (d) and debentures payable to bearer (e)—all these have been held to be negotiable instruments. So also the share warrants to bearer issued by an English company registered under the Companies Acts, 1862—1908, certifying that “the bearer is entitled to one share of £——, which is fully paid up, numbered —— in the company” (f).

It was formerly thought that no English instruments, outside those already recognised by the Courts as negotiable, could become negotiable by custom (g). But in *Bechuana-land Exploration Co. v. London Trading Bank* (h), the bearer debentures of an English company were held negotiable, there being “sufficient proof of a mercantile usage to treat the debentures in question in this case as negotiable.” In *Edelstein v. Schuler* (i), Bigham, J., considered it was “no longer necessary to tender evidence in support of the fact that such bonds are negotiable.” Apparently, therefore, such debentures are now judically recognised as negotiable.

Foreign instruments may become negotiable in England by custom. The instrument must not be expressed in any way which would negative negotiability (k). It is important to show, not that the instrument is negotiable in the country of its origin (l), but that it is transferable by delivery, and further that it passes free from defects in the title of the transferor (m).

(y) See 51 Geo. 3, c. 64, s. 4.

(z) *Brandao v. Barnett* (1846), 12 Cl. & F. 787.

(a) *Symons v. Mulkern* (1882), 30 W. R. 875.

(b) *Gorgier v. Mieville* (1824), 3 B. & C. 45.

(c) *Goodwin v. Roberts* (1875), 1 App. Cas. 476; *London and County Bank v. London and River Plate Bank* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 535; *Bentinck v. London Joint Stock Bank*, [1893] 2 Ch. 120.

(d) *Venables v. Baring*, [1892] 3 Ch. 527.

(e) *Edelstein v. Schuler*, [1902] 2 K. B. 144.

(f) *Webb v. Alexandria Water Co.* (1905), 93 L. T. 339.

(g) See *Crouch v. Crédit Foncier* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 374, now treated as overruled by the following cases.

(h) [1898] 2 Q. B. 658, 678, following *Goodwin v. Roberts* (1875), 1 App. Cas. 476, and *Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank* (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 194.

(i) [1902] 2 K. B. at pp. 155, 156.

(k) *Colonial Bank v. Hepworth* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 36.

(l) *Venables v. Baring*, [1892] 3 Ch. 527.

(m) See *Simmons v. London Joint Stock Bank*, [1891] 1 Ch. at p. 294.

The parties to an instrument which is otherwise not negotiable cannot make it negotiable by contracting to that effect (*n*); but they may be estopped from denying what they had agreed (*o*).

Instances of instruments which the Courts have refused to recognise as negotiable are bills of lading (*p*), money orders not signed by the payee (*q*), American railway share certificates with blank power of transfer (*r*), share certificates with blank indorsement (*s*), and Prussian Consolidated Bonds (*t*).

Iron warrants (*i.e.*, written warrants to deliver so many tons of iron to bearer) are not negotiable (*u*); but they may be made assignable free from equities (*x*).

(*n*) *Dixon v. Bovill* (1856), 3 Macq. H. L. C. 1.

(*o*) See *Goodwin v. Roberts* (1875), 1 App. Cas. 476.

(*p*) See *Lickbarrow v. Mason* (1787), 1 Smith L. C., 12th. ed., 726.

(*q*) *Fine Art Society v. Union Bank of London* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 705.

(*r*) *London and County Bank v. London and River Plate Bank* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 535.

(*s*) *Colonial Bank v. Cody* (1890), 15 App. Cas. 267.

(*t*) *Picker v. London and County Bank* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 515.

(*u*) *Dixon v. Bovill* (1856), 3 Macq. H. L. C. 1.

(*x*) *Merchant Banking Co. v. Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co.* (1877), 5 Ch. D. 205.

CHAPTER XI.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT : PARTNERSHIP.

WHEN one person gives another authority to act in his name or on his behalf in such manner as to bring him into legal relations with a third party, the former is called a principal, the latter an agent, and the contract between them is a contract of agency. The relation of principal and agent requires the consent of both parties. There must be an express or implied assent to, or a subsequent ratification of, that relation (a).

With some few exceptions, whatever a man may lawfully do by himself, he may do by another. But there are certain confidential or personal duties which cannot be delegated to an agent. Thus, if a man is engaged to perform duties which involve the exercise of artistic skill or of taste or discretion (*e.g.*, to write a book, or to act or sing at a theatre), he cannot hand such duties over to a deputy without the consent of his employer (b). So a special power of appointment cannot be delegated (c); nor can consent to the execution of a power of appointment be given by an agent (d). Again, persons who are wholly or partially incapable of contracting are in like measure incapable of contracting by agent. It by no means follows, however, that a person incapable of contracting on his own behalf is incapacitated from acting as agent for another. An infant may in many cases act as agent for an adult, and (apart from special legislation on this subject) a married woman may act as the agent of her husband.

(a) *Per cur.* in *Markwick v. Hardingham* (1880), 15 Ch. D., at pp. 349, 350.

(b) *L. C. C. v. Hobbis* (1897), 75 L. T. 687; though a case of necessity may be an exception; *Harris v. Fiat Motors* (1906), 22 T. L. R. 556; and see *Combes's Case* (1613), 9 Rep. 75 a.

(c) *Topham v. Duke of Portland* (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 257.

(d) *Hawkins v. Kemp* (1803), 3 East, 410; but see *Stuart v. Norton* (1860), 9 W. R. 320.

A contract of agency arises, like other contracts, by mutual agreement. But in certain cases of so-called "agency of necessity" a *quasi*-relationship of principal and agent is created by operation of law—for example, a ship-master, or the acceptor of a bill of exchange for the honour of the drawer, may act as agent by reason of necessity (*e*). An agent of necessity is one who, in a special emergency without express authority or the opportunity of obtaining it, is entitled to incur additional expense in the protection of his principal's interests, and thereby to bind his principal to the necessary extent.

The agreement forming the contract of agency may be either express or implied. If the agent is to execute a deed (*f*), he must be appointed under seal by a formal instrument sometimes called a power of attorney (*g*). If a corporation appoints an agent to execute an agreement which if executed by a corporation requires a seal, it must—as we have seen (*h*)—make the appointment formally by seal. But, apart from these instances, no formality is necessary to a contract of agency. An agent may be appointed verbally, even when he is appointed for the purpose of signing contracts in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (*i*).

Agency may be inferred from the relationship of the parties. For instance, in partnership a partner is the agent of the firm for all purposes necessary for carrying on their particular partnership (*k*). A married woman may be the express or implied agent of her husband. A woman living with a man as his mistress has the same implied authority to act as his agent in purchasing necessities as she would have if she were his wife (*l*). If the man holds her out as his agent and third parties act upon the faith of such holding out, the man is estopped from denying the agency. And

(*e*) See the remarks of Lord Esher, M.R., in *Gwilliam v. Twist*, [1895] 2 Q. B., at p. 87; and *G. N. Ry. Co. v. Swaffield* (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 132; *Prager v. Blatspiel*, [1924] 1 K. B. 566.

(*f*) Except when he is merely executing a deed in the name and by the authority of a principal, who is actually present: *Harrison v. Jackson* (1797), 7 T. R. 207; and see L. P. A., 1925, s. 74.

(*g*) See L. P. A., 1925, ss. 123–130, for powers of attorney in connection with conveyancing, &c.

(*h*) *Ante*, p. 14; and see *post*, Book VI., Law of Persons, Chap. VIII.

(*i*) 29 Car. 2, c. 3; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71; and see *Heard v. Pilley* (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. 548.

(*k*) See, further, *post*, p. 207.

(*l*) *Gray v. Cathcart* (1922), 38 T. L. R. 562.

generally, whenever one person by his conduct holds out another as his agent, he will not be allowed to deny the agency as against any one who deals with the apparent agent upon the faith of such holding out (*m*).

Thus, persons who act as directors of a company, even if they are not yet duly appointed directors, are agents of the company, and their transactions on behalf of the company with others, who have dealt with them *bona fide* without notice of the irregularity in the appointment, will bind the company (*n*).

Again, a person who appears on the face of a written contract to have contracted as a principal cannot, in order to avoid liability as principal, show by extrinsic evidence that he contracted as an agent (*o*). But where A signed a charterparty as charterer, B was permitted to prove that he was the real charterer and A only his agent (*p*).

A person who describes himself as agent is not thereby protected unless it appears that he signed in that capacity (*q*). If he signs as agent he may generally show that he is the principal and sue on the contract (*r*).

A contract of agency may also be created by RATIFICATION. Where A purports to act as agent for P, either having no authority at all or having no authority to do that particular act, the subsequent adoption by P of A's act has the same legal consequences as if P had originally authorised the act.

But there can be no ratification, unless A purported to act as agent (*s*), and to act for P; and in such a case P alone can ratify (*t*). Nor can there be any binding ratification of an agreement which was originally void.

(*m*) *Pickering v. Busk* (1812), 15 East, 38; and see *Cornish v. Abington* (1859), 4 H. & N., at p. 556; and *Soames v. L. & S. W. Ry.* (1919), 88 L. J. K. B. 524.

(*n*) See *Biggerstaff v. Rowatt's Wharf*, [1896] 2 Ch. 93; *Dey v. Pullinger*, [1921] 1 K. B. 77.

(*o*) *Higgins v. Senior* (1841), 8 M. & W. 834; and see *Humble v. Hunter* (1848), 12 Q. B. 310, followed in *Formby v. Formby*, [1910] W. N. 48; *Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Selfridge*, [1915] A. C. 847.

(*p*) *Fred. Drughorn v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic*, [1919] A. C. 203. It was held in this case that evidence of B is admissible to show that A was agent of B, unless the contract distinctly represents A as owner or proprietor. Otherwise a principal could not ratify.

(*q*) *Universal Steam Navigation Co. v. MacKelvie*, [1923] A. C. 492.

(*r*) *Post*, p. 204.

(*s*) *Wilson v. Tummon* (1843), 6 M. & G. 236. See *Tiedemann and Ledermann, In re*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 66; *Robinson v. Midland Bank* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 402.

(*t*) See *Heath v. Chilton* (1844), 12 M. & W. 632.

If A contracts in his own name, hoping that P will ratify the contract, and if A does not disclose the position to the other contracting party, P cannot ratify so as to sue upon the contract (u). A company cannot ratify a contract made by promoters before the company was incorporated; for there was no existing principal at the time of the contract (x). If, however, when the contract is made, there exists some one capable of subsequently ratifying it, it does not matter that his identity was not ascertained by the agent at the time of the contract. For instance, an insurance policy can be taken out on behalf of an unascertained heir who might afterwards ratify the contract (y). The contracting party must, however, intend at the time of contract to be acting for an existent and ascertainable though unascertained principal (z).

If an agreement is beyond the powers of a limited company and therefore void, the company cannot adopt and ratify it (a). Probably a man cannot ratify a contract to which his signature has been forged (b). The ratification of an "unauthorised signature not amounting to a forgery" is excepted from section 24 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (c), whereby a forged or unauthorised signature to a bill is made wholly inoperative.

Ratification must go to the whole of the contract. A man cannot accept the beneficial part and reject the rest (d). He may ratify a contract though he at first repudiated it as not made with his authority (e); but ratification, once it is made, cannot be retracted. It must be made with full knowledge of the facts of the case (f): it is not valid if induced by the misstatements of a third party, even if they were innocently made (g). If one man pays another's creditors for him, the debtor may ratify his friend's act. But the creditors may, if they like, return the money so paid;

(u) *Keighley v. Durant*, [1901] A. C. 240.

(x) *Kelner v. Baxter* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P. 174; *Natal Land, &c., Co. v. Pauline Colliery Syndicate*, [1904] A. C. 120. There is nothing to prevent the company making a contract in identical terms after formation: *Howard v. Patent Ivory Co.* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 156.

(y) *Hagedorn v. Oliveron* (1814), 2 M. & S. 485; and see *Lyell v. Kennedy* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 437.

(z) See discussion of the position of the undisclosed principal in *Keighley v. Durant*, [1901] A. C. 240.

(a) See *Riche v. Ashbury Carriage Co.* (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 653.

(b) *Brook v. Hook* (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 89; but see the remarks of Lord Blackburn in *M'Kenzie v. British Linen Co.* (1881), 6 App. Cas., at p. 99.

(c) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61; *Morison v. London, &c., Bank*, [1914] 3 K. B. 356.

(d) See *Bristow v. Whitmore* (1861), 9 H. L. Cas. 391.

(e) See *Soames v. Spencer* (1822), 1 Dowl. & R. 32; *Simpson v. Eggington* (1855), 10 Exch. 845.

(f) *Marsh v. Joseph*, [1897] 1 Ch. 213; see *Bancroft v. Heath* (1900), 5 Com. Cas. 110.

(g) See *Biggar v. Rock Life Assurance Co.*, [1902] 1 K. B. 516.

and the debtor cannot after return of the money ratify or profit by the payment (*h*).

Ratification relates back to the time of the original contract. It must be made within a reasonable time: a man cannot bind the other party to the contract by a ratification made after the time has arrived for performance (*i*). In general, if a thing must be done by a certain time or not at all, ratification cannot take place after that time. A principal has, however, been allowed to ratify an insurance contract after loss and even with knowledge of the loss; he has further been allowed to ratify an offer accepted on his behalf which to his knowledge has since been withdrawn (*k*). Moreover, ratification cannot be allowed to prejudice the rights of third parties (*l*), or to operate so as to divest an estate once vested (*m*).

Thus, if a landlord must give notice to quit within a certain time, he will not be allowed to ratify after that time an unauthorised notice previously given on his behalf (*n*). So also, where partners agreed that the survivor of them should have an option of buying the dead man's share, if notice were given to the deceased's executors within a certain time after death, it was held that an unauthorised notice given within the time could not be ratified after the time had expired (*o*).

Mere non-intervention is not ratification: there must be words or conduct which make it clear that the principal intends to ratify (*p*). Subject to this qualification, ratification may be either express or implied, except that ratification of the execution of a deed must itself be by deed (*q*).

An agent's authority cannot exceed the powers of his principal; in other words, an agent cannot do that which

(*h*) *Walter v. James* (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 124.

(*i*) *Metropolitan Asylums Board v. Kingham* (1890), 6 T. L. R. 217.

(*k*) See *Williams v. North China Insurance Co.* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 757; *Bolton v. Lambert* (1888), 41 Ch. D. 295; *Tiedemann and Ledermann, In re*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 66. But these decisions are not wholly authoritative: see *Fleming v. Bank of New Zealand*, [1900] A. C., at p. 587. Ratification after loss in the case of marine insurance is anomalous: see *Grover & Grover v. Mathews*, [1910] 2 K. B. 401.

(*l*) *Donnelly v. Popham* (1807), 1 Taunt. 1; *Gloucester Election Petition, In re*, [1901] 1 K. B. 683.

(*m*) See *Lyell v. Kennedy* (1889), 14 App. Cas., at p. 462.

(*n*) *Doe d. Mann v. Walters* (1830), 10 B. & C. 626.

(*o*) *Dibbins v. Dibbins*, [1896] 2 Ch. 348.

(*p*) *Moon v. Towers* (1860), 8 C. B. (N.S.) 611.

(*q*) *Mayor of Oxford v. Crow*, [1893] 3 Ch. 535.

his principal could not do (*r*). If the authority given is so ambiguously expressed that two courses of action are open to the agent, and the agent in good faith acts in one way though the principal intended him to act in the other, the principal will be bound by the agent's act (*s*). In carrying out that which he is authorised to do, an agent has implied authority to do whatever may be necessary for or properly incidental to the purpose. Thus notice to an agent of any fact material to the transaction in which he is then employed as agent is notice to the principal (*t*). But the knowledge of or notice to a man who is not employed in the transaction is immaterial, although he may be acting as agent for the same principal in some other transaction (*u*).

With regard to the extent of their authority, agents may be divided into two classes, general and particular. A GENERAL AGENT has implied authority from his principal to do everything that general agents usually do in the class of business in which he is engaged. But the authority of a PARTICULAR AGENT is confined to the particular business which he is employed to do, and is restricted by any instructions which he may have received from his principal as to the conduct of that particular business. Thus a gentleman's groom, who sells a horse for him privately, has no implied authority to warrant the horse sound. But the groom of a horse-dealer would have such authority, because grooms of horse-dealers are general agents, and usually do warrant their masters' horses to be sound (*x*).

An agent, authorised to take payments of money, has no authority (unless it be customary in that particular business) to accept anything instead of cash—for example, a cheque (*y*) or bill of exchange (*z*). An agent authorised to receive payment for goods in a shop is not ordinarily authorised to receive payment elsewhere.

The authority of an agent to pay his principal's debt implies

(*r*) *Poulton v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 534.

(*s*) *Ireland v. Livingston* (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 395, 416.

(*t*) See *Société Générale de Paris v. Tramways Union Co.* (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 424; *Payne, In re*, [1904] 2 Ch. 608. Cf. L. P. A., 1925, s. 199 (ii) (b).

(*u*) *Morrison v. Universal Marine Insurance Co.* (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 197; and see *Blackburn v. Vigors* (1887), 12 App. Cas., at pp. 537, 541.

(*x*) *Howard v. Sheward* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P. 148.

(*y*) See *Papé v. Westacott*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 272; *Blumberg v. Life, &c., Corporation*, [1897] 1 Ch. 171.

(*z*) *Hine v. Steamship Insurance Syndicate* (1895), 72 L. T. 79.

authority to promise to pay it (a). An agent, acting as manager of a beer-house, may order cigars for sale therein (b). An agent, acting as manager of a ship, may pledge the owners' credit for repairs (c). A hospital matron may pledge the credit of the committee of management for meat for the hospital (d). A railway company's general manager may pledge its credit for the cost of medical assistance to one of its servants (e); but a station-master has no implied authority to do the like for medical assistance to a passenger who is injured in an accident (f). A coachman, as such, has no implied authority to pledge his master's credit for forage supplied for the horses (g).

The manager of an estate has implied authority to grant the usual leases (though a steward might not have authority to grant a lease for a term of years (h)) and to give and accept notices to quit, which a rent collector could not do (i). An agent, authorised to sell property for the owner and to accept a commission on the purchase price, has implied authority to make a binding contract and sign the same (k). In general, an agent employed to find a purchaser would not have power to make the contract of sale (l).

An agent has no authority to give persons into custody, unless he cannot properly carry out his duty otherwise (m). A bank manager, for example, has no such implied authority (n).

An agent has ordinarily no authority to borrow on the principal's behalf so as to bind him (o). But "where money is borrowed on behalf of a principal by an agent, the lender believing that the agent has authority though it turns out that his act has not been authorised, or ratified, or adopted by the principal, then, although the principal cannot be sued at law, yet in equity, to the extent to which the money borrowed has in fact been applied in paying legal debts and obligations of the principal, the lender is entitled to stand in the same position as if the money had originally been borrowed by the principal" (p).

Authority to sell goods did not at common law include authority

(a) *Hale, In re; Lilley v. Foad*, [1899] 2 Ch. 107.

(b) *Watteau v. Fenwick*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 346. See *Edmunds v. Bushell* (1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. 97.

(c) *The Huntsman*, [1894] P. 214.

(d) *Real and Personal Advance Co. v. Phalempin* (1893), 9 T. L. R. 569.

(e) *Walker v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 228.

(f) *Cox v. Midland Counties Ry. Co.* (1849), 3 Exch. 268.

(g) *Wright v. Glyn*, [1902] 1 K. B. 745.

(h) *Weiner v. Harris*, [1910] 1 K. B. 285.

(i) *Pearse v. Boulter* (1860), 2 F. & F. 133.

(k) *Rosenbaum v. Belson*, [1900] 2 Ch. 267.

(l) *Chadburn v. Moore* (1892), 61 L. J. Ch. 674.

(m) *Abrahams v. Deakin*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 516; cf. *Percy v. Glasgow Corpn.*, [1922] 2 A. C. 299.

(n) *Bank of New South Wales v. Owston* (1879), 4 App. Cas. 270.

(o) *Brocklesby v. Temperance Building Society*, [1895] A. C. 173, at p. 180; and see *Fry v. Smellie*, [1912] 3 K. B. 282.

(p) *Per Romer, L.J.*, in *Bannatyne v. MacIver*, [1906] 1 K. B., at p. 109; and see *Wrexham, &c., Ry. Co., In re*, [1899] 1 Ch. 440; *Reversion, &c., Co. v. Maison Cosway*, [1913] 1 K. B. 364; *Harris Calculating Machine Co., In re*, [1914] 1 Ch. 920.

to raise money on them. But by the Factors Act, 1889 (*q*), where a "mercantile agent" (who is defined as a person "having in the customary course of his business as such agent authority either to sell goods, or to consign goods for the purpose of sale, or to buy goods, or to raise money on the security of goods") is, with the consent of the owner, in possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods, then any sale, pledge or other disposition of the goods made by him when acting in the ordinary course of his business (that is, as he would act if duly authorised (*r*)) is, subject to the provisions of the Act, as valid as if he were expressly authorised so to do by the owner of the goods, provided the person taking the goods acts in good faith and has no notice that the other is acting without authority. Any such disposition of goods is valid notwithstanding the determination of the consent, unless the person taking the goods has notice that the consent has determined (*s*). Thus it has been held that a retail trader, who had received goods from a wholesale manufacturer ostensibly on sale or return, was a mercantile agent and had implied authority to pledge the goods (*t*).

Where the agency is such that the principal relies on the agent's skill and discretion or on his personal discharge of the matters to be done, the agent cannot delegate his powers to any one else, unless the principal expressly or impliedly consents or unless trade usage permits (*u*). Generally, where a sub-agent is appointed, in the absence of a special agreement there is no privity between the sub-agent and the principal; the sub-agent is accountable to the agent, the agent to the principal (*x*).

An agent for another is not necessarily entitled to be rewarded for his services. But generally there is a contract for his remuneration, either express or implied from circumstances which show that it was intended that he should be remunerated at such rate as is customary in the particular kind of business, or at a reasonable rate. Where he works as a solicitor, as an auctioneer or in any other capacity in

(*q*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45, s. 2; and see *Weiner v. Harris*, *supra*.

(*r*) See *Oppenheimer v. Attenborough*, [1903] 1 K. B. 221.

(*s*) *Biggs v. Evans*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 88.

(*t*) *Weiner v. Harris*, *supra*. But goods cannot be sold contrary to express condition on which they were entrusted: *Biggs v. Evans*, *supra*.

(*u*) See *De Bussche v. Alt* (1877), 8 Ch. D. 286; *Bell v. Balls*, [1897] 1 Ch. 663; and the remarks of Lord Esher, M.R., in *Gwilliam v. Twist*, [1895] 2 Q. B., at p. 86.

(*x*) See *Montagu v. Forwood*, [1893], 2 Q. B. 350. There it was held that the principal could recover from the sub-agent, because the latter knew that he was dealing only with an agent. See also *Powell v. Evan Jones & Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 41.

which remuneration is usually charged, it will be presumed that he is to be paid at the usual rate. If he is to have no reward, an action will not lie to compel him to give his services; but if he does the work and is negligent, he will be liable for such negligence, although he is working gratuitously.

If he is to be paid for his services, he is liable for the results of his want of skill and of reasonable diligence. If he is grossly unskilful or negligent or dishonest, or if he fails to keep proper accounts (*y*), he may lose his commission. And he must make good to his principal any loss which is the natural consequence of his omission to take proper care, or of any other breach of duty on his part (*z*). Where his remuneration depends upon the result of his services, there is usually an implied contract that he shall have a chance to earn his commission during that time; so if the principal's factory is burnt down, he will not be discharged from his contract to employ the agent (*a*). If an agent is employed to find a purchaser for certain property and is to have a fixed commission if successful, he can claim nothing on a *quantum meruit* if he fails (*b*). If he finds a purchaser and the seller will not complete the sale, he can recover (*c*), for if the act of his principal prevents him from earning his commission, he can claim damages for breach of the contract of agency (*d*). If the principal revokes his agent's authority before the contract is fully performed, and he is not forbidden to do so by the agreement, it depends upon the true construction of their agreement whether the parties intended that the agent should be remunerated for services rendered before revocation (*e*).

(*y*) *White v. Lincoln* (1803), 8 Ves. 363; and see *Hurst v. Holding* (1810), 3 Taunt. 32.

(*z*) See *Salvesen v. Rederi Aktiebolaget Nordstjernan*, [1905] A. C. 302; *Weld Blundell v. Stephens*, [1919] 1 K. B. 520; [1920] A. C. 956.

(*a*) *Turner v. Goldsmith*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 544; *Reigate v. Union Manufacturing, &c., Co.*, [1918] 1 K. B. 592.

(*b*) See *M'Leod v. Artoia* (1889), 6 T. L. R. 68; and *ante*, pp. 92-96.

(*c*) *Prickett v. Badger* (1856), 1 C. B. (N.S.) 296.

(*d*) *Inchbald v. Western Neilgherry Coffee Co.* (1864), 17 C. B. (N.S.) 733.

(*e*) See *Noah v. Owen* (1886), 2 T. L. R. 364. Revocation of authority is allowed, subject to contract, by the common law, unless, owing to part performance and the circumstances, it would be inequitable (*Reed v. Anderson* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 779), or unless the authority is coupled with an interest: *Rhodes v. Fielder* (1919), 122 L. T. 128. An agent appointed by power of

An agent can recover no commission on any business which is, obviously or to his knowledge, unlawful (*f*), for example on an illegal insurance transaction (*g*). A promise, express or implied, to pay commission in respect of contracts made null and void by the Gaming Act, 1845, is itself made void by the Gaming Act, 1892 (*h*).

A principal must make good to his agent all losses or expenses incurred by the agent in the proper execution of his duty (*i*), unless they arise over some business which the agent knew was unlawful (*k*), or unless they arise by the agent's own fault (*l*) or out of transactions which are outside the scope of the agency (*m*).

An agent may not take any surreptitious profit in the course of his agency (*n*). If he does so, it is a fraud upon his principal, who may thereupon repudiate the contract. An agent must act in the interests of his principal and must fully disclose his own personal interest. He may not purchase from, or sell to, his principal without the latter's knowledge and consent (*o*). Any secret profit received by the agent must be accounted for and paid over to the principal; if it is not, the principal can recover it as money received to his use (*p*).

Thus, even if an agent advises his principal in good faith, a secret bribe to the agent will avoid the contract (*q*). But if the principal knew that his agent usually received money from third persons, and omitted to inquire how much was received, he cannot say this was a secret profit (*r*).

A secret profit made by a company director in the conduct of

attorney is protected by statute: L. P. A. 1925, s. 124, re-enacting section 47 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41).

(*f*) *Haines v. Busk* (1814), 5 Taunt. 521.

(*g*) *Allkins v. Jupe* (1877), 2 C. P. D. 375.

(*h*) 55 Vict. c. 9, s. 1; and see *ante*, p. 82.

(*i*) See *Thacker v. Hardy* (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 685; *Johnson v. Kearley*, [1908] 2 K. B. 514; *Famatina, &c., Corp., In re*, [1914] 2 Ch. 271; *Christoforider v. Terry*, [1924] A. C. 566.

(*k*) See *Levy v. Warburton* (1901), 70 L. J. K. B. 708.

(*l*) *Ellis v. Pond*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 426.

(*m*) *Coates v. Pacey* (1892), 8 T. L. R. 474.

(*n*) See *Grant v. Gold Exploration Syndicate*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 233.

(*o*) *Rothschild v. Brookman* (1831), 5 E. R. 273; *Robinson v. Mollett* (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 802.

(*p*) *Powell v. Evan Jones & Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 11; *Nitedals Taendstik-fabrik v. Bruster*, [1906] 2 Ch. 671.

(*q*) *Shipway v. Broadwood*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 369; and see *ante*, pp. 80.

(*r*) *Great Western Insurance Co. v. Cunliffe* (1869), L. R. 9 Ch. 525; *Baring v. Stanton* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 502.

the company's business must similarly be accounted for and given up to the shareholders (s).

An agent making a secret profit will apparently not be allowed to keep his other remuneration, if he has been dishonest (t).

Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906 (u), an agent who corruptly accepts any gift or consideration for doing, or forbearing to do, any act in relation to his principal's affairs is guilty of a misdemeanour.

If a contract, induced by bribing an agent, be disadvantageous to the principal, the principal can not only recover the bribe from the agent, but also the amount of his consequential loss either from the agent or from the giver of the bribe (x).

Questions often arise as to who is the right person to sue or to be sued on a contract.

When A makes a contract, he may either :—

- (a) expressly state that he is agent for P; or
- (b) say that he is agent without mentioning for whom (that is, not disclosing his principal); or
- (c) contract as principal.

And in each of these three cases, he may be :—

- (i) really agent for P;
- (ii) really principal;
- (iii) he may think that he is agent for P, though he is not; or
- (iv) he may know that he is not agent for P, though he chooses to say that he is.

As to (i) (a), A being the real agent and P the disclosed principal in every case, P can sue on the contract because it is from him that the consideration moves. Certain classes of agents (factors, carriers, &c.) may also by virtue of their special position sue with their principal's consent. But a broker or a *del credere* agent cannot sue if the principal be disclosed (z). If the principal be undisclosed, he is also the right person to be sued. The agent

(s) See *Archer's Case*, [1892] 1 Ch. 322.

(t) See *Andrews v. Ramsay*, [1903] 1 K. B. 635; *Hippisley v. Knee*, [1905] 1 K. B. 1; and *Nitedals Taendstikfabrik v. Bruster*, *supra*.

(u) 6 Edw. 7, c. 34; 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64.

(x) *Mayor of Salford v. Lever*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 168.

(z) *Fairlie v. Fenton* (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 169, and *post*, p. 206.

cannot, as a rule, be sued unless he has purposely pledged his personal credit or signed the written contract so as to bind himself (a). The agent may be sued if he warranted himself to have an authority which he did not in fact possess. If he has contracted on behalf of a fictitious or non-existent person, or of a person who cannot contract, the agent is personally liable (b). By mercantile usage a British agent contracting on behalf of a foreign principal has ordinarily no authority to pledge his credit; he will be personally liable, unless it plainly appears from the contract itself or from the surrounding circumstances that he was authorised to establish privity between the foreign principal and the third party, in which case the foreign principal alone is liable (c).

As to (i) (b), the undisclosed principal may sue, but every defence good against the agent will be good against the principal (d), but the agent is personally liable. If the principal be disclosed after the contract is made, but before judgment has been obtained against the agent, the other party may elect to sue the principal (e). He cannot sue both (f). If, however, he knew at the time of making the contract who was the real principal, though the name was not mentioned, and yet elected to give credit to the agent, he cannot afterwards sue the principal (g).

Where an agent contracts under an agreement in which are words indicating agency, he is not personally liable, unless the usage of trade has that effect (h). Where an agent signs a written contract as if intending to contract personally, parol evidence is inadmissible to discharge the agent, but is admissible to charge the principal. It is admissible to prove that the professed agent is in fact the real principal (i). If, however, at the time of making

(a) See *Dramburg v. Pollitzer* (1873), 28 L. T. 470. As to the liability of an agent who signs a negotiable instrument, see *ante*, p. 174.

(b) See *Kelner v. Baxter* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P. 174.

(c) *Malcolm v. Hoyle* (1893), 63 L. J. Q. B. 1; *Harper v. Keller* (1915), 113 L. T. 175; *Miller v. Smith*, [1917] 2 K. B. 141.

(d) *George v. Clagett* (1797), 7 T. L. R. 359; *Montagu v. Forwood*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 350.

(e) *Thomson v. Davenport* (1829), 9 B. & C. 78.

(f) *London General Omnibus Co. v. Pope* (1922), 38 T. L. R. 270.

(g) *Paterson v. Gandasequi* (1812), 15 East, 62; *Addison v. Gandasequi* (1812), 4 Taunt. 574; *Dunn v. Newton* (1884), 1 C. & E. 278; and see *Armstrong v. Stokes* (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B., at p. 605.

(h) *Fleet v. Murton* (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 126.

(i) *Carr v. Jackson* (1852), 7 Exch. 382; cf. *Fred. Drughorn v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic*, [1919] A. C. 203.

the contract by which the agent rendered himself personally liable, a distinct collateral and contemporaneous agreement is entered into that the agent should not be personally liable, evidence of that agreement is admissible to prove that there never was such a contract as alleged (*k*).

As to (ii) (a) and (b), the fact that he said he was acting for somebody else does not matter, unless the deception has materially prejudiced the other party to the contract (*l*).

As to (iii) and (iv), A not being the real agent, his position is the same under circumstances (a) or (b). There is no contract. In case (a) the other party thinks that he is contracting with P. In either case A does not intend to contract at all. Their minds are not *ad idem*. But the agent can be sued on his implied warranty that he had authority to contract as agent for P, and is liable for all damage sustained in consequence of his want of authority (*m*). He is liable on the implied warranty whether he acted in a *bona fide* belief that he had authority or not; if he either knew or ought to have known that he had no authority, he can also be sued in tort for fraudulent misrepresentation (*n*).

In an action for breach of warranty of authority the plaintiff can recover his actual consequent loss, and also the profit which he would have got had the agent possessed the pretended authority (*o*). But the agent will not be liable if, at the time when he purported to act as agent, he expressly stated that he had not then got authority (*p*). The alleged principal, as we have seen (*q*), may always ratify a contract which another has made professedly as his agent.

As to (c) in circumstance (ii) there is no difficulty. In circumstances (i), (iii) and (iv) A will not be allowed to say

(*k*) *Wake v. Harrop* (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 451.

(*l*) *Schmaltz v. Avery* (1851), 16 Q. B. 655; *Harper v. Vigers*, [1909] 2 K. B. 549.

(*m*) *Collen v. Wright* (1857), 8 E. & B. 647; *Bank of England v. Cutler*, [1908] 2 K. B. 208; *Yonge v. Toynbee*, [1910] 1 K. B. 215; *Edwards v. Porter*, [1925] A. C. 1.

(*n*) *Polhill v. Walter* (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 114. Note that for innocent misrepresentation no action ordinarily lies. And see *Starkey v. Bank of England*, [1903] A. C. 114.

(*o*) *Simons v. Patchett* (1857), 7 E. & B. 568; *Godwin v. Francis* (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 295.

(*p*) *Halbot v. Lens*, [1901] 1 Ch. 344.

(*q*) See *ante*, p. 194.

that he is merely the agent, whether it be true, mistaken or wilfully false, but as we have seen P may in some cases prove the agency (r).

Various Classes of Agents.

We have already distinguished a general agent from a particular agent (s). "It is necessary to deal here with certain other special classes of agents.

A FACTOR is an agent entrusted with the possession as well as the disposal of property and is therefore by the nature of his employment authorised to receive payment for the goods of which he disposes (t). Unless otherwise directed by his principal, a factor to whom goods are entrusted for sale may sell them in his own name (u) and at his own price (x). He may give reasonable credit (y); if trade usage permits, he may warrant the goods (z), and, as we have seen above, he may validly pledge them. Unless it is expressly agreed to the contrary, a factor has by custom a lien over his principal's goods for all lawful claims arising out of the agency.

BROKERS are only employed to buy and sell goods; they are not put in possession of them. A broker has no implied authority to contract in his own name. When he has made the contract, his authority ceases: he, therefore, cannot alter or annul the contracts which he makes for his principal (a). He may sign the memorandum required by the Sale of Goods Act as agent for both parties (b). He may be sued on an implied warranty of authority (c); he has a lien on all samples and papers of his principal in his possession (d).

(r) *Ante*, p. 203.

(s) *Ante*, p. 197.

(t) See *Drinkwater v. Goodwin* (1775), 1 Cowp. 251; and *ante*, p. 199.

(u) *Dixon, Ex parte* (1876), 4 Ch. D. 133.

(x) *Smart v. Sandars* (1846), 3 C. B. 380.

(y) See *Houghton v. Matthews* (1803), 3 B. & P., at p. 489.

(z) *Dingle v. Hare* (1859), 7 C. B. (N.S.) 145.

(a) *Xenos v. Wickham* (1866), L. R. 2 H. L. 296; see p. 57, *ante*, where also the position of auctioneers is discussed.

(b) *Thompson v. Gardiner* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 777; but his clerk may not: *Henderson v. Barnewall* (1827), 1 Y. & J. 387.

(c) *Starkey v. Bank of England*, [1903] A. C. 114.

(d) *Mildred v. Maspons* (1883), 8 App. Cas. 874, at p. 880. As to stock-broker's lien, see *London and Globe Corporation, In re*, [1902] 2 Ch. 416.

A DEL CREDERE AGENT is a factor who, in consideration of an additional premium beyond the usual commission, warrants the solvency of the purchaser when he sells goods on credit. He is in effect a surety for the purchaser whom he has selected (*e*), but his contract does not fall within the Statute of Frauds as a promise "to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another" (*f*), and therefore need not be in writing (*g*).

The authority of a BARRISTER to use his discretion while acting as an advocate in Court is complete (*h*). If he agrees with opposing counsel to compromise or refer a case, he binds his client, unless he does so in contravention of express instructions given him by his client (*i*), or unless the compromise or reference includes or affects matters outside the scope of the action (*k*). Such an agreement is irrevocable, unless there has been a mistake (*l*).

A SOLICITOR may compromise an action upon terms once action is brought (*m*), but not against his client's express instruction (*n*). Before action brought he has no implied authority to compromise (*o*). Payment or tender of a debt to the solicitor on the record is payment or tender to the client in the case (*p*); so also payment to his solicitor of a deposit on a sale of land is payment to the seller (*q*). A solicitor has a general lien for his costs upon his client's papers, but otherwise must hand them over in good order as required (*r*). His general lien is unaffected by the fact that his client may have given him securities to secure the

(*e*) *Thomas Gabriel & Sons v. Churchill*, [1914] 3 K. B. 1272.

(*f*) See *ante*, pp. 44-47.

(*g*) See *Sutton v. Grey*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 285, at p. 288.

(*h*) See *Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford* (1860), 5 H. & N. 890; and *post*, p. 819.

(*i*) See *Neale v. Gordon Lennox*, [1902] A. C. 465; *West Devon Great Consols Mine, In re* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 51.

(*k*) *Kempshall v. Holland* (1895), 14 R. 336.

(*l*) *Hickman v. Berens*, [1895] 2 Ch. 638; *Shepherd v. Robinson*, [1919] 1 K. B. 474.

(*m*) *Little v. Spreadbury*, [1910] 2 K. B. 658; *Welsh v. Roe* (1918), 87 L. J. K. B. 520.

(*n*) *Fray v. Vowles* (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 232.

(*o*) *Macaulay v. Polley*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 122. See *Yonge v. Toynbee*, [1910]

1 K. B. 215 (determination of authority by lunacy of client).

(*p*) *Butler v. Knight* (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 109.

(*q*) *Ellis v. Goulton*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 350.

(*r*) *Taylor, In re*, [1891] 1 Ch. 590.

payment of particular costs (s). He must keep proper accounts and must not disclose his client's secrets.

Determination of Agency.

A contract of agency may be determined in many different ways, *e.g.*—

- (i) by consent of both parties;
- (ii) by effluxion of the time for which the agency was to last;
- (iii) by completion of the business for which the agent was employed;
- (iv) by the death, bankruptcy or insanity of either party (t);
- (v) By revocation by the principal; or
- (vi) by the happening of an event which makes the continuation of the agency unlawful or impossible.

On the termination of the agency the principal must pay the agent any remuneration which he may have earned, and indemnify him against any liability which he has properly incurred as agent.

Partnership.

“Every partner is an agent of the firm and his other partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership” (u). Participation in the profits is cogent, but not conclusive, proof of partnership (x).

An actual partnership, then, is where two or more agree to combine property or labour or both in a common undertaking to be conducted on behalf of each and every one of them. It is defined by statute as the relation subsisting between persons carrying on a business in common with a view to profit (y). They may make private stipulations

(s) *Morris, In re*, [1908] 1 K. B. 473. See also the remarks of Neville, J., in *Rapid Road Transit Co., In re* (1908), 99 L. T., at p. 775.

(t) Except where the agent's authority is coupled with an interest: *Smart v. Sandars* (1848), 5 C. B. 895, at p. 915; *Rose, In re* (1894), 1 Manson, 218.

(u) Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 39), s. 5.

(x) See 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 2, sub-s. 3, and such cases as *Tennant, Ex parte* (1877), 6 Ch. D. 303; *Hawksley v. Outram*, [1892] 3 Ch. 359.

(y) See 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 1, sub-s. 1.

against the ordinary incidents of partnership attaching to them, which will be binding between the partners themselves (z), but they cannot in this way diminish the liability of any of them to third persons who are not aware of these stipulations. Persons, who are not and never intended to be partners in fact, may be deemed partners in law *quoad* third persons, to whom they have been held out as partners.

It is provided by section 2 of the Partnership Act, 1890, that in determining whether a partnership does or does not exist regard shall be had to the following rules:—

(1) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, joint property, common property or part ownership does not of itself create a partnership as to anything so held or owned, whether the tenants or owners do or do not share any profits made by the use thereof.

To purchase goods so as to share profits on re-sale might make the parties partners (a). It is possible that there may be a mere co-ownership as to property, while there is a partnership as to profits derived from it (b).

(2) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself create a partnership, whether the persons sharing such returns have or have not a joint or common right or interest in any property from which, or from the use of which, the returns are derived (c).

(3) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is *prima facie* evidence that he is a partner in the business, but the receipt of such a share, or of a payment contingent on or varying with the profits of a business, does not of itself make him a partner in the business (d), and in particular—

(a) The receipt by a person of a debt or other liquidated amount by instalments or otherwise out of the accruing profits of a business does not of itself make him a partner in the business or liable as such:

(b) A contract for the remuneration of a servant or agent of a person engaged in a business by a share of the profits of the business does not of itself make the servant or agent a partner in the business or liable as such (e):

(c) A person, being the widow or child of a deceased partner and receiving by way of annuity a portion of the profits made in the business in which the deceased person was a partner, is not by reason only of such receipt a partner in the business or liable as such:

(z) *Keen v. Price*, [1914] 2 Ch. 98; see also *Jeffery v. Bamford*, [1921] 2 K. B., at pp. 358, 359.

(a) *Reid v. Hollinshead* (1825), 4 B. & C. 867; and see *Oppenheimer v. Frazer*, [1907] 2 K. B. 50.

(b) *Davis v. Davis*, [1894] 1 Ch. 393.

(c) *Sutton v. Grey*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 285.

(d) This is the rule of *Cox v. Hickman* (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 268.

(e) *Ross v. Parkyns* (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 331.

(d) The advance of money by way of loan to a person engaged, or about to engage, in any business on a contract with that person that the lender shall receive a rate of interest varying with the profits, or shall receive a share of the profits arising from carrying on the business (f), does not of itself make the lender a partner with the person or persons carrying on the business or liable as such, provided that the contract is in writing, and signed by or on behalf of all the parties thereto:

(e) A person receiving, by way of annuity or otherwise, a portion of the profits of a business in consideration of the sale by him of the goodwill of the business, is not by reason only of such receipt a partner in the business or liable as such.

A nominal partnership is one in which a man who has no interest in the business allows his name to be used by the firm. He is liable for the debts of the firm to all third persons who knew his name was used, unless they have received express notice that he is only an ostensible partner. Any acts done with his consent or permission, which are sufficient to induce others to believe him to be a partner, render him liable as such. A person "holding himself out" as partner is liable to any one who deals with the firm on the faith of such representation (g).

A dormant partner is one whose name does not appear to the world; he is liable for all the debts of the firm contracted during his partnership, even though the creditors never knew of his existence. But he need not, like an ostensible partner, give notice of his retirement except to persons who knew of his connection with the firm. He is an actual, though undisclosed, partner; for the business is conducted on his behalf.

There are other classes of partners which deserve a passing mention. A particular partner is one who is partner with another in respect of a special transaction or in a particular line of business, as distinct from a general partner, who is interested in the whole of the business of the firm. The Limited Partnership Act, 1907 (h), has introduced into English law a new kind of partner, whose liability is limited to the amount of the capital which he risks in the

(f) See *Young, In re; Jones, Ex parte*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 484, where the lender by contract was to receive a sum out of the profits.

(g) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 14, sub-s. 1.

(h) 7 Edw. 7, c. 24, s. 7.

partnership business. The authority of such a limited partner to bind his firm is the same as in other forms of partnership.

The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, apply to limited partnerships as if they were ordinary partnerships, and on all the general partners of a limited partnership being adjudged bankrupt the assets of the limited partnership will vest in the trustee (i). Prior to 1914 a limited partnership might be wound up under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (k).

The relative rights of partners *inter se* are usually defined by agreements called articles of partnership. If the authority of one partner to bind his firm is restricted by such an agreement, his acts, if contrary thereto, will not be "binding on his firm with respect to persons having notice of the agreement." But they will bind the firm with respect to persons who have no such notice (l).

In general, a partner's authority to act as agent is confined to acts necessary and incident to the carrying on of the partnership business. In matters outside the partnership business, the firm are not liable, unless they authorised the partner so to act (m), or are estopped from denying his authority (n). The firm are not bound, unless the partner has acted as agent; if he acted as principal, he alone is liable (o).

In particular a partner has implied authority to draw cheques in the firm name on the firm's bank, to give receipts for payments to the firm, and to buy and sell goods for the partnership business. He may also assign book debts due to the firm (p); but he may not wipe out his personal debts by setting them off against debts due to the firm (q). Nor has he any authority to settle a debt by

(i) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, s. 127.

(k) See Lindley on Partnership (9th ed.), pp. 929—930.

(l) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 8.

(m) Section 7.

(n) See *Farquharson v. King*, [1902] A. C. 325; but see *Kinahan v. Parry*, [1910] 2 K. B. 389; [1911] 1 K. B. 459.

(o) *British Homes Assurance Corporation v. Paterson*, [1902] 2 Ch. 404.

(p) See *Marchant v. Morton*, [1901] 2 K. B. 829; *Briggs, In re*, [1906] 2 K. B. 209.

(q) *Piercy v. Fynney* (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 69.

accepting shares in a company (*r*). A partner has no implied authority to bind his firm either by a submission to arbitration (*s*) or by a deed (*t*). Nor may he bring his partners into partnership relations with other persons in that or other businesses (*u*).

Where the partnership is an ordinary trading firm, a partner may borrow money in the name of the firm, and even assign to the lender the firm's book debts as security (*x*). He can also sign bills of exchange or promissory notes so as to bind the firm.

But farmers in partnership are not an ordinary trading firm in this sense (*y*); nor apparently are auctioneers (*z*); nor is a partnership formed to run a cinematograph entertainment (*a*). And as there is no usage or need that solicitors should be parties to negotiable instruments, a solicitor has no implied authority to accept bills in the name of his firm (*b*). Nor will a guarantee given by a solicitor bind his partners, unless it can be shown that they were aware of the transaction and that the security was given in pursuance of the ordinary practice of the parties (*c*). Nor has a solicitor implied authority to bind his firm by a post-dated cheque drawn in the name of the firm (*d*), or to receive money indefinitely from a client with a view to laying it out upon proper security when found; but it is incidental to the business of a solicitor to receive money for the purpose of laying it out upon a particular mortgage, in which case a firm may be liable for the receipt of money by one of its members (*e*). A solicitor has no implied authority to make himself a constructive trustee, so as to make an innocent partner liable (*f*).

A partner's liability dates from the time of his becoming a partner (*g*). If he wishes to be no longer bound by the acts of his partners, he must terminate his partnership and

(*r*) *Niemann v. Niemann* (1889), 43 Ch. D. 198.

(*s*) *Adams v. Bankart* (1835), 1 Cr. M. & R. 681; *Farrar v. Cooper* (1890), 44 Ch. D. 323.

(*t*) *Harrison v. Jackson* (1797), 7 T. R. 207.

(*u*) *Singleton v. Knight* (1888), 13 App. Cas. 788.

(*x*) *Briggs*, *In re*, *supra*.

(*y*) See *Greenslade v. Dower* (1828), 7 B. & C. 635; and see *Harris v. Amery* (1865), L. R. 1 C. P., at p. 154.

(*z*) *Wheatley v. Smithers*, [1907] 2 K. B. 684.

(*a*) *Higgins v. Beauchamp*, [1914] 3 K. B. 1192.

(*b*) *Hedley v. Bainbridge* (1842), 3 Q. B. 316, 321; *Levy v. Pyne* (1842), Car. & M. 453; *Garland v. Jacomb* (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 216.

(*c*) See *Brettell v. Williams* (1849), 4 Exch. 623.

(*d*) *Forster v. Mackreth* (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 163.

(*e*) *Harman v. Johnson* (1853), 2 E. & B. 61.

(*f*) *Mara v. Browne*, [1896] 1 Ch. 199.

(*g*) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 17, sub-s. 1.

give notice of the dissolution (*h*). If he be a "dormant" partner, notice will not be necessary (*i*); nor is it necessary where the partner dies or becomes bankrupt. After dissolution the authority of a partner to bind the firm continues for the purpose of completing transactions unfinished at the date of dissolution, and of winding up the partnership (*k*).

Partners may sue and be sued in the name of their firm, but in the former case they can be compelled to disclose the name and address of every member of the firm (*l*). In the latter case they must enter an appearance in their own names individually, but the subsequent proceedings may continue in the name of the firm (*m*).

If judgment has been recovered against a firm, execution can at once issue without leave against all property of the firm within jurisdiction, and also against the goods of any individual partner who was served with the writ. But the plaintiff cannot without leave issue execution against any person who was not served with the writ. If such person dispute his liability, an issue will probably be directed to determine whether he was a partner or held himself out as a partner at the date of the contract (*n*). But if a person, served as a partner, enters appearance under protest (*o*) denying that he is a partner, he is not entitled to dispute the liability of the firm and consequently cannot obtain an order for an issue to try the question of his partnership before the other issues in the action (*p*).

The judgment creditor of a man who is a partner in a firm can, under section 23 of the Partnership Act, 1890 (*q*), obtain an order charging that partner's interest in the partnership property and profits with payment of the amount of the judgment debt and interest thereon, and by the same or a subsequent order a receiver may be appointed of that partner's share of profits (whether already declared or accruing) and of any other money which may be coming to him in respect of the partnership (*r*).

(*h*) *Ibid.*, s. 36. See *Moss v. Elphick*, [1910] 1 K. B. 846.

(*i*) Section 36, sub-section 3.

(*k*) Section 38.

(*l*) Order XLVIII.A., r. 1; and see *Abrahams v. Dunlop Tyre Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 46.

(*m*) Order XLVIII.A., r. 5; and see *Ellis v. Wadeson*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 714.

(*n*) Order XLVIII.A., r. 8; *Davis v. Hyman*, [1903] 1 K. B. 854.

(*o*) Order XLVIII.A., r. 7.

(*p*) *Weir v. McVicar*, [1925] 2 K. B. 127.

(*q*) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39.

(*r*) And see Order XLVI., r. 1A.

CHAPTER XII.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

CLOSELY akin to the relation of principal and agent are two other legal relationships—master and servant and employer and workman. The distinction between a servant and a workman, though clearly understood in ordinary intercourse, is difficult to define in legal language. The word “servant” has been used in different senses both by Judges and in Acts of Parliament at different stages in the history of our law. On the other hand, the meaning of the terms “employer” and “workman” has been defined, as we shall see presently, with some precision by various statutes (*a*).

A servant is one who for consideration agrees to work subject to the orders of another (*b*). Where a person who does work for another is an independent contracting party, free to carry out the work in his own way and according to his own discretion, he is not a servant. In such a case the other party is not as a rule liable for any tortious or criminal act which the former commits in carrying out that work. But where a person is bound to do the work under the control and subject to the directions of another, he is his servant (*c*).

A contract of service may be either express or implied from the conduct of the parties. The contract need not be drawn up in any particular form, unless it be such that it cannot be completely performed within one year. In the latter case there must be a memorandum in writing sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (*d*). But if the parties con-

(*a*) See *post*, p. 224.

(*b*) See Macdonell, *Master and Servant* (2nd ed.), p. 7.

(*c*) See Vol. 1, p. 128.

(*d*) See *ante*, pp. 51-53; *Davey v. Shannon* (1879), 4 Ex. D. 81; but see *McGregor v. McGregor* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 424.

tract for a year's service to begin on the day after the contract, it has now been decided that such an agreement requires no memorandum in writing (*e*). Contracts for the hire of inferior servants are exempted from stamp duty (*f*), and if made by a corporation, do not require to be under seal (*g*).

Infants may enter into contracts of service, and will be bound by them if the contracts are for their own benefit (*h*).

The consideration for a contract of service is, as a rule, an agreed sum to be paid as wages. From the fact that services have been rendered and accepted will generally be implied an agreement to pay wages. If the servant has left the question of wages entirely to his master's discretion, the servant cannot recover any sum even on a *quantum meruit* (*i*), but it is otherwise if it was agreed that some wages should be paid, but the actual amount was left to the master's discretion (*k*). The doing of extra work which is outside the contract of service would support a claim for extra pay. An infant may bring an action for any sum not exceeding £100 due for wages, piecework or for work as a servant (*l*).

As in other cases of contract, the law does not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration. An anticipated legacy from the master may be the consideration for the servant's work. An agreement to leave a legacy in return for service may be enforced against the master's executors (*m*). Where a woman served as nurse to her aunt for three years at the aunt's request, it was held that she was unable to recover any wages in the absence of an express agreement (*n*).

The length of the service is often not fixed by the terms of the contract. In the case of some inferior servants there is apparently a

(*e*) *Smith v. Gold Coast Explorers*, [1903] 1 K. B. 285, 538.

(*f*) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, Sched. 1. The exemption includes any labourer, artificer, manufacturer, or menial servant.

(*g*) See *Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton* (1840), 6 M. & W., at p. 822; and *ante*, p. 193.

(*h*) *Clements v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 482; *Roberts v. Gray*, [1913] 1 K. B. 520; and see *post*, Book VI., Chap. IV.

(*i*) See *ante*, pp. 95-96; and *Taylor v. Brewer* (1813), 1 M. & S. 290; *Roberts v. Smith* (1859), 4 H. & N. 315.

(*k*) *Peacock v. Peacock* (1809), 2 Camp. 45.

(*l*) 3 Edw. 7, c. 42, s. 3, extending 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 96.

(*m*) See *Synge v. Synge*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 466.

(*n*) *Russel v. McClymont* (1906), 8 F. 821.

presumption that the contract is of a year's duration (o), even if wages be paid monthly (p). This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a contrary usage (q); the jury must look at all the facts of the case in deciding the terms upon which the parties contracted (r). Payment of wages weekly or monthly is strong evidence of a contract of hiring for a week or a month. Contracts of service with the Crown are determinable at the pleasure of the Crown, whether expressed to be for a definite time or not.

Except under certain special statutes (s), a master is not obliged to give his servant a character (t). But if he does make representations as to the servant's character which he knows to be false to a third person who thereupon employs the servant, an action will lie for any damage which that third person sustains in consequence (u). A servant who is improperly dismissed, or discharged without due notice, may immediately sue his master for such damages as will compensate him for the loss which he has actually sustained. And similarly, if the master refuses to allow him to begin his service, the servant may sue immediately (x). He may either treat the contract as subsisting and sue for damages or treat it as rescinded and sue on a *quantum meruit*. The latter course is usually less profitable and an implied contract may be difficult to prove (y).

If master and servant have not expressly agreed upon the conditions under which each may terminate the contract, the conditions may be implied. "In the absence of misconduct or of grounds specified in the contract, the engagement can only be terminated after reasonable notice" (z). In the case of a menial servant a month's notice is deemed reasonable (a). If improperly dismissed,

(o) *Lilley v. Elwin* (1848), 11 Q. B. 742.

(p) *Fawcett v. Cash* (1834), 5 B. & Ad. 904.

(q) *Baxter v. Nurse* (1844), 6 Man. & Gr. 935.

(r) *Warburton v. Heyworth* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 1.

(s) Such as the Army Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58), s. 92, sub-s. 2; Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), ss. 128, 129.

(t) *Carrol v. Bird* (1800), 3 Esp. 201; and see the remarks of Lord Esher, M.R., in *Pullman v. Hill*, [1891] 1 Q. B., at p. 528.

(u) *Foster v. Charles* (1830), 7 Bing. 105. Giving a false character may be a criminal offence: 32 Geo. 3, c. 56, s. 2; and see *R. v. Costello*, [1910] 1 K. B. 28.

(x) See *ante*, p. 98.

(y) *Lamburn v. Cruden* (1841), 2 M. & G. 253.

(z) Per Lord Alverstone, C.J., in *African Association and Allen, In re*, [1910] 1 K. B., at p. 399.

(a) As to proving a varying custom in respect of notice, see *Moult v. Halliday*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 125. But see *George v. Davies*, [1911] 2 K. B. 445. For meaning of "menial," see *Nicoll v. Greaves* (1864), 17 C. B. (N.S.) 27.

the servant can then recover a month's wages, in addition to wages already due, if any, and a sum in respect of tips, in cases where it was an implied term of the contract that he should receive them (*b*). A servant must make reasonable efforts to obtain other employment, and if successful, the loss resulting from the previous dismissal will, of course, be diminished (*c*). The length of reasonable notice in particular cases depends on the nature of the service; a clerk (*d*), a governess (*e*), and a schoolmistress (*f*) have been held entitled to three months' notice.

A servant may be dismissed without notice for wrongful disobedience of his master's lawful orders (*g*). But he is not bound to do work which he has not agreed to do; nor need he obey orders which imperil his life. If a servant becomes exposed by the nature of the service to additional risks not contemplated by the hiring, he may cease to serve and may sue for his wages (*h*). He is not bound by a trade usage of which he was unaware when he entered the employment (*i*).

Thus, where a waggoner refused to work late during harvest time unless supplied with beer in accordance with an alleged but unproved custom, it was held that this was a sufficient reason for dismissal (*k*). And where a platelayer was dismissed for refusing, after day-work, to proceed to night-work without a further allowance for his time in proceeding thereto, this was held a proper dismissal (*l*). In an extreme case a housemaid was held not to have been improperly dismissed for disobeying her master's order not to visit her dying mother (*m*). A master may dismiss a servant who "does anything incompatible with the due or faithful discharge of his duty to his master," or who by his own act prevents himself from being in a position duly and faithfully to perform his duty. "If a servant is guilty of such a crime outside his service as to make it unsafe for a master to keep him in his employ, the servant may be dismissed

(*b*) *Manubens v. Leon*, [1919] 1 K. B. 208; and see *G. W. Ry. Co. v. Helps*, [1918] A. C. 141.

(*c*) See the remarks of Fry, L.J., in *Reid v. Explosives Co.* (1887), 19 Q. B. D., at p. 269.

(*d*) *Fairman v. Oakford* (1860), 5 H. & N. 635.

(*e*) *Todd v. Kellage* (1852), 22 L. J. Ex. 1.

(*f*) *Pottle v. Sharp* (1896), 65 L. J. Ch. 908; *Metznor v. Bottom* (1854), 9 Ex. 518.

(*g*) As to cases in which such disobedience exposes the master to criminal or civil proceedings, see Vol. 1, p. 129.

(*h*) See *O'Neil v. Armstrong*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 418, where the Chino-Japanese War supervened upon a contract between seaman and shipmaster.

(*i*) *Meek v. Port of London Authority*, [1918] 2 Ch. 96.

(*k*) *Lilley v. Elwin* (1848), 11 Q. B. 742.

(*l*) *Beale v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1901), 17 T. L. R. 450.

(*m*) *Turner v. Mason* (1845), 14 M. & W. 112.

by his master (*n*); and if the servant's conduct is so grossly immoral that all reasonable men would say he cannot be trusted, the master may dismiss him " (*o*).

Habitual drunkenness (*p*), gross insubordination (usually needing something more than a single act), or gross incompetence (*q*) are good grounds for dismissal. While the contract lasts, the servant can recover wages for a period of temporary illness (*r*), but a servant's total inability to work (*e.g.*, through paralysis) would give the master a right to determine the contract. Though the master dismisses for insufficient reason, he has a good defence if it afterwards appears that good grounds in fact existed (*s*). It is for the jury to say whether the facts disclose a valid ground of dismissal (*t*). The contract being indivisible, a dismissed servant cannot claim for services for a period interrupted by dismissal, but may sue for wages due and unpaid before dismissal. He cannot, however, ask a jury to award him " exemplary " or " vindictive " damages, or to take into consideration any circumstances of harshness or oppression accompanying his dismissal, or any loss sustained by him from discredit thrown upon him by the manner of his dismissal (*u*).

A contract of service may be determined by mutual consent, which may be either express or implied from the conduct of the parties. The death of either the master or the servant will also determine the contract (*x*). The contract is a personal one; hence agreements for service are never specifically enforced, and cannot be transferred or assigned without the consent of the other party. It is an implied term of the contract that the servant should not in any subsequent employment divulge or make use of his former master's trade secrets (*y*). Death of a partner may terminate the contract of a servant of the partners, but not where the contract was made without particular regard to the character of the business or the personality of the

(*n*) See *Thayre v. L. B. & S. C. Ry. Co.* (1906), 22 T. L. R. 240.

(*o*) *Per* Lord Esher, M.R., in *Pearce v. Foster* (1886), 17 Q. B. D., at p. 539 (merchant's clerk dismissed for speculating).

(*p*) *Speck v. Phillips* (1839), 5 M. & W. 279.

(*q*) *Harmer v. Cornelius* (1858), 5 C. B. (N.S.) 236.

(*r*) *Cuckson v. Stones* (1856), 28 L. J. Q. B. 25; *Warburton v. Co-operative Wholesale Society*, [1917] 1 K. B. 663.

(*s*) *Ridgway v. Hungerford Market Co.* (1835), 3 A. & E. 171; *Boston Deep Sea Co. v. Ansell* (1888), 39 Ch. D. 339.

(*t*) *Clouston v. Corry*, [1906] A. C. 122.

(*u*) *Addis v. Gramophone Co.*, [1909] A. C. 488; but see the dissenting judgment of Lord Collins, p. 497.

(*x*) But the servant, on death of the master, or the servant's representatives on death of the servant, can recover for work done: *Cutter v. Powell* (1795), 6 T. R. 320; 2 Sm. L. C. (12th ed.), p. 1.

(*y*) *Amber Size, &c., Co. v. Menzel*, [1913] 2 Ch. 239.

partners (z). Bankruptcy of the master does not in itself determine contracts of service (a). In the case of a joint stock company, however, a winding-up order is notice of discharge to the servants, and so is the appointment of a receiver and manager in a debenture-holder's action; but a resolution for voluntary winding-up is not notice of discharge (b).

APPRENTICESHIP is a particular kind of contract of service. "No technical words are necessary to constitute the relation of master and apprentice" (c). The distinguishing feature of a contract of apprenticeship is that the one party should teach and the other should learn. Where, as is usually the case, the apprenticeship is for more than a year, the contract must be in writing. The indentures of apprentices to the sea are regulated by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (d). In the absence of express agreement (e), the master has no power to dismiss an apprentice for ordinary misconduct (f); but if the apprentice be an "habitual thief," the master may dismiss him (g). The term "workman" in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, includes an apprentice (h).

It has been found necessary to make laws to protect a class of persons who lack the power to protect their own interests. A series of statutes called the Truck Acts (i) provide that workmen are not to have unreasonable deductions made from their wages (e.g., for fines, damaged goods, materials, tools (k)), nor to have their wages paid otherwise than in lawful current coin (l), nor to be obliged to spend their wages in any particular place or manner (m). Various statutes have also been passed to improve the conditions of labour (and especially of child labour) in certain trades, as for example chimney-sweeping (n) and coal-

(z) See *Phillips v. Alhambra Co.*, [1901] 1 Q. B. 59, and cases there cited.

(a) *Thomas v. Williams* (1834), 1 A. & E. 685.

(b) Buckley on the Companies Acts (9th ed.), p. 457, and cases there cited.

(c) Per Lord Kenyon in *R. v. Rainham* (1801), 1 East, at p. 534.

(d) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, ss. 105—109; see also ss. 393—398.

(e) *Westwick v. Theodor* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 224.

(f) *Winstone v. Linn* (1823), 1 B. & C. 460.

(g) *Learoyd v. Brook*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 431.

(h) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84, s. 3.

(i) See 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37; the Truck Amendment Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 46); and the Truck Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 44).

(k) See 59 & 60 Vict. c. 44, ss. 1—3.

(l) 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37, ss. 1 and 3.

(m) *Ibid.*, s. 2; 50 & 51 Vict. c. 46, s. 6.

(n) See 3 & 4 Vict. c. 85.

mining (o). Most important among the statutes dealing with employment are the Workmen's Compensation and Employers' Liability Acts.

At common law the relations of employer and workman stood as follows. Each was bound to conduct himself and his work so as not to injure others. Further "the contract between employer and employed involves, on the part of the former, the duty of taking reasonable care to provide appliances and to maintain them in a proper condition, and so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to unnecessary risk" (p). He was liable to an action for negligence, if in the conduct of his business he did or omitted to do anything which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would not do or omit to do, though he was not liable if the injured workman was guilty of contributory negligence.

Before the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (q), "a servant might have sought redress from his master, subject to any defence the master might set up, in the following cases:—

- (a) for injuries sustained by the servant by reason of the negligence of the master himself;
- (b) for injuries sustained by reason of the negligence of a servant acting within the scope of the master's employment;
- (c) for injuries sustained by reason of the master having negligently provided defective or dangerous implements or materials" (r).

It is still open to an injured workman to sue his employer on his liability under the common law. In order to succeed in such an action the plaintiff must establish negligence of the kind indicated in the last paragraph. And

(o) Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 58); Coal Mines Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 50); Coal Mines Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 22). See also Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 77); and, generally, Employment of Children Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 34); Factory and Workshops Act, 1901 (1 Edw. 7, c. 22), &c.

(p) *Per* Lord Herschell in *Smith v. Baker*, [1891] A. C., at p. 362.

(q) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42.

(r) *Per* A. L. Smith, J., in *Weblin v. Ballard* (1886), 17 Q. B. D., at p. 124.

to such an action there are still, apart from denial of the facts, three defences open to an employer : —

(i) The doctrine of “ common employment,” which was enunciated in the case of *Priestley v. Fowler* (s), still protects an employer if the action be brought at common law; where the person injured and the person who caused the injury are both workmen in the same employment, even though they are in very different grades of that employment and engaged in very different work, their common employer is not responsible for the consequences of the injury (t).

(ii) The employer may also allege another rule: if the workman knew and realised the risk of injury and voluntarily incurred the danger, the master is not liable (u). This rule is based on the maxim *volenti non fit injuria*. But it is necessary to show that he voluntarily underwent the risk. The maxim is *volenti* not *scienti fit injuria*.

(iii) The employer may also plead that the real cause of the injury was the contributory negligence of the workman.

At common law there was a fourth defence open to an employer, if the injuries to his workman proved fatal. Such a case was governed by the rule that “ a personal action dies with the person ”; so that if a workman died in consequence of injuries received in the course of his employment, his personal representatives could not bring an action to recover damages on behalf of his widow and children or other dependants. This defence, however, was taken away in 1846 by Lord Campbell’s Fatal Accidents Act (x).

In 1880 was passed the Employers’ Liability Act (y). This Act gives to an injured workman in many cases a right of action, which he did not possess at common law. It entitles him to compensation if his injury was caused by reason of—

(s) (1837), 3 M. & W. 1, confirmed in *Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid* (1858), 3 Macq. H. L. 266, discussed in *Cole v. De Trafford* (No. 2), [1918] 2 K. B. 523, 539.

(t) See *Wilson v. Merry* (1868), L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 326; *Johnson v. Lindsay*, [1891] A. C. 371. Questions have frequently arisen as to whether plaintiff is a servant, and as to the meaning of “ same employment ”: see *Wright v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 252; *Cameron v. Nystrom*, [1893] A. C. 308; *Union Steamship Co. v. Claridge*, [1894] A. C. 185.

(u) *Thomas v. Quartermaine* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 685; *Smith v. Baker*, [1891] A. C. 325; *Coldrick v. Partridge*, [1910] A. C. 77.

(x) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, ss. 2—5; and see 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95, and 8 Edw. 7, c. 7.

(y) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42.

(i) the defective condition of ways, works, plant or machinery, provided such defect is attributable to the negligence of the employer or of some person to whom he has delegated his duty in that behalf;

(ii) the negligence of the employer's superintendents or of those to whom he has entrusted the duty of giving to the workmen orders or directions;

(iii) some act or omission by a fellow workman in obedience to the employer's by-laws or to the particular instructions of one placed in authority over him; or

(iv) the negligence of any fellow workman who has charge of any signal, points, locomotive engine or train upon any railway (z).

In all actions coming within this Act the workman is given the same rights and remedies against his employer as any one not in his service would have had; so that the doctrine of common employment does not apply. It still, however, remains open to the employer in any action under this Act to plead contributory negligence, or to set up the defence that the workman knew of the defect or negligence and did not complain to the employer or to some person superior to himself in the service within a reasonable time (a). The master can also raise the technical defences that the workman did not give him proper notice of the accident or did not give it within the prescribed time (b). Or it may be that the workman had contracted with his employer not to claim compensation under the Act for personal injuries (c).

Under this Act the term "workman" includes every railway servant, labourer, servant in husbandry, journeyman, artificer, handicraftsman, miner and every one engaged in manual labour, but not a domestic or menial servant, nor a seaman (d); the term "employer" includes a body corporate (e). The action can only be

(z) Sections 1 and 2.

(a) Unless he knew that the employer or such superior was already aware of it: section 2, sub-section 3.

(b) Section 4.

(c) Such a contract is not against public policy, and the widow of a workman fatally injured, who sues under Lord Campbell's Act, will be bound by it: *Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 357; *Dewhurst v. Salford Guardians* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 478.

(d) *Macbeth & Co. v. Chislett*, [1910] A. C. 220.

(e) Section 8.

brought in the County Court (*f*). Allowance is made for the pain and suffering caused by the injury; but the total sum recoverable cannot exceed the amount of three years' wages (*g*).

In the year 1897 a novel principle was introduced into the law of employer and workman. By the Workmen's Compensation Act of that year (*h*) it was for the first time provided that in certain specified trades and works the employer should be liable to compensate any workman who was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, whether the employer or any of his subordinates had been guilty of any negligence or had committed any breach of duty or not. The scope of this enactment was extended in 1900 to agricultural labourers (*i*). The law has been consolidated by the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925 (*k*), which has repealed the previous Acts, but has left untouched both the common law and the Employers' Liability Act, 1880. It will be observed that the right to compensation accorded to a workman by these Acts is not based upon any right of action in tort, but arises directly out of the contractual relation of employer and workman. It was thought right that, if a workman is injured in the course of his employment, the loss which he thereby sustains should be borne in substantially equal shares by his employer and himself. The employer is in fact made to insure his men. The sum awarded to the injured workman is not handed over to him in a lump sum, as are the damages recovered in an ordinary civil action; he is paid a weekly allowance in lieu of wages during his total or partial inability to work.

The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, provides that "if in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall" [subject to other provisions of the Act] "be liable to pay compensation" (*l*). But if

(*f*) Section 6, sub-section 1.

(*h*) 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37.

(*k*) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84.

(*l*) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84, repealing 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 42 and 6 Edw. 7, c. 58. The latter Act still applies to accidents which occurred before January 1, 1924.

(*g*) Section 3.

(*i*) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 22.

the injury is "attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of that workman, any compensation claimed in respect of that injury shall, unless the injury results in death or serious and permanent disablement, be disallowed."

A workman (or, in the event of his death, his dependants (*m*)) can also claim compensation if it be proved in the method prescribed by sections 43 and 44 of the Act that he suffered from one of certain specified "industrial diseases" (*n*), due to the nature of his employment, which

- (i) prevented him from earning full wages;
- (ii) caused him to be suspended from work; or
- (iii) caused his death.

Under this Act the utmost amount recoverable is thirty shillings a week during total or partial incapacity to work, or £600 in case of death (*o*). Notice of the accident and the claim for compensation must be sent to the employer within certain prescribed times; but failure to do so will not be a bar to the claim, if the employer has not been prejudiced thereby, or if the failure or delay was due to some reasonable cause (*p*). The workman must, if required, submit to medical examination (*q*); otherwise he will not be allowed to proceed with his claim. If the employer disputes his liability to pay compensation under the Act or the amount or duration of the compensation payable by him, the question will be settled by arbitration, not by an action at

(*m*) As to who are "dependants," see section 4: *Coulthard v. Consett Iron Co.*, [1905] 2 K. B. 869; *Hodgson v. West Stanley Colliery*, [1910] A. C. 229; *Potts v. Niddrie, &c., Coal Co.*, [1913] A. C. 531; *Montgomery v. Blows*, [1916] 1 K. B. 899; *Simms v. Lilleshall Colliery*, [1917] 2 K. B. 368. As to partial dependants within section 4, sub-section 2, of the 1925 Act, re-enacting section 22 of the 1923 Act, see *Pearl v. Bolckow, Vaughan & Co.*, [1925] 1 K. B. 399; *Nash v. McAlpine* (1923), 133 L. T. (C. A.); and *Kennedy v. Horden Collieries*, [1925] 2 K. B. 438.

(*n*) See Sched. III. and two statutory orders, dated May 22, 1907, and December 2, 1908, and the Workmen's Compensation (Silicosis) Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 14). It is possible that, apart from this section, infectious diseases may be "accidents" within the statute, though it may be difficult to show the date of such "accident" and to prove that it occurred in the course of the employment: see *post*, pp. 296-297.

(*o*) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84, s. 8, re-enacting sections 2-4 of the 1923 Act, which repealed the provisions of the 1906 and later Acts (7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 42, and 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 83).

(*p*) Section 2, sub-section 1. See *Miller v. Richardson*, [1915] 3 K. B. 76; *Burvill v. Vickers*, [1916] 1 K. B. 180. Provisions as to notice are now governed by sections 14 and 15 of the 1925 Act.

(*q*) At the employer's cost: section 17.

law. The rules as to arbitration are laid down in the first schedule to the Act.

Under the Act of 1925 an "employer" includes any body of persons corporate or unincorporate and the legal personal representative of a deceased employer, and, where the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, the latter shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to continue to be the employer of the workman whilst he is working for that other person" (r).

" 'Workman' does not include any person employed otherwise than by way of manual labour whose remuneration exceeds three hundred and fifty pounds a year or a person whose employment is of a casual (s) nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business, not being a person employed for the purposes of any game or recreation and engaged or paid through a club, or a member of a police force, or an outworker (t), or a member of an employer's family dwelling in his house, but save as aforesaid, means any person who has entered into or works under a contract of service (u) or apprenticeship with an employer, whether by way of manual labour, clerical work or otherwise, and whether the contract is expressed or implied, is oral or in writing" (r). The Act does not apply to persons in the naval or military service of the Crown (x).

To entitle an injured workman to compensation under this Act, he must satisfy the Judge or arbitrator—

- (i) that he has sustained personal injury through an accident (y);
- (ii) that at the time of the accident he was in the employ of the respondent;
- (iii) that the accident arose out of his employment; and
- (iv) that the accident occurred in the course of his

(r) Section 5. It has been held that a professional football player is within section 13 of the 1906 Act (*Walker v. Crystal Palace Football Club*, [1910] 1 K. B. 87), but that a taxi-cab driver is not (*Doggett v. Waterloo Taxi-cab Co.*, [1910] W. N. 137; *Kerswell v. Perry & Co.* (1924), 132 L. T. 238). See also *Griffith v. "Penrhyn Castle" Owners*, [1917] 1 K. B. 474. As to workmen who are French citizens, see 9 Edw. 7, c. 16.

(s) For "casual," see *Williams v. Haigh* (1926), 134 L. T. 238.

(t) An outworker is one who works for an employer, but in his own home and under such conditions as he himself arranges. See sections 3 and 48 of the 1925 Act which amends section 13 of the 1906 Act and extends the meaning of the term "workman." Section 3, sub-section 1, is framed to cover taxi-cab drivers.

(u) As to "contract of service," see *Simmons v. Heath Laundry Co.*, [1910] 1 K. B. 543; *Kemp v. Lewis*, [1914] 3 K. B. 543.

(x) Section 33, sub-section 1.

(y) For the definition of an accident, see *post*, pp. 294-295.

employment (z). Under the 1925 Act, however, if the accident occurred in the doing of an act for the purpose of, or in connection with, the employer's trade or business, it will be deemed to have occurred in the course of his employment, and, if it led to death or serious and permanent disablement, although the act was done contrary to regulations or orders or without orders (a).

If the applicant succeeds in establishing these four points, he need not prove negligence in any one; it is wholly immaterial that he contributed to the accident by his own negligence, or that he voluntarily incurred a known risk, or that the injury was occasioned by the negligence of a fellow workman in the same employment.

The only defences open to the respondent on proof of the above facts are—

(a) that the applicant has not been disabled by his injuries for more than three days (b);

(b) that he has already recovered compensation for the same injuries either at common law or under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880;

(c) that his injuries are attributable to his own serious and wilful misconduct; but it is found in practice very difficult to establish this defence—and indeed, if the injuries have resulted in death or serious and permanent disablement, it is not open to the employer to raise it;

(d) that the workman was employed under a scheme of compensation, benefit or insurance, which the Registrar of Friendly Societies, after taking steps to ascertain the views of the employer and workmen, had certified to be not less favourable to the workmen and their dependants than their rights under the Act (c).

(z) He must prove both (iii) and (iv): *Pomfret v. Lancs. and Yorks. Ry. Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 718. See *Stewart v. Longhurst*, [1917] A. C. 249; *Dennis v. White*, *ibid.*, 479; *Davidson v. M'Robb*, [1918] A. C. 304.

(a) Section 1, sub-section 2, re-enacting section 7 of the 1923 Act; and see *Newton v. Guest* (1925), 133 L. T. 26; *Borley v. Ockenden*, [1925] 2 K. B. 325; *Parker v. Federal S. N. Co.* (1926), 134 L. T. 137.

(b) Section 1, sub-section 1 (a), re-enacting section 5 of the 1923 Act, reducing the period from one week.

(c) Section 31. A workman cannot contract himself out of his rights under the Act, except by an arrangement which is in strict accordance with the provisions of this section.

The respondent may also in reduction of damages show that the prolongation of the disability or that any special damage, such as the loss of a limb or a finger, was due to some unreasonable conduct on the part of the applicant, and was not the necessary result of the accident (*d*).

The Act alters the ordinary law of contract—

(i) by adopting the novel principle mentioned above, that the employer is to be liable apart from any breach of duty on the part of himself or the persons for whose acts he is responsible;

(ii) in certain cases, where a “principal” has engaged a “contractor” for the whole or any part of any work undertaken by the “principal,” the Act makes the “principal” liable to pay compensation, although there is no contractual relation whatever between him and the injured workman (*e*);

(iii) if the employer, after insuring his liability to compensate under the Act, becomes bankrupt (or, in the case of a company, has commenced to be wound up), the liability of the employer is transferred direct to the insurers, although there is no contractual relationship whatever between the insurers and the injured workman (*f*).

Hence now, when a workman is injured in the course of his employment, there are three different methods of procedure open to him: —

(i) He may sue either in the High Court or in the County Court for damages at common law. The amount of damages which he can recover is not limited by any restriction dependent upon the amount of his wages, and it will be paid to him in one sum. But he will have to establish negligence in his employer or in some one for whose act or default the employer is responsible, and his claim is liable to be defeated by any of the defences indicated on page 714.

(ii) He can sue for damages under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880. If he pursues this course he can recover damages in many cases in which no action would lie at common law; he can recover a larger amount of damages than would be awarded him under the Act of 1925, and the amount recovered will be paid to him in a lump sum. But he will have to prove a great deal more than is necessary in proceedings taken under the Act.

(*d*) *Marshall v. Orient Steam Navigation Co.*, [1910] 1 K. B. 79, 83.

(*e*) Section 6.

(*f*) Section 7.

(iii) Lastly, he can claim compensation in the County Court under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925. The advantage of so doing is that he need not prove negligence on the part of any one; he has merely to establish that he has sustained bodily injuries, which were caused by an accident arising out of and also in the course of his employment (g). His right under the Act is now an incident attached to the contractual relation of employer and workman. The disadvantage is that he can recover at the most only half his weekly wages (h).

If, however, owing to the nature of his employment, the workman is suffering from one of the industrial diseases mentioned above, and there has been no negligence on the part of his employer or of any one for whose act or default the employer is responsible, the only remedy of the workman (or, in case of death, of his dependants) is to claim compensation under the Act.

(g) See note (a) on p. 225.

(h) Under the Act of 1906 an infant could only claim 10s. a week, but this provision was repealed by the Act of 1923, s. 4, sub-s. 4, and no such distinction appears in the Act of 1925.

CHAPTER XIII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

THE relation of landlord and tenant arises when one persons confers on another a right, less than a freehold estate, to the exclusive possession of lands or tenements for a fixed or determinable time, but always for a less period than that for which he himself has an interest in the premises. Such a relation may often be created by word of mouth; but the terms of the contract are usually (and in some cases must be (a)) embodied in an agreement or lease. The landlord is frequently called the lessor, and the tenant the lessee; the act of letting is called a demise, and the lease is usually granted in consideration of rent or of some other recompense payable at fixed periods.

When a man transfers his whole estate or interest in land to another, the document is not called a lease. If he is a freeholder, it is called a conveyance (b); if he has only a leasehold interest, it is called an assignment. Again, a lease must be distinguished from a mere licence; it confers on the lessee a "real right," namely, the right to prevent every one else (including the landlord, unless he stipulates for such a right) from entering on the demised premises during the term, except by his permission. Thus a man, who engages a stall at an exhibition or a seat at a theatre (c), is a licensee and not a lessee (d), even though the contract be drawn in the form of a lease (e).

(a) See *post*, pp. 229-230.

(b) In the L. P. A., 1925, s. 205, a conveyance includes a lease and every assurance of property or of an interest therein, except a will.

(c) *Hurst v. Picture Theatres*, [1915] 1 K. B. 1; and see remarks of Eve, J., in *Joel v. International Circus* (1920), 124 L. T., at p. 461.

(d) *Rendell v. Roman* (1893), 9 T. L. R. 192; and see *Frank Warr & Co. v. L. C. C.*, [1904] 1 K. B. 713 (theatre refreshment bar).

(e) *Edwardes v. Barrington* (1901), 85 L. T. 650; *Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phillips*, [1904] A. C. 405.

There are several different kinds of tenancies. The principal ones are :—

- (i) A tenancy for a term of years.
- (ii) A tenancy from year to year.
- (iii) A tenancy at will.
- (iv) A tenancy by sufferance.

There may also be quarterly, monthly or weekly tenancies (f).

(i) The period for which the tenancy is to continue must be certain; otherwise there would only be a tenancy at will (f). An estate for years is frequently called a “term,” because its duration is bounded or limited; it must have a certain beginning as well as a certain end. Under the common law, the lessee must enter on the land by virtue of the lease; otherwise he had only an interest in the term and was not possessed of it. This interest was called an “*interesse termini*” and was alienable. It was “more than a right of entry: it was an interest which the law recognised in a future term, coupled with a right to complete that interest by possession” (g). But a person who had only an *interesse termini* could not maintain an action on a covenant for quiet enjoyment, nor an action for trespass or for damages (h). This interest is, however, now abolished and leases take effect at law or in equity from the commencement of the term without actual entry (i).

By sections 52 to 54 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, which repealed and re-enacted corresponding provisions in the Statute of Frauds (k) and the Real Property Amendment Act (l), “all conveyances of land or of any interest therein are void for the purpose of conveying or creating a legal

(f) Co. Litt. 45 b, 54 b. A statutory *quasi*-tenancy was created by the Rent Restriction Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 97). The Rent Restriction Acts, 1920 to 1924, are the statutes now in force. Under the Act of 1923 (13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 32) certain restrictions on the right to possession will remain in force up to June 24, 1930.

(g) *Per* Bowen, L.J., in *Gillard v. Cheshire Lines Committee* (1884), 32 W. R., at p. 943, cited with approval by Neville, J., in *Mann, Crossman v. Land Registry*, [1918] 1 Ch. at p. 210.

(h) *Wallis v. Hands*, [1893] 2 Ch. 75.

(i) L. P. A., 1925, s. 149, sub-ss. 1 and 2.

(k) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 1, 2.

(l) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3. As to the inadmissibility of oral evidence to vary, see *Henderson v. Arthur*, [1907] 1 K. B. 10.

estate unless made by deed," and "all interests in land created by parol and not put in writing and signed by the persons so creating the same, or by their agents thereunto lawfully authorised in writing, have, notwithstanding any consideration having been given for the same, the force and effect of interests at will only." There are certain exceptions, the most important of which is a lease for a term not exceeding three years.

A term of years may arise by estoppel. Thus, if a man demises for a term of years premises in which he has no interest and subsequently acquires an estate in them, then the lease takes effect. The lessor is estopped from denying its validity, and the lessee from disputing the lessor's title. Assignees of the original lessee are similarly estopped. But the lessor cannot distrain, for rent owed by the tenant, goods belonging to a stranger, for the stranger is not estopped from disputing the title (*m*).

At common law writing was not necessary to the creation of a term of years.

By the Settled Land Act, 1882, all leases made by limited owners under that Act must be by deed. This provision was more extensive than the Real Property Amendment Act, and applied to leases for all periods however short, whether they came under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds or not. But now by the Settled Land Act, 1925, leases not exceeding three years may be in writing without seal (*n*).

Leases in writing, but not under seal, may be construed as agreements capable of being specifically enforced (*o*). "Since the Judicature Act . . . there are not two estates as there were formerly, one estate at common law by reason of the payment of the rent from year to year, and an estate in equity under the agreement. There is only one Court (*p*), and the equity rules prevail in it. The tenant holds under an agreement for a lease. He holds, therefore, under the same terms in equity as if a lease had been granted" (*q*), provided relief could have been given by specific performance. And any objection that the agreement is not in writing must be raised specifically by the tenant as a defence to any action brought against

(*m*) *Tadman v. Henman*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 168.

(*n*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 18, s. 42, sub-s. 5 (ii), repealing the Act of 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), s. 7.

(*o*) *Zimbler v. Abrahams*, [1903] 1 K. B. 577.

(*p*) *I.e.*, one High Court, in which is merged the superior Courts of equity and common law.

(*q*) *Per* Jessel, M.R., in *Walsh v. Lonsdale* (1882), 21 Ch. D., at p. 14; and see *Coatsworth v. Johnson* (1886), 55 L. J. Q. B. 220; *Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coombs*, [1901] 2 Ch. 608. For a case which came before a Court unable to decree specific performance, see *Foster v. Reeves*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 255.

him by his landlord. Thus, if a tenant on being sued for rent pleads that there was no concluded agreement and fails, he cannot afterwards raise the defence that there was no agreement in writing in an action for rent which subsequently becomes due (r).

(ii) A tenancy from year to year exists where both landlord and tenant are entitled to notice before the tenancy can be determined by either of them. By the common law such notice must be given at least a half-year before the expiration of the current year of the tenancy, so that the tenancy may expire at that period of the year at which it commenced. In some cases more than six months' notice has been made necessary by statute (s); but the tenant must occupy for complete years.

A tenancy from year to year was originally a development of a tenancy at will, by which the tenancy at will was determinable only at that period of the year at which it commenced, and on reasonable notice. This was ultimately decided to be half a year. "A tenancy from year to year lasts only so long as both parties please; that is, it is determinable by either party at the end of any year, by giving notice to quit half a year before the end of the year. There is no reason why it should not be so determined by either party at the end of the first year—as well as at the end of any subsequent year, unless the parties have by express contract prevented such determination" (t). Mere permission to occupy land creates but a tenancy at will, unless the circumstances show an intention to create a tenancy from year to year, as for instance an agreement to pay rent by the quarter or other aliquot part of a year (u).

A demise for "one year certain" or for "one year only" does not create a tenancy from year to year, as it is to end on a precise day, and therefore no notice to quit is necessary to determine such a tenancy. A demise for one year, with an option at the end of that time to take a lease at a fixed rent *per annum*, has been held to give the tenant a right, after the first year, to a lease of at least one year (x).

A tenancy from year to year may also arise by implication of law. Thus, where a lessee for a term of years holds over after the expiration of the lease and continues to pay

(r) *Humphries v. Humphries*, [1910] 2 K. B. 531; *Cooke v. Rickman*, [1911] 2 K. B. 1125.

(s) See *post*, p. 255.

(t) *Per* Lord Denman, C.J., in *Doe d. Clarke v. Smaridge* (1845), 7 Q. B., at p. 958; and see *Croft v. Blay*, [1919] 1 Ch. 277.

(u) *Richardson v. Langridge* (1811), 4 Taunt. 128.

(x) *Austin v. Newham*, [1906] 2 K. B. 167.

rent to his landlord, he will, in the absence of any special agreement (y), be deemed in law to be a tenant from year to year and will be bound by all such of his former covenants as are referable to a yearly tenancy (z)—but not if the liability which he thereby incurs would be of so serious a nature that he cannot be assumed to have contemplated it when he held over, *e.g.*, where the covenant in question would throw upon the tenant expenses for structural work largely in excess of the annual rent of the premises (a).

(iii) A tenancy at will exists “where lands or tenements are let by one man to another to have and to hold to him at the will of the lessor, by force of which lease the lessee is in possession. In this case the lessee is called tenant at will, because he hath no certain nor sure estate, for the lessor may put him out at what time it pleaseth him” (b). Whenever the tenancy is determinable at the will of one party, the law implies it is also determinable at the will of the other (c). An estate at will, therefore, may be determined by either party by express words or by any act which is inconsistent with the continuance of the tenancy; it is determined as soon as notice thereof reaches the other party (d).

A tenancy at will may be created by agreement, express or implied. Where a person lives in a house rent free by permission of the owner, there is an implied tenancy at will. It may also arise by implication where a tenancy from year to year cannot be inferred—for example, in the case of an entry under a void lease without any payment of rent or agreement to pay it. A good example of a tenant at will is the minister of a dissenting congregation placed in possession of a chapel and dwelling-house by trustees in whom the property is vested. A tenancy at will may also be created by an “attornment” clause in a mortgage deed, whereby the mortgagor “attorns” to or becomes tenant of the mortgagee, though the

(y) *Oakley v. Monck* (1866), L. R. 1 Ex. 159.

(z) *Kelly v. Patterson* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 681; and see *Dougal v. McCarthy*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 736; *Wedd v. Porter*, [1916] 2 K. B. 91.

(a) *Valpy v. St. Leonard's Wharf Co.* (1903), 1 L. G. R. 305; *Harris v. Hickman*, [1904] 1 K. B. 13.

(b) *Littleton's Tenures*, s. 68. As to what words create a tenancy at will, see the judgment of Jessel, M.R., in *Voisey, Ex parte; Knight, in re* (1882), 21 Ch. D., at p. 457.

(c) *Co. Litt.* 55 a.

(d) *Turner v. Doe d. Bennett* (1842), 9 M. & W. 643, at p. 646.

tenancy thus created is sometimes a tenancy from year to year determinable as the parties may agree.

(iv) A tenant by sufferance is one who has lawfully entered into possession of premises, but who remains in possession of them without the consent of their owner after his right to do so has ceased. The consent of the owner would at once convert it into a tenancy at will. The tenancy can only be terminated by a demand of possession by the landlord; if the tenant is turned out of possession without such a demand, he may maintain an action of trespass, but not one of ejectment (*e*).

Certain persons—for example, infants, lunatics and convicts—may be disabled from granting leases, just as they are disabled from making other contracts (*f*). The power of landowners to grant leases for periods not exceeding their own interest in the property has sometimes been curtailed by statute (as in the case of corporations and government departments), and sometimes extended (as in the case of tenants for life and other limited owners, mortgagors and mortgagees).

The power of the Crown to grant leases of Crown lands is confined by statute to the granting of occupation leases for not more than 31 years (*g*), of mining leases for not more than 63 years (*h*), and of building leases, or leases for foreshore building or reclamation, for not more than 99 years (*i*). The enrolment of assignments of Crown leases is no longer necessary (*k*).

The leasing powers of civil corporations, municipal and others, are regulated by their respective Acts, public and private, and also by the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (*l*). The rules prevailing as to contracts made by corporate bodies apply to leases.

Universities and colleges are empowered to grant leases, generally for 21 years, mining leases for 60 years, and building leases for 99 years (*m*).

(*e*) *Doe d. Harrison v. Murrell* (1837), 8 C. & P. 134.

(*f*) See Book VI., Law of Persons.

(*g*) 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 22.

(*h*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 36, s. 4.

(*i*) 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 23; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 99, s. 1.

(*k*) See Crown Lands Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 28), s. 5.

(*l*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50, s. 108, as amended by 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 72; and see *Davis v. Leicester Corporation*, [1894] 2 Ch. 208. As to corporations' leases for workmen's dwellings, see 53 & 54 Vict. c. 70, s. 74, &c., and the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 44). These statutes have been partially repealed by the Housing Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 14).

(*m*) 21 & 22 Vict. c. 44; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 59. See also 13 Eliz. c. 10, s. 4.

A large number of statutes have limited the common law powers of ecclesiastical corporations, sole and aggregate. Their leasing powers were expressly given and are now regulated by the Ecclesiastical Leasing Acts (*n*). An incumbent may, with the consent of the patron of his living and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, lease the lands, houses, mines, minerals or other property belonging to his benefice (*o*).

Corporations and trustees for charitable uses, may be lessees so long as the leases are in accordance with the provisions of the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888 (*p*).

Tenants for life and limited owners generally have statutory power to grant, with certain exceptions, leases as a rule for 50 years, mining leases for 100 years and building or forestry leases for 999 years (*q*).

The repealed Conveyancing Act, 1881 (*r*), conferred on the mortgagor or mortgagee in possession power to grant agricultural or occupation leases for 21 years and building leases for 99 years, on certain conditions therein enumerated. The periods have been extended by the L. P. Act, 1925, to 50 and 999 years respectively (*s*). In cases where this Act does not take effect by reason of the mortgage-deed being prior to January 1, 1882, or where the Act is excluded by express agreement, the mortgagor cannot, unless so empowered by the mortgage deed, grant a lease which will be valid against the mortgagee (*t*).

There is another exception to the common law rule that the tenant's interest determines with that of the landlord. "Where the lease or tenancy of any farm or lands held by the tenant at a rack-rent" (*i.e.*, full rent obtainable in the market) "shall determine by the death or cesser of the estate of any landlord entitled for his life, or for any other uncertain interest, the tenant shall continue to hold and occupy such farm or lands until the expiration of the then current year of his tenancy, and shall then quit upon the terms of his lease or holding, in the same manner as if such lease or tenancy were then determined by effluxion of time or other lawful means during the continuance of the landlord's estate" (*u*). And provision is now made whereby a lease can be surrendered without terminating sub-leases (*x*).

(*n*) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 108; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 57; 28 & 29 Vict. c. 57.

(*o*) See *Bartlett v. Phillips* (1859), 4 De G. & J. 414; *Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Wodehouse*, [1895] 1 Ch. 552.

(*p*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 42. For the powers given to the Charity Commissioners, see 16 & 17 Vict. c. 137, ss. 21, 26; and as to official trustees, see 18 & 19 Vict. c. 124; *Mason's Orphanage and L. & N. W. Ry. Co., In re*, [1896] 1 Ch. 54, 596.

(*q*) Settled Land Act, 1925, s. 41.

(*r*) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 18.

(*s*) See 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 99.

(*t*) *Thunder v. Belcher* (1803), 3 East, 449. See *Keech v. Hall* (1778), 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.), 577. Statutes have dealt specially with agricultural holdings.

(*u*) Landlord and Tenant Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 25), s. 1; and see Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 (13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9), s. 24.

(*x*) L. P. A., 1925, s. 150.

Covenants.

The stipulations contained in leases under seal are called covenants. The tenant usually covenants to pay rent, to keep and deliver up the premises in a state of repair, to allow the landlord to enter and inspect the condition of the premises, and to pay rates and taxes other than those usually paid by the landlord, &c. (y). The landlord on his side usually covenants that the tenant shall have "quiet enjoyment." This means that the landlord undertakes that the tenant shall quietly enjoy the premises, and shall not be disturbed by himself nor by any one claiming under him, or paramount to him. This covenant is implied by law in every demise, unless restricted by the insertion of a more qualified express covenant (z).

In deeds the word "demise" had the effect of creating this covenant (a); in a parol letting the law will imply an agreement for quiet enjoyment, but not for good title (b). In a demise of land a promise of quiet enjoyment during the term is implied (c). But the lessor does not thereby covenant that the premises will endure during the term (d). An agreement to let premises at a future date implies an undertaking by the lessor that he will then give a good title (a).

A covenant that the lessee shall, while paying rent and performing his covenants, quietly enjoy, &c., is an absolute covenant for quiet enjoyment (e). An action on this covenant may be maintained for the disturbance of a way of necessity (f); or where the lessor uses his own quarry so as to cause water to percolate into the lessee's mine (g); or fails to repair a culvert (h).

The liability of a landlord at common law may of course be modified or extended by an express covenant. The mere act of letting does not under the common law render the lessor liable for disturb-

(y) See the judgment of Jessel, M.R., in *Hampshire v. Wickens* (1878), 7 Ch. D., at p. 561; *Anderton, In re* (1890), 45 Ch. D. 476.

(z) *Spencer's Case* (1583), 5 Rep. 16 a; *Jones v. Lavington*, [1903] 1 K. B. 253; *Malzy v. Eichholz*, [1916] 2 K. B. 308.

(a) See *Baynes v. Lloyd*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 820; [1895] 2 Q. B. 610. This has been a question of much controversy. See Jenks' Digest of Civil Law (2nd ed.), p. 635, and *Markham v. Paget*, [1908] 1 Ch. 697.

(b) *Bandy v. Cartwright* (1853), 8 Exch. 913; and see *Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Touse* (1887), 35 Ch. D. 519.

(c) *Hall v. City of London Brewery Co.* (1862), 2 B. & S. 737.

(d) *Arden v. Pullen* (1842), 10 M. & W. 321.

(e) *Dawson v. Dyer* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 584; *Davis v. Town Properties Corp.*, [1903] 1 Ch. 797; *Phelps v. City of London Corp.*, [1916] 2 Ch. 255.

(f) *Morris v. Edgington* (1810), 3 Taunt. 24.

(g) *Shaw v. Stenton* (1858), 2 H. & N. 858. See *Aldin v. Latimer Clark*, [1894] 2 Ch. 437; *Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 836.

(h) *Booth v. Thomas* (1926), 42 T. L. R. 296.

ance by a stranger or by a person acting under title paramount. Thus where the lessor covenanted against eviction by himself and all persons claiming by, from or under him, it was held that there was no breach where the tenant was evicted by one whose title was paramount to the lessor's (i); nor was there where an entry was made upon the lessee and goods were seized by the collector of land tax for arrears due from the lessor before the demise (k). In this latter case Lord Denman, C.J., points out that the claim was not by title from the lessor, but against the lessor, and consequently the disturbance was not within the covenant. And where the owners of the reversion upon a lease recovered possession of the premises, it was held that the covenant for quiet enjoyment in the underlease was not thereby broken (l). When this covenant has been broken, the tenant is relieved from the payment of rent during the continuance of such breach, but is not released from the performance of any other covenant (m).

This covenant for quiet enjoyment gives rise to a right of the tenant to deduct certain moneys from his rent when due. "The immediate landlord is bound to protect his tenant from all paramount claims; and when, therefore, the tenant is compelled, in order to protect himself in the enjoyment of the land in respect of which his rent is payable, to make payments which ought, as between himself and his landlord, to have been made by the latter, he is considered as having been authorised by the landlord so to apply his rent due or accruing due" (n). Payment of rent by a lodger to a superior landlord, who has distrained his goods for rent due from his immediate landlord, is deemed a valid payment of any rent due from him to his immediate landlord (o).

At common law the lessor of furnished apartments impliedly covenants that they are fit for occupation (p), though there is no implied warranty on the part of the tenant that he is a fit and proper person to occupy them and is not suffering from an infectious disease (q). In other cases there is no such implied covenant that premises are fit for occupation. In the absence of express agree-

(i) *Merrill v. Frame* (1812), 4 Taunt. 329; on title paramount, see *Markham v. Paget*, [1908] 1 Ch. 697.

(k) *Stanley v. Hayes* (1842), 3 Q. B. 105.

(l) *Kelly v. Rogers*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 910.

(m) *Morrison v. Chadwick* (1849), 7 C. B. 266; but see *Malzy v. Eichholz*, [1916] 2 K. B. 308. On the other hand, non-payment of rent is no excuse for breaking an independent covenant for quiet enjoyment: *Edge v. Boileau* (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 11.

(n) *Per Rolfe, B.*, in *Graham v. Allsopp* (1848), 3 Exch., at p. 198. See also the judgment of Pollock, C.B., in *Jones v. Morris* (1849), 3 Exch., at p. 747. This is not because a covenant for quiet enjoyment includes protection against a superior landlord (see *Markham v. Paget*, *supra*), but because the law implies an antecedent request. See p. 36, *ante*, and Smith L. C. (12th ed.), I, p. 180, *sub. Lampleigh v. Braithwait* (1616), Hobart, 105.

(o) Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 53), s. 3.

(p) A similar implied covenant is created by statute under the Housing of Working Classes Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 14), s. 1, repealing but largely re-enacting the Acts of 1890 and 1909. See *Dunster v. Hollis*, [1918] 2 K. B. 795; *Ryall v. Kidwell*, [1914] 3 K. B. 135; *Cockburn v. Smith*, [1924] 2 K. B. 119.

(q) *Humphreys v. Miller*, [1917] 2 K. B. 122.

ment a lessor is not bound to repair (*r*), nor to rebuild premises injured by fire (*s*), nor to support ruinous premises (*t*). Where premises were insanitary, it was held that the wife and children of the tenant could not recover against the landlord for loss and illness, as they were not parties to the contract (*u*).

Every tenant is bound, without any express covenant or agreement to that effect, to keep the demised buildings wind and water tight, and to manage the farm lands in a husbandlike manner according to the "custom of the country," and so to cultivate them as not to deteriorate them (*x*). The "custom of the country" to be recognised by law must, as we have seen (*y*), be reasonable and certain, though not immemorial, and must be the custom of a whole district. It will then prevail in all tenancies, unless there be express covenants to the contrary effect or stipulations in the demise, which are inconsistent with the custom and are therefore taken to exclude it by implication (*z*).

Express covenants are usually inserted in leases to define the course of cultivation to be adopted by the tenant. Their interpretation raises many points. The words "all mines and minerals" were held not to include flints, when it was the usage in the district that such belonged to the tenant and the express covenant did not contradict that usage (*a*). Again, the words "he should not remove or sell during the last year" from the farm in question any hay, fodder or manure, were held to include not only that which was produced during the last year, but also what was produced at any time during the term (*b*); clover sown with corn is still "tillage" (*c*); an agreement to cultivate and manage "as had been done" by the previous tenant applies only to his mode of cultivation on quitting, and not to the terms of his lease (*d*). A

(*r*) *Gott v. Gandy* (1853), 2 E. & B. 845.

(*s*) *Bayne v. Walker* (1815), 3 Dow, 233.

(*t*) *Colebeck v. Girdlers Co.* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 234; but see *Dalton v. Angus* (1881), 6 A. C. 740.

(*u*) *Cavalier v. Pope*, [1906] A. C. 428; *Cameron v. Young*, [1908] A. C. 176; and see *Fairman v. Perpetual, &c., Building Society*, [1923] A. C. 74, overruling *Mellon v. Henderson*, [1913] S. C. 1207.

(*x*) See *Williams v. Lewis*, [1915] 3 K. B. 493; *Wedd v. Porter*, [1916] 2 K. B. 91.

(*y*) Vol. 1, pp. 79-80.

(*z*) *Hutton v. Warren* (1836), 1 M. & W. 466.

(*a*) *Tucker v. Linger* (1883), 8 App. Cas. 508.

(*b*) *Gale v. Bates* (1864), 33 L. J. Ex. 235.

(*c*) *Birch v. Stephenson* (1811), 3 Taunt. 469.

(*d*) *Liebenrood v. Vines* (1815), 1 Mer. 15, 719; and see *Lord Hood v. Kendall* (1855), 17 C. B. 260.

covenant to cultivate "according to the best rules of husbandry practised in the neighbourhood" in an agricultural lease of a farm near London was held not to be broken by the conversion of a part of the premises into a market garden, on proof that other farms in the neighbourhood had been converted into market gardens (e). As the tenant must cultivate in a husbandlike manner, so he must keep all ditches, fences and boundaries in repair (f).

Where, however, the holding is one which falls within the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 (g), the tenant may, notwithstanding any custom of the country or any agreement with his landlord, "practise any system of cropping on his holding and dispose of the produce without incurring any penalty, forfeiture or liability," provided that he makes adequate provision to protect the holding from injury or deterioration. But this does "not apply—

- (a) in the case of a tenancy from year to year, as respects the year before the tenant quits the holding or any period after he has given or received notice to quit which results in his quitting the holding; or
- (b) in any other case, as respects the year before the expiration of the contract of tenancy."

The tenant frequently, and sometimes the landlord, covenants to repair. These covenants vary greatly and the actual terms of the particular covenant must always be carefully considered.

We may notice here some of the decisions, in which express covenants to repair have received judicial interpretation. Thus it has been held that a tenant, who has agreed to "substantially repair, uphold and maintain a house," is bound to do inside painting (h). "Habitable repair" means a state of repair reasonably fit for the occupation of an inhabitant (i). "External repairs" include boundary walls (k). "Good tenantable repair" has been defined as "such repair as, having regard to the age, character, and locality of the house, would make it reasonably fit for the occupation of a reasonably-minded tenant of the class who would be likely to take it" (l). A covenant to repair a house does not include laying a

(e) *Meux v. Copley*, [1892] 2 Ch. 253.

(f) *Cheetham v. Hampson* (1791), 4 T. R. 318; and see Co. Litt. 41 b.

(g) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9. See *Meggeson v. Groves*, [1917] 1 Ch. 158. "Arable land" does not include land in grass, which by the terms of any contract of tenancy is to be retained in the same condition throughout the tenancy: section 30, sub-section 4; nor does it apply to market gardens: *Taylor v. Steel-Maitland*, [1913] S. C. 562.

(h) *Monk v. Noyes* (1824), 1 C. & P. 265.

(i) *Belcher v. McIntosh* (1839), 8 C. & P. 720; and see *Jones v. Joseph* (1918), 87 L. J. K. B. 510; *Griffin v. Pillett*, [1926] 1 K. B. 17.

(k) *Green v. Eales* (1841), 2 Q. B. 225, where the covenant was by the landlord.

(l) *Per Lopes, L.J.*, in *Proudfoot v. Hart* (1890), 25 Q. B. D., at p. 55.

floor on an improved plan, nor putting on a new roof to an old house (*m*). Where a lessee covenanted to repair, he was held not liable to rebuild a house, which was old and had to be pulled down owing to faults in the foundations (*n*). But he might be required to repair at the very beginning of the tenancy (*o*). Where A agreed with B to let a warehouse, "the building to be put by me into good tenantable repair," it was held that A was not bound to fit it for any particular purpose, and that if B required any extra support for his goods he should have called A's attention to it while the repairs were being executed (*p*). Opening doors in a wall and keeping them open, or pulling down a wall between two yards, is a breach of a covenant to repair (*q*); not so the removal of fixtures which can be replaced at the termination of the tenancy (*r*).

The covenant to repair generally extends to all buildings erected on the premises during the term, unless it is to repair the "building demised," in which case it will not include buildings subsequently erected (*s*). A covenant to erect buildings within a certain time, and to keep the buildings so erected in repair, is broken not only as a covenant to build, but also as a covenant to repair, if the lessee fails to erect them (*t*). A general covenant to repair may override a special covenant to repair only certain buildings on land demised: *Field v. Curnick*, [1926] 2 K. B. 374.

Generally a yearly tenant is made answerable for keeping the premises in fair repair, but not for ordinary wear and tear, nor if they be burnt down (*u*). Where the lease contains an express condition—"fair wear and tear excepted"—in favour of the tenant, he cannot apparently be made liable for dilapidations caused by exposure to atmosphere and ordinary use, and therefore is not liable for the cost of external painting (*x*). But a separate covenant by the tenant to paint both the inside and the outside of a house is often inserted in a lease.

(*m*) *Soward v. Leggatt* (1836), 7 C. & P. 613.

(*n*) *Lister v. Lane*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 212; cf. *Henman v. Berliner*, [1918] 2 K. B. 236. Words which merely qualify the tenant's covenant to repair must be distinguished from a covenant to repair by the landlord: *Westacott v. Hahn*, [1918] 1 K. B. 495. For the test in deciding which party is liable for restoration, see *Lurcott v. Wakeley*, [1911] 1 K. B. 905.

(*o*) *Truscott v. Diamond Rock Boring Co.* (1882), 20 Ch. D. 251.

(*p*) *McClure v. Little* (1868), 19 L. T. 287; cf. *Melles v. Holme*, [1918] 2 K. B. 100; *Murphy v. Hurley*, [1922] 1 A. C. 369.

(*q*) *Doe d. Wetherell v. Bird* (1833), 6 C. & P. 195; *Gange v. Lockwood* (1860), 2 F. & F. 115.

(*r*) *Doe d. Burrell v. Davis* (1851), 15 Jur. 155.

(*s*) *Cornish v. Cleife* (1864), 3 H. & C. 446; *Smith v. Mills* (1899), 16 T. L. R. 59.

(*t*) *Bennett v. Herring* (1857), 3 C. B. (N.S.) 370; *Jacob v. Down*, [1900] 2 Ch. 156; but see *Stephens v. Junior Army and Navy Stores*, [1914] 2 Ch. 516.

(*u*) *Ferguson v. Anon.* (1797), 2 Esp. 590; *Torriano v. Young* (1833), 6 C. & P. 8. The statute 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 86, does not affect the mutual rights and duties of landlord and tenant. As to liability of a tenant for life, cf. *Woodhouse v. Walker* (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 404 with *Parry, In re*, [1900] 1 Ch. 160.

(*x*) *Terrell v. Murray* (1901), 17 T. L. R. 570, approved in *Citron v. Cohen* (1920), 36 T. L. R. 560; and see *Davies v. Davies* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 499.

Waste.

The tenant must not do anything that would destroy any part of the premises demised. This is expressed by saying he must not commit waste. Waste is of two kinds: voluntary and permissive (*y*). Voluntary waste consists of acts done by the tenant, and permissive waste is neglect of his duty to keep the premises demised in a state of preservation (*z*). Decisions as to waste have been largely concerned with the cutting down of timber (*a*). As a general rule, what trees are "timber trees" depends on the custom of the country; some, however, are always so reckoned, *e.g.*, oak, elm and ash of more than twenty years' growth (*b*). Other illustrations of waste are the destroying of heirlooms, ploughing up ancient meadow land, pulling down a house or other building demised, altering their nature by pulling down partition walls (*c*).

Ploughing up strawberry-beds and removing a border of box, although planted by the tenant, have been held to amount to waste (*d*); so also has destroying a quickset hedge of white-thorn (*e*).

If a demise be made "without impeachment of waste," the tenant can commit acts of waste with certain exceptions (*f*). These exceptions are those acts which would amount to an unconscientious use of the property, and were so restrained by the Courts of Equity, such as destroying the mansion or cutting down timber which sheltered the house or was planted to ornament it (*g*). This kind of waste is termed equitable waste. By the Law of Property Act, 1925 (*h*), it is enacted that "an estate for life without impeachment of waste shall not confer or be deemed to have conferred upon the tenant for life any legal right to commit waste of the description known as equitable waste, unless an intention to confer such right shall expressly appear by the instrument creating such

(*y*) Some acts, which are technically waste, are in fact substantial improvements to the property, and in the absence of an express covenant will not be restrained. These are called acts of meliorating waste.

(*z*) As to the landlord's remedies for waste, see *post*, p. 263.

(*a*) See *Honywood v. Honeywood* (1874), L. R. 18 Eq., at p. 309; *Dashwood v. Magniac*, [1891] 3 Ch. 306.

(*b*) *Aubrey v. Fisher* (1809), 10 East, 446, 455; *Whitty v. Dillon* (1860), 2 F. & F. 67.

(*c*) *Simmons v. Norton* (1831), 7 Bing. 640; *Jones v. Chappell* (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 539; *Rush v. Lucas*, [1910] 1 Ch. 437.

(*d*) *Empson v. Soden* (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 655.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 53 a.

(*f*) *Baker v. Sebright* (1879), 13 Ch. D. 179.

(*g*) *Vane v. Lord Barnard* (1716), 2 Vern. 738.

(*h*) Section 135, repealing and re-enacting 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, sub-s. 3.

estate." There is no corresponding clause to provide for the case of a tenant for a term of years, probably because the case could very seldom arise, as express covenants as to repairs are usually inserted. But he would nevertheless be restrained from committing equitable waste.

The rules respecting voluntary waste apply to all tenancies. Moreover, the committal of an act of voluntary waste by a tenant at will at once determines the tenancy, and renders the tenant liable to an action for trespass (i).^e

Permissive waste is committed when buildings are allowed to go to ruin by the rotting of the timber or by the walls falling to pieces through not having been properly plastered. Merely omitting to roof an unroofed house, or leaving land uncultivated, does not amount to waste, but leaving the banks of a river unrepaired, so that the water bursts through and does damage, amounts to waste (k).

In the absence of any express statute, condition or agreement, a tenant for a term of years may be liable for permissive waste (l). An action for permissive waste does not lie against a tenant from year to year (m). Nor is a tenant at will liable for permissive waste, the uncertain nature of his tenure freeing him from liability for repairs.

Rent.

Rent is the remuneration which a tenant agrees to pay his landlord for the use and occupation of the demised premises. The clause "yielding and paying," &c., in a lease is in law a covenant or contract to pay the rent mentioned in it. Rent is usually a fixed sum of money, but it may consist of manual labour, such as ploughing a certain quantity of land yearly, cleaning a parish church and ringing the bell (n), or it may take the form of a royalty on bricks made in a brickfield, or on every ton of the coal brought to the surface from a coal mine (o). But the rent must be certain. If the amount be not actually fixed, it must be clearly ascertainable. "No distresse can be taken for any services that are not put into certaintie, nor can be reduced to any certainty"; but it is a good reservation if

(i) *Harnett v. Maitland* (1847), 16 M. & W. 257.

(k) See *Hutton v. Warren* (1836), 1 M. & W. 466; and Co. Litt. 53 b.

(l) *Yellowly v. Gower* (1855), 11 Exch. 274, 294; *Davies v. Davies* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 499. A tenant for life is apparently not so liable: *Cartwright, In re; Avis v. Newman* (1889), 41 Ch. D. 532.

(m) *Torriano v. Young* (1833), 6 C. & P. 8; *Leach v. Thomas* (1835), 7 C. & P. 327.

(n) *Doe d. Edney v. Benham* (1845), 7 Q. B. 976.

(o) As to a way-leave, see *N. E. Ry. Co. v. Lord Hastings*, [1900] A. C. 260.

a tenant agrees as his rent "to sheere all the sheepe depasturing within the lord's manor, for this is certaine enough, albeit the lord hath sometime a greater number and sometime a lesser number there" (p). But a percentage on outlay on improvements to be made by the landlord, though reserved as a rent payable by the tenant, is not recoverable by distress, but only by action on the agreement (q).

Rent must be reserved to the lessor and must, as a rule, be paid to him or to his duly authorised agent. Under section 25, sub-section 6 of the Judicature Act, 1873 (r), the right to recover could be assigned to a stranger. By section 10 of the Conveyancing Act of 1881, rent and the benefit of the lessee's covenants and every condition of re-entry were made to run with the reversion or any severed parts of the reversion. Section 2 of the Conveyancing Act of 1911 allowed the owner of the reversion to enforce the condition of re-entry in respect even of a breach of covenant which occurred before he acquired the reversion. Section 141 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, which repeals but re-enacts the provisions of these statutes, enables him also to sue for rent which accrued prior to his own interest. When the landlord is one of several joint tenants, he may (unless the lessee has notice from the other joint tenants not to pay to him) receive rent from the lessee, and give a good discharge for it (s).

A rent reserved in general terms, without specifying any time for payment, will be payable at the end of each year, even though a subsequent parol understanding is come to between the parties that the rent is to be paid quarterly (t). The time at which the rent is payable is, however, usually regulated by the lease.

The proviso for re-entry on non-payment of rent should

(p) Co. Litt. 96 a. See *Walsh v. Lonsdale* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 9; *Budd-Scott v. Daniell*, [1902] 2 K. B. 351.

(q) *Hoby v. Roebuck* (1816), 7 Taunt. 157; *Lambert v. Norris* (1837), 2 M. & W. 333; *Adams v. Hagger* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 480.

(r) See *ante*, p. 122.

(s) *Robinson v. Hofman* (1828), 4 Bing. 562.

(t) *Cole v. Sury* (1627), Latch. 264; *Turner v. Allday* (1836), Tyr. & Gr. 819; *Tollett v. Curling* (1847), 16 L. J. Q. B. 390.

expressly dispense with the necessity for any formal demand of the rent; otherwise, in order to create forfeiture for non-payment, the rent must be demanded on the premises immediately before sunset on the day on the morning of which it became due (*u*). Should the demand be made any sooner on that day, it will be bad (*v*). If the landlord, to oblige the tenant and without further consideration, alters the day of payment, and the tenant defaults, the landlord may enforce his rights under the lease (*x*).

The tenant has a statutory right to make certain deductions from his rent in respect of certain rates and taxes which he has paid, such as the landlord's property tax, which is payable by the tenant on behalf of the landlord and for which the landlord must allow a deduction from the next quarter's rent under a penalty of £50 (*y*); the tenant is not bound to show him the collector's receipt for payment of the tax (*z*). Others, such as certain rates under the Public Health Act, 1875 (*a*), and the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847 (*b*), are, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, if paid by the tenant, to be allowed by the landlord. In tenancies for a short term, or where the landlord undertakes and neglects to pay them, the poor rates come under the same category (*c*). Under the Licensing Act, 1910, the licence-holder may deduct from his rent a certain proportion of a charge imposed upon the licensed premises by quarter sessions, in spite of any agreement to the contrary (*d*).

Sometimes an additional rent is reserved in case the lessee commits or omits certain acts. It depends upon the actual words used whether such a provision means that the lessee is allowed to do or omit such acts and merely pay the additional sum as compensation (*e*), or that he is prohibited from doing or omitting those acts. In the latter case the lessor will be entitled to re-enter as on a forfeiture for breach of condition (*f*). It is also important to determine whether this additional rent is reserved by way of penalty or of

(*u*) *Tinckler v. Prentice* (1812), 4 Taunt. 549; *Dibble v. Bowater* (1853), 2 E. & B. 564.

(*v*) *Doe v. Paul* (1829), 3 C. & P. 613. The necessity of proving "a common-law demand" has, however, been removed by section 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76).

(*x*) *Smith and Hartogs, In re* (1895), 73 L. T. 221.

(*y*) Income Tax Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 40), First Sched., Sched. A., No. VIII., r. 1.

(*z*) *North London, &c., Co. v. Moy*, [1918] 2 K. B. 439.

(*a*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, ss. 104, 214, 257.

(*b*) 10 & 11 Vict. c. 34, s. 45; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 160.

(*c*) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, ss. 1, 8.

(*d*) 10 Edw. 7 and 1 Geo. 5, c. 24, s. 2, and Sched. III. And see *Hancock v. Gillard*, [1907] 1 K. B. 47.

(*e*) See *Legh v. Lillie* (1860), 6 H. & N. 165.

(*f*) See *Weston v. Metropolitan Asylum Board* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 404.

liquidated damages (*g*). In the case of an agricultural holding, the tenant is expressly relieved from distress by the landlord for such penal rent or liquidated damages, except where the condition which the tenant has broken is one restraining "the breaking up of permanent pasture, the grubbing of underwoods, or the felling, cutting, lopping or injuring of trees, or regulating the burning of heather" (*h*).

Right to Distrain.

The relation of landlord and tenant gives the landlord a right to distrain for rent in arrear (*i*). But certain conditions must first be fulfilled. The rent must be certain, and either there must be an actual demise, or the tenant must have entered into possession under an agreement which can be specifically enforced. The right can be exercised at any time during the tenancy or within six calendar months after its determination, provided in the latter case that the landlord's title or interest still continues and the tenant is still in possession (*k*). And during the same period the executor or administrator of a deceased landlord can distrain for all rent due to the landlord during his lifetime (*l*).

The rent must not only be due, but in arrear; the landlord cannot distrain until the day after that on which the rent was payable (*m*). The landlord must have a reversion in himself to entitle him to distrain (*n*); it does not matter how short it be. For instance, a tenant from year to year, underletting from year to year, has a sufficient reversion to entitle him to distrain on the under-tenant in possession. But a lessee, who has assigned the whole of his interest, cannot distrain, even for rent which was due at the date of the assignment; he can only recover it by an action (*o*).

(*g*) *Wallis v. Smith* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 243; *Diestal v. Stevenson*, [1906] 2 K. B. 345.

(*h*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 29.

(*i*) This is so, even in the case of a weekly tenancy (*Yeoman v. Ellison* (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 681), and also in the case of a tenancy at will, if any rent has been reserved (*Morton v. Woods* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 658; 4 *ibid.*, 293).

(*k*) 8 Anne, c. 14, ss. 6, 7 (c. 18 in revised edition); *Lewis v. Davies*, [1914] 2 K. B. 469.

(*l*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, s. 26.

(*m*) See *Child v. Edwards*, [1909] 2 K. B. 753 (rent due on Sunday); and see Bank Holidays Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 17), s. 3.

(*n*) As to the rights of a mortgagor and mortgagee respectively to distrain, see the notes to *Moss v. Gallimore* (1779), 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.), 588 *et seq.*

(*o*) *Staveley v. Allcock* (1851), 16 Q. B. 636.

And it is not enough, apparently, that the person in whom the legal reversion is vested has agreed in writing to assign it to the distrainor, unless the latter has subsequently entered on the premises under and by virtue of that agreement (*p*).

In the case of an agricultural holding the landlord cannot distrain in respect of rent which became due more than a year before the distress (*q*); and, if the amount of compensation due to the tenant has been ascertained, he can only distrain for the balance of the rent due after deduction of such compensation (*r*).

A landlord cannot, as a rule, distrain twice for the same rent. "If there is a fair opportunity and no lawful or legal cause why he should not work out the payment of rent by reason of the first distress, his duty is to work it out by the first distress. He must not vex his tenant by the exercise upon two occasions of this summary remedy" (*s*). The fact that the landlord was misled as to the value of the goods (*t*), or that the value of the cattle taken (where cattle are distrained) was not sufficient (*u*), or that the tenant prevented the landlord from realising the value of the goods distrained (*x*), would be "lawful or legal cause" for a second distress. So will the fact that the landlord abandons the goods distrained either through the false representations of the tenant (*y*), or for his accommodation at his request (*z*). An illegal entry by a bailiff, afterwards withdrawn, was held to be a trespass, not a distress; therefore the landlord could distrain afresh for the same rent (*a*).

The landlord, as a general rule, may distrain any goods which he finds on the premises. But to this rule there are many exceptions. He cannot now effectively distrain on the goods of any under-tenant or lodger; and even of the goods of his immediate tenant some are absolutely, and some are conditionally, privileged from distress. Goods

(*p*) *Lewis v. Baker*, [1905] 1 Ch. 46.

(*q*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 34.

(*r*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 37.

(*s*) *Per Parke, B.*, in *Bagge v. Mawby* (1853), 8 Exch., at p. 649.

(*t*) *Hutchins v. Chambers* (1758), 1 Burr. 579.

(*u*) See 17 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 4. It is doubtful whether this statute was not repealed by 44 & 45 Vict. c. 59. See Woodfall, *Landlord and Tenant* (21st ed.), p. 616.

(*x*) *Lee v. Cooke* (1858), 3 H. & N. 203.

(*y*) *Wollaston v. Stafford* (1854), 15 C. B. 278.

(*z*) *Thwaites v. Wilding* (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 4; *Crosse v. Welch* (1892), 8 T. L. R. 401, 709.

(*a*) *Grunnell v. Welch*, [1905] 2 K. B. 650; and see Vol. 1, pp. 469-470.

conditionally privileged from distress may not be seized, if there are other goods sufficient to satisfy the demand; and it is for the landlord to show that this is not the case (*b*).

(i) The goods of any under-tenant or lodger, which are on the demised premises, are protected from distress by the Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1908 (*c*). This statute enacts that, where a superior landlord levies a distress on the goods of an under-tenant or lodger, or "any other person whatsoever not being a tenant of the premises or of any part thereof, and not having any beneficial interest in any tenancy of the premises or of any part thereof," such under-tenant, lodger or person may make a declaration (*d*) that the immediate tenant has no property in the goods distrained. If the distress be then proceeded with, it is illegal and application may be made to a magistrate's Court for the restoration of the goods. The goods, however, of the husband, wife or partner of the immediate tenant of the distrainor are not protected by the Act (*e*). By statute, more exceptions have been established. Thus, the sale of farming stock taken in execution is regulated by 56 Geo. 3, c. 50, s. 6 (*f*).

Under the Law of Distress Amendment Act, 1888 (*g*), the wearing apparel and bedding of a tenant and his family and the tools and implements of his trade, to the value of £5, are exempted from distress for rent, except after the expiration of seven days from a demand for possession of premises in respect of which the lease, term or interest of the tenant has determined; if such goods are taken contrary to the Act, a Court of summary jurisdiction may order that they be restored if they have not been sold (*h*).

Frames, looms, materials or tools in either woollen, worsted, linen, cotton, flax, mohair or silk manufactures are exempt from distraint for rent, unless the rent for which distraint is made be owing by the owner of the loom or other machine (*i*).

By the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1847 (*k*), gas-meters and fittings "shall not be subject to distress . . . for rent of the premises where the same may be used." This provision includes such articles

(*b*) *Nargett v. Nias* (1859), 1 E. & E. 439.

(*c*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 53, ss. 1, 2.

(*d*) The declaration need not be on oath: *Rogers, Enunghblut & Co. v. Martin*, [1911] 1 K. B. 19; but if false is punishable under section 5 of the Perjury Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6), repealing a similar provision in 8 Edw. 7, c. 53, s. 1.

(*e*) *Ibid.*, s. 4.

(*f*) See *Hutt v. Morrell* (1847), 11 Q. B. 425; *Secretary of State for War v. Wynne*, [1905] 2 K. B. 845.

(*g*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21, s. 4, and see 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 147; *Boyd v. Bilham*, [1909] 1 K. B. 14; *Gonsky v. Durrell*, [1918] 2 K. B. 71. Bedding includes a bedstead: *Davis v. Harris*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 729. As to when goods comprised in a hire-purchase agreement are protected, see *Jay's Furnishing Co. v. Brand*, [1915] 1 K. B. 458.

(*h*) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 24, s. 4.

(*i*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 40, s. 18.

(*k*) 10 & 11 Vict. c. 15, s. 14.

as gas-stoves let for hire (*l*). Electric meters and fittings are similarly protected (*m*).

Rolling stock of a railway company employed in a colliery or other work is not liable to be distrained for rent due by the parties using it, provided the conditions requiring the owner to be indicated are complied with (*n*).

By the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923, "agricultural or other machinery, which is the property of a person other than the tenant and is on the holding under an agreement with the tenant for the hire or use thereof in the conduct of his business, and live stock, which is the property of a person other than the tenant and is on the holding solely for breeding purposes, shall not be distrained for rent" (*o*).

(ii) Under the common law some goods are absolutely privileged from distress. Of these the most important class is that of "fixtures," which are privileged because they are considered to be part of the thing demised, and so are all other things which are in the eye of the law part of the realty, such as keys, windows and charters concerning the realty. By a common law rule things could not be distrained which could not be restored within five days in the same condition; for they are only taken as a pledge for the rent due. Therefore perishable goods, such as newly-slaughtered butcher's meat, could not be distrained (*p*). Nor can money, unless it is in a bag, so that the same specific coins can be recovered (*q*). Besides the nature of the attachment to the freehold, the object of such annexation must be considered, whether it was to improve the inheritance, or to ensure a more complete enjoyment of it (*r*). Those affixed for the former purpose are not liable to be distrained (*s*).

Distress cannot affect incorporeal rights (*t*). Things which are brought on to the premises of a person exercising a public trade to be worked, carried or wrought up in the way of his trade or employ cannot be distrained by his landlord; they are privileged for the sake of trade and commerce (*u*).

Thus, a horse standing in a blacksmith's shop to be shod; corn delivered to a miller to be ground (*x*); cattle sent to a butcher to be killed (*y*); goods given to a carrier to be carried, or to an auctioneer to be sold upon his own premises (*z*); goods pledged with a pawn-

(*l*) *Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Hardy* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 619.

(*m*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 56, s. 25.

(*n*) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 50, s. 3. See *Easton Estate Co. v. Western Waggon Co.* (1886), 54 L. T. 735.

(*o*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 35, sub-s. 4.

(*p*) *Morley v. Pincombe* (1848), 2 Exch. 101.

(*q*) *Wilson v. Duckett* (1675), 2 Mod. 61.

(*r*) *Hellawell v. Eastwood* (1857), 6 Exch. 295; and see *Holland v. Hodgson* (1872), L. R. 7 C. P., at pp. 333-340.

(*s*) *Darby v. Harris* (1841), 1 Q. B. 895; *Provincial Billposting Co. v. Low Moor Iron Co.*, [1909] 2 K. B. 344.

(*t*) *British Mutoscope Co. v. Homer*, [1901] 1 Ch. 671 (patent).

(*u*) *Simpson v. Hartopp* (1744), 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.), 493.

(*x*) Co. Litt. 47 a.

(*y*) *Brown v. Shevill* (1834), 2 A. & E. 138.

(*z*) *Adams v. Grane* (1833), 1 Cr. & M. 380. As to the limit of the exception, see *Lyons v. Elliott* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 210.

broker, or deposited for safe custody, such as furniture at a depository (a), or goods deposited with a wharfinger or granary-keeper (b)—none of these can be lawfully distrained. "The exception has been acted on for so many years that it is impossible now to extend it by judicial decision," said Lord Herschell, L.C., in *Clarke v. Millwall Dock Co.* (c), where a vessel, in the process of being constructed and paid for by the owner as the work progressed, was held not be privileged from distress, as it had not been "delivered" to the builder. A picture sent to an artist for alteration is not privileged, as painting is not considered a public trade (d).

In the case of an innkeeper, the goods and horses of his guests at the inn are privileged so long as they are on the premises (e). Again, things which are actually in some person's use are privileged, in order to prevent breaches of the peace occurring in the attempt to carry out such a distress (f). Goods in the custody of the law are exempt (g), except where growing crops have been seized and sold under an execution, in which case, so long as they remain on the land, they are liable to be distrained for rent which became due after the seizure and sale (h). Crown chattels are privileged.

(iii) Goods, which are conditionally privileged from distress, are such chattels as beasts of the plough, sheep, instruments of husbandry, tools not in actual use (i).

Under the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923, live stock at agistment on a holding are conditionally exempt; if taken in to be fed, they are only distrainable for the amount due for their feeding (k). Corn, hay, straw and growing crops when ripe, though not distrainable at common law, have under certain conditions been made so by statute (l).

Unless the tenant makes an agreement to the contrary (m), the landlord can only distrain goods which are on the lands out of which the rent issues. If the

(a) *Swire v. Leach* (1865), 18 C. B. (N.S.) 479; *Miles v. Furber* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 77.

(b) *Thompson v. Mashiter* (1823), 1 Bing. 283; *Matthias v. Mesnard* (1826), 2 C. & P. 353.

(c) (1886), 17 Q. B. D., at p. 500.

(d) *Von Knoop v. Moss* (1891), 7 T. L. R. 500. See *Edwards v. Fox* (1896), 60 J. P. 404. As to pictures sent for exhibition or sale, see *Challoner v. Robinson*, [1908] 1 Ch. 49; and see *Simms Manufacturing Co. v. Whitehead*, [1909] W. N. 95 (samples not privileged).

(e) *Robinson v. Walter* (1616), 3 Bulst. 269. As to auctioneers, see *Lyons v. Elliott* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 210.

(f) Co. Litt. 47 a; *Field v. Adames* (1840), 12 A. & E. 649.

(g) See *Benn-Davis, In re* (1885), 55 L. J. Q. B. 217. This does not apply to bankruptcy: *Mackenzie, In re*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 566.

(h) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 2.

(i) 52 Hen. 3, c. 4; *Keen v. Priest* (1859), 4 H. & N. 236.

(k) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 35, sub-ss. 1, 2; *London and Yorkshire Bank v. Belton* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 457; *Masters v. Green* (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 807.

(l) 2 Wm. & M., Sess. 1, c. 5, s. 2; 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, ss. 8, 9.

(m) *Daniel v. Stepney* (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 185. See *Roundwood Colliery Co., In re*, [1897] 1 Ch. 373.

tenant, after his rent is in arrear (*n*), fraudulently or clandestinely removes his own chattels off the premises and does not leave thereon sufficient to meet the arrears (*o*), the landlord may within thirty days take and seize such goods, wherever found (*p*). And the landlord may also distrain the cattle or stock of his tenant feeding upon any common appendant or appurtenant, or in any way belonging to the demised premises (*q*).

The landlord may distrain either personally or by a bailiff. In the latter case the bailiff must be authorised to act as such by a certificate in writing, given by the Judge or registrar of a County Court; otherwise the distress will be illegal (*r*). The distress must be made between sunrise and sunset. A bailiff or other person distraining may climb over a fence or wall enclosing a garden (*s*), and thus get to the building, and then proceed by any unfastened door or open window to effect a levy in the house. But the premises must (except in the case of fraudulent removal (*t*)) be entered without breaking open an outer door or a window (*u*). If, however, the distrainer after entering peaceably be forcibly ejected or be refused re-admittance after he has temporarily absented himself (not intending to abandon the distraint), he will be justified in using force to procure re-admission (*x*).

A seizure must next be made. Laying hold of a single chattel will be enough to symbolise the seizure of all the goods; so will any words or acts which amount to an expression of an intention to distrain (*y*).

(*n*) *Rand v. Vaughan* (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 767.

(*o*) *Tomlinson v. Consolidated Credit Corporation* (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 135.

(*p*) 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, ss. 1—3, 7.

(*q*) *Ibid.*, s. 8.

(*r*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21, s. 7. See the Distress for Rent Rules, 1888; *Hogarth v. Jennings*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 907; *Perring v. Emmerson*, [1906] 1 K. B. 1. As to cancellation of a certificate, see 58 & 59 Vict. c. 24, s. 1. A penalty of £10 may be incurred by a bailiff acting without such a certificate (section 2).

(*s*) *Long v. Clarke*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 119.

(*t*) *Semayne's Case* (1605), 5 Rep. 91; 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 115.

(*u*) *Browning v. Dann* (1736), Bull. N. P. 81; and see the judgment of Bowen, L.J., in *American Must Corporation v. Hendry* (1893), 62 L. J. Q. B., at pp. 389—391; and *Hodder v. Williams*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 663.

(*x*) See *Bannister v. Hyde* (1860), 2 E. & E. 627; *Eldridge v. Stacey* (1863), 15 C. B. (N.S.) 458.

(*y*) *Hutchins v. Scott* (1837), 2 M. & W. 809.

At common law a landlord, who had seized goods under a distress, could only impound them and hold them in proper custody until the arrears of rent and costs were paid (z); now, however, he can proceed to realise the amount due by selling them. Before doing so, he must serve on the tenant, or leave at the chief mansion house (a), a notice in writing specifying the goods distrained and the cause of distraint (b). The landlord must allow five days to elapse before he proceeds to sell the goods distrained; this delay is prescribed to give the tenant an opportunity of paying the arrears of rent and costs of the distress and so redeeming his goods. During those five days the landlord must, if the tenant requires it in writing, have the goods valued by an appraiser, or the tenant may require that they should be removed, at his own cost, to a public auction room for sale there (c). The five days will be extended to fifteen if the tenant makes request in writing to the landlord or bailiff, and gives security for any additional cost occasioned by such extension (d). During this period the goods are in the custody of the landlord, who is responsible for them (e).

The sale must be advertised so that the goods may not be sold far below their proper value. Whether the sale be private or by auction, the landlord cannot himself make a valid purchase (f). The bailiff or auctioneer must retain for the use of the tenant any sum by which the proceeds of the sale exceed the amount due for arrears of rent and expenses (g). If the distress be illegal, excessive or irregular, the tenant has certain rights of action, with which we have already dealt (h).

(z) Without the tenant's consent impounding on the premises was illegal up to 1737 (11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 10). Public pounds are now obsolete.

(a) 2 Wm. & M., Sess. 1, c. 5, s. 1.

(b) Apparently the amount of rent in arrear need not be specified: *Tancred v. Leyland* (1851), 16 Q. B. 669.

(c) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21, s. 5.

(d) *Ibid.*, s. 6.

(e) Co. Litt. 47 b. As to animals, see 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 27, s. 7; *Dargan v. Davies* (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 118.

(f) See *Moore v. Singer Manufacturing Co.*, [1904] 1 K. B. 820.

(g) 2 Wm. & M., Sess. 1, c. 5, s. 2. As to surplus goods, see *Evans v. Wright* (1857), 2 H. & N. 527. Costs are regulated by the Distress for Rent Rules, 1920.

(h) Vol. 1, pp. 469, 470.

Assignment of Leaseholds.

A tenant may always assign or underlet the demised premises, unless he is prohibited from so doing by his lease. It is a very usual covenant in a lease that a tenant shall not assign his interest without his landlord's consent in writing, but that such consent shall not be unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld in the case of any respectable and responsible person (*i*). A tenant, who has permitted the premises to be used as a brothel and has been convicted, can be compelled to assign them to a nominee of his landlord (*k*).

The assignment of a lease must be distinguished from an under-lease. An under-lease passes something less than the whole estate of the lessee. The sub-lessee does not hold the same estate as was originally granted to the lessee; hence there is no privity of estate between lessor and sub-lessee. Consequently those covenants in the original lease which "run with the land" neither bind nor benefit the sub-lessee, for by law they are annexed only to the estate originally granted (*l*). The landlord has common law rights of distress and re-entry against a sub-lessee, and also the equitable right to enforce against him all restrictive covenants contained in the original lease, of which the sub-lessee has had actual or constructive notice (*m*). The word "assignee" does not necessarily include sub-lessee (*n*).

Disclaimer of the Tenancy.

An assignment by operation of law takes place on the death or bankruptcy of either the lessor or lessee; and if

(*i*) *Evans v. Levy*, [1910] 1 Ch. 452; *Willmott v. London Road Car Co.*, [1910] 2 Ch. 525; *Cohen v. Popular Restaurants*, [1917] 1 K. B. 480. The landlord may not charge for consent (55 & 56 Vict. c. 13, s. 3). If the breach occurred after 1925 relief may be granted: L. P. A., 1925, s. 146, sub-s. 8. For assignments, see *Abrahams v. Mac Fisheries*, [1925] 2 K. B. 18; *Gibbs v. Houlder Bros.*, [1925] Ch. 575; *Carrington Manufacturing Co. v. Saldin* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 455; *Chaplin v. Smith*, [1926] 1 K. B. 198.

(*k*) 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 5.

(*l*) *South of England Dairies v. Baker*, [1906] 2 Ch. 631. As to covenants running with the land, see *ante*, p. 119. It is probably not the intention of sections 78 and 79 of L. P. A., 1925, to create privity between the landlord and sub-lessee.

(*m*) *Hall v. Ewin* (1887), 37 Ch. D. 74.

(*n*) See *Wilson v. Twamley*, [1904] 2 K. B. 99.

a landlord be adjudicated a bankrupt, his property passes first to the Official Receiver and then to the trustee as soon as one is appointed. A tenancy at will is determined as soon as the tenant learns of his landlord's bankruptcy (o). Where a tenant becomes bankrupt, the lease may expressly provide that this fact shall determine the tenancy or give a right of re-entry. Otherwise the tenant's interest passes to his trustee in bankruptcy. If to this interest onerous covenants are attached, the trustee has power to disclaim the property; but he cannot do so as to part only of the demised premises (p). The disclaimer must be in writing and signed by the trustee; in some cases the leave of the Bankruptcy Court must first be obtained (q). He must disclaim within twelve months of his appointment, or within twelve months of his learning of the existence of the lease (r); but such period may be extended by the Court. This limitation, however, only applies where there is no notice served by any person interested (s) calling on the trustee to decide whether he will disclaim or not; if such a notice be served on him, he must disclaim within twenty-eight days after he receives it or within such extended time as the Court may allow (t). A trustee who disclaims is freed from all personal liability; if he does not disclaim, he stands in the position of an assignee.

The effect of the disclaimer only extends so far as is necessary to release the bankrupt and trustee from liability, and does not otherwise affect the rights or liabilities of third parties in relation to the property disclaimed (u). Thus, if the bankrupt be an assignee, the original lessee remains liable (x); if he be an original lessee who has

(o) *Doe d. Davies v. Thomas* (1851), 6 Exch. 854.

(p) *Allen, Ex parte; Fussell, in re* (1882), 20 Ch. D. 341.

(q) Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59), s. 54, sub-ss. 1, 2 and 3, amended 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 7.

(r) *Cohen, In re*, [1905] 2 K. B. 704.

(s) This includes the landlord: *Page, In re* (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 401.

(t) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, s. 54, sub-ss. 4, 5, 6; *Lovering, Ex parte; Jones, in re* (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 586.

(u) *Walton, Ex parte; Levy, in re* (1881), 17 Ch. D. 746; *East and West India Dock Co., Ex parte; Clarke, in re, ibid.*, 759; *Harding v. Preece* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 281; and see the remarks of Romer, L.J., in *Stein v. Pope*, [1902] 1 K. B., at p. 599.

(x) *Hill v. East and West India Dock Co.* (1884), 9 App. Cas. 448; *Stacey v. Hill*, [1901] 1 K. B. 660.

sublet the premises, the under-lessee cannot be ejected so long as he observes the covenants in the original lease; he can be distrained upon or ejected if he fails to pay the rent thereby reserved (y).

Termination of Lease.

A lease for a fixed period or a term of years, or until a certain event happens, terminates at the expiration of the period or term of years or on the happening of the event. If the lease (other than a tenancy at will) be determinable at the option of one of the parties, he must give reasonable notice (where no period is fixed by the lease) of his intention to determine it.

As soon as the reversion and the term both vest in the same person in the same right, the term becomes merged in the reversion and so ceases to exist (z).

A tenancy may also terminate by surrender, that is by the tenant rendering up the estate to his immediate landlord with the latter's consent. Surrenders are either by the act of the parties or by operation of law.

Under section 52 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (a), "all conveyances of land or of any interest therein are void for the purpose of conveying or creating a legal estate unless made by deed"; but this does not apply to "surrenders by operation of law, including surrenders which may, by law, be effected without writing" and under section 53, sub-section 1, "no interest in land can be created or disposed of except by writing signed by the person creating or conveying the same, or by his agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing, or by will, or by operation of law" (b).

(y) *Walton, Ex parte; Levy, in re, supra.*

(z) *Chambers v. Kingham* (1878), 10 Ch. D. 743; and see *Radcliffe, In re; Radcliffe v. Bewes*, [1892] 1 Ch. 227; *Hole, In re*, [1906] 1 Ch. 673; *Westwood v. Heywood*, [1921] 2 Ch. 130.

(a) Repealing and re-enacting 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3. See *Doe v. Thomas* (1829), 9 B. & C. 288. See *Fenner v. Blake*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 426, where a kind of estoppel seems to dispense with a deed—a doubtful decision: see *Foa, Landlord and Tenant* (6th ed.), 693. See also *Gray v. Owen*, [1910] 1 K. B. 622.

(b) Repealing and re-enacting 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 3.

A surrender may be partial (not extending to the whole of the premises) (c) or conditional (d). If one of the parties by his acts puts himself into a position which is inconsistent with the continuation of the lease and the other party assents thereto, then the law infers a surrender of the lease. Where the tenant consents to the granting of a new lease, he is estopped from denying the landlord's title to grant it, and as this implies the non-existence of any previous lease, the former lease is surrendered by operation of law (e). The same principle holds good where there is any new relationship created inconsistent with that of landlord and tenant. For instance, where the lessee of a ferry became servant to the lessor and accounted to him for the profits, a surrender by operation of law was held to have taken place (f). So also if the tenant has quitted the premises and the landlord has taken possession of them (g), not merely for a temporary purpose such as repairing, but under such circumstances as to show a clear assent to the abandonment of the premises by the tenant (h). Where, however, there is a change in the personality of the tenant, there is no surrender by operation of law unless the old tenant gives up possession to the new tenant at or about the time of the grant of the new lease to which he assents (i).

On the surrender of a lease the tenant remains liable for breaches of covenant and for rent up to the day on which the surrender takes effect (k). If he has sublet the premises the under-tenant, when the lease is merged, still remains liable under his lease or tenancy (l).

If the tenant either asserts a title to the property in another or claims it himself (m), or insists on any claim inconsistent with the relationship of landlord and tenant (n), he is said to disclaim. For example, a denial by a yearly tenant of his landlord's right to raise the rent will amount to a disclaimer (o); so, apparently, will a claim to the possession of the title deeds (p), or a claim to title by

(c) *Holme v. Brunskill* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 495.

(d) *Coupland v. Maynard* (1810), 12 East, 134.

(e) *Lyon v. Reed* (1844), 13 M. & W. 285; *Knight v. Williams*, [1901] 1 Ch. 256; but, as to where a third party has accepted a new lease, see *Wallis v. Hands*, [1893] 2 Ch. 75.

(f) *Peter v. Kendal* (1827), 6 B. & C. 703.

(g) *Nickells v. Atherstone* (1847), 10 Q. B. 944.

(h) *Moss v. James* (1878), 47 L. J. Q. B. 160.

(i) *Wallis v. Hands*, [1893] 2 Ch. 75.

(k) *Att.-Gen. v. Cox* (1850), 3 H. L. Cas. 240; *Shaw v. Lomas* (1888), 59 L. T. 477; and see 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35.

(l) *Mellor v. Watkins* (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 400. See Co. Litt. 338b; L. P. A., 1925, s. 139, repealing and re-enacting 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 9.

(m) *Jones v. Mills* (1861), 10 C. B. (N.S.) 788.

(n) *Doe v. Rollings* (1847), 4 C. B. 188.

(o) *Vivian v. Moat* (1881) 16 Ch. D. 730.

(p) *Doe v. Price* (1832), 9 Bing. 356.

adverse possession (*q*); but a mere refusal to pay rent until the true owner of the premises be ascertained will not (*m*). In the case of a tenant for a term of years mere verbal disclaimer will not operate as a forfeiture (*r*).

If a lease be granted on a condition which is subsequently broken, the landlord may re-enter although there is no covenant for re-entry in the lease. The landlord has no right to re-enter for a breach of covenant, unless the lease contains an express proviso for re-entry (*s*). A proviso for re-entry must be construed strictly and will not be enforced unless it clearly includes the breach of covenant complained of (*t*). We have discussed the right of the landlord to re-enter for a forfeiture and the tenant's right to relief in a former chapter (*u*).

In the case of a tenancy from year to year, a half-year's notice to quit is necessary from either party to the other, and the notice must expire at the end of a current year (*x*). But in the case of a tenancy to which the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 applies, a year's notice expiring twelve months from the end of the then current year of tenancy is required, notwithstanding any written agreement to the contrary. Under this Act a landlord may give a tenant from year to year notice to quit a part only of his holding, if the notice is given with a view to use the land for any of the improvement purposes mentioned in the Act (*y*). The notice, which should be clear in all its terms (*z*), should be given by the landlord or his agent (*a*) either to the tenant personally or left at his house, its nature and contents being at the time explained to his servant or some member of his

(*q*) *Neale v. Beadle* (1913), 107 L. T. at p. 651.

(*r*) *Doe v. Wells* (1839), 10 A. & E. 427.

(*s*) *Doe v. Phillips* (1824), 2 Bing. 13.

(*t*) *Croft v. Lumley* (1858), 6 H. L. Cas. 672; and see *Harman v. Ainslie*, [1904] 1 K. B. 698. The right may be waived by receipt of rent after breach: *R. v. Paulson*, [1921] 1 A. C. 271.

(*u*) See Book III., Chap. III.; and as to the procedure, Book V., Chap. XVIII.

(*x*) See *Dixon v. Bradford, &c., Coal Co.*, [1904] 1 K. B. 444.

(*y*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, ss. 25, 27, repealing 8 Edw. 7, c. 28, ss. 22, 23.

(*z*) *Doe v. Wilkinson* (1840), 12 A. & E. 743; *Gardner v. Ingram* (1889), 61 L. T. 729; *Lancs. and Yorks. Bank's Lease, In re*, [1914] 1 Ch. 522.

(*a*) *Doe v. Mizem* (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 56; *Jones v. Phipps* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 567; see also *Wordsley Brewery Co. v. Halford* (1903), 90 L. T. 89; *Knight and Hubbard, In re*, [1923] 1 Ch. 130.

family (b). Where the notice is served on the tenant personally, no explanation is necessary (c).

In cases of tenancies which can be ended on one of the four usual quarter days, any two quarters of the year are deemed to amount to a half-year, whatever may be the exact number of days included in those two quarters. Thus, if the tenancy commenced at Lady Day, notice on September 29 to quit on the following Lady Day is good (d). Where the tenancy began at Michaelmas, notice served on March 26 is not a valid notice (e). In the case of other tenancies 6 months means at least 182 days (f).

A yearly tenancy usually can only be terminated on the same day of the year as it commenced, but if the tenancy commence between the usual quarter days, and rent be paid for a portion of the quarter and thenceforward on the usual quarter days, the tenancy for the purpose of notice to quit is deemed to have commenced on the quarter day next succeeding the day of entry (g).

In cases of tenancies for shorter periods than one year, such as lodger tenancies, there is no fixed rule as to the length of notice; it must be a matter of express contract or governed by usage (h). But even in the case of a weekly tenancy some notice is necessary (i). A tenancy at will is determined at the will or death of either party (k); the will may be either expressed or implied from the doing of any act inconsistent with the continuance of the tenancy, such as the tenant committing voluntary waste, or executing an assignment of his interest (l), or the landlord granting a lease (m)—in the last two cases as soon as knowledge thereof reaches the other party (n).

(b) *Jones v. Marsh* (1791), 4 T. R. 464; *Tanham v. Nicholson* (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 561. For service of notice under the Agricultural Holdings Acts, see *Van Grutten v. Trevenen*, [1902] 2 K. B. 82; and 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 53.

(c) *Liddy v. Kennedy* (1871), L. R. 5 H. L. 134.

(d) *Roe d. Durant v. Doe* (1830), 6 Bing. 574; *Doe d. Matthewson v. Wrightman* (1801), 4 Esp. 5; *Doe d. Harrop v. Green* (1802), *ibid.* 198.

(e) *Morgan v. Davies* (1878), 3 C. P. D. 260.

(f) See notes on *Clayton v. Blakey*, 2 Smith's L. C. (12th ed.), p. 122.

(g) *Sandill v. Franklin* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 377; and see *Meggesson v. Groves*, [1917] 1 Ch. 158; *Croft v. Blay*, [1919] 2 Ch. 343.

(h) *Jones v. Mills* (1861), 10 C. B. (n.s.) 788.

(i) *Bowen v. Anderson*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 164; *Weston v. Fidler* (1903), 88 L. T. 769; *Queen's Club Estates v. Bignell*, [1924] 1 K. B. 117; *Precious v. Reddie*, [1924] 2 K. B. 149.

(k) *Doe d. Price v. Price* (1832), 9 Bing. 356; *Turner v. Doe d. Bennett* (1842), 9 M. & W. 643, 646.

(l) *Doe d. Price v. Price*, (*supra*); *Turner v. Doe d. Bennett* (1842), 9 M. & W. 643, 646.

(m) *Pinhorn v. Souster* (1853), 8 Exch. 763.

(n) *Ibid.*, and see *Doe v. Thomas* (1851), 6 Exch. 854.

On the determination of the tenancy the rights of the tenant to the fruits of his labour depend on the nature of the tenancy, and in some cases on the mode of its ending.

In the case of all tenancies determinable at an uncertain time, that is, at a period which does not depend on the will of the tenant and upon which he cannot calculate, he had at common law a right to, “ emblements,” that is, to enter, take and carry away the profits of his own labour on the land. Under this rule the late tenant can claim all crops which are the result of his own labour, and which are, in the ordinary course of husbandry, produced and marketable within the year, such as corn, turnips, carrots, hemp, flax, hops, potatoes and the like (o).

Since 1851, however, a tenant who pays a rack rent is allowed, in lieu of claiming emblements, to continue in occupation till the end of the current year of the tenancy and to get in such crops himself, paying rent at the same rate till he quits (p). Where, however, the tenancy was of such a nature that its end could always be foreseen and calculated by the tenant, he has no right to emblements. But in some counties there is a local custom which entitles such a tenant, in the absence of any express agreement to the contrary, to take “ away-going ” crops, tillages, &c. (q).

Fixtures.

A “ fixture ” formerly meant any chattel which on becoming affixed to the soil became part of the realty. The term “ fixtures ” now has come to mean those things which form an exception to the above rule, and which may be removed by the person who affixed them to the soil (r). Fixtures may, as between landlord and tenant, be divided into three classes—

- (i) ornamental or domestic fixtures,
- (ii) trade fixtures, and
- (iii) agricultural fixtures.

(o) *Graves v. Weld* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 105.

(p) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 1.

(q) *Wigglesworth v. Dallison* (1779), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 613, and cases there cited; *Hutton v. Warren* (1836), 1 M. & W. 466; and Vol. 1, pp. 80-84.

(r) *Climie v. Wood* (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 328; and see *Holland v. Hodgson* (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 328.

(i) In the case of ornamental and domestic fixtures, the chattel must have been affixed by the tenant, and be of an ornamental character or of domestic convenience; it must not be permanently affixed, but capable of being removed entire.

The right of the tenant to remove such ornamental or domestic fixtures must be exercised during the tenancy. He may deprive himself of this right by express covenant; as, for instance, if he undertake to "yield up" in good repair all improvements and fixtures (s). On the other hand, he may so contract as to enlarge his right of removal (t). The right of removal is lost as soon as the tenant ceases to be such, and becomes a "trespasser" (u). It exists so long as his term lasts, and longer if he holds under such circumstances that he is still considered a tenant. A person claiming under the tenant is, apparently, allowed more time for the removal of fixtures than the tenant himself (x).

Such things as grates, ornamental chimney-pieces, wainscots fastened with screws, coppers, &c., are all ornamental or domestic fixtures. An outgoing tenant may remove an ornamental chimney-piece put up by himself during the tenancy, but not a plain chimney-piece, though made of marble, nor has he any right to remove pillars of brick and mortar built on a dairy floor to hold pans, although such pillars are not let into the ground (y).

Window-sashes, which are merely fastened by laths nailed across the frames to prevent their falling out, are not fixed to the freehold and are therefore removable by the tenant (z). Similarly such articles as cornices, bookcases and similar furniture fixed by screws to the wall, bells and iron backs to chimneys are all tenant's fixtures. But a tenant who is not a gardener by trade cannot remove an ornamental border of box, planted by himself on the demised premises, except by special agreement with his landlord (a).

Where a lease is disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, the Court, when granting leave to disclaim, makes "such orders with respect to fixtures, tenant's

(s) As to the effect of a covenant specifying certain fixtures and then using "general words," see *Lambourn v. McLellan*, [1903] 2 Ch. 268.

(t) *London and South African Exploration Co. v. De Beers Co.*, [1895] A. C. 451.

(u) *Pugh v. Arton* (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 626.

(x) See *Glasdir Copper Works, In re*, [1904] 1 Ch. 819.

(y) *Bishop v. Elliott* (1855), 11 Exch. 113.

(z) *R. v. Hedges* (1779), 1 Leach, 201.

(a) *Empson v. Soden* (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 655.

improvements and other matters arising out of the tenancy, as the Court thinks just" (b).

(ii) The right of a tenant, who is carrying on a trade on the demised premises, is wider than that of an ordinary tenant. He may remove any fixture which was erected for the purposes of his trade, provided it can be removed without being itself destroyed and without injuring the land or building (c).

As examples of trade fixtures we have colliery machinery, including fire and steam engines, soap-boilers' vats, furnaces, brewing vessels, bakers' ovens, an engine and boiler (the former being screwed to planks, the latter fixed in brickwork), salt-pans fixed to a brick floor with mortar; also buildings, if they are merely accessory to machinery, green-houses built by a nurseryman for his business, or trees planted by him for the purposes of his trade, but he may not cut down those which have actually taken root, nor remove vines planted for fruit bearing. At common law a tenant could not cut down, remove or be compensated for leaving, orchard trees (d). Market-gardeners may remove glass-houses and other buildings erected for trade purposes, with the same privileges as those given to agricultural tenants (e).

(iii) The common law rules as to "agricultural fixtures" were less favourable to tenants than the rules as to trade fixtures (f). The matter was dealt with by the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1851 (g), and the former Agricultural Holdings Acts. It is now governed by the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 (h), in respect of all agricultural and pastoral holdings.

These Acts do not extend to a tenancy at will, or to one for a less period than one year (i). Except in the case of

(b) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, s. 54, sub-s. 3; and see *Horn v. Baker* (1808), 9 East, 215, and *ante*, pp. 251-253.

(c) See *Climie v. Wood* (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 328; *Wake v. Hall* (1880), 8 App. Cas. 195.

(d) *Per* Cozens-Hardy, J., in *Mears v. Callender*, [1901] 2 Ch., at p. 395.

(e) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 48, repealing and re-enacting 8 Edw. 7, c. 28, s. 42.

(f) See *Elwes v. Maw* (1802), 2 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 188, and the notes to it.

(g) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25.

(h) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 22, sub-s. 2, repealing and re-enacting 8 Edw. 7, c. 28, s. 21, sub-s. 2. As to holdings of not more than two acres, see 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 51, repealing 50 & 51 Vict. c. 26, and amending 8 Edw. 7, c. 36. As to market gardens, see 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 48, repealing and re-enacting 8 Edw. 7, c. 28, s. 42.

(i) See the definition of "contract of tenancy" in 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 57, sub-s. 1. As to the meaning of the term "holding" in the Act, see *Lancaster, In re*, [1918] 2 K. B. 472.

manuring however, compensation cannot be recovered for improvements executed during the last year of a tenancy, unless the landlord has assented to them or failed to object for a month after having received notice from the tenant of his intention to begin such improvements. But a tenant from year to year may recover for any improvements made by him during the last year of his tenancy before he receives notice to quit, provided he gives up his holding in due course in pursuance of such notice (*k*).

The improvements within this Act are divided into three classes (*l*). The first comprises the erection, alteration or enlargement of buildings; making and improving pasture, gardens, water meadows, roads and bridges; water-courses and works for supplying water, planting osier beds, hops, orchards, and reclamation of waste land, and a few minor matters. The second class consists of drainage; the third of liming, chalking, claying, clay-burning and marling land, consuming on the holding feeding-stuff not produced thereon and purchased manure, laying down temporary pasture and making necessary repairs to buildings, which the landlord has failed to do within a reasonable time after receiving written notice.

In respect of these three classes, the tenant is entitled, on quitting at the termination of his tenancy, to obtain from the landlord compensation estimated at such an amount as fairly represents the value of the improvements to an incoming tenant (*m*).

As to improvements of the first class, the consent in writing of the landlord is required (*n*). As to those of the second class, the tenant must give the landlord from two to three months' written notice of the intended improvements, and of the manner in which he proposes to carry them out. The parties may then agree as to what the compensation shall be. Failing such an arrangement, the landlord may execute the improvements himself and charge the tenant £5 *per cent. per annum* on the outlay; or he may recover the amount by a charge, recoverable as rent, which would form a sinking fund and pay off the charge in twenty-five years, based on a rate of interest of £3 *per cent. per annum*. The period and percentages may be varied by the Minister having regard to current rate of interest. If the landlord does not execute the improvements within a reasonable time, the tenant may do so and claim compensation for them. It is also open to the parties to come to an arrangement between themselves as to improvements of this class, and so dispense with the necessity of notice (*o*). In the case of improvements of the third class, the consent of the landlord is not required, nor need any notice be given him by the tenant. It is

(*k*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 8.

(*m*) *Ibid.*, s. 1.

(*o*) *Ibid.*, s. 3.

(*l*) *Ibid.*, First Schedule.

(*n*) *Ibid.*, s. 2.

provided that, if fair and reasonable compensation be provided for by any written agreement entered into prior to 1921, such compensation shall be substituted for compensation under the Act (*p*).

The landlord may set off any benefit which he allowed the tenant in consideration of the tenant executing the improvements, and the value of manure that would have been produced by consumption on the premises of any crops removed during the last two years of the tenancy (*q*) and any sums due for waste or breach of covenant by the tenant (*f*).

When the landlord desires to make certain kinds of improvements specified in the Act, such as making roads, building cottages, opening mines, &c., he may give notice to quit as to a part of the holding, which the tenant may accept by written notice within twenty-eight days as a notice to quit for the entire holding. Should he not do this, he becomes entitled to a reduction in his rent, which is to be settled by agreement or by reference without appeal (*s*). Where a tenant affixes any engine, machinery, fencing or other fixture, or erects under certain conditions any building, it becomes his property and may be removed by him on quitting his holding, provided he gives the landlord a month's written notice, pays all rent and discharges all obligations, does not do any avoidable damage by removal and makes good any damage so caused. The landlord may elect, before the expiration of the notice, to purchase the fixture at a price which represents its fair value to an incoming tenant. This section does not apply to any fixture or building affixed or erected before 1884 (*t*).

The Act also gives compensation to tenants where damage has been done by game (*u*). Further a landlord, who without good cause and for reasons inconsistent with good estate management turns out his tenant by notice to quit or refusal to renew or demand of higher rent in the circumstances specified by the Act, must compensate the tenant for loss unavoidably incurred by the sale or removal of his goods or household stock (*x*).

The Small Holdings and Allotments Act, 1908 (*y*), which aims at increasing the number of agricultural tenants by giving county councils the right to acquire land com-

(*p*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 4. After the beginning of 1921 such agreements are allowed only in the case of market gardens: section 49, sub-section 6.

(*q*) *Ibid.*, s. 1, sub-s. 2.

(*s*) *Ibid.*, s. 27, sub-ss. 1, 2.

(*u*) *Ibid.*, s. 11.

(*x*) *Ibid.*, s. 12. These provisions are almost identical with those of the Act of 1908.

(*y*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 36, s. 47, sub-s. 1, repealing 7 Edw. 7, c. 54, s. 35. The 1908 statute was amended in 1922 (12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 51) and 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 61).

(*r*) *Ibid.*, s. 16, sub-s. 1.

(*t*) *Ibid.*, s. 22.

pulsorily for letting in small holdings, also makes provision for the compensation of agricultural tenants for the improvements which they have made during their tenancy.

Remedies at Law.

In addition to his power of distress, the landlord may bring an action to recover his rent, or the residue that the distress did not satisfy. Where a lease is not by deed, the landlord can only recover arrears of rent for six years (z); where the lease is by deed, he may sue on the tenant's covenant for twenty years' arrears (a). A landlord can also sue for "use and occupation" (b), in cases where there is no actual contract of tenancy, but actual occupation coupled with an express or implied undertaking to pay for it (c). A corporation may thus sue and be sued (d), although there be no contract under seal (e).

In the letting of a furnished house however there is, as we have seen (f), an implied condition that the house is fit for habitation; should this not be so, the tenant may give up possession of the house and furniture, and sue on the breach of contract (g). There is, however, no implied promise that the furnished house shall continue fit for habitation throughout the term (h). On the breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment, the tenant is relieved from liability to pay rent (i); if there be no eviction he can sue for nominal damages and also for any actual damage which he may have sustained (k); if he be evicted, he may recover, in addition to the damage sustained, the value of the unexpired residue of the term (l).

(z) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 42.

(a) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3. See *Jolly, In re*, [1900] 2 Ch. 616.

(b) Both at common law and under the statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 14.

(c) *Churchward v. Ford* (1857), 2 H. & N. 446.

(d) *Lowe v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1852), 18 Q. B. 632.

(e) *Mayor of Thetford v. Tyler* (1845), 8 Q. B. 95.

(f) *Ante*, p. 236.

(g) *Smith v. Marrable* (1843), 11 M. & W. 5; *Wilson v. Finch Hatton* (1877), 2 Ex. D. 336.

(h) *Sarson v. Roberts*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 395; but see as to workmen's dwellings the Housing, &c., Act (15 Geo. 5, c. 14), s. 1.

(i) *Morrison v. Chadwick* (1849), 7 C. B. 266.

(k) *Child v. Stenning* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 82; *Hole v. Chard Union*, [1894] 1 Ch. 293.

(l) *Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 836.

The landlord may sue for damages for injury to the reversion arising from the tenant's breach of the covenant to repair; or he may re-enter for forfeiture, if there is a clause in the lease to that effect and if he has given a proper notice within the Law of Property Act, 1925 (m). Even then, the Court may, as we have seen, grant relief to the tenant (n).

Similarly, an action will lie against a tenant who has committed waste, both for an injunction and for damages. In such an action the measure of damages is not so much the outlay necessary to restore the premises, as the diminution in the value of the reversionary interest, less a discount for immediate payment (o). An injunction may be obtained against acts amounting to breaches of covenant to cultivate in a husbandlike manner (p), but a mandatory injunction will not be granted to compel the lessee to cultivate in the manner prescribed by his lease (q).

Where a tenant for "any term of life, lives or years" wilfully holds over any lands or tenements after the determination of such terms, and "after a demand made and notice in writing given" by the landlord or his duly authorised agent for delivering the possession of them, he becomes liable to the landlord for double the annual value of the holding, which is to be recovered by action (r). Where the tenant gives notice to quit on a specified date and nevertheless continues in possession after that date, he is liable for double rent (s).

Double value cannot be recovered by distress, but double rent may be recovered either by distress or action.

(m) Section 146, repealing the Conveyancing Acts, 1881 and 1892; *Morgan v. Hardy* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 770; and see *Conquest v. Ebbetts*, [1896] A. C. 490. As to injury done to the reversion after the term has expired, see *Joyner v. Weeks*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 31; *Henderson v. Thorn*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 164.

(n) Book III., Chap. III.

(o) *Whitham v. Kershaw* (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 613.

(p) *Crosse v. Duckers* (1873), 27 L. T. 816; *Phipps v. Jackson* (1887), 56 L. J. Ch. 550; for threat of breach, see *Leeds Industrial Society v. Slack*, [1924] A. C. 851.

(q) *Musgrave v. Horner* (1874), 31 L. T. 632.

(r) 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1; and see *Crook v. Whitbread* (1919), 88 L. J. K. B. 959.

(s) 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 18; *Johnstone v. Huddleston* (1825), 4 B. & C. 922, 935; and see *Flannagan v. Shaw* (1919), 36 T. L. R. 34.

In both cases the action may be brought in the County Court if the amount claimed does not exceed £100 (t).

The tenant, on the other hand, can of course sue the landlord for the breach of any covenant to be performed on his part. But a breach of covenant by the landlord will not, as a rule, entitle the tenant to throw up the lease and quit the premises.

(t) And generally as to the procedure in an action brought by a landlord to recover possession of the demised premises, see Book V., Chap. XVIII.

CHAPTER XIV.

CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA.

AT the present day a merchant seldom hires a ship for any long period of time. He may hire a ship, or a certain portion of a ship, for his exclusive use on a definite voyage or for a short period, the master and the crew being both engaged and paid by the shipowner. Or he may merely place his goods on board a "general ship"—that is, a ship which is practically doing the work of a common carrier, calling at many ports, discharging and receiving goods belonging to different merchants. The distinction between these two cases somewhat resembles that which exists between hiring a cab and taking a seat in a public omnibus.

There are, therefore, two distinct kinds of "contracts of affreightment," as they are called:—

- (i) Contracts by charterparty.
- (ii) Contracts for the conveyance of goods in a general ship.

(i) By a contract of CHARTERPARTY an entire ship, or some particular part of it, is let to a merchant for the conveyance of goods either on a particular voyage or voyages or for a period of time. The contract may be (a) a voyage charter, *i.e.*, an agreement to carry goods on a defined voyage; or (b) a time charter, under which the ship is at the disposal of the charterer for a specified time.

A charterparty may be made in any form which the parties choose to adopt, and even by word of mouth (a). Particular trades often have special forms. The Stamp Act, 1891, requires that charterparties be stamped with a sixpenny stamp (b).

(a) *Rederi Aktiebolaget Nordstjernan v. Salvesen*, [1905] A. C. 302.

(b) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, ss. 49—51.

A charterparty usually contains various provisions, which have different degrees of importance. There may be misdescriptions which, although untrue, give no cause of action. There may be collateral or independent agreements which, if broken, will be good ground for an action for damages, but will not justify repudiation of the contract. Lastly, there may be provisions of primary importance, which are intended to be a substantive part of the contract and which amount to conditions precedent; the breach of any such provision will entitle the other party to repudiate and rescind the contract, *e.g.*, the shipowner may refuse to let the charterer have this ship, or the charterer may refuse to load his cargo.

"Whether a descriptive statement in a written instrument is a mere representation or whether it is a substantive part of the contract, is a question of construction which the Court, and not a jury, must determine" (c). Thus, a provision that a ship is "now in the port of Amsterdam" (d), or that a ship shall "sail on or before the 4th of February next" (e), or be ready to receive a cargo during a certain time (f), is one which amounts to a condition precedent, and the breach of it will release the charterer.

But "unless the non-performance alleged in the breach of the contract goes to the whole root and consideration of it, the covenant broken is not to be considered as a condition precedent, but as a distinct covenant, for the breach of which the party injured may be compensated in damages" (g). So a stipulation that a ship shall sail "in a reasonable time" or with all convenient speed may be merely a collateral agreement, the breach of which would not justify the freighter in refusing to load (h).

The shipowner must provide a vessel which is seaworthy for the particular cargo (i), and fit to receive it at the time

(c) *Per Williams, J., in Behn v. Burness* (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B., at p. 205.

(d) *Behn v. Burness, supra.*

(e) *Glaholm v. Hays* (1841), 2 Man. & G. 257.

(f) *Oliver v. Fielden* (1849), 4 Exch. 135; and see *Brown v. Turner*, [1912] A. C. 12.

(g) *Per Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in Davidson v. Gwynne* (1810), 12 East, at p. 389.

(h) *Tarrabochia v. Hickie* (1856), 1 H. & N. 183; *Bank Line v. Capel*, [1919] A. C. 435, at p. 452.

(i) *Stanton v. Richardson* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 390; affirmed (1875), 45 L. J. C. P. 78; *Tattersall v. National Steamship Co.* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 297; considered in *Bank of Australasia v. Clan Line Steamers*, [1916] 1 K. B. 39. Wherever the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, applies there is no absolute warranty of seaworthiness, but the carrier must exercise due diligence in the matter (section 2, and Art. III. 1 (a)).

of loading (*k*). These are implied conditions precedent. If the ship is not in existence, there is no contract (*l*). The shipowner also impliedly warrants that he will begin and carry out the voyage with reasonable despatch, and that the ship shall not deviate from the ordinary commercial route without justification, such as for the purpose of saving life.

(ii) When the owner of a ship contracts with several different merchants to convey their goods to the place of destination, the contract is said to be for conveyance in a general ship. Wherever the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (*m*), applies, contracts of this nature are governed thereby. The Act is of almost universal (*n*) application and applies even to foreign ships carrying from British ports. The master generally makes the contract on behalf of the owner of the ship; he is legally bound to give (*o*) to each merchant who sends goods on board his vessel a document called a "bill of lading," which is in fact a receipt for those goods. "He has no authority to make a contract of carriage to bind the shipowner, except in respect of goods received by him" (*p*). Such a document must, at the time when it is executed, bear a sixpenny stamp (*q*). It states or incorporates the terms of the contract by which the shipowner agrees to carry the goods, and specifies the rate at which he is to be paid for carrying them.

A BILL OF LADING differs from a charterparty in the following respects:—

(a) A charterparty is a contract between the shipowner and a charterer: a bill of lading is a contract between either the shipowner or the charterer and the shipper of the goods.

(b) A bill of lading operates as a receipt for the goods shipped: a charterparty does not.

(c) A bill of lading is a document of title to the goods

(*k*) *McFadden v. Blue Star Line*, [1905] 1 K. B. 697.

(*l*) *Couturier v. Hastie* (1852), 25 L. J. Ex. 253; (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 673.

(*m*) 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22.

(*n*) Exceptions are coastal traffic, where bills of lading are not used, cases where goods consigned are not property within Art. I. (c) of the schedule, and cases of special arrangement under Art. VI. It applies to ships under charterparty only if bills of lading are issued: Art. V.

(*o*) Art. III. (3).

(*p*) *Per Lord Esher, M.R.*, in *Leduc v. Ward* (1888), 20 Q. B. D., at p. 479.

(*q*) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 40.

comprised in it; a charterparty merely gives the charterer a right to the use of the ship for a limited period.

Although by mercantile usage a bill of lading has now come to be a symbol of the right of property in the goods, its primary office and purpose is to express the terms of the contract under which the goods are shipped (*r*). It is the best evidence of these terms; consequently it cannot be afterwards varied by parol evidence (*s*), unless it is obviously incomplete or it refers to provisions in a particular form of bill of lading (*t*). A bill of lading, however, was not at common law conclusive as to the quantity or quality of the goods shipped. But the Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (*u*), enacts that every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee for value shall be conclusive evidence as against the master or other person signing it, even though the goods had wholly or partly not been shipped as stated, unless the holder of the bill of lading had actual notice of this fact at the time he received the bill. It is now conclusive, therefore, against a person actually signing it or a person in whose name and with whose authority it is signed, but against no one else (*x*).

A bill of lading is also a document of title; it is transferable by indorsement. A transfer of the bill of lading will pass the property in the goods, and the bill will cease to be in force as soon as complete delivery of possession of the goods has been made to some person having a right to claim them under it (*y*).

“ A cargo at sea . . . is necessarily incapable of physical delivery. During this period of transit and voyage the bill of lading by the law merchant is universally recognised as its symbol, and the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a symbolical delivery of the cargo. Property in the goods passes by such indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading wherever it is the intention of the parties that the property shall pass, just as under similar circumstances the property would pass by an actual

(*r*) See the judgment of Blackburn, J., in *Fraser v. Telegraph Construction Co.* (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B., at p. 571.

(*s*) See *Leduc v. Ward* (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 475.

(*t*) *The Canada* (1897), 13 T. L. R. 238.

(*u*) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111, s. 3; and see 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22, Art. III. (5).

(*x*) *Brown v. Powell Coal Co.* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 562.

(*y*) See the judgment of Willes, J., in *Meyerstein v. Barber* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P., at p. 53.

delivery of the goods. And for the purpose of passing such property in the goods, and completing the title of the indorsee to full possession thereof, the bill of lading, until complete delivery of the cargo has been made on shore to some one rightfully claiming under it, remains in force as a symbol and carries with it not only the full ownership of the goods, but also all rights created by the contract of carriage between the shipper and the shipowner. It is a key which, in the hands of a rightful owner, is intended to unlock the door of the warehouse, floating or fixed, in which the goods may chance to be" (z).

But a bill of lading is not a negotiable instrument. A holder, into whose hands it has come without any just title, can acquire no property in the goods. The possession of a bill of lading cannot have greater force than the actual possession of the goods. The holder in due course of a bill of exchange has a good title, even though he received the bill from a thief; but the holder of a bill of lading for stolen goods acquires no property in them (a).

An unpaid seller of goods, while still in possession of them, has a common law lien for the price. If he has parted with the possession, he may, so long as the goods are in transit, stop them if he hears that the buyer is insolvent. He exercises this right of "*stoppage in transitu*" by giving notice to the carrier, and can then re-sell the goods. But he has no right to stop them as against an indorsee of the bill of lading, who took it *bona fide* and for value (b).

Though the custom of merchants at an early date made a bill of lading transferable by indorsement so as to pass the property in the goods to the indorsee, it was not until 1855 that such an indorsement transferred to the indorsee the contractual rights and liabilities under the bill (c). The transferee can now sue and be sued in his own name upon the contract. Where the agreement is for carriage in a general ship, the only contract between the parties is the bill of lading. In other cases both a charterparty and a bill

(z) *Per* Bowen, L.J., in *Sanders v. Maclean* (1883), 11 Q. B. D., at p. 341.

(a) See the judgment of Lord Loughborough in *Lickbarrow v. Mason* (1787), 1 Smith L. C. (12th ed.), at pp. 744 *et seq.*; and Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 19, sub-s. 3.

(b) See Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), ss. 47, 48, set out *ante*, pp. 156-157.

(c) Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 111), s. 1.

of lading are generally drawn up, and the contractual rights and liabilities of the parties depend, of course, upon the precise language of these documents (*d*).

At common law the shipowner is not liable to the charterer or to the holder of the bill of lading for any loss or damage occasioned to the goods by:—

(a) The act of God (*e*).

(b) The act of the “King’s enemies.” This phrase covers pirates (*f*) and foreign belligerents, but not rebels.

(c) Inherent vice in the goods themselves (*g*).

(d) Negligence on the part of the owner of the goods, which conduced to the loss or damage of which he now complains.

But it is usual to extend the exemption of the shipowner from liability by a special clause in the bill of lading to the effect that he is not to be liable for the act of God, the King’s enemies (*h*), fire or shipwreck if without his actual fault, nor for the default or incapacity of any pilot whom he is compelled by law to take on board, nor for felonious embezzling or secreting of gold, silver, jewels and precious stones by his servants or a stranger, unless their true nature and value be declared in writing to him or his master at the time when they were shipped on board. In all other respects he is an insurer of the goods, like a common carrier (*i*).

The earliest reported case on this subject is *Morse v. Slue* (*k*), which was decided as long ago as 1671. There the defendant, who was master of a ship, was held liable for the loss of certain goods which had been delivered to him by the plaintiff for carriage, even though such loss was not due to any negligence. It is not expressly stated in any of the reports of the case that it was a general

(*d*) But wherever the Act of 1924 applies only certain exemptions in favour of the carrier or shipowner are lawful (Arts. IV. (2) and III. (8)).

(*e*) This phrase has been defined: Vol. 1, p. 656.

(*f*) Piracy is also a “peril of the sea”: *Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity, &c., Assurance Co.*, [1909] 1 K. B. 785.

(*g*) This phrase is defined: Vol. 1, p. 657.

(*h*) But where a master deviates from his course and so meets with the King’s enemies the shipowner is not protected: *James Morrison & Co. v. Shaw*, [1916] 2 K. B. 783.

(*i*) See Vol. 1, pp. 655 *et seq.*

(*k*) 2 Lev. 69; 1 Vent. 190.

ship (l). But this is immaterial, as there is no difference in this respect between the liability of the shipowner under a charterparty and his liability when the goods have been carried on a general ship.

“Certainly it is difficult,” said Blackburn, J., in *Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson (m)*, “to see any reason why the liability of a shipowner who engages to carry the whole lading of his ship for one person should be less than the liability of one who carries the lading in different parcels for different people.” In this case the defendant, who was a barge-owner, let out barges under the care of his own servants to carry cargo to and from places on the Mersey. The places between which he plied were not fixed by him, but by each customer who chose to employ him. The plaintiffs hired a barge to carry some salt-cake from Widnes to Liverpool. The barge got on a shoal in consequence of a fog, and the cake was injured. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the defendant had incurred the liability of a common carrier, and must compensate the plaintiffs, though there was no negligence on his part.

The shipper, on the other hand, must load the ship within the time stipulated in the charterparty or the bill of lading; or if none be stipulated, within a reasonable time. He must load it with the cargo specified, which must not include anything explosive or contraband (n), or likely to involve the ship in unusual danger or delay (o). He usually has to pay, in addition to the freight, primage (a small customary present to the master), average, several petty charges for beaconage, &c., and sometimes also demurrage. We will conclude with a brief explanation of these and other mercantile terms connected with carriage by sea.

FREIGHT is the payment made for the conveyance of goods to their destination. No freight becomes due until the transit of the goods is completed. If the ship be disabled from completing her voyage, the master may trans-ship the goods and convey them to their destination in a new ship, charging the freight originally agreed. The

(l) It almost certainly was a general ship; see the judgment of Cockburn, C.J., in *Nugent v. Smith* (1876), 1 C. P. D., at pp. 430, 431.

(m) (1874), L. R. 9 Ex., at p. 341.

(n) Contraband of war ordinarily applies to goods, not to passengers: *Yangtze Insurance Association v. Indemnity Marine Assurance Co.*, [1908] 2 K. B. 504.

(o) *Mitchell v. Steel*, [1916] 2 K. B. 610. Anything dangerous may be destroyed (14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22, Art. IV. (6)).

shipowner has a lien upon the cargo until the freight is paid, but this he may agree to waive. If goods brought from abroad reach England safely and their owner does not make entry for them and land them within the time appointed, or if none be appointed within seventy-two hours after the ship is reported, the shipowner may land them himself and place them in a warehouse. He will preserve his lien for the freight if he gives the warehouseman notice of it; and his ship is free for another voyage. If not claimed within ninety days, the goods may, after public notice, be sold and freight and warehouse rent deducted from the price.

DEMURRAGE is the compensation payable by the shipper to the shipowner for detention of the ship through delay in loading or unloading. The charterparty usually allows the charterer a certain number of days in which to load or unload his cargo; these are called "lay days" (*p*). After the lay days are ended "demurrage days" begin, during which extra payment must be made for the use of the ship, usually at an agreed sum per day. The merchant must pay demurrage for any delay beyond the agreed period, even though it is not attributable to any fault of his (for example, if the crowded state of the docks prevents him from getting alongside the quay). Where time is allowed for unloading, it begins to run as soon as the vessel arrives at the usual place of discharge, not at the nominal entrance of the port.

SALVAGE is the compensation paid by the shipowner or merchant to other persons by whose assistance the ship or its cargo may be saved from impending peril (whether from the sea or enemies), or recovered after actual loss (*q*). Salvage remuneration may be awarded to the commander, officers and crew of a King's ship (*r*). But actual passengers in the ship where there has been a common danger cannot claim salvage, nor, as a rule, can a

(*p*) These are also variously described in charterparties as "days," "running days," "working days," "weather-working days."

(*q*) See 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, s. 65, sub-s. 2.

(*r*) *The Domira* (1912), 30 T. L. R. 521. See also *The Portreath*, [1923] P. 155.

compulsory pilot (s). In salvage operations the vessel asking for assistance has a duty cast upon her to accommodate, as far as possible, her own movements to those of the salving vessel and to render assistance in the common enterprise (t).

When the whole ship or the whole cargo is in jeopardy, whatever damage or loss is voluntarily incurred by the owner of any particular part for the preservation of the rest is called a "general loss" (u), and the several persons interested in the ship, freight and cargo must severally contribute their respective proportions to indemnify the owner of the particular part against the loss or damage which has been incurred for the good of all. Such a contribution is called "general average" (x), and will be adjusted as soon as the ship arrives at her destination. In case of dispute, the matter is referred to "average adjusters," whose decision is final. The master or other person in charge of the whole adventure decides whether a loss is to be incurred; only an act done by the master or person in charge of the ship, or with his sanction or authority, can create a right to general average. Stranding the ship to save her and the cargo, jettison, *i.e.*, throwing overboard part of the ship's cargo in order to lighten her in a storm, or cutting away the mast to secure the common good, are examples of such acts. It is no objection to the right to general average that the act causing the loss was tortious (y).

In a "particular average" loss there is no voluntary sacrifice for the common good (z). A particular thing is lost, and the loss has to be borne where it falls. Thus if an anchor is lost, the shipowner must bear the loss; or if in a heavy sea the waves sweep overboard and damage part of the cargo, the owner of that part must bear the loss.

A BOTTOMRY BOND is an agreement entered into by the

(s) *The Bedeburn*, [1914] P. 146.

(t) *Hatfield v. Glasgow* (1915), 84 L. J. P. 161.

(u) 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, s. 66, sub-ss. 1, 2; and see *Joseph Watson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.*, [1922] 2 K. B. 355.

(x) Though this term is often used to denote the loss which gives rise to it: *Chellev v. Royal Commission of Sugar Supply*, [1922] 1 K. B. 12.

(y) *Austin Friars Steamship Co. v. Spillers*, [1915] 3 K. B. 586.

(z) Section 64, sub-section 1.

owner of a ship or his agent, whereby, in consideration of a sum of money advanced for the use of the ship, the borrower undertakes to return the same with interest if the ship terminates her voyage successfully, and binds or hypothecates the keel or bottom of the ship (which includes ship and cargo for this purpose) for the performance of his contract. A similar contract, hypothecating the cargo alone, is called *respondentia*, but it is of rare occurrence.

Since the introduction of the telegraph, bottomry bonds have become rarer. A shipowner, moreover, usually mortgages his ship instead of giving a bottomry bond. And the master of a ship has now by statute a maritime lien for disbursements (a).

The master ought, if he can, before giving a bottomry bond, to communicate with the owners of the ship or cargo in order that they may have the chance to provide the necessary money in some other way. "The master is only the agent to bind the cargo-owner in the hour of necessity and his authority must be measured by this principle" (b).

Where several bonds are given, charging the same subject-matter, the latest must be satisfied first (c).

The letters C.I.F., when they occur in a contract for the sale of goods, stand for cost, insurance and freight. Their presence means that the contract price is to include the price of the goods and the cost of their carriage and insurance while in transit to the buyer. The letters F.O.B. ("free on board") mean that the contract price of the goods is to include the cost of delivering them on board ship. The rules as to the transfer of ownership apply. But it is usually understood that the property in goods specified in an f.o.b. contract passes to the purchaser as soon as they are shipped, although the seller may, in certain circumstances, have the right of stoppage *in transitu*. Under a c.i.f. contract the property in the goods will normally pass to him when the bill of lading has been indorsed and handed to him. It seems to be clear, however, that during the voyage they are at the risk of the consignee.

When goods are consigned from any foreign port to England, the contract of sale is usually made c.i.f. The bill of lading is dispatched by post to the agent of the consignor at the port of arrival, who tenders it to the consignee and receives in exchange the full price mentioned in it. But if, as frequently happens, the bill of lading is tendered before the ship has arrived, it may be arranged that the consignee shall pay the agent of the consignor cost and insurance only when the bill of lading is tendered to him, and shall pay the freight of the ship as soon as the ship arrives.

(a) Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), s. 167.

(b) *Per Bowen, L.J.*, in *The Pontida* (1884), 9 P. D., at p. 180.

(c) *The Eliza* (1833), 3 Hag. Adm. 87.

CHAPTER XV.

CONTRACTS OF ASSURANCE.

A CONTRACT OF ASSURANCE or insurance is one under which a person or company agrees, in consideration of receiving a payment or a series of payments called premiums, to pay a larger sum if a particular event happens. The person or company thus agreeing is usually called the insurer, the other party to the contract the assured; the agreement is called a policy of assurance.

The chance that the particular event may or may not happen is called the risk; and it is against this risk that the assured is protected by the policy. As soon as a valid contract of assurance is legally concluded, the risk is said to attach; and after this has happened the premiums paid by the assured can in no case be returned to him. Nor will any such premiums be returned, if the policy was voidable *ab initio* by reason of fraud (a) or other illegal act (b) on the part of the assured. But if no contract was ever in fact made between the parties owing to some innocent mistake, the policy may be set aside and the premiums paid may be recovered (c).

Any contract by which a man was protected against any contingent risk is regarded at common law simply as a wager or bet, and as such is enforceable, for true insurances have not been affected by the statutes as to wagers. In 1774 the Gambling Act forbade the making of any insurance "on the life or lives of any person or persons, or on any event or events whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for whose use, benefit or on whose account such policy or policies shall be made shall have no interest; or by way of

(a) *Prince of Wales Insurance Co. v. Palmer* (1858), 25 Beav. 605.

(b) *Harse v. Pearl Life Assurance Co.*, [1914] 1 K. B. 558; *Goldstein v. Salvation Army Assurance Society*, [1917] 2 K. B. 291.

(c) *Fowler v. Scottish Equitable Co.* (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 225.

gaming or wagering" (d). Further, the policy must contain the names of the persons interested therein for whose use or benefit the policy is made (e). If either of these two provisions is not satisfied, the policy is void.

In all kinds of insurance, then, to support the transaction the assured must have an "insurable interest" in the subject-matter of the insurance, and this interest must exist at the time when the contract is made, though it may have ceased before any money is payable under the policy. "I know no better definition of an interest in an event," said Lord Blackburn, "than . . . that, if the event happens, the party will gain an advantage; if it is frustrated, he will suffer a loss" (f).

Contracts of assurance are of many different kinds, and different rules apply to each. Those in most frequent use are:—

- (i) Contracts of *life insurance*, which include all policies of assurance upon human life, or the granting of annuities upon human life.
- (ii) Contracts of *fire insurance*, which protect the insurer against loss by or incidental to fire.
- (iii) Contracts of *marine insurance*, by means of which any person who is interested in a ship or its cargo is insured against any loss incident to marine adventure.
- (iv) Contracts of *assurance against accidents*, which entitle the insurer to any payment upon the death of a person from accident or violence, or otherwise than from a natural cause, or as compensation for personal injury.
- (v) Contracts of *insurance by employers* against their liability to pay compensation or damages to workmen in their employment.

These contracts are generally made under seal; but at common law a seal was not necessary except when they were made with a corporation.

(d) 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 1.

(e) *Ibid.*, s. 2; and see *Evans v. Bignold* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 622.

(f) *Wilson v. Jones* (1867), L. R. 2 Ex., at p. 150, quoted with approval by Kennedy, L.J., in *Griffiths v. Fleming*, [1909] 1 K. B., at p. 820.

LIFE INSURANCE.

A *policy of life insurance* is a contract by which the insurer for valuable consideration undertakes to pay to the person for whose benefit the insurance is made a certain sum of money on the death of the person insured, or an annuity on his attaining a certain age. The consideration may be either the payment of a gross sum or of certain periodical payments called premiums (*g*). Such a policy is not a contract of indemnity. The insurer is bound to pay the agreed sum or annuity on the happening of the event named, not merely, as in the case of damage by fire or shipwreck, the pecuniary loss actually sustained. Hence a man may insure his life in as many companies as he pleases, and on his death his personal representatives can recover from each company the full amount for which he was insured with it.

The fact that the deceased's death was wrongfully caused by another person, and the personal representatives of the deceased have in consequence recovered damages in respect thereof under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (*h*), is no ground for the insurance company refusing to pay the whole sum for which the policy was effected. And, in assessing the damages in an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, the jury must not take into account any sum paid or payable on the death of the deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance (*i*).

As we have seen above, the person who makes the contract must at the time have an "insurable interest" in the life which he insures; and, as a rule, this interest must be a pecuniary one. No greater sum can be recovered from the insurers than the value of the interest which the assured had in the life or lives insured at the moment of making the policy (*k*). He can, however, recover the amount of

(*g*) When a policy has been in force for some time, the insurance company out of its profits often gives the assured a benefit or *bonus*. This either increases the amount payable under the policy when the life lapses, or is applicable in reduction of the future premiums.

(*h*) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.

(*i*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 7, s. 1; cf. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 125, s. 35.

(*k*) 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 3.

his interest at that moment, although it has diminished or ceased before the time of payment arrives.

For example, a creditor may insure the life of his debtor to the extent of his debt (l), and recover on the policy after the debt has been paid (m). A surety may also insure the life of the principal debtor (n).

Every one has an insurable interest in his own life and may insure to any amount (o). "An insurance by a man on his own life is not within the mischief of the Act. A man does not gamble on his own life to gain a Pyrrhic victory by his own death" (p). But it is usual to put in a "suicide clause." A frequent provision of this kind relieves the insurance company if the assured commits suicide within twelve months of the date of the insurance.

A wife always has an insurable interest in the life of her husband, for he is bound to maintain her (q). It was formerly doubted whether a husband had such an interest in the life of his wife. But in *Griffiths v. Fleming* (r), the Court of Appeal held that a husband will be presumed to have such an interest to the extent of the amount to which he insures her, though this presumption may be rebutted. "This interest appears to be the personal interest founded on affection and mutual assistance, and not a pecuniary interest" (s). It is, therefore, not necessary for the husband to give affirmative evidence that such an insurable interest exists.

A father has no insurable interest in the life of his child, unless he has in some way a pecuniary interest therein (t). But a child has an insurable interest in the life of his father so long as his father is bound to maintain him. A servant who has been engaged for a fixed number of years at a definite salary has an insurable interest in the life of his master to the extent of so much of that period as is unexpired at the time of effecting the policy (u).

A person, who "undertakes for reward the nursing and maintenance of one or more infants under the age of seven years apart from their parents or having no parents," can have no insurable interest in the life of the child; to make, or attempt to make, such an insurance is a statutory offence (x).

(l) 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 3.

(m) *Law v. London Indisputable* (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 196.

(n) *Lea v. Hinton* (1854), 5 De G. M. & G. 823. The facts of the case are given at 19 Beav. 324.

(o) *Wainwright v. Bland* (1836), 1 Moo. & Rob. 481.

(p) *Per Kennedy, L.J.*, in *Griffiths v. Fleming*, [1909] 1 K. B., at p. 821.

(q) *Evans v. Bignold* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 622.

(r) [1909] 1 K. B. 805; and see section 11 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75).

(s) *Per Kennedy, L.J.*, *ibid.*, at p. 823.

(t) *Halford v. Kymer* (1830), 10 B. & C. 724; *Att.-Gen. v. Murray*, [1904] 1 K. B. 165. But see *Carmichael v. Carmichael's Executrix*, [1920] S. C. (H. L.) 195.

(u) *Hebbon v. West* (1863), 3 B. & S. 579.

(x) Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 67), ss. 1 (i), 2; 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 8, s. 4; 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 11, s. 2.

There is, however, one exception to the rule that the person effecting the insurance must have an insurable interest in the life of the assured. A person may effect a valid policy of insurance with a collecting society or industrial assurance company for the payment of the funeral expenses of his parent, grandparent, grandchild, brother or sister, although he has not, at the time of effecting the policy, an insurable interest in their lives, provided he *bona fide* expects to incur expenses in connection with the death or funeral of the assured (*y*).

The statute of George III. also requires that the name of the person for whose benefit the assurance is effected shall be expressly stated in the policy; and this rule is strictly enforced (*z*). The law will not uphold any policy of insurance which in fact contravenes the rule, although on its face it appears to comply with it. A valid policy of insurance can, of course, be assigned (*a*), and the assignee need not have an insurable interest (*b*). But where A insures his life at the instance and for the benefit of B, who is to pay the premiums, and in pursuance of an arrangement between them, under which B is immediately to secure the sole benefit of the policy by assignment or otherwise, here the contract is from its inception made for the benefit of B, and B's name must be inserted in the policy; otherwise the contract is void *ab initio*, for it is a fraudulent evasion of the statute (*c*). The mere circumstance, however, that B pays A's premiums for him is not, of itself, sufficient to vitiate the policy (*d*).

Fraud on the part of either party will render the contract voidable. If the policy was obtained by the fraud of any agent of the insurance company, the assured may recover the amount of any premiums he has paid, either by action of deceit (*e*), or as money obtained for the company by the

(*y*) Assurance Companies Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 49), s. 36; Industrial Insurance Act, 1923 (13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 8), s. 3.

(*z*) 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2.

(*a*) This was so before the Judicature Act, 1873, was passed (see 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144); but notice of the assignment had to be given to the insurance company, as is still the case (section 3); see *post*, p. 282.

(*b*) *Ashley v. Ashley* (1832), 3 Sim. 149.

(*c*) *Shilling v. Accidental Death Insurance Co.* (1857), 27 L. J. Ex. 16.

(*d*) *Wainwright v. Bland* (1836), 1 M. & W. 32.

(*e*) See the judgment of Lord Alverstone, C.J., in *Kettlewell v. Refuge Assurance Co.*, [1908] 1 K. B., at p. 550; this case was affirmed, [1909] A. C. 243.

fraud of its agent (f). But where the company denies liability it is not, as a rule, necessary for it to prove actual fraud in the assured. Any one who applies for a policy is usually required to answer the questions on a printed proposal form and sign a declaration at its foot that the answers shall form the basis of the contract and are true. Further, the policy usually contains a proviso that it was granted on the express condition that the answers given on the proposal form are true. All material facts, meaning thereby all facts which affect risk (g), must be disclosed at the time of the proposal. The company's questions usually cover a wide ground as to general health and previous illness. Nevertheless, the non-disclosure of material facts may vitiate the policy, although no specific inquiry was made as to them; for the applicant may often be aware of facts of which the company has no suspicion, and knowledge of which is essential to enable it properly to estimate the risk. The contract is, as we have seen (h), one *uberrimæ fidei*; and any misstatement or suppression of any material fact, however innocently made, may vitiate the policy.

Thus, if the proposer makes no mention of a serious illness, this would make the contract voidable (i). So would the non-disclosure of the fact that the proposer, though insured in certain offices, had been refused by others (k). Reference to the usual medical attendant of the proposer is most important to an insurance company, for it can thus learn the medical history of the proposer. Non-disclosure of the real medical attendant (l)—even though an unqualified doctor (m)—will vitiate the policy. Where a proposer concealed the fact that she had consulted a certain doctor for nervous depression, the jury found that this was a material fact for the insurance company to know; but as she had acted without fraud, and the truth of her answers had not been made part of the

(f) See the judgment of Buckley, L.J., [1908] 1 K. B., at pp. 552, 553; and *Hughes v. Liverpool, &c., Society*, [1916] 2 K. B. 482; *Byrne v. Rudd*, [1920] 2 Ir. R. 12.

(g) *Mutual Insurance Co. of New York v. Ontario M. P. Co.*, [1925] A. C. 344; *Anderson v. U. S. Equitable Life Assurance Society* (1925), 42 T. L. R. 132.

(h) *Ante*, p. 69.

(i) *British Equitable Co. v. Musgrave* (1887), 3 T. L. R. 630; *Yorke v. Yorks Insurance Co.*, [1918] 1 K. B. 662. An answer literally true but substantially false amounts to concealment: *Glicksman v. Lancashire and General Assurance Co.*, [1927] A. C. 139.

(k) *London Assurance Co. v. Mansel* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 363.

(l) *Huckman v. Fernie* (1838), 3 M. & W. 505.

(m) *Everett v. Desborough* (1829), 5 Bing. 503.

basis of the contract, it was held that there had not been sufficient non-disclosure of material facts to make the policy voidable (n).

Many insurance policies are effected through agents; the knowledge of an agent is the knowledge of his principal; he must communicate to him what he knows (o). He has no power to alter conditions in a policy (p), and any statement made by him, whether orally or in writing, which is inconsistent with the terms of the policy, is not admissible in evidence against the company (q). If an agent acts outside the scope of his authority, he cannot bind his principals unless they ratify and adopt his act (r). Hence, if the applicant for a policy employs or permits a third person, even an agent of the company, to write the answers to the company's questions for him, he will be bound by any misstatement, even though innocently made by such third person; and if such misstatement be material, the policy will be void. Thus, where the local agent of an insurance company filled up the proposal form, and in so doing inserted untrue answers without the knowledge or authority of the intending insurer, who afterwards signed the proposal form without reading it, it was held that it was the duty of the applicant to read the answers before signing the form, and that he must be taken to have read and adopted them; and, secondly, that in filling in the false answers the agent was acting, not as the agent of the insurance company, but as the agent of the applicant, and that therefore the policy was void (s).

As soon as the insurer receives the proposal form and assents to its terms, he is deemed to have promised to grant the proposer a policy of insurance. But no risk will, it seems, attach until he receives the first premium or consents to give credit for it. Indeed, it is usual for the insurer expressly to stipulate that there is to be no insurance till the first premium is paid. If in the interval circumstances change so as materially to alter the risk, the insurer can refuse to grant a policy (t). Within a month of his accepting or giving credit for a premium the insurer must, under a penalty of £20, execute and duly stamp a formal policy (u).

(n) *Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Co.*, [1908] 2 K. B. 863.

(o) *Bawden v. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance Co.*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 534; *Ayrey v. British Legal, &c., Association*, [1918] 1 K. B. 136.

(p) *Accey v. Fernie* (1840), 7 M. & W. 151.

(q) *Horncastle v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. of U.S.A.* (1906), 22 T. L. R. 735.

(r) *Wing v. Harvey* (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 511.

(s) *Biggar v. Rock Life Assurance Co.*, [1902] 1 K. B. 516; *Pearl Life Assurance Co. v. Johnson*, [1909] 2 K. B. 288; *Keeling v. Pearl Assurance Co.* (1923), 129 L. T. 573. The same point has been similarly decided in Scotland: *Life and Health Assurance Association v. Yule* (1904), 6 F. 437.

(t) *Canning v. Farquhar* (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 727.

(u) Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), ss. 98—100. The amount of the

The policy usually contains a number of conditions as to payment of premiums, &c. Frequently it is stipulated that the insured person shall not increase the risk to his life by such acts as travelling in uncivilised countries, or that nothing shall be recoverable if he dies by suicide or at the hands of justice. As a man (or persons claiming through him) may not profit by his felonious act, death by felonious suicide or in a duel will not be covered by the policy, even though there be no express conditions to that effect (*x*). Where a husband insured himself in his wife's favour and his wife was afterwards convicted of his murder, it was held that the sum insured was payable to the husband's executors, but that the wife could take no benefit by her criminal act (*y*). Suicide committed by a person of unsound mind does not make the policy void, unless there be an express condition to that effect (*z*).

Money may be borrowed on the security of a policy of life insurance. In such a case the policy is either formally assigned by deed, or it may be deposited with the mortgagee with a memorandum in writing charging any money which may become payable under the policy with the repayment of the sum lent. A mere deposit of the policy does not amount to an assignment, even though the person with whom it is deposited subsequently pays the premiums (*a*), but it confers on him a lien; hence temporary loans are often secured by simply depositing the policy.

No assignment, however, confers on the assignee or those claiming through him any right to sue the company until a written notice of such assignment has been given to the insurance company (*b*). Such notice should be given as soon as possible after the assignment, for in the event

stamp varies with the sum for which insurance is effected. See also 58 & 59 Vict. c. 16, s. 13, and 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 18, s. 40. If the insurer does not comply the assured may prove a verbal contract: see Porter on Insurance (7th ed.), p. 19.

(*x*) *Amicable Society v. Bolland* (1830), 2 Dow. & Cl. 1; *Cornish v. Acciaient Insurance Co.* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 453; but see *Wigan v. English and Scottish Law Life Assurance Association*, [1909] 1 Ch. 291.

(*y*) *Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Association*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 147; followed in *Hall, In re*, [1914] P. 1.

(*z*) *Horn v. Anglo-Australian Life Assurance Co.* (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 511.

(*a*) *Howes v. Prudential Assurance Co.* (1883), 49 L. T. 133; and see *Williams, In re*, [1917] 1 Ch. 1.

(*b*) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 144, s. 3.

of a second assignment, the priorities will depend upon the date of this notice; and, further, any *bona fide* payment made by the company previous to such notice will be valid in favour of the company. The assignee takes the rights which the assignor possessed, subject to any equities to which the policy was liable. If the assured person is dead already, and assignor and assignee are alike ignorant of the fact, the contract to assign is void (c).

FIRE INSURANCE.

By a policy of *insurance against fire* the insurer, in consideration of a payment of a certain annual premium, undertakes to make good to the assured any loss or damage caused by fire during the year to the property specified in the policy. The assured cannot recover more than the amount of his actual loss; for the contract is one of indemnity. It is true that a certain round sum is always named in the policy, and the assured cannot receive more than that sum, though he usually recovers less. The amount which he can recover depends entirely upon the loss which he has in fact sustained. If he is insured with two separate companies, he cannot recover twice over (d); the two companies must share the loss between them in proportion to the sums named in their respective policies.

As in life insurance, a person who wishes to effect a policy against fire in the first place fills up by himself or his agent (who is often also an agent of the company) a proposal form, which usually states the names of the parties, the day on which the insurance is to commence, the term for which it is to be in force, the property to be insured and the place where the same is situate. He signs at the foot of this form a declaration that the statements contained in it are true. As soon as the insurer accepts the terms of the proposal the contract is complete (e), and a duly written policy of insurance is forthwith prepared. This policy must, under a penalty of £20 (f), be executed and stamped with a sixpenny

(c) *Strickland v. Turner* (1852), 7 Exch. 208.

(d) See *post*, p. 285.

(e) *Thompson v. Adams* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 361.

(f) 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 18, s. 40, amending 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, ss. 99, 100, unless a composition has been effected under section 116 in accordance with 7 Edw. 7, c. 13, s. 8, sub-s. 2.

stamp within one month after the insurer receives or takes credit for the premium or other consideration.

Any one who proposes to insure his property against fire must make a full disclosure of all material facts. A fact is not necessarily immaterial because he did not consider it material (*g*). A policy is usually, though not invariably, in force for one year only; it generally allows a certain number of days at the end of that year during which the policy can be renewed. Loss occurring during those days will be covered if the assured pays his premium before the days expire (*h*). But to pay a premium after those days without giving notice to the insurers of a loss which had already occurred to the knowledge of the owner would be fraud (*i*).

The assured must have an insurable interest in the property insured. It is only the value of his interest at the date when it is destroyed or injured which he can recover from the insurer (*k*). The owner of the property, whether legal or equitable, has of course an insurable interest, and so has any one who holds the property in trust for the owner and is responsible to him for its safety. Both these classes of persons are entitled to recover the full amount of the loss (*l*). A person who has a vested interest in the property insured in remainder or reversion has such an interest, but a person who has merely an expectancy or right incapable of being enforced at law has not (*m*). Mortgagors and mortgagees, lessees for life or for a term of years, executors and administrators have such an interest, but can recover only to the value of their limited interest. If the premises are burnt to the ground, the owner can only recover the value of his old premises; he is not entitled to the cost of erecting new ones (*n*). Where there has been a total

(*g*) *Lindenau v. Desborough* (1828), 8 B. & C. 586. As to correcting a *bona fide* mistake, see *Golding v. Royal London, &c., Co.* (1914), 30 T. L. R. 350.

(*h*) *Salvin v. James* (1805), 6 East, 571; *McKenna v. City Life Assurance Co.*, [1919] 2 K. B. at pp. 496, 497.

(*i*) See Bunyon on Fire Insurance (7th ed.), p. 11.

(*k*) See *Carreras v. Cunard Steamship Co.*, [1918] 1 K. B. 118.

(*l*) *Waters v. Monarch, &c., Insurance Co.* (1856), 5 E. & B. 870; see also *North British, &c., Insurance Co. v. Moffatt* (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 25.

(*m*) *Lucena v. Craufurd* (1802), 3 Bos. & Pul. 75; (1806), 2 Bos. & Pul. N. R. 269; (1808), 1 Taunt. 325.

(*n*) *Yates v. Dunster* (1855), 11 Exch. 15.

loss of goods fully insured, any salvage that may remain will belong to the insurers (o). But if the goods were not fully insured, the owner has what is left of them after his claim has been paid by the insurers. A shareholder has no insurable interests in the assets of a company (p).

If the assured parts with his interest in the property during the period of insurance, he cannot recover anything. A policy of fire assurance cannot be assigned without the consent of both parties, which is usually evidenced by an indorsement on the policy. Moreover, the removal of the goods from the place mentioned in the policy without the consent of the insurer will render the policy voidable (q), and generally if the assured breaks any of the conditions of the policy, this will give the insurer a right to avoid the contract. But this right may be waived by the subsequent conduct of the assurance company, as, for example, if it accepts a premium after knowledge of the breach (r). So, if after the policy is effected the assured alters the premises in such a way as to increase the risk of fire, this will avoid the contract; whether the alteration would have this effect or not is a question of fact in each case.

The assured, as we have seen, can never recover more than his loss; hence the insurers, as soon as they have paid him the full amount of such loss, are entitled to the benefit of all his legal remedies against third parties. They have a right to be "subrogated" or put in the place of the assured; and they need no longer sue in his name (s). If the assured has rights against third parties and either voluntarily or for payment forbears to exercise them, the insurers can recover from him the amount which he could have claimed in the exercise of his rights (t).

In *Darrell v. Tibbitts* (u) the tenants of a house were compensated by the Brighton Corporation for damage done to the house

(o) *Da Costa v. Firth* (1766), 4 Burr. 1966.

(p) *Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co.*, [1925] A. C. 619.

(q) *Pearson v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.* (1876), 1 App. Cas. 498.

(r) *Wing v. Harvey* (1854), 5 De G. M. & G. 265 (a life policy).

(s) *King v. Victoria Insurance Co.*, [1896] A. C. 250.

(t) *Castellain v. Preston* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 380; *West of England Fire Insurance Co. v. Isaacs*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 226; *Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Spooner*, [1905] 2 K. B. 753.

(u) (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 560.

by a steam-roller which broke a gas-pipe and caused an explosion. The tenants repaired the premises according to their covenant with the landlord. But the landlord also recovered on a fire insurance policy. The insurers, who had paid in ignorance of the tenants' repairing covenant, were entitled to recover their money from the landlord, who would otherwise have been paid twice over.

MARINE INSURANCE.

A contract of *marine insurance* is one "whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure." The law upon the subject has been codified by the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 (x). The policy must specify (1) the name of the assured or of some person who effects the insurance on his behalf; (2) the subject-matter insured and the risk insured against; (3) the voyage, or period of time, or both, as the case may be, covered by the insurance; (4) the sum or sums insured; (5) the name or names of the insurers, who are usually called "underwriters," as it is the practice for them to subscribe at the foot of the policy their names and the amounts for which they agree to be respectively liable (y).

The assured must have an insurable interest in either the ship, the cargo or the marine adventure. Such interest exists where a person is so placed with respect to the thing insured as to have either benefit from its continued existence or prejudice from its destruction or damage (z). The owner of the ship or of any goods on board her has an insurable interest to the extent of the value of the ship or goods respectively. The mortgagee of a ship has an insurable interest to the extent of his debt, and a mortgagor has such an interest to the value of the ship (a), the lender of money on bottomry or *respondentia* (b) to the extent of the amount payable to him under the bond (c), and a person

(x) 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, s. 1.

(y) Section 23.

(z) Cf. section 5.

(a) Section 14; *Alston v. Campbell* (1779), 4 Brown, Parl. Cas. 476; *Samuel v. Dumas*, [1923] 1 K. B. 592.

(b) See *ante*, p. 274.

(c) Section 10.

advancing freight in so far as such freight is not repayable in case of loss (d). “The master or any member of the crew has an insurable interest in respect of his wages” (e). The assured need not be interested at the time when the insurance is effected; it is sufficient if he is interested at the time of the loss (f). But if at the time of effecting the policy he had no insurable interest and no expectation of acquiring any such interest, the policy is void as a gaming or wagering contract (g).

It lies upon the assured to prove that he has an insurable interest, and he cannot relieve himself of this burden by inserting in the policy certain words, such as “interest or no interest,” “full interest admitted,” (h), “the policy itself sufficient proof of interest.” Policies so worded are called “P.P.I. policies” (i); they are not legally binding. If any person in the employment of the owner of a ship, not being a part owner of the ship, effects such a policy, he will be guilty of an offence under the Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act, 1909 (k), and punishable on summary conviction with imprisonment for six months with or without hard labour, or by fine not exceeding £100, and also liable to forfeit to the Crown any money he may receive under the contract. The same punishment is imposed on any one who effects a contract of marine insurance without having any *bona fide* interest either in the safe arrival of the ship or in the safety or preservation of the subject-matter insured, or a *bona fide* expectation of acquiring such an interest.

“Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be true. If it be untrue, the insurer may avoid the contract” (l). Representations as to matters of fact are

(d) Section 12.

(e) Section 11.

(f) Section 6.

(g) Section 4.

(h) *Berridge v. Man On Insurance Co.* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 346.

(i) Section 4, sub-section 2. Also known as honour policies. See *London County Commercial, &c., In re*, [1922] 2 Ch. 67.

(k) 9 Edw. 7, c. 12. There is no record of a prosecution under this Act.

(l) 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, s. 20, sub-s. 1.

“true” if substantially correct, and as to matters of expectation or belief if made in good faith (m). Full disclosure of material facts must be made by both parties. “If the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party” (n). “Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk” (o). In the absence of inquiry, the assured need not disclose any circumstance which diminishes the risk, or which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. “The insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge and matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, ought to know” (p). Nor need the assured disclose any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer, or anything which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or implied warranty. What is material and what is not is a question of fact (q).

In marine insurance a short document called a “slip” takes the place of the ordinary proposal form. This slip contains brief particulars of the proposed insurance. It is prepared by the broker for the insured and is submitted to the underwriters or their brokers, who, if they agree to take the risk, initial the slip, naming at the same time the sum for which they undertake to be liable. As soon as the slip is initialled, the contract is concluded between the parties (r); but owing to the strict provisions of the Stamp Act, 1891 (s), it cannot be enforced until it is subsequently embodied in a policy properly stamped and executed. Only such a policy is admissible as evidence of the contract in any Court of law (t). By initialling the slip the underwriters impliedly promise to grant a

(m) Section 20, sub-sections 3, 4, 5.

(n) Section 17; see *Carter v. Boehm* (1765), 3 Burr. at p. 1909; *Scottish Shire Line v. London and Provincial, &c., Co.*, [1912] 3 K. B. 51. There must be full disclosure even in litigation: *Graham Joint Stock Shipping Co. v. Motor Union Insurance Co.*, [1922] 2 K. B. 563; *Teneria Moderna v. N.Z. Insurance Co.*, [1924] 1 K. B. 79.

(o) Section 18, sub-section 2; *Thames, &c., Insurance Co. v. “Gunford” Ship Co.*, [1911] A. C. 529.

(p) Section 18 (3 b.); see also *The Bedoun*, [1894] P. 1; *Charlesworth v. Faber* (1900), 5 Com. Cas. 408; *British and Foreign Mar. Ins. Co. v. Gaunt*, [1921] 2 A. C. 41, at pp. 59—62.

(q) Section 18, sub-section 4; *Mann, Mcneal & Steeves v. Cap. and Counties Insurance Co.*, [1921] 2 K. B. 300.

(r) Section 21; see *Morrison v. Universal Marine Insurance Co.* (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. at p. 199.

(s) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, ss. 92—97.

(t) 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, s. 22.

policy, but no action can be maintained against them should they refuse to do so (u). If, however, a proper policy be subsequently effected and duly stamped, reference may be made to the slip, although it is unstamped, for the purpose of showing the date at which the liability of the insurers commenced; and the insurers will be liable for any loss or damage occurring to the ship between the date on which the slip was initialled and the date of the policy (x).

Where consideration for the payment of the premium wholly fails and there has been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured or his agents, the assured can recover the premium; if the consideration is apportionable and wholly fails in respect of an apportionable part, a proportionate part of the premium may be recovered (y).

If the policy does not specify the value of the subject-matter insured, it is called an "open" or "unvalued policy." It leaves the insurable value to be subsequently ascertained, subject to the limit of the total sum insured (z). But the policy may be a "valued" one, specifying the agreed value of the subject-matter insured; if so, in the absence of fraud, the value so fixed is, "as between the insurer and assured, conclusive of the insurable value of the subject intended to be insured, whether the loss be total or partial" (a).

If it be shown that the assured had only a partial interest in the subject-matter insured, the valuation will be taken to apply only to his proportion of interest. Where one-half of the freight was "valued at £2,000" and one-half had been prepaid, the assured recovered a total loss on the other half (b). And where freight was "valued at £6,500," but at the moment of loss only 55 bales were on board the ship, the assured recovered such proportion of £6,500 as the 55 bales bore to the ship's whole cargo (c).

It will be observed, then, that whenever the insurance is an open one, the damages claimed under it are unliquidated, but no more than the insurable interest or the loss suffered can be recovered (d). When the policy is a valued one, it is possible for the assured to recover more than he has actually lost, *e.g.*, by reason of the depreciation of the ship subsequent to the making of the contract.

(u) *Fisher v. Liverpool Marine Insurance Co.* (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 418; but see *Bhugwandass v. Netherlands Sea Insurance Co.* (1888), 14 A. C. 88.

(x) *Mead v. Davison* (1835), 3 A. & E. 303.

(y) Section 84, sub-sections 1, 2.

(z) Section 23.

(a) Section 27, sub-section 3.

(b) *Allison v. Bristol M. I. Co.* (1876), 1 App. Cas. 209; and see *Feise v. Aguilar* (1811), 3 Taunt. 506.

(c) *Forbes v. Aspinall* (1811), 13 East, 323. But see *The Main*, [1894] P. 320.

(d) *Baker v. Adam* (1910), 102 L. T. 248.

Before loss, the benefit of a policy of marine insurance can only be assigned along with the property insured, or in pursuance of an agreement to assign it made at the time such property was sold to the assignee (*e*). After loss, however, the policy may be separately assigned. In either case the assignee can sue in his own name and recover the full value of the loss or damage, although he had no insurable interest in the property at the time when the policy was effected. The insurer can raise any defence which would have been available to him if the action had been brought by the assignor, provided it arises under the policy assigned (*f*). This is another instance in which a policy of marine insurance is not a mere contract of indemnity; for if a policy be assigned after loss, the holder may recover though he has no insurable interest in the thing insured.

A “floating policy” is one which describes the insurance in general terms, leaving the name of the ship or ships or other details to be subsequently defined (*g*). This is used where the assured has ordered goods, but does not yet know their quantity or quality or the ship by which they will arrive.

A “Lloyd’s policy” is one drawn in the form which is set out in the First Schedule to the Act. It is a form which has long been in use as a voyage policy; there are statutory rules for the interpretation of its terms.

A policy may be made subject to certain so-called “warranties,” which are really conditions (*h*). A warranty is defined by the Act as “a promissory warranty by which the assured undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some condition shall be fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of a particular state of facts.” Such a “warranty may be express or implied; it must be exactly complied with, whether it be material to the risk or not. If it be broken, then, subject to any express provision in the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach” (*i*). It is no defence for the assured to say that

(*e*) Section 51.

(*f*) Section 50, sub-section 2; *Baker v. Adam*, *supra*; *Pickersgill v. London and Provincial, &c., Co.*, [1912] 3 K. B. 614.

(*g*) Section 29, sub-section 1.

(*h*) For the distinction between a warranty and a condition in a contract, see *ante*, pp. 142—145.

(*i*) Section 33. See *Union Insurance Society v. George Wills & Co.*, [1916] 1 A. C. 281; *Yorks. Insurance Co. v. Campbell*, [1917] A. C. 218.

the breach has been remedied and the warranty complied with before loss, but the insurer may waive the breach (*k*).

“ There is no implied warranty as to the nationality of a ship, or that her nationality shall not be changed during the risk ” (*l*). There is an implied warranty of the seaworthiness of the ship in voyage policies, but not in time policies (*m*); there is no implied warranty that goods are seaworthy (*n*). There is an implied warranty that the adventure in question is a legal one (*o*), that it will be commenced within a reasonable time (*p*), and prosecuted with reasonable despatch (*q*), and that there will be no change of voyage or deviation without lawful excuse (*r*).

Unless otherwise agreed, the insurer is liable for “ any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against.” He is not liable for loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of the assured; but, unless otherwise agreed, “ he is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, even though the loss would not have happened but for the misconduct or negligence of the master or the crew ” (*s*). Unless otherwise agreed, the insurer of ship or goods is “ not liable for any loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay be caused by a peril insured against ”; nor is he liable for “ ordinary wear and tear, ordinary leakage and breakage,” inherent vice of the thing insured, loss proximately caused by rats or vermin, or injury to machinery not proximately caused by maritime perils (*t*).

A loss may be either total or partial. A total loss is either an actual or a constructive total loss: the words “ total loss ” in a policy ordinarily include both actual and constructive (*u*). An *actual total loss* occurs if the

(*k*) Section 34.

(*l*) Section 37.

(*m*) Section 39. See *Thomas v. Tyne, &c., Insurance Association*, [1917] 1 K. B. 938.

(*n*) Section 40.

(*o*) Section 41.

(*p*) Section 42, sub-section 1.

(*q*) Section 48.

(*r*) Sections 45, 46; and see section 49 as to “ lawful excuse.”

(*s*) Section 55. See *Trinder v. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co.*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 114; *Mountain v. Whittle*, [1921] 1 A. C. 615.

(*t*) Section 55 (c).

(*u*) Section 56.

thing insured is destroyed or so damaged as to lose its species (*x*), or if the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof (*y*). A *constructive total loss* occurs where the thing insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its actual loss appearing unavoidable, or because the cost of preserving it from actual total loss would exceed its value (*z*). In determining whether a ship seriously damaged by perils insured against can be treated as a constructive total loss, the test is whether a prudent uninsured owner would repair her having regard to all the circumstances (*a*).

When there is a constructive total loss, the assured can either (1) treat the loss as partial, or (2) treat it as total and abandon the thing insured to the insurer. In the latter case he must give notice of abandonment (*b*). The insurer then takes over the interest of the assured in what is left of the thing insured, and becomes entitled to any freight earned by the ship after abandonment (*c*). Where the insurer pays for a total loss, he thereupon becomes entitled to take over the assured's interest in whatever is left of the thing so paid for, and he is thereby "subrogated" to all the rights and remedies of the assured from the date of the loss (*d*). A *partial loss* is any loss other than a total loss. General average loss, particular average loss and salvage we have mentioned elsewhere (*e*).

ASSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT.

A policy of *assurance against accident* usually provides that the assured shall receive certain weekly payments, if he suffers disablement from any physical injury caused by "violent, accidental, external and visible means," and that his representatives shall receive a certain

(*x*) See *Roux v. Salvador* (1836), 7 L. J. Ex. 328; *Cossman v. West* (1887), 13 App. Cas. at pp. 174, 181.

(*y*) Section 57, sub-section 1. As to total loss by capture, see *Andersen v. Marten*, [1908] A. C. 334.

(*z*) Section 60, sub-sections 1, 2.

(*a*) *Macbeth v. Maritime Insurance Co.*, [1908] A. C. 144; *Hall v. Hayman*, [1912] 2 K. B. 5.

(*b*) Sections 61, 62.

(*c*) Section 63, sub-sections 1, 2; and see *Barque Robert Besnard Co. v. Murton* (1909), 101 L. T. 285.

(*d*) Section 79.

(*e*) Sections 64—66, and see *ante*, p. 273.

sum if such injury results in his death within a specified time. "Disablement" occurs when the assured is prevented, wholly or partially, from attending to his ordinary business; it may be either permanent or temporary, total or partial; and these terms are, as a rule, carefully defined in the policy. The amount payable in case of death and the weekly compensation for disablement are fixed by the policy, without any regard to the income or earnings of the assured; in other words, the contract is not one of indemnity. But the weekly payments continue only so long as the assured is disabled, and the policy often provides that in no case shall such compensation be payable for more than twenty-six weeks for any one accident. The period covered by the assurance is generally one year, though it may be limited to any period, or confined to a particular journey. At the end of the year the assurance company is in no way bound to renew the policy: it may continue it or not at its pleasure (f). The policy must bear a sixpenny stamp (g), except in the case of a policy of insurance authorised by the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, or by the rules of a society or a branch society registered under that Act (h).

It is necessary in the first place to determine, so far as is possible, the precise meaning of the word "accident." It is unfortunately used in two very different senses—one much wider than the other. Strictly, an occurrence can only be said to be accidental when it is due neither to design nor to negligence. For, if an act be intentional, it is clearly no accident; if it be the result of culpable negligence, then by due care it could have been avoided, and the negligent person cannot be allowed to excuse himself by declaring it an accident. In this narrower sense of the word, an accident must be "nobody's fault."

Thus an injury caused by lightning, tempest or any extraordinary rainfall—any *vis major* or "act of God"—is accidental and therefore

(f) *Simpson v. Accidental Death Insurance Co.* (1857), 2 C. B. (N.S.) 257; *Stokell v. Heywood*, [1897] 1 Ch. 459.

(g) 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 18, s. 40, amending 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 1, unless a composition has been effected under section 116.

(h) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 25, s. 33.

not actionable (i). The sudden and unexplained bolting of a horse would also be an accident in this sense. The loss of a deed, the disappearance of a will, may be accidental. Where rats on board a ship gnawed through a lead pipe, and the sea water consequently escaped and damaged the cargo, the Judges were much divided; but the House of Lords eventually decided that this was a "danger or accident of the seas," the jury having expressly found that there was no negligence on the part of the shipowners (k).

So, in Courts of equity, the word "accident" has always been defined as "such an unforeseen event, misfortune, loss, act or omission, as is not the result of any negligence or misconduct in the party" applying for relief (l). In criminal law, too, "an effect is said to be accidental when the act by which it is caused is not done with the intention of causing it, and when its occurrence as a consequence of such act is not so probable that a person of ordinary prudence ought, under the circumstances in which it is done, to take reasonable precautions against it" (m). If death is caused by pure accident, no crime is committed. But if the act which caused the death is one which the accused knew, or ought to have known, to be dangerous to human life or likely to cause grievous bodily injury, then its commission is culpable negligence and is not a pure accident (n).

But the word "accident" is constantly used to describe a collision on a railway, or any similar disaster, whether it is caused by any one's negligence or not. The word is used in this more extended meaning in the title of Lord Campbell's Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (o), and throughout the Notice of Accidents Acts, 1894 and 1906 (p). In policies of assurance against accidents, the word usually covers the results of the assured's own negligence as well as that of other people, but not of his own deliberate act.

(i) *Nichols v. Marsland* (1876), 2 Ex. D. 1; *Nugent v. Smith* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 423.

(k) *Hamilton v. Pandorf* (1887), 12 App. Cas. 518.

(l) Story, 78.

(m) Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law (6th ed.), art. 231.

(n) See Vol. I, pp. 119—120, 297—300.

(o) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.

(p) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 28; 6 Edw. 7, c. 53, *post*, p. 399, n. (i). As to the meaning of the word "accident" under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, see *post*, pp. 299—301.

In any action brought on a policy of assurance against accidents the plaintiff must establish that he has sustained injury in consequence of an "accident" within the meaning of the policy. The risk insured against is generally defined with exactness in the conditions of the policy.

1. There must as a rule be some external violence operating directly upon the person of the assured. If the assured's own deliberate act produces as its ordinary result some injury to himself, this is not covered by the policy (*q*). Thus suicide is not an accident (*r*). But suicide is not to be presumed (*s*).

2. There is generally a proviso which excludes death or disablement resulting from any natural disease or internal weakness, or any medical operation rendered necessary by any such disease or weakness.

Under this proviso it has been held that the insurer was not liable for death caused by sunstroke (*t*). But where the assured was heavily thrown from his horse while hunting, and, the ground being very wet, he was wetted to the skin, and his vitality was so much lowered by the shock of the fall and the wetting that pneumonia subsequently set in and proved fatal, it was held by the Court of Appeal that his death was directly caused by an accident within the meaning of the policy (*u*).

3. The policy does undoubtedly protect the assured from the consequences both of his own and of other people's negligence. Thus compensation has been recovered in cases where the accident was caused by the assured jumping into or out of a railway carriage or omnibus while in motion. It is usual now, however, for the insurance company to guard itself by a proviso that the policy shall not cover any injury caused by the assured's acting in contravention of the by-laws of any public company. It is usual also to exclude any accident which happens to the assured while he is under the influence of intoxicating liquor (*x*). But, in all cases

(*q*) *Clidero v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co.* (1892), 19 *Rettie* (Sc.) 355; but see *Hamlyn v. Crown Accidental Insurance Co.*, [1893] 1 *Q. B.* 750; *Burridge v. Haines* (1918), 87 *L. J. K. B.* 641.

(*r*) *Ellinger v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York*, [1905] 1 *K. B.* 31.

(*s*) *Trew v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co.* (1861), 6 *H. & N.* 839.

(*t*) *Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers' Assurance Co.* (1861), 3 *E. & E.* 478.

(*u*) *Etherington and Lancs. and Yorks. Accident Insurance Co., In re*, [1909] 1 *K. B.* 591; *Yates v. South Kirby, &c., Collieries*, [1910] 2 *K. B.* 538.

(*x*) *Mair v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co.* (1877), 37 *L. T.* 356.

not covered by such exceptions, the assured can recover, though his own misconduct or negligence conduced to the accident. Some companies also insert in their policies a clause excluding liability for injuries sustained by the assured "while wilfully (or wantonly) exposing himself to unnecessary danger," or "to obvious risk of injury." This clause has the effect of excluding all accidents which arise from the assured exposing himself to any risk of injury which was obvious to him at the time, or would have been obvious to him if he had paid reasonable attention to what he was doing (*y*).

4. The death or disablement must be the direct result of the accident. As a rule this is a simple issue of fact. But legal questions of some difficulty arise when two or more causes contribute to produce death or injury to the assured. If a man suffering from a serious illness meets with an accident and subsequently dies, it may be difficult to determine whether his death was caused by the illness or by the accident. It is immaterial whether the illness precedes or succeeds the accident in point of date. The question in every case is, What really caused the death? If the accident is the true cause of death or disablement, the interposed disease is merely a link in the chain of circumstances, and not a separate and independent cause.

Thus, if an accident brings on, as its natural result, some disease such as hernia or erysipelas, and that disease causes death, then here clearly the accident directly causes the death, though it preceded the disease in point of time; the whole train of circumstances constitutes a single cause (*z*). And this is so although the policy expressly provides that the insurance shall not extend to such a form of disease. Unless the policy makes it clear that the intention of the parties was otherwise, such an exception will not protect the insurer when such a disease is the direct result of an accident within the meaning of the policy (*a*). Where a signalman saw that an accident to a train was imminent, and the consequent alarm produced a nervous shock which incapacitated him from work, it

(*y*) *Cornish v. Accident Insurance Co.* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 453; and see *Shilling v. Accidental Death Insurance Co.* (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 266; (1858), 1 F. & F. 116; and *Mair v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co.*, *supra*.

(*z*) *Isitt v. Railway Passengers Assurance Co.* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 504 (a case of pneumonia).

(*a*) *Fitton v. Accidental Death Insurance Co.* (1864), 17 C. B. (N.S.) 122; *Smith v. Accident Insurance Co.* (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 302.

was held that this was an accident within the meaning of the policy (b).

But if a man is afflicted with a disease, and an accident occurs to him during his illness, and after the accident he dies of the disease, then clearly the accident is not the cause of death (c). Thus, where the assured suffered from Bright's disease, and died from that disease, but the progress of the disease was accelerated by an accidental fall from his dogcart, the Court held that it had not been proved that the assured died from the accident, and gave judgment for the defendants (d). It is otherwise where the accident brings out a latent disease which would otherwise have remained harmless (e). And where the assured, whilst crossing a stream, was seized with an epileptic fit and fell into the stream, and was there drowned whilst suffering from the fit, the Court of Appeal held that the death was occasioned by "accidental, external and visible means," and that the company was liable, although the policy contained a proviso that the insurance should not extend "to an injury caused by or arising from natural disease or weakness, or exhaustion consequent upon disease"; for the assured sustained no personal injury which could occasion death except the drowning, which was accidental (f).

In modern policies the assured is also covered against illness or certain specified diseases and, under a policy covering illness, most of these questions cannot arise.

As in all other cases of insurance, the assured must make a full disclosure of all material facts. If there be any false statement or misrepresentation, or any suppression of the truth, whether fraudulent or not, in any proposal or application for the policy, or in any claim made under it, the contract is void (g). The same result will follow in the case of death, if the insurance was really effected by some one who had no insurable interest in the life of the assured; and this whether the policy was made out in the name of the assured or not (h). Again, it is generally made a condition precedent to any liability on the part of the insurance company that notice of any accident should be promptly

(b) *Pugh v. L. B. & S. C. Ry. Co.*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 248.

(c) *Cawley v. National Employers' Association* (1885), 1 T. L. R. 255.

(d) *M'Kechnie's Trustees v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co.* (1889), 17 *Rettie* (Sc.) 6.

(e) *Fidelity, &c., Co. v. Mitchell*, [1917] A. C. 592.

(f) *Winspear v. Accident Insurance Co.* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 42; and see *Reynolds v. Accidental Insurance Co.* (1870), 22 L. T. 820; *Lawrence v. Accidental Insurance Co.* (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 216; *Wicks v. Dowell*, [1905] 2 K. B. 225.

(g) See *London Assurance Co. v. Mansel* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 363; *Thomson v. Weems* (1884), 9 App. Cas. 671; *Dawson's v. Bonnin*, [1922] 2 A. C. 413.

(h) *Shilling v. Accidental Death Insurance Co.* (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 266; *Harse v. Pearl Life Assurance Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 92.

given to them at their head office; and if so, the absence of such notice is a defence to any action on the policy (i), even though it was impossible to give the required notice (k). But, to produce this result, the giving of such notice must be expressly made a condition precedent to liability (l). The policy often provides in addition that the company may, if it thinks fit, send its own medical man to attend or visit the assured, or have a post-mortem examination, or require other proof satisfactory to its directors of the cause of death, of the nature of the accident, of the extent of disablement, &c. And compliance with these provisions may also be made a condition precedent to liability. But it must be remembered that "proof satisfactory to the directors" in such a provision means "proof which ought to be satisfactory to the directors" (m), and that the assured or his representative is not bound to forward any such proof after the company has once definitely repudiated all liability (n). Lastly, the policy usually contains a clause entitling the company, if it thinks fit, to have any dispute referred to arbitration; and if the clause be drawn (as it usually is) in such a way that no cause of action arises till the dispute has been determined by arbitration, then such clause will afford an answer to any action except one to enforce the award (o). In any arbitration under such a clause, the arbitrators or umpire have now full power to state, in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court, any question of law arising in the course of the reference (p).

ASSURANCE AGAINST EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY.

There is another form of accident insurance which has become common since the passing of the Employers'

(i) *Williams and Lancs. and Yorks. Accident Insurance Co., In re* (1903), 51 W. R. 222.

(k) *Cassel v. Lancs. and Yorks. Accident Insurance Co.* (1885), 1 T. L. R. 495; *Cawley v. National Employers' Association* (1885), 1 C. & E. 597.

(l) *Stoneham v. Ocean Accident Assurance Co.* (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 237.

(m) *Braunstein v. Accidental Death Insurance Co.* (1861), 31 L. J. Q. B. 17.

(n) *Shiells v. Scottish Assurance Corporation* (1889), 16 Rettie (Sc.) 1014.

(o) *Caledonian Insurance Co. v. Gilmour*, [1893] A. C. 85; *Woodall v. Pearl Assurance Co.*, [1919] 1 K. B. 593.

(p) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, ss. 7, 19; section 19 was repealed but re-enacted by 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49, s. 94; and see *Isitt v. Railway Passengers' Assurance Co.* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 504.

Liability Act, 1880, and the subsequent Workmen's Compensation Acts. Under this form of insurance the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured against any liability which he may incur for damages or costs in case any one in his employ should be accidentally injured and should claim compensation from his employer. The premium payable is usually calculated in the form of a percentage on the total amount of wages paid by the employer, but on scales that vary according to the risks of the particular trade which he carries on. These policies also must bear a sixpenny stamp (q). The provisions of the Life Insurance Acts, 1870 to 1872, are extended to companies undertaking employers' liability business (r). So, too, policies are now issued to the owners of public vehicles indemnifying them against all claims by persons who may be injured by any accident when entering, riding in or alighting from, such vehicles. The owner of any private carriage may also be indemnified against the carelessness of his coachman, but not against negligence of his own.

All these are contracts of indemnity, and are regulated by the same rules as fire and marine insurance; the principle of contribution is applicable; and the liability of the insurer depends on the antecedent liability of the assured. Unless the person injured has a valid claim for compensation against the assured, either at common law or under the statute, the assured has no insurable interest and therefore no claim under the policy. The word "accident" in such a policy means any injury in respect of which compensation is properly claimed from the plaintiffs.

We have already discussed generally the cases in which an employer is liable under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, respectively, for personal injuries caused to his workmen by any accident arising out of and in the course of their employment (s). There has been much discussion as to the precise meaning of the word "accident" under these Acts. All the cases, up to April, 1905, will be found collected

(q) 62 & 63 Vict. c. 9, s. 11, overruling the decision in *Lancashire Insurance Co. v. Commissioners*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 353. This section was amended by 7 Edw. 7, c. 13, s. 8, sub-s. 3, and the duty raised from a penny to sixpence by 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 18, s. 40.

(r) By the Assurance Companies Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 49).

(s) See *ante*, pp. 224—225.

in the arguments and judgments in the case of *Brinton's v. Turvey* (t). In that case a workman who had been employed in sorting wool died of anthrax, caused by a bacillus passing from the wool into the corner of his eye; and the Court held that it was a case of "injury by accident" within the meaning of the Act. "When some affection of our physical frame is in any way induced by an accident, we must be on our guard that we are not misled by medical phrases to alter the proper application of the phrase 'accident causing injury,' because the injury inflicted by accident sets up a condition of things which medical men describe as disease" (u). "The accidental character of the injury is not, I think, removed or displaced by the fact that, like many other accidental injuries, it set up a well-known disease, which was immediately the cause of death" (x). The reasons, however, given by Lord Robertson for his dissenting judgment deserve careful consideration.

Since this decision a case occurred in which a workman, who in the course of his employment was stationed close to an open hatchway, was seized with an epileptic fit, and consequently fell into the hold and was injured; it was held by the Court of Appeal that he was entitled to recover compensation under the Act (y). Again, where the engine-driver of a train was injured by a stone intentionally thrown at the engine by a boy standing on a bridge over the railway, it was held by the Court of Appeal that the injury was caused by an accident within the meaning of the Act of 1897 (z). A murder may be an "accident" within the Act (a). In *Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co.* (b), a workman whose employment necessitated the handling of white and red lead gradually accumulated lead in his system, with the ultimate result that he suffered from lead-poisoning which produced partial paralysis and incapacity for work. Mathew, L.J., was of opinion that this was not an accident within the meaning of the Act. The other two members of the Court expressed no opinion on this point, but Collins, M.R., said: "It appears that an accident must be a mishap from which the element of haphazard is to be eliminated, and the word at the same time is to be treated as being used in its popular and ordinary sense" (c).

Where a workman in the employment of a firm of shipbuilders,

(t) [1905] A. C. 230. See also *Broderick v. L. C. C.*, [1908] 2 K. B. 807; *Eke v. Hart-Dyke*, [1910] 2 K. B. 677; *Scott v. Pearson*, [1916] 2 K. B. 61; *Pyper v. Manchester Liners*, *ibid.*, 691.

(u) *Per* Lord Halsbury, L.C., [1905] A. C. at p. 233.

(x) *Per* Lord Macnaghten, *ibid.*, at p. 234.

(y) *Wicks v. Dowell & Co.*, [1905] 2 K. B. 225.

(z) *Challis v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.*, [1905] 2 K. B. 154.

(a) *Nisbet v. Rayne*, [1910] 2 K. B. 689.

(b) [1905] 2 K. B. 232; followed in *Williams v. Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds*, [1926] 1 K. B. 497.

(c) [1905] 2 K. B. at p. 236; and now see *Yates v. South Kirby, &c., Collieries*, [1910] 2 K. B. 538. The view of Collins, M.R., that a date must be fixed was not accepted in *Selva v. Burrell*, [1921] 1 K. B. 355; and see *Carr v. Port Glasgow Burgh*, [1923] S. C. 844.

while engaged in tightening a nut with a spanner, suddenly fell down dead, and the post-mortem examination showed that the man was suffering from a very large aneurism of the aorta, and that he died from rupture of the aorta which was probably caused by his pressing heavily on the spanner, it was held by a majority of the House of Lords that this was an "accident" within the meaning of the Act of 1906 (*d*).

It is usual to insert in policies of assurance against employers' liability, clauses protecting the company against any change in the trade of the employer or of his mode of conducting it, and also a proviso obliging him to defend any action brought against him by his workman, if the company requires him so to do, and forbidding his compromising the action or paying any compensation to the workman without the consent of the directors. The policy also frequently requires the employer to give immediate notice to the company at their head office of any accident causing injury to a workman in his employ, and stipulates that time shall be of the essence of such condition. Notice by telephone to the person who introduced the employer to the company has been held not to be notice to the company within the meaning of this condition (*e*).

There are many other contracts of assurance in common use. Householders often insure themselves against losses by burglary and theft, and manufacturers against losses through riot or civil commotions as well. The conditions of such policies are similar to those of fire insurance. The rights of the parties, of course, depend on the express terms of their agreement.

Thus the policy often excludes any claim for loss by theft or robbery committed by members of the assured's household, business staff or other inmates of the insured premises (*f*). Where the policyholder was insured against the risk of "theft following upon actual forcible and violent entry upon the premises," and a thief in the early morning entered the premises by merely turning the handle of a door, it was held that the loss was not due to "actual forcible and violent entry," and therefore it was not covered by the

(*d*) *Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes*, [1910] A. C. 242.

(*e*) *Williams and Lancs., &c., Insurance Co., In re* (1903), 51 W. R. 222.

(*f*) *Saqui v. Stearns*, [1911] 1 K. B. 426.

policy (*g*). Where a burglary occurred after a proposal for burglary insurance was accepted, but before a policy had been formally executed under the seal of the company, it was held that there was a completed contract of insurance, although the policy remained in the hands of the company and nothing had yet been paid by way of premium; for the policy recited that a premium had been paid, and the insurers were therefore held to have waived prepayment (*h*).

There is another kind of insurance known as *guarantee insurance*. A common example of this is where a man seeks to enter into the employ of another, and an assurance company guarantees his honesty and fidelity. A policy is drawn up, whereby the company undertakes to recoup the employer any loss which he may suffer through the servant's dishonesty to the extent of the sum secured by the policy. The annual premium required varies with the nature of the employment, the duties to be performed and the amount of security required. These policies differ from other insurances in that innocent concealment by the assured of material facts does not avoid the contract, but if the concealment be fraudulent the contract may be set aside (*i*). Such contracts usually provide that the employer shall give notice to the company of any dishonest act of his servant within a specified time, but even without such provision the employer is bound to communicate to the insurer any knowledge or suspicion of dishonesty.

By an assurance policy of a very similar kind companies often guarantee the solvency of a trader or become sureties for the payment of the principal or interest due on any mortgage, debenture or other debt. Companies which carry on assurance business must perform certain statutory obligations in respect of deposit, audit, accounts and other matters (*k*).

(*g*) *George and Goldsmiths, &c., Insurance Association, In re* [1899] 1 Q. B. 595.

(*h*) *Roberts v. Security Co.*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 111.

(*i*) *North British Insurance Co. v. Lloyd* (1855), 10 Exch. 523; *Lee v. Jones* (1862), 17 C. B. (N.S.) 382; *Seaton v. Burnand*, [1900] A. C. 135.

(*k*) See the Assurance Companies Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7. c. 49).

CHAPTER XVI.

IMPLIED CONTRACTS AND QUASI-CONTRACTS.

If the terms of the contract are written down or declared at the time of making it, it is an express contract. But we can often infer from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties what their intentions were, although they have not stated them in so many words; and the agreement thus arrived at is an implied contract, which the law will enforce whenever the intentions of the parties are clear.

A promise will be implied in a great variety of very different circumstances. If A takes his seat in a tramcar and the car starts, he must pay the conductor at least the fare to the next stopping-place; for by his conduct he has tacitly agreed so to do. Where a person buys an article and its price is not definitely fixed, he will be deemed to have intended to pay its market value or what it is fairly worth. So if A employs B to do some business or to execute some work for him without any express agreement as to B's remuneration, it will be assumed, in the absence of special circumstances, that A intended to pay him so much as his services deserved.

The rule applies whenever one man avails himself of the benefit of any work done for him by another, although without his express authority or request. If a carpenter makes a bookcase for A under the mistaken impression that A had ordered him so to do, and the bookcase is erected in A's library and used by him, A must pay him a fair price for it. If a wine merchant sends wine to A's house, which A drinks, he must pay for it, though he never ordered it (*a*). But the rule does not apply where A cannot repudiate what was done, *e.g.*, where his shoes are mended without any request or intention on his part to have the work done. A must take his shoes as they are or not at all.

Again, if C employs D as his agent in a transaction, the law will imply an undertaking by C to indemnify D against all losses and expenses properly incurred by him in the transaction. And generally, whenever C requests D to do any lawful act which may

(*a*) Cf. *Hart. v. Mills* (1846), 15 M. & W. 85; *Ramsden v. Chessum* (1913), 110 L. T. 274.

involve him in personal liability, C will be deemed to have undertaken to indemnify D against all the natural consequences of D complying with his request (b).

Whenever A gives B an unconditional acknowledgment that he owes B a definite sum of money, such as an I O U, the acknowledgment imports a promise to pay (c). So if A owes B various sums of money and B owes A other sums of money, and the two go into their cross-accounts, setting off what A owes B against what B owes A, and then strike a balance (d), the law will imply a promise by the party against whom such balance is found to pay that amount to the other party; for otherwise the whole performance would be meaningless. Neither the acknowledgment nor the settled account needs to contain an express promise to pay, for this is implied from the conduct of the parties. In both cases, however, it will be open to the defendant to prove that there was a mistake in the figures (e), or that the money was not yet due (f), or that the consideration for the debt had failed (g), or never existed (h), or was illegal (i).

If a man pays a debt due from another without any request from him so to do, he cannot claim the money from that other; for the law does not, as a rule, allow one man to make himself the creditor of another without the latter's consent (k). But if the payment be made at the debtor's request, the law will imply a promise to repay the amount.

If A asks B to become surety for him to C and B does so, then, if B is compelled to pay the money, he can recover it from A, a promise so to pay it being implied from the request that he should become a surety (l). So if two or more persons are jointly liable for the same debt, and one of them under legal compulsion pays the debt, he is entitled to contribution from the others (m).

But a man cannot recover money which he has voluntarily paid for another, although that other might have been compelled to pay it (n). Thus if two houses, separately sub-demised, are included

(b) *Dugdale v. Lovering* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 196; *Cory & Son v. Lambton and Hetton Collieries* (1916), 86 L. J. K. B. 401.

(c) *Irving v. Veitch* (1837), 3 M. & W. 90; *Buck v. Hurst* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 297.

(d) This is called "settling an account."

(e) *Perry v. Attwood* (1856), 6 E. & B. 691; and see Lord Haldane's remarks in *Camillo Tank Steamship Co. v. Alexandria Engineering Works* (1921), 38 T. L. R. 134, at p. 137.

(f) *Lemere v. Elliott* (1861), 6 H. & N. 656.

(g) *Jacobs v. Fisher* (1845), 1 C. B. 178.

(h) *Kennedy v. Broun* (1863), 13 C. B. (N.S.) 677.

(i) *Rose v. Savory* (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. 145.

(k) *National Motor Mail Coach Co., In re*, [1908] 2 Ch., at p. 520.

(l) *Roberts v. Crowe* (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 629.

(m) *Holmes v. Williamson* (1817), 6 M. & S. 158.

(n) *Johnson v. R. M. S. P. Co.* (1867), L. R. 3 C. P. 38.

in one lease and one sub-lessee is compelled to pay the whole of the head-rent, he cannot recover anything from the other (o). And if one of two tenants in common repairs the common property, he cannot sue the other for contribution (p).

In all the above instances a promise is implied as an inference of fact. But there are many cases in which it would be absurd to pretend that either party had any intention of entering into any contract or making any promise to pay or refund money. In such cases, therefore, no contract can be implied; and yet it may be clearly just and equitable that one party should pay or refund the money in question. The law, therefore, in order to give the plaintiff a remedy, assimilates to contracts certain cases in which there clearly is no contractual relation whatever between the parties. These we may best describe as “quasi-contracts”—for that term in itself denotes that they are not contracts at all, but that the law will treat them as if they were. The remedy is analogous to, and in the form of, an action on a contract, because otherwise no remedy would exist.

The best illustration, probably, of a quasi-contract is the time-honoured instance known to the Roman Law as *Indebiti Solutio* (q). Suppose A, who owes B £5, meets C, who strongly resembles B, and thrusts the money into his hand, saying, “Here is the money I owe you.” If C retains the money paid to him in such circumstances, he commits no tort; he has made no misrepresentation; he has said nothing to lead A to suppose that he is B. Yet there clearly ought to be some remedy to compel C to refund the money. In such a case the common law of England holds this to be money had and received for the use of the person who paid it by mistake, and allows him to bring an action *quasi ex contractu* to recover it, although there is no possible ground for implying that the recipient ever promised to repay it.

The principle underlying this class of cases is explained by Lord Mansfield in *Moses v. Macferlan* (r): “This kind of equitable action, to recover back money which ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial and therefore much encouraged. It lies only for money which, *ex æquo et bono*, the defendant ought to refund. It does not lie for money paid by the plaintiff, which is claimed of him as payable in point of honour and honesty, although it could not

(o) *Hunter v. Hunt* (1845), 1 C. B. 300; *Johnson v. Wild* (1890), 40 Ch. D. 146.

(p) *Leigh v. Dickeson* (1884), 15 Q. B. D. 60.

(q) Justinian Institutes, Book III., Title xxvii., 6.

(r) (1760), 2 Burr., at p. 1012.

have been recovered from him by any course of law—as in payment of a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations, or contracted during his infancy, or to the extent of principal and legal interest upon an usurious contract, or for money fairly lost at play; because in all these cases the defendant may retain it with a safe conscience, though by positive law he was barred from recovering. But it lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for money got through imposition (express or implied), or extortion, or oppression, or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances. In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money.”

This passage from the judgment of Lord Mansfield was cited with approval in *Bradford Corporation v. Ferrand* (s) by Farwell, J., who adds, “Baron Martin, in *Freeman v. Jeffries* (t), explains actions *quasi ex contractu* thus: ‘But for a long time implied contracts have been admitted into the law, where, a transaction having taken place between parties, a state of things has arisen in reference to it which was not contemplated by them, but is such that one party ought in justice and fair dealing to pay a sum of money to the other.’”

Again, Lindley, L.J., remarks in *Rhodes, In re; Rhodes v. Rhodes* (u), that owing to the “unfortunate terminology of our law, . . . the expression ‘implied contract’ has been used to denote not only a genuine contract established by inference, but also an obligation which does not arise from any real contract, but which can be enforced as if it had a contractual origin. Obligations of this class are called by the civilians *obligationes quasi ex contractu*.” In *Birkenhead Union v. Brookes* (x), Darling, J., quoted this passage with approval, and added, “Now I understand that to mean that they are obligations, and they are imposed by the law. They do not rest upon contract at all; they do not rest upon any supposed contract at all. They rest upon . . . simple obvious justice.”

These cases, which we group under the title quasi-contracts, are of great variety. They are not true contracts; many, indeed, are more closely akin to torts; others are based upon general principles of equity. They are, however, obligations which our Courts will enforce. But we

(s) [1902] 2 Ch., at p. 662; and see the remarks of Tindal, C.J., in *Tregoning v. Attenborough* (1830), 7 Bing., at p. 98, and *Sinclair v. Brougham*, [1914] A. C., at pp. 416, 454.

(t) (1869), L. R. 4 Ex., at p. 199.

(u) (1890), 44 Ch. D., at p. 107.

(x) (1906), 95 L. T., at p. 362.

shall only in this chapter deal in any detail with those instances which fall under the three following heads:—

- (i) Money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff.
- (ii) Penal actions.
- (iii) Foreign judgments.

(i) *Money Received for the Use of the Plaintiff.*

Under the old system of pleading, the plaintiff frequently inserted in his declaration a count for money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff (*y*). This was one of the most comprehensive and elastic of the forms of action under which money could be claimed. It is still applicable wherever the defendant has received a definite sum of money which in justice and equity belongs to the plaintiff.

Whenever the plaintiff has paid money to the defendant for a consideration which has wholly failed, it may be recovered by him as money received to his use (*z*), *e.g.*, if he has paid the defendant money for a worthless cheque (*a*), or under a contract of sale which has been rescinded (*b*), or which the defendant could not complete (*c*). So if a principal has handed money to his agent for anticipated expenditure which subsequently becomes unnecessary, or if the authority of the agent be revoked before he has spent the money, the principal may recover it (*d*). In such cases, however, the failure of consideration must be complete in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover the money he had paid over to the defendant (*e*).

If the plaintiff has paid the defendant money under a mistake of fact, he may recover it back from the defendant as money received to his use (*f*).

If a man wrongfully usurps the office of another and receives

(*y*) This was one of the common counts in "*Indebitatus Assumpsit*." A "declaration" was the name formerly given to what is now called a statement of claim.

(*z*) *Straton v. Rastall* (1788), 2 T. R. 366.

(*a*) *Woodland v. Fear* (1857), 26 L. J. Q. B. 202.

(*b*) *Blackburn v. Smith* (1848), 2 Exch. 783; *Simmons v. Heseltine* (1858), 23 L. J. C. P. 129.

(*c*) *Gosbell v. Archer* (1835), 2 A. & E. 500; *Rowland v. Divall*, [1925] 2 K. B. 500; *Chillingwork v. Esche*, [1924] 1 Ch. 97.

(*d*) *Taylor v. Lendey* (1807), 9 East, 49; *Fletcher v. Marshall* (1846), 15 M. & W. 755.

(*e*) *Nicholson v. Ricketts* (1860), 29 L. J. Q. B. 55.

(*f*) *Kelly v. Solari* (1841), 9 M. & W. 54; *Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 234; *Jones v. Waring & Gillow*, [1926] A. C. 670; *British American Continental Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade*, [1926] 1 K. B. 328.

the emoluments pertaining to it, that other may recover the emoluments as money had and received to his use. Similarly, if a man receives the fees attached to an office which he holds under a void appointment, such fees may be recovered from him by the person who was validly appointed to that office (*g*). If the plaintiff has paid under protest money to the defendant in discharge of a demand illegally made upon him, he may recover it back as money had and received to his use; for example, an overcharge demanded by a carrier for carrying goods (*h*), or an excessive charge paid to the steward of a manor for admission to copyholds (*i*), or money improperly demanded as a toll (*k*).

Whenever money has been wrongfully obtained by the defendant through duress of the plaintiff's person or his goods or by any other tortious oppression, the plaintiff may waive the tort and claim the money as having been received to his use (*l*). And the same rule applies where the plaintiff's goods have been wrongfully obtained and converted by the defendant into money (*m*).

Money paid under a judgment cannot be recovered so long as the judgment remains in force, even though the plaintiff is now in a position to prove that he ought not to have had judgment against him (*n*). After a settlement under legal process it would be against public policy to allow the matter to be re-opened (*o*). But where A brought an action against B for £125 and allowed him credit on the writ for £75, which A mistakenly supposed B had paid on account, and claimed only the balance, and B paid the balance and obtained from A a receipt for the whole £125, it was held that A could recover the £75 as B knew that A had made a mistake, and had taken an improper advantage of it (*p*).

(ii) Penal Actions.

There are many acts which our ancestors desired to prohibit, but which they did not wish to constitute felonies or misdemeanours. They therefore prohibited them by passing a statute which rendered the offender liable to pay as a penalty a sum of money to be recovered from him by

(*g*) *Howard v. Wood* (1678), 2 Lev. 245; *King v. Alston* (1848), 12 Q. B. 971.

(*h*) *Ashmole v. Wainwright* (1842), 2 Q. B. 837; *Baxendale v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1858), 5 C. B. (N.S.) 309.

(*i*) *Traherne v. Gardner* (1856), 5 E. & B. 913.

(*k*) *Waterhouse v. Keen* (1825), 4 B. & C. 200.

(*l*) *Astley v. Reynolds* (1731), 2 Str. 915; *Wakefield v. Newbon* (1844), 6 Q. B. 276, 280; *Owen v. Cronk*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 265; but see *Brocklebank v. R.*, [1925] 1 K. B. 52.

(*m*) *Lamine v. Dorrell* (1705), 2 Ld. Raym. 1216; *Bavius v. London and South Western Bank*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 270.

(*n*) *Marriott v. Hampton* (1797), 7 T. R. 269; 2 Smith L. C. (12th ed.), 403.

(*o*) *Moore v. Vestry of Fulham*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 399.

(*p*) *Ward v. Wallis*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 675.

a civil action. Such an action was called a PENAL ACTION; the plaintiff was sometimes the person aggrieved by the act, sometimes the Attorney-General, but most frequently a "common informer." In order to encourage common informers to bring such actions they were, if the action succeeded, entitled to the penalty adjudged, or, as frequently happened, to keep half the penalty for themselves on paying the other half to the King (q). The statute often expressly authorised the plaintiff to bring an action of debt for the penalty. There was of course no debt, but it was convenient to treat the matter as though a debt existed. The case is therefore clearly one of quasi-contract. And in modern times statutes have frequently imposed penalties on the commission of acts which they prohibit, and direct the manner in which such penalties are to be recovered. The Attorney-General must sue for the penalty, unless the particular statute expressly allows the person aggrieved or a common informer to sue. Penal statutes are always construed restrictively (r).

Penal actions are not criminal proceedings; in form, at all events, they are civil actions; but in such actions the plaintiff has no right to administer interrogatories or to obtain discovery of documents (s).

By 2 Will. & M., Sess. 1, c. 5, any person who commits a pound breach or rescues any goods distrained for rent, whether he be the owner of the goods or not, is liable to pay treble damages, which can be recovered from him by the person aggrieved in a special action on the case.

By 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 3, any tenant or lessee, who fraudulently removes his goods in order to avoid a distress for rent by his landlord, and any person, who wilfully and knowingly aids or assists him in fraudulently removing or concealing them, is liable to pay double the value of the goods so removed or concealed, and this penalty can be recovered by the landlord by an action of debt.

So, if a tenant who has been served with a writ for the recovery of the demised premises does not forthwith give notice thereof to the landlord or his bailiff, he forfeits three years' rack rent to his

(q) The action was then called a *qui tam* action, as the informer sued *tam pro domino rege, quam pro se ipso*.

(r) See the judgment of Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B., at p. 764.

(s) *Martin v. Treacher* (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 507; *Mayor of Derby v. Derbyshire C. C.*, [1897] A. C. 550.

landlord, who may recover that sum in any Court of common law having jurisdiction for the amount (*t*).

By the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866 (*u*), it is provided that "if any member of the House of Commons votes as such in the said House . . . without having made and subscribed the oath of allegiance appointed to be taken, he shall be subject to a penalty of £500 to be recovered by action in one of Her Majesty's superior Courts."

Again, by section 41 of the County Courts Act, 1888 (*x*), every registrar, treasurer, high bailiff or other officer of any County Court, who shall be by himself or his partner, or in any way, directly or indirectly concerned as solicitor or agent for any party in any proceeding in the County Court, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the sum of £50 to any person who shall sue for the same by an action of debt.

By the Public Health Act, 1875 (*y*), any person, who, not being duly qualified to act as member of a local board, acted as such member, was liable to a penalty of £50, which could have been recovered in a Court of summary jurisdiction by any person by action of debt; but no one except the party aggrieved, or the local authority of the district in which the offence was committed, could sue for the penalty without the leave of the Attorney-General. The Local Government Act, 1894 (*z*), contains a similar provision to the effect that any person, who acts when disqualified as a member of a parish or district council or board of guardians, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £20 recoverable before justices in the manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts (*a*).

In any proceeding for an offence under the Rivers Pollution Act, 1876 (*b*), the County Court having jurisdiction in the place where the offence is committed may by summary order require the offender to abstain from the commission of the offence, and if he disobey such order the Judge may impose on him a penalty not exceeding £50 a day for every day during which he is in default payable to the person complaining, such penalty to be enforced in the same manner as any debt adjudged to be due by the Court.

Various statutes have defined the limit of time within which penal actions could be brought. By 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3, the time (unless otherwise specified by a particular statute) is, if

(*t*) Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), s. 209.

(*u*) 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19, s. 5; see *Bradlaugh v. Clarke* (1883), 8 App. Cas. 354 (in which case Mr. Bradlaugh had sat and voted without having taken the oath and had therefore clearly incurred the penalty, but it was held that a common informer could not bring an action to recover the penalty as the statute gave him no interest therein either by express words or necessary implication), and *Forbes v. Samuel*, [1913] 3 K. B. 706.

(*x*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43.

(*y*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 253.

(*z*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 73, s. 46.

(*a*) See 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 51.

(*b*) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 75, s. 10.

the action be brought by a "person grieved," limited to a period of two years from the arising of the cause of action (c).

(iii) *Foreign Judgments.*

The judgment of an English Court, as we have seen (d), cannot properly be called a contract, for it is not founded upon any agreement between the parties. A judgment imposes an obligation irrespective of the will of the party, and the judgment can itself be enforced by the various forms of execution available.

But a foreign judgment stands on a different footing (e). It can only be enforced here by bringing a second action on it, as though it were a contract. It is not a contract, but it is convenient to treat it as such. It is not strictly in this country *res judicata*, and therefore does not create an absolute estoppel. Nevertheless it is practically conclusive between the parties on the merits.

The above observations apply only to civil actions in a foreign Court. Our Courts do not enforce the penal judgments of another country. But where the foreign proceeding is in its nature both civil and criminal—*i.e.*, where the person injured by the crime can in the same proceeding recover damages from the offender—the judgment for damages can be enforced in England (f).

A foreign judgment does not create a merger so as to extinguish the original cause of action (g). Thus, it would not be a good plea to an action on the original cause of action to allege that a judgment had been obtained against the defendant in a foreign Court on the same grounds, unless the plea also alleged satisfaction by payment of the sum recovered (h). But it would be a good defence to show a judgment in a foreign Court against the plaintiff (i).

A foreign judgment for a fixed amount establishes a debt of which the foreign judgment will be at least *prima facie*

(c) See *Robinson v. Currey* (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 21; discussed in *Thomson v. Clanmorris*, [1900] 1 Ch. 718.

(d) *Ante*, p. 10.

(e) And for this purpose a Scotch, Irish or Colonial judgment is a foreign judgment. But Scotch and Irish judgments may be registered here and enforced under the Judgments Extension Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 54), without the necessity of commencing a fresh action in England. See also 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67, s. 41, sub-s. 3, and s. 73; and 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81, Part II. (colonial judgments): *Wakely v. Triumph Cycle Co.*, [1924] 1 K. B. 214.

(f) *Raulin v. Fischer*, [1911] 2 K. B. 93.

(g) *Smith v. Nicholls* (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 208; *Bank of Australasia v. Harding* (1850), 9 C. B. 661; *Bank of Australasia v. Nias* (1851), 16 Q. B. 717.

(h) *Barber v. Lamb* (1860), 29 L. J. C. P. 234.

(i) *Ricardo v. Garcias* (1845), 12 Cl. & F. 368.

evidence. Every presumption will be made in favour of such a judgment; it will be presumed that the foreign Court had jurisdiction over any matter which it entertained (*k*). It is no defence that the foreign Court made a mistake either in its own law or in ours (*l*). This is so apparently whether such a mistake appear on the face of the record or not (*m*), or whether the defendant was or was not guilty of *laches* in bringing the English law before it in evidence. For a foreign Court must be presumed to know its own law; and English law in a foreign country is a mere question of fact to be proved before the Court like any other fact (*n*), and the Court which tries the question is the best judge of facts (*o*).

But the judgment of a foreign Court may be impeached here,

- (i) if the foreign Court knowingly and perversely refused to act on the English law proved before it in matters which it acknowledged should be governed by English law (*p*); or
- (ii) if the judgment be not final and conclusive on the face of it (*q*); or
- (iii) if the judgment be "contrary to the first principles of reason and justice" (*r*). It is not sufficient to show that the plaintiff could not have succeeded if he had brought his action here. It is doubtful whether a foreign judgment upon a contract which

(*k*) *Houlditch v. Marquis of Donegal* (1834), 8 Bli. (n.s.) 301; *Henderson v. Henderson* (1844), 6 Q. B. 288.

(*l*) *Pemberton v. Hughes*, [1899] 1 Ch. 781.

(*m*) But see *Robertson v. Struth* (1844), 5 Q. B. 941.

(*n*) See *Castrique v. Imrie* (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. 414. As to proof of foreign law in England, see 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81, s. 15.

(*o*) *Bank of Australasia v. Harding*, *supra*; *Bank of Australasia v. Nias*, *supra*; *Godard v. Gray* (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 139.

(*p*) *Simpson v. Fogo* (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 657; *Reimers v. Druce* (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 196; *Munroe v. Pilkington* (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 81.

(*q*) *Frayes v. Worms* (1861), 10 C. B. (n.s.) 149; *Nouvion v. Freeman* (1890), 15 App. Cas. 1; *Macartney, In re*, [1921] 1 Ch. 522; and *Beatty v. Beatty*, [1924] 1 K. B. 807.

(*r*) *Per* Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in *Buchanan v. Rucker* (1807), 1 Camp., at p. 66; criticised by Blackburn, J., in *Schibsby v. Westenholz* (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B., at p. 160; and see 2 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), at p. 818. In *Robinson v. Fenner*, [1913] 3 K. B., at p. 844, Channell, J., expressed the opinion that the injustice relied on must be in the procedure of the foreign Court. It is not enough that the Court here should think "that the result in the particular case is unjust." See also *Scarpetta v. Lowenfeld* (1911), 27 T. L. R. 509.

by English law is illegal or immoral will be enforced in England (s). Or

- (iv) if the judgment be proved to have been obtained by fraud (t); or
- (v) if the Court had no jurisdiction over either the subject-matter of the suit or the parties (u); or
- (vi) if the defendant was not summoned, and had no notice of the proceedings (x) and therefore no opportunity of being heard—unless he voluntarily appeared and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court: by thus taking his chance of a judgment in his favour, he is bound by the Court's decision (y).

Thus, in *Ferguson v. Mahon* (z), to an action on a judgment obtained in the Court of Common Pleas in Ireland, the defendant pleaded that he had never been served with, or at any time had notice of, any process of the Court at the plaintiff's suit for the cause of action on which the judgment was obtained, and that he (the defendant) had never appeared to the action; and this plea was held good because, said Lord Denman, C.J., "when it appears, as here, that the defendant has never had notice of the proceeding or been before the Court, it is impossible for us to allow the judgment to be made the foundation of an action in this country."

A foreign Court by English law (a) has jurisdiction over—

- (i) its own subjects and all persons domiciled in that country;
- (ii) those who are resident therein at the time of commencing the suit, whether domiciled there or not: for they owe local or temporary allegiance (b);

(s) See *Santos v. Illidge* (1860), 8 C. B. (N.S.) 861, on the one hand, and such cases as *Kaufman v. Gerson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 591; *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B. 746, on the other. But all these were cases in which the original action was brought in England, not actions on a foreign judgment.

(t) *Cammell v. Sewell* (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 447; *Vadala v. Lawes* (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 310; *Codd v. Delap* (1905), 92 L. T. 510.

(u) *Pemberton v. Hughes*, [1899] 1 Ch. 781.

(x) *Rousillon v. Rousillon* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 351; see also *Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote*, [1894] A. C. 670; followed in *Emanuel v. Symon*, [1908] 1 K. B. 302; cf. *Rudd v. Rudd*, [1924] P. 72.

(y) *De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone* (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 238; *Guiard v. De Clermont*, [1914] 3 K. B. 145.

(z) (1839), 11 A. & E. 179.

(a) See the judgment of Blackburn, J., in *Schibsby v. Westenholz* (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B., at p. 161.

(b) But not as to matters of status, e.g., divorce, for which domicile is essential.

- (iii) those who were resident in the country at the time of the making of the contract or doing the act on which the proceedings are based (c);
- (iv) any one who selects that tribunal to sue in as plaintiff;
- (v) any one who voluntarily appears to defend the action (d); and also over
- (vi) any property within its jurisdiction, but not over the owner of it merely as such owner (e).

Contracting parties may confer a more extensive jurisdiction on a foreign tribunal by stipulating that its judgment shall bind them for all future time (f). They thus submit absolutely to the foreign jurisdiction. But such stipulation must be express: it cannot be implied.

The sentence of a Court of Admiralty of competent jurisdiction pronounced *in rem* is conclusive against all the world as to the existence of the ground on which the Court professes to decide, provided such ground appear clearly on the face of the sentence (g). The sentence must positively aver the facts proved before it and specifically profess to be founded on them. But though admissible and conclusive evidence of the points it thus involves, the judgment, if obtained from a foreign Court, cannot be pleaded as an estoppel.

Foreign judgments upon matters in their nature local, such as the title to land there situate, must be given the same effect here as abroad; our Courts will refuse to re-try the matter here. Similar effect must be given to any foreign judgment dealing with personal property situated in that foreign country. If it be disposed of in a manner binding according to the law of the country in which it is, that disposition is binding everywhere—unless indeed the law of that foreign country be barbarous or monstrous, or of so dangerous and unusual a character that it ought not to be recognised by other countries as giving validity to a contract of sale (h).

(c) *Douglas v. Forrest* (1828), 4 Bing. 686, 703; *Carrick v. Hancock* (1895), 12 T. L. R. 59.

(d) *Novelli v. Rossi* (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 757.

(e) See *British S. A. Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique*, [1893] A. C. 602.

(f) *Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery Co.*, [1894] A. C. 202, 213.

(g) See *Minna Craig S. S. Co. v. Chartered Mercantile Bank*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 55, 460.

(h) See the remarks of Crompton J., in *Cammell v. Sewell* (1860), 5 H. & N., at pp. 743, 744, and of Blackburn, J., in *Schibsby v. Westenholz* (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B., at p. 160; and the notes to *Duchess of Kingston's Case* (1776), 2 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), at pp. 818, 819.

ADJECTIVE LAW.

BOOK V.—PART I.

CHAPTER I.

RELIEF.

THE preceding chapters of this work have been mainly concerned with substantive rights and wrongs. In this Book we propose to deal with the procedure by which rights are enforced and wrongs redressed. This is often called Adjective Law. The law consists of rules of conduct prescribed by Substantive Law, and enforced by Adjective Law. In other words, Substantive Law deals with rights and duties, Adjective Law with remedies.

The wisest measure conferring rights or imposing duties will be inoperative if no adequate remedy be provided in case those rights are violated or those duties neglected. A defect in the machinery by which an Act of Parliament is to be enforced may render that Act a dead letter.

Often what purports to be only a change in procedure really effects a change in Substantive Law. A new remedy is created, or an old remedy is extended, to cover new cases, or a new ground of defence permitted to an inequitable claim; in each case the Substantive Law is altered. When the prætor first allowed an *exceptio doli*, when the clerks of the Chancery first issued writs *in consimili casu*, they were really altering and extending the existing Substantive Law of the realm.

Take Lord Campbell's Libel Act of 1843 (a). Up to that time it had been the rule in criminal cases that "the greater the truth, the greater the libel." There was some sense in this maxim; it meant that the truer the charge, the more likely it was to stir up angry feelings and to provoke a breach of the peace. But this result followed, that a man could be punished for publishing what was literally true. In civil proceedings the maxim did not apply; the truth of the words was always a perfect answer; no plaintiff could recover compensation for injury to a reputation to which he had no right. But in criminal proceedings, prior to 1843, the defendant was never allowed to plead that his words were true. Yet there are occasions on which it is right that the truth should be fearlessly spoken, even though some one's reputation may be injured thereby. There are other occasions on which to rake up some ancient scandal and give it publicity is a cruel act which can benefit nobody, even though the words be literally true. Hence Lord Campbell's Libel Act very sensibly provided that the truth shall be a defence to criminal proceedings, whenever it is for the public benefit that the truth should be made known. But it is clear from reading the Act that the draftsman was bent on altering the law by modifying the procedure in such prosecutions.

No right is perfect unless the person on whom it is conferred has adequate means of enforcing it. If no sufficient remedy be provided by the law, the person aggrieved will have to rely upon his own efforts. An individual ought not, as a rule, to be entrusted with the power to remedy his own wrongs, for three reasons:

(i) because he cannot safely be allowed to decide as to the fact of a wrong having been done to him; few men can be impartial judges in their own cause;

(ii) because he may lack the power of compelling recognition of his right or redress of his wrong;

(iii) because if he possesses that power, he may exercise it arbitrarily or with unnecessary force. The State, therefore, undertakes the task of determining the nature and extent of the right alleged to have been invaded, and of deciding whether or not a wrong has been done; it vindicates the party aggrieved against the aggressor, and assesses the amount of compensation due to him, or determines what other relief should be accorded. This is effected in most cases by an action at law.

(a) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96.

Self-help.

But there are certain cases in which a man is permitted to take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights himself without having recourse to litigation. Thus, as we have seen, a landlord may distrain on the goods of his tenant for rent in arrear (b). And a creditor may in many cases enforce payment of the debt due to him by exercising a lien on the goods of his debtor which are in his possession (c). So an executor or administrator may pay to himself out of the estate which he is administering any debt due from the deceased to him in his own right. There are many other cases in which a man may enforce his rights without commencing an action. The most important of these we proceed to discuss in the following order:—

Self-defence.

Expelling a trespasser.

Removing goods improperly placed on one's land.

Re-entry by an owner on his land.

Recaption, or resuming possession of one's own chattel.

Abating a private nuisance.

Distress *damage feasant*.

1. *Self-defence*.—The law permits a man in certain cases to repel force by force. If force be unlawfully used or threatened, which would harm a man, his wife, his child or his servant, he may use such moderate degree of force as is reasonably necessary to repel the attack. But the force which he employs must be proportionate to that used by his assailant, and must not exceed that which is required by the necessity of the moment; otherwise he will himself become an aggressor. If the wrongdoer has desisted, there is no occasion and therefore no right to employ force against him; such force would not be in self-defence, it would be a counter-attack (d).

(b) *Ante*, pp. 244—250.

(c) Vol. 1, pp. 26—28.

(d) *Reece v. Taylor* (1835), 4 Nev. & M. (K. B.) 469.

Similarly, if force be used to disturb a man in the peaceful possession of his land or goods, he is entitled to use force in defence of such possession.

The force used in resisting violence must be commensurate with the violence sought to be repelled. If, in defending his property, a man inflicts on the aggressor more damage than is necessary under the circumstances of the case, he is liable to an action. Thus, if a mastiff savagely attacks a spaniel, the owner of the spaniel is justified in beating off the mastiff with his stick, but not in killing him, unless he could not otherwise save his spaniel (*e*). So a man is not justified in shooting a dog which is attempting to kill one of his fowls, unless the dog is in the very act of killing the fowl and cannot be prevented from doing so by any other means (*f*).

2. *Expelling a trespasser*.—Any one who is in peaceful possession of a house or land is entitled to expel any person who trespasses thereon. But he must first request him to depart, then, if the request is not complied with, he may remove him, but only by gently laying hands upon him; if he is then resisted, it would seem that he in his turn may use sufficient force to overcome the resistance (*g*). In some cases this right to prevent by force any violent invasion of one's house or property may amount to a right even to kill the intruder, *e.g.*, where he is breaking into a house by night with intent to commit any grave felony. And this right is not confined to the master of the house; his servants, other members of his family, and even strangers who happen to be present have the same right (*h*). And where a person is lawfully in the house of another, still if he proceeds to commit a breach of the peace there, the owner or occupier of the house may gently lay hands upon him and eject him, using no more force than is necessary for that purpose.

Endeavouring to turn a man out of a house into which he has peacefully entered differs from resistance to a forcible attempt to enter in this respect. In the former case a request to leave is necessary before any force can be used to eject him; in the latter

(*e*) *Wright v. Ramscot* (1667), 1 Saunders, 84.

(*f*) *Janson v. Brown* (1807), 1 Camp. 41. As to the right of a private citizen to arrest any one who is in the act of committing a crime, see Vol. 1, pp. 485, 486.

(*g*) See *Dean v. Taylor* (1855), 11 Exch. 68; *Rimmer v. Rimmer* (1867), 16 L. T. 238.

(*h*) 1 Hale, 481, 484; Foster, 274; and see Vol. 1, p. 452.

no such request is necessary. Thus, if A forcibly enters upon B's land, B may forcibly eject him; but if A enters quietly B must first request him to leave; if he refuses to do so B may use sufficient force to remove him, and if A resists he will be guilty of an assault (i).

If a trespasser enters upon land and builds a house upon it, the owner may enter and pull down the house, although the trespasser is actually inhabiting it at the time (k).

3. *Removal of goods*.—If the goods of another be on A's land without his consent, it is his duty in the first place to communicate, if possible, with the owner of the goods and request him to remove them. If they be not removed within a reasonable time after notice, still, he has no right to destroy them or do any act which will seriously damage them, unless their presence on his land becomes a material inconvenience which prevents the use and enjoyment of his property; for such inconvenience would amount to a nuisance which he is entitled to abate (l). But he is not bound to take any care of such goods; they lie there at the owner's risk. *A fortiori*, A is not bound to take the trouble to return to B any goods which he has wrongfully placed on A's land. But A may do so if he thinks fit; and A's entering on B's land for the purpose merely of restoring to him his goods is no trespass (m).

Thus, if a parcel be left by mistake at a man's house by a postman or carrier, it is his duty to return it to a postman or to that carrier. If, however, he does not know who left the parcel at his house, but it bears a name and address so that he knows for whom it was intended, then it is his duty before he destroys it to communicate with that person, and request him to fetch his goods away. And even if there is nothing on the parcel to show for whom it is intended, still he must keep it for a reasonable time in case inquiries should be made for it. But in either case, as soon as a reasonable time has elapsed, he is no longer bound to take any care of the goods.

(i) *Wheeler v. Whiting* (1840), 9 C. & P. 262, 265.

(k) *Davison v. Wilson* (1848), 11 Q. B. 890; *Burling v. Read* (1850), *ibid.*, 904; *Jones v. Foley*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 730. But where A seeks to abate a nuisance or to assert a right of way or common, he cannot pull down a house occupied by B without notice and a demand that B should himself remove the house: see *post*, p. 322.

(l) See *post*, pp. 321, 322.

(m) *Rea v. Sheward* (1837), 2 M. & W. 424.

4. *Re-entry*.—The lawful owner of land of which another is in possession without right may enter on it, provided he is entitled by law so to enter and can do so peaceably (*n*). But he may not effect such entry “with strong hand or multitudes of people.” Such an entry was made a crime by an ancient statute (*o*). Merely breaking open the door in the absence of the wrongful possessor will not prevent the entry being peaceable (*p*). By such a peaceable entry the owner obtains once more possession of his land; and by virtue of his possession he may remove the former possessor, provided he can do so peaceably. Violence after entry in ejecting the former possessor is as much forbidden by the statute as forcible entry. But the violence merely renders the offender liable to prosecution: the entry or re-entry, if otherwise lawful, will not be made void by the violence (*q*). So a landlord is justified in entering on the demised premises and expelling a tenant on the expiration of his term (*r*).

5. *Recaption*.—Whenever a man has been wrongfully deprived of his goods, he may reclaim and seize them wherever he finds them. Such a retaking is called recaption. He may retake them wherever they may be, provided he does not thereby provoke a riot or a breach of the peace. “We will that every one shall have recourse to judgment rather than to force” (*s*). “If a man takes my goods and carries them on to his own land, I may justify my entry into the said land to take my goods again: for they came there by his own act” (*t*); and he may use reasonable force for their recaption, if the wrongful possessor resists or refuses to restore his goods (*u*).

(*n*) *R. v. Wilson* (1835), 3 A. & E. 817, 824; *Harvey v. Bridges* (1847), 1 Exch. 261; *Beddall v. Maitland* (1881), 17 Ch. D. 174.

(*o*) 5 Rich. 2, st. 1, c. 7; see Vol. 1, pp. 452, 456.

(*p*) *Turner v. Meymott* (1823), 1 Bing. 158.

(*q*) *Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club*, [1920] 1 K. B. 720.

(*r*) *Taunton v. Costar* (1797), 7 T. R. 431.

(*s*) Statute of Gloucester, 1278 (6 Edw. 1, c. 8).

(*t*) *Viner's Abridgment*, Trespass, I. (a); cited by Parke, B., in *Patrick v. Colerick* (1838), 3 M. & W., at p. 485; and see *Burridge v. Nicholetts* (1861), 6 H. & N. 383.

(*u*) Such, at least, is the law laid down in *Blades v. Higgs* (1861), 10 C. B. (N.S.) 713; and see Pollock and Wright on Possession, at p. 115; Britton, vol. i., 57, 116. But this case is of very doubtful authority. It was, however, followed

If the taking away was felonious, the owner may even enter on the land of a third person to resume possession of his property, unless such third person has acquired a good title to the goods. If the taking was not felonious and the goods are now on the land of a third person (not the original taker), the owner must first demand his goods: if on demand they be refused, he may enter and take them. Again, if such goods come upon another's land by accident, *e.g.*, if a tree be blown down or fruit drop from a tree, the owner may enter on the other's land and resume possession of his property (*x*). The same rule applies where loppings of trees necessarily fall on the land of another (*y*).

6. *Abatement of Nuisance*.—Again, if it can be done, a private nuisance may be abated by the party whom it injures. It has, however, been held that under certain circumstances notice must be given before abating a private nuisance to the person on whose land it exists (*z*). “Where the person complaining of the nuisance could only get rid of it by going on to the soil of his neighbour . . . he cannot justify going on to the soil of his neighbour to remove the nuisance—except in a case of emergency—unless he has first given his neighbour notice to remove it” (*a*). But the person aggrieved need not give any notice to the offending party, if he can abate the nuisance without entering on that other's land. If, however, there is a question of right to be tried, the more reasonable course is to give notice (*b*).

The law is not the same in the case of a public nuisance. To justify a private individual in abating a public nuisance on his own authority, he must show that it did him a

by Lord Russell, C.J., in 1898 in the unreported case of *Himmelspring v. The Singer Manufacturing Co.* But the law undoubtedly permits a man whose property has been stolen to follow the thief “in hot pursuit” and retake his property at once by force.

(*x*) See the remarks of Tindal, C.J., in *Anthony v. Haneys* (1832), 8 Bing., at p. 192. But the right was queried in *Miles v. Brooker*, [1919] 1 K. B., at p. 558.

(*y*) *Millen v. Hawery* (1624), Latch, 13. As to the somewhat analogous right of stopping *in transitu* goods which have been sold, but have not yet come into the possession of the purchaser, see *ante*, p. 155.

(*z*) *Jones v. Williams* (1843), 11 M. & W. 176.

(*a*) *Per* Lord Herschell, L.C., in *Lemmon v. Webb*, [1895] A. C., at p. 5.

(*b*) See the remarks of James, L.J., in *Commissioners of Sewers v. Glassey* (1872), L. R. 7 Ch., at p. 464.

special injury; he can only interfere with it as far as may be necessary to exercise his right of passing along the highway with reasonable convenience and not because the obstruction happens to be there (c). It is true that Blackstone laid it down that "if a new gate be erected across the public highway, which is a common nuisance, any of the King's subjects passing that way may cut it down and destroy it" (d), but "a private individual can abate a nuisance" only "where necessary to exercise a right" (e).

In *Lemmon v. Webb* (f), the House of Lords decided that, where branches of trees growing on A's land overhang the land of B, B is entitled to remove those branches without notice to A, for the act of removing the branches is done on B's land and therefore does not involve a trespass. In *Perry v. Fitzhove* (g), where a cottage had been erected on a common, it was held that a commoner whose rights were thereby infringed need not give notice to the offending party before pulling down the cottage, unless it was in actual occupation. "An act done under such circumstances would probably be dangerous to human life and calculated in the highest degree to excite violence and breach of the peace. The law will not permit any man to pursue his remedy at such a risk" (h). In this case there was no allegation in the pleadings that notice had been given. It was afterwards held in *Davies v. Williams* (i), on similar facts, that a commoner, after notice and request to the offender to remove the house, may pull it down although the house is actually occupied at the time.

Although in all these cases the person aggrieved may, if he thinks fit, take the law into his own hands and abate the nuisance, yet he is not bound to do so; he may bring an action whenever his rights have been infringed. He is not bound to abate the nuisance himself (k).

7. *Distress damage feasant*.—We have already dealt with the right of a landlord to distrain the goods of his

(c) See *Dimes v. Petley* (1850), 15 Q. B. 276; *Bateman v. Bluck* (1852), 18 Q. B. 870.

(d) 3 Bla. Com. 5.

(e) *Per Cockburn, C.J.*, in *Arnold v. Holbrook* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B., at p. 100.

(f) [1895] A. C. 1.

(g) (1846), 8 Q. B. 757.

(h) *Per Lord Denman, C.J.*, *ibid.*, at p. 776; and see *per Lush, J.*, in *Lascelles v. Lord Onslow* (1877), 2 Q. B. D., at p. 447.

(i) (1851), 16 Q. B. 546; approved in *Lane v. Capsey*, [1891] 3 Ch. 411. See also *Burling v. Read* (1850), 11 Q. B. 904.

(k) See *Smith v. Giddy*, [1904] 2 K. B. 448; *Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board* (1878), 4 Ex. D. 5.

tenant for rent in arrear (*l*). But there is another right possessed by the owner of land called distress of cattle, &c., *damage feasant*. If cattle or other animals be on a man's land, eating the grass or otherwise doing damage either to the land or to other animals thereon, he may seize them without legal process, place them in a pound, and retain them therein till he is compensated for the injury which he has sustained. This remedy applies also to inanimate things, such as a locomotive, or turves placed on a man's land without his permission and encumbering it (*m*). But things in actual use may not be distrained lest a breach of the peace should ensue (*n*).

The distress may be made either during the day or night, but it must be made while the cattle are still actually trespassing or the goods are still encumbering the ground. It can be made only for the amount of damage done at the time when it is levied (*o*). The same cattle can be distrained again for fresh damage if found trespassing again. But, if after A's cattle have been trespassing on B's land A regains possession of them before B has notice of the damage which they have done, B cannot enter A's land and forcibly seize the cattle; his only remedy is to bring an action for damages against A. The animals distrained may be driven to any pound within the hundred, or to any pound outside the hundred which is within the shire though not more than three miles from the place where the distress is taken (*p*). The pound must be in a fit condition to receive the animals distrained (*q*), and while there they must be supplied with food and water (*r*).

In many mercantile matters also the parties adjust their legal rights without having recourse to litigation. In some professions and trades there is a kind of "domestic tribunal," which settles disputes between the members arising out of any professional or trade matter. Thus the General Medical Council has power to deal with all charges of professional misconduct made against a registered medical practitioner. The Benchers of any Inn of Court have power to disbar any barrister of that Inn who has been

(*l*) *Ante*, pp. 244—250.

(*m*) *Ambergate Ry. Co. v. Midland Ry. Co.* (1853), 2 E. & B. 793; *Bromhall v. Norton* (1682), Sir T. Jones Rep. 193.

(*n*) *Stovey v. Robinson* (1795), 6 T. R. 138.

(*o*) *Vaspor v. Edwards* (1701), 12 Mod. 658.

(*p*) *Coaker v. Willcocks*, [1911] 2 K. B. 124, interpreting 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 12, s. 1.

(*q*) *Wilder v. Speer* (1838), 8 A. & E. 547.

(*r*) Protection of Animals Act, 1911, s. 7.

guilty of professional misconduct (s). The Discipline Committee of the Law Society is a statutory body, to whom is entrusted the duty of inquiring into any complaint against a solicitor and the power, if necessary, of striking the offender off the rolls (t). The Committee of the Stock Exchange has also stringent powers over its members.

Again, in many partnership deeds, in most policies of life, fire, accident and marine insurance and in many other mercantile contracts, the parties insert a provision that any dispute arising thereunder shall be submitted to arbitration. Such an arbitration clause often makes the obtaining of an award under it a condition precedent to any right of action on the contract containing it (u).

The clause usually states how the arbitrator is to be appointed; in some cases he is to be nominated by some named person or person holding a specified office; in other cases, it is provided that each party shall appoint an arbitrator, and that the two arbitrators before entering on their work shall agree upon an umpire, who shall be called in if they differ and whose decision shall be final. The procedure in such an arbitration is regulated by the Arbitration Act, 1889 (x). The arbitrator (or umpire) has full power to examine witnesses on oath or affirmation, and to compel the parties to produce books and documents. He has also full discretion with regard to costs. The proceedings are not public.

Such an arbitration is outside the Courts, yet it is to some extent under the supervision of the High Court. For instance, if the parties cannot agree upon an arbitrator, or the arbitrator or umpire refuses to act or becomes incapable or dies, either party may serve a notice upon the other to make the necessary appointment, and if the appointment is not made within seven days the Court may, on application, make the appointment (y). It can remove an arbitrator for misconduct and, if necessary, set the award aside (z). The

(s) See *post*, Book VI., Chap. VIII., Barristers.

(t) See *post*, Book VI., Chap. VIII., Solicitors.

(u) *Woodfall v. Pearl Assurance Co.*, [1919] 1 K. B. 593.

(x) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49.

(y) *Ibid.*, s. 5, and see section 6.

(z) *Ibid.*, s. 11. See *Produce Brokers' Co. v. Blyth & Co.* (1918), 119 L. T.

Court also has power to issue *subpœnas* to compel unwilling witnesses to attend before the arbitrator (a). It can even extend the time agreed upon for his making the award. Where an award is bad on the face of it, the Court may set it aside. The arbitrator can also, if he chooses, state a case for the opinion of the Court on any point of law.

The award may be enforced in the same way as a judgment. The successful party applies by originating summons asking for "leave to enforce the award dated — in the above arbitration in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect," and upon production of the award and a copy of it together with an affidavit verifying them the Master will make an order. The order must be drawn up before execution can issue upon it.

Should either party, contrary to his agreement, have recourse to litigation and issue a writ instead of appointing his arbitrator, the other party may, if he wishes, at once take out a summons to stay all proceedings in the action. But he must do so promptly; he waives his right of objection, if, before applying for such a stay, he takes any step in the action (b). Thus, if the defendant attends on the hearing of the plaintiff's summons for directions, or appeals from any order made against him, or applies for particulars or security for costs, or a *fortiori* delivers a defence, he takes a "step in the action." But merely writing to the plaintiff for further time to plead will not preclude the defendant from applying for a stay (c).

These arbitrations by consent must be carefully distinguished from compulsory references. A Master or Judge has power in many cases after an action has been commenced to order all matters in dispute in the action to be referred to an official or special referee, whether the parties consent to such a course or not, and although there is no arbitration clause in the contract between them. An official referee is an officer of the Court, whose duties are defined in a later chapter (d). A special referee is a practising barrister or surveyor or other person, nominated by the parties to an action or by the Judge or Master after action brought. Such referee, whether official or special, has all the powers of an arbitrator mentioned above (e).

(a) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, s. 8.

(b) See the remarks of Cave, J., in *Rein v. Stein* (1892), 66 L. T., at p. 471.

(c) But it will be otherwise, if he takes out a summons to the like effect: *Ford's Hotel Co. v. Bartlett*, [1896] A. C. 1. See Odgers on Pleading and Practice (8th ed.), at pp. 222, 223. As to an agreement to refer which wholly ousts the jurisdiction of the Court, see *post*, p. 531.

(d) *Post*, pp. 362—366.

(e) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 88 *et seq.*, repealing 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, ss. 13—17.

CHAPTER II.

THE HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF LAW.

WE now draw a sharp distinction between Courts of civil and Courts of criminal jurisdiction. In the former, contracts are enforced, debtors are compelled to pay the money which they owe, and wrongdoers to compensate those whom they have injured; so that the proceedings, if successful, end in a judgment that the defendant shall pay the plaintiff so much money or that the plaintiff shall have some other appropriate relief. The object of criminal proceedings, on the other hand, is to punish offenders. Hence these proceedings, if the accused is convicted, terminate in a sentence which may inflict fine or imprisonment on the offender or, in a few cases, even death. Civil and criminal proceedings, then, are essentially different both in their objects and in their results; and for each purpose our Courts usually hold distinct and separate sittings.

But this was not always so. In early times nearly all our Courts had jurisdiction over some matters which we should now classify as criminal, as well as over some which we should call civil. Indeed, in early times the distinction between a tort and a crime was not clearly understood. There was but little purely civil litigation. Contracts of record or under seal, and contracts for the payment of a sum certain, were the only contracts which the Courts enforced in the reigns of our Norman and Plantagenet kings (a). Most of their time was taken up with suits relating to land and the services due to the king or some other lord in respect of land.

At the time of the Norman conquest the most important

(a) The action of *assumpsit*, though not unknown in the days of Henry VI., did not come into real use till the reign of Henry VII., and its great extension took place under Lord Mansfield in the eighteenth century.

tribunal in England was the Shire-gemôt or County Meeting. This Court took cognisance of felonies, breaches of the peace, nuisances and other offences which concerned the State, as well as of actions involving title to lands and other civil suits which concerned only the individual suitors; it also heard appeals from inferior tribunals, such as the Hundred Court. In Saxon times the County Court met twice or thrice a year. In the thirteenth century in the larger counties it met every month.

Under Henry II. the justices *in eyre* began to make their circuits through the land, and tried the more important civil and criminal cases in the County Court, which on these occasions assembled in full session to meet them. Dugdale tells us that this was done "to the end that the people might have justice with more ease administered to them upon all occasions, and consequently the better attend their domestick affairs" (b). The King's Judges came down into the county to try the cases in the County Court, because the jurisdiction to deal with crimes was essentially local.

By the Assize of Clarendon, 1166, all landowners were obliged to attend twice a year to meet the King's justices. This was the origin of the county Assizes. To this day the King's Judges still come twice or oftener a year into every county in England. All indictable offences, whether treasons, felonies or misdemeanours, can be tried at the Assizes; so can any civil action, which can be brought in the King's Bench or Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, and also any probate action.

Each county had from very early times two officers—the shire-reeve or sheriff, and the coroner. Each of these officers had his own Court, apart from the County Court. In every hundred of a county a "Court leet" was held at least once a year, and the sheriff also held his "tourn," which was the grand Court leet for the county. Both these Courts had a limited criminal jurisdiction; in both "a view of frankpledge" was taken (c). Moreover, in each county

(b) *Origines Juridiciales*, p. 51.

(c) The sheriff's tourn was abolished in 1887; but a court leet may still be held in many manors and in a few boroughs until the full operation of the L. P. Act, 1922, has put an end to them.

there were many manors, in which the lord of the manor had jurisdiction in minor matters both civil and criminal to the exclusion of the Hundred Court. The freehold tenants were bound to attend the Court baron of the manor; the copyhold tenants were bound to attend the customary Court. In many manors there was also held a Court leet over which the lord, or in his absence the steward, of the manor presided.

Wholly apart from these petty local Courts, certain of the landed gentry were from time to time appointed in the interests of the public safety to be "conservators of the peace." They were at first chosen by the freeholders of the county, but after 1327 by the Crown (*d*). Then, in 1360, "justices of the peace" were appointed by the King for each county. Under the statute 34 Edw. 3, c. 1, the primary duty of these officers was, as their name indicates, to preserve the peace. Larger powers, however, were from time to time assigned to them by the King in their "commission" (*e*). The form of the commission of justices of the peace was settled by the Judges in the time of Queen Elizabeth; it has remained substantially the same ever since. A vast number of modern statutes have enormously increased the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, who now regularly hold their petty sessional Courts in every division of each county (*f*). Many boroughs have a separate commission of the peace.

From the great meetings of the County Court at which the King's justices *in eyre* were present sprang, as we have seen, the Assizes. But the ordinary meetings of the County Court, which the King's justices did not attend, still continued; and at these, though the sheriff presided, all the freeholders of the county were still in theory the Judges. Edward III., however, who appointed justices of the peace for each county, enacted that they should meet at least

(*d*) There is much learning as to conservators of the peace in the exhaustive judgment of Lord Camden C.J., in *Entick v. Carrington* (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1030.

(*e*) See the remarks of Lord Denman, C.J., in *R. v. Dunn* (1840), 12 A. & E. at p. 617.

(*f*) See *post*, pp. 340,--342.

four times a year (*g*); and the ordinary meetings of the County Court appear soon to have merged in these quarterly meetings of justices, which we now know as the Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the County. Words were inserted in the commission of justices of the peace authorising any two or more of them (*h*) to “hear and determine all and singular the felonies, poisonings, enchantments, sorceries, arts magic, trespasses, forestallings, regratings, ingrossings, extortions, unlawful assemblies, indictments . . . and the same offenders, and every one of them, for their offences . . . to chastise and punish. . . . Provided always, that, if a case of difficulty upon the determination of any of the premises before you, or any two or more of you, shall happen to arise, then let judgment in nowise be given thereon before you, and any two or more of you, unless in the presence of one of our justices of the one or other bench, or of one of our justices appointed to hold the Assizes in the aforesaid county” (*i*). The Court of Quarter Sessions, it will be observed, was not to encroach upon the Assizes.

And at the present day the Courts of Quarter Sessions cannot try any crime which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life (except burglary); many other grave offences, such as perjury and forgery, are also excepted (*k*). These sessions are held at least four times a year in each county. The justices of the peace for the county—unpaid laymen—are the Judges.

As soon as the doctrine of the King’s peace became established, any crime which the prosecutor could reasonably allege to be “against the peace of our lord the King” had, with a few exceptions, to be tried either at the Assizes or in the Court of Quarter Sessions; the sheriff no longer dealt with it in the ancient County Court, which therefore gradually fell into disuse for criminal purposes. And after the Statute of Gloucester, 1278, no civil case could be tried

(*g*) 25 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. 7; 36 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. 12.

(*h*) Provided one was of the *quorum*, *i.e.*, one of certain senior justices specially named in the commission.

(*i*) See the form of the commission in Burn’s Justice of the Peace (30th ed.), Vol. III., pp. 111, 112; and in Dickinson’s Quarter Sessions (6th ed.), p. 79.

(*k*) See *post*, pp. 344–345.

there, if the amount claimed exceeded 40s. The ancient County Court, however, still continued to assemble for civil purposes; but its jurisdiction had become almost obsolete, when the County Court Act of 1846 (*l*) was passed. This Act created the modern County Court, which has nothing to do with the old County Court and is held in every town of any size in England at least six times a year, and has a limited jurisdiction in civil cases (*m*).

So much for the counties. But even in Anglo-Saxon times, cities such as Winchester, York and London had acquired the right of holding Courts of their own. In these Courts an officer appointed by the citizens themselves decided all civil disputes which arose within the limits of the city, and also exercised some criminal jurisdiction over the citizens. In less important towns, however, it was found difficult to exclude the jurisdiction of the County Court. But in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the policy of the Crown was to strengthen the towns in order to create a counterpoise to the power of the nobles (*n*). The three Edwards and Richard II. granted to many boroughs and to a few other privileged areas (called "liberties") charters, which created Courts of criminal and in some cases also of civil jurisdiction. The citizens were proud of these local Courts, for they were a badge of their independence. Some of them have fallen into disuse; from the others are directly descended our present Borough Courts of Quarter Sessions (*o*) and our Civil Borough Courts of Record (*p*).

Courts of Borough Quarter Sessions are now held in a great number of our larger cities and towns. As their name indicates, they are held at least four times a year and have the same criminal jurisdiction and adopt the same procedure as the Court of Quarter Sessions in a county. The Judge of each of these Courts is called a Recorder. In some of these cities or towns there is also held a Borough Court of Record of civil jurisdiction—such for instance, as the Mayor's Court, London, the Court of

(*l*) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95.

(*n*) For a brief history of the rise of the boroughs, see Odgers on Local Government (2nd ed.), pp. 70—80.

(*o*) See *post*, pp. 342—346.

(*m*) See *post*, pp. 385 *et seq.*

(*p*) See *post*, p. 391.

Passage at Liverpool, the Salford Court of Record, and the Tolzey Court at Bristol. The jurisdiction of these Courts is generally limited to causes of action arising within the borough, but unlimited as to the amount which can be claimed in the action (*q*). Of most of them the Recorder of the borough is the Judge. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have each its own Court, over which the Vice-Chancellor presides.

In addition to local jurisdiction there were established under the Plantagenets other Courts having jurisdiction throughout the realm, viz., the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer (*r*), which for many centuries were the three superior Courts of common law at Westminster.

By the side of these Courts of law there arose the Court of Chancery, in which the Lord Chancellor exercised equitable jurisdiction. The Courts of common law and of equity flourished side by side, though they were in many respects at variance with each other. Indeed, a plaintiff often obtained judgment in a Court of law on a set of facts upon which he would have been utterly defeated in a Court of equity; and it sometimes happened that parties in the course of the same litigation were driven backwards and forwards from Courts of equity to Courts of law (*s*).

Nor did harmony always prevail between the three Courts of common law at Westminster. Each had its own procedure, each its exclusive jurisdiction. The Court of Exchequer had an equitable jurisdiction; but this was eventually transferred to the Court of Chancery (*t*). It is impossible to trace here the history and development of these Courts or to describe the fictions by which the Courts of King's Bench and Exchequer filched actions from the Court of Common Pleas. All necessity for such devices was at last removed by the Uniformity of Process Act, 1832 (*u*), which gave to all three superior Courts at Westminster

(*q*) See *post*, p. 391.

(*r*) As to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer, see next page.

(*s*) See Report of the Chancery Commission, 1852, pp. 1, 3.

(*t*) 5 Vict. c. 5; and see Younge & Collyer's Reports in Equity.

(*u*) 2 Will. 4, c. 39. This Act created the modern writ of summons.

collateral jurisdiction over suits between private persons—a jurisdiction which originally belonged exclusively to the Court of Common Pleas. It also simplified and harmonised the procedure of all three Courts, though certain matters still remained within the exclusive cognisance of each. Further efforts in this direction were made by the Common Law Procedure Acts, 1852, 1854 and 1860 (x).

Again, by the end of the eighteenth century the Court of Chancery had become more technical, if that were possible, than the Courts of common law themselves. Its procedure had ceased to be elastic; it would only grant relief in certain specified cases. A plaintiff, who had undoubtedly a strong moral claim, was constantly told that he had no equity. Cumbersome procedure, technical pleadings and preposterous rules of evidence caused the suitors much vexation of spirit, much unnecessary expense and, worst of all, intolerable delay. “Lord Eldon and the Court of Chancery pressed heavily upon mankind.” Attempts were made from time to time to deal with this state of things by legislation, notably by the Master in Chancery Abolition Act and the Chancery Procedure Act, both of 1852 (y), and the Consolidated Orders in Chancery of 1845 and 1860. Finally, the superior Courts of common law and equity were united by the Judicature Act, 1873 (z), carried through Parliament by Lord Selborne, then Lord Chancellor, with the assistance of Lord Cairns, his opponent in politics. This Act created the Supreme Court of Judicature. This Court consists of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal, both of which are Superior Courts of Record. To the High Court of Justice was transferred every jurisdiction which had formerly been vested in, or capable of being exercised by, any of the following Courts:—

- (1) The High Court of Chancery, as a common law Court as well as a Court of Equity, including the jurisdiction of the Master of the Rolls, as a Judge

(x) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 126.

(y) 15 & 16 Vict. cc. 80, 86.

(z) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66. It came into force on November 1, 1875. It has now been replaced by the Judicature Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49).

or Master of the Court of Chancery, and any jurisdiction exercised by him in relation to the Court of Chancery as a common law Court;

- (2) The Court of Queen's Bench;
- (3) The Court of Common Pleas at Westminster;
- (4) The Court of Exchequer, as a Court of Revenue, as well as a common law Court;
- (5) The High Court of Admiralty;
- (6) The Court of Probate;
- (7) The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes;
- (8) The Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster;
- (9) The Court of Pleas at Durham;
- (10) The Courts created by Commissioners of Assize, of Oyer and Terminer and of Gaol Delivery, or any of such Commissioners (a);

and subsequently in 1883—

- (11) The London Court of Bankruptcy.

To the Court of Appeal were transferred all jurisdiction and powers of the following Courts:—

- (1) The Court of Appeal in Chancery;
- (2) The Court of Appeal in Chancery of the County Palatine of Lancaster;
- (3) The Court of the Lord Warden of the Stannaries;
- (4) The Court of Exchequer Chamber;
- (5) The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upon appeal from any judgment or order of the High Court of Admiralty;

and many other minor appellate jurisdictions.

The High Court of Justice now consists of three Divisions:—

The King's Bench Division.

The Chancery Division.

The Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.

Originally by the Judicature Act each of the three Superior Courts of common law was made a separate division of the High Court of Justice, but by an Order in Council dated December 16, 1880, the Common Pleas and Exchequer

(a) Judicature Act, 1873, s. 16.

Divisions were merged in the Queen's Bench Division, and the offices of Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Division and Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer Division abolished.

Each Division of the High Court is clothed with every jurisdiction and power possessed by the Courts which were merged in it by the Judicature Act. That Act enabled the Courts of common law to give, in addition to the ordinary legal remedies, any relief which the Court of Chancery could formerly have given (*b*). Law and equity are now administered concurrently. Every Court applies the same principles of law and equity to the actual facts of the case; every Court has power to grant whatever form of relief the nature of the case may require, whether legal or equitable. This was the greatest and most beneficial law reform of the long reign of Queen Victoria. On December 4, 1882, outward expression was given to the fusion of law and equity by physically uniting the Courts in one building—the Royal Courts of Justice.

The ancient County Courts, though retaining in theory some small civil jurisdiction, were almost obsolete before the commencement of the nineteenth century. Their place had in certain localities been taken by Courts of Requests, established by Act of Parliament at the special request of the inhabitants (*c*). By the year 1800, fifty-four such Courts had been established by fifty-four separate Acts of Parliament, the first of which was passed in the reign of James I. These Courts collected small debts only; they were of very varying degrees of efficiency; they had jurisdiction only in small causes up to £2; and were wholly inadequate to the needs of their districts. There were also in existence Courts leet and Courts baron, which still possessed some civil jurisdiction in cases concerning land.

It is largely to the influence of Jeremy Bentham (*d*) that we owe our present County Court system. He warmly and

(*b*) See the judgment of Lord Watson in *Ind, Coope & Co. v. Emmerson* (1887), 12 App. Cas. at p. 308.

(*c*) These Courts must be distinguished from the ancient Court of Requests, which came into existence in the reign of Henry VII., and was abolished in 1640.

(*d*) He was born in 1748 and died in 1832; he was made a Bencher of Lincoln's Inn in 1817.

constantly advocated the establishment of local Courts within at the most half-a-day's journey from the home of every individual—Courts which should be readily accessible in every month of the year and which should deal out every kind of justice to the local suitors. Each Court, he urged, should consist of a single Judge, a trained lawyer, who should be responsible for every step of the proceedings from beginning to end, and have all necessary powers vested in him for that purpose. Such was Bentham's dream; but it was not till Queen Victoria was on the throne that any Court of the kind was called into existence. In the year 1833, a Royal Commission recommended the establishment of a general system of local Courts for the recovery of small debts. After several abortive attempts, Lord Cottenham, as Lord Chancellor, carried the Act of 1846, which created the modern County Courts (*e*). Though they were called County Courts, they did not adopt either the constitution or the procedure of the ancient County Court (the oldest of our law Courts). At first, these new Courts had jurisdiction only in common law cases where the amount in dispute did not exceed £20, and even as to these there were several important exceptions. In 1850 the limit was raised to £50 (*f*), and more effectual means were taken to deter plaintiffs from bringing petty cases into the superior Courts. In 1856 the County Courts were enabled to try almost any question by consent of both parties; while, on the other hand, a case within the limits might be removed into a superior Court at the will of the defendant on his giving security for costs. In 1857 their jurisdiction was extended to actions relating to wills or intestacy, where the property in dispute did not exceed £200 if personal, £300 if real. In 1865 they were empowered to deal with equitable claims of every kind, so long as the amount involved did not exceed £500. Later Acts have added jurisdiction in Bankruptcy and in some districts in Admiralty. Thus have been built up the County Courts of to-day, which are an inestimable boon to our poorer suitors.

(*e*) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95.

(*f*) It is now £100; see *post*, p. 386.

Until the middle of the last century there also flourished in England and Wales many Ecclesiastical Courts. Chief among these were the Prerogative Court for wills and administrations, the Court of Arches for appeals from inferior Ecclesiastical Courts in the Province of Canterbury, the Court of Peculiars (a branch of the Court of Arches), a Faculty Court, which granted dispensations to marry, and a Court of Delegates for ecclesiastical affairs. Most of these were held at Doctors' Commons, which lay close to St. Paul's Cathedral. There was also a Consistory Court in each diocese except that of Canterbury. But in 1857 the Ecclesiastical Courts were shorn of their most important functions. Their jurisdiction as to wills and as to the distribution of personal property on intestacy was transferred to a newly created Court of Probate (*g*); some subordinate jurisdiction was, as we have seen, vested in the County Courts. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts in matters arising between husband and wife was transferred to the new Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes (*h*). So that now the Ecclesiastical Courts deal only with clergymen of the Established Church in their professional character (*i*).

Bankruptcy was unknown to the common law—it is purely the creation of statute. If a man could not pay his debts, he was imprisoned until some person paid them for him. In the seventeenth century bankruptcy was introduced for traders, and in the early part of the eighteenth century various statutes were passed for the relief of insolvent debtors. At first all business under these statutes was entrusted to commissioners appointed separately for each case. A number of permanent commissioners were appointed in 1831 for the London district, and afterwards for county districts also, each of whom could act separately, when once set in motion by the *fiat* of the Lord Chancellor, but subject to the control, first of a Court of

(*g*) Court of Probate Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 77); amended by 21 & 22 Vict. c. 95.

(*h*) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85).

(*i*) See Vol. I, pp. 232, 233.

Review in Bankruptcy, and afterwards of one of the Vice-Chancellors. This arrangement was considerably modified in 1861, and in 1869 imprisonment for debt was abolished altogether, except in the case of a dishonest person who can pay his debts, but refuses to do so. In the same year the commissioners were all abolished; bankruptcies in the country were transferred to the County Courts, and a new Court was created to deal with bankruptcies in London, which was called the London Court of Bankruptcy (*k*).

Prior to the year 1908 a person who was convicted of a crime on an indictment had no right of direct appeal. If he was acquitted, there was an end of the proceedings; he could never be placed on his trial again for the same offence. Moreover, a prisoner had always many opportunities of raising any point of law. On his arraignment he could demur to the indictment. At any stage of the proceedings before verdict he could move to quash the indictment. After verdict he could move in arrest of judgment. And even after judgment, if the defect on which he relied appeared on the face of the record, he might apply to the Attorney-General for leave to issue a writ of error, which could be argued in the Court of King's Bench (or later in the King's Bench Division), and taken thence even up to the House of Lords (*l*). But if there was no point of law which the prisoner could raise in his defence, and the jury found him guilty on the facts, their decision was final. He could obtain no new trial (*m*); nor could he appeal against the severity of his sentence. His only chance, apart from the reservation of a case, dealt with in the next paragraph, was that the Home Secretary might possibly be induced to advise the King to pardon (*n*) him or to remit some portion of his punishment.

(*k*) The jurisdiction of this Court was transferred to the Supreme Court of Judicature in 1883 by the Bankruptcy Act of that year (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, ss. 92—94), and is exercised by the High Court of Justice. The Act now in force is 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59 (1914), as amended 1926 (16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 7).

(*l*) See, for example, *R. v. Bradlaugh and Besant* (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 569; (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 607.

(*m*) Except in the case of a misdemeanour tried at bar in the Court of King's Bench.

(*n*) The objection to a pardon is that it necessarily assumes the correctness of the conviction.

It sometimes happened that a Judge had to decide a point of law on circuit, away from his books. He might come to the conclusion that, if certain facts were proved to the satisfaction of the jury, the prisoner had committed a crime, and he would then direct the jury, on proof of those facts, to find the prisoner guilty. Should the Judge, however, have any doubt as to the correctness of his decision, he would often, after sentencing the prisoner, suspend punishment until he had consulted his brother Judges at Serjeants' Inn. Then, in the year 1848, a Judge was empowered by statute (o) to "state a case"—that is, to briefly state the facts on which the point of law arose—for the opinion of a Court which was created in that year, and known as the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved. If he thought fit to do so, sentence was usually passed, but respited until the point of law was decided on the case stated. If the Court for Crown Cases Reserved thought that the point of law had been wrongly decided at the trial, the verdict would be set aside and the conviction quashed. But a case could only be stated on a point of law; and there was no power, even on a point of law, to compel a Judge to state a case if he declined to do so. No Court, moreover, had any power in a criminal case to review or vary the finding of a jury on any question of fact.

This state of things led to the passing of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 (p). That Act created the Court of Criminal Appeal, which is a Superior Court of Record. It abolished the writ of error and the Court for Crown Cases Reserved (q). It is still, however, possible for a Judge, a recorder or a chairman of Quarter Sessions to state a case for the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal; and a prisoner can still, at successive stages of his trial, demur, move to quash the indictment, or move in arrest of judgment, but in actual practice he now invariably raises any point of law by way of appeal.

(o) The Crown Cases Reserved Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 78).

(p) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23. This Act came into operation on April 19, 1908; it does not extend to Scotland or Ireland.

(q) *Ibid.*, s. 20.

CHAPTER III.

CRIMINAL COURTS.

OUR ordinary criminal Courts are now :—

1. Petty Sessions.
2. Quarter Sessions.
3. The Assizes.
4. The Central Criminal Court.
5. The King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice.
6. The Court of Criminal Appeal.

Peers who are charged with treason, felony, or misprision are tried either in—

7. The House of Lords, or
8. The Court of the Lord High Steward.

Appeals in criminal matters from the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, the Empire of India, and the Colonies are heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which advises the King thereon.

1. *Petty Sessions.*

These Courts are composed of justices of the peace, whose office dates, as we have seen, from 1327 (*a*). The executive powers of a justice of the peace rest in the main upon the terms of his commission from the King, which empowers him singly to conserve the peace, to suppress riots and affrays, to take security for keeping the peace, and to apprehend criminals. The judicial functions of justices of the peace, on the other hand, are almost entirely the creation of statute law. The procedure in their Courts is regulated principally by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts (*b*), by the

(*a*) See *ante*, p. 328.

(*b*) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49; 47 & 48 Vict. c. 43; 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39; 62 & 63 Vict. c. 22; 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 51.

Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, and by the Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (c).

Justices of the peace are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, who always acts on the advice of advisory committees, though not bound to do so. They no longer need any property qualification (d). There is no limit to the number of justices that may be appointed. They are unpaid; they elect their own chairman. They hold office for life, but may be removed by the Lord Chancellor for misconduct, as also may *ex-officio* justices. Each county has a separate commission of the peace and many cities and boroughs also have a separate commission. A justice for a county in practice only acts in a particular petty sessional district, though with a few exceptions his jurisdiction is over the whole county. A justice of the peace for a city or borough has only jurisdiction within that city or borough. A county justice may also sit at Quarter Sessions, but a city or borough justice can exercise no criminal jurisdiction at Quarter Sessions, even if his city or borough has such a Court. Certain positions in local government, such as that of mayor or chairman of a district council, carry with them the privilege of making the holder *ex-officio* a justice while holding office. A mayor is the chief magistrate in the borough and presides at the Court. His right to act as a justice lasts for a year after his mayoralty.

All Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature are specially named in the commission of the peace for every county of England and Wales, and therefore have all the powers of a justice of the peace. County Court Judges are *ex-officio* justices of the peace for the places in which their circuits lie. A recorder is also *ex-officio* a justice for his city or borough.

Any two or more justices acting in their own division, and sitting in their usual Court-house, form a Court of petty sessions (e). Modern statutes have very largely increased the powers of justices of the peace. They have now an

(c) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 58; 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86.

(d) See Justices of the Peace Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 16).

(e) This is an inferior Court, not of Record; see *post*, p. 385.

extensive jurisdiction over a most miscellaneous collection of matters both civil and criminal. This jurisdiction has, no doubt, been conferred on them because they are the most readily accessible of our judicial officers, and the proceedings before them are short, simple and inexpensive. Their jurisdiction is threefold.

(i) They deal with many civil or *quasi*-civil matters, such as disputes concerning contracts between master and servant, affiliation orders, &c. These proceedings begin with a complaint, not on oath, and if successful end in an order to pay money, which creates merely a civil debt (f).

(ii) They have also power to deal summarily with many minor criminal matters, and, subject to certain conditions, with some indictable offences (g). In such cases they decide whether the accused is guilty or not without any indictment and without the aid of a jury. These proceedings begin with an information and end, if successful, in a conviction.

A Court of Summary Jurisdiction is a Court held by justices to try cases which they are empowered by the Summary Jurisdiction and other Acts to try summarily.

(iii) They also do valuable work in connection with cases which may subsequently be tried by a jury on indictment. These proceedings begin with a complaint or an information and, if successful, end with a committal. The justices do not decide whether the accused is guilty or not of the offence with which he is charged, but only whether the case should be dealt with summarily or sent for trial by a jury either at Assizes or Quarter Sessions. The depositions of witnesses are taken. The accused must be present; he can, if he wishes, give evidence on oath, or make an unsworn statement from the dock; and in either case he can call witnesses, whose depositions also will be taken.

In all three classes of cases the justices have power to summon the defendant and any necessary witness before them and, if the summons be disregarded, to compel his attendance by issuing a warrant for his apprehension.

(f) See further as to the civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace, *post*, pp. 396—399.

(g) See *post*, pp. 404—411.

One justice can conduct a magisterial investigation preliminary to the trial of an indictment; two justices, as a rule, are necessary to decide a case summarily. A Court of petty sessions is usually held at regular intervals in a stated place. A magisterial investigation, on the other hand, can be held at any time at any place within the justices' jurisdiction. In trying a case summarily, the justices sit in open Court and the proceedings are public, whereas in conducting a magisterial investigation they are strictly not sitting as a Court, and may exclude the public if they think that the ends of justice will be the better served thereby. In London, Metropolitan Police magistrates, and in some of the larger provincial towns, stipendiary magistrates, exercise the office of justice of the peace. Such a magistrate and the Lord Mayor or any alderman of the City of London, sitting alone, has all the powers of a Court of summary jurisdiction composed of two justices of the peace.

From a summary conviction or order made by a Court of petty sessions an appeal may lie either to the Court of Quarter Sessions or, by way of case stated, to the King's Bench Division. The former Court will re-hear the whole case and decide all questions both of fact and law; the latter Court will only hear arguments on a point of law. But no appeal lies from the decision of a justice of the peace committing any person charged with crime to take his trial on indictment at the Assizes or Quarter Sessions.

2. *Quarter Sessions.*

Every Court of Quarter Sessions, whether of a county or a borough, is an inferior Court of Record. We have already traced the history of this Court in the counties, where it gradually superseded the ancient County Court so far as criminal cases were concerned (*h*). All the justices of the county are Judges of the Court of Quarter Sessions for their county, though it is sufficient if two justices be present. If the business of the county requires it, the Court sits in two divisions, each of which is composed of at least

(*h*) See *ante*, p. 327.

two justices. The Court is presided over by a chairman appointed by the justices; a deputy chairman is also appointed, who presides in the second Court. The Court tries on indictment prisoners committed to it for trial by the justices of the county. It originally had jurisdiction over all indictable offences except in "cases of difficulty," which were referred to the Judge of Assize, but its powers have become more strictly defined by statute.

Cities and boroughs varied both as to the jurisdiction of the local Court of Quarter Sessions, and as to the persons who composed it; for these matters were defined for each borough by the terms of its own charter. The Judge of a borough Court of Quarter Sessions is called a Recorder. He tries indictments with the aid of a jury, and he is the sole Judge of the Court. Although the justices of the peace for the borough may be present on the bench, they can take no part in the proceedings. They do, however, have certain administrative functions and the mayor is empowered, in the absence of the Recorder, to adjourn the Court. A Recorder is appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary. He must be a barrister of not less than five years' standing. He is *ex officio* a justice of the peace for the borough, and he may sit in Parliament for any constituency other than one in the borough of which he is Recorder.

Each Court of Quarter Sessions has an officer called the clerk of the peace. In a county he is appointed by the standing joint committee of the county justices and the county council (*i*). In a borough he is appointed by the town council of the borough, and is removable by the Recorder (*k*).

The jurisdiction of all Courts of Quarter Sessions, whether for a county or a borough (*l*), was regulated and made uniform by the Court of Quarter Sessions Act, 1842 (*m*), and subsequent Acts, which created new offences, have in

(*i*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 83.

(*k*) Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 164.

(*l*) The Court of Quarter Sessions for the Soke of Peterborough is an exception.

(*m*) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1.

some cases excepted them from the jurisdiction of Courts of Quarter Sessions.

The Act of 1842 provides that no Court of Quarter Sessions shall try any person for any treason, murder or capital felony, or for any felony which, when committed by a person not previously convicted of felony, is punishable by penal servitude for life (*n*). Nor can it try any of the following offences:—

Misprision of treason;

Offences against the King's title, prerogative, person or Government, or against either House of Parliament;

Offences subject to the penalties of *præmunire*;

Blasphemy and offences against religion;

Administering or taking unlawful oaths;

Most offences under the Perjury Act, 1911 (*o*); perjury and subornation of perjury;

Most offences under the Forgery Act, 1913 (*p*);

Bigamy and offences against the laws relating to marriage;

Abduction of women and girls;

Endeavouring to conceal the birth of a child;

Composing, printing or publishing blasphemous, seditious or defamatory libels;

Bribery;

Stealing or fraudulently taking or injuring or destroying records or documents belonging to any Court of law or equity, or relating to any proceeding therein;

Stealing or fraudulently destroying or concealing wills or testamentary papers, or any document or written instrument being or containing evidence of the title to any real estate, or any interest in lands, tenements or hereditaments.

By other statutes Courts of Quarter Sessions are precluded from trying:—

The misdemeanour of three or more armed persons, being in pursuit of game by night (*q*);

Fraudulent misdemeanours by agents, trustees, bankers, factors, &c. (*r*);

Personation of holders of stock (*s*);

Offences against women and young girls punishable by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (*t*);

Bribery of agents or servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906 (*u*);

(*n*) There is now an exception in the case of burglary under 59 & 60 Vict. c. 57, repealed and re-enacted by the Larceny Act, 1916.

(*o*) 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6, s. 10; see the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, First Schedule.

(*p*) 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 27, s. 13. See the Criminal Justice Act 1925, First Schedule.

(*q*) 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 9.

(*r*) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 87.

(*s*) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 36, s. 3.

(*t*) 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 17.

(*u*) 6 Edw. 7, c. 34, s. 2, sub-s. 5.

Offences under the Punishment of Incest Act, 1908 (x);

Any offence against sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Larceny Act, 1916 (y);

Offences under the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 (z) and 1920 (a);

Offences against the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act, 1925 (b).

Child Destruction (Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1922)

All indictments are tried by a jury at Quarter Sessions. The Court also deals with certain appeals from the decision of Courts of petty sessions. By section 37, sub-section 1, of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, any person aggrieved by any conviction of a Court of summary jurisdiction who did not admit his guilt in the Court below, may appeal to a Court of Quarter Sessions, and, under the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, any person who has pleaded guilty may similarly appeal against his sentence. The procedure is laid down in the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (c). The appeal must be made to the Court of Quarter Sessions which will be held next after the conviction, unless that will be held within fifteen days, in which case the appellant may postpone his appeal to the next subsequent Court (d). The appellant must give notice in writing of his intention to appear within seven days after his conviction both to the prosecutor and to the clerk of the petty sessional Court; such notice must state the grounds of the appeal (e). He must further, within three days after his notice of appeal, enter into recognisances before the petty sessional Court to prosecute the appeal (f). Pending the hearing of the appeal the appellant may be released on bail, if the Court think fit, on entering into recognisances or giving security (g). The justices or Recorder hear such appeals without a jury and decide all questions arising thereon both

(x) 8 Edw. 7, c. 45, s. 4, sub-s. 2.

(y) 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, s. 38; but see now Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 18 and First Schedule.

(z) 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, s. 10, sub-s. 3.

(a) 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75.

(b) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 72.

(c) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49.

(d) *Ibid.*, s. 31, sub-s. 1.

(e) *Ibid.*, s. 31, sub-s. 2; notice to the solicitor of the other party is not sufficient: *R. v. Justices of Oxfordshire*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 149.

(f) *Ibid.*, s. 31, sub-s. 3.

(g) *Ibid.*, s. 31, sub-s. 4. There are certain other statutes giving a right of appeal and the procedure in such cases may be somewhat different.

of law and fact. Every such appeal is a re-hearing; witnesses are called before the Court, which can hear fresh evidence not presented to the Court below. A Court of Quarter Sessions may also in a proper case sentence to detention in a Borstal institution a person who has been summarily convicted by justices of the peace and sent by them to Quarter Sessions for that purpose (*h*). It can, moreover, hear appeals as to rating questions and affiliation orders, and appoint visiting justices in lunacy. It also directs the enrolment of orders for the diversion or closing of highways made on the certificate of justices who have viewed them (*i*). In counties it further confirms new licences, and can act as the compensation authority under the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910 (*k*). But the bulk of the administrative business of the Court of Quarter Sessions for a county has been transferred to the county council (*l*).

On the hearing of an appeal the Court of Quarter Sessions may state a case for the opinion of the King's Bench Division (*m*). As the Court of Quarter Sessions, though a Court of Record, is an inferior Court, it is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division. But in all cases of trial on indictment the appeal only lies to the Court of Criminal Appeal.

3. *The Assizes.*

We have already mentioned how members of the King's Court were sent on circuit throughout the country to try cases in the counties. From this practice we have derived the modern Assizes. England and Wales are divided into eight circuits, over each of which the Judges of the High Court travel, holding a Court at the assize towns of each county. These circuits are:—

(*h*) Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 10. As to a Borstal institution, see *post*, pp. 447, 448.

(*i*) 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, ss. 85—91.

(*k*) 10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, c. 24, ss. 2, 12 and 20.

(*l*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 3.

(*m*) Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 20.

- (1) The Northern (Westmoreland, Cumberland and Lancashire).
- (2) The North-Eastern (Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire).
- (3) The Midland (Lincoln, Derby, Nottingham, Warwick, Leicester, Northampton, Rutland, Buckingham and Bedford).
- (4) The South-Eastern (Norfolk, Suffolk, Huntingdon, Cambridge, Hertford, Essex, Kent, Surrey and Sussex).
- (5) The Oxford (Berkshire, Oxford, Worcester, Stafford, Salop, Hereford, Monmouth and Gloucester).
- (6) The Western (Hants, Wilts, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall, Somerset and Bristol).
- (7) The North Wales and Chester (Montgomery, Merioneth, Carnarvon, Anglesey, Denbigh, Flint and Chester).
- (8) The South Wales (Pembroke, Cardigan, Carmarthen, Brecknock, Radnor and Glamorgan).

The King has power by Order in Council to appoint places at which Assizes are to be held and to alter the arrangements of the existing circuits (*n*). Various orders have been made with the following result. At least one Judge of the High Court goes round each circuit three times a year, *viz.*, in the winter, summer and autumn; in a few counties only twice a year. Two Judges attend the Assizes in the larger counties twice a year. At Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds four Assizes are held in each year, two of which are attended by two Judges, two by one. *he - all*

The Judges of Assize sit under three commissions, *viz.*, of oyer and terminer, gaol delivery, and assize. The first two commissions empower them to try all persons against whom an indictment has been presented within the county of that assize (*o*), and also all persons brought before them charged under either a criminal information or a coroner's inquisition. The third commission—that of assize—

(*n*) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 72, re-enacting previous Acts, and 42 Vict. c. 1.

(*o*) In 1835 the criminal jurisdiction of the Admiralty was also vested in the commissioners of assize.

empowers them, *inter alia*, to try civil actions. King's counsel may also be included in these commissions (*p*). A Court of Assize has no appellate jurisdiction.

4. *The Central Criminal Court.*

This Court was created in 1834 by the Central Criminal Court Act (*q*). It can try any indictable offence arising within the City of London, the counties of London and Middlesex, and certain specified portions of the counties of Essex, Kent and Surrey. The Central Criminal Court can, moreover, try all offences committed on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty (*r*), and also indictments for offences committed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court which have been sent by the King's Bench Division to be tried there under a writ of *certiorari* (*s*). It hears no civil actions and has no appellate jurisdiction.

The Central Criminal Court must sit at least twelve times a year at dates fixed by four Judges of the High Court. The Judges include the Lord Chancellor, the Judges of the High Court, the Lord Mayor, aldermen, Recorder and Common Serjeant of the City of London, and one or more commissioners. A Judge of the High Court generally attends on the second day of the sittings to hear the more serious cases. All the Judges of the Court have equal rank and jurisdiction (*t*), but it is not the practice for the Lord Mayor and aldermen to take any active part in the trials.

5. *The King's Bench Division of the High Court.*

The former Court of King's Bench was styled by Blackstone "the sovereign ordinary Court of justice in causes criminal" (*u*), and the present King's Bench Division

(*p*) Administration of Justice Act, 1925, s. 2.

(*q*) 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36.

(*r*) 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, s. 22. See also 7 & 8 Vict. c. 2. For the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, see *post*, p. 372.

(*s*) Palmer's Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 16), ss. 1, 3.

(*t*) *R. v. Justices of C. C. C.* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 479. Both the Assizes and the Central Criminal Court have the status of the High Court: Judicature Act, 1925, s. 70; and see *R. v. Justices of the C. C. C.*, [1925] 2 K. B. 43.

(*u*) 4 Bla. Com. 320.

retains some portion of the splendour of its venerable predecessor. It exercises its jurisdiction in three distinct capacities :—

(i) As a Court of first instance. The Court of King's Bench from the earliest times acted as the Assize Court for the ancient county of Middlesex (x); it could try on indictment any treason, felony or misdemeanour committed therein. And in spite of the creation of the Central Criminal Court, the King's Bench Division still has this power, though it rarely exercises it. The procedure is the same as at the ordinary provincial Assizes. The trial will be held before one Judge unless on motion an order has been made by the Court that the trial shall be at bar, *i.e.*, by three Judges (z).

Again, the King's Bench Division can try any misdemeanour in whatever part of England committed, for which a criminal information has been filed by some officer of the Crown (a). It can also try any crime committed out of England by governors of colonies or other public officials (b), or by officials of the Crown in India (c).

(ii) Secondly, into this Court an indictment from any inferior Court may be removed for trial by writ of *certiorari* and tried there either at bar or *nisi prius* (*i.e.*, either by three Judges or only one), and, unless otherwise ordered, by a jury of the county in which the crime was committed. An order for such removal can only be made on one of the following grounds—

- (a) that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the Court below owing to local partiality or prejudice;
or
- (b) that some question of law of more than usual difficulty or importance is likely to arise upon the trial; or

(x) Hence the King's Bench Division has now jurisdiction both over the modern county of Middlesex, and the greater part of the new county of London.

(z) Crown Office Rules, 1906, rr. 150—155; Statutory Rules and Orders, 1906, p. 627.

(a) See *post*, pp. 425 *et seq.*

(b) 11 Will. 3, c. 12; 42 Geo. 3, c. 85; 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, s. 10.

(c) 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 61, s. 127, repealing 10 Geo. 3, c. 47, s. 4; 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, s. 39; 21 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 7.

- (c) that a special jury or a view of certain premises is necessary to a satisfactory trial and cannot be obtained in the Court below (*d*).

(iii) The King's Bench Division has also appellate jurisdiction. The Judges of the old Court of King's Bench had a general superintendency over all inferior Courts which had any jurisdiction in criminal matters. They could order that the proceedings in any such inferior Courts should be brought before them and quashed, if they were found to be irregular, whether they related to charges of high treason or of the smallest misdemeanour which affected the public welfare. This wide power has now devolved on the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice (*e*), and is usually exercised by a Divisional Court consisting of three Judges. It is exercised in several ways:—

(a) It can order any inferior Court to do its duty by writ of *mandamus* or order in the nature of a *mandamus* (*f*).

(b) It can order any inferior Court to keep within its jurisdiction by writ of *prohibition* (*g*).

(c) Any one convicted at petty sessions may apply to the King's Bench Division for a writ of *certiorari* (*h*) on the ground:—

(a) that there is some defect or informality apparent on face of the proceedings before the justices, or

(β) that there was a want of jurisdiction on their part or that they exceeded their jurisdiction, or

(γ) that the conviction was obtained by fraud.

If such a writ be granted, the proceedings will be brought before the King's Bench Division which will, if necessary, quash the conviction. Further, any one who desires to question the decision of a Court of summary jurisdiction on the ground that it is erroneous in point of law, or is in excess of jurisdiction, can apply (*i*) to the justices to state

(d) Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 13.

(e) For the most authoritative decisions as to the true nature and jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division, see *The Overseers of Walsall v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1878), 4 App. Cas. 30.

(f) See p. 506.

(g) See p. 510.

(h) See p. 511.

(i) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 33.

a case for the opinion of the King's Bench Division. If they refuse to do so, he may apply to the King's Bench Division for an order directing them to state a case.

The case, which must be stated within three months, is a document signed by the justices, setting out the material facts and the decision of the justices so as to inform the High Court of the point or points of law which arose. Within three days of receiving the case, the appellant must lodge it in the High Court. It is placed in what is called the "Crown Paper" and heard by a Divisional Court of three Judges. The Court will, according to its view, quash or affirm the conviction or uphold or reverse the acquittal, and in the last case will remit it to the justices with a direction to convict. The Court may also in case of need send a case back to be re-stated so as to clear up any doubt as to the facts. Neither party may dispute the facts stated in the case. Cases stated under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Acts are determined by a Divisional Court of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. They are, of course, stated in a civil matter, *viz.*, the separation or maintenance of a married woman.

6. *The Court of Criminal Appeal.*

This Court has jurisdiction over all criminal cases tried at Quarter Sessions, the Assizes, the Central Criminal Court, or in the King's Bench Division, whether on an indictment or a criminal information or a coroner's inquisition (*k*). It consists of the Lord Chief Justice of England and the other Judges of the King's Bench Division (*l*). The Court is properly constituted if there are present not less than three Judges; the number must be uneven, and the decision of the majority prevails. Only one judgment is delivered. It sits in London unless otherwise directed (*m*).

To this Court the convicted prisoner has an unfettered right of appeal on any question of law, whether the question

(*k*) Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 23), ss. 3, 20.

(*l*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, as amended by 8 Edw. 7, c. 46.

(*m*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 1, sub-s. 2.

was raised by the prisoner in the Court below or not (*n*). Again, from the verdict of the jury on any question of fact, or from the decision of the Court on any question of mixed law and fact, the prisoner can appeal, provided he obtain either the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal or a certificate from the Judge who tried the case that it is a fit case for appeal (*o*), *e.g.*, that the verdict is unreasonable, or that it cannot be supported on the evidence laid before the Court, or that on any ground there has been a miscarriage of justice (*p*). Lastly, the prisoner can appeal against the sentence passed upon him, but only if he has obtained the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the penalty is not one fixed by law (*q*). In doing so he runs a certain risk, for on such an appeal the Court may, if it thinks fit, quash the sentence appealed against and inflict a heavier one (*r*).

The Court of Criminal Appeal can quash a conviction on any of the grounds on which a verdict can be set aside in civil cases (*s*). It may enter a verdict of acquittal and thus prevent the injustice of allowing a person, who is now adjudged to be innocent, to remain recorded as a criminal. In a proper case it will hear fresh evidence. If the trial has been such that it must be treated as a mere nullity the Court can direct a re-trial (*t*), but not in any other case.

7 and 8. *The House of Lords and the Court of the Lord High Steward.*

The House of Lords exercises criminal jurisdiction both as a Court of first instance and as a Court of appeal.

(i) As a Court of first instance the House of Lords can

(*n*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 3 (a); *R. v. Tonks*, [1916] 1 K. B. 443.

(*o*) *Ibid.*, s. 3 (b).

(*p*) *Ibid.*, s. 4, sub-s. 1.

(*q*) *Ibid.*, s. 3 (c).

(*r*) *Ibid.*, s. 4, sub-s. 3.

(*s*) *Ibid.*, s. 4, sub-s. 1.

(*t*) See *R. v. Dyson*, [1908] 2 K. B. at p. 458; *Crane's Case* (1921), 15 Cr. App. Rep. 183; *R. v. Lloyd* (1923), 17 Cr. App. Rep. 184; and *R. v. Dennis*, [1924] 1 K. B. at p. 869. In cases relating to non-repair or obstruction to any highway, public bridge, or navigable river, the appeal lies to the Court of Appeal; see section 29 of the Judicature Act, 1925, re-enacting section 20, sub-section 3, of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907.

try any one impeached by the House of Commons for any high crime or misdemeanour; the latest instance is the impeachment of Lord Melville in 1806 (u). As a Court of first instance it can also try temporal peers and peeresses, whether English, Scotch or Irish, accused of high treason, felony or misprision. In such cases the accused cannot waive his privilege to be so tried (x). The preliminary proceedings take place in one of the ordinary Courts and are the same as on any other indictment, but after an indictment has been presented in the Court below it is removed to the House of Lords (or into the Court of the Lord High Steward) by writ of *certiorari*. For the purposes of the trial the House is presided over by a peer who is called the Lord High Steward. He is either a peer appointed by the King's commission, or in the absence of such appointment the Lord Chancellor. His Majesty's Judges may be summoned to give their opinion on any questions of law that may arise (y). But all the members of the House are entitled to be present, and when present are equally judges of law and of fact. Though a Lord High Steward may be presiding, he has merely the right to regulate the procedure, and is a judge of law to no greater extent than any other peer. The bishops have a right to be present, but by the canon law they may not vote in capital cases, and so withdraw before judgment is given.

If the House of Lords is not sitting, the accused will be tried in the Court of the Lord High Steward. In such a case the Lord High Steward is not merely the president of the Court, giving his vote with the rest; he is judge of matters of law. All peers who have a right to sit and vote in Parliament must be summoned to attend (z). They are the sole judges of fact, and the majority, which must consist of twelve at least, decides the guilt or innocence of the accused.

(u) 29 St. Tr. 549.

(x) 3 Co. Inst. 29.

(y) See *R. v. Earl Russell*, [1901] A. C. 446, in which case the Earl of Halsbury, L.C., presided as Lord High Steward. There were also present about 160 peers, including all the law lords, who generally hear appeals, and the following Judges:—Sir Francis Jeune, and Mathew, Wills, Wright, Lawrance, Kennedy, Darling, Bigham, Cozens-Hardy, Farwell, and Buckley, JJ.

(z) 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, s. 11.

(ii) The House of Lords also sits as a Court of final appeal. Before 1908 an appeal would only lie to the House in a criminal case on a point of law apparent on the face of the record. But now an appeal lies to it from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, if the Director of Public Prosecutions or the prosecutor or defendant obtains the certificate of the Attorney-General "that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal involves a point of law of exceptional public importance, and that it is desirable in the public interest that a further appeal should be brought" (a).

(a) Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 23), s. 1, sub-s. 6; Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, s. 16). For an example of such an appeal see *R. v. Beard*, [1920] A. C. 479.

CHAPTER IV.

SUPERIOR CIVIL COURTS.

OUR chief Civil Court^e of first instance is :—

1. The High Court of Justice.

From this Court an appeal lies to

2. The Court of Appeal,

and a further appeal to

3. The House of Lords.

Appeals from the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, India, and the Colonies lie to

4. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

5. There are other Courts vested with local or special jurisdiction which are yet superior Courts, such as :—

(i) The Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster.

(ii) The Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Durham.

(iii) The Court of Railway and Canal Commission.

(iv) The War Compensation Court.

(v) The Railway Rates Tribunal.

An immense quantity of minor civil business is transacted in the Borough Courts and the County Courts. These local Courts, however, are inferior Courts of record, and will be discussed in the next chapter. Justices of the peace have also, as we have seen (a), jurisdiction over certain civil or *quasi*-civil matters.

I.—THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

The Supreme Court of Judicature has a central office, which was created in 1879 (b). The Supreme Court consists of two parts :—

The High Court of Justice, which exercises original

(a) See *ante*, p. 341.

(b) Judicature Act, 1925, ss. 104—106, re-enacting Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 78), ss. 4—14.

jurisdiction, and also possesses appellate jurisdiction from some inferior Courts, and

The Court of Appeal, which exercises appellate jurisdiction with such original jurisdiction only as may be incident to the determination of an appeal.

There is no limit to the amount which a plaintiff can recover in an action properly brought in the High Court of Justice. It has jurisdiction over all persons who are within England and Wales, whether they be British subjects or not (c). It has also a general jurisdiction over all injuries, which are not merely local, such as trespass to land (d), committed abroad, provided such injuries be actionable by the law of England and also wrongful by the law of the country where they were committed (e). But the Court has of its own accord restricted these wide powers to cases in which the defendant is within jurisdiction at the time the writ is issued (f), so that it can be served upon him here. If the defendant is out of jurisdiction, no writ can be issued except by leave, and such leave will only be granted in the cases specified in Order XI. (g).

Leave will be readily granted if the whole subject-matter of the action be land situate within jurisdiction, or the construction, rectification, avoidance or enforcement of any deed, will, contract, obligation or liability affecting lands or tenements within jurisdiction (h). The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action to recover damages for trespass to land situate abroad (d).

Again, leave can be obtained to issue a writ against any one, who is not domiciled or ordinarily resident in either Scotland or Ireland, for any breach within jurisdiction of a contract which ought to be performed within jurisdiction (i). It does not matter where the contract was made. And it will be sufficient if a part of the contract has been broken, provided that part had to be performed within jurisdiction (k). Leave in matters of tort can be obtained where the action is founded on a tort committed within jurisdiction (l).

(c) There are one or two exceptions; see *post*, p. 393.

(d) *British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique*, [1893] A. C. 602.

(e) *Machado v. Fontes*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231; *Carr v. Fracis Times Co.*, [1902] A. C. 176.

(f) *Watkins v. North American, &c., Co.* (1904), 20 T. L. R. 534.

(g) *Eager, In re*; *Eager v. Johnstone* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 86.

(h) Order XI., r. 1 (a) and (b).

(i) Order XI., r. 1 (e).

(k) *Rein v. Stein*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 753, 757; *Mutzenbecker v. Española*, [1906] 1 K. B. 254.

(l) Order XI., r. 1 (ee). Before 1920 leave in cases of tort could only be

If, however, the proposed defendant, though temporarily abroad, is domiciled or ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction, he can be sued here both in contract and in tort (*m*). A foreign company may reside within jurisdiction (*n*); but a man who carries on business within jurisdiction, whether in his own name or under any other style or firm, cannot be sued here, if he resides abroad (*o*). And there can be no substituted service of a writ in an action in which there cannot in law be personal service (*p*).

Leave will also be given to serve a writ out of jurisdiction whenever "the action is for the administration of the personal estate of any deceased person, who at the time of his death was domiciled within the jurisdiction, or for the execution (as to the property situate within the jurisdiction) of the trusts of any written instrument, of which the person to be served is a trustee, and which ought to be executed according to the law of England" (*q*). And where the writ has already been duly served on a defendant within jurisdiction, leave will be given in a proper case (*r*) to serve another defendant who is outside jurisdiction, provided he be a necessary and proper party to the action.

The procedure in the High Court is mainly regulated by "Rules of the Supreme Court," which are divided according to their subject-matter into seventy-two "Orders." They are made by the Rules Committee under powers conferred on them by the Judicature Acts, and have all the force and effect of a statute. These rules, however, with a few exceptions, do not apply to the procedure or practice in any proceedings

- (a) in criminal matters;
- (b) on the Crown side of the King's Bench Division;
- (c) on the Revenue side of the King's Bench Division; or
- (d) in Divorce or other matrimonial causes (*s*).

obtained under sub-rules (a), (c), (f), (g). See *Leaders v. Anderson* (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 50, at p. 55.

(*m*) Order XI., r. 1 (c), (ee).

(*n*) "*La Bourgoyne*," [1899] A. C. 431. The fact that a foreign company has a branch office in this country will not enable a plaintiff to serve a writ at the branch office without leave under Order XI.: *Jones v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co.* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 421; *O'Connor v. Star Newspaper Co.* (1891), 30 L. R. Ir. 1.

(*o*) *De Bernales v. New York Herald*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 97, n.; *MacIver v. Burns*, [1895] 2 Ch. 630.

(*p*) *Field v. Bennett* (1886), 56 L. J. Q. B. 89; *Jay v. Budd*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 12.

(*q*) Order XI., r. 1 (d).

(*r*) *Ibid.*, r. 1 (g).

(*s*) Order LXVIII., rr. 1, 2.

As we have already seen, the High Court of Justice is now divided into three divisions, *viz.* :—

- (i) The King's Bench Division.
 - (ii) The Chancery Division.
 - (iii) The Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.
- We will deal first with—

(i) *The King's Bench Division.*

The Lord Chief Justice of England is the President of this Division. He is nominated for that office by the Prime Minister. There are also seventeen puisne Judges, who are appointed by letters patent from the Crown on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor. They must be at the date of their appointment barristers of not less than ten years' standing (*t*). The greater part of their time is occupied in trying civil causes with or without a jury, and either at the Royal Courts of Justice in London or at the Assizes all over England and Wales. For this purpose each Judge sits separately. But two or more Judges frequently sit together and so form a Divisional Court to hear appeals from County Courts and magistrates, and to exercise jurisdiction in matters concerning the prerogative writs (such as *mandamus*, *certiorari*, prohibition, *quo warranto*, &c.). A Judge also sits every day at Judges' Chambers in the Royal Courts to hear appeals from Masters and to deal with other interlocutory matters.

The business of the High Court of Justice is grouped under several heads. Separate lists are published of special jury causes, common jury causes, cases for trial by Judge alone, commercial cases, and short causes sent for trial under Order XIV., revenue cases, motions for judgment, &c., respectively. When sitting, the Judge is assisted by an associate who, when necessary, swears the jury and the witnesses, and reads aloud documents which are admitted in evidence after seeing that they are properly stamped.

(*t*) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 9, sub-s. 1.

Commercial Causes.

Provision has been made for the prompt despatch of commercial business in the King's Bench Division. At the commencement of each sittings one Judge is appointed specially to hear commercial causes in London; a separate list is kept for the entry of such causes for trial. Two other lists are kept, one for the Liverpool and one for the Manchester commercial causes, which will be tried at the Assizes for those cities. If either party desires to have the action entered in any one of these lists, he applies to the special Judge, who will order the action to be transferred to the list, if he deems it a commercial cause. An appeal will lie from his decision to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the action is not a commercial cause (*u*). Commercial causes include causes arising out of the ordinary transactions of merchants and traders—amongst others, those relating to the construction of mercantile documents, exports or imports of merchandise, affreightment, insurance, banking, mercantile agency and mercantile usages (*x*). As soon as a cause is entered in the commercial list, any application with respect to it is generally made to the Judge in charge of such list and not to a Master. The Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, give judgment on any point of law raised on the pleadings; he may also at any time after appearance and without pleadings make such order as he thinks fit for the speedy determination of the questions really in controversy between the parties.

When the so-called "Commercial Court" was established, it was at first supposed that this Court would be allowed greater laxity in construing the ordinary rules of evidence; but in *Baerlein v. Chartered Mercantile Bank* (*y*), Lindley, L.J., said: "The Commercial Court has no more power to dispense with strict evidence, or to depart from the administration of the law in the ordinary way, than any other Judge or Court. The power to dispense with strict evidence depends entirely on the Judicature Act of 1894." There is strictly no such thing as the Commercial Court. "There is no Act

(*u*) *Sea Insurance Co. v. Carr*, [1901] 1 K. B. 7.

(*x*) See Annual Practice, 1925, Vol. II., at p. 2364.

(*y*) [1895] 2 Ch. at p. 491; and see now section 99, sub-section 1, Judicature Act, 1925.

of Parliament establishing such a Court; it is a mere piece of convenience in the arrangement of business" (y).

An order for the transfer of the action to the commercial list will be made where "the Court is satisfied that the Judge's having peculiar knowledge of commercial matters and habitual practice in dealing with commercial documents and correspondence between commercial men will greatly facilitate the trial of that particular case" (z), but not merely on the ground that the case relates to a bill of exchange or to a security for goods or to a bill of lading or stoppage *in transitu*. It will be good ground for applying for an order to transfer the action to the commercial Court that the case "is likely to be tried far better, far more quickly, far more economically, and far more advantageously in every sense if it comes before a Judge who has special skill and knowledge as to transactions of this nature, than if it keeps its place in one of the general lists," or that "the case requires the consideration of an enormous amount of mercantile correspondence and great familiarity with commercial business" (z). Every cause must be regarded, when an application of this kind is made, in respect of its particular features and its particular elements, and in each case it is for the Court to determine whether or not in their opinion it would be more effectively, more quickly, and at less expense tried in the Commercial Court than elsewhere" (a).

The Masters.

The Judges receive valuable assistance from the Masters. These officers are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls in rotation (b). They must have been practising barristers or solicitors of five years' standing. The Masters of the King's Bench Division are all barristers (c). Their duties are very varied. The central office of the Supreme Court is under their control and superintendence. They have power to transact all such interlocutory business and exercise such authority and jurisdiction as may be transacted or exercised by a Judge at chambers, except in the following matters:—

"(a) All matters relating to criminal proceedings or to the liberty of the subject;

(y) [1895] 2 Ch., at p. 491; and see now Judicature Act, 1925, s. 99, sub-s. 1.

(z) *Per* Lindley, L.J., in *Baerlein v. Chartered Mercantile Bank*, [1895] 2 Ch. at p. 493.

(a) *Per* Lopes, L.J., *ibid.*, at p. 495.

(b) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 106, sub-s. 1.

(c) The Masters of the Chancery Division are all solicitors and are appointed by the Lord Chancellor.

- “(b) Granting leave for service out of the jurisdiction of a writ or notice of a writ of summons;
- “(c) Appeals from district registrars;
- “(d) Prohibitions;
- “(e) Injunctions and other orders under section 45 of the Judicature Act, 1925, other than orders for the appointment of receivers by way of equitable execution and injunctions so far, and so far only, as the same are ancillary or incidental to equitable execution and charging orders;
- “(f) Reviewing taxation of costs;
- “(g) Acknowledgments of married women or applications to dispense with the concurrence of a husband in a disposition by a married woman” (d).

They also investigate matters specially referred to them by any Court or a Judge. At least two Masters act as taxing masters to tax solicitors' bills of costs (e).

An application at chambers, whether to a Judge or to a Master, is usually made by summons; in urgent cases, however, it may be made *ex parte*, that is, without any notice to the other side. Any person affected by an order of a Master may appeal therefrom to the Judge at chambers. Such appeal is by indorsement made upon the summons by the Master, or by notice in writing, given by the party appealing within five days after the decision complained of or such further time as may be allowed (f). An appeal from the Master's decision will be no stay of proceedings unless so ordered by a Judge or Master. In all matters of practice and procedure there is a further appeal to the Court of Appeal, but as a rule the leave of the Judge or of the Court of Appeal must first be obtained.

The District Registrars.

There are in most of our larger provincial towns branch offices of the High Court of Justice called district registries; their districts are defined by various Orders in Council. A district registrar has in all actions proceeding in his district registry the same powers as a Master and does substantially

(d) Order LIV., r. 12.

(e) The Taxing Masters were solicitors on their appointment.

(f) Order LIV., r. 21.

the same work. Any plaintiff, wherever resident, may (except in a probate action) issue his writ either out of a district registry or out of the central office in London at his option (*g*). If he adopts the former course all proceedings will, unless otherwise ordered, be taken in the district registry down to and including the entry of final judgment, and also the subsequent proceedings for enforcing the judgment (*h*). Where the writ of summons is issued out of a district registry and the plaintiff is entitled to an interlocutory judgment, this must be entered in the district registry, and so will the final judgment when damages have been assessed (*i*).

On the other hand, when an action is proceeding in London, either party can, in a proper case, obtain an order transferring it to a district registry (*k*). An appeal from the decision of a district registrar lies to the Judge in chambers in London.

The Official Referees.

The Judicature Act, 1873, created a new class of permanent officials called Official Referees (*l*). Their duty is to try such questions and actions as may be referred to them under the provisions of that or any subsequent Act or of any rule of Court, and also to act as arbitrators in cases referred to them as such under the Arbitration Act, 1889 (*m*). There are at present three official referees. They are officers of the Supreme Court. Their offices are at the Royal Courts of Justice; but they perform their duties either in London or in the country, as they may from time to time be directed or may deem most convenient.

The work of an official referee may be roughly grouped under four heads:—

1. References for trial under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1889 (*m*).

(*g*) Order V., r. 1.

(*h*) Order XXXV., rr. 1, 5.

(*i*) Order XXXV., r. 2.

(*k*) Order XXXV., r. 17.

(*l*) See now Judicature Act, 1925, ss. 88—97.

(*m*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49.

2. References for inquiry and report under section 13 of that Act.
3. The assessment of damages under Order XXXVI., r. 57A.
4. References to him as an arbitrator by consent of the parties or under an order of the High Court under section 3 of the Arbitration Act, 1889.

An appeal lies against the order of the Court or a Judge under either section 13 or 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, and it may be reversed if the Court of Appeal thinks that the discretionary power was wrongly exercised (*n*). If the parties agree on a particular referee, they may have his name inserted in the order of reference, otherwise the business is distributed to the official referees in rotation (*o*). But the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice of England have each power to order the transfer of any causes and matters from one official referee to another, if the state of pending business renders such a transfer expedient (*p*).

1. *References for Trial*.—In any cause or matter (other than a criminal proceeding by the Crown) the Court or a Judge may at any time order the whole cause or matter, or any question or issue of fact arising therein, to be tried before an official referee—

(a) if all the parties interested who are not under disability consent; or

(b) if the cause or matter requires any prolonged examination of documents (*q*), or any scientific or local investigation (*r*), which cannot in the opinion of the Court or a Judge conveniently be made before a jury or conducted by the Court through its other ordinary officers; or

(c) if the question in dispute consists wholly or in part of matters of account (*s*).

If any substantial portion of the matter in dispute in an action is a question of account which cannot be conveniently tried in the ordinary way, the Court or Judge has power to refer the whole action to an official referee (*t*).

An order under section 89 of the Judicature Act, 1925, corresponding with section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, can only be made in a pending proceeding, and should be strictly confined to questions arising in that proceeding unless the parties by consent include other matters in the reference, in which case the award will owe its validity to the consent of the parties, and not to any statutory authority (*u*).

An official referee, to whom any action has been referred for trial under the above section, has full power to deal with any interlocutory

(*n*) *Case v. Willis* (1892), 8 T. L. R. 610.

(*o*) Order XXXVI., r. 45; see *Shrager v. Basil Dighton*, [1924] 1 K. B. 274.

(*p*) Order XXXVI., r. 47 B.

(*q*) *Ormerod v. Todmorden Mill Co.* (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 664.

(*r*) *Hamilton v. Merchants' Marine Insurance Co.* (1889), 58 L. J. Q. B. 544.

(*s*) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 89 (*c*).

(*t*) *Ward v. Pilley* (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 427; *Hurlbatt v. Barnett & Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 77. But see *Humphrey v. Humphrey* [1917] 2 K. B. 72.

(*u*) *Darlington Waggon Co. v. Harding, &c., Co.*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 245.

application affecting the conduct of such reference, such as an application for amendment of a pleading, or particulars, or discovery or a commission to examine a witness abroad; but an appeal lies from his decision on such matters to the Judge at chambers (*x*). The hearing before him is conducted in the same manner as a trial before a Judge without a jury; but he has no power of committal or attachment (*y*). He may have an inspection or view, if he deems it expedient, for the better disposal of the controversy before him (*z*). In any reference for report under section 88 of the Judicature Act, 1925, corresponding with section 13 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, he may at any stage of the proceedings state a special case for the opinion of the Court on any question of law arising in the reference (*a*). He usually delivers in open Court a judgment stating his findings of fact and decision on the law. A written order or certificate is then drawn up by which he directs how judgment shall be entered.

Either party may move to set aside the judgment directed to be entered by an official referee, wholly or in part, on any ground on which he might move to set aside the judgment entered by the order of a Judge (*b*). If the action be in the King's Bench Division, any motion to set aside the official referee's certificate, and also any motion for a new trial (*c*), must still be made to a Divisional Court (*d*); and from the decision of the Divisional Court an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, without leave (*e*). But if the action be in any other Division, the application should be made to the Judge to whom the action was assigned (*f*).

On the hearing of such a motion, the Court has power, *inter alia* (*g*)—

(*a*) to set aside the judgment or any of the findings of the official referee;

(*b*) to remit the cause or matter, or any part thereof, to the same or any other referee for reconsideration with such directions as it may think fit (*e.g.*, where fresh material evidence has been discovered since the trial) (*h*);

(*c*) to direct judgment to be entered for either party, or make such other order therein as may be just (*i*).

(*x*) *Hayward v. Mutual Reserve Association*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 236; *Macalpine & Co. v. Calder & Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 545.

(*y*) Order XXXVI., rr. 49, 51, 52 A, 55 c. (*z*) *Ibid.*, r. 48.

(*a*) *Ibid.*, r. 52; Order LIX. A., r. 5; section 94 Judicature Act, 1925.

(*b*) See Order LIX. A.

(*c*) *Forrest v. Todd* (1897), 76 L. T. 500.

(*d*) Order LIX. A., r. 2; *Glasbrook v. Owen* (1890), 7 T. L. R. 62; *Gower v. Tobitt* (1891), 39 W. R. 193; *Wynne-Finch v. Chaytor*, [1903] 2 Ch. 475.

(*e*) *Munday v. Norton*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 403; *Ruf v. Pauwels*, [1919] 1 K. B. 660.

(*f*) *Wynne-Finch v. Chaytor*, *supra*, overruling *Serle v. Fardell* (1890), 44 Ch. D. 299.

(*g*) Under Order LVIII., r. 4, and Order LIX., r. 3.

(*h*) And see section 10 of the Arbitration Act, 1889; sections 91, 92, Judicature Act, 1925.

(*i*) *Clark v. Sonnenschein* (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 464; *Joyner v. Weeks*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 31.

2. *References for Inquiry or Report.*—Subject to rules of Court, and to any right to have particular cases tried by a jury, a Judge may refer any question arising in any cause or matter (other than a criminal proceeding by the Crown) to any official referee for inquiry or report.

The official referee in this case reports his finding to the Judge who referred the question to him; and that Judge may adopt the report and direct judgment to be entered accordingly, unless either party moves to have the report varied or sent back to the same or some other referee for further inquiry (k).

This power is frequently exercised in cases where a difficult account has to be taken. At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter, the Court or a Judge may direct any necessary accounts to be taken, notwithstanding that there may be some further relief sought for, or some special issue still to be tried (l). And such an account may be sent to be taken by an official referee (m). The Court or a Judge may, in the order, give special directions as to the mode in which the account is to be taken or vouched; it may, for instance, direct that the books of account, in which the accounts in question have been kept, shall be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the truth of the matters contained in them (n). But, in the absence of any such special direction, the official referee is allowed a wide discretion as to his mode of procedure. An official referee, when acting under this section, has no power to make any order as to costs.

3. *Assessment of Damages.*—When an interlocutory judgment has been signed in an action in the King's Bench Division and the amount of damages sought to be recovered is substantially a matter of calculation, the Judge may direct that the amount for which final judgment is to be entered shall be ascertained by an official referee. The attendance of witnesses and the production of documents before such official referee may be compelled by *subpœna*. He will indorse the amount found by him upon the order referring the amount of damages to him, and deliver the order, with such indorsement, to the person entitled to the damages. All subsequent proceedings as to taxation of costs, entering judgment, and otherwise, will be taken precisely as though the amount so found had been assessed by a jury upon a writ of inquiry (o).

4. *Submission to an Official Referee.*—The parties to any dispute may without commencing any litigation agree in writing to submit all matters specified in such writing to the decision of an official referee; and such official referee will then, subject to any order of the Court

(k) Order XXXVI., rr. 54, 55; 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, s. 10; sections 91, 92, Judicature Act, 1925.

(l) Order XXXIII., r. 2.

(m) *Rochejoucauld v. Boustead*, [1897] 1 Ch. 196, 213.

(n) Order XXXIII., r. 3.

(o) Order XXXVI., rr. 57 and 57 A. As to enforcing payment of the Court fees in connection with proceedings before an official referee see Order XXXVI., r. 55 D.

or a Judge as to transfer or otherwise, hear and determine the matters agreed to be referred to him, and make and publish his award thereon (*p*). An official referee has in such matters all the powers of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1889.

Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy of the High Court (q).

The London Court of Bankruptcy was not included in the list of Courts whose jurisdiction was vested in the High Court by the Judicature Act, 1873. But by section 93 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (*r*), this Court was united and consolidated with and now forms part of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and its jurisdiction is transferred to the High Court of Justice. By section 94 of the same Act and orders made thereunder by the Lord Chancellor, all matters, which would previously have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of the London Court of Bankruptcy, may be assigned to such Division of the High Court as the Lord Chancellor may direct. After having been assigned from 1884 to the King's Bench Division, they were in 1921 assigned to the Chancery Division (*s*).

Every County Court also has now jurisdiction in bankruptcy save a few which have been specially excepted by orders made by the Lord Chancellor. In order to determine in which Court a petitioning creditor must file a petition against a particular debtor, it is necessary to ascertain in what district that debtor spent the greater portion of the six months which immediately preceded the presentation of the petition. If during those six months he resided in the metropolis for a longer period than he did in the district of any provincial County Court, the petition must be filed in the High Court of Justice. Proceedings must also be taken in the High Court against any debtor, who is not resident in England or whose address cannot be found (*t*). The Chancery Division also hears appeals from the County Court in bankruptcy matters (*u*).

(*p*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, s. 3.

(*q*) The Bankruptcy Act now in force is the Act of 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59), as amended in 1926 (16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 7).

(*r*) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, repealed and re-enacted by the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, ss. 96, 97.

(*s*) Order of Birkenhead, L.C., dated August 15, 1921; see [1921] W. N., Pt. II., pp. 362, 369.

(*t*) Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 98; and see *post*, p. 777.

(*u*) See Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 108. The jurisdiction in bankruptcy being at present assigned to the Chancery Division, this forms the solitary instance of a Divisional Court in that Division.

The jurisdiction of the High Court is exercised by one of the Judges of the High Court appointed from time to time for the purpose by the Lord Chancellor and called the Judge in Bankruptcy (*x*). There are also five Registrars in Bankruptcy appointed by the Lord Chancellor, who have power to hear bankruptcy petitions and to make receiving orders and adjudications thereon; publicly to examine debtors; to grant orders of discharge; to approve compositions and schemes of arrangement; and such other powers as are necessary to decide questions arising in the bankruptcy (*y*).

The Judge may review, rescind or vary any order made by a Registrar in the exercise of his Bankruptcy jurisdiction (*z*). An appeal from the Judge in Bankruptcy or from one of the Registrars of the High Court in Bankruptcy lies to the Court of Appeal; and thence, but only by leave of the Court of Appeal, to the House of Lords.

There is another important official attached to every Court which has jurisdiction in bankruptcy. He is appointed by the Board of Trade, and is called the "Official Receiver." His chief duty is to investigate the conduct of the debtor; he conducts the public examination of the debtor, and reports to the Court upon any previous transactions connected with his insolvency. In some cases it is necessary to prosecute the bankrupt for offences against the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (*a*), and in such a prosecution the Official Receiver takes a leading part. He also acts as receiver and manager of the debtor's estate until a trustee is appointed, or if no trustee is appointed, or during a vacancy.

In discharging these duties an Official Receiver is under the supervision and control of the Board of Trade, which also audits his accounts and has power to disallow any items improperly charged therein (*b*).

A trustee is appointed by a resolution of the creditors passed at a meeting by a majority in value of those present; he may or may not be a creditor himself; his appointment must be sanctioned by the Board of Trade (*c*). As soon as a trustee has been appointed, he becomes an officer of the Court, and all the property of the bankrupt,

(*x*) Section 97.

(*y*) Section 102; Bankruptcy Rules, 1915, r. 7. One of the bankruptcy Registrars acts as Registrar in the winding up of companies, so that the actual number of the Registrars who act in bankruptcy matters is four.

(*z*) *Tobias, In re* (1891), 8 Morr. 30.

(*a*) Sections 154—159, repealing 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, ss. 11, 12; see Vol. 1, pp. 267—269.

(*b*) See further as to his duties, *post*, p. 782.

(*c*) Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 19.

of whatever kind and wherever situated, subject to a few exceptions (*d*), vests in him. His title to such property will thenceforward be recognised by every Court in the British dominions (*e*). It is his duty to realise this property and distribute the proceeds amongst the creditors. The Board of Trade has a large power of control over trustees; it enforces the due performance of their official duties, audits their accounts, and can disallow their remuneration.

Jurisdiction over Election Petitions.

Formerly the House of Commons claimed as one of its privileges, and exercised, the right to determine questions of a disputed election for any county or borough. Such questions were at first referred to a Committee of Privileges and Elections, then to a Committee of the whole House, and after the year 1770 to a Select Committee. In 1868, jurisdiction over disputed elections to the House of Commons was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster (*f*), and such matters are now heard and determined by two Judges of the High Court, being two out of a rota of three selected every year by the Judges themselves. The result of such trial is intimated to the Speaker, who either confirms the election or issues a new writ.

The Divisional Courts.

The Judges of the King's Bench Division frequently sit as a Divisional Court. Such a Court consists of two Judges, or of more than two if the Lord Chief Justice, with the concurrence of not less than two other Judges, should think it expedient. Any number of Divisional Courts may sit at the same time; each of them exercises all or any part of the jurisdiction of the High Court (*g*).

We have already dealt with the jurisdiction, both original and appellate, of a Divisional Court of the King's Bench Division in criminal matters (*h*). In civil matters its

(*d*) See *post*, p. 782.

(*e*) Bankruptcy Act, 1914, ss. 19, 20, 62; see *James, Ex parte* (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 609, 614; *Simmons, Ex parte* (1888), 16 Q. B. D. 308.

(*f*) 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, s. 5; see also 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51; Judicature Act, 1925, s. 67, sub-s. 1.

(*g*) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 63, sub-s. 2.

(*h*) See *ante*, pp. 350, 351.

jurisdiction is almost entirely appellate, except in matters on “ the Crown side ” with which we shall deal presently (*i*). Thus it deals, *inter alia*, with :—

Appeals from County Courts under section 120 of the County Courts Act, 1888 (*k*);

Special cases stated by Courts of petty and Quarter Sessions in civil matters, except as to separation and maintenance orders, which are dealt with by a Divisional Court of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division;

Appeals from the Mayor’s Court, London (*l*), and all other Borough Courts of Record (except the Liverpool Court of Passage), and from the Vice-Chancellor’s Court of the University of Oxford (*m*);

And appeals from a Judge of the High Court sitting in chambers on matters which do not relate to practice or procedure.

In these matters the decision of a Divisional Court is final, unless leave to appeal is given by the Divisional Court or by the Court of Appeal (*n*). In some cases, however, no such leave can be given, and the decision of the Divisional Court is therefore final (*o*).

The Crown Side of the King’s Bench Division.

Proceedings on the Crown side of the King’s Bench Division may be either civil or criminal. The criminal proceedings are by way either of an indictment (*p*), or of a criminal information (*q*). The chief civil proceedings are :—

(i) *mandamus* (*r*);

(ii) *habeas corpus* (*s*);

(*i*) See Order LIX., r. 1 (*a*).

(*k*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43.

(*l*) Mayor’s Court of London Procedure Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii.), s. 45.

(*m*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 26, and Order in Council of August 23, 1894.

(*n*) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 31 (*f*).

(*o*) Such as a special case stated under section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1889.

(*p*) See *post*, pp. 417 *et seq.*

(*q*) See *post*, pp. 425 *et seq.*

(*r*) See *post*, pp. 506 *et seq.*

(*s*) See *post*, pp. 504 *et seq.*

- (iii) *certiorari* (t);
- (iv) prohibitions (u);
- (v) informations in the nature of a *quo warranto* (x);
- (vi) attachments for contempt of Court (y);
- (vii) petitions of right (z).

The procedure in all such matters is now regulated by the Crown Office Rules of 1906.

The Revenue Side of the King's Bench Division.

Revenue cases since 1901 are heard by a single Judge, appeals from whom go direct to the Court of Appeal and not to a Divisional Court. Such matters are mostly cases stated as to points of law relating to income tax, super-tax, stamp duties and death duties. The Judge taking revenue cases also hears actions (called "informations") by the Crown for unpaid taxes, penalties and applications for committals, &c., relating to the above taxes. Order XIX. of the Rules of the Supreme Court as to pleading has no application to revenue proceedings; hence the defendant to an information on the Revenue side may still plead the general issue (a). Order LII. applies to proceedings on the Revenue side of the King's Bench Division, although Order XXVII. as to dismissal for want of prosecution does not (b). Customs and excise cases are not "revenue" cases.

(ii) *The Chancery Division.*

The Chancery Division consists of the Lord Chancellor, who is president (c), and six puisne Judges. These puisne Judges are divided into three groups, each consisting of two Judges, who deal with cases assigned to either of them, and to each group are attached the Chancery Masters with a

(t) See *post*, pp. 511 *et seq.*

(u) See *post*, pp. 510 *et seq.*

(x) See *post*, p. 514.

(y) See Vol. I, pp. 220—223.

(z) See *post*, pp. 574 *et seq.*

(a) *Att.-Gen. v. McCormack*, [1903] 2 Ir. R. 517.

(b) *Att.-Gen. v. Williamson* (1889), 60 L. T. 930.

(c) The Lord Chancellor rarely sits as a Judge of first instance, but he has jurisdiction as President over certain special matters, such, for instance, as the transfer of cases from or to the Chancery Division.

staff of clerks working under them. The bulk of the work of the Chancery Division consists of business specially assigned to it, to which its organisation is specially adapted. Nevertheless it administers law as well as equity. It never tries a case with a jury, though it has the power.

By the Judicature Act of 1873 (*d*) certain causes and matters were assigned to the Chancery Division and placed within its exclusive jurisdiction. These causes or matters include the administration of the estates of deceased persons, the dissolution of partnerships and the taking of partnership or other accounts, the redemption or foreclosure of mortgages, the raising of portions or other charges on land, the sale and distribution of the proceeds of property subject to any lien or charge, the execution of charitable or private trusts, the rectification or cancellation of deeds or other written documents, the specific performance of contracts between vendors and purchasers of real estates, the partition or sale of real estates, the wardship of infants and the care of infants' estates, and proceedings under the Trustee Acts, 1893—1925 (*e*).

Any action, therefore, in reference to one of the above causes or matters should be brought in the Chancery Division. If it be commenced in some other Division, the Court or any Judge of such Division may direct it to be transferred to the Chancery Division, and order the plaintiff to pay the costs thereby occasioned (*f*). On the other hand, as all matters in the Chancery Division are tried by a Judge alone, an order will, in a proper case, be made transferring an action to the King's Bench Division in order that it may be tried by a jury (*g*). Such a trial cannot be demanded as of right, it is a matter for the discretion of the Court; and the burden of showing that the action ought to be tried with a jury lies on the applicant (*h*).

(*d*) See now Judicature Act, 1925, s. 56, and Order LIV. B. (1).

(*e*) *Ibid.*, ss. 56 (sub-s. 1), 58.

(*f*) *Ibid.*, s. 59; and see *Cocq v. Hunasgeria Coffee Co.* (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. 415.

(*g*) See Order XXXVI., rr. 3, 7.

(*h*) *Timson v. Wilson* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 72; *Jenkins v. Bushby*, [1891] 1 Ch. 484. The law was altered by the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, s. 2, discussed in *Ford v. Blurton* (1922), 38 T. L. R. 801, but the earlier position was

A Judge of the Chancery Division, when sitting in chambers, has the same power and jurisdiction as if he were sitting in open Court (i). A set of chambers is attached to each group of two Judges mentioned above. The business generally transacted in such chambers consists of interlocutory applications, proceedings that have originated primarily in chambers, proceedings that have been adjourned for hearing to chambers, proceedings on judgments and orders. The Master has power to deal with any matter which he is directed by the Judge to hear and investigate, subject to any directions which the Judge may have given. In all other respects the jurisdiction of a Master of the Chancery Division is the same as in the King's Bench Division. The winding-up of companies is now regulated by Part IV. of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (k), and is transacted in the Department for Companies Winding-up, in which the registrars perform the duties which devolve on the Masters in the Chancery Division.

(iii) *The Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.*

In this Division are consolidated, by the Judicature Act, 1925, the three Courts of Probate, Divorce and Admiralty. There are three Judges of this Division—the President and two puisne Judges. They are assisted by four registrars, who sit at Somerset House and deal with summonses in probate and divorce matters.

The Lord High Admiral is known to have held a Court as early as in the reign of Henry I. (l). This Court acquired jurisdiction over all wrongful acts, civil and criminal, com-

restored, subject to rules to be made subsequently, by section 3 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 28).

(i) See R. S. C., Order LV.

(k) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69.

(l) "It has been doubted whether the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court or of the Lord High Admiral arose in the reigns of Edward III. or Richard I. or Henry 1.; but, whenever it arose, it arose at a time when the distinction did not exist between local and transitory actions, and the Courts of this country had no jurisdiction to entertain actions which did not arise within a county"; *per* Fry, L.J., in *Turner v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board*, [1892] P. at p. 300; and see 13 Rich. 2, st. 1, c. 5; 15 Rich. 2, c. 3. The Court fell into abeyance during the Commonwealth, but was revived after the Restoration. See the account of the ceremony on March 13, 1663, given by Pepys in his *Diary* (1828 ed.), vol. ii. at p. 17.

mitted on the high seas or in the main streams of great rivers below bridges. It administered a body of maritime law as adopted by itself from maritime customs and laws common to all nations and also from such codes of sea law as the laws of Oleron and the *Consolato del Mare*. Its criminal jurisdiction was transferred in 1835 to the Central Criminal Court, and in 1844 it was also vested in the Judges of Assize. But its civil jurisdiction continued till 1875.

In 1857 the Court of Probate was created by the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77; it succeeded to the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the Ecclesiastical Courts over the wills and intestacies of dead persons. The goods of persons dying without wills were in olden times distributable *in pios usus*. The Church undertook this duty, and afterwards usurped jurisdiction over wills, as these were documents by which its title on an intestacy was superseded.

In the same year, 1857, was created the Divorce Court, which succeeded to the authority of the Ecclesiastical Courts over marriages, with the additional power of decreeing the dissolution of marriage, which until then could only be effected by an Act of Parliament.

The most important Admiralty actions are brought not against a person but against a ship or cargo, in order to enforce a maritime lien. These are called actions *in rem*, because in them the plaintiff claims that the ship or cargo, if within the jurisdiction of the Court, be arrested and detained until the sum due to him be paid or secured or judgment be given in the action. Such actions are :

- (a) the action of damage by collision or otherwise to ship or cargo;
- (b) the action on a bottomry bond, by which money is lent at a high premium on the chance of the ship arriving safely;
- (c) the *respondentia* action, in which the cargo alone has been pledged in the same way;
- (d) the action of possession in which an owner, mortgagee, or other person, claims to be allowed to take possession of the ship;

- (e) the action for salvage, or for towage, in which reward is claimed for assisting a vessel in distress, or for towing her;
- (f) the action for pilotage;
- (g) the action for masters' and seamen's wages in respect of service on board the ship; and
- (h) the action for necessities supplied to the ship in port.

There are also Admiralty actions *in personam*, in which a maritime lien is not claimed. Admiralty actions have in some respects a procedure of their own (*m*). This Division of the High Court also deals with questions of prize. The President, by virtue of a commission issued under the Great Seal at the beginning of every war, has jurisdiction over "all captures, seizures, prizes and reprisals of ships and goods which are or shall be taken and to hear and determine according to the course of Admiralty and the law of nations" (*n*).

Probate actions determine the validity of a will as a whole, whether in respect of the capacity of the testator or of its due execution, but not the construction of the will, which is for the Chancery Division. They also determine who is entitled to letters of administration in a case of intestacy. They are of three kinds:—

- (a) The action for propounding a will in solemn form.
- (b) The interest action, in which the plaintiff claims to have letters of administration granted to him as one of the next-of-kin of the deceased intestate.
- (c) The revocation action, in which it is sought to revoke a probate granted in common form or letters of administration.

The Court has jurisdiction whenever the deceased person at the time of his death owned land or personalty in England, or personalty in transit to England. It does not matter

(*m*) See, for instance, Order XIII., r. 12A; Order XIX., r. 28; Order XX., r. 3; Order XXVII., r. 11A; Order XXX., r. 1D.

(*n*) Proceedings are governed by the Naval Prize Acts and the Prize Rules made by authority of those Acts.

where the will was made, or whether the deceased was a British subject or not, or whether he was domiciled in England or not.

The most important matrimonial causes are suits for—

- (a) nullity of marriage,
- (b) divorce,
- (c) judicial separation,
- (d) restitution of conjugal rights,
- (e) alimony.

The Court has jurisdiction to dissolve any marriage, whether celebrated in England or not, if the parties are domiciled in England at the time when the proceedings for a divorce are commenced (o). In other matrimonial causes “residence, not domicil, is the test of jurisdiction” (p). The rules of the Supreme Court do not affect the procedure or practice in divorce or other matrimonial causes; the procedure is regulated by the Divorce Rules.

Two Judges of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division as often as occasion requires sit as a Divisional Court to hear appeals from County Courts exercising Probate or Admiralty jurisdiction, and from Courts of petty sessions exercising jurisdiction under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (q), and from the Wreck Commissioners.

II.—THE COURT OF APPEAL.

This Court is composed of the Master of the Rolls and five Lords Justices of Appeal, with the occasional assistance of the Lord Chancellor, any ex-Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, and the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, who are *ex officio* Judges of the Court (r). The Court sits in two divisions; the Master

(o) *Bater v. Bater*, [1906] P. 209. And see *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P. 46; *D. v. Montagu v. De Montagu*, [1913] P. 154; *Rudd v. Rudd*, [1924] P. 72.

(p) *Per Jeune, P.*, in *Roberts v. Brennan*, [1902] P., at p. 144; *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier*, [1895] A. C., at p. 531.

(q) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39, *post*, pp. 397, 398.

(r) Additional Judges sit occasionally under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 51), s. 6 (re-enacted by the Judicature Act, 1925, s. 7).

of the Rolls presides in the first Court, and the senior Lord Justice in the second Court. The Master of the Rolls and the Lords Justices are appointed by the Prime Minister. They must have been Judges of the High Court for at least one year, or barristers of fifteen years' standing. Final appeals and motions for new trials are heard by three Judges; interlocutory appeals by two Judges (s).

The Court of Appeal has power to hear and determine appeals from any judgment or order of the High Court of Justice or any Judge thereof, whether sitting in the Royal Courts or on circuit, and whether in a Divisional Court or at *Nisi Prius* or at Judges' chambers. There are, however, limitations imposed by statute or by rules of Court, which (a) confer appellate jurisdiction on Divisional Courts and prescribe that the appeal from the original Court shall, in the first place at any rate, lie to such Courts; or (b) restrict the right of appeal in particular cases. It cannot hear appeals in any "criminal cause or matter." The Court of Appeal also hears motions for new trials, and motions to set aside a verdict where there has been a trial by jury. An appeal from the decision of a Judge of the High Court, sitting at chambers on any matter of practice and procedure, also lies to the Court of Appeal. For all the purposes of and incidental to the hearing and determination of any such appeal, and the amendment, execution and enforcement of any judgment or order made on such appeal, the Court of Appeal has all the power, authority and jurisdiction vested in the High Court of Justice.

It also hears appeals:—

- (a) From any judgment or order of the Chancellors of the Palatine Courts of Lancaster and of Durham (t).
- (b) From a decision on a point of law of the Court of Railway and Canal Commission (u).
- (c) From an order of the Judge of the Liverpool Court of Passage (x).
- (d) From an order of a County Court Judge on a question of law

(s) As to the jurisdiction in lunacy of the Lords Justices, see *post*, pp. 767, 768.

(t) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 28.

(u) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 25, s. 17, sub-s. 2; see *post*, p. 381.

(x) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 37, s. 10; see *post*, p. 391.

submitted to him for his decision by an arbitrator appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925 (y).

(e) From an order of a County Court Judge on a case stated by an arbitrator under the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 (z).

III.—THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

This Court forms no part of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and it has no original jurisdiction in ordinary civil actions (a); but an appeal lies to it against any judgment or order of the Court of Appeal. At least three members of the Court must be present. The Lords of Appeal are appointed by letters patent (b). They must either have held high judicial office for two years, or have been for fifteen years practising barristers in England or (Northern) Ireland, or practising advocates in Scotland. They hold office during good behaviour and are entitled to sit and vote as Lords of Parliament during their lives. All lay peers have, strictly speaking, the same right to vote on judicial as they have on legislative matters. This right, however, has fallen into disuse, and since 1883 no lay peer has attempted to exercise it. When the House sits to hear appeals, it is usual for the Lord Chancellor, ex-Lord Chancellors, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, and certain other peers who have held or hold high judicial office or are qualified to be appointed as Lords of Appeal, to attend.

The practice on appeals to the House of Lords is regulated by the Appellate Jurisdiction Acts, 1876 and 1887, by the Appeal (*Forma Pauperis*) Act, 1893, and by certain Standing Orders of the House (c).

The House of Lords has power in all cases to summon the Judges to attend and assist it in its deliberations by giving their opinion on any points of law.

The House of Lords also exercises civil jurisdiction in cases of claims to peerages. Such claims, which were originally heard before the King in Parliament, have since the reign of Charles II. been

(y) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84; see Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1926.

(z) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9, s. 16, sub-s. 4, s. 58, sub-s. 3 (a); and County Court (Agricultural Holdings) Rules, 1923.

(a) *Skinner v. East India Co.* (1666), 6 St. Tr. 710.

(b) See Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59), ss. 5, 6; and Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 70), s. 2.

(c) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 22. The Orders will be found in the Annual Practice, 1920, Vol. II., at p. 2443; and in Denison and Scott's House of Lords Practice.

decided by a committee of the full House of Lords on reference from the King, who acts upon the resolution of such committee.

It also decides questions as to disputed elections of the sixteen representative peers of Scotland (*d*), and of the twenty-eight representative peers of Ireland (*e*), and also questions of claims to vote on such elections. An Act of Parliament is still necessary to dissolve the marriage of persons having an Irish domicile, for the Courts of Ireland have only power to grant a divorce *a mensa et thoro*. These Irish Divorce Bills are always introduced into the House of Lords (*f*). But since the Act of 1922 the Irish Free State is not treated as part of the United Kingdom: it has the status of a Dominion.

IV.—THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL.

Besides its executive business, the Privy Council exercises important judicial functions as a Court of Final Appeal from the Ecclesiastical Courts and from the Courts of India, the Colonies, Southern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Such appeals are known as appeals to the King in Council, and down to the year 1833 were few in number and were generally heard by committees of the Council specially appointed for each case, and usually in vacation time when the Judges were free to attend. But in 1833 a statute was passed, which constituted the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (*g*). It consists of the Lord Chancellor, the four Lords of Appeal, if Privy Councillors, and such other members of the Privy Council as have held any high judicial office in the United Kingdom or the Colonies. It is the ultimate Court of Appeal for upwards of 350 millions of persons.

The proceedings commence by the appellant lodging a petition of appeal to the Right Honourable the Lords of the Judicial Committee, to which the respondent must enter a formal appearance by giving notice in writing to the registrar. If he fails to do so, the appellant can serve a peremptory order calling on him to appear within six weeks, at the end of which time, if the respondent is still

(*d*) Union with Scotland Act, 1706 (6 Anne, c. 11); Scottish Representative Peers Act, 1707 (6 Anne, c. 78); Representative Peers (Scotland) Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 52).

(*e*) 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67. The representative Peers of Ireland are not abolished by 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 4, which created the Free State.

(*f*) As to the jurisdiction of the House of Lords as a Final Court of Appeal in criminal cases, see *ante*, p. 354.

(*g*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41.

in default, the appellant can set down the appeal *ex parte*. If the respondent appears, he must lodge his answer to the petition. Both the petition and answer must contain an abstract of the facts as to which the appeal has arisen, together with a short statement of the reasons offered by the parties for the reversing or affirming the judgment of the Court below. When both the petition and answer are lodged, the appeal is set down and heard. Only one judgment is delivered; in this the Committee states the reasons for which it will advise His Majesty to allow or dismiss the appeal. Its decision is then reported to the King in Council.

Besides the ordinary appeals, the King may refer to the Judicial Committee the determination of important constitutional controversies, such as the ownership of unoccupied land in Southern Rhodesia, the boundary between South Australia and Victoria, and the extent of Labrador. These are not really lawsuits, but they are determined judicially after full argument on behalf of the respective contestants. It may easily develop into the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the Empire.

V.—OTHER SUPERIOR COURTS.

There are also other superior Courts of record, which have jurisdiction only over certain counties, or which have been created in modern times for certain special purposes. They form no part of the Supreme Court of Judicature. We shall only deal here very briefly with:—

(i) The Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster.

(ii) The Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Durham.

(iii) The Court of Railway and Canal Commission.

(iv) The Railway Rates Tribunal.

(i) *The Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster.*

The Vice-Chancellor of the Duchy and County Palatine of Lancaster is the sole Judge of this Court, which is a superior Court of Record. He sits alternately at Liverpool and Manchester; there is a registrar and an office of this

Court at each of these cities, and also at Preston. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited in area, but unlimited in amount. It is essential that the parties to the action should be within the county palatine, though not the property which forms the subject-matter in dispute (*h*). Within the county palatine this Court has the same powers and jurisdiction as the Chancery Division of the High Court (*i*). It also possesses the summary jurisdiction of the Chancery Division (*k*), statutory jurisdiction over the property of infants and other persons under disability (*l*), power to administer assets, and to wind up any limited company whose registered office is within the county. It has also jurisdiction under the Law of Property Act, 1925 (*m*), the Trustee Act, 1925 (*n*), and the Judicial Trustee Act, 1896 (*o*). An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, and thence to the House of Lords.

(ii) *The Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Durham.*

The County Palatine of Durham has also a Court of its own, which is a superior Court of Record. The sole Judge of this Court is the Chancellor of the County Palatine, who sits in the Shire Hall of the City of Durham. Its jurisdiction is unlimited in amount, but, apart from statute, either the property which is the subject-matter of the action must be situate, or the parties must reside, within the county. If the parties reside within jurisdiction, it is immaterial where the property is situate. The jurisdiction of the Court has been extended by various statutes. For example, the Palatine Court of Durham Act, 1889 (*p*), has conferred upon it jurisdiction to administer assets and to deal with the property of infants or other persons under disability, and all the summary jurisdiction of the Chancery Division. It has power to wind up any limited company, whose registered

(*h*) *Longdendale Cotton Spinning Co., In re* (1878), 8 Ch. D. 150.

(*i*) Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 23), s. 3.

(*k*) Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 43), s. 11.

(*l*) Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 82), s. 12.

(*m*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 203, sub-s. 3.

(*n*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 19, s. 67, sub-s. 1.

(*o*) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 35, s. 2.

(*p*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 47, ss. 6, 7.

office is within the county. It has jurisdiction under the Charitable Trusts Acts, 1853 to 1869, the Settled Land Act, 1925 (q), the Law of Property Act, 1925 (r), the Trustee Act, 1925 (s), and the Judicial Trustee Act, 1896 (t). An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal and thence to the House of Lords (u).

Formerly the Palatine County of Lancaster had a Court of Common Pleas, and the Palatine County of Durham a Court of Pleas, but the jurisdiction of both these Courts was vested in the High Court by section 16 of the Judicature Act, 1873 (x).

The county of Chester was also formerly a county palatine, and had Palatine Courts of its own, but these were abolished by Act of Parliament in 1830 (y).

(iii) *Court of Railway and Canal Commission and*
(iv) *The Railway Rates Tribunal.*

The Commission was created by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888 (z). It consists of a Judge of the High Court, who presides (a), and of two other persons, not Judges, appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the President of the Board of Trade, one of whom must be an expert in railway matters. The President alone decides points of law. It is the duty of this Court to enforce the provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 (b), and of other special Acts, which provide that railway and canal companies shall afford reasonable facilities for carrying traffic over their systems, and shall not give any undue preference to any particular person or company, or any particular description of traffic. If complaint be made to the Court on any of these grounds, it has power to order the company complained of to obey

(q) 15 Geo. 5, c. 18, s. 113.

(r) 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 203.

(s) 15 Geo. 5, c. 19, s. 67.

(t) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 35, s. 2.

(u) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 28, repealing and re-enacting 52 & 53 Vict. c. 47, s. 11.

(x) *Ibid.*, s. 18, repealing and re-enacting 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66.

(y) 11 Geo. 4, and 1 Will. 4, c. 70, ss. 13, 14.

(z) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 25.

(a) When a Scotch or Irish railway is concerned, a Judge of the Court of Session in Scotland or of the High Court of Ireland presides: section 4.

(b) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31.

the provisions of these Acts or to restrain it by injunction from disobeying them. It may also order the company to pay a sum not exceeding £200 for every day after a day named in the order that the company fails to obey the order or injunction; and further it may, in addition to or in lieu of any other relief, award damages to the complainant (*c*). The Court has also jurisdiction to decide as to the legality of any toll, rate or charge for the carriage of any merchandise (*d*), and to determine any dispute with respect to the "terminal charges" of any canal company, *e.g.*, for loading and unloading, covering and delivering goods where such charges have not been fixed by statute, and to decide what would be a reasonable charge for such work (*e*). The power of controlling rates in the case of railways has been much reduced by the Railway Act of 1921 (*f*), which established the Rates Tribunal. The duty of both Courts is to safeguard the interests of the general public and to protect them from the evils of monopoly.

Both Courts have all the powers, rights and privileges of a superior Court with respect to the attendance and examination of witnesses, the production and inspection of documents, the entry on, and inspection of, property and the enforcement of their orders (*g*). They may also, subject to the approval of the Lord Chancellor and the President of the Board of Trade, make rules for their procedure and practice and subsequently vary them (*h*). There is no appeal from either Court on any question of fact, but on a question of law an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal (*i*).

All the powers and jurisdiction of these Courts and the law administered by them are statutory. They decide matters which no other Court can decide. If a man makes a contract with a railway or canal company to carry goods at a certain rate, he must pay this rate; it will be no defence to an action at law for him

(*c*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 25, s. 12.

(*d*) *Ibid.*, s. 10.

(*e*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 48, s. 15.

(*f*) See 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 55, ss. 27, 28. The same proviso applies to through rates.

(*g*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 25, s. 18.

(*h*) *Ibid.*, s. 20; and see rules made under section 22 of the Act of 1921.

(*i*) *Ibid.*, s. 17; and section 26 of the Act of 1921.

subsequently to allege that such rate is unreasonable; but this would be a good ground for complaint to the Court of Commission or the Rates Tribunal.

The principal statutes under which these Courts act are the following:—

1. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 (*k*), which entitles the public to reasonable facilities for passengers and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of goods.

2. The Regulation of Railways Act, 1873 (*l*), under which proceedings may be taken against a company which refuses to publish its rates.

3. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888 (*m*), which deals with “through rates” and “undue preference.”

4. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894 (*n*), which gave to the Commissioners jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints as to the increase of rates and charges made for unloading on a private siding.

5. The Railways Act, 1921 (*o*), which amends the above Acts on some points, and, in the case of Railways, transfers to the Rates Tribunal jurisdiction in most, though not in all, questions of rates.

A “reasonable facility” must be a convenience to the public at large, not merely to a private individual. The public is entitled to all such reasonable facilities as the company can reasonably be expected to provide, such, for instance, as a cloak-room (*p*), a waiting-room, and proper platforms, but not a refreshment-room (*q*). The junction of any private siding or private branch railway is now declared to be a reasonable facility (*r*). But the Court of Commission cannot compel the railway to do a specific thing; it will not constitute itself a manager of the company. The granting of through rates is a reasonable facility; and either a trader interested in the traffic or another railway company may demand a through rate.

An “undue preference” exists, whenever a railway company charges A less than it charges B for carrying the same class of merchandise, provided A and B are competing traders using the same railway or canal. A railway company may urge in excuse that the preference is necessary to secure in the public interests the traffic for which it is made, or that the inequality cannot be removed without unduly lowering the reasonable rate (*s*).

(*k*) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31. The provisions of this Act were extended in 1868 to steam vessels worked by a railway company: 31 & 32 Vict. c. 119, s. 16.

(*l*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 48.

(*m*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 25.

(*n*) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 54. The first section of this Act and the amending Act (2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 29), were repealed by the Act of 1921, which, however, leaves considerable powers to the commissioners.

(*o*) 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 55, s. 16.

(*p*) *Singer Manufacturing Co. v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 833.

(*q*) *S. E. Ry. Co. v. Railway Commissioners* (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 586.

(*r*) 4 Edw. 7, c. 19, s. 2.

(*s*) See *Holwell Iron Co., Lim. v. Midland Ry. Co.*, [1910] 1 K. B. 296.

CHAPTER V.

INFERIOR CIVIL COURTS.

IN ancient days it was the rule of the King's Court that its clerk should record in writing all the proceedings of the Court. Subsequently it became a settled principle that nothing could be averred or proved against these records; and all Courts where this rule prevailed were known as "Courts of Record." All Superior Courts were Courts of Record, while humbler tribunals, such as the ancient County Court, the Hundred Court and the Court Baron, were "Courts not of Record," even though in time all of them kept some kind of record.

As soon as the ascendancy of the King's Court was established over local tribunals, Courts of Record were divided into Superior and Inferior Courts of Record, the latter being so called because, like Courts not of Record, their proceedings are subject to the supervision of the High Court of Justice or some other Superior Court. This supervision is exercised by means of various writs, of which the writs of *Mandamus*, *Certiorari* (a) and Prohibition are the most important (b). There are other respects in which such Courts differ from Superior Courts of Record; for instance, with regard to the immunity of the Judges for acts done or words spoken while discharging their judicial functions (c), and the power of committal for contempt of Court (d). Moreover, at the present day, as we shall see (e), an appeal

(a) Any proceeding in the County Court may by the order of a Master be removed into the High Court by writ of *certiorari*, if difficult questions of law will arise in it, or for any other reason which the Master thinks sufficient, and on such terms as to payment of costs, giving security, or otherwise as the Master may think fit to impose: 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 126; and see *Rees v. Williams* (1851), 7 Exch. 51; *Parker v. Bristol and Exeter Ry. Co.* (1851), 6 Exch. 184; *Longbottom v. Longbottom* (1852), 8 Exch. 203, 208.

(b) See *post*, pp. 504 *et seq.*

(c) See Vol. 1, p. 490.

(d) See Vol. 1, pp. 220—223.

(e) See *post*, pp. 390, 391.

lies, subject to certain conditions, from almost every Inferior Court either to a Divisional Court or to the Court of Appeal.

Our Courts, therefore, are divided into three classes:—

- (i) Superior Courts of Record.
- (ii) Inferior Courts of Record.
- (iii) Inferior Courts not of Record.

Superior Courts of Record include the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal, the High Court of Justice, and any Divisional Court and any Judge of any Division sitting in Court alone (f). Also the Central Criminal Court, and all Courts held under any commission of oyer and terminer, assize, gaol delivery, or Nisi Prius. The Courts of Chancery of the Counties Palatine of Lancaster and Durham and the Court of Railway and Canal Commission are also Superior Courts of Record.

On the other hand, the Mayor's Court, London; the City of London Court; the Salford Hundred Court; the Court of Passage, Liverpool; the Tolzey Court of Bristol; all County Courts; Courts of Quarter Session; Sheriffs' Courts; and Coroners' Courts, are Inferior Courts of Record. But Courts of petty sessions, Courts of Pie Poudre, Courts of the Market and Staple, the Court of the Duchy Chamber of Lancaster, and all Manorial Courts are Inferior Courts not of Record.

The most important of the Inferior Courts of Record is the County Court.

COUNTY COURTS.

The term "County Court" has no necessary connection with a geographical or administrative county. There are more than 500 County Court districts, which are grouped together into over fifty circuits. To each circuit one Judge at least is appointed and he holds a Court in each district once in every month of the year, except September (g). These Courts were created by the County Court Act, 1846 (h), but their jurisdiction has since that date been

(f) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 61.

(g) Some Courts are bi-monthly, while in many the sittings are oftener than once a month.

(h) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. The most recent statutes dealing with these Courts are those of 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 73) and 1924 (14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 17).

increased to a remarkable extent. It now depends mainly on three things:—

- (i) The place where the defendant resides, or the property in dispute is situated.
- (ii) The nature of the plaintiff's claim.
- (iii) The amount of the claim.

An ordinary County Court action must, as a rule, be commenced in the Court of the district in which the defendant resides or carries on business. But it may, by leave of a Judge or Registrar, be commenced in the Court of the district in which the defendant lived or carried on business within the last six months, or with the like leave in the Court of the district where the cause of action wholly or in part arose (i). Any proceedings relating to a charge or lien on lands, &c., or to partition, or to proceedings under the Trustee Acts, or to the administration of the assets of a deceased person, or to any partnership, must be respectively commenced in that Court within the district of which the lands, &c., or any part thereof are, or the persons making the application under the Trustee Acts reside, or the deceased last lived, or the partnership business was carried on.

The ordinary jurisdiction of the County Court now extends to all personal actions where the debt, demand or damage claimed, whether on balance of account or otherwise, does not exceed £100; and further to any action (a) where the debt or demand claimed is reduced by an admitted set-off to £100; (b) for the recovery of any demand not exceeding £100, which is the whole or part of the unliquidated balance of a partnership account, or of a distributive share under an intestacy, or of any legacy; (c) in ejectment, where neither the value of the lands, &c., claimed nor the rent thereof exceeds £100 by the year, subject to the defendant or his landlord having the right to apply within one month to a Judge of the High Court to order such action to be tried in the High Court in any case where the title to other lands, &c., of greater annual value than

(i) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 74. As to the metropolis, see section 84.

(k) *Ibid.*, s. 75.

£100 would be affected; (d) to try the title to any corporeal or incorporeal hereditament, where neither the value of the lands, &c., nor the rent payable, nor, in case of an easement or licence, where neither the value nor reserved rent of the lands, &c., in respect of which, or on, through, over or under which, such easement or licence is claimed, exceeds the sum of £100 by the year (*l*). Save that a County Court cannot, except by consent, try any action (*l*) in which the title to any toll, fair, market or franchise (*m*) shall be in question, (2) for libel or slander, (3) for seduction, or (4) for breach of promise of marriage (*n*).

A cause of action for more than £100 may not be divided to enable a plaintiff to bring two or more actions in the County Court for portions of the same claim. But the plaintiff may, if he thinks fit, abandon the excess and take judgment for £100 in full discharge of the cause of action.

The Court can grant an injunction in any case where an injunction can be granted, provided the amount of damages claimed does not exceed £100 (*o*).

The County Court also has a considerable jurisdiction in equity. It has all the powers and authority of the High Court in the following matters:—

An administration action by creditors, legatees, devisees, heirs-at-law or next-of-kin;

An action for the execution of a trust;

An action for the foreclosure, redemption or enforcement of any charge or lien;

An action for the specific performance of, or the reforming or cancelling of, any agreement for the sale, purchase or lease of property;

An action under the Trustee Acts, the Trustee Relief Acts, &c.;

An action relating to the maintenance or advancement of infants;

(*l*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, ss. 56—60, as amended by 3 Edw. 7, c. 42, s. 3.

(*m*) Including an action for infringement of a patent: *R. v. County Court Judge of Halifax*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 263.

(*n*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 56.

(*o*) See, however, *R. v. Cheshire County Court Judge*, [1921] 2 K. B. 694; *Smith v. Smith*, [1925] 2 K. B. 144.

An action for the dissolution or winding up of any partnership;

An action for relief against fraud or mistake; provided the estate, fund, property or assets concerned, or the mortgage charge or lien claimed, or the damage sustained, does not exceed in amount or value £500 (*p*).

The jurisdiction of a County Court can be extended so as to include a claim for any amount in any common law action, if the parties to any such action agree in writing, signed by themselves or their solicitors, that a particular Court shall have jurisdiction to try their case. And if a defendant sets up a counterclaim he is not restricted as to the amount he can seek to recover thereby. High Court actions may also be remitted to the County Court for trial. But in equity actions and matters jurisdiction cannot be extended or given by consent. If during the progress of any such action or matter a want of jurisdiction appears, it is the duty of the Judge to direct the transfer of the action or matter to the Chancery Division of the High Court (*q*). A Judge of that division has power, at the instance of any party, to make an order at chambers authorising the action or matter to proceed in the County Court.

In all our larger provincial towns the County Court is also a Court of Bankruptcy, and has in bankruptcy matters all the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court (*r*). Several County Courts have also a limited jurisdiction in Admiralty—a jurisdiction, indeed, which in some respects exceeds that of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court (*s*), and some also in probate actions (*t*).

The County Court has exclusive jurisdiction under several Acts, such as—

- The Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923 (*u*);
- The Alkali, &c., Works Regulation Act, 1906 (*x*);
- The Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 (*y*);
- The Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (*z*);

(*p*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 67.

(*q*) *Ibid.*, s. 68. For procedure if the action be instituted in the wrong County Court, see 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 73, s. 10.

(*r*) Bankruptcy Act, 1914, ss. 96—105; *Skinner v. Northallerton County Court Judge* (1899), 6 Manson, 274.

(*s*) *Cargo ex "Argos"* (1873), L. R. 5 P. C. 134.

(*t*) Court of Probate Act, 1858, s. 10.

(*u*) 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 9.

(*x*) 6 Edw. 7, c. 14.

(*y*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 90.

(*z*) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42.

The Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (*a*); and

The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925 (*b*).

It can also, under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (*c*), wind up any company whose paid-up capital is less than £10,000. It has extensive powers under the Allotments Acts, 1908 to 1925 (*d*); the Building Societies Acts, 1874 and 1894 (*e*); the Commons Act, 1876 (*f*); the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901 (*g*); the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 (*h*); the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893 (*i*); the Local Loans Act, 1875 (*k*); the Locomotives Act, 1898 (*l*); the Lunacy Act, 1890 (*m*); the Riot (Damages) Act, 1886 (*n*); the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876 (*o*); the Settled Land Act, 1925 (*p*); and the Solicitors Act, 1870 (*q*).

The Judge, who must be a barrister of at least seven years' standing, is appointed by the Lord Chancellor (except where the whole of the district is within the Duchy of Lancaster, in which case the Chancellor of that Duchy appoints). A County Court Judge cannot sit in Parliament, nor can he practise or act as arbitrator for remuneration to himself. In case of illness or unavoidable absence, he may appoint a deputy, but no deputy can act for more than fourteen days at a time without the approval of the Lord Chancellor.

The chief officers of the County Court are the Registrar and the high bailiff. Since the County Courts Act, 1924, the two offices are to be performed by the Registrar. One Registrar at least is appointed to each Court, and no person can be Registrar of more than one Court; he must be a solicitor of at least seven years' standing, and is appointed by the Lord Chancellor (*r*). He must, on a vacancy in the

(*a*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.

(*b*) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84.

(*c*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, s. 131, sub-s. 3.

(*d*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 36 and 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 59; 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 51;
15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 61.

(*e*) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 42; 57 & 58 Vict. c. 47.

(*f*) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 56.

(*g*) 1 Edw. 7, c. 22.

(*h*) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 25.

(*i*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 39.

(*k*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 83.

(*l*) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 29.

(*m*) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5.

(*n*) 49 & 50 Vict. c. 38.

(*o*) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 75.

(*p*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 18, s. 113, sub-s. 3.

(*q*) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 28.

(*r*) County Courts Act, 1924 (14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 17).

office of high bailiff, exercise the powers and perform the duties of that office (s). The accounts of the Registrars are audited by the County Courts Department of the Treasury. In bankruptcy matters the Registrar has powers similar to those of a Registrar in the High Court—except that the Registrar of a County Court cannot discharge a debtor or approve a composition or scheme which is opposed by any creditor.

The high bailiff's duties consist in serving the summonses and orders and executing all the warrants issued out of the Court; he is made responsible for the acts and defaults of himself and his officers. The remuneration is by salary and allowances; he is also entitled to retain for his own use the fees received for keeping possession of goods under executions. The bailiffs who assist the Registrar in his capacity as high bailiff are appointed by the certificate of the Judge who has power to suspend or dismiss them (t).

No official of the Court may by himself or his partner act directly or indirectly as solicitor for any party in the Court, subject to a penalty of £50 (u).

In order that the suitors may know, a convenient time beforehand, when the Courts will be held, the Judge must appoint the days and hours of holding each of his Courts; and notice of such days and hours must be affixed in some conspicuous place in the court-house and in the office of the Registrar three calendar months beforehand (x).

The Judge has discretion over the costs of every action in the County Court, whether it be tried by a jury or not, whether it be remitted from the High Court or not. Such discretion must, of course, be exercised judicially, but is not restricted by any provision as to "good cause." In the absence of any special direction, the costs will follow the event; in the case of a remitted action the costs of the proceedings in the High Court will be allowed according to the scale in use in the High Court, the costs incurred since the order to remit according to the County Court scale (y).

Appeals from the decisions of a County Court Judge, as a rule, lie to a Divisional Court of the King's Bench Division.

(s) 14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 17, s. 1.

(u) *Ibid.*, s. 41.

(y) See County Courts Act, 1919, s. 11.

(t) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 33.

(x) County Court Order I., r. 1.

In certain cases, however, such as those arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, the appeal lies direct to the Court of Appeal. In bankruptcy matters, appeal lies to a Divisional Court of the Chancery Division sitting in Bankruptcy, of which Court the Judge in Bankruptcy must be a member, and thence to the Court of Appeal—but only by leave of the Divisional Court.

BOROUGH COURTS OF RECORD.

In the Middle Ages, the incorporation of a town as a borough was invariably accompanied by the grant of jurisdiction to a Court of the borough. As a rule, there were two Courts, one having civil jurisdiction and another having criminal jurisdiction, or one Court having both civil and criminal jurisdiction. There have been created at different times no less than 215 borough Courts. Of these only nineteen now actively exercise judicial functions. Their jurisdiction is generally limited to causes of action arising within the borough, but unlimited as to the amount which can be claimed; they can try practically any action which could be brought in the King's Bench Division of the High Court. In most of them the Recorder of the borough is the Judge.

An appeal lies from all these Courts to the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice (z), except in the case of the Liverpool Court of Passage, an appeal from which lies direct to the Court of Appeal (a).

The most prominent of these borough Courts are—

The Mayor's and City of London Court.

The Liverpool Court of Passage.

The Salford Hundred Court (b).

The Courts of Tolzey and Pie Poudre at Bristol.

(z) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 24.

(a) Liverpool Court of Passage Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 37), s. 10; *Anderson v. Dean*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 222; *Coates v. Moore*, [1903] 2 K. B. 140.

(b) This Court is regulated in the main by the Salford Hundred Court of Record Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. cxxx.).

THE MAYOR'S COURT OF LONDON AND THE CITY OF
LONDON COURT.

These ancient Courts of Record existed separately until 1920, when they were amalgamated (c). The former Court was presided over by the Recorder of London and, in his absence, by the Common Serjeant. Its jurisdiction was both legal and equitable and was almost unlimited in extent. The cause of action, with a few exceptions, had necessarily to arise within the City of London. The City of London Court was created by the City of London Small Debts Act, 1852 (d), and, for all general purposes, was a County Court. The procedure in the Mayor's Court was peculiar to itself and was, in a great measure, founded on the procedure which prevailed in the Superior Courts at Westminster before the Judicature Act, 1873. The City of London Court was governed generally by County Court rules.

Since 1920 the Courts have formed one Court of civil jurisdiction for the City of London, and are known as "the Mayor's and City of London Court," having and exercising all the powers and jurisdiction of the old Courts. The Judges are the Recorder, the Common Serjeant, the assistant Judge of the Mayor's Court and such other Judges as may be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. These assistant Judges have the status of County Court Judges.

All causes and proceedings are commenced by plaint, except in cases where but for the Act they could only have been commenced in the Mayor's Court. In such cases, directions, based on the Rules of the Supreme Court, may be given as to the procedure to be followed. For the purpose of proceedings which are within the jurisdiction of a County Court, the Court is deemed to be a County Court and the procedure is that authorised by the statutes and rules for the time being applicable to County Courts (e).

(c) Mayor's and City of London Court Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. cxxiv.).

(d) 15 & 16 Vict. c. lxxvii.

(e) See generally Mayor's and City of London Court Rules, 1921, Stat. R. and O. 1920, No. 2382.

THE UNIVERSITY COURTS.

Closely akin to the borough Courts are the Courts peculiar to the two ancient Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. These Courts claim exclusive jurisdiction over the members of the University. This creates a curious exception to the jurisdiction of the High Court. If the defendant be a member of the University of Oxford resident within its limits, he must be sued in the Vice-Chancellor's Court, although the plaintiff be in no way connected with the University or resident within its limits, and although the cause of action did not arise within those limits (*f*). In Cambridge the rule is the same, save that the privilege cannot be claimed if any person not a member of the University is a party (*g*).

THE SHERIFF'S COURT.

In ancient days the sheriff was an important judicial officer. In every county the sheriff presided in the Shire Court, and exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Nowadays the sheriff is responsible for the due execution of process. He cannot serve as a justice of the peace while in office. Nevertheless there are still some traces of his old judicial position. He—or rather his deputy, the under-sheriff—still holds a Court in which, with the aid of a jury of twelve persons, the following matters are dealt with:—

- (a) Where a judgment creditor has sued out a writ of *elegit*, the sheriff, on receipt of such writ, must hold an inquisition for the purpose of ascertaining by means of his jury what lands the judgment debtor holds in the county and what is their value.
- (b) Where, in an action for unliquidated damages or for the detention of goods, the plaintiff has signed interlocutory judgment on default of the defen-

(*f*) *Ginnett v. Whittingham* (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 761. The University of Oxford claims a similar exclusive privilege in criminal matters when any member of the University resident within its limits is either the prisoner or the prosecutor.

(*g*) 19 & 20 Vict. c. xvii., s. 18.

dant's appearance, and has taken out a writ of inquiry, the sheriff, by means of his jury, ascertains the amount of the damages or the value of the goods (*h*).

- (c) Where lands over the value of £50 are compulsorily taken or injuriously affected under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 (*i*), if the owner of the lands taken does not require an arbitrator, the compensation payable to him is to be ascertained by the sheriff and his jury.

An application for a new trial after the damages have been assessed by a jury before a sheriff must be made to the Court of Appeal (*k*).

THE CORONER'S COURT.

This is a Court of Record, presided over by an officer who is called "the coroner." A separate coroner is appointed for every county in England and Wales, and for every county borough or for every borough having a Court of Quarter Sessions. Many counties are divided into districts, in each of which there is a coroner. The county council, or, in a borough, the borough council, appoints.

Whenever there is reasonable cause for suspecting that any person has died either a violent death or one of which the cause is unknown, or that a person's death is due to some cause other than common illness, it is the duty of the coroner to hold a Court in order to inquire by what means he came to his end. For this purpose he will summon a jury of not less than twelve nor more than twenty-three persons, who must by their verdict decide how the deceased came by his death. Such an inquiry is called an inquest or inquisition. The body must be viewed both by the coroner and by the jury summoned by him; and the coroner can issue a *subpœna* summoning before him any person who can, he believes, throw any light on the matter. He can attach

(*h*) A writ of inquiry to assess damages cannot be obtained without leave of the Court: Juries Act, 1918; and see *Smythe v. Wiles*, [1921] 2 K. B. 66.

(*i*) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18.

(*k*) *Radam & Co. v. Leather*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 85.

such person for contempt of Court in the event of his disobedience. The coroner can also, by means of a *subpœna duces tecum*, compel any one to produce any documents in his possession which are likely to be useful at the inquiry. He has also power to order a *post-mortem* examination of the body and the attendance of medical witnesses. The witnesses are examined on oath by the coroner, and it is his duty, in cases of suspected murder or manslaughter, to take down the deposition of each witness in writing. Such deposition is afterwards read over to the witness, and signed by him and the coroner. The finding of the jury is recorded in writing, and is attested by the signatures and seals of the jury, as well as of the coroner; the document so recording the finding is called an **INQUISITION**.

If the jury has found any named person who is alive guilty of murder or manslaughter, the coroner commits him for trial, and will issue a warrant for his arrest if not already in custody. Usually, however, an independent investigation takes place before a justice of the peace in the ordinary way, and both sets of depositions are sent up and dealt with at the Assizes. In recent years, where a charge of murder or of manslaughter has been certain, there has been a tendency for the coroner merely to open the inquest and then adjourn it until after the trial, so as to avoid duplication of the preliminary proceedings; but he need not do so. The fact that the justices have or have not decided to send the accused for trial does not prevent the coroner's jury from returning a verdict in conflict with the justices' decision; and if they find a verdict of murder or manslaughter against a named individual who is in custody or subsequently arrested, he must be arraigned, even if the justices do not commit him or the grand jury ignore the bill against him. So, too, a verdict of suicide or accidental death cannot prevent justices from committing an accused person on a charge of committing murder or manslaughter of the deceased.

The coroner also holds inquests on persons executed, or dying within the precincts of a prison, and in cases of treasure trove.

“ The coroner’s inquisition is not like a judgment *in rem*. Nothing is done which is conclusive upon any person affected by it. . . . An inquiry before a coroner is merely in the nature of a preliminary investigation. It is not of any binding force. . . . The result of an investigation conducted by the coroner, however valuable for certain purposes, cannot in law be treated as *prima facie* evidence against any person of the facts found by the jury ” (l).

INFERIOR COURTS NOT OF RECORD.

Of the inferior civil Courts which are not Courts of Record we need only deal here with Courts of petty sessions.

The Court of Petty Sessions.

A Court of petty sessions, though not a Court of Record, is nevertheless a Court, even when it consists of only one justice (m), and such a Court has power to deal with many matters of a purely civil nature, such as disputes concerning contracts between master and servant (n) or between members of friendly societies, or the assessment and division between the frontagers of the expenses incurred by a district council in making up a road. Where a plaintiff seeks to recover damages not exceeding £5 for injury done to his cattle by the defendant’s dog, he can recover them summarily as a civil debt (o). The justices have also jurisdiction over certain *quasi*-civil matters, such as affiliation orders (p).

These proceedings, whether civil or *quasi*-civil, are commenced by a “ complaint,” which is never made on oath, and need not be made in writing (q). As a rule a summons is issued in the first instance, but if the charge is serious and supported by oath a

(l) *Per* Swinfen Eady, M.R., in *Bird v. Keep*, [1918] 2 K. B., at pp. 698, 699; see also *Calmenson v. Merchants’ Warehousing Co.* (1921), 90 L. J. P. C. 134; *Barnett v. Cohen*, [1921] 2 K. B. 461.

(m) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 13, sub-s. 11.

(n) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, ss. 4—7, and see section 9.

(o) 6 Edw. 7, c. 32, s. 1, sub-s. 3.

(p) Justices also grant licences to public-houses, but such work is administrative and not judicial: *Boulter v. Kent JJ.*, [1897] A. C. 556; *R. v. Sharman*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 578; *Attwood v. Chapman*, [1914] 3 K. B. 275.

(q) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 8.

warrant may issue at once. In all cases where the defendant fails to appear in obedience to the summons, a warrant for his arrest may be issued, if the complainant substantiates his claim upon oath (*r*). As in all other civil proceedings, the defendant can be compelled to give evidence on oath. If the case be decided in favour of the plaintiff, the justices make an "order" for payment of money; this merely creates a civil debt. It may be made payable by instalments; satisfactory security may be taken for its payment. Such order cannot be enforced by imprisonment, except in three cases:—

- (a) Non-compliance with an affiliation order (*s*);
- (b) Disobedience to an order to do or abstain from an act (*t*);
- (c) Wilful non-payment, where the defendant has it in his power to pay (*u*).

And even in these cases the punishment is a civil and not a criminal imprisonment.

Justices of the peace, moreover, have power to grant a judicial separation in cases that fall under two statutes:—

- (i) Under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (*x*), a married woman can obtain a judicial separation in any one of the following cases—

- (a) Where her husband has been summarily convicted of an aggravated assault upon her, or convicted upon indictment of any assault upon her for which he has been sentenced to a fine of more than £5 or imprisonment for more than two months.
- (b) Where her husband has deserted her. To obtain relief on this ground the desertion need not be for any specified period.
- (c) Where her husband has been guilty of persistent cruelty to her, or of wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for her, and the wife has, owing to such cruelty or neglect, been driven to leave and live apart from him. In order to constitute cruelty "there must be danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental,

(*r*) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 2.

(*t*) *Ibid.*, s. 34.

(*x*) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39: extended and amended by the Married Women's (Maintenance) Act, 1920, and the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Act, 1925 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 63, and 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 51).

(*s*) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 54.

(*u*) *Ibid.*, s. 35.

or a reasonable apprehension of it'' (y). If the ground on which the wife seeks a judicial separation be wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance, the Court must be satisfied that her husband either "had actual earnings in his possession or that he had the capability of earning money" (z).

- (ii) Under the Licensing Act, 1902 (a), where her husband is an "habitual drunkard," that is to say (b) is "a person who, not being amenable to any jurisdiction in lunacy, is notwithstanding, by reason of habitual intemperate drinking of intoxicating liquor, at times dangerous to himself, or to herself, or to others, or incapable of managing himself or herself, and his or her affairs." Under this Act, a married man can obtain a judicial separation from a wife who is an habitual drunkard within the above definition (c).

Any order for judicial separation, which the justices may make under the above Acts, must state the grounds on which it is based, and may contain further provisions as to the custody of any children of the marriage under sixteen, as to the payment of a reasonable sum not exceeding £2 per week for alimony, and as to the payment of the Court fees and the costs of the parties (d). Alimony may also be ordered without separation.

Justices of the peace are also authorised to assess the compensation payable to persons whose lands have been taken or injuriously affected by the acquisition of land by virtue of statutory powers when the amount claimed, if under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 (e), does not exceed £50, or if under the Public Health Act, 1875 (f), does not

(y) *Per Lopes and Lindley, L.JJ., in Russell v. Russell*, [1895] P., at p. 322.

(z) *Per Jeune, P., in Earnshaw v. Earnshaw*, [1896] P., at p. 162.

(a) 2 Edw. 7, c. 28, s. 5, sub-s. 1.

(b) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 19, s. 3 (b).

(c) 2 Edw. 7, c. 28, s. 5, sub-s. 2.

(d) See 42 & 43 Vict. c. 19, s. 29; 2 Edw. 7, c. 28, s. 5, sub-s. 2. Under 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 63, the husband may be ordered to pay an additional ten shillings for maintenance of each child under 16.

(e) When acquired by a railway company or local authority: 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, ss. 3, 22, 24; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 176.

(f) When injuriously affected by a local authority: 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, ss. 181, 308.

exceed £20. They have also power whenever the tenancy of premises let at £20 a year or under has expired or been duly determined by notice to quit, to put the landlord in possession, provided certain notices have been given and other steps duly taken (*g*). As to the duties of justices in connection with the stopping up or diversion of a highway, see Vol. 1, p. 263.

A Court of summary jurisdiction may also by the direction of the Board of Trade, or on the application of any person authorised by that Board to make a preliminary inquiry, hold a formal investigation into any shipping casualty (*h*). It may be assisted at such inquiry by one or more assessors possessing nautical or engineering experience or other special skill or knowledge. These assessors will be appointed out of a list of persons approved for the purpose by the Secretary of State. Where a formal investigation involves or appears likely to involve any question as to the cancellation or suspension of the certificate of a master, mate or engineer, the Court must hold the investigation with the assistance of not less than two assessors having experience in the merchant service. The Court after hearing the case must make a report to the Board of Trade containing a full statement of the case and of the opinion of the Court thereon, accompanied by such report of, or extracts from, the evidence, and such observations as the Court think fit (*i*).

(*g*) 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 24; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 74, s. 1; 62 & 63 Vict. c. 44, s. 5. As to deserted premises, see 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 16; 57 Geo. 3, c. 52. But see 13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 32, s. 4.

(*h*) Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), s. 466; see also Merchant Shipping Act, 1906, and the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, ss. 29, 30.

(*i*) The Lord Chancellor may also appoint wreck commissioners, one of whom will, at the request of the Board of Trade, hold a formal investigation into any shipping casualty: 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 466, sub-s. 2, s. 477. Many other local inquiries are held by commissioners and inspectors by the direction of the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board. For instance, the Notices of Accidents Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 28), requires the proprietors of any railway, tramway, gasworks, canal, harbour, bridge, pier, or other public undertaking to give notice to the Board of Trade of any accident which causes either the death of any workman in their employ, or prevents his working as usual on any one of the next three working days; and the Board may thereupon direct an investigation to be held into the causes and the circumstances of such accident. A similar notice is required to be given to the inspector of the district of any accident which has occurred in any mine (under the Coal Mines Act, 1911) or quarry (under the Notice of Accidents Act, 1906).

PART II.

PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES.

CHAPTER VI.

COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

THE general rule is that any member of the community can prosecute a criminal (*a*). Any person, however, who commences criminal proceedings maliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause, is liable to an action for malicious prosecution, if the proceedings fail (*b*); and the fact that the prosecutor was not personally aggrieved or concerned in the matter will be some evidence of malice to go to the jury.

As a rule, however, whenever the person or property of any private individual is injured by a criminal act, the prosecution is at the instance of the person injured. If the criminal act amounts to a felony, it is indeed his duty either himself to prosecute or to give information to the police in order that they may prosecute, if they think fit. But if the crime amounts only to a misdemeanour, there is no duty to prosecute, and no duty to inform the police. The person injured may take proceedings or not as he

(*a*) Justices can only convict summarily of a common assault on the complaint of a person not aggrieved, if the person aggrieved is unable to prosecute (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 42; *Pickering v. Willoughby*, [1907] 2 K. B. 296), not if he is merely unwilling to do so (*Nicholson v. Booth* (1888), 57 L. J. M. C. 43); they can, however, convict of an aggravated assault on the complaint of any one: section 43, any one may prosecute on indictment for an assault (*R. v. Gaunt* (1895), 73 L. T. 585). Some of the statutes creating summary offences make provisions prescribing the persons entitled to prosecute.

(*b*) See Vol. I, p. 481.

wishes (c). The police may prosecute in any case which they deem of sufficient importance, whether the person directly injured desires it or not.

The Director of Public Prosecutions is authorised, under the superintendence of the Attorney-General, to institute or carry on criminal proceedings in any Court, and to give advice and assistance to chief officers of police, clerks to justices and other persons concerned in any criminal proceeding (d). He may intervene in any criminal proceeding actually commenced, and take the further conduct of the case out of the hands of the private prosecutor or the police. As a rule he only does so in cases of importance or difficulty, or in which special circumstances, or the refusal or failure of a person to proceed with a prosecution, render action on his part necessary to secure the due prosecution of an offender. The cases in which he may intervene are prescribed by rules made under the Acts. The officer of State who is constitutionally responsible for the prosecution of offenders is the Attorney-General (e), who in such matters is not subject to control. This fact is one of the arguments used against the modern practice of making the Attorney-General a member of the Cabinet.

Another distinction between the right to prosecute for a crime and the right to bring a civil action is this—the High Court of Justice has jurisdiction over every act committed in any foreign country, by the law of which such act is either a tort or crime, provided it is also a tort by the law of England (f). But at common law, no English Court had power to try any crime committed in a foreign country, and although jurisdiction has now been conferred on some of our Courts to try British subjects who have committed certain crimes abroad, no English Court can try an alien for any crime committed in a foreign country (g).

(c) See Vol. 1, p. 104.

(d) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 22; 47 & 48 Vict. c. 58; 8 Edw. 7, c. 3.

(e) For the view that the Home Secretary is responsible for "political" prosecutions, see "The Home Office," by Sir Edward Troup. It is impossible to find room for a full discussion of this important matter which aroused considerable controversy in 1924.

(f) See Vol. 1, p. 102.

(g) See Vol. 1, p. 136, where the one exception is mentioned. If a man, who has committed in Great Britain a crime for which he could be sentenced to one year's imprisonment, flees to some other part of the King's dominions, he can be arrested there and brought back to Great Britain under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 69). He can also be brought back, if he has fled to a foreign country, provided reciprocal treaties have been made under the Extradition Acts, 1870, 1873, and 1895 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 60; 58 & 59 Vict. c. 33), between that foreign country and Great Britain.

Venue.

Again, in civil actions, in the High Court of Justice at all events, it is immaterial in what part of England the tort or breach of contract which is sued on was committed. But it is otherwise in criminal cases. Although the King's Bench Division has general jurisdiction throughout the realm, it is not the usual or convenient Court, and all other criminal Courts have jurisdiction only in particular counties or places. The common law rule was that the accused must be tried in the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed. Many statutes were passed making crimes triable in other districts, and most of these statutes are still in force. As a rule, however, it will be found that any particular case is covered by the common law rule and the general provision, added by the Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (*h*), that a person accused of any indictable offence may be tried in any county or place in which he was apprehended, or is in custody for that offence, or has appeared in answer to a lawfully issued summons charging him with that offence. But in cases where hardship would be inflicted the justices may discontinue the proceedings, so that they may take place in a more convenient Court. If the justices refuse to discontinue upon application by the accused alleging hardship, an appeal lies to the High Court against such refusal.

If the accused is charged with more than one indictable offence, then any Court to which he is committed for trial can try him upon all such offences though otherwise it would not have had jurisdiction.

Moreover the justices may commit to the Assizes or Quarter Sessions of some other county or place if it is more convenient for the purposes of expedition or saving expense. The justices must not exercise this power of committal if the next Assizes or Quarter Sessions having jurisdiction is to

(*h*) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84, s. 11.

be held within a month or if the accused would thereby suffer hardship (i).

Limitation.

Moreover, to all civil rights of action (k), a period of limitation has been assigned within which the action must be brought. The contrary is the rule in criminal cases. At common law, lapse of time for any period, however long, was no bar to a prosecution; the maxim was, *Nullum tempus occurrit regi*. By statute, however, several exceptions have been made to this rule.

Thus, in prosecutions for treason committed within Great Britain the indictment must be preferred within three years after the offence was committed (l). There is an express exception where the charge is for "designing, endeavouring, or attempting any assassination of the King by poison or otherwise" (m). Proceedings under the Riot Act must be commenced within one year (n), and under the Customs Acts within three years (o).

In prosecutions for blasphemy, information must be laid within four days of the commission of the offence, and prosecution must follow within three months after the information (p).

Under the Unlawful Drilling Act, 1820 (q), the period of limitation is six months; under the Night Poaching Act, 1828 (r), twelve months; under the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Acts (s), twelve months after the offence or three months after the close of an inquiry (not exceeding two years altogether); under the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1874 (t), three years; under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1922 (u), in respect of offences against a girl

(i) Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86), s. 14. Rules may be made for the purpose of the due exercise of this power.

(k) There are two exceptions: see *post*, p. 465.

(l) 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, s. 5 (for England, Wales and Berwick-on-Tweed); 7 Anne, c. 21, s. 1 (for Scotland).

(m) 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, s. 6.

(n) 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 5, s. 8.

(o) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 36, s. 257.

(p) 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 35, s. 2. As to profane swearing, see 19 Geo. 2, c. 21, s. 12.

(q) 60 Geo. 3, and 1 Geo. 4, c. 1, s. 7.

(r) 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 4.

(s) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 51 (Parliament); 47 & 48 Vict. c. 70, s. 30; and 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 7 (Borough Councils); 47 & 48 Vict. c. 70, ss. 35, 36 (City of London); 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, s. 75 (County Councils); 56 & 57 Vict. c. 73, s. 48 (District and Parish Councils and Boards of Guardians); and 62 & 63 Vict. c. 14 (London Borough Councils). Under these Acts the commencement of a prosecution is the service of the process and not its issue, unless the accused deliberately evades service.

(t) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 88, s. 46.

(u) 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 56. Commencement of proceedings for rape is enough: *R. v. West*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 174.

over thirteen and under sixteen years of age, nine months; under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887 (x), three years after the offence or one year after the discovery of the offence by the prosecutor, whichever shall first happen; under the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (y), the period is six months; for the felony of unduly solemnising a marriage (z), and for the offences under the Marriage Act, 1836 (a), three years; and for a false declaration for procuring a marriage out of the district in which one of the parties dwells, eighteen months (b). And charges against officials for neglecting or exceeding their duty must be brought within six months after the offence was committed (c). Unless the contrary be expressly provided, the indictment must be presented or the criminal information issued before the expiration of the period of limitation.

Proceedings before Justices of the Peace.

Criminal proceedings are usually commenced by an application for either a summons or a warrant, or the accused having been arrested (d) without warrant is brought up before the justices. Application for a summons or warrant is made to a justice for the county or borough, in which the crime was committed, by a private prosecutor or by a police officer acting on his own motion. A SUMMONS is merely a written order by a justice, bidding the accused appear before him to answer the charge stated in the summons on a day named, which is called the "return day." The prosecutor can usually obtain such a summons by making a verbal complaint. A WARRANT, on the other hand, is a written order from the justice to an officer of police, bidding him arrest the accused, and this can only be obtained by the prosecutor "laying an information" in writing before the justice, and swearing to the truth of the statements contained in it. On an application for a warrant the justice may, if he thinks it sufficient, issue a summons.

If a summons is granted and the accused does not appear

(x) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28, s. 15.

(y) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 61, s. 1.

(z) 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 21.

(a) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 41.

(b) 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6, s. 3, sub-s. 2.

(c) Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), s. 1 (a). There is also the general limitation of six months for offences triable summarily; see *post*, p. 409. See also the Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 67), s. 32.

(d) As to arrest, see Vol. 1, p. 480.

on the return day, the justices may issue a warrant for his apprehension,

Thus in one way or another, either by summons or warrant, the accused is brought before justices of the peace, who must then in the first place consider whether the case is one which—

(i) should be disposed of summarily (*i.e.*, then and there without a jury and without any indictment being drafted), or

(ii) should be sent for trial by a jury on an indictment at either Quarter Sessions or Assizes.

This question is in most cases determined as a matter of law by the nature of the offence with which the accused is charged. Every treason, felony and misdemeanour is indictable; every other criminal offence may be disposed of summarily by justices of the peace. At common law an indictable offence could only be tried by a jury; a justice of the peace could in no case dispose of it summarily; the accused was entitled to a verdict of his peers. But to this rule important exceptions have been made by modern legislation. Many acts, which were already indictable misdemeanours at common law, have been made by statute offences punishable summarily by justices; nevertheless they still remain indictable misdemeanours, and may in a proper case be so treated, though it is more usual to follow the procedure prescribed by the statute.

It is in some cases difficult to decide in the first instance whether a particular act is punishable on indictment or summarily. Where the act may properly be included in either category (*e*), it depends upon its seriousness whether it is treated as triable summarily or as triable on indictment. Again, it may depend upon some additional fact. Thus, in some cases it is expressly enacted that the offence must be tried summarily if the accused has not been previously convicted of such an offence; he can only be tried on indictment if it be at least a second offence (*f*). The Court, therefore, cannot tell whether it has jurisdiction or not without

(*e*) See, for instance, an assault on a police constable, Vol. 1, p. 322.

(*f*) See, for instance, stealing a dog, Vol. 1, p. 344.

inquiring into the prisoner's antecedents. Again, if a man damages the front door of a dwelling-house with a chisel, his act may amount to an attempt to commit housebreaking or burglary, if it were done with a felonious intent to enter the house and steal the goods therein. But it will be only a malicious injury to property if done wantonly and out of pure mischief, and this offence is triable summarily if the damage done be less than £20 (g).

Moreover, in some cases, which are *prima facie* non-indictable, the prisoner can now elect to be tried by a jury on an indictment (h); and in other cases, which are *prima facie* triable only on indictment, the magistrates may, if they think proper, offer the accused the alternative of being tried summarily.

Thus all assaults are indictable; nevertheless, justices of the peace can now try summarily any assault which is not so grave as to amount to a felony, provided the person assaulted be himself the prosecutor (i). On the other hand, any person who is charged with an offence for which on summary conviction he could be sentenced to imprisonment for more than three months (except an assault of a non-felonious character) can at the hearing, but before the charge has been gone into, claim to be tried by a jury, and then the case will be dealt with as an indictable offence, even if not otherwise indictable. Hence, when any person appears before justices charged with such an offence, they must—before taking any evidence—inform him of his right to be tried by a jury (k), telling him at the same time, if they think fit, at which Quarter Sessions or Assizes he will be tried (l). They must also adopt this course where the liability of the accused to more than three months' imprisonment only appears incidentally in the course of summary proceedings (m).

Again, justices of the peace are now authorised to deal summarily with children under fourteen years of age (n) who are accused of indictable offences other than homicide, provided the parent or

(g) Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 14, sub-s. 1.

(h) This is so, even where the statute which creates the offence expressly enacts that it "shall be prosecuted summarily in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts": *R. v. Goldberg*, [1904] 2 K. B. 866. A summary offence is only indictable if the defendant so claims: *R. v. Kakelo*, [1923] 2 K. B. 793.

(i) Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100), s. 42; and see Vol. 1, pp. 322 *et seq.*

(k) Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 17.

(l) As to choice of Court, see Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 14.

(m) *R. v. Beesby and Others*, [1909] 1 K. B. 849.

(n) The change of procedure does not, of course, render punishable any child who is not above the age of seven years, nor of sufficient capacity to commit crime.

guardian of the child consents. A Court of petty sessions at any time during the hearing of such a case, if satisfied by the evidence that it is expedient to deal with it summarily, may cause the charge to be reduced into writing and read to the parent or guardian of the child, and then ask the parent or guardian, "Do you desire the child to be tried by a jury, and object to the case being dealt with summarily?" The justices, whenever they think it desirable, explain to the parent or guardian the meaning of the phrase, "the case being dealt with summarily," and tell him at what Court—whether Assizes or Sessions—the child will be tried, if the case is not tried summarily. If the parent raises no objection and the case is disposed of summarily, the justices can only inflict one month's detention or such of the other punishments mentioned in section 107 of the Children Act, 1908, as are applicable to a child under fourteen (o). Again, when a young person (p) is charged with any indictable offence other than homicide, the justices have a similar power, but only if the "young person" consents. In both cases the Court must sit in a different building or room from that in which its ordinary sittings are held, or on different days and at different times from those at which its ordinary sittings are held. All persons apparently under the age of sixteen must be prevented from associating, either before or after their attendance in Court, with any adult offender who is not charged jointly with them. Again, unless with the leave of the Court, no person may attend the hearing except the Court officials, the parties and their advocates, or persons directly concerned in the case, and *bona fide* representatives of a newspaper or news agency.

An "adult" (*i.e.*, a person over sixteen years of age) may also in certain cases elect to be dealt with summarily by the magistrates in preference to being sent to the Assizes or Quarter Sessions (q). The chief offences referred to are:—

- (a) Offences under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861, ss. 16, 20, 21 and 51.
- (b) Misdemeanours under the Coinage Offences Act, 1861.
- (c) Offences under the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, ss. 20 and 47.
- (d) Offences under the Debtors Act, 1869, s. 31, paragraph 1.
- (e) Offences under the Perjury Act, 1911.
- (f) Offences under the Forgery Act, 1913, s. 2, sub-s. 2 (a), s. 7 (a), where the amount or value does not exceed £20.
- (g) Offences under the Larceny Act, 1916, ss. 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 (a), 14, 15, sub-ss. 1 and 2, ss. 16, 17,

(o) A boy may still be whipped with a birch rod under the Larceny Act, 1916, s. 37 (*R. v. Lydford*, [1914] 2 K. B. 378).

(p) For the purposes of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, a child is defined to be a person who, in the opinion of the Court before whom he is brought, is under the age of fourteen years. A young person is one who, in the opinion of the Court, is over fourteen and under sixteen years of age (8 Edw. 7, c. 67, s. 128).

(q) Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 24, and the Second Schedule to the Act.

sub-ss. 1 and 2, ss. 18, 32, sub-s. 1, s. 33, sub-ss. 1 and 2, and s. 35.

(h) Attempted suicide.

(i) Aiding and abetting the commission of any indictable offence which may be dealt with summarily, and incitement to commit a summary offence or an indictable offence triable summarily.

(k) Indecent assault on a boy or girl under sixteen.

The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is also necessary in any case where he is carrying on the prosecution.

The maximum punishment that the magistrates can inflict in cases (a) to (i) is imprisonment for three months with or without hard labour, or instead a fine up to £20. In case (k) imprisonment for six months can be given.

Whatever be the value of the property concerned, the adult can elect to be dealt with summarily

(i) when the charge is one of an attempt to commit any of the offences (a), (b), (c) or (d) above; or

(ii) when the adult pleads guilty to any of the above offences.

In this case the maximum punishment is imprisonment for six months with or without hard labour. By pleading guilty he loses his right to appeal to Quarter Sessions.

The magistrates can now, when dealing summarily with indictable offences, order the accused on conviction to pay the costs of the prosecution (r).

A justice of the peace has a valuable power which he can exercise in all cases where property has been obtained by any crime punishable under the Larceny Act, 1916 (s). He can issue a search warrant authorising certain persons to enter a building to search for stolen goods, and to seize them if found. The warrant must name or describe the persons authorised to search, the building to be searched, and goods for which search is to be made. The officer must take the warrant with him; he should also take with him a person who can identify the stolen property. He should demand admission before exercising his right to enter by force.

Every prisoner who is brought up for trial at either the Assizes or Quarter Sessions is tried on an indictment (t) and by a jury (u). In the case of such a prisoner who comes

(r) 8 Edw. 7, c. 15, s. 6.

(s) See section 103 of the Larceny Act, 1861, and section 42 of the Larceny Act, 1916. He can do so too in the cases of offences committed in the colonies by persons who have fled to England with the property taken: Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 69), s. 24. See also the Forgery Act, 1913 (8 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 27); Firearms Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 43); and Dangerous Drugs and Poisons (Amendment) Act, 1923 (13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 5), for statutes which confer similar powers.

(t) Remember that a criminal information and an inquisition are also possible, but in such cases no preliminary proceedings before justices are necessary.

(u) An "incorrigible rogue" is convicted at petty sessions and brought before the quarter sessions merely for sentence. A young person committed with a

before the justices, their duty is merely to prepare the case for the subsequent trial. This ancillary jurisdiction can be exercised by one justice of the peace sitting alone (x).

But when the prisoner is to be dealt with summarily, the Court must be differently constituted; it must then, as a rule, consist of at least two justices (y), and the Court is a "Court of Summary Jurisdiction." In certain cities and large towns, however, a stipendary magistrate or a police magistrate has been appointed, who has all the powers of a Court composed of two justices; and so has the Lord Mayor or an alderman of the City of London. The procedure of such a Court is regulated by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, 1848, 1879, and 1899 (z), the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, and the Criminal Justice Act, 1925.

Summary Jurisdiction of Justices in Non-indictable Cases.

Beside the indictable offences with which justices of the peace have now power to deal summarily, they have jurisdiction to dispose of an enormous number of petty criminal offences which are not indictable (such as adulteration of food, breaches of by-laws, offences against the Licensing Acts, cruelty to animals, &c.). It is practically impossible in this work to give even an outline of the very varied matters which can now be dealt with summarily by justices. Nearly every year some new statute makes additions to the list. Suffice it to say that with regard to all that are of a criminal character—

(i) the proceedings must be commenced within six months (a) from the date of the alleged offence;

(ii) the jurisdiction of the justices is ousted if a *bona fide* claim of right be raised by the defendant, provided the

view to sentence to a Borstal Institution is also convicted by the justices: Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 10.

(x) The Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42); and the Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86).

(y) There are certain statutes which authorise a single justice to form a Court of summary jurisdiction; but when sitting thus alone he cannot inflict more than fourteen days' imprisonment or a fine of more than twenty shillings: Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 20, sub-s. 7.

(z) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49; 62 & 63 Vict. c. 22.

(a) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11. This applies to all summary cases where no time is specially limited in the statute or statutes relating to the offence.

existence of the right claimed is possible in law and would justify the act complained of (b).

(iii) if the justices find the accused guilty, the maximum punishment which they can inflict is, as a rule, six months' imprisonment with hard labour (c); they can never impose penal servitude;

(iv) the justices can also impose a fine; if this be not paid, the defaulter may in most cases be imprisoned for a term varying according to a graduated scale; in other cases the payment of the fine may be enforced by distraining his goods (d).

Neither the complainant nor the defendant can make more than one speech. The majority of the justices present decides whether the defendant is guilty or not. The chairman has no casting vote. Hence, if the votes be equal, the matter must be adjourned for a re-hearing; a difficulty of this kind may be avoided by one of the justices present withdrawing his vote. If the Court thinks that the offence, though proved, is of a trifling nature, it can, without proceeding to conviction, dismiss the information, or it may convict and bind over the accused to be of good behaviour; in either case it can order the accused to pay the prosecutor reasonable damages for injury or compensation for loss not exceeding £25 (e).

From a conviction by a Court of summary jurisdiction an appeal lies to Quarter Sessions (f), where the whole case will be heard over again, and new witnesses may be called; it is heard by the justices of Quarter Sessions or by a Recorder without a jury.

In most non-indictable offences such an appeal is allowed

(b) *Scott v. Baring* (1895), 64 L. J. M. C. 200; *Burton v. Hudson*, [1909] 2 K. B. 564. So, too, the jurisdiction of the justices to try any case of assault will be ousted, if the assault arose out of any claim to land, &c.: 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 46.

(c) There are a few cases in which two justices in petty sessions can sentence a man to twelve months' imprisonment, e.g., where a place is kept for unlawful gaming; where a ticket-of-leave man or person under police supervision omits to report himself to the police, &c.; see 17 & 18 Vict. c. 38, s. 4; 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, ss. 5, 7, 8; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 4.

(d) See also sections 1—5 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914.

(e) Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 7, sub-s. 2. As to the power of justices to deal with persons "mentally deficient," see 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 28.

(f) See *ante*, p. 342.

to the defendant on any question of fact—and sometimes even to the prosecution.

The decision of a Court of summary jurisdiction can also be reviewed in the King's Bench Division (g).

Preliminary Investigation by Justices of the Peace into Cases which will be Tried on Indictment.

When a case is to be sent for trial by a jury, the duties of a justice of the peace are very different from those which he discharges when he tries a case summarily. He has no longer to decide whether the accused is or is not guilty of the offence with which he is charged. He has merely to determine whether there is such a *prima facie* case against the accused as to warrant his being put upon his trial; if there is, then he has one further duty—that of seeing that all necessary steps are taken to prepare the case for trial, and to secure the attendance of the prisoner and the witnesses. In certain cases the consent of a law officer is required before a prosecution can be commenced at all, e.g., for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Acts; but in most cases no consent is necessary. The accused having been arrested is brought before the justices or the would-be prosecutor attends before a justice and swears an information, upon which the justice will decide whether the facts disclosed warrant a prosecution or not. If he does, he will issue a warrant for the apprehension of the accused or a summons warning him to attend. In one of these ways the accused comes before the justices; his presence at the preliminary hearings is essential. The justice can also compel the attendance before him of any one “likely to give material evidence” (h) by issuing a summons, or even, in case of need, a warrant.

The prosecutor then states his case, and calls his witnesses, who are examined in chief, cross-examined and re-examined. The clerk to the justices writes down the gist

(g) See *ante*, p. 350.

(h) Indictable Offences Acts as amended and extended by the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 29, and the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 31.

of the statements made in the box. This record of the sworn evidence of each witness is called his "deposition."

At the close of the evidence for the prosecution the justice should consider whether a *prima facie* case has been made out against the accused. If not, he is entitled to be discharged. If, however, the justice thinks that the evidence given is sufficient to justify the accused being put upon his trial for any indictable offence, he must ask him if he wishes to make a statement. He must also tell him that anything he may say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence at his trial, and that he has nothing to hope or fear from any promise of favour or any threat which may have been held out to him to make any admission or confession of his guilt (*i*). The accused thereupon sometimes replies merely "I reserve my defence" (*k*), or "I have nothing to say"; sometimes he makes a detailed statement from the dock. He may, however, prefer to go into the witness-box and give evidence on oath, when he will be liable to be cross-examined by the prosecutor or his advocate. He may also, if he thinks fit, call witnesses in his favour. The hearing is sometimes adjourned to enable him to procure the attendance of such witnesses. The prisoner's statement, his evidence if he has elected to go into the box, and the evidence of his witnesses, if any, are also taken down by the clerk to the justices, and are added to the depositions (*l*).

The justice must then determine whether there is a case to be submitted to a jury; if so, he will commit the prisoner for trial either at the Assizes or Quarter Sessions. He cannot discharge him unless he thinks there is no reasonable probability of any jury convicting him; and even if he is of this opinion, the prosecutor can nevertheless, in certain cases (*m*), insist upon the prisoner being committed for trial; if he does so, he must be bound over (*n*) to

(*i*) Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 12.

(*k*) But see *post*, pp. 413, 414.

(*l*) The prisoner's statement is now always treated as part of the depositions (see *ibid.*, s. 12, sub-s. 4).

(*m*) For a list of these cases, see *post*, pp. 417, 418.

(*n*) See note (*r*) on p. 413.

prosecute and may be ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution if the prisoner is eventually acquitted. In either case the clerk reads over to each witness the notes of his evidence. This gives the witness an opportunity of correcting or adding to them. The witness then signs the deposition as being correct (*o*), and the committing justice also signs. The prisoner is also entitled to sign his statement which the committing justice must sign (*p*). The depositions of the witnesses, the prisoner's statement, the exhibits and the sworn information, if any, are then remitted to the clerk of the Court in which the prisoner is to be tried (*q*), to enable him to draft the indictment. The prosecutor is bound over to attend and prosecute, and the witnesses to attend and give evidence at the trial—each in his own recognisance (*r*). If any witness refuses to be bound over, he can be detained in prison and taken against his will to the place of trial to give evidence (*s*).

Before the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, all witnesses whose evidence was relevant were bound over to attend the trial. But now the committing justice has power, where the evidence is merely formal or the attendance of the witness at the trial will be unnecessary by reason of the facts stated in the accused's statement or of his having pleaded guilty, to bind the witness over to attend conditionally, *i.e.*, unless the prosecutor or the accused gives notice to the clerk of the Court that he desires such person to attend to give evidence (*t*). The justice must inform the accused of his right to give such notice (*u*).

Where the accused has pleaded guilty or admitted the

(*o*) See further as to depositions, *post*, pp. 415, 416.

(*p*) Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 12, sub-s. 4.

(*q*) *I.e.*, to the clerk of assize, if the prisoner is committed to the Assizes; to the clerk of the peace for the county, if the prisoner is committed to county Quarter Sessions; to the clerk of the peace for the borough, if the prisoner is committed to borough Quarter Sessions.

(*r*) See the Indictable Offences Rules, 1926 (Statutory Rules and Orders, No. 676). A "recognisance" is a contract executed or acknowledged before a Court of record, or before any Court or officer authorised to take it, by a person, who thereby admits his indebtedness to the Crown in a specified sum, such indebtedness to cease upon his doing the act enjoined by the Court. Entering into such a recognisance is called "being bound over" to do the act enjoined.

(*s*) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 20.

(*t*) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, s. 13, sub-ss. 1 and 2.

(*u*) *Ibid.*, s. 13, sub-s. 3.

truth of the accusation a certificate of that fact is sent to the clerk of the Court of trial with the depositions.

A form of committal is made out in every case and signed by the committing justice. A person who has been committed for trial will be detained in prison unless the justice thinks fit to let him "out on bail." But during such detention he is not treated as a convict; he is placed with other prisoners awaiting trial. Bail is never allowed in cases of treason; in felonies and the graver misdemeanours (*x*) the justice has a discretion to admit the prisoner to bail or not; in the lesser misdemeanours he must let the accused out on bail, if sufficient bail is offered.

It is the duty of the justices to secure, so far as it lies in their power, the attendance of the accused at the trial, and this is the consideration which will govern the exercise of their discretion in granting bail. The amount of the security which they will demand from the accused and his bail will therefore depend upon the probability or possibility of his wishing to escape trial; and this again will depend on the nature of the charge, on the strength of the case against him, on his character, his wealth, and other surrounding circumstances. If a man who is out on bail agree with his bail to indemnify them against the pecuniary loss which they will sustain through his not appearing at the trial, he and his bail are all guilty of an indictable conspiracy (*y*). Where the justices refuse bail on committal, the accused can apply to a Judge of the High Court for bail (*z*).

Another application is frequently made to the justices at this stage of the proceedings. The accused asks for "legal aid" under the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903 (*a*). To entitle him to such aid a defence must be disclosed in the evidence given at the hearing or in the statement made by him in answer to the statutory caution, and the justices must be satisfied that the accused's means are insufficient to provide the legal aid which it is desirable, in the interests of justice, that he should have in the preparation and conduct of his defence (*b*). A defence may be "disclosed" by the

(*x*) The misdemeanours referred to include perjury, attempts to commit felony, concealment of birth, false pretences, and those offences for which the county paid the costs of the prosecution: 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 23. As the costs of all misdemeanours are, since the Costs in Criminal Cases Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, s. 15), s. 1, chargeable on the county rate, it is a question whether the bailing of persons committed for all misdemeanours is not made discretionary. It will be wiser to assume that section 23 of the 1848 Act still only applies to the cases which were covered by it in 1848.

(*y*) *R. v. Porter*, [1910] 1 K. B. 369. And see further as to bail and recognisances, sections 19–24 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 58).

(*z*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 58, s. 23.

(*a*) 3 Edw. 7, c. 38.

(*b*) *Ibid.*, s. 1, sub-s. 1.

depositions, though the accused has not raised it: he may be too ignorant to know how to defend himself or make points.

If the application is granted, the justices certify that he ought to have such legal aid, and solicitor and counsel are assigned to him. The expenses of such defence are paid out of public funds in the same way as the costs of his prosecution (c). A poor prisoner, whether he applied to the justices or not, may make the same application (d) to the Judge (e) who is to try him, at or before the trial.

Depositions.

It is difficult to over-estimate the value and importance of the depositions taken before justices under the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (f). They are an official record of the oral evidence given by the witnesses when the circumstances were comparatively fresh in their memory. They inform the prisoner of the facts by which the charge made against him will be sought to be established, and so enable him to prepare his defence. They enable the clerk of indictments to prepare the indictment, and the Judge, Recorder, or chairman to decide whether the prisoner is entitled to have legal aid assigned to him (g); and they serve to check or contradict, if necessary, the evidence which the witnesses give at the actual trial.

As, however, depositions are only secondary evidence, they can be read at the trial if the witness has been conditionally bound over and no notice has been given that his attendance is required; but if the witness has been bound over in the usual way, they cannot be read at the trial if the witness can be called. If he is dead or too ill to travel, or has become insane, or is kept out of the way by the accused or on his behalf, they will become admissible and can then be read to the jury as evidence of the facts which they record (h).

(c) *Ibid.*, s. 2, sub-s. 1.

(d) *Ibid.*, s. 1, sub-s. 1.

(e) Judge means "Judge of assize, or chairman of quarter sessions, or recorder, or the deputy of either of the two latter": section 1, sub-section 1, and section 3.

(f) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42; see also Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86), ss. 12, 13, and the Indictable Offences Rules, 1926 (Stat. R. & O., No. 676).

(g) Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 38), s. 1, sub-s. 1.

(h) Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86), s. 13, sub-s. 3. The

The necessary conditions which must be fulfilled are:—

- (i) that the deposition is that of a witness who comes within one of the above-mentioned categories;
- (ii) that it is proved by the certificate of the committing justice or of the clerk to the justices or by evidence on oath that the accused was present and that he or his advocate had full opportunity to cross-examine;
- (iii) that the deposition purports to be signed by the justice before whom it purports to have been taken.

The accused can call evidence to show that all or any of these conditions have not been fulfilled.

The prisoner is entitled to inspect the depositions without fee (*i*), and, after he has been committed, he may obtain a copy of them at any time before the first day of the Sessions or Assizes on payment of 1½d. for each folio of 90 words (*k*). In cases in which legal aid is granted under the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903 (*l*), the prisoner has a right to a copy without paying any fee therefor.

illness need not necessarily be established by medical evidence, so long as the evidence available is such as the Court can rely upon: *R. v. Noakes*, [1917] 1 K. B. 581.

(*i*) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, s. 4.

(*k*) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 27. The prosecution pay 4d. per folio of 72 words.

(*l*) 3 Edw. 7, c. 38, s. 1; and see *ante*, p. 414.

CHAPTER VII.

INDICTMENTS AND CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS.

PROSECUTION by indictment is the usual method of bringing to justice persons accused of serious crime. An INDICTMENT is a formal accusation in writing charging a definite person with the commission of a definite crime so that he may be tried on that charge by a jury at Assizes or Quarter Sessions. It may be preferred at any time after the commission of the offence, unless a period of limitation has been fixed by some statute (a).

At common law any person may attend at Assizes or Quarter Sessions and prefer a bill of indictment without any previous notice or preliminary proceedings. Although justices did and were expected to conduct an investigation, it was not a necessary condition to the preferring of a bill that any justice should have done so. In course of time, a committal became the rule, and, after the remodelling of procedure before justices by the Acts of 1848, the common law right was rarely exercised for the honest reason that the prosecutor desired to secure the conviction of a criminal. Several offences where abuse was found to be common were subjected to special conditions in 1859, and the list of such offences has been extended by subsequent statutes.

The offences to which the Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859 (b), applies are :—

The cases to which the Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859, applies are as follows :—

Under the Vexatious Indictments Act itself—

Perjury and subornation of perjury.

Conspiracy.

Obtaining money or goods by false pretences.

Indecent assault.

Keeping a disorderly house.

(a) See *ante*, p. 403.

(b) 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17, s. 2.

Offences under any of the following statutes:—

The Debtors Act, 1869, as amended by the Bankruptcy Acts, 1883 and 1890;

The Libel Act, 1881;

The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885;

The Merchandise Marks Act, 1887;

The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, s. 2;

The Punishment of Incest Act, 1908, s. 4, sub-s. 1;

The Children Act, 1908, Part II., s. 35;

The Perjury Act, 1911, s. 11;

The Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 164, sub-s. 3; and

The Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act, 1925.

If any person wishes to indict any one whom he believes to have committed any of these offences the indictment will not be received unless the accused has been committed for trial by the justices, or, if they have decided not to commit, the prosecutor has insisted upon being bound over to prosecute (b) (in which case, if the accused is acquitted, he may be ordered to pay the costs of the defence), or the consent in writing of a Judge of the High Court or of a Law Officer has been obtained.

Even in cases not covered by this Act, the almost invariable practice is to bring the accused before justices who commit for trial, though there is no legal obligation to go before the justices. There are still cases of “voluntary bills”; almost without exception they are not adopted by the Grand Jury, and even in such cases notice must be given to the clerk of the Court.

It would not be accurate now to say that all indictments (in which term for this purpose inquisitions and criminal informations are not included) must go before the Grand Jury. If on the fifth day before the date fixed for holding the Court all persons committed for trial at that Court have pleaded guilty, and that fact has been certified by the committing justices, the attendance of the Grand Jury may be dispensed with, and the indictments stand without being found by them (c).

Subject to the dispensing with the Grand Jury in such a case, no one who is not accused by an inquisition (d), or

(b) 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17, s. 2.

(c) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, s. 19.

(d) *Post*, pp. 425 *et seq.*

a criminal information (e), can be brought up for trial on a criminal charge unless the indictment has been found by the Grand Jury.

The proceedings commence by a charge to the Grand Jury, who are first sworn, and in that charge the presiding Judge comments on and advises them as to the bills (as the draft indictments are called) which will be brought before them. The public are admitted to hear the charge; the barristers attending the Court abstain from appearing, but this abstention is a voluntary rule of professional conduct only. They then retire with the bills and hear the witnesses for the prosecution in private. If they decide that a sufficient case is made out to justify a trial they "find a true bill"; if they decide that no sufficient case is made out, they "ignore" the bill, or "find no true bill," as it is now more usually termed. The bill is indorsed "true bill" or "no true bill" as the case may be, signed by the foreman and returned into Court. Once a true bill is found the formal accusation is termed an "indictment" upon which the accused can now be arraigned and tried. On the back of the indictment appears the name of every witness intended to be examined at the trial on behalf of the prosecution (f).

Great changes have been made by the Indictments Act, 1915 (g), in the rules relating to the form and language of indictments. In addition to the valuable provisions in the body of the Act, there is a schedule containing a number of rules which are to have effect as if enacted in the Act. The Act, moreover, creates a rule committee, which has power from time to time, subject to the approval of the Lord Chancellor, to make rules varying or annulling the rules in this schedule, and to make further rules with respect to the matters already dealt with (h). Forms of indictment are given in an appendix to the rules which have been made by the committee under the Act. These forms or others in conformity with them should now

(e) *Post*, pp. 425 *et seq.*

(f) Rules made under Indictments Act, 1915, s. 2.

(g) 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 90. The references on this and the next four pages are to the sections of and to the rules under this Act, unless the contrary is stated.

(h) Sections 1, 2.

be used in all cases to which they are applicable (i). No indictment will be open to objection in respect of its form or contents, if it is framed in accordance with the rules and precedents under this Act (k). But it is expressly provided that "nothing in this Act or the rules thereunder shall affect the law or practice relating to the jurisdiction of a Court or the place where an accused person can be tried, nor prejudice or diminish in any respect the obligation to establish by evidence according to law any acts, omissions, or intentions which are legally necessary to constitute the offence with which the person accused is charged, nor otherwise affect the laws of evidence in criminal cases" (l).

The function of an indictment is to define the precise charge which the prisoner is called upon to answer, and of which the jury must either acquit or convict him. It may charge the prisoner with only one offence or with two or more offences. In the latter case, each charge must be set out in a separate paragraph or "count"; and each count must contain a complete and distinct charge of crime as though it were a separate indictment. Every indictment must commence by stating the name of the prisoner, if known, and the name of the Court in which it is proposed that he shall be tried. After this "commencement," as it is called, every indictment in which only one offence is charged, and each count of an indictment which charges more than one offence, must consist of two parts:

(a) A short statement in ordinary language of the specific offence with which the prisoner is charged, "avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence." If the offence be statutory, the title and section of the Act creating the offence must be stated. This is a great improvement on the old law, which permitted an indictment to state vaguely that the prisoner's act was "against the form of the statute in such case made and provided," without in any way specifying it.

(i) Rule 4 (5).

(l) Section 8, sub-section 1.

(k) Section 3, sub-section 2.

(b) Such particulars of the offence “as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge,” *e.g.*, the date when the crime was committed, the property affected by it, the name of the owner, &c. The particulars must be stated in ordinary language which the prisoner can understand; it is not necessary to use technical terms (*m*).

At the end of the indictment a statement may be added in a separate count alleging, if such be the fact and that fact affects the power of the Court to inflict punishment, that the prisoner has been previously convicted at a certain time and place (*n*). So, too, in a proper case, and after due notice has been given to the prisoner and to the clerk of the Court (*o*), a count may be added charging the prisoner with being an habitual drunkard or an habitual criminal. But the prisoner may not be called upon to plead to any such statement unless and until he has pleaded guilty to, or been found guilty of, the main charge contained in the indictment.

The old law relating to the form and language of an indictment is now superseded. For instance, in former times certain “words of art” were necessary to the validity of an indictment. Thus in an indictment for murder the words “feloniously and of malice aforethought did kill and murder” were absolutely necessary. So, if the word “burglariously” was not inserted in an indictment for burglary, the prisoner was entitled to be acquitted. But now “words of art” are no longer necessary, for, by rule 4 (3), an indictment must “describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms.”

Again, there was formerly much learning on the question whether a prisoner might be charged in the same indict-

(*m*) Section 3, sub-section 1; rule 4, sub-rules 3 and 4.

(*n*) Rule 11. See the precedent on p. 425.

(*o*) See the Inebriates Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 60), s. 1, sub-s. 2, and the Prevention of Crime Act, 1903 (8 Edw. 7, c. 59), s. 10, sub-s. 4. In the case of an habitual criminal, moreover, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions must be obtained before such a charge is inserted in the indictment. As to this requirement, see *R. v. Turner*, [1910] 1 K. B. 346; *R. v. Waller*, *ibid.*, 364; see also *R. v. Norman*, [1924] 2 K. B. 315.

ment with more than one criminal offence. In this connection great importance was attached to the distinction between a felony and a misdemeanour. Each distinct felony had to be charged in a separate indictment save in two or three cases in which an exception had been made by statute. Any number of misdemeanours, on the other hand, could be inserted in the same indictment in separate counts, though, where the result of so doing was obviously inconvenient or unfair to the prisoner, the Judge at the trial might compel the prosecutor to elect on which charges he would proceed and which abandon. But now "charges for any offences, whether felonies or misdemeanours, may be joined in the same indictment if those charges are founded on the same facts, or form or are a part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character," (p).

To an indictment for treason, however, no count can be added for any other crime, whether a felony or a misdemeanour, but any number of counts for different treasons may be joined in the same indictment provided they are founded on the same facts or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions (q). So an indictment for murder should not contain a count for any other felony, even though it led up to or was connected with the murder, for a charge of murder is too serious a matter to be complicated by having alternative counts inserted in the indictment (r).

Charges against two or more persons may be joined in the same indictment,

(a) if their crime be a joint one (such as a conspiracy), or,

(b) where the charges against them are several, if the facts on which such charges are founded form part of the same transaction or of similar or connected transactions.

Thus A and B may each be charged in separate counts

(p) Section 4 and rule 3.

(q) Indictments Act, 1915, s. 4, Sched. I., r. 3. See, for example, *R. v. Lynch*, [1903] 1 K. B. 444.

(r) *R. v. Jones* (1918), 13 Cr. App. R. 86. There are many cases in which a prisoner indicted for one crime may be convicted thereon of another crime not set out in the indictment. As to this, see *post*, pp. 441 *et seq.*

of the same indictment with stealing certain goods and with receiving such goods or a portion of them knowing them to have been stolen. And where stolen property has passed through many hands, any number of persons who have at different times knowingly received such property or any part thereof may be charged and tried together (*s*). But the Judge may always order a separate trial of any count or counts, if he thinks that any of the accused would be prejudiced or embarrassed by all the counts being tried together (*t*).

As soon as an indictment is presented the accused is entitled on request to be supplied with a copy of it free of charge (*u*), and its language therefore should be such as he can understand. The indictment must make it clear to the prisoner with what offence he is charged, but this can be done "without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence" (*x*). It may be, however, that the prisoner's act is only criminal if done with a special intent; in such a case that intent should be expressly averred in the indictment, as it must be proved at the trial. Different intents may be alleged in the alternative in the same count (*y*). It is not, as a rule, necessary to allege an intent to defraud, deceive or injure any particular person (*z*). In other cases—*e.g.*, receiving stolen goods—it is necessary to prove, and therefore to aver, guilty knowledge.

Again, it is sufficient in an indictment to describe any place, time, act, omission, person or property in ordinary language provided it be such as to indicate with reasonable clearness the matter referred to. The precise value of property stolen or fraudulently obtained need not be stated, unless proof of such value is necessary to give the Court jurisdiction or to bring the case within a particular section of an Act of Parliament. If such property belongs to more

(*s*) Larceny Act, 1916, s. 40, sub-s. 3.

(*t*) Indictments Act, 1915, s. 5, sub-s. 3; and see *R. v. Lockett*, [1914] 2 K. B. 720; *R. v. Norman*, [1915] 1 K. B. 341.

(*u*) Rule 13 (1).

(*x*) Rule 4 (3).

(*y*) Rule 5 (1), and see Indictments Nos. 5 and 31, Appendix A., in the Act.

(*z*) Rule 10; Larceny Act, 1916, s. 40, sub-s. 1.

persons than one, they may be described as "A and others," or as "the firm of B & Co.," or as "the executors of the late C," or as "the Commissioners of," &c., or in any way which is sufficient to identify them (a). Figures and abbreviations may be used in an indictment for expressing anything which is commonly so expressed (b).

Lastly, an indictment should never set out the evidence by which it is sought to prove the charge, nor should it allege any matter which need not be proved at the trial. The presence of any such unnecessary matter will not, however, render it invalid. Mere surplusage will not vitiate an indictment (c), though it will be a good ground for depriving the prosecution of so much of the costs as has been caused thereby (d).

It may make the preceding observations clearer to the student, if we subjoin an indictment in the old form and an indictment in the much shorter form now in vogue.

Form of Indictment for Larceny and Receiving in use prior to 1915.

City of Chichester } The jurors of our Lord the King upon their
to wit. } oath present that John Smith, on the first
day of February in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred
and twelve, one gold watch and chain of the goods and chattels of
James Robinson feloniously did steal, take and carry away, against
the peace of our Lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Second Count.—And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid do further present that the said John Smith afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, the chattels aforesaid before then feloniously stolen, taken and carried away as aforesaid, feloniously did receive and have, he, the said John Smith, then well knowing the said chattels to have been feloniously stolen, taken and carried away, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Third Count.—And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid do further present that, before the commission of the offence in the first count of this indictment charged and stated, the said John Smith at the Assizes and General Session of Oyer and Terminer and General Delivery of the Gaol of our Lord the King holden at

(a) Rules 6, 7 and 9.

(b) Rule 1 (4).

(c) *R. v. Parker* (1870), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 225; *R. v. Newbould* (1872), *ibid.*, 344.

(d) Section 6

Cardiff, in and for the county of Glamorgan, on the eighteenth day of March in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and three, was then and there convicted of felony by the name of Joseph Scott, which said conviction is still in full force, strength and effect, and not in the least reversed, annulled or made void.

Form of Indictment for Larceny and Receiving now in use.

THE KING *v.* A B.

Court of trial: West Sussex Quarter Sessions, held at Chichester.

First Count.

Statement of offence.

A B is charged with simple larceny, contrary to section 2 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

Particulars of offence.

On May 18, 1917, at Tortington, in the county of West Sussex, A B stole a gold watch, the property of X Y.

Second Count.

Statement of offence.

A B is charged with receiving stolen goods, contrary to section 33 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

Particulars of offence.

On May 21, 1917, at Tortington, in the said county, A B received the said watch knowing it to have been stolen.

A B was convicted of burglary at the Bristol Assizes on November 13, 1916.

Inquisitions and Criminal Informations.

Nearly every criminal offender who appears at the Assizes or Quarter Sessions is tried on an indictment. Cases do nevertheless occur, in which no indictment is drafted. Thus a prisoner may be committed for trial for murder or manslaughter by a coroner in pursuance of the verdict of his jury and tried upon an inquisition (e), although a person so committed is generally brought before a justice

(e) A coroner is empowered to accept bail for a person against whom a verdict of manslaughter has been found by his jury: 50 & 51 Vict. c. 71, s. 5, sub-s. 2.

and indicted as well. With the jurisdiction of the coroner's Court we have already dealt (f).

Moreover, an information charging a misdemeanour can be filed by the Attorney-General *ex officio*, or by the Master of the Crown Office with leave from the King's Bench Division at the instance of a private individual. The provisions of the Indictments Act, 1915, and the rules made thereunder, apply to criminal informations in the High Court and inquisitions (g).

Criminal informations are of two kinds:—

- (i) Those filed by the Attorney-General himself, usually called *ex officio* informations.
- (ii) Those filed by the King's Coroner by the direction of the King's Bench Division at the instance of some private individual, who is called the "relator."

(i) The Attorney-General has a right, by virtue of his office, to file a criminal information in respect of any misdemeanour, but he only does so in cases of so dangerous a nature as to call for immediate suppression by the officers of the State. He will not take the initiative unless the crime be eminently dangerous to the public welfare, or directly derogatory to the dignity of the Crown, or calculated to provoke public riot or disorder—such, for instance, as the publication of a seditious libel (h).

(ii) In the second class of informations the relator is usually some private individual, who has been aggrieved by some infringement of a public right or neglect of a public duty on the part of the defendant. But still the act or omission must be such as calls for the prompt and immediate interference of the Court. Nor will a criminal information be granted, unless the Court is satisfied that the ordinary remedies by action or indictment are insufficient in the particular case. Thus an information for a nuisance will not, as a rule, be granted unless the public have a direct and independent interest in the prompt suppression of the

(f) *Ante*, pp. 394 *et seq.*

(g) 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 90, s. 8, sub-s. 3.

(h) See *R. v. Russell* (1905), 93 L. T. 407.

nuisance (i). Criminal informations may also be filed against Judges and magistrates for illegal, unjust and wilfully oppressive conduct, provided such conduct arises from corrupt and malicious motives, and not from mere error of judgment or ignorance of law (k). But an information for libel will not be granted, unless the person libelled holds some public office or position in England and has been attacked in his public character (l); or unless the libel tends to obstruct the course of justice or to prejudice the fair trial of any accused person. No criminal information for libel will lie where the words complained of are privileged by reason of the occasion on which they were published, or where they appear to be true, or where they can no longer exercise any prejudicial influence.

A criminal information, then, differs from an indictment in four important particulars. There is no preliminary investigation before a magistrate; it lies only for a misdemeanour; it cannot be tried at Quarter Sessions; and it is tried on the civil side of the Court (m). In the case of an *ex officio* information, which now rarely occurs, the defendant is put on his trial as speedily as possible on the mere information of the Attorney-General. In the more usual case of an information by the King's Coroner, the leave of the King's Bench Division must be obtained before the information is issued (n); and the arguments in open Court on the application for such leave take the place of the investigation by a justice of the peace which precedes the trial of an indictment.

The counsel for the relator must move the Court upon proper affidavits for an order *nisi* calling upon the defendant to show cause why an information should not issue against him. The motion must be made within a reasonable time after the offence was committed (o). The relator, too, must come to the Court in the first instance; he must not have attempted to obtain redress in other ways (p). He must submit himself to the Court, and consent to waive his civil remedy by action, if need be, and must be prepared to go through with the criminal proceedings to verdict. In cases of libel the relator must also swear to his innocence in all particulars of the charge contained in the libel (q). For although, at the trial of the information when granted, truth will be no defence (except

(i) *R. v. Casey* (1876), 13 Cox, 310; and see Vol. 1, pp. 252, 253.

(k) *R. v. Marshall* (1855), 4 E. & B. 475.

(l) *R. pros. Vallombrosa v. Labouchere* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 320; see Vol. 1, p. 194.

(m) *R. v. Hausmann* (1909), 3 Cr. App. R. 3.

(n) Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 35.

(o) Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 37; as to a justice of the peace, see rule 36.

(p) *Pollard, Ex parte* (1901), 17 T. L. R. 773.

(q) *R. v. Webster* (1789), 3 T. R. 388.

under Lord Campbell's Act), still it is "sufficient cause to prevent the interposition of the Court in this extraordinary manner," and the Court will leave the prosecutor to proceed by way of indictment (r).

On a later day the defendant will appear by counsel or in person to show cause why a criminal information should not issue against him; this is called the argument on the order *nisi*. He generally files affidavits in reply to those read on the former occasion. If the order be made absolute, the relator must enter into a recognisance effectually to prosecute the information and to abide by and observe the order of the Court. The amount of the recognisance is fixed at £50 (s). If the order be discharged on the merits, the Court generally gives the defendant his costs. And no second application for a criminal information may be made to the Court, even upon additional affidavits—except in very peculiar circumstances, as where the only person who had made an affidavit on behalf of the defendant on the argument of the first order has since been convicted of perjury in respect of such affidavit (t). But the relator "can still prefer an indictment" in the ordinary way (u).

The information must set out the offence with all the certainty and precision of an indictment (x). As soon as it is filed a copy must be served on the defendant, who must appear thereto within the times specified in the Crown Office Rules of 1906, which minutely regulate the procedure on criminal informations. If he does not, he may be attached under a Judge's warrant (y).

A criminal information not *ex officio* will be tried on the civil side of the Assizes for the county in which the misdemeanour was committed—unless a trial at bar be ordered, when it will be tried on the civil side of the King's Bench Division (z). In either case there will be a jury, common or special. A special jury can be obtained, either by the prosecutor or the defendant, upon giving a similar notice to that required in civil cases (a). The procedure at the trial of an information in all respects resembles that on the trial of an indictment. In *ex officio* informations the counsel for the Crown (whether the Attorney-General himself or any one appearing for him) has the right to reply although the defendant calls no witness (b). If the defendant be found guilty, the Court will hear evidence in aggravation or mitigation of sentence.

A defendant, who is convicted on the trial of a criminal information, may appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal as in the case of conviction on indictment (c).

(r) *R. v. Bickerton* (1722), 1 Strā. 498.

(s) Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 35.

(t) *R. v. Eve and Parlbly* (1836), 5 A. & E. 780.

(u) *Per* Lord Denman in *R. v. Cockshaw* (1833), 2 Nev. & Man. at p. 379.

(x) For precedents of criminal informations, see *Odgers on Libel and Slander*, 5th ed. at pp. 796—800.

(y) 48 Geo. 3, c. 58, s. 1.

(z) Informations could also be brought in former days in the Court of Exchequer in respect of property or revenue of the Crown, for intrusion, for breach of the excise laws, etc.

(a) Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 147.

(b) *R. v. Horne* (1777), 20 St. Tr. 651, 660.

(c) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 20, sub-s. 2.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE TRIAL OF AN INDICTMENT.

BEFORE the first day of the Assizes or Quarter Sessions arrives, the persons who are to serve on the jury are summoned to attend. All such persons must possess a certain small property qualification (*a*). There is no special jury at any Assize or Quarter Sessions—though one can be obtained for a trial at bar of a misdemeanour in the King's Bench Division—and the fact that a person's name is on the special jury list for civil cases affords him or her no ground for claiming exemption from serving on the jury in criminal cases. Certain classes of persons, however, are exempt, such as clergymen, ministers, practising barristers and solicitors, public officials, etc.

Pleas.

On the day of trial the first step is to “arraign” the prisoner, *i.e.*, to call him to the bar of the Court, read to him the substance of the indictment (*b*), and ask him to plead to it. If the prisoner, when arraigned, appears to be insane, he will not be allowed to plead; the question of his fitness to plead will have to be tried immediately by a jury sworn for that purpose, and should the jury find him to be unfit to plead (*c*), he will be detained during His

(*a*) Each must own a freehold of the value of £10 a year, or be a leaseholder for a term of at least twenty-one years of lands of the value of £20 a year, or occupy a house rated at not less than £20, or in Middlesex £30, a year. It is strange that a property qualification is still required for the jury at county Quarter Sessions, although none is required for justices of the peace, who are the Judges of the Court.

(*b*) A prisoner may be arraigned on a criminal information (see *ante*, p. 425), or on a coroner's inquisition (see *ante*, p. 425), as well as on an indictment: and the provisions of the Indictments Act, 1915, apply equally to all three proceedings: section 8, sub-section 3.

(*c*) That is, that he is unfit to plead and take his trial, and to understand and follow the proceedings. A deaf mute who was so unfit by reason of his infirmity, but was not insane, was held to be unfit to plead in *R. v. Governor of Stafford Prison*, [1909] 2 K. B. 81.

Majesty's pleasure (*d*). If, however, no question arises as to the prisoner's sanity, he has eight courses open to him :—

(i) He may plead that he is " Guilty " of the crime charged against him in the indictment or in some particular count of it, whereupon nothing remains but to sentence him (*e*), unless he withdraws his plea before sentence and pleads " Not Guilty " (*f*).

(ii) Where on the indictment upon which the prisoner has been arraigned he may be lawfully convicted of some other offence not charged in it, he may plead " Not Guilty " of the offence charged but " Guilty " of the other offence (*g*).

(iii) He may stand mute, either out of perversity or because he is dumb, in both of which cases a plea of " Not Guilty " will be entered for him (*h*).

(iv) He may demur to the indictment.

(v) He may move to quash the indictment.

(vi) He may plead to the jurisdiction of the Court; he may contend that the Court is not competent to try the crime charged or has no jurisdiction over him or over the place where the crime was committed.

(vii) He may plead specially in bar; there are three such pleas :—

(a) Autrefois acquit.

(b) Autrefois convict.

(c) Pardon.

(viii) He may plead " Not Guilty " (*i*).

It is necessary to say more as to some of these pleas.

(iv) A demurrer is an objection, written on parchment and filed, by which the prisoner admits the facts alleged against him, but denies that they amount to the crime charged in the indictment. Hence he cannot without special leave demur and then plead " Not

(*d*) Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800 (39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94), s. 2.

(*e*) If he pleads " Guilty " to one charge only of several, the prosecution may elect to have him tried upon the other charge or charges, and then sentence will be postponed until after verdict.

(*f*) *R. v. Plummer*, [1902] 2 K. B. 339.

(*g*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 58, s. 39, sub-s. 1.

(*h*) The question whether he stands mute of malice or by visitation of God will first be tried : 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 2.

(*i*) Where the indictment contains several counts, the prisoner may, before trial or at any stage of the trial, apply to the Judge, under section 5 of the Indictments Act, 1915, to have some of them tried separately from the others.

Guilty," if his demurrer fails (*k*). A prisoner, therefore, rarely demurs, but pleads "Not Guilty" and raises his objection to the indictment in arrest of judgment (*l*), after all questions of fact have been decided by the verdict of the jury.

(v) A motion to quash the indictment is usually made before the prisoner pleads, and this is the most convenient time for such an application; but it can be made after the prisoner has pleaded (*m*), or even after the case for the prosecution is closed (*n*). The Court will not, as a rule, quash an indictment for a crime of enormity, such as high treason, on a motion to quash. Objection to an indictment in such cases should be taken on motion in arrest of judgment, or by demurrer (*o*).

The Court now has power at any stage of the trial to amend any defect in an indictment if this can be done without injustice to the prisoner, and may order the postponement of the trial if necessary (*p*).

(vii) A special plea in bar cannot without leave be pleaded along with "Not Guilty." In order to succeed on a plea of either "autrefois acquit" or "autrefois convict," the prisoner must prove:—

(a) that a verdict was lawfully given on the former indictment (*q*). Thus, if at the former trial the jury disagreed, the prisoner cannot plead "autrefois acquit";

(b) that he was "in jeopardy" under the former indictment (*r*), *i.e.*, that he was tried before a competent Court on a valid indictment. Thus, if the indictment was quashed on motion after verdict, the plea will fail;

(c) that the offence charged is the same or substantially the same in both indictments, or that the prisoner could have been convicted at the previous trial of the offence with which he is now charged (*s*).

"Thus an acquittal on a charge of murder is a bar to a subsequent indictment for manslaughter" (*t*); for the prisoner could have been convicted of manslaughter on the former indictment. So a conviction for obtaining goods by fraud is a bar to an indictment for larceny of the same goods from the same person, as the charges are substantially the same (*u*). But the plea will be no bar if in order to establish the present charge it will be necessary for the prosecutor to prove any fact which has occurred since the date of the first trial. Thus a conviction by justices in petty sessions for assault at

(*k*) *R. v. Strakan* (1855), 7 Cox, 85; *R. v. Taylor* (1824), 3 B. & C. 502.

(*l*) See *post*, p. 452.

(*m*) See *R. v. Thompson*, [1914] 2 K. B. 99.

(*n*) *R. v. James* (1872), 12 Cox, 127.

(*o*) *R. v. Lynch*, [1903] 1 K. B. 444.

(*p*) Indictments Act, 1915, s. 5, sub-ss. 1, 4.

(*q*) See *R. v. Ketteridge*, [1915] 1 K. B., at p. 471.

(*r*) *Wemyss v. Hopkins* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 378; cf. *R. v. O'Brien* (1882), 15 Cox, 29.

(*s*) *R. v. Barron*, [1914] 2 K. B. 570.

(*t*) *Per Lord Reading*, L.C.J., *ibid.*, at p. 574.

(*u*) *R. v. King*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 214; Larceny Act, 1916, s. 44.

the instance of the person assaulted and imprisonment consequent thereon are not either at common law or under the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 45, a bar to an indictment for the murder or manslaughter of the person assaulted should he subsequently die from the effects of the assault (x).

(viii) A plea of "Not Guilty" is a general traverse of the whole indictment. Hence, as a rule, it stands alone; but by Lord Campbell's Libel Act (y) the defendant on an indictment for libel may plead, in addition, that the words are true, and that their publication was for the public benefit. This plea of justification is practically the only case in purely criminal matters in which a prisoner is entitled to plead two pleas at the same time—"Not Guilty," as well as justification. In cases which are criminal in form but civil in substance, the defendant always has the right to plead "Not Guilty" and add other pleas. Thus, on an indictment for non-repair of a highway the prisoner may plead that he is not guilty and also that a neighbouring landowner is bound to repair the highway in question *ratione tenuræ*.

If the prisoner pleads "Not Guilty," the clerk of the Court calls the jurors (z), each of whom enters the box as his name is called. Subject to the right of challenge (z) on behalf of the prisoner or of the Crown, the first twelve called, who answer to their names, are sworn, and—in the case of a felony—the prisoner is "given in charge" to them, that is, the clerk tells them shortly of what offence the prisoner is accused, adding the words, "Your charge therefore is to inquire whether he be guilty or not guilty and to hearken to the evidence."

As soon as the jury has been sworn, counsel for the prosecution opens the case for the Crown. The prosecution always begins, for the prisoner is presumed innocent until he is found guilty. If no one appears to prosecute him or the prosecution offer no evidence he will be discharged, for he "stands upon his deliverance."

Counsel generally commences his opening speech by

(x) *R. v. Morris* (1867), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 90; *R. v. Friel* (1891), 17 Cox, 325; *R. v. Tonks*, [1916] 1 K. B. 443.

(y) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6.

(z) Challenges may be either (a) peremptory, *i.e.*, giving no reason; or (b) for cause, and may be either against the whole array of jurors summoned, or against individual jurors called into the box. The prisoner may, without assigning any cause, challenge in a case of treason thirty-five, and in a case of felony twenty, individual jurymen. "Where a felony is tried together with any misdemeanour, the jury shall be sworn and the person accused shall have the same right of challenging jurors as if all the offences charged in the indictment were felonies": 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 90, s. 4.

telling the jury what the law requires him to prove before he can ask them to convict the prisoner of the crime charged in the indictment. Then he states succinctly and in chronological order the facts upon which he relies as establishing the guilt of the accused. It is his duty to state clearly and impartially every material fact which he believes his witnesses can prove, whether such facts tend to establish the prisoner's guilt or not; he must not state any fact which he is not prepared with evidence to prove. He need not at this stage of the proceeding comment on or even allude to any evidence which he understands the prisoner's witnesses are prepared to give, and he should abstain from all invective against a fellow-citizen who has not yet been proved guilty of any offence (a). The prosecuting counsel is not bound to make an opening speech and it is left to his discretion what he says, subject to the supervision of the Court. He will, as a rule, abstain from referring to any evidence which he knows will be objected to. In certain cases it is necessary to show that the indictment has been presented with the consent of the Attorney-General or of the Public Prosecutor. This is usually proved by producing his consent in writing. The Court will take judicial notice of the signature of the Law Officers, of the Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutor (b).

Counsel then proceeds to call the witnesses for the prosecution, who will be cross-examined by the prisoner or his counsel, and perhaps re-examined by the counsel for the prosecution. If material documents are produced by any of these witnesses, they are read to the jury by the clerk of the Court.

Examination of Witnesses (c).

The examination of a witness by the counsel who calls him into the box is known as "examination-in-chief." The prisoner's counsel has always the right to cross-

(a) See *R. v. Banks*, [1916] 2 K. B. 621.

(b) Criminal Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86), s. 34.

(c) The law as to what witnesses are competent, and what compellable, in a criminal case is discussed later.

examine any witness who has given evidence for the Crown, though it is not always wise for him to do so. If a witness be cross-examined, the first counsel may re-examine him on any point which arises out of the cross-examination. Different rules govern the examination-in-chief, the cross-examination and the re-examination of witnesses.

When examining in chief, it is the duty of counsel to bring out clearly and in proper chronological order every relevant fact to which the witness can depose. He must confine his questions strictly to what is relevant, and must prove all relevant facts by admissible evidence. Anything that goes to prove a material fact is relevant; everything else will be excluded. And relevant facts must be proved in the proper way. If he seeks either to prove an irrelevant fact, or to prove a relevant fact by inadmissible evidence, counsel for the prisoner will at once rise and object. An objection as to the admissibility of any evidence must be taken as soon as it is tendered; it will be very difficult to raise any objection after the evidence has once been received.

Counsel examining in chief must not ask "leading questions." A leading question is one which suggests to the witness the answer which it is desired he should give to it. Counsel may not put such a question to his own witness, unless it is merely introductory or relates to matters as to which there is no dispute.

A party may not attack the character of a witness whom he himself has called, or call evidence to contradict him (*d*); for by voluntarily placing him before the Court to give evidence the party represents to the Judge and jury that the witness is worthy of belief. It sometimes happens, however, that a witness shows a decided bias against the party who called him, and a reluctance to state anything that tells in his favour. In such a case the Judge may allow that witness to be treated as hostile, that is, to be treated as though he had been called by the other side. Then he may be cross-examined and contradicted; he may be asked leading questions. He can also be asked as to any previous statement made by him, *e.g.*, in his deposition before the magistrate or in a signed proof of his evidence; and, after his attention has been called

(*d*) Except where he is compelled by the law to call that particular person as his witness, *e.g.*, an attesting witness to a will.

to the particular portions which are inconsistent with his present evidence, such statement, if in writing, may be put in evidence to contradict him (e).

In cross-examination counsel has a much freer hand than when examining in chief. He may ask any number of leading questions. And he need not confine his questions to the facts in issue; he may branch out into many collateral matters; he may attack the character and impugn the credit of the witness to any extent which his instructions justify. But he should use this liberty guardedly. He must put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share (f). But in all other matters it is often safer to ask too little than too much.

Reckless cross-examination frequently lets in awkward pieces of evidence which were hitherto inadmissible. Thus, if counsel for the prisoner asks a witness called for the prosecution as to part of a conversation which that witness had with a third person when the prisoner was not present, counsel for the Crown will be entitled, if he wishes, to bring out the whole of that conversation in re-examination, although it was not admissible in chief. So if either counsel reads part of any document in cross-examination, he renders the whole document admissible and makes it part of his case; if he reads any letter written by the witness, he will let in the reply to it.

On the other hand, witnesses under cross-examination may be asked, and will be compelled to answer (g), questions not only as to the facts of the case but also as to matters not material to the issue, with the view of impugning their credit and thus shaking their whole testimony; this is called "cross-examining to credit." But, in order to prevent the case from thus branching out into all manner of irrelevant issues, it is wisely provided that on such matters the answer of the witness must be accepted as final; no evidence can be called to contradict him. To this rule, however, there are exceptions. For instance, a witness can always be asked whether he has not been convicted of a crime; and, if he either denies the fact or refuses to answer, the opposite party may prove his conviction, although the conviction of the witness on some former occasion may be wholly irrelevant to the issue as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner now in the dock. If the defending counsel

(e) Criminal Law Procedure Act, 1865 (Lord Denman's Act) (28 & 29 Vict. c. 18), s. 3.

(f) See Powell on Evidence (9th ed.), at p. 538.

(g) There are some questions; however, which a witness will not be compelled to answer, either in cross-examination or in chief: see *post*, pp. 629—633.

asks questions attacking the prosecutor or his witnesses or with a view to showing that the accused has a good character, he will enable the prosecuting counsel to cross-examine the accused (if he gives evidence) as to his previous convictions or general bad character, which otherwise would not be allowed.

The object of re-examination is merely to give the witness an opportunity of explaining any seeming inconsistency in his answers, and of stating the whole truth as to any matter which was touched on, but not fully dealt with, in cross-examination. Counsel, when re-examining, can ask no question that does not arise out of the cross-examination, except by leave of the Court, and then further cross-examination will be allowed; he may not ask any leading question; and he should not ask again any question which he has already asked in chief.

The counsel for the prosecution always can and usually does put in evidence the prisoner's statement made before the magistrates not on oath, whether it tells in favour of the prisoner or not, and whether the prisoner is going to give evidence before the jury or not (*h*). But if it contains an admission that the prisoner has been previously convicted, the passage should not be read to the jury. This usually closes the case for the prosecution.

Defence.

If at this stage of the proceedings the Judge is of opinion that there is no evidence to go to the jury, he may direct them to acquit the prisoner. He is not bound to do so, and if the prisoner is represented by counsel, will usually not do so, unless the counsel makes an application for the purpose (*i*).

If, however, a *prima facie* case has been made out, the next step is for the prisoner or his counsel to decide whether any witnesses shall or shall not be called for the defence. If the prisoner wishes to give evidence on oath himself, now

(*h*) *R. v. Bird* (1898), 15 T. L. R. 26.

(*i*) *R. v. Power*, [1919] 1 K. B. 572.

is the time for him to go into the witness-box (*k*), and it is the duty of the Judge to make it clear to him that he has this right (*l*), though the prisoner is not bound to exercise it; he may instead make a statement not on oath from the dock. The fact that the prisoner has given evidence on oath does not give the counsel for the prosecution the right to have the last word (*m*), though his calling his wife or any other witness to give evidence as to any fact will do so.

But if the prisoner desires to call witnesses other than himself as to the facts, his counsel or—if he be not defended by counsel—he himself opens his case, and the witnesses for the defence will then be examined in chief, cross-examined, and, if necessary, re-examined. Witnesses, who speak merely to the character of the prisoner, are usually called at the end of his case. The counsel for the prosecution has a right to cross-examine them, but as a rule he does not do so. It is possible that the prosecution may desire to call rebutting evidence. If the defence has called evidence as to facts which could not have been controverted by the prosecution when calling witnesses, the prosecution may, if it can, call witnesses to disprove the new facts set up by the defence. Again, if the prisoner either asserts or calls witnesses to show that he is a person of good character, the prosecution can prove that he is a person of bad character. But evidence will not be allowed to be called in rebuttal merely because the prosecution has forgotten or neglected to call witnesses who were necessary at the outset of the case (*n*).

Speeches of Counsel.

After the case for the prosecution is concluded and the prisoner has given evidence if he wishes so to do, the remaining steps in the proceedings and the number of

(*k*) Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 36), s. 1. The prisoner may be convicted of perjury if he is sworn as a witness even after he has pleaded guilty: *R. v. Wheeler*, [1917] 1 K. B. 283.

(*l*) *R. v. Tate*, [1908] 2 K. B. 680.

(*m*) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, s. 3.

(*n*) See *R. v. Crippen*, [1911] 1 K. B. 149; *R. v. Sullivan*, [1923] 1 K. B.

speeches which counsel are permitted to make depend practically on two considerations: (i) Is the prisoner defended by counsel? (ii) Does the prisoner intend to call any witnesses as to the facts other than himself? We have already mentioned that each counsel (or if none is retained for the defence, the prisoner) is entitled to "open"—that is, to state to the jury—his own case. But in addition to these opening speeches there are two other kinds of speeches which may be made. In some cases counsel may "sum up his own evidence"; in other cases he may make "a general reply"—that is, a speech in which he not only sums up his own evidence, but also deals with the evidence called against him and answers the arguments of his opponent.

It is only where the prisoner is defended by counsel that counsel for the prosecution has a right to sum up his case (o), and it is only where the prisoner calls witnesses, other than himself, who speak to the facts of the case and not merely as to the prisoner's character, that the prosecuting counsel has a right to reply (unless he be the Attorney- or Solicitor-General, who have the right of reply in all cases, though they do not always exercise it).

This matter may be made clearer if we set out in detail the order of the speeches. There are four cases to be dealt with:—

(i) *Where the prisoner is not defended by counsel, and calls no witness to the facts except himself.*

1. Counsel for the prosecution opens his case.
2. Witnesses for the prosecution.
3. Prisoner's statement before the magistrates.
4. Prisoner gives evidence if he wishes.
5. Prisoner makes a speech in his defence.
6. Witnesses as to prisoner's character.

It will be observed that in this case counsel for the prosecution makes only one speech and has no opportunity of commenting on the prisoner's evidence.

(ii) *Where the prisoner is not defended by counsel, but calls witnesses as to the facts, in addition to giving evidence himself.*

1. Counsel for the prosecution opens his case.
2. Witnesses for the prosecution.
3. Prisoner's statement before the magistrates.
4. Prisoner opens his case.

5. Prisoner calls his witnesses, including himself, if he wishes, and witnesses to character, if any.

6. Prisoner sums up his case.

7. Counsel for the prosecution replies on the whole case. *

(iii) *Where the prisoner is defended by counsel, who calls no witness to the facts except the prisoner.*

1. Counsel for the prosecution opens his case.

2. Witnesses for the prosecution.

3. Prisoner's statement before the magistrates.

4. Prisoner gives evidence, if he wishes.—

5. Counsel for the prosecution sums up his case.

6. Prisoner's counsel speaks in his defence.

7. Witnesses to character.

Counsel for the prosecution has an opportunity and a right to comment on the prisoner's evidence (p).

(iv) *Where the prisoner is defended by counsel, who calls other persons besides the prisoner to give evidence as to the facts.*

1. Counsel for the prosecution opens his case.

2. Witnesses for the prosecution.

3. Prisoner's statement before the magistrates.

4. Prisoner's counsel opens the defence.

5. Witnesses for defence, including, if counsel thinks fit, the prisoner and witnesses to his character.

6. Prisoner's counsel sums up the case for the defence.

7. Counsel for the prosecution replies on the whole case. *

Summing-up and Verdict.

When all the witnesses on both sides have been examined and the speeches of counsel are ended, the Judge proceeds to sum up the case to the jury, that is, he calls the attention of the jury to the more important facts which bear on either side, and directs them as to the law (q). The Judge should lay down the law in general terms, and should make such observations and explanations as are required by the particular case then before the Court. He must leave to the jury all questions which properly arise upon the evidence, even though they may not have been raised by counsel (r). The jury are bound to accept the law as laid down by the Judge and to apply it to the facts before them. But if the Judge expresses an opinion as to the facts—as he may, if he thinks fit—they are not bound to

(p) *R. v. Gardner*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 150.

(q) See the remarks of Lord James of Hereford in *Clouston v. Corry*, [1906] A. C., at pp. 129, 130.

(r) *R. v. Hopper*, [1915] 2 K. B. 431.

follow his opinion, and he must tell them so; for it is their province, and not his, to weigh the evidence and to decide what is the proper inference to be drawn from the facts proved.

In criminal cases a higher degree of proof is required than in civil, for the jury should not convict an accused person, unless they are satisfied that his guilt has been proved "beyond reasonable doubt." If, after giving the matter full consideration, the jury find that the evidence has not induced in them such a belief in the prisoner's guilt as honest men would reasonably act upon in the ordinary affairs of business life, it is their duty to acquit him; and the Judge should always so direct them. If on the indictment before them it is open to the jury to convict the prisoner of some other offence not charged therein, the Judge must inform them that they have this power whenever evidence has been given of facts and circumstances which would justify them in taking such a course (r). The Judge should also instruct the jury as to any points of the law of evidence where without such instruction they might go wrong. Thus he must warn them not to convict the prisoner on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice; and where two prisoners are jointly indicted, he should explain to the jury that anything said by one prisoner behind the back of the other is not evidence against that other.

The jury may, if they wish, retire to consider their verdict. They must all twelve agree on one verdict (s). They have to say whether on the facts proved and the law, as explained to them by the Judge, they find the prisoner "Guilty" or "Not Guilty": this is called a "general verdict." They have it in their discretion to find the prisoner "Guilty" on the whole of the indictment, or "Guilty" on some counts, but not on others. The first delivery of a verdict is not necessarily final; they may be directed by the Judge to reconsider it.

(r) *R. v. Hopper*, [1915] 2 K. B. 431.

(s) But a majority—if it consist of twelve—suffices in a coroner's jury; and in Scotland a bare majority from the jury of fifteen.

If they have been locked up for several hours without any prospect of their agreeing on a verdict, or if any one of the jury dies or falls so ill that it would be some days before he would be able to sit again, and the necessary consent to go on with ten or eleven jurors is not given, or if in a case of felony, after the Judge's summing-up, one of them leaves the jury-box and the Court without leave (*t*)—in these and other similar cases the jury will be discharged and a new one sworn. The second trial may take place in a different Court (*u*). The Judge may in a proper case allow the jury to view the premises where the offence is alleged to have been committed, but all necessary precautions must be taken to prevent the jury from receiving information except by evidence in Court (*x*).

If the jury acquit the prisoner, he is discharged, unless he is to be tried on another charge. If they find him guilty, they may at the same time, if they think fit, recommend him to the mercy of the Court. If they find him "Guilty but insane," the Judge will order him to be detained in a criminal lunatic asylum until His Majesty's pleasure be known (*y*). The jury may also, if they think fit, find a "special verdict" setting forth the facts which have been established to their satisfaction, and adding that, if these facts amount in law to a criminal offence, they find him guilty of that offence (*z*). Only a jury can find a man guilty or not guilty on an indictment.

The indictment, as we have seen, defines the precise charge which the prisoner is called upon to answer and of which the jury must either acquit or convict him. They can, in a few cases, convict him of an offence other than that charged in the indictment, provided it has been established by the evidence. Where the words used in charging one offence include those used in another minor offence of the same class, the jury can reject part of the averment and convict of the minor offence alone. Thus, on an indictment for murder the jury may find the prisoner guilty of manslaughter (*a*). Again, on an indictment for any crime the jury may convict him of an attempt to commit

(*t*) See *R. v. Ketteridge*, [1915] 1 K. B. 467, distinguished in *R. v. Twiss*, [1918] 2 K. B. 853; and see 60 Vict. c. 18. By section 15 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, where a jurymen dies or is discharged by the Court for illness or some similar reason, the jury will be considered as remaining properly constituted so long as the number of its members is not reduced below ten, and both the prosecutor and the accused have given their assent in writing.

(*u*) *R. v. Holmen*, [1918] 2 K. B. 861.

(*x*) *R. v. Martin* (1872), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 378.

(*y*) Criminal Lunatics Act, 1884. (47 & 48 Vict. c. 64), ss. 5, 16.

(*z*) See, for an example of a special verdict, *R. v. Dudley* (1885), 14 Q. B. D., at pp. 273—5; and also *ibid.*, p. 560.

(*a*) So on an indictment for perjury the prisoner may be convicted of taking a false oath: *R. v. Hodgkiss* (1869), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 212, Vol. 1, p. 213.

it (b). In addition many statutes have been passed which enable a prisoner who is charged with one crime to be convicted of another.

On an indictment for robbery the prisoner may be convicted of an assault with intent to rob (c), but not of a common assault. On an indictment for larceny the prisoner may be convicted of embezzlement; on an indictment for embezzlement he may be convicted of larceny (d).

Where on an indictment for a misdemeanour the evidence shows that the prisoner really committed a felony, he can nevertheless be convicted of the misdemeanour with which he is charged (e). Thus, if a prisoner is indicted for obtaining money by false pretences (which is a misdemeanour) and the evidence shows that he was really guilty of larceny (which is a felony), he can be convicted of false pretences (f). But he cannot be convicted of felony on an indictment for misdemeanour.

Without special statutory enactment no one indicted for a felony can be convicted of a misdemeanour; such special statutory enactment exists in certain cases:—

- (a) on an indictment for murdering a newly-born child, the prisoner may be convicted of concealment of birth (g);
- (b) on an indictment for cutting, stabbing or wounding with felonious intent, the prisoner may be convicted of the misdemeanour of unlawfully wounding, but not of common assault (h);
- (c) under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, a prisoner who is indicted for rape may be convicted of a misdemeanour under that Act (i);
- (d) on the trial of a person over sixteen years of age for the manslaughter of a child or young person of whom he had the custody or care the prisoner may be convicted of a misdemeanour under section 12 of the Children Act, 1908 (k);
- (e) any person charged with an offence which is a felony under the Official Secrets Act, 1911, may, if the circumstances warrant such a finding, be found guilty of an offence which is a misdemeanour under that Act (l);

(b) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 9. Thus, on an indictment for murder the prisoner can be convicted of the statutory felony of attempt to murder: *R. v. White*, [1910] 2 K. B. 124.

(c) Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50), s. 44, sub-s. 1.

(d) *Ibid.*, sub-s. 2.

(e) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 12; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 88.

(f) Larceny Act, 1916, s. 44, sub-s. 4.

(g) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 60. Cf. *R. v. Simmonite*, [1916] 2 K. B. 821. The jury may also convict of infanticide: see Vol. 1, p. 300.

(h) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 5.

(i) 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 9; *R. v. Williams*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 320.

(k) 8 Edw. 7, c. 67, s. 12, sub-s. 4. And see *R. v. Tonks*, [1916] 1 K. B. 443.

(l) 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, s. 5.

- (f) on an indictment for larceny the prisoner can now be convicted of obtaining the money or goods by false pretences (*m*);
- (g) and, as we have already seen, on an indictment for any felony the prisoner can be convicted of the misdemeanour of attempting to commit that felony.

There may, after verdict, be other issues for the jury to try, such as, Has the prisoner been previously convicted, or Is he an habitual drunkard, or Is he an habitual criminal? ✓

After the verdict has been given on all the issues to be tried, in cases of felony the prisoner is asked if he has anything to say why the Court should not proceed to judgment. No motion to quash the indictment is possible after verdict; but at any time between verdict and sentence the counsel for the defence may move in arrest of judgment, though only on some point of substance arising on the face of the record, *e.g.*, such uncertainty in the indictment as cannot be amended by the Court and has not been cured by verdict. Such a motion is now very rarely made; if it succeeds, the prisoner will be discharged, but such discharge is not equivalent to an acquittal; he may be re-arrested and tried on a fresh indictment for the same offence.

Finally, before sentencing the prisoner, the Judge may also hear witnesses as to the prisoner's antecedents and general character, to enable him to decide on the amount of punishment which he will award the prisoner. These the Judge will examine himself, generally on oath; and in so examining them he is not limited by the ordinary rules of evidence (*n*). If their evidence tells against the prisoner, he should be allowed to cross-examine them; but he is not entitled at this stage of the proceedings to give evidence himself on oath in mitigation of his punishment (*o*).

The principles by which the Judge is guided in passing sentence are discussed in Chapter IX. (*p*). After sentence, the Judge may make a restitution order, *i.e.*, order that the goods, but not money, the subject of the charge, be

(*m*) Larceny Act, 1916, s. 44, sub-s. 3.

(*n*) *R. v. Douglas Campbell* (1911), 75 J. P. 216.

(*o*) *R. v. Hodgkinson* (1900), 64 J. P. 808.

(*p*) *Post*, p. 445.

handed to the prosecutor after ten days. He may also in cases of felony order a reward to be paid up to £100, but this is rarely done. Lastly, the prisoner is then delivered to the proper authorities to undergo his punishment if it involves imprisonment (r). Before leaving the Court, he may, if he thinks fit, apply to the Judge for leave to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal on any question of fact or of mixed law and fact (s).

(r) But see Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 23), s. 7, sub-s. 2.

(s) See *post*, pp. 452 *et seq.*

CHAPTER IX.

PROCEEDINGS AFTER VERDICT.

Sentence.

EXCEPT where the punishment is death, our law does not rigidly fix the sentence to be passed on any convicted criminal, but leaves a large discretion to the Judge. A maximum penalty is, as a rule, prescribed, and the Judge may award any sentence which he thinks fit below that maximum. He will give due weight to any recommendation to mercy made by the jury. He may inflict fine, or imprisonment, or penal servitude within the limits prescribed, and in a few cases also whipping (a). If he decides to send the prisoner to penal servitude, it cannot be for less than three years. If he decides to pass a sentence of imprisonment, it cannot, as a rule, be for more than two years; such imprisonment may now in the case of every indictable offence be with or without hard labour (b). In certain cases he may order a prisoner who is between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one to be detained in a Borstal institution, and such detention must be for at least two and not more than three years (c). A convicted criminal, who is found by the jury to be, or who admits himself to be, an habitual criminal, may in addition to a sentence of penal servitude be ordered to be detained as an habitual criminal for not less than five, nor more than ten, years (d). In almost every other case no minimum is fixed by the law, and the Judge may pass as light a sentence as in his judicial discretion he thinks right; he may order the prisoner

(a) See *ante*, pp. 138, 139. No person can be sentenced to be whipped except under a statutory enactment: Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 36, sub-s. 2.

(b) Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 16, sub-s. 1; *R. v. Gould* (1918), 13 Cr. App. R. 144.

(c) See *post*, pp. 447, 448.

(d) This is called "preventive detention"; see *post*, p. 449.

to enter into recognisances to come up for judgment when called upon so to do, or he may deal with him under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1907 (e).

It is one of the most difficult tasks which a Judge has to perform, to determine the proper sentence to be passed on a particular prisoner. The punishment must be made not only to "fit the crime," but also to fit the criminal; it should be reformatory as well as deterrent, remedial and not vindictive. The previous history of the prisoner, his education and environment, and all the surrounding circumstances which attended his criminal act, should be carefully considered, and the punishment eventually awarded should be one which will build up, and not break down, his character and strengthen whatever element of good may be left in him. Too short a sentence is often mistaken leniency, as the good influences of prison discipline have then no time in which to operate.

With such ends in view, the Legislature has passed several statutes, the more important of which we will proceed to notice briefly. Youthful offenders, under certain circumstances, may be sent to a reformatory or to an industrial school, or placed under the care of a probation officer. Probation officers are now appointed by the justices of the peace; they may be of either sex; it is their duty to keep an eye on the youthful offender or any other person who is placed in their charge and to keep him away from bad company and evil surroundings, and, so far as is possible, to bring every good influence to bear upon him.

"Where any person has been convicted on indictment of any offence punishable with imprisonment, and the Court is of opinion that, having regard to the character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition of the person charged, or to the trivial nature of the offence, or to the extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment, or any other than a nominal punishment, or that it is expedient to release the offender on probation, the Court may, in lieu of imposing a sentence of imprisonment, make an order discharging the offender conditionally on his entering into a recognisance, with or without sureties, to be of good behaviour and to appear for sentence when

(e) 7 Edw. 7, c. 17; see also Criminal Justice Acts, 1925 and 1926, and *post*, p. 451.

called on at any time during such period, not exceeding three years, as may be specified in the order " (f). It will be noted that the Act says " any person "; it is not a measure for first offenders only.

The Court may also order the offender to pay compensation and costs. The recognisance may bind him not to associate with thieves and other undesirable persons, and in certain cases to abstain from intoxicating liquor for a specified time (g). The probation officer reports to the Court on the behaviour of the offender, and if the report is unsatisfactory, the offender will be brought before the Court again and sentenced for the original offence, or otherwise dealt with (h).

Another important attempt towards the reformation of criminals was made by the Prevention of Crime Act, 1908 (i), which recognised and put on a statutory basis what is known as " the Borstal system." That Act provides that " where a person is convicted on indictment of an offence for which he is liable to be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment, and it appears to the Court—

(a) that the person is not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-one years of age; and

(b) that, by reason of his criminal habits or tendencies, or association with persons of bad character, it is expedient that he should be subject to detention for such term and under such instruction and discipline as appears most conducive to his reformation and the repression of crime;

the Court may, in lieu of passing a sentence of penal servitude or imprisonment, pass a sentence of detention under penal discipline in a Borstal institution for a term of not less than two years nor more than three years " (k). In such an institution the prisoners are not kept in solitary confinement; they are drilled and taught a trade, and

(f) Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, s. 1, sub-s. 2; see also Criminal Justice Acts, 1925 and 1926.

(g) Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, s. 2. See further, as to probationers, the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, Part I., as amended by Criminal Justice Act, 1926.

(h) Courts of summary jurisdiction have even greater power; they may, without proceeding to conviction, either discharge the offender conditionally on his entering into a recognisance and hand him over to a probation officer, or discharge him unconditionally, although a technical offence has been proved.

(i) 8 Edw. 7, c. 59.

(k) *Ibid.*, s. 1, sub-s. 1, as amended by section 11, sub-section 1 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914.

every effort is made to fit them, both morally and physically, for honest work at the end of the period of detention.

Before passing such a sentence, the Court must consider any report or representations by or on behalf of the Prison Commissioners as to the suitability of the case for treatment in a Borstal institution (*l*); and it must be satisfied that the character, state of health, and mental condition of the offender, and the other circumstances of the case, are such that he is likely to profit by the instruction and discipline suggested.

Every person sentenced to detention in a Borstal institution will, on the expiration of the term of his sentence, remain for a further period of one year under the supervision of the Prison Commissioners (*m*). At Borstal, Lincoln, Aylesbury (for females), Wormwood Scrubs, and several other selected prisons the full Borstal system is in operation, and lads under sentence of detention will be sent to one or other of these prisons. Prisoners who are sentenced to less than twelve months are not sent to such an institution, because it is found that, generally speaking, little can be effected in less than that time; but at every local prison a juvenile-adult class has been formed for lads between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, irrespective of length of sentence, and the methods of the Borstal system are applied in these classes as far as the length of the sentences and the size of the classes permits. Aliens are not, as a rule, selected for the Borstal system, unless good reasons exist in any particular case and no expulsion order has been recommended by the Court. Other prisoners not regarded as suitable subjects for the Borstal system are:—

- (a) Young prisoners whose previous character is good and who might suffer more by association with recidivists and "hooligans" than they would gain by the special training.
- (b) Lads in bad health or of poor physique, who are unfit for drill and hard work.
- (c) Lads who in a reformatory school or when previously under Borstal treatment have had a chance of reform and have failed to profit by it.

If an alien has been convicted of a crime, the Court may recommend the Home Secretary to expel him from the kingdom, and at the same time either sentence him to a period of imprisonment or merely order him to be detained until the pleasure of the Home Secretary be known (*n*). If an expulsion order is made and the alien disobeys it, he

(*l*) This report is usually made by the governor of the prison in which the prisoner is confined while awaiting trial.

(*m*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 59, s. 6, sub-s. 1, as amended by 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 58, s. 11, sub-s. 2.

(*n*) 5 Edw. 7, c. 13, s. 3; and see 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 92.

will be deemed to be a rogue and vagabond, and may be imprisoned for three months with hard labour (o).

An habitual drunkard, who has been convicted of a crime, may, subject to certain conditions, be sentenced to be detained in a certified reformatory for inebriates (p).

Greater severity is properly shown towards hardened offenders. Any person, who—

(a) since he was sixteen years old has been three times convicted of a crime (q) (not including the one on which he awaits sentence), and “is leading persistently a dishonest or criminal life,” or

(b) has on a previous occasion been found to be an habitual criminal and sentenced as such (r),

is deemed to be an habitual criminal (s). In other words, an habitual criminal is one who has adopted crime as a profession and whose ordinary mode of life is criminal, and not one whose offences, though frequent, are of merely an occasional or trivial character.

Where such a person is convicted on indictment of a crime (q), and subsequently admits that he is, or is found by the jury to be, an habitual criminal, and the Judge passes upon him a sentence of penal servitude, he may, if he deems it expedient for the protection of the public that the offender should be further detained, add to the sentence a period, not exceeding ten, nor less than five years, of what is called “preventive detention” (t).

But the sentence passed in Court on a criminal is not the only punishment which he suffers from his conviction. His character is ruined; his family are disgraced. Moreover, there are many cases in which a conviction involves professional or other disqualifications; *e.g.*, any one convicted of felony is permanently disqualified from holding a licence under the Intoxicating Liquor Licensing Acts. There are many other disqualifications which

(o) 5 Edw. 7, c. 13, s. 3, sub-s. 2, s. 7; see Vol. 1, p. 245.

(p) Inebriates Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 60), ss. 1, 2; *R. v. Briggs*, [1909] 1 K. B. 381; and see Vol. 1, p. 243.

(q) As defined in the schedule to the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 59).

(r) See *R. v. Davis*, [1917] 2 K. B. 855. The fact that an offender has previously been convicted of being an habitual criminal is not conclusive. The jury must be satisfied that he is leading persistently a dishonest or criminal life: *R. v. Norman*, [1924] 2 K. B. 315.

(s) 8 Edw. 7, c. 59, s. 10, sub-s. 2.

(t) *Ibid.*, s. 10, sub-s. 1.

depend on the nature of the sentence passed upon him. Under section 2 of the Forfeiture Act, 1870 (*u*), a conviction of felony followed by a sentence of death, or of penal servitude, or of any term of imprisonment with hard labour, or of imprisonment for a term of more than twelve months, with or without hard labour, vacates any military and naval office or any civil office under the Crown or other public employment, or any ecclesiastical benefice, or any place, office or emolument in any university, college or other corporation, which the prisoner may at the time be holding. A conviction of felony, followed by any such sentence, also forfeits any pension or superannuation allowance payable by the public, or out of any public fund. The prisoner at the same time becomes incapable of holding any of the offices mentioned above, or of being elected or sitting or voting as a member of either House of Parliament, or of exercising any right of suffrage or other parliamentary or municipal franchise whatever within England, Wales, or Ireland; but this disability lasts only until he has served his full sentence.

Besides determining the amount of the punishment which the prisoner is to undergo, the Judge is sometimes called upon to make an order as to certain minor matters. The property in stolen goods, as we have seen (*x*), does not as a rule pass from the owner, but even if it has done so in consequence of a sale in market overt or otherwise, it re-vests on the conviction of the offender (*y*). In all cases of theft and embezzlement (but not of false pretences) the Court has power, if the prisoner is convicted (*z*), to save the owner from the trouble and uncertainty of a lawsuit by ordering the goods to be restored to him on such terms as it thinks just (*a*). This is called a "restitution order." But since the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, the re-vesting of the property and the operation of such an order are suspended for ten days after the conviction; and if notice of appeal is given within that time, then the suspension subsists until the appeal is disposed of (*b*). A restitution order does not, however, operate as an adjudication upon the ownership of the goods in question; the Judge simply orders them to be handed to the owner. Whether any order is made or not in the criminal Court, it is open to any one who claims to be the real owner to bring an action in a civil Court to establish his right, and the order has no bearing whatever on the merits of that claim; nor does the conviction of the prisoner create any estoppel in a subsequent civil case, as the parties are not identical. If the Court orders the

(*u*) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 2.

(*x*) See Vol. 1, p. 20.

(*y*) Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 24, sub-s. 1. This does not apply to goods obtained by fraud or other wrongful means short of larceny: section 24, sub-section 2.

(*z*) If acquitted, the prisoner has a right to retain any goods which he is charged with stealing or receiving which were in his possession.

(*a*) See Larceny Act, 1916, s. 45. The Court can also deal with any proceeds of the stolen property found in the possession of the prisoner: *R. v. Justices of Central Criminal Court* (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 314.

(*b*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 6 (Criminal Appeal Act, 1907).

goods to be restored to their owner, it can, if it thinks fit, compensate any person in whose possession they were found out of any money found on the prisoner which it has reason to believe to be the proceeds of the theft (d).

If the prisoner is convicted of felony the Court may, upon the application of any person aggrieved, immediately after the conviction "award any sum of money, not exceeding £100, by way of satisfaction or compensation for any loss of property suffered by the applicant through or by means of the said felony, and the amount awarded for such satisfaction or compensation shall be deemed a judgment debt" (e) and is recoverable accordingly. A similar power exists where a prisoner is bound over under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, but the limit in this case is £25 (f).

At the end of the trial the Court usually makes an order that the costs of the prosecution shall be paid out of the funds of the county or county borough in which the offence was alleged to have been committed (g), but the expenses of witnesses who are only called as to the prisoner's character are not paid unless the Court makes a special order to that effect (h). The officer of the Court assesses the amount of such costs, but in doing so he must have regard to the regulations made by the Home Secretary (i).

If witnesses for the defence have been called at petty sessions and bound over to appear at the trial, their expenses will be paid in the same manner as if they were witnesses for the prosecution, unless expressly disallowed by the Court at the trial. The costs of the defence will be paid out of public funds in one case only—where the prisoner has been granted a certificate for legal aid under the Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903 (k).

In all cases of indictable offences, the Court now has power, in addition to any punishment it may inflict, to order a prisoner who has been convicted to pay the costs of the prosecution (l). Payment of such costs, as a rule, falls primarily on the public funds, but the county or county borough can recover the amount of such costs from the prisoner when such an order has been made on him. The Court also has power to impound any money found on the prisoner when arrested and apply it towards payment of those costs (m).

In certain cases, a prisoner who has been acquitted can obtain an order from the Court that the prosecutor shall pay the costs of the defence (n). These cases are:—

(d) *R. v. Justices of the Central Criminal Court, supra.*

(e) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 4.

(f) 7 Edw. 7, c. 17, s. 1, sub-s. 3; 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 58, s. 8.

(g) Costs in Criminal Cases Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 15), ss. 1, 4. The same order can be made where the prisoner for some reason is not tried on any charge for which he was committed: *ibid.*, s. 7.

(h) *Ibid.*, s. 1, sub-s. 4.

(i) *Ibid.*, s. 5.

(k) 3 Edw. 7, c. 38; see *ante*, p. 414.

(l) 8 Edw. 7, c. 15, s. 6, sub-s. 1.

(m) *Ibid.*, s. 6, sub-ss. 4, 5.

(n) 8 Edw. 7, c. 15, s. 6, sub-s. 2. The justices at petty sessions, in dismissing a charge of an indictable offence, may, if they think the charge was not brought *bona fide*, order that the prosecutor shall pay the costs of the defence. If these costs amount to more than £25, an appeal lies to Quarter Sessions.

- (i) indictments or informations for libel;
- (ii) offences under the Corrupt Practices Acts (o);
- (iii) offences against the Merchandise Marks Acts, 1878—1894 (p);
- (iv) any case where the justices have declined to commit for trial and the prosecutor has insisted on being bound over under the Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859 (q), to prefer an indictment against the accused.

Appeal.

After verdict has been given the prisoner can no longer move to quash the indictment (r). But he can at any time after the verdict and before judgment move in arrest of judgment on any objection which appears on the face of the record. It is still open to the Judge, if he thinks fit (s), to state a special case, as was frequently done in the days before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved was abolished. But now the most usual course is for a convicted person to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which came into existence on April 19, 1908 (t).

Prior to this date a prisoner convicted on indictment had no right of appeal on a question of fact, nor as to the amount of his sentence. And as to any point of law, nothing in the nature of an appeal was open to him, unless he could induce the Judge to state a case, *i.e.*, to state the facts on which the point of law arose, for the opinion of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. This the Judge might refuse to do; and if he did refuse, no Court had power to compel him to do so.

The Court of Criminal Appeal consists of the Judges of the King's Bench Division of the High Court (u). The Lord Chief Justice is the President. Three Judges form a quorum, and the number of Judges present must be an uneven one. The Court can sit in two or more divisions, if

(o) Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 102); Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 51).

(p) 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 15; 57 & 58 Vict. c. 19.

(q) 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17; see *ante*, p. 417.

(r) See *ante*, p. 431.

(s) Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 23), s. 14, sub-s. 4. The Court of Criminal Appeal has now power to "require a case to be stated" (section 20, sub-section 4); formerly it could only be reserved at the will of the Judge.

(t) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, ss. 1, 23, sub-s. 3. Writs of error and motions for new trials are abolished: section 20, sub-section 1.

(u) *Ibid.*, s. 1, sub-s. 1, as amended by the Criminal Appeal (Amendment) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 46), s. 1.

the Lord Chief Justice so directs. Unless the Court thinks it desirable to deliver separate judgments in any case where a question of law is to be determined, only one judgment is delivered and that by the President of the Court or by such member of the Court as the President may direct (x).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals in the case of a conviction (y) on any indictment, or in the case of a conviction on a criminal information or on a coroner's inquisition, or in any case where a person is dealt with by a Court of Quarter Sessions as an incorrigible rogue under the Vagrancy Act, 1824 (z). It has no jurisdiction "in the case of convictions on indictments or inquisitions charging any peer or peeress, or other person claiming the privilege of peerage, with any offence not now lawfully triable by a Court of Assize" (a); for such matters must be decided by the House of Lords. Nor in the case of indictments for non-repair or obstruction of highways, public bridges or navigable rivers, which are criminal only in form; such appeals will be tried by the Civil Appeal Court (b).

The prisoner has an unfettered right of appeal on any question of law (c). Again, from the verdict of the jury on any question of fact, or from the decision of the Court on any question of mixed law and fact, the prisoner can appeal provided he obtains either the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal, or a certificate from the Judge who tried the case that it is a fit case for appeal (d). Lastly, the prisoner has a right to appeal against the sentence passed upon him, provided that the sentence is not one fixed by law, and the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal is first obtained (e). This power exists when the prisoner has pleaded guilty, as well as when he has been found guilty by the jury (f). But it

(x) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 1, sub-s. 5.

(y) A special verdict "Guilty, but insane," is an acquittal, not a conviction; hence the prisoner cannot appeal: *Felstead v. R.*, [1914] A. C. 534; *R. v. Taylor* (1915), 11 Cr. App. R. 198.

(z) 5 Geo. 4, c. 83.

(a) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 20, sub-s. 2; *R. v. Hausmann* (1909), 3 Cr. App. R. 3.

(b) *Ibid.*, s. 20, sub-s. 3. Appeal in such cases lies to the Court of Appeal as if the conviction were a judgment in a civil action.

(c) *Ibid.*, s. 3 (a).

(d) *Ibid.*, s. 3 (b).

(e) *Ibid.*, s. 3 (c).

(f) *R. v. Ettridge*, [1909] 2 K. B. 24.

is not always wise for the prisoner to exercise it, as on such an appeal the Court may, if it thinks fit, quash the sentence appealed against and inflict a more severe one (*g*). A person sentenced to a term of preventive detention may—without leave—appeal against his sentence (*h*); and so may a person sentenced to detention in a Borstal institution (*i*). The Court may grant the appellant bail pending the hearing of the appeal (*k*), and the Registrar of the Court has power, in a proper case, to expedite the hearing.

On the hearing of an appeal on any question of law or fact the Court may quash the conviction on any of the grounds on which a verdict may be set aside in civil cases (*l*), *e.g.*, that the verdict is unreasonable, or that it cannot be supported on the evidence laid before the Court, or that on any ground there has been a miscarriage of justice (*m*). The quashing of a conviction by the Court of Criminal Appeal puts the accused in the same position for all purposes as if he had been acquitted by the jury (*n*). But the Court may, if it thinks fit, enter a verdict of “Not Guilty,” thus preventing a person, now adjudged to be innocent, remaining recorded as a criminal. So, too, if the prisoner has been convicted of the offence charged against him in the indictment, and the jury could on the indictment have found him guilty of some other offence (*o*), and it is clear from their verdict that they must have been satisfied of facts which proved him guilty of that other offence, the Court of Criminal Appeal may substitute for the verdict found by the jury a verdict of “Guilty” of that other offence, and pass any sentence which is warranted in law for that other offence, provided it is not of greater severity than the sentence passed in the Court below (*p*). Thus,

(*g*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 4, sub-s. 3.

(*h*) Prevention of Crime Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 59), s. 11.

(*i*) Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 23), s. 14, sub-s. 2.

(*k*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 14, sub-s. 2.

(*l*) See *post*, pp. 697 *et seq.*

(*m*) *Ibid.*, s. 4. In such cases the prisoner has a right to be present at the hearing of the appeal if he so wishes: section 11, sub-section 1, and *R. v. Dunleavy*, [1909] 1 K. B. 200.

(*n*) *R. v. Barron* (No. 2), [1914] 2 K. B. 570.

(*o*) See *ante*, pp. 441–443.

(*p*) Section 5, sub-section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907.

where the prisoner had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, the Court ordered a verdict of manslaughter to be entered and sentenced him to four years' penal servitude (q).

Provisions are inserted in the Act to prevent unnecessary and frivolous appeals. In the first place, as we have seen, leave to appeal is, in most cases, necessary. The detention of a prisoner pending appeal does not, unless an order is made that it shall do so, count as a part of the sentence passed upon him below; and, as we have just seen, in the case of an appeal against sentence, the Court can increase the sentence—a power which in a proper case it will exercise. The Court has also power to dismiss an appeal where there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice (r) in the inferior Court, though the appellant may strictly be right in point of law. But where a substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred, the Court must quash the conviction and cannot order a new trial, though the prisoner may be obviously guilty.

The proviso in section 4, sub-section 1 of the Act does not enable the Court to "substitute itself for the jury and find the facts which are necessary to support the conviction. The proviso is intended to apply to a case in which the evidence is such that the jury must have found the prisoner guilty if they had been properly directed. It does not apply where the evidence leaves it in doubt whether they would have so found" (s).

Where, therefore, any question of fact has been tried by the jury, the Court will not reverse the conclusion at which it has arrived, unless no honest jury could reasonably have come to that conclusion. Where the evidence before the jury bears both ways, and there was material upon which the jury, if they believed it, could properly find a verdict of "Guilty," the Court will refuse to disturb it (t).

Unless a Government department or a private prosecutor undertakes to support the conviction, the duty of appearing for the Crown rests on the Director of Public Prosecutions.

(q) *R. v. Hopper*, [1915] 2 K. B. 431.

(r) As to what is a substantial miscarriage of justice, see *R. v. Rodley*, [1913] 3 K. B. 468; *R. v. Kurasch*, [1915] 2 K. B. 749.

(s) *Per cur.* in *R. v. Dyson*, [1908] 2 K. B., at p. 457; cf. *R. v. Wann* (1912), 107 L. T. 462.

(t) Unless fresh evidence is forthcoming in support of the defence: see *post*, p. 457.

The conduct of the appeal lies on the appellant, but the Court has power, if his means are insufficient, to assign him counsel and solicitor, or counsel only, at any stage of the appeal (*u*). In cases where the appeal is against sentence only, no legal aid will be assigned unless special cause is shown (*x*). In order that the whole facts should be properly laid before the Court at the hearing of the appeal, it is provided that upon the trial of any person at Quarter Sessions or Assizes the evidence, the arguments and decision upon points of law, the summing-up of the Judge, the verdict of the jury, and, if the prisoner be found guilty, the speeches and evidence as to his character, and the sentence, must be taken down by the official shorthand writer, so that an accurate record of the proceedings can be laid before the Court of Criminal Appeal, if an appeal is entered (*y*). This provision, however, is only directory and not mandatory; so that, if the trial takes place in the absence of a shorthand writer, the trial is valid—if the prisoner is acquitted, he cannot be tried again; if he is convicted, his conviction cannot be quashed on that ground (*z*).

The Act and the Rules made under it provide machinery for the production before the Court of the evidence given at the trial and also of fresh evidence where admissible (*a*). Thus, the Judge or chairman who presided at the trial must on request furnish to the Registrar a copy of his notes, and also a report on the case generally or on any point arising in it (*b*). The Registrar is charged with the duty of procuring in proper form all documents, exhibits and things put in evidence in the Court below (*c*). And the Court has power to—

- (a) order the production of any document, exhibit or other thing connected with the proceedings;
- (b) order any witnesses who would have been compellable witnesses at the trial to attend and be examined before the Court, whether they were or were not called at the trial;
- (c) receive the evidence, if tendered, of any witness (including the appellant) who is a competent but not compellable

(*u*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 10.

(*x*) *R. v. Crawley* (1908), 72 J. P. 270.

(*y*) *Ibid.*, s. 16.

(*z*) *R. v. Elliott* (No. 2) (1909), 2 Cr. App. R. 171; *R. v. Rutter* (1909), 73 J. P. 12.

(*a*) *Ibid.*, ss. 8, 9, 15, 16, and Criminal Appeal Rules, 1908.

(*b*) *Ibid.*, s. 8; rules 14, 15.

(*c*) *Ibid.*, s. 15, sub-s. 1; rules 20, 32.

witness, and, if the appellant makes an application for the purpose, of the husband or wife of the appellant, in cases where the evidence of the husband or wife could not have been given at the trial except on such an application;

- (d) order any question involving prolonged examination of documents or accounts, or any scientific or local investigation, to be referred for inquiry and report;
- (e) appoint any person with special expert knowledge to act as assessor to the Court;

and exercise in relation to the proceedings of the Court any other powers which may for the time being be exercised by the Court of Appeal on appeals in civil matters, and issue any warrants necessary for enforcing the orders or sentences of the Court: Provided that in no case shall any sentence be increased by reason of or in consideration of any evidence that was not given at the trial (d).

The Judge of the Court below can make orders as to the custody of the documents and exhibits in the case (e). Copies of the documents or exhibits can be obtained by the appellant or respondent on payment according to a fixed scale (f). Provision is also made for the summoning of witnesses (g); and the prosecutor, although he may have declined to support a conviction or sentence, must give such assistance in his power as the Court or Director of Public Prosecutions may require of him (h).

Fresh evidence can only be adduced by leave of the Court. The names of the witnesses and the nature of the evidence must be stated—and should strictly be before the Court on affidavit—when the application is made (i). The leave is limited to the witnesses or documents thus named, and the appellant is not entitled to adduce any other evidence (k). Leave will not generally be given, unless the omission to call the witnesses at the trial is satisfactorily explained (l). Thus, it would require very exceptional circumstances for the Court to permit a prisoner to give evidence for the first time on the appeal, for he had the opportunity of doing so on his trial in the Court below (m). The witnesses will give their evidence in open Court, or, if the Court so directs, before an examiner appointed for the purpose (n). Upon such evidence the Court will in a proper case quash the conviction (o) or reduce the sentence (p), but cannot

(d) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 9.

(e) Rule 8.

(f) Rule 39.

(g) Rule 40.

(h) Rule 27.

(i) *R. v. Lovett* (1908), 1 Cr. App. R. 94; *R. v. Atkins* (1908), 24 Times L. R. 807.

(k) *R. v. Laws* (1908), 24 Times L. R. 630.

(l) *R. v. Martin* (1908), 1 Cr. App. R. 33; *R. v. Mortimer* (1909), 99 L. T. 204; *R. v. Hendry* (1909), 25 Times L. R. 635.

(m) *R. v. Malvisi* (1909), 73 J. P. 392; cf. *R. v. Kirkham*, *ibid.*, 406.

(n) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 9 (d), and Rules 40, 41.

(o) *R. v. Betridge* (1909), 73 J. P. 71.

(p) *R. v. Dickenson* (1909), 73 J. P. 287.

increase it (*q*). The Court will not quash a conviction merely because evidence was discovered after the trial, proving that a material witness for the prosecution had been previously convicted of criminal offences, unless the convictions were of such a nature as to affect the witness's credibility (*r*).

The Court relies on the Judge's notes and the shorthand writer's transcript of his notes, which are verified by affidavit. Neither the prisoner nor his counsel, if he had one, can be heard (although present at the trial) to dispute the accuracy of the notes unless serious grounds for doing so are shown (*s*).

No costs are allowed on either side on the hearing and determination of an appeal or any proceedings preliminary or incidental thereto (*t*). The expenses of the appellant, if legal aid is assigned, and of his attendance and of the attendance of witnesses by order of the Court are paid in the same way as the expenses of a prosecution for felony (*u*). There is no provision in the Act as to the expenses of supporting the conviction. The Public Prosecutor will pay out of the public funds granted to his office the expenses incurred in those cases in which he is represented; a private prosecutor must pay them out of his own pocket.

The creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal in no way affects the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, which from time immemorial has been vested in the Crown acting under the advice of the Home Secretary. Application can be made to the Home Secretary at any time after conviction. He may, if he thinks fit, advise the Crown to pardon the offender altogether or mitigate the sentence by means of a "conditional pardon." The prerogative of mercy is frequently exercised in cases where the prisoner has been sentenced to death and the jury have recommended him to mercy. The Judge in such a case must pass sentence of death in spite of the recommendation, but he always forwards the recommendation to the Home Secretary, and reprieves the prisoner till the pleasure of the Crown is known (*x*). The Home Secretary may, however, if he thinks fit, refer the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal, or he

(*q*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 9 *ad finem*.

(*r*) *R. v. Weaver* (1908), 1 Cr. App. R. 12.

(*s*) *R. v. Hampshire* (1908), 1 Cr. App. R. 212.

(*t*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 13, sub-s. 1. The costs of a case stated follow the same rule: 8 Edw. 7, c. 15, s. 9, sub-s. 5.

(*u*) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 13, sub-s. 2.

(*x*) The Judge will also respite execution whenever a woman convicted before him of murder is proved to be pregnant.

may submit to that Court any particular point of law arising in any case for its opinion (y). The effect of an unconditional pardon is to absolve the prisoner from further punishment and from any disqualifications incurred by his conviction; but it is not equivalent to an acquittal by the jury or to the quashing of a conviction by the Court.

(y) 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, s. 19; *R. v. Gray*, 12 Cr. App. R. 244; *R. v. Dickman* (1910), 26 Times L. R. 640.

PART III.

CIVIL PROCEDURE.

CHAPTER X.

COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS.

Right of Action.

WE now turn to Civil Proceedings—by means of which the State enforces payment of money due or the due performance of a contract, or compels a wrongdoer to compensate those whom he has injured. A plaintiff has a right of action whenever he has a claim to some advantage enforceable in the law Courts of the State. Whenever the defendant has violated some right of the plaintiff's, or has neglected his duty in some way which has injured the plaintiff, or has broken his contract with the plaintiff, the plaintiff has a good *prima facie* right of action.

But it does not follow that he should at once have recourse to the law Courts. There are many matters to be considered before litigation is actually commenced. In the first place, he should be satisfied that a complete cause of action ever vested in him, and, if so, whether it has been postponed, or extinguished, or barred by any Statute of Limitation; or whether he is estopped from suing. Further, before issuing the writ, he must decide the nature of his claim, and in what Court it should be presented, and for what relief he will ask. He must select the parties by and against whom respectively the action should be brought, and determine what causes of action he may join; for all these matters must be stated clearly on his writ. He must show that a right of action existed and was vested in him, before

he commenced the suit. If special damage be an essential part of the cause of action, litigation must be delayed until such damage has accrued. He must also consider whether or not any preliminary notice is requisite, and if so, to whom and when it should be given: *e.g.*, a notice to quit, notice of dishonour, notice of assignment, or notice under section 146 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (*a*), must be given before litigation is commenced; and in a few cases notice of action must be given to the defendant before the writ is issued. If the case falls within the Statute of Frauds, 1677 (*b*), or section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (*c*), or section 40 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (*a*), the plaintiff should not issue his writ until he is in possession of a memorandum sufficient to satisfy those statutes (*d*). Or it may be that by the agreement between the parties no right of action accrues till after the happening of some event which has not yet occurred. If so, the cause of action is not complete. Again, the right of action may have been extinguished by merger, surrender or release, or satisfied by payment, or lost through “laches” (*e*), or postponed by credit having been given for a specified period, or by the acceptance of a bill of exchange or promissory note payable at some future day.

Whenever a statute gives a right to a sum of money and provides no means of recovering it, the remedy is by action (*f*). If a statute expressly gives a right of action, the plaintiff must take care to comply with all the provisions of the statute which vests in him that right. In some cases, for instance, the consent of a Judge or of the Attorney-General must be obtained before commencing proceedings.

Whether formal notice of action be strictly requisite or not, it is only fair to the proposed defendant that some reasonable notice of the intended proceedings should be given, or some demand made, so as to give him the opportunity of putting the matter right or of making an amicable settlement. Such a step may be expedient on other grounds. Thus in an action for wrongfully depriving the plain-

(*a*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 20.

(*b*) 29 Car. 2, c. 3.

(*c*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71.

(*d*) *Bill v. Bament* (1841), 9 M. & W. 36; *Lucas v. Dixon* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 357.

(*e*) See *post*, p. 461.

(*f*) *Richardson v. Willis* (1872), L. R. 8 Ex. 69.

tiff of his goods, the fact that the defendant has refused to give the goods up on demand will be clear proof of the conversion. In an action for libel or slander, the fact that the opportunity of retraction and apology has been given to the defendant by the plaintiff may greatly strengthen the plaintiff's case. In some cases it is also necessary before commencing an action against constables and other officers to make a demand for a copy of the warrant under which they committed the act complained of, and to afford them the opportunity of tendering amends (*g*).

The parties, by their own agreement, may have fixed a time, before which no right of action should accrue to either. Thus a person who contracts to do work and supply materials may stipulate that his remuneration shall be paid by instalments, or he may agree to complete the whole and be paid when the work is done, and not till then. In any such case the time for payment is fixed by the agreement of the parties. Or it may have been their intention that no right of action should accrue until some condition precedent shall have been performed.

If a man binds himself to do certain acts which he afterwards renders himself unable to perform, he thereby dispenses with the performance of conditions precedent to those acts (*h*). It cannot, however, be laid down as a universal rule that where, by agreement, an act is to be done on a future day, no action can be brought for breach of the agreement till the day for doing the act has arrived. "If," said Lord Campbell, C.J., "a man promises to marry a woman on a future day, and before that day marries another woman, he is instantly liable to an action for breach of promise of marriage. If a man contracts to execute a lease on and from a certain day for a certain term, and before that day executes a lease to another for the same term, he may be immediately sued for breaking the contract. So, if a man contracts to sell and deliver specific goods on a future day, and before the day he sells and delivers them to another, he is immediately liable to an action at the suit of the person with whom he first contracted to sell and deliver them" (*i*). In cases of this kind there is an implied promise that, in the meantime, neither will do anything to the prejudice of the other inconsistent with their relation; and upon a breach of this implied promise an action will lie without waiting for the expiration of the time specified in the original contract (*k*).

Any agreement, which altogether ousts the Courts of their jurisdiction (*i.e.*, which wholly debars the aggrieved party from coming

(*g*) 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 6. In most cases, however, notice of action is now unnecessary: Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), s. 2.

(*h*) *Synge v. Synge*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 466; *Ogdens v. Nelson*, [1905] A. C. 109; *British and Beningtons v. North Western Cachar Tea Co.*, [1923] A. C. 48.

(*i*) *Hochster v. De la Tour* (1853), 2 E. & B., at p. 688; and see *Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jenkins & Co.*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 326.

(*k*) *Frost v. Knight* (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 111; *Nickoll and Knight v. Ashton, Edridge & Co.*, [1901] 2 K. B. 126. As to when the conduct of one party entitles the other to rescind the contract, see *ante*, pp. 106–113.

for redress into a Court of law), is void (l). A question often arises whether an arbitration or award has been "made a condition precedent to an action, or whether the agreement to refer disputes is a collateral and independent one" (m). If it has been made a condition precedent, no action can be commenced until an arbitration has taken place and an award has been published. But the "question must be determined in each case by the construction of the particular contract, and the intention of the parties must of course be collected from its language" (m). In cases where there is, first, a covenant to pay, and secondly a covenant to refer, the covenants are deemed distinct and collateral, and the plaintiff may sue on the covenant to pay, leaving the defendant to apply, if he thinks fit, under section 4 of the Arbitration Act, 1889 (n), to stay the action; or, as it was put by Lord Cranworth in *Scott v. Avery* (o), "If I covenant with A to do particular acts, and it is also covenanted between us that any question which may arise as to the breach of the covenants shall be referred to arbitration, the latter covenant does not prevent the covenantee from bringing an action. A right of action has accrued, and it would be against the policy of the law to give effect to an agreement that such a right should not be enforced through the medium of the ordinary tribunals. But if I covenant with A B that if I do or omit to do a certain act, then I will pay to him such a sum as J S shall award as the amount of damage sustained by him, then, until J S has made his award, and I have omitted to pay the sum awarded, my covenant has not been broken and no right of action has arisen."

As on the one hand parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Courts by their own agreement, so, on the other hand, they cannot, as a rule, by consent, give a Court jurisdiction over matters which do not properly fall within it. All Judges derive their authority from the Crown under some commission warranted by law, and they cannot act officially outside the scope of the powers thus confided to them.

Limitation of Actions.

The Legislature has thought fit to prescribe certain periods of time, at the expiration of which persons will be protected in the peaceable possession of property. It would be inequitable to permit the title of those in secure possession to be impugned by litigation, when lapse of time may have

(l) *Scott v. Avery* (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 811; and see *Atlantic Shipping Co. v. Dreyfus*, [1922] A. C. 250.

(m) *Per cur.* in *Collins v. Locke* (1879), 4 App. Cas., at p. 689, distinguished in *Viney v. Bignold* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 172; and see *Caledonian Insurance Co. v. Gilmour*, [1893] A. C. 85.

(n) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49. As to the procedure on such an application, see *ante*, p. 324.

(o) (1856), 5 H. L. Cas., at p. 848.

rendered evidence of their title difficult to obtain. The same principle has been applied to claims for debt or damages. Our law assists only those who are vigilant and who do not sleep upon their rights. It is in the interest of the State that all litigation should be commenced and determined within a reasonable time; hence, if a man abstains for an undue time from claiming that which he now asserts to be his due, he may find his approach to the Courts barred by some peremptory enactment.

There is an important distinction, however, between the effect of the Statutes of Limitation in the case of actions to recover chattels and actions to recover land. In the case of actions to recover chattels the statutes do not destroy the plaintiff's title to the chattels after the period has elapsed, but only bar his remedy against the wrongdoer; whereas in the case of actions to recover land the effect of the Real Property Limitation Acts is not only to bar the remedy against the wrongdoer, but to confer on him a title to the land itself (*p*). From this rule a curious result follows. If during the period of limitation the person in possession of the land gives an acknowledgment in writing of the claimant's title or pays rent or interest to him or to any person through whom he claims, this will cause the period of limitation to recommence. But when the period of limitation has once expired, no subsequent acknowledgment or payment will have this effect; the claim cannot be revived, because the title to the land is now by the operation of the statute vested in the person in possession, and can only be re-vested in the former owner by a formal conveyance from him. It is otherwise in the case of chattels.

A defendant who relies on a Statute of Limitations must raise this defence by a special plea (*q*). At the trial he must in the first place establish that the case falls within that statute; next he must show that the prescribed period has elapsed since the statute began to run against the plaintiff or his predecessor in title. It will then be open to

(*p*) See, however, *Tichborne v. Weir* (1892), 67 L. T. 735.

(*q*) Order XIX., r. 15. This rule does not apply to actions for the recovery of land: see Chap. XIX., and also Order XXI., r. 21.

the plaintiff to prove, for example, that at the time when the statute began to run there was no one representing his interest capable of bringing an action to assert or defend that interest; for the operation of the statute is suspended during a period of disability. But as soon as the right to bring an action has vested in any one capable of suing, the statute begins to run, and it will not cease to run though a subsequent disability should arise (r). If the person entitled to bring an action is, at the time when the cause of action first accrues, an infant or of unsound mind, he may bring an action on a simple contract debt within six years, on a specialty within twenty years, of his coming of age or becoming sane (s). If the defendant is, at the time when the cause of action first accrues, beyond the seas (i.e., outside the British Islands and the Channel Islands), the action may be brought against him at any time within the prescribed period after his return from beyond the seas. The fact that the plaintiff does not know of his return will not prevent the statute running in his favour. Coverture is no longer a disability except where the marriage took place, and the wife's title accrued, before 1883 (t). Concealed frauds may prevent the lapse of time from barring the plaintiff's right (u).

We will deal first with cases in which the title to real property is involved.

By the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874 (x), an action to recover any land or rent-charge (y) must be brought within twelve years after the right of action accrued either to the plaintiff or to any person through whom he claims (z). But if during that period an acknowledgment in writing of the plaintiff's title has been made to him by the person in possession of the land or rent, the plaintiff's right will be deemed to have first accrued at the time when such acknowledgment was given.

(r) *Baird v. Fortune* (1861), 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 127; *Penny v. Brice* (1865), 18 C. B. (N.S.) 393.

(s) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3, and 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, ss. 3, 5, as amended by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, ss. 9—14.

(t) Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 9.

(u) See *Gibbs v. Gould* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 59; *Thorne v. Heard*, [1895] A. C. 495; *McCallum, In re*, [1901] 1 Ch. 143.

(x) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 2.

(y) The word in the Act is "rent," but it has been construed to mean "rent-charge"; see *Shaw v. Crompton*, [1910] 2 K. B. 370.

(z) Only six years' arrears of rent can be recovered in the action: *Hickman v. Upsal* (1876), 4 Ch. D. 144.

When a plaintiff is entitled to an estate or interest in reversion or remainder, or any other future interest in land, the statute will not begin to run against him until his estate or interest vests in possession—provided the tenant for life or other person whose estate preceded the plaintiff's was then in possession or in receipt of the rents and profits of the land. In any other case the action must be brought within twelve years after the time when a right to sue accrued to such other person, or within six years after a right of action accrued to the plaintiff—whichever of these two periods is the longer (zz). Thus, if lands be settled on A for life, with remainder to B, and a trespasser turns A out of possession in 1926, A cannot recover possession after 1938, but B will have six years after the death of A in which to bring an action, or if A died prior to 1926, B can still sue up to 1938.

If at the time at which the right of any person to sue for the recovery of land shall have accrued such person shall have been under any disability, such as idiotcy, lunacy or unsoundness of mind, then such person or any person claiming through him may sue for the land at any time within six years next after the time when the person to whom such right shall first have accrued shall have ceased to be under such disability or died, whichever of those events shall have first happened (a). No time, however, is to be allowed on account of the absence beyond seas of the person entitled to sue, or of any one through whom he claims (b). And the utmost time allowed for disabilities is limited to thirty years (c).

A mortgagor will be barred at the end of twelve years from the time when the mortgagee took possession or from the last written acknowledgment by the mortgagee of the mortgagor's title (d).

Money charged upon land by mortgage, judgment, lien or otherwise will be deemed to be satisfied at the end of twelve years if no interest has been paid and no acknowledgment in writing has been made in the meantime (e). But there is no statute which limits the right of a secured creditor to enforce his lien on or mortgage of personal property (f).

The title of the Crown to any real property or chattel real (other than a franchise or liberty) will not be barred until the expiration of sixty years from the time when the Crown was last in possession, or from its last receipt of rent in respect thereof (g).

Actions for the payment of money, whether as debt or damages, are mainly regulated by the Statute of Limitations

(zz) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 2.

(a) *Ibid.*, s. 3.

(b) *Ibid.*, s. 4.

(c) *Ibid.*, s. 5.

(d) *Ibid.*, s. 7.

(e) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, s. 8; see *Jay v. Johnstone*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 189; *Taylor v. Holland*, [1902] 1 K. B., at p. 678.

(f) *London and Midland Bank v. Mitchell*, [1899] 2 Ch. 161.

(g) Crown Suits Acts, 1769 and 1861 (9 Geo. 3, c. 16; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 62), and see *Emerson v. Maddison*, [1906] A. C. 569. But see the Intestates' Estates Act, 1884, s. 2.

of 1623 (*h*). But many modern Acts have been passed dealing with particular classes of actions. We can only state here the periods of limitation which occur most frequently in actual practice:—

In any action to which the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (*i*), applies, a period of six months.

In any action brought under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (*k*), twelve months.

In actions of slander where the words are actionable *per se*, two years.

In actions for infringement of copyright, three years (*l*).

In actions for trespass to the person, assault or false imprisonment, four years.

In all other actions of tort and on simple contracts, six years.

In an action to recover a legacy, twelve years.

In an action to recover money due under any recognisance, deed, bond or other specialty, or to recover the personal estate of any intestate from his representatives or from the Crown, twenty years.

There is no limitation as to the time in which an action by the Crown must be brought for the recovery of money due to it, nor to an action against an express trustee who has been guilty of a fraudulent breach of trust, or who still retains the property which is the subject of the action or its proceeds, or has previously converted the same to his own use (*m*).

In other respects equity follows the law as to periods of limitation. Where, however, a party claims a purely equitable remedy, a delay much shorter than the period of limitation may bar his claim, for the Court insists upon prompt action. If, therefore, a party asks for specific performance or rescission of a contract or any other equitable relief after such a lapse of time as to convince the Court that he has slept upon his rights, it will refuse him

(*h*) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16.

(*i*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 61, s. 1; and see *post*, pp. 469, 470.

(*k*) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, s. 3.

(*l*) Copyright Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46), s. 10.

(*m*) Trustee Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 59), s. 8, sub-s. 1.

relief on account of his *laches*, as it is called (*n*). *Laches* is not imputable to the Crown.

It is always important to mark carefully the precise point of time from which a Statute of Limitation runs. For example, where a tort consists of the breach of an absolute right which entitles the plaintiff to sue at once, the action must be brought within the statutory period after the date of the breach. But where special damage is an essential part of the cause of action so that the plaintiff cannot sue until he has sustained such damage, the time will not begin to run against him until such special damage has accrued.

In an action for trespass to land the statute begins to run from the date of the trespass, whether the owner of the land be aware of the trespass or not. Thus, where a trespasser wrongfully worked the mines of the plaintiff, in consequence of which the plaintiff's land subsided, it was held that the statute commenced to run from the date of such wrongful working, and not from the subsidence; for the wrongful working was in itself a complete tort (*o*).

In actions of detinue the time runs from the date of the demand of the goods by the plaintiff. In actions of conversion the time runs from the date of the act on which the plaintiff relies as amounting to a conversion, even if the plaintiff be ignorant of it (*p*), unless such ignorance was owing to the fraud of the defendant in concealing the conversion, in which case the time does not run until the fraud has been discovered or might with reasonable diligence have been discovered (*q*). Where the defendant has been guilty both of wrongful detention and of conversion, the plaintiff has a right to sue in either form of action. Hence, where goods had been entrusted by the plaintiffs to the defendant for safe custody and the defendant wrongfully sold them, and the plaintiffs, more than six years afterwards, being ignorant of such sale, demanded the return of the goods, it was held that it was not too late for them to sue in detinue for the breach of the bailee's duty to deliver them up on request, although his right to sue for a conversion of the goods arose immediately the sale took place (*r*).

(*n*) See *Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd* (1874), L. R. 5 P. C. 221; *Blake v. Gale* (1886), 32 Ch. D. 571; *Knight v. Simmonds*, [1896] 2 Ch. 294.

(*o*) *Spoor v. Green* (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 99; *East Stonehouse U. D. C. v. Willoughby*, [1902] 2 K. B. 318; *Walter v. Yalden*, [1902] 2 K. B. 304. Contrast the cases cited on the next page.

(*p*) *Granger v. George* (1826), 5 B. & C. 149; *Trotter v. Maclean* (1879), 13 Ch. D. 574.

(*q*) *Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England v. N. E. Ry. Co.* (1877), 4 Ch. D. 845.

(*r*) *Wilkinson v. Verity* (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 206; *Miller v. Dell*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 468.

But where the act complained of does not give rise to an action of tort unless special damage be sustained in consequence, the time of limitation does not commence to run until that damage is in fact sustained. Thus, where the *owner* of coal mines worked them in such a way as eventually to cause the plaintiff's land to subside and his houses to be injured, it was held that the plaintiff was not barred from suing, although more than six years had elapsed since the last working, as the working itself was *prima facie* lawful and only become tortious when it caused damage to the plaintiff (*s*). So in an action of slander, where the words themselves are not actionable without proof of special damage, time will not run until such damage has accrued (*t*).

Where the tort is a continuing one time does not run until it has ceased: where it recurs from time to time, then a fresh right of action arises on each occasion. Thus, in the case of false imprisonment, the time of limitation commences to run from the last, and not from the first, day of the imprisonment (*u*).

By the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (*x*), every action brought against any person (*y*) for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any neglect or default in the execution of any Act of Parliament, duty or authority, must be commenced within six months from the date of the act, neglect or default complained of, or in the case of a continuance of injury or damage within six months next after the ceasing thereof. The Act applies to any action in either the King's Bench or the Chancery Division, whether for damages or an injunction or both (*z*). But an independent contractor, who is doing under contract, and for his own profit, work which a public authority is authorised to carry out under statutory powers, cannot claim the benefit of the statute (*a*). The provisions of the Act with regard to the time within which an action must be brought would seem not to apply

(*s*) *Backhouse v. Bonomi* (1861), 9 H. L. Cas. 503; *Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 127; cf. *West Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunncliffe*, [1908] A. C. 27.

(*t*) *Saunders v. Edwards* (1663), 1 Sid. 95.

(*u*) *Coventry v. Apsley* (1691), 2 Salk. 420; *Hardy v. Ryle* (1829), 9 B. & C. 603.

(*x*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 61, s. 1.

(*y*) This term includes a body corporate.

(*z*) *Fielding v. Morley Corporation*, [1900] A. C. 133; and see *Parker v. London County Council*, [1904] 2 K. B. 501; *The Ydun*, [1899] P. 236; *Lyles v. Corporation of Southend-on-Sea*, [1905] 2 K. B. 1; *Bradford Corp. v. Myers*, [1916] 1 A. C. 242; *Clayton v. Pontypridd U. D. C.*, [1918] 1 K. B. 219.

(*a*) *Tilling v. Dick, Kerr & Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 562.

to actions brought under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, by section 3 of which the action may be brought within twelve months (*b*).

Except in the cases with which we have already dealt (*c*), an action for breach of covenant, or on a bond or other specialty must be commenced within twenty years after the right of action accrued or has been acknowledged in writing or by payment on account of principal or interest (*d*). All actions upon simple contracts and actions for debt grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty must be brought within six years next after the cause of action arose (*e*), or within six years of any acknowledgment by the party liable, or his agent, or of any part payment (on account of principal or interest) made by the party liable or his agent. The time begins to run as soon as the cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff or any one through or under whom he claims, even though he be not aware that a complete cause of action has vested in him.

A curious anomaly results from this rule in connection with actions arising out of negligence. Where there is no contract between the parties, the plaintiff cannot sue in tort until he has suffered damage; hence the statute does not begin to run until such damage has accrued. But where the defendant negligently performs his contract with the plaintiff, an action lies at once for this breach, although no damage has yet been caused thereby. Thus, if a vendor covenants that he has a good right to convey when he has not, his covenant is broken immediately upon the execution of the conveyance, and the purchaser could sue at once. He need not wait for any disturbance of his possession; for an eviction does not constitute the breach of the covenant in question, but is consequential damage arising therefrom (*f*). It may, therefore, happen that such a purchaser never becomes aware of the defect in the title until after the period of limitation has expired; whereas, if he

(*b*) *Venn v. Tedesco*, [1926] 2 K. B. 227; distinguishing *Williams v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board*, [1905] 1 K. B. 804: cf. the decision that the period allowed by the Maritime Convention Act, 1911, does not operate in a case where the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, applies: *H.M. Tug Danube II.*, [1921] P. 183.

(*c*) *Ante*, p. 467.

(*d*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, ss. 3, 5. If an action be brought in England on a bond executed in India, the period of limitation is twenty years, although in India it would be only three years: *Alliance Bank of Simla v. Carey* (1880), 5 C. P. D. 429.

(*e*) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 9.

(*f*) *King v. Jones* (1812), 5 Taunt. 401, 426.

could sue in tort, he would still have six years within which to take proceedings.

In actions brought under a penal statute (*g*) which does not contain any express direction to the contrary (*h*), where the penalty is reserved to the King alone, the proceedings must commence within two years of the offence; where the penalty is divided between the King and a common informer (*i*), the informer must bring his action within one year, but the King can do so within two years of the offence (*k*).

If a debtor has given an acknowledgment in writing admitting his liability either to the plaintiff or to any person through whom the plaintiff claims, or has made any payment to the plaintiff or such person on account of principal or interest, time will begin to run again, so that the period of limitation is calculated from the date of the acknowledgment, admission or payment. Whether the debt be due on a record or by specialty or under a simple contract, the acknowledgment must be in writing signed by the debtor or by his agent. In the case of a simple contract debt the acknowledgment must also be made to the creditor or his duly authorised agent (*l*), and, further, it must be so worded that a promise to pay the debt is inferred from it. Similarly, where there has been a part payment of the principal or interest due on a contract, such part payment will not take the case out of the Statutes of Limitation unless an acknowledgment of liability and a promise to pay the balance can be inferred (*m*), for the payment of a sum of money does not necessarily involve an admission that further sums are payable, still less any promise to pay them.

The effect of an acknowledgment is confined to cases of debt, and has no application to actions of tort or to claims for unliquidated damages in actions of contract.

(*g*) See *ante*, pp. 308—311.

(*h*) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 36.

(*i*) Such an action is called a *qui tam* action; for a recent instance, see *Forbes v. Samuel*, [1913] 3 K. B. 706.

(*k*) 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 5; but see *Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris*, [1900] 1 Ch. 718.

(*l*) See, as to recognisance and specialty debts, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 5; as to simple contract debts, Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), s. 13.

(*m*) *Taylor v. Hollard*, [1902] 1 K. B. 676; and see the judgment in *River Steamer Co., In re* (1871), L. R. 6 Ch., at p. 828; of Blackburn, J., in *Morgan v. Rowlands* (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B., at p. 497; of Brett, L.J., in *Harlock v. Ashberry* (1882), 19 Ch. D., at p. 548; and of Cotton, L.J., in *Green v. Humphreys* (1884), 26 Ch. D., at p. 478.

“The legal effect of an acknowledgment of a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations is that of a promise to pay the old debt, and for this purpose the old debt is a consideration in law. In that sense and for that purpose the old debt may be said to be revived. It is revived as a consideration for a new promise. But the new promise, and not the old debt, is the measure of the creditor's right. If a debtor simply acknowledges an old debt, the law implies from that simple acknowledgment a promise to pay it, for which promise the old debt is a sufficient consideration. But if the debtor promises to pay the old debt when he is able, or by instalments, or in two years, or out of a particular fund, the creditor can claim nothing more than the promise gives him ” (n).

The acknowledgment must be made before the action is commenced. Where several persons are liable jointly on a contract, and one of them gives an acknowledgment without the consent or knowledge of the others, such acknowledgment only operates to take the case out of the statute against the particular person giving it (o).

In the case of a simple contract debt the acknowledgment must be made to the creditor or his agent; an acknowledgment to a stranger is not sufficient (p). In the case of a specialty debt, however, it is sufficient although made to a stranger (q). And there is another difference between a specialty and a simple contract debt in this connection. If the contract be under seal, any acknowledgment is sufficient, even though no promise to pay can be implied from it; whereas if it be a simple contract debt the acknowledgment must, as we have seen, contain an express promise to pay or be couched in such terms that a promise to pay on request is inferred from it (r).

But a conditional promise to pay will be sufficient if the plaintiff can establish by evidence that the condition has been fulfilled (s). So a mere admission that there is a debt still remaining unpaid may be a sufficient acknowledgment to bar the statute, if it is not accom-

(n) *Per* Wigram, V.-C., in *Philips v. Philips* (1844), 3 Hare, at p. 300.

(o) 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 14.

(p) *Stamford Banking Co. v. Smith*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 765.

(q) *Moodie v. Bannister* (1859), 4 Drewry, 432.

(r) *Tanner v. Smart* (1827), 6 B. & C. 603; see also *Quincey v. Sharpe* (1876), 1 Ex. D. 72. The question whether a promise to pay can be inferred must depend on the words of each particular acknowledgment: see *Langrish v. Watts*, [1903] 1 K. B. 636; *Cocper v. Kendall*, [1909] 1 K. B. 405; *Brown v. Mackenzie* (1913), 29 T. L. R. 310; *Spencer v. Hemmerde*, [1922] A. C. 507, at pp. 519–536, where the history of and authorities on this subject are reviewed.

(s) *Chasemore v. Turner* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 500; *Curwen v. Milburn* (1889), 42 Ch. D. 424.

panied by words which are inconsistent with an implied promise to pay; but not if the admission be guarded by words which profess inability to pay, or in any other way prevent such an implication from arising (t). It is not sufficient that the document contains a promise by the defendant to pay when he is able, or by bill, or a mere expectation that he will pay at some future time (u).

It was at common law a bar to any action if the defendant could show that it was not commenced within the prescribed period of limitation, even though the plaintiff was induced to delay commencing proceedings sooner by the defendant's conduct. In some cases of fraud, however, equity would in former days interfere to prevent the party defrauded from being deprived of his rights by a strict application of the statute. Now in every Division of the High Court, if in answer to the plea of a statute of limitation the plaintiff can prove that the existence of his cause of action was concealed from him by the fraud of the defendant, and that he could not by reasonable diligence have discovered such fraud, he will not be barred until the statutory period has run from the discovery of such fraud (x).

Where the plaintiff brought an action to recover by way of damages money lost by the fraudulent representations of the defendant, and the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, the reply of the plaintiff that he did not discover, and had not reasonable means of discovering, the fraud within six years before action, owing to the fact that it had been fraudulently concealed from him by the defendant, was held good (y). There is an exception to one portion of this rule in the case of partners. As between partners the statute will not begin to run until the fraud has been actually discovered. The mere fact that the fraud might have been discovered at an earlier date if reasonable diligence had been used will make no difference, for a partner is entitled to rely on the good faith of his co-partners (z).

(t) See the judgment of Lord Tenterden, C.J., in *Tanner v. Smart* (1827), 6 B. & C., at p. 609.

(u) See, for instance, *Spong v. Wright* (1842), 9 M. & W. 629.

(x) *Gibbs v. Gould* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 59, overruling *Imperial Gas Light Co. v. London Gas Light Co.* (1854), 10 Exch. 39; and see *Lawrance v. Lord Norroys* (1890), 15 App. Cas. 210; *Willis v. Earl Howe*, [1893] 2 Ch. 545; *Betjemann v. Betjemann*, [1895] 2 Ch. 474.

(y) *Gibbs v. Gould* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 59.

(z) *Betjemann v. Betjemann*, [1895] 2 Ch. 474.

Parties.

Next it must be determined what persons shall be made plaintiffs and what persons shall be made defendants on the writ. In the selection of "parties," as they are called, there is a twofold chance of making a mistake: the plaintiff may omit parties whose presence is essential, or he may add parties whose presence is improper. A mistake of either kind will certainly hamper him in the subsequent proceedings in the action, and will probably also cause him expense in rectifying the error. He should, therefore, carefully consider whom he must join, and whom he may join or not as he pleases; for some parties may be necessary, others unnecessary, while some he may add or not as he thinks fit. The Rules of the Supreme Court, however, contain provisions which prevent any error as to parties from being necessarily fatal to the ultimate success of the action.

For example, it is expressly provided that no action "shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every cause or matter deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it" (a). And "where an action has been commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, or where it is doubtful whether it has been commenced in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court or a Judge may, if satisfied that it has been so commenced through a *bona fide* mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as may be just" (b).

In actions founded on contract, the law relating to parties depends largely on whether the contract sued on is joint, or several, or joint and several (c). If A makes a contract with several persons jointly and breaks it, all of them who are alive and solvent must join as co-plaintiffs; if they break it, all of them who are alive and solvent must be joined as co-defendants. "A joint debtor has a right to demand, if he pleases, that he shall be sued at one and

(a) Order XVI., r. 11.

(b) *Ibid.*, r. 2.

(c) As to this distinction, see *ante*, p. 8.

the same time with all his co-debtors" (d). The personal representatives of a deceased joint creditor should not be joined as plaintiffs, nor should the representatives of a deceased joint debtor be joined as defendants; the right to sue and the liability on the contract vest in the survivors, and therefore only the survivors should be made parties. But if all the persons originally entitled to sue on such a joint contract be dead, the personal representatives of the last surviving creditor must sue; if all the persons originally liable on such a contract be dead, the personal representatives of the last surviving debtor must be sued.

If, however, the contract made by two or more persons be several as well as joint, the plaintiff may sue one or more or all of them in the same action. If he joins them all, he can in the same action claim against all of them jointly, and also against each of them severally (e). If he does not join them all, then he can only rely on the several liability of those whom he has chosen to sue. If the contract be several and not joint, the plaintiff may, at his option, join as parties to the same action all or any of the persons liable thereon; and if any of the persons originally liable on that contract be dead, he may also, if he chooses, add the executors or administrators of such deceased persons.

In an action for a wrong arising out of a contract, the same persons must be joined as parties as are necessary in actions for breach of contract. But in actions of pure tort (*i.e.*, for wrongs independent of any contract) much greater liberty is allowed as to the joinder of both plaintiffs and defendants. Any person injured by a tort may sue alone, though others were injured by the same act, but joint owners or joint occupiers of any land prejudicially affected by any wrongful act, or the joint owners of any chattel which the defendant has taken, destroyed or injured, whether by negligence or design, should all be joined as co-plaintiffs in the action. But in all cases of actions for

(d) *Per Bowen, L.J., in Hodgson, Beckett v. Ramsdale, In re* (1885), 31 Ch. D., at p. 188.

(e) Order XVI., r. 6.

the prevention of waste or otherwise for the protection of property one person may sue on behalf of himself and all persons having the same interest (*f*).

If several persons are jointly concerned in the commission of a tort, the plaintiff is not obliged to join them all as defendants; he may, if he prefers, sue only one or two. The liability of the others will be no defence for those sued, and will not mitigate the damages recoverable; for all persons concerned in a common wrongful act are jointly and severally liable for all damage caused by it. But a judgment against these is a bar to any subsequent action for the same tort against any one else who was jointly liable with them, even though the judgment in the first action has not been satisfied (*g*).

Thus a person who has been libelled in a newspaper may join as defendants in the same action the proprietor, the editor, the printer, and the publisher, or any one of them as he thinks fit; for all are jointly and severally liable for the publication and its consequences. If he thinks fit to sue some only of those who are liable to him and obtains judgment against these, the others will escape liability; nor can those against whom he has recovered judgment claim contribution from the rest (*h*). "In order to constitute joint tortfeasance in the strict sense of the word . . . there must be a concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincidence of separate acts which by their conjoined effect cause damage" (*i*).

Joinder of Causes of Action.

A plaintiff who has more than one cause of action is not always bound to issue a separate writ for each. In some instances he may join two or more causes of action in the same proceeding. There are four distinct cases to be considered:—

1. It may happen that a plaintiff has more than one cause of action against the same defendant or defendants. In such a case he may join them all in the same action (*k*).

(*f*) Order XVI., r. 37.

(*g*) *Brinsmead v. Harrison* (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 547; *Goldrei v. Sinclair*, [1918] 1 K. B. 180; *The Koursk*, [1924] P. 140.

(*h*) See Vol. 1, p. 636.

(*i*) *Per Sargant, L.J.*, in *The Koursk*, [1924] P., at pp. 159–160.

(*k*) To this general rule there are three exceptions or *quasi*-exceptions, which will be found in rules 2, 3, and 5 of Order XVIII.; and see *post*, pp. 593, 594.

And in most cases he ought to do so; for if he brings two actions unnecessarily where one would have sufficed, he will probably have to pay the costs of one action. Thus a landlord should avail himself of all his causes of action against his tenant in the same action; he should set out every covenant that there is any ground for believing broken, and allege every available breach of such covenant. But if the defendant can convince a Master that the causes of action which the plaintiff has joined cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, the Master may order one or more of them to be excluded.

2. But there is not the same liberty when two or more different plaintiffs wish to join on one writ distinct and separate causes of action against the same defendant or defendants. This can only be done in three cases:—

(a) “ Claims by plaintiffs jointly may be joined with claims by them, or any of them separately against the same defendant ” (l).

(b) Claims by husband and wife may be joined with claims by either of them separately (m).

(c) And, generally, unconnected persons who have each a distinct and separate cause of action against the same defendant may join in one writ whenever their separate causes of action arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and involve any common question of law or fact, but in no other case (n).

And even in these three cases, if any defendant can show that the joinder of such causes of action may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the Master may order separate trials, or make such other order as may be expedient.

Persons who have separate interests in the same premises may join as co-plaintiffs in an action in respect of any injury done to those premises. Thus, the owner and the occupier of a house may sue together for an injunction to restrain a nuisance to that house (o). Moreover, the owners and occupiers of two or more adjoining houses may all join in one action to restrain, or to recover damages for, any

(l) Order XVIII., r. 6.

(m) *Ibid.*, r. 4.

(n) Order XVI., r. 1.

(o) *Viscount Gort v. Rowney* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 625.

nuisance or other injury which affects their respective properties, though to different extents, provided such nuisance or injury is caused by the same acts of the same person (*p*).

If a committee or any other defined body of persons be labelled or slandered collectively as a body, they may all join in one action (*q*). But if A defames B on one occasion, and C on another, B and C cannot join as co-plaintiffs in one action against A, even though the charges be "historically" connected, for each slander is a separate "transaction" (*r*).

3. Where two or more defendants are jointly liable to the same plaintiff, whether in contract or in tort, he may, as we have seen (*s*), join them all in one action. Where, in addition to a claim against two or more defendants jointly, he has separate claims against one or more of them individually, it is doubtful whether he can join such separate claims with the joint one. The cases on the point are somewhat difficult to reconcile (*t*). But where a plaintiff has no claim against A and B jointly, but seeks to recover judgment against A on one cause of action, and at the same time to recover judgment against B on a separate and distinct cause of action, he clearly cannot join these two causes of action on one writ.

If, however, a plaintiff has but one cause of action, which entitles him to judgment against either A or B but not against both, he may join A and B on the same writ as defendants in the alternative, and so determine the question which of them is liable to him (*u*). He will then in all probability have to pay the costs of the defendant who is held not liable, though he will be allowed to recover them back again from the defendant who is liable if the Judge is satisfied that it was a reasonable and proper course for him to join both defendants in the action (*x*).

(*p*) *House Property Co. v. Horse Nail Co.* (1885), 29 Ch. D. 190.

(*q*) *Booth v. Briscoe* (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 496.

(*r*) *Sandes v. Wildsmith*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 771.

(*s*) *Ante*, p. 474.

(*t*) *Pope v. Hawtrey* (1901), 85 L. T. 263; *Bullock v. L. G. O. Co.*, [1907] 1 K. B. 264, followed in *Compania Sansinena v. Houlder*, [1910] 2 K. B. 354; *Thomas v. Moore*, [1918] 1 K. B. 555; *Beck, In re* (1918), 87 L. J. Ch. 335; 118 L. T. 629. But claims against husband and wife may be joined with claims against either of them separately: Order XVIII., r. 4.^a

(*u*) Order XVI., rr. 6, 7.

(*x*) *Besterman v. British Motor Cab Co.*, [1914] 3 K. B. 181.

Thus, where the plaintiff's shop stood between the parcel office of the Great Western Railway Company and the parcel office of the Midland Railway Company, and the first company obstructed the access to his premises on the north side, the second on the south, and between them seriously injured his business, it was held that these were two separate torts committed by two independent tortfeasors, and gave rise to two distinct causes of action which could not be joined on one writ (*y*). But a plaintiff may join in one action a claim against a principal on a contract made by his alleged agent and an alternative claim against the alleged agent for contracting without authority; for in neither event could he recover against them both (*z*).

4. Separate causes of action with different plaintiffs and also different defendants can never be joined on the same writ. If A has a cause of action against X, and B has a wholly distinct and independent cause of action against Y, A and B cannot issue one writ against X and Y, even though their separate actions arise out of the same transaction and involve similar questions of law or fact. But if there be many such actions the parties may agree or a Master will sometimes make an order that one be taken as "a test action," and then the others will be stayed till that one is tried, and will follow its event.

(*y*) *Sadler v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, [1896] A. C. 450; and see *Gower v. Couldridge*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 348.

(*z*) *Honduras Ry. Co. v. Lefevre* (1877), 2 Ex. D. 301; *Smith v. Buskell* (1919), 35 T. L. R. 525. And see Odgers on Pleading and Practice (9th ed.), pp. 25—37, where the whole subject of joinder of causes of action is discussed.

CHAPTER XI.

ORDINARY REMEDIES.

LET us assume that the intending plaintiff has now satisfied himself that he has a good cause of action which it not barred by any Statute of Limitation, and that he has decided whom he will make parties, and what causes of action he will join on his writ. He must next proceed to select the Court in which he will sue and to determine what relief he will ask that Court to afford him.

Choice of Court.

We have already dealt with the jurisdiction of our different civil Courts. In many cases the action might be brought in more than one Court; and in such cases the plaintiff should sue in an inferior Court rather than in a superior Court, unless there is some good reason for his preferring the latter. Various Acts of Parliament contain provisions which mulct in costs a plaintiff who sues in a superior Court when he might with more propriety have brought his action in an inferior Court.

For example, by section 11 of the County Courts Act, 1919 (*a*), if an action, founded on contract, be brought in the High Court of Justice and the plaintiff recovers less than £40, he will be entitled to no costs whatever; if he recovers £40 or more, but less than £100, he will be entitled to County Court costs only; if he recovers exactly £100, he will be entitled to County Court costs only (*b*)—

- (i) unless a Judge of the High Court certifies that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in that Court, or makes a special order as to costs (*c*); or

(*a*) 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 73.

(*b*) *Millington v. Harwood*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 166.

(*c*) 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 73, s. 11.

- (ii) unless within twenty-eight days after service of the writ, or such further time as may be allowed, the plaintiff obtains an order, under Order XIV., empowering him to enter judgment for £20 or more (*d*). The Court has power to extend the time.

If the action was founded on tort, and the plaintiff recovers less than £10, he will be entitled to no costs whatever; if he recovers £10 or more, but less than £50, he will be entitled to County Court costs only; unless a Judge of the High Court certifies that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in that Court, or makes a special order as to costs.

There are similar provisions with reference to other inferior civil Courts, such as the Mayor's Court, London, the Liverpool Court of Passage, &c.

In former days the choice of a Court depended largely upon the relief which the plaintiff desired to obtain by his action. Many remedies were peculiar to certain Courts and could not be obtained in others. The Courts of common law, as a rule, could only give a creditor judgment for a debt due to him, or compensate an injured person by awarding him damages, or ordering his goods or land to be restored to him. Courts of equity, on the other hand, even where recognising and enforcing exactly the same primary rights and liabilities as the common law Courts, applied different remedies to protect and enforce them. Where the common law could only award damages for a wrong when committed, equity could prevent its commission by injunction. Where law could only give damages for a breach of contract, equity could enforce its specific performance. Where law could give damages for fraud or breach of faith, equity could insist upon the defendant delivering an account of all moneys which he had thus wrongfully acquired, or declare him to be trustee for the injured party of all the property affected by such fraud or breach of trust. But now in most, if not all, of our civil Courts, superior or inferior, every kind of relief, legal or equitable, can be claimed and given; and even where it is not claimed, yet if the right to it appear incidentally in

(*d*) Administration of Justice Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 28), s. 20.

the course of the proceedings, the appropriate relief may be granted (*e*).

Henceforward in this Chapter, and indeed throughout the next ten Chapters, we will assume that the plaintiff has commenced his action in some Division of the High Court of Justice. The procedure in the County Court is dealt with in the last Chapter of this Book (*f*).

Relief.

The same cause of action may entitle a plaintiff to relief of different kinds. He should therefore state, both on his writ and in his Statement of Claim (*g*), the precise relief which he desires to obtain in the action. He may ask both in the Chancery and the King's Bench Divisions of the High Court for any of the following kinds of relief or for two or more of them, either together or in the alternative :—

- (i) Payment of a debt with or without interest.
- (ii) Damages.
- (iii) Possession of land.
- (iv) Recovery of a chattel.
- (v) *A mandamus*...
- (vi) An injunction.
- (vii) A declaration of right or title.
- (viii) The appointment of a receiver.
- (ix) An account.
- (x) Specific performance of a contract (*h*).

The first five of the above kinds of relief are legal remedies; the rest are in their origin equitable. There are many other remedies peculiar to special kinds of action, *e.g.*, actions between mortgagor and mortgagee, *cestuis que trustent* and trustees, &c.

(*e*) See section 36 of the Judicature Act, 1925.

(*f*) *Post*, pp. 704—717.

(*g*) A statement of claim supersedes the writ; hence if some special form of relief be claimed on the writ and not in the statement of claim, it will be deemed to have been abandoned: *Cargill v. Bower* (1878), 10 Ch. D., at p. 508.

(*h*) But note that claims for specific performance of contracts between vendors and purchasers of real estates, including contracts for leases, are assigned to the Chancery Division by section 56 of the Judicature Act, 1925, and therefore should not be brought in the King's Bench Division.

I.—LEGAL REMEDIES.

1. *Payment of a Debt with or without Interest.*

Most of the actions commenced in our Courts are brought to recover debts, and these are usually undefended. In actions for debt, it is necessary to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled also to claim interest. If it has been expressly agreed that interest at a certain rate shall be paid from a date named, then interest at that rate can be recovered. So, if the course of dealing between the parties be such that it may be reasonably inferred that the debtor at the date of the contract agreed to pay interest (i).

An agreement to pay interest can be implied from the acts of the debtor, as where a tradesman has sent in bills from time to time in which interest is charged, and the debtor has paid such bills in full without objection (k). But where goods are sold and delivered, and no mention of interest is made at the time of the contract, the vendor cannot entitle himself to interest by subsequently giving the purchaser notice that, if he does not pay within a specified time, interest will be charged, though such a notice may be useful as a demand in writing under section 28 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (l).

Claims for money lent with interest at an unusual or exorbitant rate are, of course, within the Money-lenders Acts, 1900 and 1911 (m).

As a rule, however, where there is no agreement, express or implied, to pay interest, no interest can be recovered (n). But to this rule there are exceptions. On any bill of exchange, promissory note, cheque or any negotiable instrument to which the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, applies, interest is payable till payment or judgment at the rate of 5 per cent. if no other rate be stated. Interest at a fair percentage will also be allowed on a money bond (o). If a surety be compelled to pay a debt which he has guaran-

(i) *De Havilland v. Bowerbank* (1807), 1 Camp. 50; *L. C. & D. Ry. Co. v. S. E. Ry. Co.*, [1893] A. C. 429.

(k) *Marquis of Anglesey, In re*, [1901] 2 Ch. 548.

(l) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.

(m) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51; 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 38; see *ante*, pp. 61, 77, 78.

(n) *Page v. Newman* (1829), 9 B. & C. 378, followed in *L. C. & D. Ry. Co. v. S. E. Ry. Co.*, *supra*.

(o) *Dixon, In re*, [1900] 2 Ch. 561.

teed, he can recover the amount paid from the principal debtor with interest thereon at a reasonable rate (*p*). A judgment carries interest at 4 per cent. both on debt and costs (*q*).

In no other circumstances can interest be recovered unless the case falls under the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (*qq*), which enables a jury, "if they shall think fit," to award interest as damages "upon all debts or sums certain payable at a certain time or otherwise . . . if such debts or sums be payable by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time, or, if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment"; and also upon the money recoverable under any policy of assurance made after the passing of the Act (*r*). A Judge who is trying a case without a jury has the same power (*s*); and so has an official referee or any other officer of the Court who is directed by a Judge to assess damages. It will be observed that no notice is required where the money is made payable at some certain time under some written instrument, but that in all other instances the Act will not apply unless the prescribed notice is given. As interest under the Act is given by way of damages, a claim under the Act cannot be added to a special indorsement.

In addition to the above it must not be forgotten that if any money has been obtained from the plaintiff by fraud or force, the jury, in assessing the unliquidated damages which the defendant must pay, may allow the plaintiff such amount as they think fit as damages for being deprived of such money; but not where such money has been received by him through an innocent mistake (*t*). Strictly speaking, however, such damages are not interest at all.

(*p*) *Petre v. Duncombe* (1851), 20 L. J. Q. B. 242.

(*q*) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 17; *Ashworth v. English Card Clothing Co.* (No. 2), [1901] 1 Ch. 704. (*qq*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.

(*r*) Sections 28, 29.

(*s*) See *L. C. & D. Ry. Co. v. S. E. Ry. Co.*, [1892] 1 Ch., at p. 146; *Macbeth v. Maritime Insurance Co.* (1908), 24 T. L. R. 559.

(*t*) *Johnson v. R.*, [1904] A. C. 817.

2. *Damages.*

This form of relief is more frequently claimed than any other, with the exception of payment of a debt. The rules which govern the assessment of damages and determine the "measure of damages," as it is called, are discussed in a later Chapter (*u*); the reader will find there some account of the different kinds of damages recoverable and the rules relating to "remoteness of damage."

In an action for unliquidated damages, it is not necessary to claim any specific figure as the amount of damages claimed. But where the plaintiff's claim is liquidated and can be ascertained exactly, he should state the precise amount to which he claims to be entitled. Where he cannot be exact, it is wiser to claim too much rather than too little; for if the jury find a verdict for a larger amount than the plaintiff claimed, that amount cannot be recovered without amending the record. The Judge, however, has power to make such an amendment, if he thinks fit (*x*). Too large a claim, however, may make an action look ridiculous.

An inquiry as to damages is often directed by the Court where there is no jury; it is taken by a Master or by some person designated in the order.

3. *Possession of Land.*

A plaintiff may also claim possession of land to which he is entitled and of which the defendant is wrongfully in possession. He must state on his writ details sufficient to clearly identify the land in question. If he succeeds in the action, the judgment will be "that the plaintiff do recover possession of the land" so described; and the plaintiff will be entitled at once to a writ of possession, bidding the sheriff to enter thereon and without delay to "cause the plaintiff to have possession of the said land and premises with the appurtenances" (*y*).

4. *Recovery of a Chattel.*

Before the Judicature Act, 1873 (*z*), when a person brought an action for the return of any chattel which had

(*u*) See *post*, Chap. XXI.

(*x*) Order XXVIII., r. 1.

(*y*) As to actions for recovery of land, see also *post*, p. 590.

(*z*) Repealed by the Judicature Act, 1925.

been wrongfully taken out of his possession, the relief for which he asked and the judgment which he obtained were always in the alternative . . . "for the recovery of the thing, or £——, its value, and for damages for its detention." The defendant was thus permitted to retain the thing if he paid the amount at which its value was assessed by the jury. This was a hardship on a plaintiff who attached a special value to the chattel wrongfully removed and who deemed damages an inadequate compensation for its loss. But now the option has been taken from the defendant and given to the plaintiff. "Where it is sought to enforce a judgment or order for the recovery of any property other than land or money by writ of delivery, the Court or a Judge may, upon the application of the plaintiff, order that execution shall issue for the delivery of the property, without giving the defendant the option of retaining the property upon paying the value assessed, if any, and that if the property cannot be found, and unless the Court or a Judge shall otherwise order, the sheriff shall distrain the defendant by all his lands and chattels in the sheriff's bailiwick, till the defendant deliver the property; or at the option of the plaintiff, that the sheriff cause to be made of the defendant's goods the assessed value, if any, of the property" (a). If the defendant disobeys an order made in this form and still refuses to return the chattel, he may be attached and sent to prison (b).

Again, in an action for breach of a contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods, the Court may on the application of the plaintiff direct that the contract be performed specifically without giving the defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages (c).

5. *A Mandamus.*

A *mandamus* is a peremptory order by the Court bidding the defendant to do that which it is clearly his duty to do.

(a) Order XLVIII., r. 1. A bailiwick is the county or other area over which a sheriff exercises jurisdiction. (b) *Hymas v. Ogden*, [1905] 1 K. B. 246.

(c) Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 7), s. 52, Vol. 1, p. 158. This section re-enacts section 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97).

The plaintiff must be personally interested in the fulfilment of such duty (*d*). He must indorse his writ with a claim in the following form:—"The plaintiff's claim is for a *mandamus* commanding the defendant to do (*here specify the duty which the plaintiff desires to have performed*)" (*e*). Other relief, such as damages or an injunction, may be claimed on the same writ (*f*). The action proceeds in the same way as an ordinary action for tort; and either by interlocutory order or in the final judgment in the action, the Judge may command the defendant, either forthwith or on the expiration of such time and upon such terms as may appear to him to be just, to perform the duty in question. Such order will have the same effect as a writ of *mandamus* formerly had (*g*). The Judge may subsequently extend the time for the performance of the duty (*h*).

The writ of *mandamus* to which reference has just been made is one of the "extraordinary remedies" with which we shall deal in the next chapter. It differs from the claim for a *mandamus* indorsed on a writ in two important particulars:—

- (i) No writ of *mandamus* can now be issued in an action (*g*).
- (ii) An action for *mandamus* may sometimes lie when the old writ of *mandamus* would not have issued (*i*). "A *mandamus* may be granted in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to be just or convenient that such order should be made" (*k*). The duty sought to be thus enforced need not therefore be of a strictly legal nature (*l*), as is still required in the case of the writ of *mandamus*.

An action for a *mandamus* may lie where no actual damage has been sustained. It is enough if the plaintiff either has been or may be damaged by the defendant's neglect of his duty (*m*). But even in an action a *mandamus* will not be granted to compel the specific performance of a private or personal contract—for instance, a *mandamus* cannot be issued to enforce a promise to marry (*n*).

(*d*) Order LIII., r. 1. The duty, moreover, must be of at least a quasi-public character: *Benson v. Paull*, 6 E. & B. 273.

(*e*) R. S. C., Appendix A., Part III., s. 4.

(*f*) See *Fotherby v. Metropolitan Ry. Co.* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P., at p. 195; *Davies v. Gas Light and Coke Co.*, [1909] 1 Ch. 708.

(*g*) Order LIII., r. 4. See *post*, p. 507.

(*h*) Order LIII., r. 3.

(*i*) See the judgment of Lord Campbell, C.J., in *Norris v. Irish Land Co.* (1857), 8 E. & B. at p. 525.

(*k*) Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), s. 25, sub-s. 8.

(*l*) *Davies v. Gas Light and Coke Co.*, [1909] 1 Ch. 248, 708.

(*m*) See *Fotherby v. Metropolitan Ry. Co.* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P. at p. 198.

(*n*) *Benson v. Paull* (1856), 6 E. & B. 273; approved in *Norris v. Irish Land Co.*, *supra*.

II.—EQUITABLE REMEDIES.

There are many different kinds of equitable relief. Some are appropriate only to a special class of persons or actions. The reader will find such special proceedings described in other books; it is only possible to deal here very briefly with those kinds of equitable relief which are general in their application and which therefore frequently occur.

6. *An Injunction.*

An injunction is a peremptory order of the Court or a Judge forbidding the committal, continuance or repetition of any tort or breach of contract, either generally or for a limited period. Injunctions for actionable wrongs are not granted where damages are the proper remedy (o). There are, however, many cases in which damages do not afford the party injured sufficient compensation (p); he therefore applies to the Court to prevent the threatened damage, or, if any damage has already occurred, to prevent any further damage being done. In many cases a plaintiff is entitled to both damages and an injunction—to damages, that is, for the loss or injury already sustained, and to an injunction to prevent any further loss or damage. But an injunction will not be granted unless there is good reason to apprehend that the defendant is about to commit an unlawful act which will result in damage irreparable in money. If he has already committed one, it must be alleged and proved that he threatens and intends to repeat or continue it, unless such an intention is already apparent from the nature of the case or from other facts proved or admitted (q).

Injunctions are either interlocutory or perpetual; they may also be divided into restrictive and mandatory. Where the rights of the parties are still undecided, an injunction is frequently issued to protect the property and interests of

(o) *London & Blackwall Ry. Co. v. Cross* (1885), 31 Ch. D. at p. 369.

(p) See the judgment of Lord Cairns, L.C., in *Doherty v. Allman* (1878), 3 App. Cas. at pp. 716–723; followed in *McEacharn v. Colton*, [1902] A. C. 104.

(q) See *Stannard v. St. Giles, Camberwell* (1882), 20 Ch. D. at p. 195.

the parties pending litigation. This is called an interim or interlocutory injunction, and it remains in force only till the trial of the action. A perpetual injunction is granted at the trial as a part of the judgment of the Court. A restrictive injunction commands the defendant not to do something; a mandatory injunction, which is much rarer, commands him in direct terms (r) to do something, *e.g.*, to pull down a wall, which he has built, so as to obstruct ancient lights and be a nuisance to the plaintiff's premises (s). A mandatory injunction may either be interlocutory or perpetual; but it is granted on an interlocutory application only in clear cases where there is urgency. The order may be made where there has been a breach of faith, contempt of Court, or some other misconduct on the part of the defendant: "if, for instance, the injury cannot fairly be compensated by money; if the defendant has acted in a high-handed manner; if he has endeavoured to steal a march upon the plaintiff, or to evade the jurisdiction of the Court" (t). Generally, a mandatory injunction will be granted only when the payment of damages would be clearly inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the injury which will be done him if the state of things wrongfully created by the defendant be allowed to continue.

The Court has power to grant an injunction wherever it appears "just or convenient that such an order should be made" (u). But the words "'just and convenient' did not mean that the Court was to grant an injunction simply because the Court thought it convenient: it meant that the Court should grant an injunction for the protection of rights or for the prevention of injury according to legal principles; but the moment you find that there is a legal principle, that a man is about to suffer a serious injury, and that there is no pretence for inflicting that injury upon him, it appears to me that the Court ought to interfere" (x).

An injunction will not, as a rule, be granted where the

(r) *Jackson v. Normanby Brick Co.*, [1899] 1 Ch. 438.

(s) *Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores*, [1904] A. C. 179.

(t) *Per* Lord Macnaghten, [1904] A. C. at p. 193.

(u) Judicature Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 49), s. 45.

(x) *Per* Jessel, M.R., in *Aslatt v. Southampton Corporation* (1880), 16 Ch. D. at p. 148.

injury to the plaintiff's right is trifling, where the payment of damages is an adequate compensation, or where, in the special circumstances, it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction (y). Nevertheless, the fact that, if granted, it will cause great inconvenience or distress is no ground for not granting it—not even if obedience to the order of the Court will involve “stopping the defendant's works and throwing out of employment a large number of workmen” (z). The defendant should not have put himself in such a position that such a result will follow. That the defendant was actuated by a good motive in doing that which it is now sought to restrain him from doing is no answer to the application (a).

A person who applies for an injunction only need not show that he has already sustained any damage; for the object of an injunction is to anticipate and prevent damage being sustained. Thus the purchaser of a plot of land can obtain an injunction to restrain his vendor from doing anything on an adjoining plot of land still owned by the vendor, which would be a breach of his obligation not to derogate from his own grant, although the purchaser has not yet suffered any actual damage (b). But where special damage is an essential part of the cause of action, an injunction will not be granted until some special damage, however small, has been sustained; for without such special damage there is no ground of action. “Damages and injunction are merely two different forms of remedy against the same wrong, and the facts which must be proved in order to entitle a plaintiff to the first of these remedies are equally necessary in the case of the second” (c).

(y) See the judgment of Smith, L.J., in *Shelfer v. City of London Electric Light Co.*, [1895] 1 Ch. at pp. 319 *et seq.*, and *Wood v. Conway Corp.*, [1914] 2 Ch. 47.

(z) *Wilts and Berks Canal Navigation Co. v. Swindon Waterworks Co.* (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 451; (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 697.

(a) *Att.-Gen. v. Birmingham Corporation* (1858), 4 Kay & J. 528.

(b) *Siddons v. Short* (1877), 2 C. P. D. 572; but the Court will as a rule refuse to grant an injunction to restrain what is known as “ameliorating waste”: *Doherty v. Allman* (1878), 3 App. Cas. 709, followed in *McEacharn v. Colton*, [1902] A. C. 104.

(c) *Per Lord Watson in White v. Mellin*, [1895] A. C. at p. 167; and see *Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Wright* (1900), 18 R. P. C. 95, and *Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Maison Talbot* (1903), 20 T. L. R. 88, 579.

An order for an injunction " may be made either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the Court may think just " (d). Such terms will be imposed whenever it is sought to restrain the defendant from doing that which he *prima facie* has a legal right to do. Thus, where there was a dispute as to the construction of a lease, the Court refused to restrain a landlord from distraining unless the tenant paid all the rent in arrear into Court within a fortnight (e).

An injunction is often granted to prevent any threatened waste, or trespass to land. This can be done whether the person against whom such injunction is sought is or is not in possession under any claim or title, or (if out of possession) does or does not claim a right to do the act sought to be restrained under any colour of title: and whether the estates claimed by both or by either of the parties are legal or equitable (d). Again, a mortgagor who is in receipt of the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises has a sufficient interest to enable him to maintain an action for an injunction to restrain any injury being done to the mortgaged property without joining the mortgagee as a co-plaintiff (f). And an injunction may be granted to restrain a defendant from publishing of the plaintiff to the injury of his trade matter which a jury has found to be libellous (g). But an interim injunction is now very seldom granted in an action either of libel or slander (h).

A few specimens of a claim for an injunction are subjoined:—

Infringement of a Patent.

The plaintiff claims an injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents, from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale or in any manner dealing with any articles constructed in infringement of the said letters patent.

Libel.

And the plaintiff claims:—

1. Damages.
2. An injunction to restrain the defendant and his agents from further circulating, distributing or otherwise publishing the said leaflet, or any other reprint of the said speech, or any similar libels affecting the plaintiff in his said profession and office.

Trespass to Land.

The plaintiff's claim is for £— damages for the defendants' wrongfully entering the plaintiff's meadow, known as The Long Close, in the parish of Ashill in the county of Somerset; and for an injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, workmen and agents, from entering on the plaintiff's said meadow, or from destroying or otherwise injuring the hedge or fence now on the east side thereof, or from erecting or causing to be erected a wooden or other fence on the said east side thereof, or from in any way interfering with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the said meadow.

(d) Judicature Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 49), s. 45.

(e) *Shaw v. Earl of Jersey* (1879), 4 C. P. D. 120.

(f) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 45; *Fairclough v. Marshall* (1878), 4 Ex. D. 37.

(g) *Saxby v. Easterbrook* (1878), 3 C. P. D. 339; *Hill v. Hart Davies* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 798; *Quartz Hill, &c., Co. v. Beall* (1882), 20 Ch. D. 501; see also *Liverpool Household Stores Association v. Smith* (1887), 37 Ch. D. 170.

(h) *Bonnard v. Perryman*, [1891] 2 Ch. 269.

*Ancient Lights.**(Mandatory Injunction.)*

The plaintiff claims :—

1. An order that the defendant forthwith pull down and remove all buildings raised by him above the level of the old houses formerly on the site thereof, and all buildings on the site of the said former houses erected in such manner as to darken or obstruct any of the ancient lights and windows of, and be a nuisance to, the house and premises now in the occupation of the plaintiff.

2. That the defendant be perpetually restrained from erecting any buildings on the site of the said former houses, in such manner as to darken or obstruct any of the plaintiff's said ancient lights and windows, or to be a nuisance to the plaintiff's said house and premises.

It may be well to add a few words as to the procedure by which an interlocutory injunction is obtained. The application in the King's Bench Division is made to a Judge at chambers (i), in the Chancery Division by a motion before a Judge in Court. It must be supported by an affidavit as to the facts. It can be made at any stage of the action. In urgent cases leave will be given to serve with the writ a summons or a notice of motion for an interim injunction. In very urgent cases if strong grounds be shown the Judge will sometimes grant an interim injunction *ex parte* (i.e., in the absence of the other side) in the first instance; but such an injunction only remains in force till the persons affected by it can be heard.

On an application for an interim injunction the Court must be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing, and that on the facts there is a probability that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The matter must be urgent; the defendant's proceedings must threaten immediate injury. All the facts must be laid before the Court, and the plaintiff must undertake to pay, in the event of the interim injunction not being made perpetual, any damages which the defendant can prove that he has suffered in consequence of its having been granted. The order for injunction recites such undertaking.

Where an injunction requires the defendant to do some act within a limited time from its service upon him, it must be served on him personally, and, if there is any intention of proceeding against him for contempt of Court in case of his disobeying the order, it must be indorsed with the words:—

"If you, the within-named A B, neglect to obey this judgment [or order] by the time therein limited, you will be liable to process of execution for the purpose of compelling you to obey the same judgment [or order]" (k).

The affidavit of service must state that the copy served was so indorsed. This indorsement is not necessary on mere prohibitive orders.

A defendant also can in a proper case obtain an interlocutory injunction. The relief sought must arise in respect of the plaintiff's

(i) Order LIV., r. 12 (e); *ante*, p. 361.

(k) Order XLI., r. 5.

action or be incident to the plaintiff's cause of action. It may be granted even before a counterclaim is delivered if this be founded upon the same contract as that on which the plaintiff sues. Thus in *Collison v. Warren* (l) the defendant gave notice of motion for an injunction seven days after the writ was issued, and on that motion obtained an order restraining the plaintiff from interfering with or disturbing the defendant in his possession and occupation of a house.

If either party disobeys an injunction, whether interim, perpetual or mandatory, while it is still in force, he is liable to be attached and sent to prison (m).

7. Declaration of Right or Title.

The Court may now in any action make a declaration as to the rights or title of the parties before it, which will bind those parties and all deriving title under them. A claim for such a declaration is generally supplemental to some other claim, such as one for damages or an injunction (n). In such a case the Court may make the declaration asked for even where it refuses to grant an injunction or to give any other relief (o), provided there has in fact been a disturbance of the right which the Court is asked to declare (p).

Moreover, a declaration of right or title may be claimed in an action brought simply and solely to obtain that declaration, and for this there is good reason. It often happens that a man is reasonably entitled to have his exact rights ascertained though they have not yet been infringed. The mere fact that his rights have been seriously called in question was formerly not enough to give him any right of action. But now the Court will, in a proper case, make binding declarations as to the right or title of any party to an action, even if nothing has been done to entitle him either to damages or to an injunction. For example, it may be that the plaintiff does not wish to obtain possession

(l) [1901] 1 Ch. 812.

(m) Injunctions are enforced against a corporation by sequestration: see *post*, pp. 696, 697, and Order XLII., r. 7.

(n) Such a claim is frequently made in actions for the recovery of land: see *post*, pp. 590 *et seq.*

(o) *Llandudno U. D. C. v. Woods*, [1899] 2 Ch. 705.

(p) *West v. Gwynne*, [1911] 2 Ch. 1; *Dysart (Earl) v. Hammerton*, [1914] 1 Ch. 822; [1916] 1 A. C. 57.

of land or any other immediate relief. He merely wishes to have his rights defined and declared. Suppose that a freeholder granted a lease of a farm for a term of years, and died before that term had expired. If a dispute subsequently arises between persons claiming to be entitled through him, *e.g.*, as heir or devisee, as to the ownership of the farm, neither of them can eject the tenant, for both are bound by the lease. They can, however, ask the Court to declare which of them is entitled to receive the rent.

The Court of Chancery would not, before the passing of the Judicature Act, 1873, make a declaration of title unless a right to "some consequential relief" was shown; it declined to make declarations "in the air" (q); and this practice was followed—with some hesitation—in the High Court from 1875 to 1883 (r). But in October, 1883, it was clearly provided (s) that "no action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations of right, whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not" (t). And now "actions can be brought merely to declare rights; and this is an innovation of a very important kind" (u).

Hence the Court can now declare what the rights of the parties are or will be, although no ancillary relief is claimed, and even where no substantive relief can at present be given (x). Such declaration may be made on an interlocutory application whether by petition or summons (y). But the jurisdiction under this rule will be exercised with great caution (z). The Court can in its discretion make a declaration as to a future right, but it will not do so if such a declaration would be "embarrassing or useless for any good purpose" (a).

(q) *Rooke v. Lord Kensington* (1856), 2 Kay & J. 753.

(r) *Cox v. Barker* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 370—372.

(s) Order XXV., r. 5.

(t) See *Honour v. Equitable Life Society*, [1900] 1 Ch. 852; *Société Maritime v. Venus Steam Shipping Co.* (1904), 9 Com. Cas. 289.

(u) *Per Lindley, L.J.*, in *Ellis v. Duke of Bedford*, [1899] 1 Ch. at p. 515.

(x) *Evans v. Manchester, &c., Ry. Co.* (1887), 36 Ch. D., at p. 640; *London Association of Shipowners v. London and India Docks Joint Committee*, [1892] 3 Ch. 242.

(y) *St. Nazaire Co., In re* (1879), 12 Ch. D. at p. 94.

(z) *Faber v. Gosworth U. D. C.* (1903), 88 L. T. 549.

(a) *Per Jelf, J.*, in *Att.-Gen. v. Scott* (1904), 20 T. L. R. at p. 633.

The following are examples of declarations which have been made under this rule:—

That the defendant, a clergyman, was not entitled to hold services and deliver addresses on the seashore at Llandudno without the consent of the Urban District Council (*b*).

That the defendants were not entitled to send sewage from their district into the plaintiffs' sewer without the consent of the plaintiffs (*c*).

That the defendants were not entitled to make an unreasonable demand for payment as a condition for giving their consent to an assignment by the plaintiff of his lease, and that the plaintiff was entitled to assign his lease without any further consent of the defendants (*d*).

That the defendant, who was the owner of the dominant tenement, was not entitled to any light claimed by him in respect of such tenement, he having lost such right by alterations in the said tenement (*e*).

That upon the true construction of a lease made between the parties, and in the events which had happened, the plaintiff was entitled to assign the residue of the term to his wife without the consent of the lessors, and free from conditions (*f*).

That a by-law made by an urban council forbidding the erection on its foreshore of certain booths, tents, swings, &c., except as therein provided, was valid (*g*).

That an indemnity given by a trade union to pay the costs of an action brought by its officers was *ultra vires* (*h*).

A declaration as to title will usually not be made on a vendor and purchaser summons, that procedure being only intended for the decision of isolated points arising out of or connected with the contract (*i*).

8. *The Appointment of a Receiver.*

An interim receiver is an officer of the Court, appointed in the interests of all parties to an action for the purpose of protecting and preserving the subject-matter of the litigation till judgment be given. If the property in dispute be land or buildings, it will be his duty to collect the rents, to receive any other profits, to expend, if necessary and

(*b*) *Llandudno U. D. C. v. Woods*, [1899] 2 Ch. 705.

(*c*) *Islington Vestry v. Hornsey U. D. C.*, [1900] 1 Ch. 695.

(*d*) *Young v. Ashley Gardens Properties*, [1903] 2 Ch. 112; *West v. Gwynne*, [1911] 2 Ch. 1.

(*e*) *Ankerson v. Conelly*, [1906] 2 Ch. 544; [1907] 1 Ch. 678.

(*f*) *Evans v. Levy*, [1910] 1 Ch. 452.

(*g*) *Williams v. Weston-super-Mare U. D. C.* (1910), 26 T. L. R. 506.

(*h*) *Oram v. Hutt*, [1914] 1 Ch. 98.

(*i*) *Wallis and Barnard's Contract, In re*, [1899] 2 Ch. 515.

he is so authorised, a certain portion of the money which thus comes into his hands in repairing the premises, and then to hold the balance to abide the order of the Court. Or he may be appointed to collect the debts due to a company or to a firm, or to receive the share of any joint owner in a partition action, or he may be specially directed to manage a business pending litigation (k).

The Judicature Act conferred upon all Divisions of the High Court the very wide power of appointing a receiver "in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to be just or convenient that such order should be made" (k), but the exercise of this power is restricted by many considerations which are justified by practical experience. Thus a receiver will not, as a rule, be appointed if either party is competent to do the work and can be trusted to do it properly. But where it is just or convenient, such an order will be made, although the dispute is as to the legal title of the parties and the defendant is in possession (l); and the Court will give the receiver possession of the property in so far as is necessary for the preservation of the plaintiff's rights (m). Where the property is let to weekly tenants, it is clearly convenient in the interests of all parties that a receiver should be appointed, lest the tenants should cease to pay rent altogether until the dispute is settled and then be unable to pay (n). Again, a *cestui que trust* may apply for a receiver if his trustee carelessly omits to call in hazardous loans or to sell wasting securities. So a secured creditor may fairly claim this relief if his debtor is dissipating the property which is the security for the loan, e.g., if a tradesman is neglecting his business and not calling in the debts due to him from customers, if a company in difficulties is squandering its assets, if a mortgagor leaves buildings out of repair and land uncultivated, so as seriously to reduce their value. When the debenture-holders of a company proceed to enforce their security

(k) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 45.

(l) *Foxwell v. Van Grutten*, [1897] 1 Ch. 64; *John v. John*, [1898] 2 Ch. 573; *Cummins v. Perkins*, [1899] 1 Ch. 16.

(m) *Charrington v. Camp*, [1902] 1 Ch. 386.

(n) *Gwatkin v. Bird* (1882), 52 L. J. Q. B. 263.

by the appointment of a receiver, their floating charge is said to "crystallise"—that is, it becomes a definite and specific charge on the assets of the company (o).

If a plaintiff desires the appointment of a receiver, he should claim it on his writ. Nevertheless the Court has power to appoint a receiver at any stage of the proceedings—even on appeal—although the plaintiff has not asked for it on his writ (p). The plaintiff may apply for a receiver either *ex parte* or on notice; but a receiver will only be granted on an *ex parte* application in cases of extreme urgency (q). Any other party, after appearance, on notice to the plaintiff may apply for one. In the Chancery Division the application if opposed is made by motion in Court; if unopposed, by summons at chambers. In the King's Bench Division it is always made by summons before a Judge at chambers (r).

The person to be appointed must first give security to the satisfaction of a Master to "duly account for what he shall receive as such receiver, and pay the same as the Court shall direct." He will, unless otherwise ordered, be allowed a proper salary or commission on the amount of his receipts (s). He will be entitled to further payment in respect of any extraordinary trouble or expenditure incurred in discharge of his duties (t), but not, as a rule, when he is himself a party to the action. He will be paid his costs and expenses in priority to the costs of other parties, and next after the costs of the realisation (u).

His first duty is to take possession of the property committed to his charge; his next duty is to manage it, remembering always that he is appointed on behalf of all parties to the action, and not of one party only. He has full authority to let lands and houses, to receive rents, and to do everything else in his power to make the property as productive as possible for the benefit of the party who may ultimately be declared to be its owner. With the sanction of the Court where necessary, he can in fact do everything that the owner could do were he in possession. In so managing the property under his care he may incur liabilities to third persons. Thus in *Stubbs v. Marsh* (x) a receiver, appointed by the Court to carry on a newspaper, had to pay damages in respect of a libel which appeared in it during his management. But in all such cases the third person must bring his action in the Court which appointed the receiver (y).

(o) As to the appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution, see *post*, p. 693; and section 43, Judicature Act, 1925.

(p) *Hyde v. Warden* (1876), 1 Ex. D. 309; *Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies* (1878), 9 Ch. D. 287; *Salt v. Cooper* (1880), 16 Ch. D. 554.

(q) *Potts, In re; Taylor, ex parte*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 648.

(r) Order L.IV., r. 12 (e); Vol. 1, p. 361.

(s) Order L., r. 16.

(t) *Harris v. Sleep*, [1897] 2 Ch. 80.

(u) *Batten v. Wedgwood Coal and Iron Co.* (1884), 28 Ch. D. 317.

(x) (1866), 15 L. T. 312. The damages, it would seem, came out of the estate, but the receiver had to pay the costs out of his own pocket.

(y) *Maidstone Palace of Varieties, In re*, [1909] 2 Ch. 283.

Lastly, the receiver must account for all moneys which have come into his hands. He must leave his accounts in the chambers of the Judge by whom he was appointed, and verify them by an affidavit (z). He will be liable for all money which he might have received if he had used due diligence; but not for a loss which occurred without any default on his part. He must not mix moneys collected by him as receiver with his own moneys (a).

9. *An Account.*

Where the plaintiff's claim is liquidated and can be ascertained exactly, he should, of course, claim only the precise amount due to him with interest if he is entitled to any. But the plaintiff often only knows that the defendant has received money on his behalf and does not know the amount: his remedy then is to make the defendant deliver him an account, showing precisely what money he has received and expended on behalf of the plaintiff. Formerly this remedy, as a rule, could only be obtained in the Court of Chancery; but now the plaintiff in simple cases can claim an account in the King's Bench Division (b).

This claim to have an account taken must be carefully distinguished from a claim on a "settled account," which is really an action brought upon an implied promise (c). Indeed, in the absence of fraud or of substantial errors in the account, the fact that an account has been settled between the parties is a good defence to a claim to have an account taken. Another defence is that the defendant is under no duty to account to the plaintiff—that is, that he has not received the moneys in question as agent or trustee for the plaintiff, and therefore is not bound to account for them to him, or, in technical language, that he is not "an accounting party."

The procedure on an application for an account will be described in a later chapter (d). We may mention here a few instances in which an account is generally ordered.

(z) Order L., r. 20.

(a) *Smart v. Flood* (1893), 49 L. T. 467.

(b) *Leslie v. Clifford* (1884), 50 L. T. 590; *York v. Stowers*, [1883] W. N. 174; and see Judicature Act, 1925, s. 56.

(c) See *ante*, p. 304.

(d) *Post*, p. 542.

The defendant will be ordered to deliver an account where he has managed the plaintiff's estate, as bailiff, land agent, solicitor or trustee, receiving the rents and profits and making disbursements for rates, taxes, and repairs.

Any beneficiary entitled to the residue of a fund under a deed or will is entitled to call upon the trustee or executor to account to him. A solicitor must always account to his client, and an agent to his principal. A claim may be made for an account of the profits made by the defendant in infringement of the plaintiff's copyright, patent right, or right to a trade mark, &c.; this claim would be supplementary to a claim for an injunction to prevent any further infringement. So in an action for breach of covenant not to trade within a certain area, or for a certain time, an order both for an injunction and for an account is frequently made.

10. *Specific Performance of a Contract.*

At common law a plaintiff's only remedy for breach of a contract was an action for damages. In many cases this was an inadequate remedy. But after a time the Court of Chancery assumed power to grant decrees for the specific performance of contracts. "This remedy by specific performance was invented and has been cautiously applied in order to meet cases where the ordinary remedy by an action for damages is not an adequate compensation for breach of contract" (e). Equity, however, would not grant this remedy in all cases of breach of contract. "The jurisdiction" to decree specific performance "has always been treated as discretionary and confined within well-known rules" (f). Gradually out of a long series of decisions of the Court of Chancery there was evolved a body of settled principles and rules which guide our Judges at the present day. The most important of these rules may be briefly stated as follows:—

(i) Specific performance will not be granted where damages would afford adequate compensation. The jurisdiction has always been confined to cases where "damages at law would not give the party the compensation to which he was entitled, that is, would not put him in a situation as

(e) *Per Kay, L.J., in Ryan v. Mutual Tontine Association*, [1893] 1 Ch. at p. 126.

(f) *Per Kay, L.J., ibid.*, at p. 126; see also *Stewart v. Kennedy* (1890), 15 App. Cas. at p. 105.

beneficial to him as if the agreement were specifically enforced'' (g).

In cases of contracts for the sale of ordinary articles of merchandise, damages calculated on the market price of the goods are practically as complete a remedy to the purchaser as delivery of the goods themselves; for with such damages in his pocket he can buy a like quantity of the same goods. "Thus, if a contract is for the purchase of a certain quantity of coals, &c., this Court will not grant specific performance, because a person can go into the market and buy similar articles and get damages for the difference in the price of the articles in a Court of law'' (h). For the same reason, if A agrees to lend B money, whether on mortgage or otherwise, "it is settled in the law of England that such a promise cannot sustain a suit for specific performance'' (i). But a contract to purchase debentures of a company can now be specifically enforced (k). There are cases, however, in which damages afford no adequate compensation even for the non-delivery of a chattel. Hence the Court will in a proper case order specific performance of a contract for the sale of any "specific or ascertained goods'' (l), or of chattels of unique value, or of peculiar value to the plaintiff (m), or even of shares or stock in companies.

Thus in *Paine v. Hutchinson* (n) the plaintiffs contracted to sell to the defendant shares in a certain company which they had purchased from C, and which remained in C's name. C executed transfers to the defendant, who made no objection to their form, but eventually refused to execute them. Subsequently an order was made to wind up the company. The Court decreed specific performance of the agreement, and ordered the defendant to concur in all steps that might be necessary and proper for causing the shares to be registered in his name.

(g) *Per* Lord Redesdale, L.C., in *Harnett v. Yeilding* (1805), 2 Sch. & Lef. at p. 553; and see *Wolverhampton Corporation v. Emmons*, [1901] 1 K. B. 515; *Molyneux v. Richard*, [1906] 1 Ch. 34.

(h) *Per* Kindersley, V.-C., in *Falcke v. Gray* (1859), 4 Drew. at p. 656.

(i) *Per* Lord Watson in *South African Territories v. Wallington*, [1898] A. C. at p. 314.

(k) Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, s. 105.

(l) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 52.

(m) *Duke of Somerset v. Cookson* (1735), 3 P. Wms. 390; *Falcke v. Gray*, *supra*.

(n) (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 383.

(ii) Specific performance will not be granted where the Court would be unable to enforce its judgment without constant and effective supervision (o).

Thus, where in the lease of a flat the lessor covenanted with the lessee to maintain a resident porter to be in constant attendance and to perform certain specified duties, the Court refused to grant specific performance of this covenant on the ground that, “in order to give effect to it by an order for specific performance, the Court would have to watch over and supervise its execution. It is a recognised rule that the Court cannot enforce a contract by compelling specific performance where the execution of the contract requires such watching over and supervision by the Court” (p). The Court will, however, order specific performance of a building contract where the buildings to be erected are sufficiently defined and damages would afford no adequate remedy (q).

For the same reason the Courts will not enforce specific performance of a contract for personal services (r), such as a contract to write a book, or to sing in an opera; for the Court could not compel the defendant to perform either task.

(iii) Specific performance will not be granted if the party seeking it has by his conduct disentitled himself to relief in equity, or wherever it would be harsh or unreasonable to grant it (s).

The Court exercises a discretion in the matter; it will not grant specific performance where it would be “what is called highly unreasonable to do so. What is more or less reasonable is not a thing that you can define; it must depend on the circumstances of each case” (t). Mere inadequacy of consideration is not a sufficient ground for

(o) *Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. v. Taff Vale Ry. Co.* (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. 331.

(p) *Per Lopes, L.J.*, in *Ryan v. Mutual Tontine Association*, [1893] 1 Ch. at p. 125; and see *Wolverhampton Corporation v. Emmons*, [1901] 1 K. B. at p. 524.

(q) *Molyneux v. Richard*, [1906] 1 Ch. 34.

(r) *Lumley v. Wagner* (1852), 1 De G. M. & G. 604; *Johnstone v. Shrewsbury Ry. Co.* (1853), 3 De G. M. & G. 914; *Bainbridge v. Smith* (1889), 41 Ch. D. 462, 474.

(s) *Hexter v. Pearce*, [1900] 1 Ch. 341, 346.

(t) *Per Lord Langdale* in *Wedgwood v. Adams* (1843), 6 Beav. at p. 605; and see *Preston v. Luck* (1884), 27 Ch. D. 497, 506.

refusing specific performance (*u*), but the Court will not enforce a contract into which the defendant entered under a mistake of fact which went to the root of the contract, provided such mistake was not caused by want of any reasonable care on his part (*x*). Mere silence may also be a ground for refusing specific performance, if it was the duty of the applicant to disclose the fact which he suppressed (*y*).

If there be "no fiduciary relation between vendor and purchaser in the negotiation, the purchaser is not bound to disclose any fact exclusively within his knowledge which might reasonably be expected to influence the price of the subject to be sold. Simple reticence does not amount to legal fraud, however it may be viewed by moralists. But a single word, or (I may add) a nod or a wink, or a shake of the head, or a smile from the purchaser intended to induce the vendor to believe the existence of a non-existing fact, which might influence the price of the subject to be sold, would be sufficient ground for a Court of equity to refuse a decree for a specific performance of the agreement" (*z*).

(iv) Again, the Court will not enforce any contract for which no consideration was given (*a*), or where all consideration has failed. It will not enforce an illegal contract, nor one that is uncertain or ambiguous in its terms, or subject to a condition precedent which has not been performed (*b*).

(v) Specific performance of a contract for the sale of land or any interest therein will not, as a rule, be granted unless there is in existence a memorandum of such contract sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. It will, however, be granted even though the contract was not in writing on proof that—

(*u*) *Heywood v. Cope* (1858), 25 Beav. 140.

(*x*) *Tamplin v. James* (1880), 15 Ch. D. 215.

(*y*) *Turner v. Green*, [1895] 2 Ch. 205, 209, in which Chitty, J., explains the dictum of Lord Manners in *Ellard v. Llandaff* (1810), 1 Ball & B. at p. 250. Compare the common law doctrine laid down in *Pickard v. Sears* (1837), 6 A. & E. 469.

(*z*) *Per* Lord Campbell, L.C., in *Walters v. Morgan* (1861), 3 De G. F. & J. at pp. 723, 724, cited with approval by Chitty, J., in *Turner v. Green*, *supra*; but see the judgment of Lord Hatherley, L.C., in *Phillips v. Homfray* (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. at p. 777.

(*a*) Even though the contract be under seal, for in equity a deed does not "import a consideration."

(*b*) See *Williams v. Brisco* (1882), 22 Ch. D. at p. 449.

- (a) it was the fraud of the defendant which prevented the contract from being reduced into writing (c); or
- (b) the defendant has expressly admitted the contract, or has not raised the defence of the Statute of Frauds in his pleading (d); or
- (c) the contract refers to the sale of property by the direction of the Court (e); or
- (d) there has been such a part performance of the contract by the plaintiff as is unequivocally referable to the agreement (f).

(vi) The Court will not grant specific performance to any person who is not ready and willing, and able, substantially to perform his part of the same contract. It will not do so "unless it can give full relief to both parties" (g).

It is true, however, that where the vendor is able to perform the contract for the sale of land in substance, but, not completely, he can, on making compensation for the deficiency in value, obtain a decree for specific performance by the purchaser. But if he cannot perform the contract substantially, then he cannot get specific performance as against the purchaser, although in such a case the purchaser is entitled to get specific performance as against the vendor with an abatement proportionate to the deficiency in value (h).

(vii) Finally, a plaintiff who seeks a decree of specific performance must not be guilty of unreasonable delay in applying for this relief or in the performance of his part of the contract (i).

(c) See *Viscountess Montacute v. Maxwell* (1720), 1 P. Wms. at p. 616.

(d) Order XIX., r. 15; *James v. Smith*, [1891] 1 Ch. 384.

(e) *Blagden v. Bradbear* (1806), 12 Ves. 466, 472.

(f) See *ante*, pp. 47—50.

(g) *Per* Lord Cranworth, L.C., in *Blackett v. Bates* (1865), L. R. 1 Ch. at p. 124. But see *Jones v. Earl Tankerville*, [1909] 2 Ch. 440.

(h) *Barker v. Cox* (1876), 4 Ch. D. 464.

(i) *Mills v. Heywood* (1877), 6 Ch. D. 196, 202; *Levy v. Stogden*, [1899] 1 Ch. 5.

CHAPTER XII.

EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES.

WE have now dealt with the ordinary remedies which are frequently granted by our Courts. There are, however, other remedies for which application is less frequently made, but which are very valuable in special cases. It is impossible in this work to describe fully the efficacy and operation of these extraordinary remedies or the procedure appropriate to each of them; we can only briefly allude to the most important of them, namely :—

1. The writ of *Habeas Corpus*.
2. The writ of *Mandamus*.
3. The writ of Prohibition.
4. The writ of *Certiorari*.
5. An information in the nature of a writ of *Quo Warranto*.
6. A Petition of Right.
7. A motion against an officer of the Court.

A criminal information may also be regarded as an extraordinary remedy, but with this we have dealt in an earlier chapter (*a*).

1. *The Writ of Habeas Corpus.*

The writ of *habeas corpus*, which plays so important a part in the constitutional history of our country, is still the most important of the extraordinary remedies which our Courts can be asked to grant. The full name of this writ is *habeas corpus ad subjiciendum* (*b*). Its object is to deliver from confinement any one who is illegally

(*a*) *Ante*, pp. 425 *et seq.*

(*b*) There are other writs of *habeas corpus*, e.g., *ad testificandum*, *cum causa*, &c., whose general object is the securing of the production of an individual before the Court for the various purposes indicated by the names of the writs.

imprisoned. It is a writ issued by the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice or by any Judge thereof, commanding any person who holds another in custody to bring his prisoner bodily before the Court on a day named in the writ, and then and there to state by what right he holds that other in custody.

Magna Carta laid down long ago that "no man shall be taken or imprisoned unless by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land" (c). The Petition of Right, 1627 (d), and the Act abolishing the Star Chamber (e) contain provisions with the same effect. Yet, in the reign of Charles II., it was found necessary to pass the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679 (f). This Act introduced no new principle into the law of England, for the right to a writ of *habeas corpus* existed at common law (g). But this right had often been rendered inoperative by reason of the subterfuges which the procedure in force allowed to be practised and, as the Act recites, "many of the King's subjects" had been "long detained in prison in such cases where by law they are bailable, to their great charges and vexation." The Act of Charles II., though it created the procedure which is still in force, applied only to persons who had "been committed for criminal or supposed criminal matters," but the procedure was extended, by the statute 56 Geo. 3, c. 100, to all persons under detention of any kind, except those who were imprisoned for debt or by process in any civil suit.

The writ cannot be directed to any one who at the date of the order is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. Hence it has, as we have seen (h), been made an unpardonable crime for any one unlawfully to take or send any person in his custody outside the realm, so that he would be deprived of the protection of the writ. The Act also provides that a Judge who refuses to grant the writ on

(c) And see 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 4; *Darnel's Case* (1627), 3 St. Tr. 1.

(d) 3 Car. 1, c. 1.

(e) 16 Car. 1, c. 10.

(f) 31 Car. 2, c. 2.

(g) *Thomlinson's Case* (1605), 12 Rep. 104; *Basset, Ex parte* (1844), 6 Q. B. 481.

(h) Vol. 1, p. 208.

application made to him for good cause is liable to a penalty of £500 (*i*). Moreover, any gaoler who refuses to make a return to the writ, or refuses or neglects to deliver within six hours after demand by a prisoner or on his behalf a copy of the warrant or commitment under which he is detained is, in certain cases, liable to a penalty of £100 and loss of office, and for a second offence to a penalty of £200 (*k*).

The procedure on an application for a writ of *habeas corpus* is regulated by Rules 216—230 of the Crown Office Rules, 1906. The writ is granted by the King's Bench Division, or a Judge thereof, either by motion or upon application *ex parte*, or upon summons, as the case may be, whenever probable and sufficient ground has been assigned for the interposition of its authority. It lies to any part of the King's dominions not having a Court of justice with authority to issue such writ (*l*) and to ensure its due execution (*m*).

The return to the writ is made by producing the person detained and setting forth the grounds and proceedings upon which he is in custody. If the Court considers that the facts set forth in the return are sufficient to justify the prisoner's detention, he is remanded to his former custody; if insufficient, he is discharged therefrom (*n*). No appeal lies from an order discharging a person from custody under a *habeas corpus* (*o*). An appeal lies from an order directing a writ to issue (*p*), and from a refusal to make such order or to order a discharge (*q*), provided that the subject-matter of the proceedings in respect of which the application is made be not criminal (*r*). A writ of *habeas corpus* will sometimes be quashed on the ground of irregularity or fraud, but not for matter that could not be properly returned to it (*s*).

2. The Writ of Mandamus.

This is one of the high prerogative writs under the common law. It can only be obtained from the King's

(*i*) 31 Car. 2, c. 2, s. 9.

(*k*) 31 Car. 2, c. 2, s. 4.

(*l*) See *Brown, Ex parte* (1864), 5 B. & S. 280.

(*m*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 20, s. 1.

(*n*) *Douglas, In re* (1842), 3 Q. B. 825; *Hammond's Case* (1846), 9 Q. B. 92.

(*o*) *Cox v. Hakes* (1890), 15 App. Cas. 506; or, though discharge has not been effected or even ordered, if the Court sanctioned the issue of the writ on the ground that the detention is illegal: *Secretary of State v. O'Brien*, [1923] A. C. 603.

(*p*) *Cox, Ex parte* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 1; see also *R. v. Jackson*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 671, n.

(*q*) *Barnardo v. McHugh*, [1891] A. C. 388; *Barnardo v. Ford*, [1892] A. C. 326.

(*r*) *Woodhall, Ex parte* (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 832; *Keller, In re* (1887), 22 L. R. Ir. 158.

(*s*) *Carus Wilson's Case* (1845), 7 Q. B. 984, 1001.

Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, and on motion, and not in an action (*t*). It is a peremptory order by the Court commanding somebody to do that which it is his clear legal duty to do (*u*). It will be granted only for some good public purpose (*x*); the duty which it enforces must be of a public nature; and the applicant must have a legal right to the performance of such duty by the party against whom he applies (*y*). He must, moreover, have made a demand for its performance, and compliance must have been refused before the writ will be issued (*z*).

It is in the discretion of the Court to grant a writ of *mandamus* or not (*a*); it will always be refused if the applicant himself be in fault (*b*), or where, if granted, it would be nugatory or useless or unnecessary, or where it must ultimately fail (*c*). Moreover, it will not be allowed to issue "for the purpose of undoing what has been done," although it will be granted "when that has not been done which a statute orders to be done" (*d*).

The operation of this writ appears to have been confined originally to a limited class of cases affecting the administration of public affairs, such as the election of corporate officers and their restoration if wrongfully removed from office, or to compel inferior Courts to proceed in matters within their jurisdiction, and public officers to perform duties imposed upon them by common law or by statute. In more recent times, however, the remedy has been extended to other cases. In almost every session of Parliament Acts are passed for making railways, forming docks, building bridges, improving towns, &c., and most of these Acts direct that certain works shall be done for the benefit of individuals, *e.g.*, that communications be made between lands intersected by works authorised by the Act, or that new buildings, bridges or roads be substituted for old ones. In the event of non-compliance with any such enactment, any person who suffers detriment therefrom may apply for a writ of *mandamus*.

This writ will not issue against the Crown or any servant of the

(*t*) Order LIII., r. 4.

(*u*) *R. v. Secretary of State for War*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 326.

(*x*) See *R. v. Bank of England* (1819), 2 B. & Ald., at p. 622.

(*y*) *R. v. Lewisham Guardians*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 498.

(*z*) *R. v. Bristol and Exeter Ry. Co.* (1843), 4 Q. B. 162.

(*a*) *R. v. All Saints, Wigan* (1876), 1 App. Cas. 611, 620.

(*b*) *R. v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1893), 62 L. J. Q. B. 572.

(*c*) *Bristol Ry. Co., In re* (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 10.

(*d*) *Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in Nash, Ex parte* (1850), 15 Q. B., at p. 95.

Crown (e) or to any superior Court of record (f). It will issue to an inferior Court if, having jurisdiction, it refuses to act (g); but not where that Court has acted. It will not be granted on the ground that in any particular case the Court below has come to an unjust or improper conclusion (h). Again, the writ may issue to the mayor and assessors of a borough commanding them to revise the burgess list (i), or to justices of the peace bidding them make a rate or hold a brewster sessions. Formerly it was sometimes issued in aid of legal proceedings in a superior Court, as by ordering that a creditor of a company should be at liberty to inspect the register of the shareholders with a view to his issuing execution against them (k).

The duty enforced by this writ may be imposed by common law or custom, by charter or by statute. But it must be a legal duty (l); an equitable right cannot be enforced by a writ of *mandamus* (m). And it must be an imperative duty, not a mere discretionary power.

Thus, where a bishop has a discretion as to whether he will issue a commission to inquire into the truth of a complaint under the Church Discipline Act, 1840 (n), no *mandamus* will lie to compel him to do so (o). Again, where a railway company has an option where its lines cross a highway either to carry the road over the railway or the railway over the road, a *mandamus* will not be granted to compel the company to do one of these two things, unless circumstances are clearly shown which establish the impossibility of the company exercising the option (p). And generally where a local authority or other public body has vested in it power to do a certain act as in its discretion it may think right, the Court will not issue a *mandamus* to compel it to do or not to do that act, so long as it has exercised its discretion honestly (q)—e.g., the Court will not compel the Benchers of an Inn of Court to call a person to the Bar (r).

(e) See the remarks of Lord Denman, C.J., in *R. v. Powell* (1841), 1 Q. B., at p. 361; *R. v. Lords Commissioners of the Treasury* (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 387.

(f) E.g., the Central Criminal Court: *R. v. Justices of C. C. C.* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 479; *R. v. Justices of C. C. C.*, [1925] 2 K. B. 43.

(g) *R. v. Brown* (1857), 7 E. & B. 757.

(h) *R. v. Justices of Worcestershire* (1854), 3 E. & B. 477; *R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury* (1848), 11 Q. B. 483; *R. v. Housing Tribunal of Appeal*, [1920] 3 K. B. 334.

(i) See *Mayor of Rochester v. R.* (1858), E. B. & E. 1024.

(k) *R. v. Derbyshire, &c., Ry. Co.* (1854), 3 E. & B. 784; *R. v. Harrison* (1846), 9 Q. B. 794; and see *Davies v. Gas Light and Coke Co.*, [1909] 1 Ch. 708.

(l) *R. v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1893), 62 L. J. Q. B. 572.

(m) *R. v. Godolphin* (1838), 8 A. & E. 338.

(n) 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, s. 3.

(o) *Julius v. Bishop of Oxford* (1880), 5 App. Cas. 214; see also *R. v. Bishop of Oxford* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 525.

(p) *R. v. S. E. Ry. Co.* (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. 471.

(q) *Smith v. Chorley Rural Council*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 678.

(r) *R. v. Gray's Inn Benchers* (1780), 1 Douglas, 353, 355.

The writ is intended to afford a remedy in those cases only where no other appropriate remedy exists; it will not issue where there is any other legal mode of enforcing the right which is equally convenient, beneficial and effective (s). It will be granted where the party has a right to have anything done and has no other specific means of compelling its performance (t). "When there is no specific remedy, the Court will grant a *mandamus* that justice may be done" (u).

But a writ of *mandamus* may issue although another remedy does exist if it be not adequate or complete, as where a statutory right of appeal exists but does not afford so complete or adequate a remedy as a *mandamus* (x). Where a remedy was provided under a local statute, but the procedure and remedy were uncertain, inconvenient and practically obsolete, it was held that a *mandamus* ought to be granted (y). And in a case in which an election petition might have been brought, a *mandamus* was granted as being a more convenient, speedy and effective remedy (z).

The procedure on an application for a prerogative writ of *mandamus* is regulated by Rules 49—69 and 125 of the Crown Office Rules, 1906. The writ is issued in the King's name out of the King's Bench Division, and the application for it must be made on motion, and supported by affidavit. As a rule, the Court directs a rule *nisi* to be issued and the person against whom the application is made may appear and show cause why the rule should not be made absolute. If it is made absolute, the writ will be issued. As a rule the writ is obeyed without question. The writ, in the first instance, commands the party to whom it is addressed to do the act required, or make a return thereto by showing cause why he does not do it (a); and unless he does the act or succeeds in quashing the writ as insufficient on the face of it, he must proceed to answer the writ or demur to it: if judgment is given against him, the Court awards a peremptory *mandamus*, and in cases of private injury, damages and costs (b). Disobedience to a peremptory *mandamus*

(s) *Nathan, In re* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 461; *R. v. Lambourn Valley Ry. Co.* (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 463; *R. v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 131; *R. v. Assessment Committee of City of London Union*, [1907] 2 K. B. 764; *R. v. Controller General of Patents* (1922), 38 T. L. R. 652.

(t) See *Mayor of Rochester v. R.* (1858), E. B. & E. 1024, 1031, 1033.

(u) *Per* Lord Mansfield, C.J., in *R. v. Bank of England* (1780), 2 Douglas, at p. 526.

(x) *R. v. Stepney Borough Council*, [1902] 1 K. B. 317.

(y) *R. v. Vestry of St. George the Martyr, Southwark* (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 398.

(z) *R. v. Stewart*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 552.

(a) See *R. v. Commissioners of Southampton* (1861), 1 B. & S. 5, and L. R. 4 H. L. 449.

(b) *R. v. S. E. Ry. Co.* (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. 471.

is punishable by writ of attachment or by committal, as well as by an order for the payment of costs.

3. *The Writ of Prohibition.*

The writ of prohibition issues out of the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, and is directed to the Judge of an inferior Court, or the parties to a suit therein, or both conjointly, requiring that the proceedings which have been commenced there be either conditionally stayed or peremptorily stopped. The object of the writ is to keep the Court to which it is directed within its proper jurisdiction, and to repress the assumption of authority by any pretended Court. Moreover, a writ of prohibition will issue to restrain a Judge of any inferior Court, spiritual or temporal, from hearing any case in which he is personally interested (c).

The writ of prohibition will issue to an Ecclesiastical Court, whenever something is being done by it "contrary to the general law of the land, or manifestly out of the jurisdiction of the Court" (cc). Thus, if an Ecclesiastical Court meddle with a matter purely temporal, civil or criminal, or with a wrong for which at common law there is a remedy, it oversteps its jurisdiction. "Where the common or statute law giveth remedy *in foro saeculari* (whether the matter be temporal or spiritual), the consuance of that cause belongeth to the King's temporal Courts only" (d). Where the spiritual Court errs in the construction of a statute, or where a suit therein is "determined contrary to the right at common law," the remedy is by prohibition (e). "The Courts of common law have, in all cases in which matter of temporal nature has incidentally arisen, granted prohibition to Courts acting by the rules of the civil law, where such Courts have decided on such temporal matters in a manner different from that which the Courts of common law would decide upon the same" (f). But where the

(c) *Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co.* (1852), 3 H. L. Cas. 759; *R. v. Farrant* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 58.

(cc) *Per* Littledale, J., in *Smyth, Ex parte* (1835), 3 A. & E., at p. 724. In early times indeed one of the main uses of the writ of prohibition was to restrain the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts; see Coke, 2nd Inst., tit. "Articuli Cleri"; *Dean of York, In re* (1841), 2 Q. B. 1; *Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter* (1850), 15 Q. B. 52; *Martin v. Mackonochie* (1881), 6 App. Cas. 424; *R. v. Bishop of St. Albans* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 454.

(d) Coke upon Littleton, 96 b, and see *Phillimore v. Machon* (1876), 7 P. D. 481.

(e) Comyns' Digest, Prohibition, G. 23; cited with approval by Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in *Gould v. Gapper* (1804), 5 East, at p. 366; and see *Enraght v. Lord Penzance* (1882), 7 App. Cas. 240.

(f) *Per* Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in *Gould v. Gapper, supra*, at p. 371.

spiritual Court has sole jurisdiction, its proceedings need not be governed by the rules of the common law.

Prohibition to the temporal Courts is limited to those cases where they act either without or in excess of their jurisdiction (*g*), or where any member of the Court is interested. Thus the writ will not lie in respect of mere irregularities which may have occurred in the proceedings of the inferior Court, nor because the Judge, in deciding any particular question properly before him, has erred in his judgment upon the law (*h*).

Any Judge of the High Court, as well during the sittings as in vacation, can hear and determine applications for writs of prohibition and make such orders for the issuing of such writs as might have been made by the High Court (*i*). The procedure on any such application is regulated by Rules 70, 71 and 126 of the Crown Office Rules, 1906. The proceedings usually commence by an application for a rule *nisi*, and the final order will be made on the argument of that rule. The grounds on which the application is based should be stated in the rule *nisi* (*k*). As soon as the writ is issued, all proceedings in the inferior Court must be suspended by those to whom it is directed upon pain of attachment. But a writ of prohibition can be set aside by a writ of *supersedeas* (*l*).

4. *The Writ of Certiorari.*

The writ of *certiorari* is issued for the purpose of removing a suit from an inferior Court (*m*) into the High Court of Justice. It is directed to the Judge or officers of the inferior Court, commanding him or them to return the record of a cause there depending, to the end that more sure and speedy justice may be done between the parties. The right of thus removing a cause exists at common law, but has from time to time been limited to some extent by statute. The remedy, as a rule, is only applicable where it is sought to review a judicial, not a merely ministerial, act of an inferior tribunal.

(*g*) *Worthington v. Jeffries* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 379, 387, 388; and see *R. v. Electricity Commissioners*, [1924] 1 K. B. 171; *R. v. Swansea Income Tax Commissioners*, [1925] 2 K. B. 251.

(*h*) See *Mayor, &c., of London v. Cox* (1866), L. R. 2 H. L. 239; *R. v. Local Government Board* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 309.

(*i*) See the County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 127.

(*k*) *R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners*, [1914] 3 K. B. 429; [1916] A. C. 216.

(*l*) *R. v. Farrant* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 58, 62.

(*m*) A writ of *certiorari* does not lie to an Assize Court for the purpose of quashing its order: *R. v. JJ. of C. C. C.*, [1925] 2 K. B. 43.

"The writ of *certiorari* is a very ancient remedy, and is the ordinary process by which the High Court brings up for examination the acts of bodies of inferior jurisdiction. In certain cases the writ of *certiorari* is given by statute, but in a large number of cases it rests on the common law. It is frequently spoken of as being applicable only to 'judicial acts,' but the cases by which this limitation is supposed to be established show that the phrase 'judicial act' must be taken in a very wide sense, including many acts that would not ordinarily be termed 'judicial.' For instance, it is evidently not limited to bringing up the acts of bodies that are ordinarily considered to be Courts. . . . The true view of the limitation would seem to be that the term 'judicial act' is used in contrast with purely ministerial acts. To these latter the process of *certiorari* does not apply, as, for instance, to the issue of a warrant to enforce a rate, even though the rate is one which could itself be questioned by *certiorari*. In short, there must be the exercise of some right or duty to decide in order to provide scope for a writ of *certiorari* at common law" (n).

Thus a writ of *certiorari* was issued to remove into the High Court an order made by Quarter Sessions stopping up a highway, on the ground that the necessary notices had not been affixed in the places required by law (o). On the other hand, in *R. v. Sharman* (p), the Queen's Bench Division refused a writ to bring up an order of justices granting a licence to an hotel on the ground that the grant of such a licence is not a judicial act, as no controversy exists at that stage of the proceedings. But the confirming authority, whose confirmation is, under the provisions of the Licensing Acts, necessary to the validity of certain classes of new licences, sit as a Court; and therefore, if a licence granted to a person not qualified by law to hold it or in other respects granted without jurisdiction is confirmed by them, a writ of *certiorari* will lie to bring it up to be quashed (q).

The Crown has an absolute right to a writ of *certiorari*. Hence in criminal cases the writ issues as of course whenever the Attorney-General applies for it on behalf of the Crown (r). But an ordinary prosecutor must show good cause before the writ will issue. "It is quite clear that, except when applied for on behalf of the Crown, the *certiorari* is not a writ of course. The Court must be satisfied on affidavits that there is sufficient ground for

(n) *Per* Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in *R. v. Woodhouse*, [1906] 2 K. B., at pp. 534, 535.

(o) *R. v. Justices of Surrey* (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 466.

(p) [1898] 1 Q. B. 578; and see *Boulter v. Kent Justices*, [1897] A. C. 556.

(q) *R. v. Manchester Justices*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 571; followed in *R. v. Sunderland Justices*, [1901] 2 K. B. 357.

(r) *R. v. Thomas* (1815), 4 M. & S. 442.

issuing it, and it must in every case be a question for the Court to decide whether, in fact, sufficient grounds do exist" (s). The grounds most frequently urged in a criminal case are that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the Court below (t), or that the defendant is a corporation (u), or that some question of law of more than usual difficulty and importance is likely to arise upon the trial (x), or that a special jury (y), or a view of the premises in respect to which the indictment is preferred (z), is required for a satisfactory trial.

In civil cases a writ of *certiorari* issued as of right at common law to remove an action from any inferior Court to the High Court (a). But this wide power has been regulated in most cases by statute (b). In quasi-civil cases the writ of *certiorari* will not issue as a matter of course; the applicant must show that he has some special grievance of his own, and must not apply merely as one of the public (c).

The procedure on an application for a writ of *certiorari* is regulated by Rules 12—31 of the Crown Office Rules, 1906. An affidavit must be filed in support of the application, except when the application is on behalf of the Crown, or when the party applying is the prosecutor of an indictment against a corporate body. The application is made as a rule to the Divisional Court by motion. In criminal cases the writ of *certiorari* is issued out of the Crown Office Department of the Central Office, and is "tested" by the Lord Chief Justice. It is directed in the King's name to the Judges or officers of the inferior Court, ordering them to return the indictment, inquisition, judgment, conviction or order, as the case may be, to the King's Bench Division. If the High Court should subsequently consider that a cause has been improperly removed, it may issue a

(s) *Per cur.* in *R. v. Surrey Justices* (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B., at p. 472.

(t) *R. v. Bell* (1859), 8 Cox, 287; *R. v. Boughton*, [1895] 2 Ir. R. 386.

(u) See *post*, p. 808.

(x) *R. v. Wartnaby* (1835), 2 A. & E. 435; *R. v. Jowl* (1836), 5 A. & E. 539; *Direct Photo. Engraving Co. v. Martin*, [1921] 2 K. B. 187.

(y) *R. v. Jeffs* (1845), 9 Jur. 580.

(z) Crown Office Rules, 1906, r. 13.

(a) *Edwards v. Liverpool Corporation* (1902), 86 L. T. 627.

(b) See, for instance, section 126 of the County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), *ante*, p. 385. As to removal from the Mayor's Court, see *Davies v. MacHenry* (1867), L. R. 3 Ch. 200; and from the Liverpool Court of Passage, see *Edwards v. Liverpool Corporation* (1902), 86 L. T. 627; and see *Liverpool Corporation Act, 1921* (11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. lxxiv.), s. 226, providing that no action shall be removed except by leave of High Court or a Judge.

(c) *R. v. Surrey Justices* (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 466.

writ of *procedendo*, commanding the inferior Court to proceed, or the writ of *certiorari* may be quashed on motion.

5. *An Information in the Nature of a Writ of Quo Warranto.*

This is the proper remedy for trying disputes between private parties as to the authority by which an office or franchise (d) is held, and for removing those who have improperly assumed to exercise either. A proceeding of this kind is now deemed to be a civil proceeding (e). It takes the place of the ancient writ of *Quo warranto*, now obsolete, which was a writ of right of the Crown, issuing out of the Court of King's Bench, and which lay only in respect of an usurpation of the rights of prerogative of the Crown (f). The modern proceeding by information in the nature of a writ of *Quo warranto* "will lie for usurping any office, whether created by charter alone or by the Crown with the consent of Parliament, provided the office be of a public nature and a substantive office—not merely the function or employment of a deputy or servant held at the will and pleasure of others; for with respect to such an employment, the Court certainly will not interfere, and the information will not properly lie" (g). The procedure is regulated by Rules 40—48, 123, 124, of the Crown Office Rules, 1906.

6. *A Petition of Right.*

"The King can do no wrong" (h); no action can be brought against him either for a tort, or on a contract, or even for a declaration as to the meaning of a contract (i). A subject can only seek redress against the Crown by a

(d) A franchise is a privilege conferred by a royal charter.

(e) *Judicature Act*, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 49), s. 48.

(f) *King v. Shepherd* (1791), 4 T. R. 381; *Frost v. Mayor of Chester* (1855), 5 E. & B. 531.

(g) *Per Tindal, C.J.*, in *Darley v. R.* (1846), 12 Cl. & F., at pp. 541, 542. In cases where the proper procedure is by an information an action for a declaration will not lie: *Everett v. Griffiths*, [1924] 1 K. B. 941.

(h) See *post*, p. 720.

(i) *Hosier v. Earl of Derby*, [1918] 2 K. B. 671; *Rowland v. Air Council* (1923), 39 T. L. R. 228; a declaration may be made against the Attorney-General as representing the Crown: *Dyson v. Att.-Gen.*, [1911] 1 K. B. 410.

petition of right, which is now almost invariably brought under the Petitions of Right Act, 1860 (*k*). A petition of right lies where the Sovereign is in possession of any land, chattel or money to which the petitioner claims a better title, and therefore seeks restitution or compensation. Again, where the petitioner has a claim for any debt arising out of a contract, such as a claim for goods supplied to the Crown or for the public service (*l*), he may also proceed by way of petition of right. So, where a subject has a claim against the Crown for damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, arising out of a breach of contract (*m*), he may resort to this method of redress, whether such breach is occasioned by the omissions or positive acts of servants of the Crown (*n*). But engagements between the Crown and those in government service are voluntary on the part of the Crown, and afford no ground for a petition of right (*o*). A petition of right, moreover, will not lie in respect of a claim founded on a tort committed either by the Crown or by any servant of the Crown in the alleged performance of his duty (*p*). “A petition of right which complains of a tortious act done by the Crown, or by a public servant by the authority of the Crown, discloses no matter of complaint which can entitle the petitioner to redress. As in the eye of the law no such wrong can be done, so in law no right to redress can arise; and the petition, therefore, which rests on such a foundation, falls at once to the ground. . . . A servant of the Crown,” however, “is responsible in law for a tortious act done to a fellow-subject, though done by the authority of the Crown” (*q*).

(*k*) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34. The old procedure by petition of right under the common law and by *monstrans de droit* is expressly preserved by section 18 of the Act, but it is practically obsolete.

(*l*) See *Feather v. R.* (1865), 6 B. & S., at p. 294; and *Windsor and Annapolis Ry. Co. v. R.* (1886), 11 App. Cas., at pp. 614, 615.

(*m*) *Thomas v. R.* (1874), L. R. 10 Q. B. 31.

(*n*) *Windsor and Annapolis Ry. Co. v. R.*, *supra*.

(*o*) *Mitchell v. R.* (1890), 6 T. L. R. 332; *Tufnell, In re* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 164.

(*p*) *Tobin v. R.* (1864), 16 C. B. (N.S.) 310; and see *Raleigh v. Goschen*, [1898] 1 Ch. 73.

(*q*) *Per cur.* in *Feather v. R.* (1865), 6 B. & S., at pp. 295—297; if, however, the tort be waived and its proceeds have been accounted for to the Crown, the recovery of the money may be the subject of a petition of right: *Marshall Shipping Co. v. Board of Trade*, [1923] 2 K. B. 343; *Brocklebank v. R.*, [1925] 1 K. B. 52.

A petition of right is addressed to the King and intituled in that Division of the High Court to which the matter would have been appropriate if it had been a dispute between subject and subject. It must set forth the facts on which the petitioner bases his claim to relief, and must be signed by him and by his counsel or solicitor (*r*). The petition must be left with the Home Secretary, who will submit it to His Majesty for his *fiat* "that right be done" (*s*). It must be sealed with the seal of the Home Office and afterwards filed at the Writ Department of the Central Office of the High Court of Justice (*t*). One sealed copy must be left at the office of the Solicitor to the Treasury, indorsed as required, and praying for a plea or answer on behalf of the Crown within twenty-eight days (*u*). The petition is then transmitted to the particular department to which its subject-matter relates.

If the petition be presented for the recovery of real or personal property which has been alienated by the Crown, a copy of such petition and *fiat* must be served upon the person in possession of the property in order that he may have the opportunity of putting in a defence to the petition (*x*). Either the Crown or such person in possession may also raise a point of law in answer to it (*y*).

7. *A Motion against an Officer of the Court.*

As a rule, the High Court of Justice does not, on summary application, adjudicate between the parties upon matters which can be duly investigated in an ordinary action. To this rule, however, there are exceptions, the most important of which is perhaps the rule that the Court has plenary jurisdiction over its own officers, and in a proper case will exercise that jurisdiction summarily if acts of misconduct be brought to its notice. To punish, "by attachment, misconduct or disobedience in its officers" would seem to be the main object for which the Court interferes summarily (*z*).

A solicitor is an officer of the Court, and in that character amenable to its surveillance. He may, therefore, be com-

(*r*) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34, s. 1.

(*s*) *Ibid.*, s. 2.

(*t*) See an excellent note by Mr. G. Stuart Robertson in the *Annual Practice*, 1918, Vol. II., p. 1906.

(*u*) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34, s. 3.

(*x*) *Ibid.*, s. 5.

(*y*) *Ibid.*, s. 6.

(*z*) See the remarks of Coleridge, J., in *Hilliard, In re* (1845), 2 D. & L., at pp. 920, 921; and *Freston, In re* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 545; *Dudley, In re* (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 44.

pelled in a summary way to do his duty to the Court and to his client—and in former days also to his articled clerk (*a*). He may thus on motion be punished for gross negligence or other professional misconduct. He may be called upon to show cause why he should not be struck off the rolls or compelled to answer the matter contained in a certain affidavit. These are not criminal proceedings, but matters within the inherent jurisdiction of the Court (*b*). These matters are now heard by the Disciplinary Committee of the Law Society (*c*). But the Court will not interfere summarily to compel payment of money or the restitution of deeds detained by a solicitor, unless the deeds or moneys were received by him whilst acting in the character of a solicitor for the applicant to whom the deeds, &c., solely belong (*d*).

(*a*) See *Bayley, Ex parte* (1829), 9 B. & C. 691; *Thompson, In re* (1848), 1 Exch. 864.

(*b*) *Hardwick, In re* (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 148.

(*c*) See the Solicitors Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 65), s. 12; Solicitors Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 56), ss. 1—5; [1923] W. N., Part II., p. 205; and *post*, p. 835.

(*d*) *Cobeldick, Ex parte* (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 149.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE WRIT OF SUMMONS.

AN ACTION was defined by Sir E. Coke as "the legal demand of a man's right" (a). But the word has now a somewhat narrower meaning; for "action" has been defined by the Judicature Act, 1925, as "a civil proceeding commenced by writ, or in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules of Court" (b). It therefore includes most of the proceedings in the High Court of Justice.

The procedure in the High Court of Justice is mainly regulated by the Judicature Act, 1925 (c), replacing the former Acts, and by the "Rules of the Supreme Court," which are made by the Judges under powers conferred on them by these enactments, and have all the force and effect of a statute. These rules are divided according to their subject-matter into 72 "Orders," and are generally referred to thus—"Order III., r. 6."

There are many proceedings in the High Court which are not actions. In divorce matters the former procedure is retained, and the suit is commenced by a "petition." So are bankruptcy proceedings, and applications to wind up an insolvent company, or under the Trustee Act, 1925 (d). These proceedings, therefore, are not actions; nor are criminal proceedings in the King's Bench Division. There are also many matters which come before the Court on what is called a "motion," i.e., a summary application made to the Court, not necessarily in any action. Thus, in the case of a motion for a writ of *habeas corpus*, *mandamus* or prohibition, or to attach a person who has committed a contempt of Court, or to set aside an award, though notice of the application must of course be given to the person affected, no writ or petition is served on him. Again, an arbitrator, or referee, or an inferior Court may state a "special case" in order to obtain the opinion of the High Court on a matter of law. The practice with regard to petitions, motions and special cases is necessarily different from the procedure in actions, and it is therefore not included in this work.

(a) Co. Litt. 285 a.
(c) 15 Geo. 5, c. 49.

(b) 15 Geo. 5, c. 49, s. 225.
(d) 15 Geo. 5, c. 19.

The rest of this chapter is confined to "actions" in the narrower meaning of that term.

In all litigation the first step is to summon into Court the party against whom the proceedings are taken. For this purpose the plaintiff in an action in the High Court of Justice must employ one or other of two slightly different documents, either "a writ of summons," or "an originating summons" (e). The difference between these two documents will be explained hereafter (f). The writ of summons, for shortness, is usually called a writ.

A WRIT is a formal document, addressed to the defendant, by which the King commands him to "enter an appearance" within so many days, otherwise judgment will be signed against him. The writ must in the first place be drafted; this is done by the plaintiff or his solicitor. Next the writ must be issued; this is done by an officer of the Court. Lastly, the writ must be served; this is done by a clerk of the plaintiff's solicitor or by a professional process-server. It must state six different things:—

(i) The nature of the claim made, and the relief or remedy required in the action (g). It is not, however, essential that the writ should set forth the precise ground of complaint, or the precise remedy or relief to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled (h). He may in every case indorse his writ *generally*. There are six cases enumerated in Order III., r. 6, in which he may, if he wishes, indorse his writ *pecially* with a full Statement of Claim (i). There is also a third kind of indorsement of claim, viz., a claim for an *account* (k).

(ii) The name and residence of each plaintiff and defendant.

(iii) The name and place of business of the plaintiff's solicitor, if he employs one.

(e) The language of Order II., r. 1, is misleading. It says: "Every action in the High Court shall be commenced by a writ of summons." This is untrue. It should run: "Every action in the High Court shall be commenced either by a writ of summons or by an originating summons."

(f) See *post*, pp. 518—527.

(g) Order II., r. 1.

(h) Order III., r. 2.

(i) See Chap. XVI., *post*, p. 544.

(k) See *post*, p. 542.

(iv) The Division of the High Court in which the plaintiff intends to sue. If the action be to recover a debt or damages it will, as a rule, be brought in the King's Bench Division; but certain matters, as we have seen, are expressly assigned to other Divisions of the High Court (l).

(v) "An address for service"—an address, that is, at which notices and all other written communications may be left for him.

(vi) If he is suing, or if any one of the defendants is sued, in a representative capacity (*e.g.*, as trustee of the estate of some bankrupt, or as the executor or administrator of some one deceased), this also must be stated on the writ. If the plaintiff be a woman, the writ should state whether she is a "widow," or a "spinster," or the "wife of A.B."

All these matters must be inserted on the writ before it is issued.

A writ, which is generally indorsed, is usually in the following form. On the face of it will appear:—

1926—S—No. 717

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

BETWEEN FLORA SMITH	.	.	.	.	.	PLAINTIFF,
					AND	
CHARLES BROWN	.	.	.	.	.	DEFENDANT.

GEORGE THE FIFTH, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, to *Charles Brown*, of 56, *Cheapside*, in the *City of London*. WE COMMAND YOU, That within Eight Days after the Service of this Writ on you, inclusive of the day of such Service, you do cause an Appearance to be entered for you in an Action at the Suit of *Flora Smith*, the wife of *John Smith*. And take notice that in default of your so doing the Plaintiff may proceed therein, and Judgment may be given in your absence.

Witness, GEORGE, VISCOUNT CAVE, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, the 28th day of *May*, in the year of Our Lord One thousand nine hundred and twenty-six.

N.B.—This writ is to be served within TWELVE Calendar Months from the date thereof, or, if renewed, within SIX Calendar Months from the date of the last renewal, including the day of such date, and not afterwards.

The defendant may appear hereto by entering an Appearance, either personally or by Solicitor, at the Central Office, Royal Courts of Justice, London.

On the back of the writ will be printed or written some claim, such as the following:—

The Plaintiff is a married woman, suing in respect of her separate estate.

(l) See *ante*, pp. 355 *et seq.* Should a mistake be made in selecting a Division of the High Court to which the action is assigned, a transfer of the action to some other Division may be ordered, otherwise all proceedings in the action will be taken in the Division specified in the writ.

The Defendant is sued as executor of the late John Robinson, and also in his own right.

The Plaintiff's claim is for £520, balance of moneys received by the said John Robinson during his lifetime, and by the Defendant since his death, to the use of the Plaintiff,

*And for an Account,
And for a Receiver.*

This Writ was issued by *W. F. JONES*, of and whose Address for Service is 29, *Fleet Street, London E.C.*, Solicitor for the said Plaintiff, who resides at 107, *Fitzjohn's Avenue, Hampstead, N.W.*

This Writ was served by me at 56, *Cheapside, London, E.C.*, on the Defendant on *Saturday*, the 29th day of *May*, 1926.

Indorsed the 29th day of *May*, 1926.

(Signed) *C. LANE*,

(Address) 29, *Fleet Street, London, E.C.*

Issuing the Writ.

As soon as the writ is prepared and its indorsement duly drafted, the next step is to "issue" it; that is, to make it an official document, emanating from the Court. The plaintiff or his solicitor takes two copies of the proposed writ either to the Central Office at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, or, except in a probate action, to a district registry, signs one copy and pays thirty shillings. The officer impresses a thirty shilling stamp on the signed copy, and files it; he stamps the other with what is called a seal, and hands it back; this then becomes the writ in the action, and bears the date of the day on which it is issued. If the action is to be tried in the Chancery Division, the writ will, at the same time, be marked with the name of one of the six Judges of that Division, to whom the action is thenceforth assigned.

There are two cases in which leave to issue a writ is necessary:—

(i) Where the defendant is not in England. No writ that the plaintiff intends to have served on any person abroad will be issued, unless the plaintiff first obtains the leave of a Judge; and such leave will only be granted in the cases specified in Order XI.

(ii) Where the plaintiff seeks to join on his writ different causes of action which may not be joined without leave. See, for instance, Order XVIII., rr. 2, 3; under these rules it is sufficient if the plaintiff obtains leave to join such claims from a Master.

Service of the Writ.

When the writ has been issued and sealed it must be served on the defendant, unless his solicitor undertakes in writing to accept service and to enter an appearance for him (*m*). Service is made by delivering a copy of the writ to the defendant personally, and at the same time showing him the original if demanded. Should, however, the plaintiff be unable to effect prompt personal service, he may apply to a Master for an order for "substituted service," *e.g.*, by serving the defendant's partner, solicitor, steward or agent, or by giving him notice of the writ by registered letter or by advertisement in the newspapers (*n*). The mode of serving the writ on particular defendants and in particular actions is specified in Order IX. In an action to recover land, where the premises are wholly deserted and void, service of the writ, when it cannot otherwise be effected, may be made by posting a copy of it on the door of the dwelling-house or other conspicuous part of the property in question (*o*).

If the defendant be out of jurisdiction, then, if he be a British subject, he can be served with the original writ; but, if a foreigner, he can be served only with notice of the writ. Service of the writ itself on a foreigner when he is not in the British dominions is of no effect in law (*p*).

The writ of summons remains in force for twelve calendar months from the date when it is issued, and must be served within that period, unless the plaintiff can obtain leave to renew it for a further period. The Master will not grant such leave unless he is satisfied that reasonable efforts have been made to serve the defendant. The writ will not generally be renewed if the Statute of Limitations has run so as to bar the debt or claim (*q*).

Ne exeat regno.—Where the plaintiff, suing in an action in the High Court proves by evidence on oath to the satisfaction of a Judge, at any time before final judgment, that he has a good cause of action

(*m*) Order IX., r. 1. A solicitor, who does not enter an appearance in pursuance of his written undertaking so to do, will be liable to attachment: Order XII., r. 18.

(*n*) Order IX., r. 2.

(*o*) Order IX., r. 9.

(*p*) Order XI., rr. 6—8.

(*q*) *Doyle v. Kaufman* (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 7, 340; *Hewett v. Barr*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 98; *The Espanoleto*, [1920] P. 223.

against the defendant to the amount of £50 or upwards, and that there is probable cause for believing that the defendant is about to quit England unless he be apprehended, and that the absence of the defendant from England will materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action (*r*), such Judge may order the defendant to be arrested and imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, unless and until he has sooner given security, not exceeding the amount claimed in the action, that he will not go out of England without the leave of the Court. The defendant cannot be kept in prison after final judgment has been signed (*s*).

Appearance.

As soon as the defendant has been served with a writ, he must make up his mind whether he will defend the action or not. If he decides to do so, he must enter an appearance within eight days after the writ, or notice of the writ, is served on him, unless a longer time is prescribed. This is done by the defendant or his solicitor, who hands to the proper officer at the Central Office or district registry two copies of a memorandum in writing bearing the date of the day on which he delivers it. One copy the officer retains; the other he seals with his official stamp and returns to the person entering the appearance. The memorandum must state the name and address of the defendant's solicitor, if he has one, or, if not, of the defendant; and must give an address for service, at which letters and notices may be left for him. By so appearing, the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the Court (*t*). He must on the same day give notice to the plaintiff or his solicitor that he has appeared, and send him the copy of the memorandum which the officer sealed, as a certificate that he really has appeared on the day indicated by the seal.

If the plaintiff has issued his writ out of a district registry and the defendant resides or carries on business within the district of such registry, the writ of summons must direct the defendant to

(*r*) That is to say, that his evidence is absolutely necessary, not that judgment cannot be realised if he goes. The plaintiff must disclose the facts which the defendant can prove, so that if he admits them no order will be made: Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 6); Order LXIX.

(*s*) *Hume v. Druyff* (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 214.

(*t*) Unless he appears "under protest." As to this, see *Keymer v. Reddy*, [1912] 1 K. B. 215; *Weir v. McVicar*, [1925] 2 K. B. 127; and Order XII., r. 30.

cause an appearance to be entered at that registry (*u*). But should the defendant neither reside nor carry on business within such district, the writ must inform him that he may cause an appearance to be entered at his option either at the district registry or at the Central Office in London (*x*).

If the defendant appears, or any of the defendants appear, in London, the action will proceed there unless the Court or a Judge be satisfied that the defendant so appearing is a merely formal defendant or has no substantial cause to interfere in the conduct of the action.

The appearance ought to be entered within the time named on the writ. A defendant may, however, appear at any time before judgment has been signed against him; though, if he do so after the time limited for appearance, he will not, unless otherwise ordered, be entitled to any further time for delivering his Defence, or for any other purpose, than if he had appeared according to the writ (*y*). Partners sued in the name of their firm must appear individually in their own names. But all subsequent proceedings will continue in the name of the firm (*z*).

Default of Appearance.

The writ usually commands the defendant to enter an appearance within eight days after the service of the writ upon him, inclusive of the day of such service. But when any defendant is out of the jurisdiction of the Court, the time allowed for appearance is not necessarily eight days, but generally a longer period determined by the distance of the locality in which the defendant is or is supposed to be. If the defendant does not enter an appearance within the period named on the writ, the plaintiff is, as a rule, on filing an affidavit that the writ has been properly served, entitled to enter "judgment in default of appearance." Where the writ is specially indorsed, and the defendant does not appear, the plaintiff may enter final judgment for the full amount claimed on the writ, and costs (*a*). If the plaintiff has claimed and signs judgment for more than is due to him, the judgment may be set aside unless he reduces it to the proper amount (*b*). If the action be for the

(*u*) Order XII., r. 4.

(*x*) *Ibid.*, r. 5.

(*y*) *Ibid.*, r. 22.

(*z*) Order XLVIII.A., r. 5.

(*a*) Order XIII., r. 3.

(*b*) See *Muir v. Jenks*, [1913] 2 K. B. 412.

recovery of land, the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment that he shall recover possession of the land. If the action be for damages or the return of a chattel, the plaintiff is not entitled to final judgment; he can only have what is called an interlocutory judgment—a judgment, that is, in his favour, but with no amount stated. The amount of damages or the value of the chattel must be subsequently assessed by a jury or by an Official Referee (c), or ascertained in any way in which a question arising in an action may be tried. The Master may order a Statement of Claim or particulars to be filed before the assessment. The defendant, although he has not appeared, may attend and argue and call evidence at the assessment. And then the plaintiff may enter final judgment for the amount so assessed (d).

But where the action is of a kind not specially provided for by Order XIII. (e.g., a claim for an injunction to restrain a nuisance or a breach of covenant) the procedure is different. The plaintiff is not at this stage allowed to enter any judgment, either final or interlocutory, although the defendant has not appeared. The plaintiff must prepare a Statement of Claim. But he does not deliver it to the defendant; he files it in the offices of the Court (e). If the defendant still does not appear, the plaintiff, after waiting ten days, can move the Court for judgment in default of Defence. The Statement of Claim will stand admitted, and the plaintiff will obtain such judgment as upon the Statement of Claim the Court considers him to be entitled (f).

Originating Summons.

We have seen that most actions in the High Court of Justice are commenced by a writ. But there are cases in which an action may in every Division of the High Court be also commenced by an originating summons, which is defined as “a summons other than a summons in a pending cause or matter” (g). This summons is disposed of privately by a Judge sitting in chambers and not in open

(c) See *ante*, pp. 362 *et seq.*

(e) Order XIII., r. 12.

(g) Order LXXI., r. 1A.

(d) See Order XIII., rr. 1—11.

(f) Order XXVII., r. 11.

Court, but in the Chancery Division it may be adjourned into Court for argument.

For example, any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, may apply by originating summons to a Judge of any Division of the High Court for the determination of any question of construction arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested (*h*).⁴ The question to be determined must be clearly stated on the summons itself; it must be a question of law, not of fact (*i*). The Judge may direct such persons to be served with the summons as he may think fit. The application must be supported by such evidence as the Judge may require, though the parties sometimes agree on a "statement of facts." But the Judge is not bound to determine any such question of construction in chambers, if in his opinion it ought not to be determined on originating summons but by an action commenced in the usual way, in which formal pleadings can be delivered and evidence given in open Court.

There are many other cases in which the procedure by originating summons may be usefully employed. Any person interested in any estate or trust may thus apply to have any question arising in the administration of such estate or trust determined without the necessity of having the whole estate or trust generally administered (*k*). Applications may also be made by originating summons for foreclosure or redemption of mortgaged property (*l*), for an order to sell a debtor's interest in land delivered in execution (*m*), for the appointment of new trustees or a vesting order (*n*), for the maintenance of infants, and under the following Acts of Parliament:—

The Lands Clauses Act, 1845 (*o*).

The Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (*p*).

The Mortmain Act, 1891 (*q*).

The Judicial Trustees Act, 1896 (*r*).

The Settled Land Act, 1925 (*s*).

The Law of Property Act, 1925 (*t*).

But a general declaration of title ought rarely to be made on a vendor and purchaser summons, such summons being intended for

(*h*) Order LIVA., r. 1.

(*k*) Order LV., r. 3.

(*m*) *Ibid.*, r. 9B.

(*o*) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18.

(*q*) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 73.

(*s*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 18.

(*i*) *Lewis v. Green*, [1905] 2 Ch. 340.

(*l*) *Ibid.*, r. 5A.

(*n*) *Ibid.*, r. 13A.

(*p*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.

(*r*) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 35.

(*t*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 20.

the decision of isolated points arising out of and connected with the contract (u).

The great advantage of this mode of procedure is that the parties obtain an early decision from the Judge without the expense and delay of pleadings. In most, but not all, cases the procedure by originating summons is designed to settle disputes where the facts are not controverted.

(u) *Wallis and Barnard's Contract, In re*, [1899] 2 Ch. 515.

CHAPTER XIV.

PROCEDURE WHERE THE WRIT IS GENERALLY INDORSED.

A GENERAL indorsement is little more than a label which indicates the class of action to which the suit belongs; it is "not essential to set forth the precise ground of complaint, or the precise remedy or relief to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled" (a). There is one exception: in actions of libel a general indorsement must "state sufficient particulars to identify the publications in respect of which the action is brought" (b).

One instance of a general indorsement has already been given (c); others are subjoined:—

Assault.

The plaintiff's claim is for damages for an assault upon him made by the defendant on February 17, 1926.

Libel.

The plaintiff's claim is for damages for a libel contained in the *Blankshire Gazette*, dated December 10, 1926, being an article headed "Wolves in Sheep's Clothing," in the third column of page 7 of the issue of that date.

Trespass.

The plaintiff's claim is for £200 damages for the defendants' wrongful entry upon the plaintiff's land known as Long Acre, East Grinstead, in the county of Sussex; and for an injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents, from entering on the plaintiff's said land or from otherwise interfering with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment thereof.

Summons for Directions.

As soon as the defendant has entered an appearance in any action (d) commenced by a writ generally indorsed, the

(a) Order III., r. 2.

(b) *Ibid.*, r. 9.

(c) *Ante*, pp. 520—521.

(d) Except in an Admiralty action, in actions commenced by specially indorsed writ or proceedings by originating summons. Where the writ is specially indorsed, the plaintiff may take out a summons for directions.

provisions of Order XXX. apply, and the plaintiff must promptly take out a SUMMONS FOR DIRECTIONS. This is a summons by means of which the Master (e) is asked to give directions with respect to any of the proceedings in the action from appearance to trial. It is taken out under Order XXX., which has no application until the defendant has entered an appearance. The defendant may not take out this summons. All that the defendant can do, if the plaintiff neglects to take out a summons, is to wait for fourteen days after the entry of his appearance, and then he can take out a summons for an order to dismiss the action, on the hearing of which the Master may either dismiss the action on such terms as may be just, or may deal with the application in all respects as if it were a summons for directions (f). The plaintiff must take out a summons for directions before he takes any fresh step in the action other than an application for an injunction or for a receiver, or the entering of judgment in default of Defence under Order XXVII.

On the first application under a summons for directions no affidavit is used, except by special order. The Master accepts the statements of the parties or their solicitors or counsel as to the nature of the action, the proposed line of defence, and the assistance they respectively need to enable them properly to prepare for trial. Though the plaintiff alone can take out the summons, all parties must at the hearing, so far as practicable, apply for any directions which they desire. The Master, too, may give whatever directions he thinks right, though neither party has asked for them. On the first hearing of the summons it is not usually possible, or even desirable, to give directions as to everything that may prove necessary at a later stage of the proceedings. Hence it is provided that application for further directions may be made subsequently by any party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who needs them. He must reinstate the original summons in the Master's list, and give

(e) Where the action is in the Commercial List, interlocutory applications are not heard by a Master. The Judge taking the Commercial List hears these applications in the first instance.

(f) Order XXX., r. 8.

two clear days' notice in writing to the other party stating what it is he wants. He may be ordered to pay the costs of the subsequent application, if the Master thinks that such further directions ought properly to have been asked for on the first hearing.

Among the various matters dealt with by the Master on a summons for directions are :—

Pleadings.—The most important and most frequent of the questions which come before the Master on this summons is “ Shall there or shall there not be pleadings? ” As a rule, the plaintiff cannot deliver a Statement of Claim without the order of a Master; and after a summons for directions has been taken out the defendant cannot deliver a Defence without the order of a Master.

Particulars.—If any pleading does not give the other party the information to which he is entitled, he may apply for “ particulars,” that is, a statement in writing supplementing the defective pleading and setting out the details omitted. Such details ought, of course, to have been given in the original pleading.

Evidence.—On this summons also the Master deals with all questions as to interrogatories and discovery of documents (*g*). Again, it may be necessary to have the evidence of some person abroad taken on commission or under letters of request, or to have a witness who is dangerously ill or about to go abroad examined here before the trial (*h*), or to obtain a copy of an entry in a banker's book under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879 (*i*). A very wide power—but little used—is given to a Master on the hearing of a summons for directions. He may “ order that evidence of any particular fact shall be given by statement on oath of information and belief, or by production of documents or entries in books, or by copies of documents or entries, or otherwise,” as he may direct (*k*).

Accounts.—On this summons, too, the Master will order

(*g*) See *post*, pp. 577 *et seq.*

(*h*) See *post*, p. 584.

(*i*) 42 Vict. c. 11.

(*k*) Order XXX., r. 7; the power is most frequently used in the Commercial Court.

the delivery of an account under Order XV. (l) or the usual partnership accounts. And indeed at any stage of the proceedings a Judge or Master may direct any necessary accounts to be taken, notwithstanding that there may be some further relief sought for, or some special issue still to be tried (m).

Security for Costs.—The defendant may in certain cases ask for an order to compel the plaintiff to give security for the costs of the action; *e.g.*, where the plaintiff resides permanently abroad, and has no substantial property, real or personal, in England. But the mere fact that the plaintiff is insolvent, or is a married woman, is not sufficient ground for such an order.

Stay of Proceedings.—Again, on a summons for directions, the Master has power to stay all proceedings, if the action is premature (n), or is frivolous and vexatious (o), or should have been brought elsewhere (p), or if the plaintiff's mode of conducting the action is oppressive and vexatious, or if he has not paid the costs of a previous action brought on the same cause of action, or if the matter in dispute is one which the parties had agreed to refer to arbitration (q). The Master will also on this summons, if the plaintiff is unduly delaying the proceedings, dismiss the action "for want of prosecution."

Place of Trial.—In every action in every Division the place of trial is now fixed by the Master (r). He will, as a rule, fix it in the place which he deems least expensive and most convenient for both parties and the majority of the witnesses on both sides (s). But if either party can satisfy him that it would be unfair to fix the trial there, the Master will direct that the action shall be tried in some other place.

Mode of Trial.—The parties have a right to demand trial

(l) See *post*, p. 542.

(m) Order XXXIII., r. 2.

(n) *Smith v. Selwyn*, [1914] 3 K. B. 98.

(o) *Reichel v. Magrath* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 665; *Remington v. Scoles*, [1897] 2 Ch. 1; *Critchell v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.*, [1907] 1 K. B. 860.

(p) *Logan v. Bank of Scotland* (No. 2), [1906] 1 K. B. 141.

(q) Arbitration Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49), s. 4.

(r) Order XXXVI., r. 1.

(s) *Ibid.*, r. 10.

by jury in certain cases (t). In all other cases it rests entirely with the Master to determine the mode of trial.

A summons for directions must be served on all parties to the action who may be affected by it not less than four days before the day named in it for the hearing of the application. The form of the summons is as follows:—

1926.—B.—No. 136.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

BETWEEN ARTHUR BROWN PLAINTIFF,
AND
CHARLES DUKE DEFENDANT.

Let all parties concerned attend the Master in Chambers, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, on *Thursday*, the *25th* day of *February*, 1926, at 1.30 o'clock in the *afternoon*, on the hearing of an application on the part of the *Plaintiff* to show cause why an Order for Directions should not be made in this Action as follows:—

Pleadings to be delivered

Particulars. That the

deliver within days particulars of
and that in default all further proceedings in this Action be stayed until such particulars are delivered (or, that the defendant be precluded from giving evidence in support thereof on the trial of the Action), and that the have
days to deliver his

after delivery of such particulars.

Admissions.

Discovery. That the *Defendant* file an affidavit of documents in ten days.

Interrogatories. For leave to interrogate the *Defendant*. Answers to be filed within ten days.

Inspection of documents.

Inspection of real or personal property.

Commission. *To Gibraltar to examine witnesses.*

Examination of witnesses

Place of trial. *Middlesex.*

Mode of trial. *Special Jury.*

Any other interlocutory matter or thing.

Dated the *19th* day of *February*, 1926.

This summons was taken out by *Messrs. L., M. & Co.*, of —, Solicitors for *Plaintiff*.

To X. Y.

of —,

Solicitor for *Defendant*.

The form of the order is as follows:—

1926.—B.—No. 136.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

MASTER WHATELY, Master in Chambers.

BETWEEN ARTHUR BROWN PLAINTIFF,
AND
CHARLES DUKE DEFENDANT.

(t) See Order XXXVI., rr. 2—9, and *post*, pp. 588, 589.

UPON HEARING the Solicitors on both sides, the following directions are hereby given, and it is ordered—

That there be pleadings in the action as follows:—Statement of Claim containing full particulars to be delivered in 10 days from this date. Defence containing full particulars in 14 days from delivery of Statement of Claim. Reply if Counterclaim in 10 days after delivery of Defence.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant do, respectively after delivery of Defence and within 10 days after service of copy receipt for deposit in Court, answer on affidavit stating what documents are or have been in their possession or power relating to the matters in question in this action.

Inspection of Documents upon usual notice.

That the action be tried in Middlesex.

That the action be tried with Judge alone unless plaintiff gives notice with notice of trial requiring jury.

Liberty to either party to apply.

And that the costs of this application be costs in the cause.

Dated the 25th day of *February*, 1926.

In commercial cases, directions are given by the Judge in charge of the commercial list, and not by a Master. His order is frequently in the following form:—

UPON HEARING the Solicitors on both sides, the following directions are hereby given, and it is ordered—

That the action be placed in the Commercial List.

That Points of Claim be delivered by the Plaintiffs in four days.

That Points of Defence be delivered by the Defendants in four days.

That lists of documents be exchanged between the parties in seven days, and inspection be given within three days afterwards.

That the action be tried without a jury.

That the date of trial be fixed for 16th *June*, 1926.

That the costs of this application be costs in the cause.

CHAPTER XV.

PROCEDURE WHERE THE WRIT IS INDORSED SPECIALLY OR
FOR AN ACCOUNT.

A PLAINTIFF can specially indorse his writ in six cases only. These are stated in Order III., r. 6, which runs as follows:—"In all actions where the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising—

(A) Upon a contract, express or implied (as, for instance, on a bill of exchange, promissory note or cheque, or other simple contract debt); or

(B) On a bond or contract under seal for payment of a liquidated amount of money; or

(C) On a statute where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; or

(D) On a guaranty, whether under seal or not, where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only; or

(E) On a trust; or

(F) In actions for the recovery of land, with or without a claim for rent or mesne profits, by a landlord against a tenant whose term has expired or has been duly determined by notice to quit, or has become liable to forfeiture for non-payment of rent, or against persons claiming under such tenant."

Even in these six cases the plaintiff is not compelled to indorse his writ specially, though as a rule he will do so, because it may lead to judgment being given more speedily. He may, if he prefers, indorse his writ generally or in some cases for an account.

The sixth and last case will be dealt with later on in the Chapter on Procedure in Actions for the Recovery of

Land (a). We will only deal here with the first five cases. In these, it will be observed, the claim arises on a contract, express or implied, or under a statute, or on a trust—never on a tort; and in each case the claim must be for “a debt or liquidated demand in money.” The indorsement must state the precise amount claimed for debt, for interest if any payable, and for costs, and must also inform the defendant that, on payment of these amounts, further proceedings will be stayed.

A few words may be necessary to explain the meaning of the phrase “a debt or liquidated demand.” These words exclude from the operation of the rule any action for unliquidated damages, that is to say, any action in which the amount of the verdict depends upon all the circumstances of the case and on the conduct of the parties, and is fixed by opinion or conjecture. In such cases one cannot say positively beforehand what sum the jury will award the plaintiff if he succeeds. Merely inserting a figure on the writ (*e.g.*, “the plaintiff claims £500 damages”) will not make such a claim liquidated. But whenever the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled (if he is entitled to anything) can be ascertained by calculation or fixed by any scale of charges, or other positive *data*, it is said to be “liquidated” (*i.e.*, “made clear”), and then, in the five cases mentioned, the writ can be specially indorsed.

It is not necessary that a fixed sum should have been expressly agreed on at the date of contract; if no price or remuneration was then fixed, the plaintiff will be paid whatever is regular and usual, according to prices current in the trade, or the scale of fees recognised in the profession. Such a claim is called a claim for a *quantum meruit*—“as much as the plaintiff has earned”—and it may be specially indorsed (b).

A solicitor's bill of costs, for instance, is a liquidated demand, although it is subject to taxation (c). A writ may be specially indorsed with a claim for arrears of rent, but not for damages for breach of a covenant to repair. Damages for wrongful dismissal are unliquidated, because the plaintiff may have obtained a better situation within a week of his dismissal. If A agrees to complete certain work for B by a specified date or in default to pay £5 per week “as liquidated damages” till the work is completed, then, if this payment is in fact liquidated damages and not a penalty, it can be claimed on a specially indorsed writ (d). A claim against the separate estate of a married woman may be specially indorsed (e).

(a) See *post*, p. 590.

(b) *Lagos v. Grunwaldt*, [1910] 1 K. B. 41, 48.

(c) *Smith v. Edwardes* (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 10.

(d) *Toomey v. Murphy*, [1897] 2 Ir. R. 601.

(e) *Scott v. Morley* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 120; *Downe v. Fletcher* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 11.

A special indorsement must contain full particulars with dates and items sufficient to inform the defendant specifically what is the claim that is made against him. It must state concisely all material facts necessary to constitute a complete cause of action. It is a Statement of Claim, and should be so headed (f); it should also be signed by the counsel or solicitor who drafted it. Such heading and signature are important, for they make it clear to the defendant that the plaintiff has not only served him with a writ of summons to which he must appear, but has also delivered to him a Statement of Claim to which he must plead (g). The plaintiff thus delivers a pleading without first obtaining the leave of a Master (which, as we have seen, he cannot do when the writ is generally indorsed). No further Statement of Claim can be delivered (h). If the plaintiff subsequently desires to amplify the statement indorsed on his writ, he must deliver an "Amended Statement of Claim"; this he can do once without leave (i).

Thus, the indorsement must expressly state the contract on which the plaintiff sues, and show that the defendant is liable thereunder. It is of no avail to set out such contract in an affidavit under Order XIV., if it is not stated in the indorsement. But it will be sufficient if the indorsement refers to some account already rendered which contains the necessary particulars. A claim for interest may be included in a special indorsement, provided facts be also alleged which show that the plaintiff is entitled to such interest. If the plaintiff sues for the balance of an account due, the defendant is entitled to know how the balance claimed is arrived at. A claim for rent must state the dates at which the rent claimed fell due. In any action on a bill of exchange, promissory note or cheque, full particulars of the amount and date of the negotiable instrument, and of the parties thereto, must be given on the writ. But a special indorsement need not contain an averment that a condition precedent has been duly performed (k).

A few precedents of special indorsements may help to explain these rules:—

(f) *Cassidy v. McAloon* (1893), 32 L. R. Ir. 368.

(g) A pleading is "delivered"; a writ, summons or notice of motion is "served."

(h) Order XX., r. 1 (a).

(i) Order XXVIII., r. 2.

(k) Order XIX., r. 14; *Bradley v. Chamberlyn*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 439; such performance is impliedly averred in every pleading: *Gates v. Jacobs*, [1920] 1 Ch. 567.

No. 1.

Action on a Butcher's Bill.

[R. S. C., Appendix C, sect. iv. (l)].

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

The plaintiff's claim is for the price of goods sold and delivered.

Particulars :—

	£	s.	d.
1926. December 31.			
Balance of account for butcher's meat to this date, full particulars of which have been delivered	35	10	0
1927. January 1 to March 31.			
Butcher's meat, full particulars of which have been delivered and exceed three folios	74	5	0
			109 15 0
1927. February 1. Paid			45 0 0
Balance due	£64	15	0

Signed, JOHN SMITH,

Plaintiff's Solicitor.

No. 2.

Action on a Bill of Exchange.

(Indorsee against Acceptor.)

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff's claim is for £308 12s. 10d., principal, interest and notarial expenses, payable by the defendant to the plaintiff on a bill of exchange for £300, dated February 1, 1926.

2. The said bill was on that day drawn on the defendant by one Frederick Brown, payable three months after date to James Robinson, or order.

3. On February 2, 1926, the defendant accepted the said bill. On April 20, 1926, James Robinson indorsed the said bill to the plaintiff. Yet the defendant has not paid the same.

Particulars.

	£	s.	d.
1926.			
May 4. Principal due	300	0	0
Interest to date		8	11 4
Noting		0	1 6
Total	£308	12	10

The plaintiff also claims interest on £300 of the above sum at £5 per cent. from date hereof until payment.

Signed, RICHARD ROE.

(l) By R. S. C., "Appendix A," or "B," or "C," is meant one or other of the Appendices of Precedents of Writs, Notices or Pleadings, which are attached to the Rules of the Supreme Court.

No. 3.

Action on a Guarantee.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. On February 9, 1926, one Silvanus Smith applied to the plaintiff to supply him with certain goods on credit.

2. On February 15, 1926, the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff in which he agreed that, if the plaintiff would supply Silvanus Smith with the said goods on credit, he would be responsible to the plaintiff for the due payment of their price.

3. The plaintiff accordingly supplied Silvanus Smith with the said goods, the prices of which amount to £175 10s.

[Here should follow particulars of the said goods with dates, items, and prices.]

4. Neither Silvanus Smith nor the defendant has paid the plaintiff the said sum of £175 10s., or any part thereof, and the plaintiff claims £175 10s.

Signed, JOSEPH GRANT.

Order XIV.

But the chief benefit which a plaintiff derives from specially indorsing his writ is that by so doing he is enabled to apply for summary judgment under Order XIV. This Order only applies where the defendant has entered an appearance to a specially indorsed writ. The plaintiff (or some one else familiar with the facts (*m*)) must make an affidavit verifying the cause of action and stating that in his belief there is no defence to it; but this affidavit (unlike others used in other interlocutory proceedings) will not be sufficient if the deponent can only speak to the facts from information and belief (*m*). He must speak to the facts of his own knowledge. The plaintiff must then serve on the defendant a copy of this affidavit and of any exhibits attached to it and a summons, calling on him to show cause why the plaintiff should not be at liberty to enter final judgment for the full amount claimed on the writ together with interest and costs. Thereupon, unless the defendant can satisfy the Master that he has a good defence to the action, an order will be made empowering the plaintiff to enter judgment accordingly. The application cannot be heard until four clear days after the service of the summons on the defendant. He may show cause against it by

(*m*) *Lagos v. Grunwaldt*, [1910] 1 K. B. 41; *Symon v. Palmer's Stores*, [1912] 1 K. B. 259.

affidavit or by offering to bring money into Court. The Master may allow the defendant to be examined upon oath.

On the hearing of the application the Master has four courses open to him:—

(i) He may give leave to the plaintiff to enter final judgment forthwith for the full amount claimed on the writ with interest, if any due, up to date of judgment and certain fixed costs.

This power should only be exercised in cases where the plaintiff's right to recover is practically indisputable. If to a portion of the plaintiff's claim no defence is shown in the defendant's affidavit, the plaintiff may have judgment forthwith for that portion of his claim, and the defendant will be allowed to defend as to the residue. Judgment may be entered under Order XIV. against a firm, even though one of the partners be an infant (*n*). It may also be obtained against a married woman (*o*); but in this case the judgment must be drawn up in the form prescribed in *Scott v. Morley* (*p*).

(ii) He may give the defendant leave to defend, subject to conditions, such as paying money into Court or giving security.

This course is only taken where the defendant's affidavit discloses a defence which is of a shadowy or doubtful nature. If the defendant pays the money into Court or gives security within the time prescribed, the action will proceed in the ordinary way.

(iii) If, however, the facts alleged by the defendant in his affidavit or by his own *viva voce* evidence or otherwise do amount to a defence to the action, either in fact or law, he is entitled to unconditional leave to defend, and the plaintiff's application may be dismissed with costs.

It is enough that there is a *bona fide* question to be tried, and the Master should give unconditional leave, even though he may think that the defendant will ultimately

(*n*) *Harris v. Beauchamp* (No. 1), [1893] 2 Q. B. 534.

(*o*) *Downe v. Fletcher* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 11; *Axford v. Reid* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 548.

(*p*) (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 120.

fail (q). It is no part of the Master's duty to try the action. The defendant is not bound in his affidavit to show a good defence on the merits; a technical defence, such as the Statute of Limitations, is sufficient. But it must be a defence. An affidavit merely pleading poverty, or showing hardship, or a remedy over against a third person, will not avail. A general statement, "I do not owe the money," or a vague suggestion of fraud or other misconduct, will not suffice (r). Where the defendant has no defence, but a good counterclaim for a larger amount than the claim, the plaintiff is entitled to have judgment on his claim, but execution will usually be stayed until after the trial of the counterclaim.

(iv) Lastly, the Master may, with the consent of the parties, himself then and there dispose of the action finally and without appeal. Or with the like consent he may make an order referring the action to a Master, in which case an appeal lies from the decision of that Master to a Divisional Court (s).

Where leave, whether conditional or unconditional, is given to defend, the Master has power to give all such directions as to the further conduct of the action as can be given on a summons for directions under Order XXX. He may order the action to be set down for trial without further pleadings; and, if he is of opinion that a prolonged trial will not be requisite, he may direct that it shall be entered in the special list of short causes under Order XIV., r. 8, and be tried either with or without a jury (t). He may not, however, restrict the defences which the defendant may raise at the trial (u). Nor will the defendant at the trial be restricted to the defences disclosed in his affidavit.

An order made under Order XIV. that the plaintiff be at liberty to enter final judgment for his claim places him

(q) *Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Co.* (1901), 85 L. T. 262; *Wells v. Allott*, [1904] 2 K. B. 842; *Dott v. Bonnard* (1904), 21 T. L. R. 166; *Codd v. Delap* (1905), 92 L. T. 510.

(r) See *Wallingford v. Mutual Society* (1880), 5 App. Cas., at p. 704.

(s) Order LIV., r. 22A.

(t) See *Macartney v. Macartney* (1909), 25 T. L. R. 818.

(u) *Langton v. Roberts* (1894), 10 T. L. R. 492.

at once in the position of a secured creditor (*x*); and as soon as he enters judgment in pursuance of the leave thus given him, he becomes a judgment creditor (*y*). No second action can ever be brought on the same cause of action. Hence a plaintiff should specially indorse his writ whenever he has a fair chance of obtaining summary judgment. But if there is no reasonable prospect of his obtaining summary judgment, the plaintiff should not take out a summons under Order XIV. He is not bound to do so merely because his writ is specially indorsed. Order XIV. is only intended to apply to cases where there is no substantial dispute as to the facts or the law. If he applies for summary judgment where there is an obvious defence to the action, he runs the risk of his summons being dismissed with costs.

There are many cases, then, in which a plaintiff who has specially indorsed his writ does not take out a summons under Order XIV. He can take out a summons for directions under Order XXX. He need not take out any summons at all. When he served his writ, he delivered a Statement of Claim. To this Statement of Claim the defendant must plead within ten days from the time limited for appearance, unless such time is extended by order or consent, or unless in the meantime the plaintiff serves a summons for judgment under Order XIV. or a summons for directions. As soon as either of these summonses is served on him, the defendant must hold his hand and wait to see what order the Master will make at the hearing. But if neither summons be taken out, the defendant must deliver his Defence within ten days from the time limited for appearance (*z*); otherwise the plaintiff can enter judgment in default of Defence. To this Defence it will generally be unnecessary for the plaintiff to deliver a Reply (*a*); he can give notice of trial within four days after the Defence has been delivered, and he can then at once enter the case for trial—a most expeditious procedure.

(*x*) *Ford, In re*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 211.

(*y*) *Gurney, In re*, [1896] 2 Ch. 863.

(*z*) Order XXI., r. 6. He can do so without the leave of a Master.

(*a*) See *post*, p. 565.

INDORSEMENT FOR AN ACCOUNT.

We have now dealt with the procedure when the writ is

(i) Generally indorsed,

(ii) Specially indorsed.

There is one other kind of indorsement occasionally employed, to which belongs a procedure of its own:—

(iii) An indorsement for an account.

In order to obtain such an account from the defendant, the plaintiff should indorse his writ with a claim to have an account taken under Order III., r. 8. This might run as follows:—“The plaintiff’s claim is for an account of all moneys received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff as his rent-collector and general agent and for payment of the amount found due on taking such account.”

The procedure, when such an account is claimed, is regulated by Order XV. If the defendant does not appear to such a writ, an order for the account claimed will be forthwith made, on proof of service, as of course; if he does appear, the order will nevertheless be made, unless the defendant can show that he is not an accounting party, or that he has already fully accounted, or that there is some other preliminary question to be tried. The application for such order may be made at any time after the time for entering an appearance has expired: if the defendant has appeared, it must be made on a summons for directions. If an order be made on such an application, the account may be taken by a Master, or a District Registrar, or by a special referee or an official referee (*b*).

After the order is made, the first step generally is for the defendant to deliver an account. This the plaintiff proceeds to criticise. If he can show that the defendant has taken credit for payments which he never made, or cannot vouch, he can have the items struck out; that is called “falsifying.” If he can show that the defendant has received moneys with which he has not debited him-

(b) See the Arbitration Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49), ss. 13, 14; *Rochevoucauld v. Boustead*, [1897] 1 Ch. 196; and *ante*, p. 529.

self, the plaintiff can have these items added; that is called "surcharging" (c). When this process has been exhausted, the Master or referee will have arrived at a correct account, and can then make an order that the defendant shall pay the plaintiff the balance shown by such account to be due to him.

(c) See Odgers on Pleading (9th ed.), pp. 46, 244, 245.

CHAPTER XVI.

PLEADINGS.

The Function of Pleadings.

IN actions where the writ is generally indorsed, and in many actions where the writ is specially indorsed, the Master will order pleadings to be interchanged between the parties. The defendant is entitled to know what it is that the plaintiff will allege against him at the trial; the plaintiff in his turn is entitled to know what defence will be raised in answer to his claim. The defendant may dispute every statement made by the plaintiff, or he may be prepared to prove other facts which put a different complexion on the case. He may rely on a point of law, or raise a cross-claim of his own. In any event, before the trial comes on it is highly desirable that the parties should know exactly what are the matters in dispute; otherwise they may go to great expense in procuring evidence to prove at the trial facts which their opponents will at once concede. On the other hand, if they assume that their opponents will not raise a particular point, they may be taken by surprise at the trial.

Moreover, it is necessary to ascertain the nature of the controversy in order to determine the most appropriate mode of trial. It may turn out to be a point of pure law, which should be decided by a Judge or by the Court; it may involve a lengthy investigation of complicated accounts, in which case the action should be at once referred to a special or official referee; or it may be a question proper for a jury. It is also desirable to place on record what are the precise questions raised in the action, so that the parties or their successors may not fight the same battle over again.

It has been found by long experience that the most satisfactory method of securing these advantages is to make each party in turn state his own case and answer that of his opponent before the day of trial. Such statements and the replies to them are called the pleadings. The plaintiff naturally begins; if he has not already specially indorsed his writ, he will in a proper case readily obtain leave to deliver a separate Statement of Claim (a). Whenever the writ is generally indorsed and the defendant has appeared, the plaintiff cannot, except in an Admiralty action, deliver a Statement of Claim without the leave of a Master, which he must obtain on a summons for directions (b). Leave will generally be given at the same time to the defendant to put in a Defence, which, besides answering the plaintiff's claim, may also set up a Counterclaim. The plaintiff sometimes obtains leave to deliver a Reply; if a Counterclaim has been pleaded, he will obtain leave to deliver a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. Further pleadings are possible, though unusual; they would be called Rejoinder, Surrejoinder, Rebutter, Surrebutter.

After the Defence, or Defence to Counterclaim, the rule is that allegations contained in previous pleadings are denied unless admitted. Consequently a fresh pleading is only necessary where additional facts are to be pleaded. The points admitted by either side are thus extracted and distinguished from those in controversy; and thus the litigation should (c) be narrowed down to two or three matters which are the real questions in dispute. The pleadings should always be conducted so as to evolve a

(a) What is now called a Statement of Claim was before 1875 called a Declaration; a Defence was termed a Plea or Pleas; and a Reply was called a Replication.

(b) A plaintiff, who has specially indorsed his writ under Order III., r. 6, delivers a Statement of Claim without leave when he serves his writ. And the defendant may sometimes plead to such a special indorsement (see *ante*, p. 534) without leave. Moreover, Order XXX. only applies to the delivery of pleadings after appearance. Hence, whenever it is necessary for a plaintiff to deliver a Statement of Claim under Order XIII., r. 12, although the defendant has not appeared (see *ante*, p. 525), he can do so without leave; and the defendant can subsequently appear and deliver a Defence thereto without leave. Other instances in which a pleading can be delivered without leave will be found under Order XXI., r. 14, and Order XXIV., r. 2; but these rarely occur.

(c) Pledgers, however, often fail to make admissions which ought to be made, and consequently enlarge the issues.

clearly defined “issue”—that is, some definite proposition of law or fact, asserted by one party and denied by the other, but which both agree to be a point which they wish to have decided in the action. It follows, therefore, that the issues determine what evidence is relevant.

The time within which each successive pleading is to be delivered is as a rule fixed by the Master when he gives leave to deliver it. If no time be thus fixed the pleadings must be delivered within the times prescribed by the Rules of Court (*d*). Such times may, however, be enlarged by a Master under Order LXIV., r. 7, or by consent of the parties without application to a Master under rule 8 of the same Order. Every pleading must be signed by the counsel or solicitor who drafted it, or by the party himself if he sues or defends in person. The pleadings are interchanged between the parties; they are not deposited or filed in Court (*e*); they are not seen or read by the Master unless the opposite party raises some question about them on which he desires the Master's decision. No technical objection can now be raised to any pleading on the ground of any alleged want of form. But “the Court or a Judge may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any indorsement or pleading which may be unnecessary or scandalous, or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action” (*f*).

The function, then, of pleadings is to ascertain with precision the matters on which the parties differ and the points on which they agree. Each party must give his opponent a clear and definite outline of his case, though he need not disclose the evidence by means of which he hopes to establish it. Each party in turn must either admit or deny every material fact alleged in the preceding pleading. Both parties thus learn before the case comes into Court what are the real points to be discussed and decided at the trial.

The fundamental rule of our present system of pleading is this:—“Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on

(*d*) *Viz.* :—A Statement of Claim within twenty-one days after appearance (Order XX., r. 1 (*c*)); a Defence within ten days after the delivery of the Statement of Claim (Order XXI., r. 8); and any subsequent pleading within four days after the delivery of the previous pleading (Order XXIII.).

(*e*) Except in cases falling within Order XIII., r. 12; see *ante*, p. 525.

(*f*) Order XIX., rr. 26, 27.

which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved" (g).

Material Facts.

Every pleading must contain the material facts on which the party pleading relies. Every fact is material which is essential to the plaintiff's cause of action or to the defendant's defence respectively. Neither party it is true, "need in any pleading allege any matter of fact which the law presumes in his favour" (h). But, subject to this, each party must always state his whole case. He must plead all the material facts on which he means to rely; otherwise he is strictly not entitled to give any evidence of them at the trial. The Statement of Claim must disclose a good cause of action; the Defence must show a good answer to the Statement of Claim. No averment must be omitted which is essential to success. If a plaintiff's cause of action, or his title to sue, depends on a statute, he must plead all facts necessary to bring him within that statute.

The question whether a particular fact is or is not material depends mainly on the special circumstances of the particular case. Sometimes it is material to allege and prove that the defendant had knowledge or notice of a certain fact. At other times it is sufficient to aver that the defendant did some act, without inquiring into the state of his mind at the time. In some cases the defendant's intention is material; in a few cases his motive. The legal relation in which the parties stand to one another should generally be stated.

Thus the law requires that notice of dishonour be given to every person, except the acceptor, who is sought to be made liable on a negotiable instrument. Unless such notice was duly given or waived or excused, no action lies against the drawer or any indorser. Hence the Statement of Claim, whether indorsed on the writ or not, must contain either an allegation that notice of dishonour was

(g) Order XIX., r. 4.

(h) Order XIX., r. 25.

given to the defendant, or a statement of the facts relied on as excusing the giving of such notice (i).

Again, at common law no action could be brought by the assignee of a chose in action in his own name against the debtor. Such an action is now permitted in certain cases by section 136 of the Law of Property Act, 1925. Hence the Statement of Claim must contain express averments of all facts necessary to bring the case within that section. It must allege an absolute assignment in writing of the chose in action, and notice in writing to the defendant of such assignment; otherwise the plaintiff would have no title to sue (k).

But the pleader need only allege facts which are material at the present stage of the action. It is sufficient that each pleading in turn should contain in itself a good *prima facie* case without reference to possible objections not yet urged. "Neither party need in any pleading allege any matter of fact as to which the burden of proof lies upon the other side" (l). "It is no part of the Statement of Claim to anticipate the Defence, and to state what the plaintiff would have to say in answer to it" (m). So, too, it is quite unnecessary for the defendant to defend himself against charges which are not yet made, or to plead to causes of action which do not appear in the Statement of Claim.

Either party may in a proper case include in his pleading two or more inconsistent sets of material facts, and claim relief thereunder in the alternative. A plaintiff may rely on several different rights alternatively, although they may be inconsistent. So a defendant "may raise by his Statement of Defence without leave as many distinct and separate, and therefore inconsistent, defences, as he may think proper" (n). A pleading is not embarrassing merely because it contains inconsistent averments (o). But whenever such alternative cases are alleged, the facts belonging to each of them must be stated separately, so

(i) *Frühauß v. Grosvenor* (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 717.

(k) *Seear v. Lawson* (1880), 16 Ch. D. 121; *Bradley v. Chamberlyn*, [1893] 1 Q. B., pp. 441, 442; *Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co.* (No. 1), [1902] 2 K. B. 190.

(l) Order XIX., r. 25.

(m) *Per James, L.J.*, in *Hall v. Eve* (1876), 4 Ch. D., at p. 345.

(n) *Per Thesiger, L.J.*, in *Berdan v. Greenwood* (1878), 3 Ex. D., at p. 255.

(o) *Child v. Stenning* (1877), 5 Ch. D. 695.

as to show on what facts each alternative relief is claimed. Thus, a commission agent may, with proper averments, claim against his principal—

(a) commission earned under a special contract duly performed;

(b) damages for not being allowed to perform the special contract and earn that commission; and

(c) on a *quantum meruit*.

“Pleadings are now to be merely concise statements of the facts which the party pleading deems material to his case” (*p*); the inferences of law to be drawn from those facts should not be pleaded. If it is necessary or expedient to lay down any proposition of law in a pleading, the facts on which that proposition is based must also be set out.

Thus a plaintiff should not merely aver, “I am entitled to certain property,” or, “It was the duty of the defendant to do so and so”; he must state in his pleading the facts, which in his opinion give him that title or which impose on the defendant that liability or duty. Again, a plaintiff should not simply allege, “I am the heir-at-law of A B deceased”; he must state the facts and show how he is related to the deceased (*q*). So, too, a defendant must not say merely, “I do not owe the money”; he must allege facts which will show that he does not owe it, *e.g.*, that he never ordered the goods or has never received them.

Whenever the same legal result can be attained in several different ways, it is not sufficient to aver merely that the result has been arrived at; the facts must be stated showing how and by what means it was attained. Thus, a contract may be rescinded in many ways; hence, if a defendant alleges that the contract upon which the plaintiff relies has been rescinded, he must state in what manner and by what means he contends that it was rescinded. So it is not sufficient for either party to allege that a bill of sale is void; facts must be set out showing why it is void, *e.g.*, that it has not been registered or is not in the form given in the Schedule to the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 (*r*).

Again, every pleading must contain only a statement of the material facts on which the party pleading relies, and not the evidence by which they are to be proved.

(*p*) *Per* Brett, J., in *Lord Hanmer v. Flight* (1876), 24 W. R., at p. 347.

(*q*) *Palmer v. Palmer*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 319.

(*r*) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31; and see *Harris v. Jenkins* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 481.

It is not always easy to decide what are the facts to be proved, and what is only evidence of those facts; but in most cases a line can be clearly drawn between a material fact and the evidence by which that fact will be proved at the trial. The fact in issue between the parties is the *factum probandum*, the fact to be proved, and therefore the fact to be pleaded. It is unnecessary to tell the other side how it is proposed to prove that fact; such matters are merely evidence, *facta probantia*, facts which merely tend to establish the fact in issue. Such facts will be relevant at the trial, but they are not "material facts" for pleading purposes and therefore should not be set out. "It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of facts is relied on, it is enough to allege it simply, without setting out the subordinate facts which are the means of proving it" (s).

A few instances will make this distinction clear.

Suppose that the defendant, who is now sued for the price of goods sold and delivered to him, has in a letter admitted that he received the goods; this admission is only a piece of evidence and should not be mentioned in the pleadings. The plaintiff should merely allege in his Statement of Claim that the goods were delivered to the defendant; the letter will be produced at the trial in proof of this allegation. So whenever any contract or any relation between any persons is to be implied from a series of letters or conversations, or otherwise from a number of circumstances, it is sufficient to allege such contract or relation as a fact, and to refer generally to such letters, conversations or circumstances without setting them out in detail (t). And where it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge or other condition of the mind of any person, it is sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the circumstances from which it is to be inferred (u). Wherever it is material to allege notice of any fact, it is sufficient to allege such notice as a fact, unless the form or the precise terms of such notice or the circumstances from which such notice is to be inferred be material (x).

Material facts must be stated in what the rule calls "a summary form," i.e., briefly and succinctly, and in strict chronological order. All immaterial matter should be

(s) *Per* Lord Denman, C.J., in *Williams v. Wilcox* (1838), 8 A. & E., at p. 331.

(t) Order XIX., r. 24.

(u) Order XIX., r. 22.

(x) Order XIX., r. 23.

rigidly excluded. Neither party, for instance should cite public Acts of Parliament, or plead to any matter of law set out in his opponent's pleading. Neither party should allege any matter of fact the burden of proving which lies on his opponent (*y*). It is sufficient to state the substance of any material conversation; the words actually uttered need not be given. Neither party need set out the whole or any part of any document, unless its precise words are material; it is sufficient to state briefly its effect (*z*). It is not necessary for any defendant to plead any denial or defence as to damages claimed or their amount (*a*), or for either party to plead any matter or to any matter which merely affects costs.

At the same time, every pleading must be precise as well as concise. Dates are, as a rule, of great importance. Sometimes it is necessary to give particulars as to place and surrounding circumstances; but all unnecessary details should be avoided. Neither party need disclose his evidence; but he must define his case. If necessary details be not stated in a pleading, the opponent may apply for particulars (*b*); and the Master will make an order that particulars be given whenever the pleading delivered does not give the opponent the information necessary to enable him to plead or prepare for trial.

Thus, in an action for the price of goods delivered at different times, the date, quantity and price of each separate consignment should be stated. In an action on any negotiable instrument full particulars of the amount and date and of the parties to it should be set out (*c*). So, too, whenever either party claims a right of way, he must define the course of the road or path, showing where he alleges his right to commence and to end; he must also state whether he claims a right to a footpath, bridle-path, or carriage-road, and whether such right vested in him by grant or prescription; but he need not name the parties or give the precise dates of lost grants (*d*).

(*y*) Order XIX., r. 25.

(*z*) Order XIX., r. 21. See *Harris v. Warre* (1879), 4 C. P. D. 125.

(*a*) Order XXI., r. 4.

(*b*) Before applying to the Master he should ask his opponent for the necessary information by letter: Order XIX., r. 7A.

(*c*) *Walker v. Hicks* (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 8.

(*d*) *Harris v. Jenkins* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 481; *Palmer v. Guadagni*, [1906] 2 Ch. 494.

Statement of Claim.

The Statement of Claim must show a right of action in every plaintiff named on the writ and a liability on the part of each defendant jointly, severally or in the alternative. Yet it need not propound any conclusions of law or contain any technical phrases. It should merely state briefly and in chronological order the material facts on which the plaintiff relies, and then claim the relief to which he deems himself entitled on those facts. The Court will declare the law arising upon the facts so pleaded, and determine the rights of the parties thereby. All necessary particulars must now be set out in the body of the pleading, unless they exceed three folios (*e*).

The Statement of Claim must be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively. It may be necessary in some cases for the pleader to begin with certain introductory averments stating who the parties are, what trade they carry on, how they are connected, and any other circumstances leading up to the dispute, and explaining what is to follow. Then, if the action be brought on a contract, it should clearly appear on the pleading whether the contract is express or implied; if express, its date should be stated, and whether it was written or oral (*f*); if implied, the facts should be set out from which the plaintiff contends a contract should be implied (*g*). If the contract be by deed, this fact should be stated; in other cases, a consideration must be shown.

In actions of tort, if the plaintiff's right which has been violated is one which every citizen possesses (*e.g.*, a right to have his reputation or person unassailed), it need not be expressly pleaded. But a private right of property (*e.g.*, a copyright, a patent right, an easement or a *profit à prendre*) must be stated in full detail (*h*); and the plaintiff must also show how such right was acquired. It is not

(*e*) Order XIX., r. 6. Seventy-two words or figures constitute a folio; Order LXV., r. 27 (14).

(*f*) *Turquand v. Fearon* (1879), 48 L. J. Q. B. 703.

(*g*) See Order XXI., r. 3, which is set out *post*, p. 558.

(*h*) *Davies v. James* (1884), 26 Ch. D. 778; *Spedding v. Fitzpatrick* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 410.

sufficient to allege that a right, or a duty, or a liability exists; the facts must be set out which gave rise to such right or created such duty or liability. Then the acts of the defendant which, according to the plaintiff, violated that right or amounted to an actionable neglect of that duty must be stated with precision.

Next should follow in either case the allegations as to damage. Full detail must be given of any special damage (i) claimed, otherwise all evidence of such matters ought in strictness to be excluded; matter in aggravation of damages may be set out in the Statement of Claim, if the plaintiff desires (k). The plaintiff can claim for any damage that has accrued to him since writ, down to the time of assessing damages, from a cause of action vested in him before writ; though where special damage is an essential part of the cause of action, some such damage before writ must be shown (l). But a plaintiff cannot claim damages in respect of any cause of action which has only accrued to him since writ. For such damages he must issue a second writ; but he can then apply, if he thinks fit, to have the two actions consolidated (m).

Lastly comes the claim for relief. The plaintiff should always claim in the one action every kind of relief to which he is entitled—be it damages or an injunction, a declaration, a *mandamus* or a receiver (n). He will not be allowed to bring a second action on the same cause of action in order to obtain relief which he might have obtained in the first action (o).

After the defendant has entered an appearance to a writ generally indorsed, the plaintiff must, as we have seen (p), obtain an order from the Master before delivering a Statement of Claim. Strictly he may not, without express leave, include in his pleading a new and independent cause of action, which is not mentioned on his writ; although he may by his Statement of Claim and without

(i) As to the distinction between special and general damage, see *post*, pp. 657 *et seq.*

(k) *Millington v. Loring* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 190.

(l) Order XXXVI., r. 58.

(m) *Martin v. Martin*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 429; but see *Lee v. Arthur* (1908), 100 L. T. 61.

(n) See *ante*, pp. 495 *et seq.*

(o) *Serrao v. Noel* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 549.

(p) *Ante*, p. 530.

any amendment of the indorsement on the writ "alter, modify or extend" any claim, which is included in the writ (*q*). On the other hand, if a plaintiff in his Statement of Claim omits all mention of a cause of action or a claim for relief which is stated on his writ, he will be deemed to have elected to abandon it (*r*).

The Statement of Claim, moreover, should correspond with the writ in the names of the parties, in the number of the parties, and in the characters in which they sue and are sued. If any party sues, or is sued, in a representative character (*e.g.*, as trustee in bankruptcy or as executor of a will), this fact must be stated in the heading of the Statement of Claim, as well as on the writ. If the plaintiff desires to add a fresh plaintiff or defendant, an application must be made under Order XVI., rr. 11 and 12; and strictly the writ should be amended too (*s*).

We subjoin three precedents of Statements of Claim. The first of these might have been indorsed on the writ; the other two could not, as the causes of action are not within Order III., r. 6.

No. 4.

Goods Sold and Delivered to a Married Woman.

1926. J. No. 30

In the High Court of Justice.

King's Bench Division.

Writ issued March 11th, 1926.

BETWEEN JOLIFFE & CO. Plaintiffs,
AND
FREDERICK BROWN Defendant

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiffs are Drapers and Dressmakers, carrying on business at 212, High Street, Kensington.

2. During the years 1924 and 1925 the late Mrs. Hannah Brown, then the wife of the defendant, ordered of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs delivered to her at 23, Langham Gardens, W., where she was then living with the defendant, goods to the value of £134 10s. 0d.; such goods were necessary articles of attire suitable to the estate and degree of the defendant's late wife.

3. Particulars of the said goods have been delivered and exceed three folios. Accounts showing such particulars were rendered half-yearly to the said Mrs. Brown at the said address and since her death to the defendant, to wit at Midsummer and Christmas in each of the years 1924 and 1925.

4. Yet the defendant has not paid the said sum of £134 10s. 0d., or any part thereof.

And the plaintiffs claim £134 10s. 0d.

HUGH WILLIAMS.

Delivered the 1st day of May, 1926, by, &c.

(*q*) Order III., r. 2; Order XX., r. 4.

(*r*) *Cargill v. Bower* (1878), 10 Ch. D. 502; *Lewis v. Durnford* (1907), 24 T. L. R. 64.

(*s*) As to amending a Statement of Claim after it has been delivered, see Order XXVIII., rr. 2, 4—10.

No. 5.

Action for Breach of Promise of Marriage.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. On March 15th, 1925, the plaintiff and the defendant orally agreed to marry each other.

2. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to marry the defendant; but the defendant has neglected and refused to marry the plaintiff, and on January 24th, 1926, he married another lady.

And the plaintiff claims* £500 damages.

CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTONE.

No. 6.

Action of Slander.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff is a solicitor and was at the date of the publication herein-after mentioned practising his profession at No. 50, — Street, in the City of London.

2. On April 27th, 1926, the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff, and of him in the way of his profession of a solicitor, to one John Smith, the words following:—"Have you heard about our neighbour along here?" (meaning the plaintiff). "They tell me he has gone for thousands instead of hundreds this time," and (on Smith asking the defendant, "Who do you mean?") "The lawyer in — Street."

3. The defendant meant, and was understood to mean, thereby that the plaintiff was insolvent, and that he was unable, and would be unable, to pay his clients the moneys received or held by him in trust for or on behalf of them, and that proceedings in bankruptcy had already been commenced against him, and that he was unfit to carry on his said profession, and to receive or hold moneys in trust for or on behalf of clients (t).

4. In consequence of the said words the plaintiff has been greatly injured in his credit and reputation and in his profession of a solicitor, and Messrs. X Y Z and others of his clients have ceased to employ him as a solicitor.

And the plaintiff claims damages (u).

JOHN DOE.

Defence.

A defendant, to whom a Statement of Claim has been delivered, has several courses open to him. If he has no case and the damages claimed are unliquidated, it is sometimes the best plan to put in no defence at all, and to let judgment go by default. The damages will then be assessed by a sheriff's jury, who do not, as a rule, take an extravagant view of the case, and less publicity attends the hearing. But in other cases it is better for a defendant who has no defence to pay money into Court as amends. This he can

(t) This is the innuendo: Vol. 1, pp. 527, 533.

(u) See *Dauncey v. Holloway*, [1901] 2 K. B. 441. Note that it is not alleged that the defendant spoke the words to X Y Z or to any other client of the plaintiff.

do at any stage of the action, and the earlier the better. If he does so, he must state the fact in his Defence (x).

If, however, the defendant really means to fight the action, he (or counsel on his behalf) should carefully consider the Statement of Claim, and the way in which the action is shaped against him. Many technical points may at once arise. Is any cause of action shown? Is the only cause of action shown frivolous and vexatious? If so, he may apply to strike out the Statement of Claim. Such an application should be made before any Defence is delivered. Should the action be referred to an arbitrator, or be remitted to the County Court (z). Then, is the claim properly pleaded? Is any portion of it embarrassing? (a). Or are particulars necessary? Have claims been joined which cannot conveniently be disposed of in one action? If so, the defendant should apply to sever them under Order XVIII., rr. 1, 7, 8, or 9.

If no such points arise, or as soon as any that do arise have been disposed of, the defendant must proceed to draft his Defence. He will probably find that there are some allegations in the Statement of Claim which he does not dispute and others which he does contest. In this case he should admit the former and deny the latter in his Defence, making it perfectly clear how much he admits and how much he denies. Again, it may be that he has some justification or other answer to the facts which he admits; such justification or other answer must be specially pleaded. Or the defendant may rely for his Defence on an "objection in point of law"; he may urge that, even admitting for the sake of argument that all that the plaintiff has alleged is correct, nevertheless he has disclosed no cause of action. Lastly, the defendant, whether he admits or contests the plaintiff's claim, may set up a cross-claim of his own—a set-off or a counter-claim—in respect of which he will be virtually a plaintiff (b).

(x) See *post*, p. 562.

(z) County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), ss. 65, 66.

(a) If so, it may be struck out under Order XIX., r. 27.

(b) See *post*, pp. 563, 564.

And speaking generally, all these different defences may be raised concurrently, even though they may appear somewhat inconsistent. The same allegation may be denied in point of fact, objected to as bad in law, and at the same time collateral matter may be pleaded to destroy its effect. A defendant may justify or excuse the act complained of, whether he admits or denies that he did it. All these various defences must be clearly and distinctly pleaded, and the facts upon which each is grounded should be stated separately. As a rule each answer to the action should be placed in a separate paragraph.

The defendant, like the plaintiff, must set out in his pleading every material fact on which he proposes to rely at the trial. But he differs from the plaintiff in this—he must not only set up a case of his own, he must also answer the case of his opponent. He must deal specifically with every allegation of fact in the Statement of Claim, which he does not admit to be true. He must frankly admit or clearly deny every material allegation made against him; he should not deny everything—to do so will only cause useless expense. He should admit all he safely can. But he must not forget that it is open to the plaintiff at any stage of the action (c), if sufficient admissions be made, to apply for judgment under Order XXXII., r. 6. A party who has unwarily made an admission will, however, in a proper case be allowed to recall it.

The contradiction in terms of an allegation in the preceding pleading is technically known as a “traverse.” If the defendant decides to traverse any paragraph of the Statement of Claim, he must deal specifically with every material fact contained in that paragraph. He need not plead to any matter of law; allegations of fact alone should be traversed, and these he must not traverse “evasively, but answer the point of substance.” He will be taken to admit every allegation of fact, which he does not specifically or by necessary implication deny or refuse to admit (d).

(c) He may do so even after he has given notice of trial: *Brown v. Pearson* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 716.

(d) Order XIX., rr. 13, 17, 19; but see Order XXI., rr. 4, 21.

Any half-admission or half-denial will be regarded as evasive.

A defendant may no longer deny generally the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim. Special instances of the application of this general principle are given in the Rules of the Supreme Court:—

“In actions for a debt or liquidated demand in money, comprised in Order III., r. 6, a mere denial of the debt shall be inadmissible.”

“In actions upon bills of exchange, promissory notes, or cheques, a defence in denial must deny some matter of fact, *e.g.*, the drawing, making, indorsing, accepting, presenting, or notice of dishonour of the bill or note.”

“In actions comprised in Order III., r. 6, classes A and B (*e*), a defence in denial must deny such matters of fact, from which the liability of the defendant is alleged to arise, as are disputed.”

“In actions for goods bargained and sold, or sold and delivered, the defence must deny the order or contract, the delivery, or the amount claimed; in an action for money had and received, it must deny the receipt of the money, or the existence of those facts which are alleged to make such receipt by the defendant a receipt to the use of the plaintiff” (*f*).

“If an allegation is made with divers circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances” (*g*).

Sometimes in order to obey these rules, and to deal specifically with every allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, it is necessary for the defendant to place on the record two or more distinct traverses to one and the same allegation. Thus, if he pleads “The defendant never broke or entered the plaintiff’s close,” he thereby admits that the close in question belongs to the plaintiff. If he intends at the trial to deny that the plaintiff owned or possessed that close, he must say so distinctly and in a separate plea. If he wishes to raise both defences, he must put on the record two separate paragraphs, *e.g.*—

1. “The defendant never broke or entered the said close.”

2. “The said close is not the close of the plaintiff.”

Again, a traverse may become evasive if it follows too closely the precise language of the allegation traversed. Thus in *Tildesley v. Harper* (*h*) the Statement of Claim alleged that the defendant offered the plaintiff a bribe of £500. The defendant pleaded, following the exact words of the Statement of Claim, that “the defendant had never offered the plaintiff a bribe of £500,” which would have been true if he had offered £499, or any lesser sum. Fry, J., held that the point of substance was that a bribe had been offered, and that this was not fairly or substantially denied. The

(*e*) See *ante*, p. 539.

(*f*) Order XXI., rr. 1, 2, 3.

(*g*) Order XIX., r. 19.

(*h*) (1877), 7 Ch. D. 403; (1878), 10 Ch. D. 393.

defendant should have pleaded that he never offered "a bribe of £500 or any other sum." Leave to amend was eventually given.

Merely to deny an allegation in terms will often be ambiguous, and therefore evasive. If an allegation be made with details of time and place, &c., the defendant must deny the substance of the allegation, and not confine himself to denying it along with the inessential details which the rule terms "circumstances."

Thus, if a Statement of Claim alleges that "the defendant assaulted and beat the plaintiff at 35, Fleet Street, on March 3, 1926, in the presence of A B" it would be evasive for the defendant to plead that "the defendant did not assault or beat the plaintiff at 35, Fleet Street, on March 3, 1926, in the presence of A B." For he might have assaulted him on another day or in another place, or when A B was not present. And these details are only "circumstances"; they are not of the essence of the allegation; they obscure the "point of substance." The right traverse is simply: "The defendant never assaulted or beat the plaintiff."

In many cases, however, it is not sufficient for a party to deny an allegation in his opponent's pleading; he must go further and dispute its validity in law, or set up some affirmative case of his own in answer to it. The office of a traverse is to contradict, not to excuse or justify the act complained of; its object is to compel the plaintiff to prove the truth of the allegation traversed, not to dispute its sufficiency in point of law. So all matters that go to show that the contract sued upon is illegal or invalid, or which, if not expressly stated, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise at the trial, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading, must be specially and separately pleaded—"as, for instance, fraud, Statute of Limitations, release, payment, performance, facts showing illegality either by statute or common law, or Statute of Frauds" (i). No evidence of such matters can, as a rule, be given at the trial if they be not expressly pleaded (k). Such a plea is called a plea in confession and avoidance, because it confesses that the act was done, but seeks to avoid liability in respect of it by stating fresh facts.

(i) Order XIX., r. 15.

(k) An exception is made in favour of the defendant in an action for the recovery of land: see *post*, p. 601. The Court will not enforce a contract which is obviously illegal even though illegality has not been pleaded: *Royal Exchange Assurance Corp. v. Vega*, [1902] 2 K. B. 384; *N. W. Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co.*, [1914] A. C. 461.

Special defences of this kind must not be insinuated into pleas which deny the facts alleged by the plaintiff. Any plea, which wears a doubtful aspect and might be either the denial of a fact or a justification of it, may be struck out as embarrassing. Yet the defendant, as we have seen, may set up both these defences in the same pleading, if he makes it quite clear that he desires to raise two distinct and separate issues.

Thus, if the plaintiff sets up a contract which was in fact made, it will be idle for the defendant merely to traverse the making of the contract; he should confess that he made the contract, but avoid the effect of that confession by pleading the Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Limitations or setting up that the contract had been duly performed or rescinded.

If the defendant pleads merely that he never agreed as alleged, this will be taken to mean that he never in fact made any such agreement; and he will not be allowed at the trial to contend, *e.g.*, that the agreement set up by the plaintiff is bad in law, or not binding on him because he is an infant, or because he was induced to enter into it by fraud. All facts tending to show the insufficiency or illegality of any contract must be specially pleaded.

So in an action of tort. If the plaintiff alleges that the defendant wrongfully entered on his premises, the defendant must not plead that "he never wrongfully entered on the plaintiff's premises"; for this mode of pleading does not make it clear whether the defendant means to deny the fact of entry, or whether he means to assert that he had a right to enter. If the former be his meaning, he should merely traverse, thus: "the defendant never entered on the said premises." If he means to justify his entry, he must plead in confession and avoidance, setting out the facts on which he relies as giving him the right to enter, *e.g.*, an express grant of a right of way.

Lastly, if the defendant desires to contend that, even assuming every word in the Statement of Claim to be correct, it discloses no cause of action, he can place on the record an objection in point of law. He is not bound to do this; he can raise the point of law at the hearing without doing so; but, unless he does so, there is no possibility of his being allowed to argue the point of law before the hearing and so save the expense of a trial. Moreover, his doing so will not entitle him, as a matter of right, to have the point of law argued before the hearing. An objection in point of law, even though expressly pleaded, is generally

argued at the trial of the action; it is only by consent of the parties, or by order of a Master, that the party objecting can have the point set down for argument and disposed of before the trial (l). As a rule, such an order will only be made where the decision of the point of law will practically render any trial of the action unnecessary; in such cases, therefore, the defendant should certainly set out his objection in his Defence (m).

The distinction between these three methods of pleading to a Statement of Claim will be clearly seen from the following precedents:—

No. 7.

Defence to Precedent No. 3 (n).

1. The defendant never agreed as alleged.
2. There is no memorandum in writing of the alleged agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
3. The plaintiff discharged the defendant from all liability in respect of the said goods by giving time to the principal debtor, the said Silvanus Smith. [Add particulars.]

[N.B.—The first paragraph traverses; the other two confess and avoid.]

No. 8.

Defence to Precedent No. 4 (o).

DEFENCE.

1. The defendant does not admit that his late wife ever ordered of the plaintiffs any of the goods mentioned in the Statement of Claim, or that the plaintiffs ever delivered any of the said goods at his residence at 23, Langham Gardens, W., or at all.
2. None of the said goods were necessities as alleged in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim.
3. The defendant regularly paid to his wife an allowance in money sufficient to enable her to purchase all necessary articles of attire, and expressly forbade her to pledge his credit for any such articles, as the plaintiffs well knew.
4. In the alternative the defendant says that the prices charged by the plaintiffs for the said goods are unreasonable and exorbitant. He brings into Court the sum of £100, and says that the same is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs' claim in this action.

FREDERICK JACKSON.

No. 9.

Defence to Precedent No. 6 (p).

DEFENCE.

1. The plaintiff did not at the date of the alleged publication practise the profession of a solicitor.

(l) Order XXV., r. 2; and see *Hellwig v. Mitchell*, [1910] 1 K. B. 609.

(m) The same considerations apply to an objection in point of law taken by the plaintiff in his Reply.

(n) *Ante*, p. 538. Defences have the same formal heading and ending as Statements of Claim: see *ante*, p. 552.

(o) *Ante*, p. 564.

(p) *Ante*, p. 555.

2. The defendant never spoke or published any of the words set out in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim.

3. The defendant never spoke or published any of the said words of the plaintiff in the way of his profession.

4. The said words do not mean what is alleged in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim. They are incapable of any of the alleged meanings or of any other defamatory or actionable meaning.

5. The said words without the said alleged meanings are true in substance and in fact.

[Add particulars.]

6. The defendant will object that the said words are not actionable without proof of special damage, and that the special damage alleged in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim is too remote and not sufficient in law to sustain the action.

RICHARD ROE.

Payment into Court.

The defendant in any action may, if he wishes, pay money into Court at any stage of the proceedings. Such a payment is not a Defence; it is rather an attempt at a compromise. The fact that money has been paid into Court and the amount so paid in must always be stated in the Defence, though it must not be mentioned to the jury (*q*). If the Statement of Claim contains more than one cause of action, the Defence must specify to which cause of action the money is paid in (*r*).

Unless the defendant, on paying money into Court, expressly denies liability, such payment is considered to admit the plaintiff's claim to the extent of the amount paid in; and the defendant cannot subsequently deliver any Defence denying such liability (*s*). But in all actions, except actions of libel and slander, the defendant may, if he thinks fit, pay money into Court with a denial of liability, and this will prevent the payment into Court operating as an admission. If the money be paid into Court without a denial of liability, the plaintiff can, unless the Master otherwise order, either take the money out of Court in satisfaction of his claim and so put an end to the action (*t*), or he may

(*q*) Order XXII., r. 22.

(*r*) Order XXII., r. 2. But the mere omission to specify such claim or cause of action will not render the payment into Court nugatory: *Benning v. Ilford Gas Co.*, [1907] 2 K. B. 290; but see *Tucker v. Lampart* (1906), 23 T. L. R., at p. 11.

(*s*) Order XXII., r. 1; *Kingham v. Robins* (1839), 5 M. & W. 94; *Hennell v. Davies*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 367; *Dumbelton v. Williams* (1897), 76 L. T. 81.

(*t*) The acceptance by the plaintiff of a sum paid into Court does not operate as a judgment or amount to an admission on the merits, except as to damages:

take it out of Court not in satisfaction and continue the action in the hope that the jury will award him a larger amount (u).⁴ But if the money be paid into Court with a denial of liability, the plaintiff can only take it out in satisfaction of his claim. If he is not willing to do this, the money remains in Court to abide further order. If the action continues after money has been paid into Court, whether with an admission or denial of liability, then if the jury find a verdict for an amount larger than the sum paid in, the plaintiff will be entitled to the whole of his costs of the action; but if the jury find a verdict for an amount not greater than the sum paid in, the plaintiff will usually be ordered to pay the whole or a substantial portion of the costs of the action incurred by the defendant after the money was paid into Court (x).

Set-off and Counterclaim.

The defendant may also defeat the plaintiff's claim wholly or partially by setting up a cross-claim. The Judicature Act of 1925 gives every defendant a very wide power of counterclaiming. He may, by virtue of section 39 of that Act, claim in the plaintiff's action any estate, right or title in himself, legal or equitable, and obtain the same relief as if he had brought a separate action against the plaintiff for the purpose. The counterclaim need not be in any way connected with the plaintiff's claim, or arise out of the same transaction. It need not be "an action of the same nature as the original action" or even analogous to it. "A claim founded on tort may be opposed to one founded on contract, or *vice versa*." It may even have arisen since the date of the writ. It is in effect a cross-action.

A counterclaim is governed by the same rules of pleading as a Statement of Claim. The defendant must set out

Coote v. Ford, [1899] 2 Ch. 93; cf. *Young v. Black Sluice Commissioners* (1909), 73 J. P. 265.

(u) In Admiralty actions, however, money can never be taken out of Court without the order of a Master: Order XXII., r. 20.

(x) See, for instance, *Wagstaffe v. Bentley*, [1902] 1 K. B. 124; *The Blanche*, [1908] P. 259 (an action of salvage).

the facts, upon which he relies in support of his counterclaim, separately from those which constitute his defence. And he must state specifically that he relies on the former "by way of counterclaim" (y). A counterclaim must, of course, show a valid cause of action; otherwise it may be struck out under Order XXV., r. 4. The claim and counterclaim will be tried together in one proceeding, unless if it be of such a nature that it cannot conveniently be tried by the same tribunal or at the same time as the plaintiff's claim (z).

At common law a defendant who had any claim against the plaintiff could not raise it in the plaintiff's action: he had to bring a cross-action. He might, it is true, when sued for the price of goods, have given evidence of a breach of any warranty, express or implied, in reduction of the price; but that was all. Then in the reign of George II. he was allowed to plead a set-off in certain cases (a). A set-off was a cross-claim for a liquidated amount of money, and could only be pleaded to a liquidated money claim. Both the set-off and the claim to which it was pleaded had to be mutual debts, both due from and to the same parties in the same right. And if the debt due from the plaintiff to the defendant exceeded the amount due from the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant could not before 1875 recover the difference in the plaintiff's action; he could only set off an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim, and he had to bring a cross-action for the balance.

The defendant's right of set-off is not affected by the Judicature Act; a set-off is still for some purposes distinct from a counterclaim. Every set-off, it is true, might be pleaded as a counterclaim; but not every counterclaim as a set-off. A set-off remains what it was—a statutory defence to the plaintiff's claim or to a portion of it. But a counterclaim is in effect a cross-action.

Default of Defence.

If no Defence be delivered in answer to a Statement of Claim, the plaintiff may enter final judgment if his claim be for a debt or liquidated damages; if it be for unliquidated damages or for detention of goods, he can enter interlocutory judgment only, and the amount for which final judgment will ultimately be entered must be assessed by an

(y) Order XXI., r. 10.

(z) See *Smith v. Buskell*, [1919] 2 K. B. 362.

(a) 2 Geo. 2, c. 22; 8 Geo. 2, c. 24 (now replaced by section 39 of the Judicature Act, 1925).

under-sheriff and a jury on a writ of inquiry, or calculated by a Master, or ascertained by an official referee (b). In an action for the recovery of land, he may sign judgment for possession of the land with costs. In all other cases he must move for judgment under Order XXVII., r. 11. On such a motion, the Court will decide the rights of the parties by looking at the Statement of Claim, which now stands admitted. No evidence is necessary unless the defendant be an infant or a lunatic, and therefore incapable of making admissions.

Reply, &c.

If a defence has been delivered, the plaintiff (or counsel on his behalf) must consider if it is properly drawn. Does it disclose any real defence to the action? Is any defence properly pleaded? If not, the plea may be struck out as embarrassing. Does it contain sufficient details to enable the plaintiff to prepare for trial? If not, he should apply for particulars. Has the defendant paid a sum of money into Court? If so, is the plaintiff content to accept that sum in satisfaction of his claim? In that case he should deliver no Reply, but give the defendant a notice that he accepts the sum paid into Court, and proceed to tax his costs.

Next comes the question, is it necessary to deliver any Reply? If the plaintiff merely wishes to deny what the defendant has stated in his Defence, no Reply need be delivered; for all material statements of fact in the Defence will "be deemed to have been denied and put in issue." (c) without any further pleading. But if the plaintiff desires to do more than merely traverse the allegations contained in the Defence, if he wishes to set up any substantive reply, which will introduce new facts and therefore involves a special plea, he must deliver a Reply. And of course, as explained later, if he is faced with a counterclaim which he disputes he must reply in order to set up his defence to it. And for this purpose he must first obtain an order

(b) See Order XXVII.

(c) Order XXVII., r. 13.

from the Master; for, except in Admiralty actions, no Reply can be delivered without leave (*d*).

A special Reply usually commences with the statement, "The plaintiff joins issue with the defendant on his Defence." This is called a "joinder of issue"; it is a compendious form of traverse, only permitted in pleadings subsequent to Defence. It operates "as a denial of every material allegation of fact in the pleading upon which issue is joined" (*e*); its effect, in short, is precisely the same as that produced by not delivering any Reply. But it only contradicts. Hence the plaintiff must be careful not to join issue merely, where he ought to allege new facts or to raise an objection in point of law. He "must raise by his pleading all matters which show that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, and all such grounds of reply as, if not raised, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleadings" (*f*).

Thus to a plea of the Statute of Limitations the plaintiff must specially reply any fact upon which he relies to take the case out of the statute, such as the infancy of the plaintiff, or the absence of the defendant beyond seas, or any acknowledgment. Another instance will be found in an old case decided as long ago as 5 Hen. VII. There the plaintiff had been granted a lease of a farm by the defendant's father. The defendant on his father's death entered upon the farm, and the plaintiff sued him for trespass. The defendant pleaded that the farm was his freehold. On this plea the plaintiff merely joined issue; and therefore at the trial he was not allowed to prove his lease. For by joining issue he had merely denied that which he now admitted, viz., that the defendant owned the freehold, and had nowhere set up a leasehold interest in himself.

But the plaintiff cannot start a new claim in his Reply different in its nature from that put forward in the Statement of Claim. Thus, if the Statement of Claim alleged merely negligence, the plaintiff cannot in his Reply assert that the defendant was guilty of fraud (*g*). In such a case the plaintiff must amend his writ and Statement of Claim by adding the new matter—if need be, in the alternative. So in an action of ejectment where the plaintiff by his

(*d*) Order XXIII.

(*e*) Order XIX., r. 18.

(*f*) Order XIX., r. 15.

(*g*) Order XIX., r. 16. Such a change of front was called "a departure in pleading."

Statement of Claim has treated the defendant as a trespasser, he cannot in his Reply turn round and claim rent from him as a tenant.

Where a counterclaim has been delivered with the Defence, a further pleading is necessary, as the plaintiff must deal specifically with every allegation of fact in the counterclaim which he does not admit to be true (*h*); and the Master will therefore give him leave to deliver a "Reply and Defence to Counterclaim." This is a pleading which combines a Reply to the Defence with the plaintiff's answer to a counterclaim. It generally commences with a joinder of issue or a joinder of issue together with a special Reply. Then follows what is really a Defence, and is governed by the rules applicable to a Defence. The plaintiff cannot join issue on a counterclaim; he must plead to it in the same way as a defendant pleads to a Statement of Claim. He may pay money into Court in satisfaction of a counterclaim, subject to the like conditions as to costs and otherwise as upon payment into Court by a defendant (*i*).

It may sometimes be necessary for the defendant to deliver a "Rejoinder" in answer to the plaintiff's Defence to a Counterclaim, but further pleading is extremely rare.

Notice of Trial; Entry for Trial.

"If the plaintiff does not deliver a Reply, or any party does not deliver any subsequent pleading within the period allowed for that purpose, the pleadings shall be deemed to be closed at the expiration of that period, and all the material statements of fact in the pleading last delivered shall be deemed to have been denied and put in issue" (*k*).

The next step is for the plaintiff to deliver a notice of trial, naming the place of trial, which has been already fixed by the Master, and stating the day which he proposes for the trial of the action. He must give at least ten days' notice of trial, unless the defendant has consented, or has been ordered, to accept short notice of trial, which is usually

(*h*) Except damages: Order XIX., r. 17.

(*i*) Order XXII., r. 9.

(*k*) Order XXVII., r. 13.

four days. The plaintiff may give notice of trial with his Reply, if any, whether it closes the pleadings or not, or, if no leave has been given to deliver a Reply, on the expiration of four days after the delivery of the Defence (l). If the plaintiff does not give notice of trial within six weeks after the close of the pleadings, the defendant may either give notice of trial himself, or apply to a Master to dismiss the action for want of prosecution (m).

Whichever party gives notice of trial must enter the action for trial on the books of the Court. If neither party enters the action for trial within the time prescribed, the notice of trial will be no longer in force. The party who enters the case for trial must pay a fee of £2 and lodge with the officer of the Court a copy of the notice of trial and two complete copies of the pleadings, including the w.it. The copy of the pleadings which is stamped with the receipt for the entry fee (n) becomes "the record" of the action. The action is now ready for trial.

Discontinuance.

But the parties do not always desire to proceed to trial. An action is often compromised; sometimes it goes to sleep without any definite compromise being arranged. Or it may be that the plaintiff is now satisfied that he cannot succeed. If so, he may at any time consent to judgment against himself. But, if he does so, he must pay the defendant his costs, and, moreover, he can never take any subsequent proceeding against the defendant or any one claiming through or under him for the same cause of action.

The plaintiff may also discontinue the action, or withdraw any part of it, by giving notice in writing to the defendant. It sometimes happens that a plaintiff is compelled—through lack of some necessary piece of evidence, or for some other adequate reason—to abandon his present proceedings, and yet he may desire to preserve his right

(l) Order XXXVI., r. 11.

(m) Order XXXVI., r. 12.

(n) In actions in the Chancery Division the stamp is put on the præcipe.

to bring a fresh action under more favourable circumstances. If he serves notice of discontinuance before the Defence is delivered, or even after its delivery, before taking any other proceeding in the action (save any interlocutory application), he may discontinue without leave and yet can bring a second action; he must, however, pay the costs of the first action, or the second action will be stayed. At any later stage of the action he can only discontinue by leave, and the Master can, and generally will, make it a condition of giving such leave that no further proceedings shall be taken in the matter (o).

(o) Order XXVI., rr. 1, 4; *Hess v. Labouchere* (1898), 14 T. L. R. 350.

CHAPTER XVII.

PREPARING FOR TRIAL.

As soon as notice of trial has been given, each party naturally begins, if he has not done so already, to ask himself how he shall prove his case. He soon discovers that he is without reliable information on certain material points. His first idea is, Can I obtain this information from my opponent? It may be that he was not present when something material happened, while his opponent was. Again, there may be many matters that have hitherto been taken for granted by both plaintiff and defendant, and of which no precise legal evidence is at hand. Must this be procured, or will such matters not be disputed at the trial? The issues in the action are (or ought to be) clearly stated in the pleadings which have been delivered between the parties; but some of these issues may not be seriously contested in Court. It is highly desirable, if possible, to ascertain before the trial what are the exact points on which there will be a real conflict of evidence. Hence the Master in a proper case allows one party to administer a string of questions to the other, and compels that other to answer them on oath, subject to certain restrictions; and the admissions obtained by means of these "interrogatories" (a) often save time, trouble and expense in preparing for the trial.

But besides this discovery of facts a party may need disclosure of documents. Some material letters have, as a rule, passed between the parties before the dispute arose, which may contain the contract sued on, or be evidence of its breach, or of an independent tort; but the plaintiff has the defendant's letters, and the defendant has the

(a) Both interrogatories and the answers to them are in writing, and are interchanged before the trial. An oral question addressed to a witness in the box at the trial, which he is to answer then and there, is not an "interrogatory."

plaintiff's; and neither set is properly intelligible without the other. Moreover, it is advisable that any one who intends to give evidence should, if possible, before he enters the witness-box, read over his own letters written at the time when the events happened; for these letters will certainly be used in his cross-examination.

Each party, therefore, desires to see all material documents in the possession of his opponent, and to take copies of the more important ones. This he can do by the process called "Discovery of Documents." And as a rule, it is wise for him to apply for this before administering interrogatories, as the documents when disclosed may render any further application unnecessary.

DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS.

Under this head there are three distinct cases which must be dealt with separately, as the procedure in each case is different.

(i) It may be that one party has, in his pleadings, particulars or affidavits, referred to some document. His opponent is, in such a case, entitled, without filing any affidavit or making any payment into Court, at once to give notice (b) that he will call and see that document, and take a copy of it, if he deems it sufficiently material. And the party who has referred to the document must produce it for inspection, if he has it in his possession at the time named in the notice; if he does not, he cannot himself put it in evidence at the trial, unless he can satisfy the Judge that he had some sufficient reason for not producing it.

(ii) In the second place, it may be that one party knows, or thinks he knows, that the other has certain material documents in his possession, though they are not referred to in any pleading, particulars, or affidavit. In such a case he may file an affidavit stating his belief, and the grounds of his belief, specifying the particular documents, and showing that they are material. Upon this the Master can order his opponent to state on affidavit whether he has or

(b) Under Order XXXI., r. 15.

ever had any of those documents in his possession or power, and, if he ever had one of them and has not now, when he parted with it, and what has become of it (c). If in this affidavit he admits that he has any of the documents specified, and that it is material, it becomes at once a document referred to in an affidavit within the preceding paragraph.

This procedure is quite distinct from the general discovery next discussed and may be adopted whether general discovery has been obtained or not.

(iii) Neither party knows precisely what documents his opponent possesses. He may be able to guess at some of them; but he would like a detailed list of them all. Any party may, without filing any affidavit or naming any particular document, apply to a Master for an order (d) directing any opponent in the action to give a list, either on oath or otherwise, of all documents which are, or have been, in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question in the action. A plaintiff can obtain such disclosure, or "discovery" as it is called, from any necessary defendant; and one defendant can obtain such discovery from his co-defendant, if there be some right to be adjusted between them in the action. The Master has power to order whichever party makes the application to pay into the "Security for Costs Account," to abide further order, a small sum of money, but such an order is now seldom made.

On the hearing of the application, the Master will order such discovery only when, and only so far as, he deems it necessary either for disposing of the action or for saving costs. If he is satisfied that discovery is not necessary, he will refuse the application. In other cases he will order either general discovery, or, if he thinks fit, discovery limited to certain classes of documents; thus, if particulars have been delivered, discovery will be limited to the issues as narrowed by the particulars (e). The usual form of

(c) Order XXXI., r. 19A (3).

(d) Under Order XXXI., r. 12.

(e) *Yorkshire Provident Co. v. Gilbert*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 148.

order is :—“ That the plaintiff and defendant do respectively after delivery of Defence, and within ten days after service of copy receipt for deposit in Court (if ordered), answer on affidavit stating what documents are or have been in their possession or power relating to the matters in question in this action.”

Affidavit of Documents.

The party against whom a general order for discovery is made must make an affidavit, specifying all the documents which relate to (f) the matters in dispute in the action, which are or have been in his possession. He must describe them with particularity sufficient to identify them hereafter, should the Court think fit to order any of them to be produced. He must specify all material documents, whether he objects to produce them or not; but immaterial documents he should altogether omit. Any document which he sets out he thereby admits to be material. Hence he should make no reference in his affidavit to any document which he honestly believes does not relate to any issue in the action. Every document which will throw any light on any part of the case is material, and must be disclosed. If some portion of a document or book is within the rule and the rest not, he must specify the portion which is; he has the document or book in his possession, and he must therefore take upon himself the responsibility of stating on oath which parts do and which do not relate to the matters in question.

The party, who makes an affidavit of documents, must also specify in it which (if any) of the documents disclosed he objects to produce, and state the grounds on which he so objects. He cannot please himself. The grounds are laid down for him. Thus, he may lawfully refuse to produce (though not as a rule to disclose) any of the following documents :—

(i) Deeds which relate solely to his own title.

(f) A frequent mistake is to treat this word as being equivalent to “ relevant.” It is not so. A party ordered to give discovery must disclose all documents which relate to the issues, even if irrelevant as evidence.

- (ii) Documents which relate solely to his own case.
- (iii) Communications between himself and his solicitor.
- (iv) Documents prepared with a view to litigation.
- (v) Documents, the production of which would tend to criminate him.
- (vi) Documents which are the property of a third person, who forbids their production.
- (vii) State documents which it is contrary to public policy to produce (*g*).

An Affidavit of Documents is generally in the following form:—

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

1926.—R.—No. 921.

BETWEEN JAMES ROBINSON *Plaintiff,*

AND

JOHN JONES *Defendant.*

I, JOHN JONES, of —, in the county of —, the above-named Defendant, make oath and say as follows:—

1. I have in my possession or power the documents relating to the matters in question in this action set forth in the first and second parts of the First Schedule hereto.

2. I object to produce any of the documents which are tied up in the bundle marked A. mentioned in the second part of the First Schedule hereto, on the ground that they all relate solely to my case and do not relate to the plaintiff's case or tend to support it, or to impeach my case, wherefore I say they are privileged from production.

3. I also object to produce the analysis and report mentioned in the second part of the First Schedule hereto, on the ground that it was made and came into existence for the use of my solicitor in this action, and as evidence and information as to how evidence could be obtained, and otherwise for the use of the said solicitor to enable him to conduct my defence in this action, and to advise me in reference thereto. It was prepared by the direction of my solicitor for his own use in anticipation of litigation and in the conduct of this action, and for no other purpose whatever; wherefore I say that it is privileged from production.

4. I object to produce all the other documents set forth in the second part of the First Schedule hereto, on the ground that they are privileged. They consist of professional communications of a confidential character made to me by my legal advisers for the purpose of giving me legal advice, cases for the opinion of counsel, opinions of counsel and instructions to counsel, prepared and given in anticipation of and during the progress of this action, letters and copies of letters passing between me and my solicitor and between my solicitor and third persons either in anticipation of or during this action, and drafts and memoranda made by my counsel and solicitor for the purpose of this action.

5. I have had, but have not now, in my possession or power the documents relating to the matters in question in this action set forth in the Second Schedule hereto.

6. The last mentioned documents were last in my possession in the month of October, 1925, when I forwarded the first of them (No. 38) to the Plaintiff, and the remaining three to the editor of the "Blankton Observer."

7. According to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, I have not now, and never have had, in my possession, custody or power, or in the possession,

(*g*) For further details as to these grounds of privilege from production, see Odgers on Pleading (9th ed.), pp. 283—287.

custody or power of my solicitors or agents, solicitor or agent, or in the possession, custody or power of any other persons or person in my behalf, any deed, account, book of account, voucher, receipt, letter, memorandum, paper or writing, or any copy of, or extract from, any such document or any other document whatsoever relating to the matters in question in this action or any of them, or wherein any entry has been made relative to such matters or any of them, other than and except the documents set forth in the said First and Second Schedules hereto.

FIRST SCHEDULE.

PART. I.

Originals.

1. Letter from Plaintiff to me, dated January 21, 1925.
2. Letter from Plaintiff's solicitor to me, dated June 5, 1925.
- 3.
- 4.

Copies.

5. Letter from me to Plaintiff, dated October 4, 1925.
6. Inventory and valuation made by John Smith on October 30, 1925.
- 7.
- 8.

PART II.

- 9—36. Certain documents, numbered 9 to 36 inclusive, which are tied up in a bundle marked A, and initialled by me.
37. An analysis and report made by Professor Wise on or about November 23, 1925, and forwarded by him to my solicitor on November 24, 1925, for his use in this action.

Cases for the opinion of counsel, opinions of counsel, and instructions to counsel prepared and given in anticipation of and during the progress of this action.

SECOND SCHEDULE.

38. Letter written and sent by me to the Plaintiff on October 4, 1925.
39. Copy of same.
40. Copy reply of the Plaintiff to that letter dated October 6, 1925.
41. Letter written and sent by me to the editor of the "Blankton Observer" on October 8, 1925, with the two copies just mentioned, all three of which were inserted by him in the issue of that paper for October 10, 1925.

Sworn by the above-named John Jones at 1, Clement's Inn, Strand, in the County of Middlesex, this 26th day of March, 1926.	}	JOHN JONES.
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Before me,

W. A. SMITHSON,

A Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme
Court of Judicature in England.

It will be observed that it has two schedules, and the first schedule has two parts. In Schedule I., Part 1, the deponent (*h*) sets out the documents which he has in his possession and is willing to produce; in Part 2, the documents which he has in his possession

(*h*) A person who makes an affidavit is called "a deponent."

and refuses to produce. In Schedule II. he sets out documents which he once had in his possession but has not now. The reasons for which he refuses production he states in the body of the affidavit.

If an affidavit of documents be in the proper form it is, as a rule, conclusive. No affidavit in reply to it will be permitted. If, however, it can be shown from the affidavit of documents itself, or from the documents disclosed in it, or from any admission in his pleadings, that the deponent has in his possession any material document which he has not disclosed, or that he has prepared the affidavit upon a wrong principle, a further affidavit will be ordered.

A Master at chambers may at any stage of the action order any party to produce such of the documents in his possession or power as the Master shall think right, and may deal with such documents when produced in such manner as shall appear just (*i*). Moreover, a Master may make an order for the inspection of any document in such place and in such manner as he may think fit, provided such inspection be necessary for disposing fairly of the action, or will save costs (*k*). It is on an application for an order for inspection that the validity of any claim of privilege from inspection is generally tested. The party producing any book or document for the inspection of his opponent may seal or cover up any part which he can swear is not material to any issue in the action. The inspecting party is entitled to make a copy of any document produced to him. In a proper case (*e.g.*, where one party denies that he wrote an important document which purports to be in his handwriting), the Master will order the party in possession of the document to permit his opponent to take photographic or *facsimile* copies of it—of course, at his own expense.

In some cases a party to an action can obtain production of documents which are in the possession of a third person, a stranger to the action. In a proper case he may even be allowed to inspect his opponent's banking account at his banker's. An order may be made that he shall be at liberty to inspect and take copies of entries in the books of any bank for the purposes of the litigation. Formerly it was necessary to compel an officer of the bank to attend the trial to produce the books, or to give evidence of their contents.

(*i*) Order XXXI., r. 14.

(*k*) Order XXXI., r. 18.

But now by the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879 (l), a copy of an entry in the book of any banker or any company carrying on the business of bankers is made *prima facie* evidence in all legal proceedings of such entry, and of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded, provided that the book was at the time of the making of the entry one of the ordinary books of the bank, and the entry was made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and the book is in the custody or control of the bank. The copy must be verified by the affidavit of a partner or officer of the bank, who must state that the copy has been examined with the original entry, and is correct.

Again, where inspection of any business books is applied for, the Master may, if he thinks fit, instead of ordering inspection of the original books, order a copy of any entries therein to be furnished and verified by the affidavit of some person who has examined the copy with the original entries; such affidavit should state whether or not there are in the original book any and what erasures, interlineations, or alterations (m). And such copies will be evidence against the party supplying them.

INTERROGATORIES.

Interrogatories, too, are useful whenever there is ground for anticipating that there will, at the trial, be any serious conflict as to the facts. In such cases the defendant's story must differ from that of the plaintiff, and it is most important for each of them, as far as he can, to discover how far these stories diverge. He may succeed in eliciting some admission which will facilitate the proof of his own case; if not, he may be able to pin his opponent down to some definite statement from which he cannot depart at the trial.

Interrogatories may be said to be admissible for the purpose of supporting one's own case (n) or for the purpose of destroying or impeaching one's opponent's case (o), but they are not admissible as to facts which support the opponent's case (p). It is essential that the interrogatory shall be directed to facts in issue or relevant to the

(l) 42 Vict. c. 11, as extended by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 72, s. 11.

(m) Order XXXI., r. 19A (1).

(n) *Hooton v. Dalby*, [1907] 2 K. B. 18, at p. 21.

(o) *Plymouth Mutual, &c., Society v. Traders Association*, [1906] 1 K. B. 403, at p. 417; *Hooton v. Dalby*, *supra*, at pp. 20, 21.

(p) *Hooton v. Dalby*, *supra*; *The Shropshire* (1922), 127 L. T. 487.

issue (q). If not it will be disallowed, even if such facts are admissible in evidence.

Neither party, however, is permitted to administer to his opponent whatever questions he pleases on matters upon which interrogating is permitted. He must first take out a summons for leave to administer interrogatories and serve his opponent with a copy of the proposed interrogatories at the same time as he serves the summons. At the hearing he submits his proposed questions to the Master, and obtains his leave to administer them. The Master will only allow such questions as he "shall consider necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs" (r). He will also, before giving such leave, take into consideration any offer which may be made by the party sought to be interrogated to deliver particulars or to make admissions, or to produce documents relating to any of the matters in question. The party interrogating may be ordered, before delivering the interrogatories to his opponent, to pay into the "Security for Costs Account," to abide further order, a sum of money fixed by the Master, though such an order is now seldom made.

There are certain rules (s) which determine what interrogatories may be administered and what not. The most important of these rules is that interrogatories must be relevant to the matters in issue. Not every question which could be asked a witness in the box may be put as an interrogatory. Thus, questions which are only put to test the credibility of the witness (questions "to credit," as they are called) will not be allowed, although, of course, they may be asked in cross-examination at the trial (t). But either party may interrogate as to any link in the chain of evidence necessary to substantiate his case. So, too—in some cases—interrogatories are admissible as to matters which are only relevant in aggravation or mitigation of damages (u).

Again, the party interrogating may put his whole case to his opponent if he thinks fit; he may also interrogate in full detail as to matters common to the case of both parties; but he is not entitled to obtain more than an outline of his opponent's case. He can compel his adversary to disclose the facts on which he intends

(q) *Lever v. Associated Newspapers*, [1907] 2 K. B. 626; *Osram v. Gabriel*, [1914] 2 Ch. 129; *Blair v. Haycock* (1917), 34 T. L. R. 39.

(r) Order XXXI., r. 2.

(s) See Odgers on Pleading (9th ed.), pp. 293–301.

(t) See the concluding words of Order XXXI., r. 1.

(u) See *Scaife v. Kemp*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 319.

to rely at the trial, but not the evidence by which he proposes to prove those facts. He cannot claim to "see his opponent's brief," or ask him to name his witnesses (x). He is entitled to know precisely what is the charge made against him, and what is the case which he will have to meet. But he is not entitled to discover in what way his opponent intends to establish that charge or prove his case.

It may make the foregoing observations clearer to the student if we subjoin a specimen of a set of interrogatories:—

INTERROGATORIES.

Administered to the defendant in an action of slander where privilege has been pleaded.

1. Did you not on March 8, 1926, or on some other, and what, day, speak to Mrs. B the words set out in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim, or some, and which, of them, or some other, and what, words to the same purport or effect? If not, state precisely what words you did speak to Mrs. B as to the alleged composition by the plaintiff with his creditors.

2. How long have you known Mrs. B? Had she any, and if so what, interest in the solvency of the plaintiff or of his firm? In what way was it your duty to discuss with her the solvency of the plaintiff or of his firm?

3. Did you at the time that you spoke the said words believe that your statement was true? If so, what information had you at that date which induced you so to believe?

4. Did you, before you spoke the said words, make any, and what, inquiries as to their truth, or take any, and what steps to ascertain whether they were true or not? If so, state when and from whom you made each such inquiry, and with what result.

5. Were not Misses X, Y, and Z [*persons mentioned in the plaintiff's particulars*], or some, and which, of them, present when you discussed with Mrs. B the solvency of the plaintiff or of the plaintiff's firm? If so, did not all the said ladies or some, and which, of them hear you speak the words set out in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim or some, and which of them or some other, and what, words to the same purport or effect? Had each or any of these ladies any interest in the solvency of the plaintiff or of his firm? Was it your duty to discuss this matter in the hearing of each or any of them, and if so, how did such duty arise?

Answers to Interrogatories.

The party interrogated must, within the time prescribed by the Master, file an affidavit answering in full detail all

(x) See, for instance, *Hooton v. Dalby*, [1907] 2 K. B. 18.

the interrogatories to which he can raise no sound objection. He must answer them fully and frankly and with scrupulous accuracy. He may answer guardedly and make qualified admissions, so long as both the admission and the qualification are clear and definite. He may answer "Yes" or "No" simply, so long as it is clear how much is thus admitted or denied. So, too, it is quite admissible to say, "I do not know," where the matter is neither within his own knowledge nor that of his servants. He is not bound to procure information from strangers for the purpose of answering. If, however, he is interrogated about acts which are done by or in the presence of persons employed by him, he is bound to make inquiries of them (*y*), for their knowledge is his knowledge, if it was acquired by them in the ordinary course of their employment by him.

If the party interrogated has any legal objection to answering any interrogatory, he must take that objection in his affidavit in answer. Such objections are of many kinds, *e.g.*, that the interrogatory is irrelevant, or not put *bona fide* for the purposes of the present action, or that it inquires into the evidence by which the party interrogated intends to establish at the trial the facts set out in his pleadings, or that it inquires into the contents of a written document, or that it is "prolix, oppressive, unnecessary or scandalous" (*z*). A solicitor, if interrogated, can also claim his professional privilege, and refuse to disclose any matters imparted to him in confidence by his client. Questions which tend to incriminate the party interrogated are not scandalous, unless they are either irrelevant or "fishing"; they will not, therefore, be struck out or set aside; they may be administered, but the party interrogated will not be compelled to answer them, if he can swear that to do so would tend to incriminate him. That the inter-

(*y*) *Bolckow, Vaughan & Co. v. Fisher* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 161; but see *Rasbotham v. Shropshire Union Railways Co.* (1883), 24 Ch. D., at p. 113. It is always advisable to require expressly that enquiries should be made by the person interrogated.

(*z*) Order XXXI., r. 6. A "scandalous" interrogatory is an insulting or degrading question, which is irrelevant to the matters in issue. "Certainly nothing can be scandalous which is relevant": *per* Cotton, L.J., in *Fisher v. Owen* (1878), 8 Ch. D., at p. 653.

rogatory will tend to incriminate third persons is no objection, if it be put *bona fide* for the purposes of the present action. That to answer it would expose the party interrogated, or third persons, to civil actions is no objection.

The fact that objections can be taken in the answers is due to the circumstance that originally the method of submitting the proposed interrogatories to a Master on a summons for leave to administer them was not in force, and consequently the proper occasion for taking objections was in the answers. The liberty is still allowed. For some, indeed, *e.g.*, that the answer would tend to incriminate the deponent, it is still the only appropriate time to take the objection. It is not the practice to take objections for the second time in the answers.

If the answers are insufficient or evasive, the party interrogating may by means of a notice (a) under the summons for directions apply for a further and better affidavit in answer. The notice should specify the interrogatories or parts of interrogatories to which a better answer is required. So, too, if the deponent introduces into his affidavit irrelevant matter, which prevents his opponent from making a fair use of the answers at the trial, the party interrogating may apply to have such matter struck out.

Any party failing to answer interrogatories, or to discover or produce or allow inspection of documents as ordered, is liable to attachment; and, if a plaintiff, to have his action dismissed for want of prosecution; if a defendant, to have his Defence, if any, struck out, and to be placed in the same position as if he had never pleaded. But such extreme penalties will only be enforced in the last resort, where it seems clear that the party in default really intends not to comply with the order of the Court. Hence, before making any application of this kind, the other party should obtain a peremptory order insisting on such discovery being made within a time specified in the order.

It will be observed that by means of interrogatories either party can compel his opponent to admit facts which are within his own knowledge or that of his agents or servants, and, moreover, to make such admissions on oath. There are many other ways in which one party can obtain admissions from the other during the progress of the action, if the other is willing to make them. Thus, admissions are frequently made on the pleadings. Anything

(a) Order XXX., r. 5.

alleged by one party in his pleading which the other does not deny is taken to be admitted (*b*). Again, either party may serve on the other a notice to admit facts; and though the person served with such a notice may refuse to admit them, a refusal to do so may affect costs (*c*). Such a notice need not be confined to matters within the knowledge of the party on whom it is served. So, too, either party may serve on his opponent a notice to inspect and admit documents. Admissions made on receiving this notice are generally made "saving all just exceptions to their admissibility in evidence." Moreover, a solicitor can always bind his client by a formal admission made in the course of the litigation; and so can counsel or solicitor in open Court at the trial, but any such admission in Court may be withdrawn if made carelessly or under a misapprehension (*d*).

INSPECTION OF PROPERTY.

It may also be advisable for one party to inspect premises or things which are in the possession of his opponent. Thus, if a landlord alleges that his tenant has left the demised premises in a bad state of repair, both he and the tenant may reasonably desire to send a surveyor over the property to report as to its condition (*e*). So, in an action for the price of goods sold, the purchaser may wish to inspect the bulk and the vendor the sample. In such cases the Master has power under Order L., r. 3, upon the application of either party to the action, and upon such terms as may be just, to make an order for the detention, preservation (*f*), or inspection of any property or thing, which is the subject of the action or as to which any question may arise therein. A Master may under the same rule authorise any persons to enter any land or building in the possession of any party to the action, and he may also authorise any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full

(*b*) Order XIX., r. 13; this rule must, however, be read with rules 17 and 19, Order XXI., r. 4, and Order XXVII., r. 13.

(*c*) Order XXXII., r. 4.

(*d*) As to the authority of counsel to compromise, see *post*, pp. 819, 820.

(*e*) As to ancient lights, see the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in *Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores*, [1904] A. C., at pp. 185—195.

(*f*) This may even extend to ordering that a steam vessel in a colonial port shall be brought home: *New Orleans S.S. Co. v. London Provincial Insurance Co.*, [1909] 1 K. B. 943.

information or evidence. Again, where one party to an action claims that the other party is detaining property other than land, and the other does not claim that he owns it, but merely that he has a lien or charge upon it, the Master may make an order that the property be handed over to the party claiming it upon his paying into Court the amount claimed in respect of the lien or charge and costs to abide the result of the action (*g*).

ADVICE ON EVIDENCE.

Having thus obtained all the information he can from his opponent or from the inspection of documents or property, each party seriously begins to get his own evidence in order. This may involve a careful search for missing letters or account books, or the inspection of ancient records and registers and the procuring of certified copies of their contents. He must not lose his case for want of some formal piece of proof. The junior counsel on each side is generally (*h*) asked at this stage of the proceeding to advise what further evidence is necessary to place everything in proper order for the hearing. He in the first place ascertains from the pleadings what are the precise issues to be tried. Then, if the burden of proof (*i*) on any issue lies on his client, he states *seriatim* what witnesses must be called, and what documents must be put in evidence on that issue. He also advises what evidence is necessary to rebut the case of the adversary on the other issues, and what evidence should be given in aggravation or mitigation of damages. Advising upon evidence is probably the last stage before trial at which counsel can reconsider the whole matter, and he should do this with great care. It is for him to see that, as far as possible, his client shall not lose

(*g*) Order L., r. 8; and see *Gebrüder Naf v. Ploton* (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 13.

(*h*) There is no obligation to obtain an opinion upon evidence, and the practice varies as to when it is asked for. Some solicitors prefer to obtain such advice early and then work upon the opinion; others put before counsel the results of their work and ask at a late stage whether it is sufficient, and if not in what respects it should be supplemented. Much depends upon the circumstances of each action.

(*i*) As to burden of proof, see *post*, pp. 639 *et seq.*

because of a wrong view of the law or want of the necessary evidence.

Securing the Attendance of Witnesses at the Trial.

The witnesses, whom it is desirable to have in attendance at the trial, are served with a formal order to attend the trial (which is called a *subpœna*), unless there is no doubt of their willingness to attend (*k*). If it is wished that any one of them should bring a particular document with him, then he is served with a *subpœna duces tecum* specifying the document.

It may, however, turn out that some material witness is too ill to attend the trial, or is about to leave the country before the trial, or is already absent abroad. In the first two cases the person who needs his evidence must at once apply for "a commission" to take his deposition before the trial. Some barrister or solicitor is appointed commissioner; he goes to the bedside or other place where the witness is, or to which he can come, accompanied by the parties or their representatives. The witness is sworn and examined, and may be cross-examined and re-examined. The commissioner takes down all the evidence and any objections to any part of it. This he then reads over to the witness, and both he and the witness sign it (*l*). As soon as this is done, the record becomes a deposition and is subsequently filed in Court. It may be necessary to apply to postpone the trial while this is taking place. But if the witness be already abroad, so that he cannot be served with a *subpœna*, a usual course is that an order will be made for a commission as above described, and then the evidence of the witness will be taken abroad before a commissioner or examiner appointed by the English Court, and the deposition taken before him can be used at the trial in England unless the witness can then be produced personally.

(*k*) Some witnesses will not attend without a *subpœna* because they do not wish to appear to favour either side. Some, too, cannot obtain leave from their employers to attend unless they have been served with a *subpœna* to attend.

(*l*) When a shorthand writer is employed it is usual for the parties to agree to waive the reading over of the deposition to the witness and his signing it.

Several foreign Governments, however, object to evidence being taken in their territories in this way. If evidence is to be taken in any such country, the Foreign Office, at the request of the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Chief Justice, may send through diplomatic channels "a letter of request" addressed to the tribunal of such other country, asking the Judges of that tribunal to order the required evidence to be taken and remitted to the English Court. The plaintiff himself will not, as a rule, be allowed thus to give his evidence abroad; it should be given before the jury here. But a defendant, if resident abroad, will be allowed this indulgence. No order will be made either for a commission or for letters of request, if it can be shown that the witnesses could be brought to England without much greater expense, or that witnesses now in England could give the same evidence.

Evidence on Affidavit.

In the Chancery Division evidence is frequently taken on affidavit instead of the witnesses personally appearing in Court. And indeed in any Division of the High Court this can be done if all parties consent. The evidence is taken before the trial. The plaintiff's affidavits must be filed and delivered within fourteen days after consent given, or such other time as may be agreed upon or allowed (*m*). Within a like period counter-affidavits may be delivered by the defendant. Affidavits in reply may be filed within seven days, or such other time as may be agreed upon or allowed, after the expiration of the preceding period; these must be confined to matters "strictly in reply." When evidence is thus taken by affidavit any party desiring to cross-examine a deponent may serve upon the party filing the affidavit a notice in writing, requiring the production of the deponent for cross-examination at the trial. Such notice must be served before the expiration of fourteen days after the time allowed for filing affidavits in reply, or within such time as may be specially appointed. Unless such deponent is produced accordingly, his affidavit cannot be used as evidence, unless by special leave of the Court. The attendance of a deponent for cross-examination may be compelled in the same way as the attendance of a witness. The Court or a Judge may also at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of a witness be read at the hearing or trial, on reasonable conditions, unless it appears that

the other party *bona fide* desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such witness can be produced (n). The deposition of a witness taken on commission or under letters of request, as already described, may also be read in evidence if the attendance of the witness himself cannot be procured.

In all other cases, in the absence of any agreement in writing between the solicitors of all parties, the witnesses at the trial of an action or at an assessment of damages must be examined *viva voce* in open Court.

Securing the Production of Documents at the Trial.

Each party must, in good time before the hearing, consider what documents will be required to prove his case at the trial, and also what documents will be needed for the cross-examination of the witnesses called against him. On this several questions arise, such as: Are such documents still in existence? In whose handwriting are they? Are they within the jurisdiction of the Court? If the originals cannot be produced, is any secondary evidence of their contents procurable? If so, is it admissible? The rule as to private documents (o) is that the originals must be produced in Court, if they still exist and can be found within the jurisdiction. If the original be produced, it may be necessary to call witnesses to prove the handwriting; if it be not produced, there may be considerable difficulty in obtaining permission to read a copy (p).

In order to facilitate the proof in Court of the documents which are either in his own or his opponent's possession, each party should, a reasonable time before the trial, serve on his opponent two notices:—

(a) A *notice to produce* at the trial the documents which are in his opponent's possession, and which he requires his opponent to bring to the Court.

(b) A *notice to inspect and admit* the documents which are in his own possession, and which he invites his opponent to call and inspect before the trial, and then to make a

(n) Order XXXVII., r. 1; and see sections 99 and 101 of the Judicature Act, 1925, and rule 7 of Order XXX.

(o) As to public documents statute law in almost every case permits an official copy of a specified kind to be used.

(p) The law on these points has been summarised *post*, pp. 634 *et seq.*

formal admission that they were written by the person in whose handwriting they purport to be.

Both these notices serve a useful purpose. Unless a party has given to his opponent notice to produce a document in his possession, he cannot give any secondary evidence of its contents. A notice to produce merely allows secondary evidence to be given. If for any reason it is necessary to have the original in Court, a *subpœna duces tecum* is necessary. The object of a notice to inspect and admit is to obtain admissions from the other party which will dispense with the need of formal proof at the trial. If, after notice to admit, his opponent unreasonably refuses to admit, he will probably, even though he win the action, have to pay the costs of proving any document not admitted. The party proving the document, if successful, will not be allowed such costs, unless he served on his opponent notice to admit it, and so gave him the opportunity of saving the expense (q).

But there is more trouble when the documents are in the possession of a third person, not a party to the action. If the person who holds the document be within the jurisdiction of the Court he can, as we have already seen, be served with a *subpœna duces tecum*; but if he be outside the jurisdiction, all that can be done is to impress upon him the importance of his attending the trial or sending the document, and to offer him such inducements as may be necessary (r).

Place and Mode of Trial.

The Master has no doubt dealt with these matters on a summons for directions. But circumstances may have changed; issues may have been raised which alter the complexion of the case. Hence the Master has power to vary the place of trial for sufficient cause (s), although his first order has not been appealed against, or if it has, then without success. Again, he may think it right to vary the

(q) Order XXXII., r. 2. As to a notice to admit facts, see *ante*, p. 582.

(r) See *ante*, p. 584.

(s) Order XXXVI., r. 1.

mode of trial by directing a trial by Judge and jury, instead of a trial by Judge alone; or by a special instead of a common jury; or by ordering that the action shall be tried by an official or special referee (*t*). He may also order a "speedy trial" of the action under Order XXXVI., r. 1A. A Master may also order different questions of fact arising in an action to be tried by different modes of trial, or that one or more questions of fact be tried before others (*u*).

In the Chancery Division an action is always tried by a Judge alone; a jury is never seen there. In any other Division of the High Court an action may be tried in one of three ways:—

- (a) By Judge alone;
- (b) By Judge and jury (special or common);
- (c) By a Judge with assessors.

Assessors are professional or scientific persons who assist the Judge with their special knowledge; they are most frequently seen in the Admiralty Court in cases of collision between two vessels.

In actions of slander, libel, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction or breach of promise of marriage—actions in which the damages are necessarily unliquidated—either party can secure a trial by jury as of right merely by giving notice in proper time that such is his wish (*v*). In all other cases the trial will be by Judge alone, unless an order be made at chambers for a trial by jury. But an order for a jury will be made if either party applies for it within ten days after notice of trial has been given,

(i) unless the action is one which could, without any consent of the parties, have been tried without a jury before the Judicature Act (*x*), or

(ii) unless the Master sees clearly that the case involves prolonged examination of documents or accounts, or a scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made by a jury (*y*).

If the parties allow the prescribed period of ten days to pass without applying for a jury, then the Master can make whatever order he thinks right as to the mode of trial. So either party can obtain a special jury, if he gives notice in proper time (*z*); if he

(*t*) See *ante*, pp. 362 *et seq.*

(*u*) See Order XXXVI., r. 7.

(*v*) Order XXXVI., r. 6.

(*x*) Such as Chancery suits or Admiralty actions: *The Temple Bar* (1885),
11 P. D. 6.

(*y*) Order XXXVI., r. 5.

(*z*) *Ibid.*, r. 9.

applies subsequently, he cannot obtain a special jury as of right; but there is generally no difficulty in obtaining one, unless the application is made with the object of delaying the trial.

If the trial is to be by Judge and jury, whether special or common, either party can in a proper case obtain an order for the jury to have a preliminary "view" of the premises or locality to which the action relates.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY OF LAND.

So far in this Book we have dealt almost exclusively with actions brought to recover a debt or damages or other relief from a person. But there are also proceedings in which the plaintiff asserts his ownership or claims possession of a chattel or of land. Thus, in England, there were formerly three classes of actions; personal actions, in which the plaintiff sought to recover a debt or damages from the defendant; real actions, in which he sought to establish his title to land or other hereditaments; mixed actions, in which he sought to establish his right to possession of land, and also to personal damages for a wrong sustained. All forms of action are now abolished, but there still inevitably remains the distinction between actions *in personam* brought against an individual, actions *in rem* which determine questions of title, and possessory actions which decide merely the right to have physical control of the property in dispute.

When the Judicature Act, 1873, came into force in 1875, the only possessory action relating to land was the action of ejectment. The plaintiff in such an action asserted no freehold title in himself; he only claimed to be the lessee, or otherwise entitled to possession of the land in dispute. No question arose as to the ownership of the land, unless and until the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff's lessor. This question of ownership, however, was frequently raised in actions of ejectment, as the procedure in all real actions had become cumbrous and expensive. The plaintiff asserted that A had granted him a lease, under which he had entered on the land demised, and had been ousted therefrom. The defendant admitted the lease, the entry, and the ouster, and merely denied the right of A to grant the plaintiff that lease. In this way the parties obtained in an action which was in form merely possessory a decision as to the title to the land which otherwise could only have been pronounced in a real action.

The action of ejectment has now been superseded by the action for the recovery of land, while the place of the former real action

is taken to some extent by an action for a declaration of title (*a*). An action to recover a chattel hardly differs from the ordinary action for damages.

ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY OF LAND.

The procedure in an action for the recovery of land differs in many respects from the procedure in personal actions. This difference arises not only from the special nature of the property that forms the subject-matter of the action, but also from an ancient rule of law which from the earliest time respected and protected possession whenever it had been peaceably acquired—a respect which was enhanced by the fear that any interference with possession might lead to a breach of the peace. The law presumed that any one in possession of land was entitled to hold possession of it. Hence a claimant who was not in possession must recover the land by the strength of his own title, and not by reason of any defect in the title of the person in possession. Even though it was abundantly clear that the person in possession had no right to be there, still the claimant in ejectment could not turn him out unless he could show in himself a title which was—*prima facie*, at all events—good against all the world. If the person in possession could show that some third person had a better title than the claimant, the action failed even though such third person had not placed the defendant in possession. This rule, that the claimant must recover by the strength of his own title, still remains the law. Every presumption is still made in favour of the person in possession. He cannot be made to disclose his title; nor can he, as a rule, be compelled to assist the claimant to establish his. It is still true that “possession is nine points of the law” (*b*).

Parties.

The proper plaintiff is the person who is entitled to the immediate possession of the property. He may either be

(*a*) As to this, see *ante*, pp. 493 *et seq.*

(*b*) *Lows v. Telford* (1876), 1 App. Cas. 414; but see *Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club*, [1920] 1 K. B. 720.

the freeholder or the lessee of the freeholder. As between freeholders the first tenant for life is the proper plaintiff, for he is the person entitled to the immediate possession of the property; there is no need to join any remainderman or reversioner. Where the person who claims possession is a tenant in common, he can sue alone, without joining the other co-tenants in common as co-plaintiffs. All joint tenants, however, must be joined on the writ (c).

A lessee to whom a lease has been granted can also bring an action although he has never yet been in actual possession of the land demised. Again, a person to whom no lease has been granted, but who has merely an agreement for a lease, can bring ejectment if he is entitled to specific performance of the contract. He has an equitable right to possession. He must, however, join his lessor in any action he may bring to recover possession of the land from a third person, for a person who has only an equitable right to enter cannot sue in ejectment without making the owner of the legal estate either plaintiff or defendant (d).

To this rule, however, two exceptions have been made by statute:—

(i) A mortgagor, if entitled for the time being to the possession or receipt of the rents or profits of any land, may sue for such possession or for the recovery of such rents or profits in his own name only, so long as the mortgagee has not given notice of his intention to take possession, or to enter into the receipt of the rents and profits (e).

(ii) Every condition of re-entry contained in a lease shall be annexed, and incident to, and go with the immediate reversion, notwithstanding severance, and shall be capable of being enforced by the person from time to time entitled to the income of the land leased (f), and if the reversion was assigned on or after January 1, 1912, the assignee can take advantage of a right of entry for a breach of covenant which accrued to the assignor before assign-

(c) *Lauri v. Renad*, [1892] 3 Ch. 402; *Roberts v. Holland*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 665.

(d) This appears to be still clear law: *Allen v. Woods* (1893), 68 L. T. 143. Nevertheless, in *General Finance Co. v. Liberator Building Society* (1878), 10 Ch. D., at p. 24, Jessel, M.R., said: "The jurisdiction in equity and common law is now vested in every Court of justice, so that no action for ejectment or, as it is now called, an action for the recovery of land, can be defeated for the want of the legal estate where the plaintiff has the title to the possession."

(e) L. P. A., 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 20), s. 98 (replacing section 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873): see *Matthews v. Usher*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 535.

(f) *Ibid.*, s. 141 (re-enacting section 10 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881).

ment (g). Section 10 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, was no doubt primarily intended to deal with cases in which the reversion has been severed; but it has been construed as meaning that a person who is only equitably entitled to the rent reserved by a lease could enforce a proviso for re-entry against the tenant, although the legal reversion immediately expectant on the termination of the lease was vested in another person who is no party to the action (h).

If the person claiming possession of freehold property has died, the proper plaintiffs in an action for the recovery of the land are at first his personal representatives; for on them the freeholds, both legal and equitable, of a deceased person now devolve until by the assent or conveyance of such personal representatives they vest in the devisee or heir-at-law, who thereupon becomes the proper plaintiff (i).

Hence, if a freeholder dies leaving a will, his land at once vests in his executors, and they alone can bring an action for the recovery of the land until they assent to its vesting in the devisee (if any) named in the will or, if none be named, in the heir. Should the executors postpone assent for more than a year, the Court can order them to execute a conveyance (k).

If, however, a freeholder dies intestate, apparently his lands at once vest in the Probate Judge until letters of administration be granted to another (l). As soon as an administrator is thus appointed, the legal estate in the land passes to him by operation of law. His title relates back to the time of death (m), and remains in him until he conveys it back to the heir. Again, if a man dies leaving a will by which he devises his freeholds, and appoints executors who predecease him, the legal estate will, it seems, pass to the devisee under the former law, and remain in him until the Court grants to some one else letters of administration *cum testamento annexo*

The person actually in possession of the land must be made defendant. "In ejectment the tenant in possession *must* be sued" (n). It is not necessary to join the landlord or any person not in possession who is in receipt of the rents and profits. If several persons be in occupation, the plaintiff strictly must join them all as defendants if he

(g) 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, s. 141, sub-s. 3.

(h) This view receives some colour from the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Turner v. Walsh*, [1909] 2 K. B. 484; *sed quare*.

(i) Administration of Estates Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 23).

(k) *Ibid.*, s. 43.

(l) *Ibid.*, s. 9.

(m) *Pryse, In the goods of*, [1904] P. 301.

(n) *Per Lord Tenterden, C.J.*, in *Berkeley v. Dimery* (1829), 10 B. & C. 113.

desires to recover the whole of the premises mentioned in his writ. But where a large number of persons are in possession under the same lessor, the rule is relaxed, and the plaintiff is allowed merely to make that lessor defendant (o). The tenant is bound, under penalty of three years' rent, "forthwith" to give notice to his landlord that a writ in ejectment has been served on him (p). The landlord can then obtain leave to appear and defend the action (q).

Joinder of Causes of Action.

As a rule, since the Judicature Act, any number of causes of action between the same plaintiff and the same defendant may be joined on one writ. But in an action for the recovery of land the plaintiff has not so large a liberty. Nevertheless, rule 2 of Order XVIII. permits the joinder of practically every kind of claim which a plaintiff would ordinarily wish to join. Under this rule the plaintiff may without leave join with his claim for recovery of the possession of the land a claim for—

1. Mesne profits (r).
2. Arrears of rent (r).
3. "Double value" (s).

(o) *Minet v. Johnson* (1890), 63 L. T. 507; *Geen v. Herring*, [1905] 1 K. B. 152; and see *Berton v. Alliance Economic Investment Co.*, [1922] 1 K. B. 759.

(p) L. P. A., 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 20), s. 145.

(q) Order XII., rr. 25, 26 and 27.

(r) If a person who has no title enters into possession of land, the rents or profits which he does in fact receive or make, or which he might have received or made, during his occupation are called "mesne profits"; and these he must pay over to the true owner as compensation for the trespass which he has committed. "Rent," on the other hand, is the money which is payable by a tenant to his landlord for the use and occupation of land under a contract express or implied. A claim for rent is therefore liquidated, while a claim for mesne profits is always unliquidated. Mesne profits can be claimed from the date of the defendant's entry on the land till possession is given up to the plaintiff: *Southport Tramways Co. v. Gandy*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 66.

(s) A tenant who wilfully holds over after the expiration of his term of tenancy and "after demand made and notice in writing" is liable to "pay at the rate of double the yearly value" of the land during the time he so holds over (4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1). A tenant who has given his landlord a notice to quit, and who fails to give up possession of the land at the time specified in such notice, is liable to pay double rent during the time he continues in possession (11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 18). Both these penal sums are still recoverable, but they are very rarely claimed. A claim for double value can be joined on the writ in an action for the recovery of land; but a claim for double rent apparently cannot. Penal rents reserved in the lease of an agricultural "holding" can now be enforced only so far as special damage can be established (8 Edw. 7, c. 28, s. 25).

4. Damages for breach of any contract under which the land or any part of it is held.

5. Damages for any wrong or injury to the premises claimed (*t*).

But when a plaintiff desires to indorse his writ specially, he can only add to his claim for recovery of the land—

(1) a claim for rent in arrear;

(2) a claim for mesne profits.

He is by the words of Order III., r. 6, expressly permitted to add the latter claim, although it is in its nature unliquidated.

If the plaintiff desires to join any other claim not included in the above list, he must apply to the Master for leave, though it would be seldom that any other such claim could be conveniently tried in an action for the recovery of land (*u*).

The rule, it will be observed, refers only to causes of action, but, as we have seen (*x*), the same cause of action may entitle the plaintiff to relief of various kinds. Therefore no leave is necessary to join a claim for a receiver (*y*), or an account, or an injunction, or for a declaration which merely tends to establish the plaintiff's right to possession, as all these things are simply machinery to enforce the plaintiff's one cause of action (*z*). But a claim for a substantive declaration of title (not merely auxiliary to a claim for possession) is a separate cause of action, and cannot be joined without leave (*a*).

If the defendant considers that several causes of action have been joined on one writ which cannot conveniently be tried together, he may apply under Order XVIII., rr. 8, 9, to have some excluded even though no leave was necessary for their joinder (*b*). Where leave is necessary the plaintiff must file an affidavit and apply for leave to a Master or district registrar. Strictly he should do this

(*t*) The rule also permits a claim for possession to be raised incidentally in an action for foreclosure or redemption.

(*u*) See, however, *Cook v. Enchmarch* (1876), 2 Ch. D. 111, where leave was granted to join a claim for the cancellation of deeds relating to the land.

(*x*) *Ante*, p. 482.

(*y*) See *Gwatkin v. Bird* (1883), 52 L. J. Q. B. 263. The Court will appoint a receiver whenever it is just and convenient to do so, even when the plaintiff claims the legal estate: Judicature Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 49), s. 45.

(*z*) *Gledhill v. Hunter* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 492.

(*a*) Order XVIII., r. 2.

(*b*) See *Saccharin Corporation v. Wild*, [1903] 1 Ch. 410.

before the writ is issued; but leave can be given subsequently (c). If claims be improperly joined without leave, still this irregularity is waived if the defendant, without raising the objection, subsequently takes any step in the action, which would be neither necessary nor useful if he intended to rely on that objection (c). He is supposed to know the law, and therefore has notice of the irregularity as soon as he sees the writ or pleading.

Indorsement on Writ, &c.

The writ must always define clearly the premises claimed, so that the sheriff may know into possession of what lands he is to put the plaintiff if he succeeds in the action. This particularity is also valuable for another reason—it enables the defendant to avail himself of the power given him by Order XII., r. 28, and “limit his defence to a part only of the property mentioned in the writ,” in which case he must describe “that part with reasonable certainty in his memorandum of appearance, or in a notice intituled in the action and signed by him or his solicitor,” and the plaintiff can then at once enter judgment under Order XIII., r. 8, for the rest of the premises specified on the writ. The writ may be indorsed either generally or specially.

(1) *General Indorsement*.—A writ may be generally indorsed as follows:—

The plaintiff's claim is as against all the defendants to recover possession of the house known as No. 17, King Street, Banbury, in the county of Oxford, now in the occupation of the defendants B, C and D.

And also as against the defendant A for £50 arrears of rent due from him under the lease of the said premises granted him by the plaintiff, and £100 for damages for breach of the covenants to repair.

And for mesne profits,

And for a receiver.

(2) *Special Indorsement*.—At first no writ could be specially indorsed with a claim for the recovery of land. But in 1883 the following words were added to Order III., r. 6:—

“(F) In actions for the recovery of land (with or without a claim for rent or mesne profits) by a landlord against a tenant

whose term has expired or has been duly determined by notice to quit, or against persons claiming under such tenant."

And in 1902 these further words were inserted in that rule: "or has become liable to forfeiture for non-payment of rent" (*d*).

Hence a writ can now be specially indorsed with a claim for the recovery of land in four cases, viz., where the defendant is:—

- (1) a tenant whose term has expired, or
- (2) a tenant whose term has been duly determined by a notice to quit, or
- (3) a tenant whose term has become liable to forfeiture for non-payment of rent (*e*), or
- (4) a person claiming under any such tenant, including a tenant at will.

And in each of these cases the plaintiff may include in the special indorsement a claim for rent or for mesne profits (*f*), although such a claim is unliquidated.

(i) WHERE THE TERM HAS EXPIRED.

Statement of Claim.

1. The Plaintiff's claim is to recover possession of a house and garden, known as No. 23, Friern Barnet Road, situate in the Parish of Finchley, in the county of Middlesex.

2. The said house and garden were demised by the Plaintiff to the Defendant by a lease in writing, dated March 17th, 1919, for the term of seven years, at the yearly rental of £60, payable quarterly.

3. The said term expired on March 25th, 1926.

4. The Defendant has not paid the quarter's rent which fell due on March 25th, 1926, or any part thereof; and the Plaintiff claims the sum of £14 10s. 0d. for arrears of rent, less tax.

5. The Plaintiff also claims mesne profits from March 25th, 1926, till possession of the said house and garden is delivered up to him.

(ii) WHERE THE TENANCY HAS BEEN DULY DETERMINED BY A NOTICE TO QUIT.

Statement of Claim.

1. The Plaintiff's claim is to recover possession of the premises known as Laburnum Lodge, Manchester Road, in the borough of Wigan, in the county of Lancashire.

2. The Defendant held the said premises of the Plaintiff as tenant from year to year. His tenancy commenced on March 25th, 1911.

3. The Plaintiff duly determined the said tenancy by serving on the Defendant on September 27th, 1925, a notice to quit the said premises on March 25th, 1926, yet the Defendant wrongfully holds possession of the said premises.

(*d*) This can only be the case where the lease contains a proviso for re-entry on non-payment of the rent for a specified period, which has expired before the issue of the writ.

(*e*) A plaintiff who claims possession of land on a forfeiture can only indorse his writ specially in one case, that of a forfeiture for non-payment of rent: *Burns v. Walford*, [1884] W. N. 31; *Arden v. Boyce*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 796. To that case section 14 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (replaced by section 146 of L. P. A., 1925), does not apply. The tenant can only obtain relief under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, ss. 210—212) and the Judicature Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 49, s. 46).

(*f*) See *ante*, p. 534.

4. The Plaintiff also claims the mesne profits of the said premises from March 25th, 1926, till possession be delivered up.

(iii) WHERE THE TERM IS FORFEITED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT.

Statement of Claim.

1. By an agreement in writing, dated September 22nd, 1924, the Plaintiff let to the Defendant a house, No. 52, Broad Street, Bristol, for the term of three years from September 29th, 1924, at the yearly rent of £120, payable quarterly.

2. By the said agreement, the Defendant promised to pay the said rent in equal quarterly instalments on the usual quarter-days. The said agreement also contained a clause entitling the Plaintiff to re-enter in case the said rent was more than twenty-one days in arrear.

3. The Defendant took possession of the said house under the said agreement, and is still in possession thereof. He paid the Plaintiff rent up to Lady Day, 1926; he has paid no rent which has accrued since that day.

And the plaintiff claims :—

(i) Possession of the said house;

(ii) £30, being one quarter's arrears of rent;

(iii) Mesne profits from date of writ (June 25th, 1926) till possession of the said house is delivered to the Plaintiff.

The service of the writ in actions for the recovery of land is the same as in all other actions except in the case of "vacant possession." If no one is in possession of the land, the writ may be served by posting a copy of it on the door of a dwelling-house or in some other conspicuous part of the property (*g*). But this course can only be taken if the tenant has abandoned possession; it is not permissible if, although he has discontinued to occupy the premises, he still retains the virtual control of them (*h*). The plaintiff cannot sign judgment on such a service without an order, and then only judgment for possession. Judgment for arrears of rent or mesne profits cannot be obtained, if service was effected in this way.

Appearance in an action for recovery of land differs from appearance in an ordinary action in two respects :—

(1) Appearance may be limited to part only of the premises claimed (*i*).

(2) Any person not named defendant on the writ who, at the date of the writ, is in possession of any part of the premises claimed may by leave appear and defend (*k*). Leave must be obtained from a Master on affidavit, and may

(*g*) Order IX., r. 9.

(*h*) *Doe d. Lord Darlington v. Cock* (1825), 4 B. & C. 259.

(*i*) Order XII., r. 28.

(*k*) Order XII., rr. 25, 26, 27.

be granted although the applicant has since the writ been turned out of possession (*l*).

A landlord whose tenant is in possession can obtain leave under these rules (*m*); when entering appearance he must state that he appears as landlord.

A mortgagee who is a landlord by reason of an attornment clause in the mortgage deed may appear under these rules and defend the action; no other mortgagee can. But in a proper case such a mortgagee who is not a landlord may obtain leave to defend the action in the name of the mortgagor (*n*).

An equitable tenant for life who is in actual receipt of the rents and profits of the land may be added under these rules where his trustee is sued alone (*o*).

Judgment may be signed against any defendant who does not appear for the whole or for any part of the property claimed. The form of the judgment is that the person whose title is asserted on the writ shall recover possession of the land, or of that portion of it, which is in the possession of the defendant who has not appeared. When the sole claim in the action is for possession of the land, the defendants who do not appear will not have to pay costs (*p*).

When the plaintiff has indorsed his writ generally, he must shortly after appearance take out a summons for directions under Order XXX. When the writ is specially indorsed under Order III., r. 6F, the plaintiff may, if he thinks fit, take out a summons for summary judgment under Order XIV.; and on the hearing of such a summons a tenant will be ordered to give up possession of the demised premises to the plaintiff, if the term has expired, or has been determined by notice to quit (*q*), or even if the lease has been forfeited through non-payment of rent. It is, however, expressly provided that in the third case the defendant shall "have the same right to relief after a judgment under this Order as if the judgment had been given after trial"; that is, he will have the right to apply within six months

(*l*) *Minet v. Johnson* (1890), 63 L. T. 507.

(*m*) Order XII., r. 26.

(*n*) *Jacques v. Harrison* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 165.

(*o*) *Longbourne v. Fisher* (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 379.

(*p*) Order XIII., r. 8. See Yearly Practice, 1926, p. 134.

(*q*) The reader must have regard to the Rent Restriction Acts, which still prevent the landlord from recovering possession of many dwelling-houses coming within the protection of these Acts.

to have the judgment set aside on payment of all rent in arrear and costs, under section 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (*r*). A mortgagor who by the terms of the mortgage deed attorned tenant to the mortgagee is a tenant within Order III., r. 6F; so is a tenant at will; and judgment can be signed against either under Order XIV. if the tenancy has been duly determined (*s*). But Order XIV. is only intended to apply to clear and simple cases, *e.g.*, where there is no dispute as to the existence between the parties of the relation of landlord and tenant either because the plaintiff and defendant are the original lessor and lessee, or because the defendant has estopped himself from denying the plaintiff's title by paying him rent, or in any other way (*t*).

On a summons under either rule 1 or rule 8 of Order XXX., and on a summons for judgment under Order XIV., the Master can, and in an action for the recovery of land generally does, order pleadings to be delivered between the parties.

Pleadings.

The rules as to pleadings in an action for the recovery of land differ in some respects from those which govern other actions. These differences are mainly due to the principle of the common law to which we have already referred, that the plaintiff in such an action must recover by the strength of his own title, and not by reason of any defect in the title of the person in possession. Hence as a general rule the plaintiff must set out in his Statement of Claim the steps by which the land has devolved on himself, showing each link in his title (*u*). But the language of the title deeds need not be set out, unless the precise words are material (*x*).

(*r*) Order XIV., r. 10.

(*s*) *Daubuz v. Lavington* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 347; *Hall v. Comfort* (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 11; *Kemp v. Lester*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 162.

(*t*) *Casey v. Hellyer* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 97; *Jones v. Stone*, [1894] A. C. 122; *Hopkins v. Collier* (1913), 29 T. L. R. 367.

(*u*) *Philipps v. Philipps* (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 127; *Davies v. James* (1884), 26 Ch. D. 778; and see *Odgers on Pleading and Practice* (9th ed.), pp. 132—139.

(*x*) Order XIX., r. 21; *Darbyshire v. Leigh*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 554.

To this rule there are two exceptions :—

(i) If the plaintiff was recently in possession, and has been ejected by the defendant, not by process of law, it is enough for him to plead these facts (y).

(ii) Where the defendant is estopped from denying the plaintiff's title, as, for instance, where the relation of landlord and tenant exists between them. A tenant is estopped from denying that his landlord who put him in possession of the land then had title so to do, or that his landlord from whom he has accepted a lease then had title to grant that lease, or that his landlord to whom he paid rent then had title to receive that rent.

The plaintiff may claim possession as the residuary devisee of a testator, and in the alternative, should the will for any reason be held invalid, as his heir-at-law. But in an action for recovery on a forfeiture of demised premises the plaintiff must be careful not to claim any rent which accrued due after the alleged forfeiture; for such a claim affirms the tenancy as still existing at that date (z).

The law deems any one, who is in possession of land, to be its owner until the contrary be proved (a). Hence in an action for the recovery of land the defendant is permitted to state merely that he is in possession, and thus to conceal all defects in his title (b). This plea is accepted as a denial of every allegation of fact alleged in the Statement of Claim; moreover, under it the defendant may set up at the trial any legal defence, even the Statute of Limitations, without any notice to the plaintiff (c). But to this rule there is one important exception. If the Defence depends on an equitable estate or right, or if the defendant claims relief upon any equitable ground against any right or title asserted by the plaintiff, he must set out such estate, right or claim specially in his Defence, and state explicitly the facts on which it is based. The defendant may also plead

(y) *Doe v. Dyeball* (1829), 3 C. & P. 610, and cf. Praetor's interdict *Unde vi*, and the Assize of *Novel disseisin*.

(z) *Dendy v. Nicholl* (1858), 4 C. B. (N.S.) 376.

(a) *Asher v. Whitlock* (1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. 1.

(b) Order XXI., r. 21.

(c) In spite of rules 13, 15 and 17 of Order XIX.; see Odgers on Pleading and Practice (9th ed.), pp. 229, 230.

a Counterclaim, *e.g.*, for relief against forfeiture (*d*), or for specific performance of an agreement to grant him a lease or sell him the land.

The cases in which a tenant is entitled to claim relief against his landlord have been already described in the chapter on the action for the recovery of land (*e*). A sub-lessee may in some cases be entitled to relief against forfeiture although his immediate lessor, the original tenant, is not (*f*). A landlord may always waive a forfeiture, if he thinks fit; in some cases, indeed, a waiver will be presumed (*g*). The issue and service of the writ to recover possession operates as a final election by the lessor to determine the lease, but the effect of the order for relief is to restore the lease as if it had never become forfeited (*h*).

Hence the pleadings in an action for the recovery of land may be as follows:—

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. On September 30th, 1904, Raymond Wilson purchased a farm known as "Manor Farm," and situate in the parish of Horsey, in the county of Norfolk, and the said farm was conveyed to him in fee simple on December 9th, 1904.

2. On March 25th, 1922, Raymond Wilson demised the said farm to the Defendant for the term of three years.

3. On July 4th, 1924, Raymond Wilson died.

4. The Plaintiff is the eldest surviving son of the late Joseph Wilson, who was the eldest brother of Raymond Wilson. He is the heir-at-law both of Joseph and Raymond Wilson. No letters of administration to the estate of Raymond Wilson have yet been granted (*i*).

5. The defendant has wrongfully retained possession of the said farm, although the term for which he held it has expired.

And the Plaintiff claims—

(i) Possession of the said farm.

(ii) £— for mesne profits from July 4th, 1924, till possession is given up to the Plaintiff.

(Signed) F. W.

Delivered the 12th day of January, 1927, by, &c.

DEFENCE AND COUNTERCLAIM.

Defence.

1. The Defendant is in possession of the farm mentioned in the Statement of Claim.

Counterclaim.

2. In the alternative, if the Plaintiff be the heir-at-law of Raymond Wilson, the Defendant says that before the expiration of the term granted to the Defendant on March 25th, 1915, Raymond Wilson, by a writing dated February

(*d*) *Warden v. Sewell*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 254.

(*e*) *Ante*, p. 590.

(*f*) *Imray v. Oakshette*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 218.

(*g*) *Hepworth v. Pickles*, [1900] 1 Ch. 108; *Summerson, In re*, [1900] 1 Ch. 112, n.

(*h*) *Dendy v. Evans*, [1910] 1 K. B. 263.

(*i*) See *ante*, p. 593.

3rd, 1924, agreed to grant, and the Defendant, by a writing dated February 4th, 1924, agreed to accept, a lease of the said farm for a term of seven years from March 25th, 1924.

And the Defendant counterclaims to have the said agreement specifically performed, and to have a lease granted to him by the Plaintiff in accordance therewith.

(Signed) W. B.

Delivered the 22nd day of January, 1927, by, &c.

REPLY AND DEFENCE TO COUNTERCLAIM.

1. The Plaintiff joins issue with the Defendant upon his defence.
2. And as to the Counterclaim, the Plaintiff denies that Raymond Wilson ever agreed as therein alleged.
3. There is no memorandum of any such agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
4. If Raymond Wilson ever agreed to grant the Defendant a lease of the said farm, which the Plaintiff denies, such agreement provided that the lease should contain a condition by which it would determine if the Defendant became bankrupt. The Defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt on December 23rd, 1924 (*k*).

(Signed) F. W.

Delivered the 1st day of February, 1927, by, &c.

Discovery.

Here again the procedure is governed by our fundamental rule that the plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title, and not by the weakness of the defendant's title. The plaintiff therefore must produce to the defendant every title deed to which he has referred in his Statement of Claim, unless the defendant is his tenant, and so estopped from denying his title. The defendant on the other hand cannot be compelled to produce any title deed in his possession which relates exclusively to his own title (*l*). If however, any document be common to the case of both plaintiff and defendant, or if any document in the possession of one party tends to establish the title of his opponent, it must be produced (*m*). Moreover, any document on which the defendant relies as supporting any equitable defence or claim for relief must be produced to the plaintiff.

(*k*) The defendant's bankruptcy affords a good defence to the Counterclaim, because a Court of equity will not decree specific performance of an agreement to grant a lease in cases where it would be useless to do so. Here, if the Court ordered a lease to be granted, the plaintiff could at once forfeit it, and re-enter by reason of the bankruptcy. And see section 146 of L. P. A., 1925.

(*l*) *Egremont Burial Board v. Egremont Iron Ore Co.* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 158; *Morris v. Edwards* (1890), 15 App. Cas. 309.

(*m*) *Ind, Coope v. Emmerson* (1887), 12 App. Cas. 300.

For the same reason the defendant in an action for the recovery of land is allowed more freedom than the plaintiff in the matter of administering interrogatories. He is entitled to know the facts on which the plaintiff's title rests, and he may, therefore, administer to the plaintiff interrogatories as to the links through which he traces his pedigree, as to the dates of the births or deaths of his predecessors in title, &c. But he will not be allowed to inquire into the evidence by which the plaintiff will seek to prove those facts (*n*). Interrogatories, however (as well as discovery of documents), are limited to matters material to the issues in the action. Hence, if the defendant be a tenant to the plaintiff, he cannot administer interrogatories which impeach his landlord's title. A defendant can also, if he wishes, interrogate as to his own case, and, as a rule, he should do so, if he claims equitable relief.

The plaintiff in an action for the recovery of land may always put his whole case as disclosed in his pleading to the defendant and compel him to admit so much of it as is within the defendant's own knowledge. He will not be deprived of his right merely because such discovery may have the effect of disclosing some part of the defendant's case. But he cannot compel the defendant to disclose any matter which relates exclusively to the defendant's own title (*o*). He cannot administer interrogatories to the defendant if the answers might subject him to a forfeiture. Thus, a tenant cannot be interrogated as to whether he has not assigned or underlet the premises contrary to a covenant in his lease (*p*). But he may be interrogated as to whether his term or other interest has not expired or been determined by a proper notice to quit (*q*). And if the defendant seeks to retain possession on some equitable ground, the plaintiff can interrogate him fully as to such equitable matter.

(*n*) *Flitcroft v. Fletcher* (1856), 11 Exch. 543.

(*o*) *Lyell v. Kennedy* (1883), 8 App. Cas. 217; *Miller v. Kirwan*, [1903] 2 Ir. R. 118.

(*p*) *Earl of Mexborough v. Whitwood U. D. C.*, [1897], 2 Q. B. 111.

(*q*) *Wigram on Discovery*, 81.

Trial.

The procedure at the trial of an action for the recovery of land is practically the same as in any other action. Where the relation of landlord and tenant exists or has existed between the parties, the plaintiff, as a rule, need not prove his title. He must in the first place establish that the defendant accepted possession of the land from himself or some predecessor in title, and that the defendant has continued in possession as tenant to himself; the simplest proof of the latter fact is that the defendant has paid him rent. Next, the plaintiff must prove the terms on which the defendant entered; this is usually done by producing and proving the lease or agreement under which the defendant occupied the land. Lastly, the plaintiff must show that under the terms of the tenancy he is now entitled to call upon the defendant to surrender possession of the premises. In other words, he must prove that the term of years for which the lease was granted has now expired by effluxion of time; or if the tenancy was from year to year only that it has been duly determined by a notice to quit; or, thirdly, that the lease contains a proviso for re-entry in case the tenant breaks any covenant in it by him to be performed, and that the defendant has broken such a covenant and thereby forfeited his lease. The defendant may, however, as we have seen, apply for relief under the Law of Property Act, 1925 (r), or under section 210 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (s). If, however, the relation of landlord and tenant does not exist between the parties, the plaintiff must prove his title strictly, for the law deems any one, who is in possession of land, to be the owner of it until the contrary be proved. The plaintiff can only recover possession by "the strength of his own title, and not by the weakness of the defendant's" title (t).

The plaintiff must establish a good title in himself to the land claimed (u); he must show that he is either the free-

(r) 15 Geo. 5, c. 20.

(s) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76.

(t) See *Asher v. Whitlock* (1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. 1.

(u) *Philipps v. Philipps* (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 127; *Davies v. James* (1884), 26 Ch. D. 778.

holder, or a person claiming under the freeholder. But if he claims as heir-at-law of A, it will be sufficient for him to prove that A was in possession at the time of his death, and that he is A's heir; and it will then be for the defendant to prove that A made a will devising the land to the defendant, or whatever other defence he relies on as justifying his possession. If the defendant can show a good title in some third person, that will be a sufficient defence, although such third person has never agreed or consented to the defendant's being in possession. "The plaintiff must exhaust the possibility that there are other heirs, and give some negative evidence to show that there are no descendants entitled in preference to himself" (x). But this will not be rigidly enforced in cases where the plaintiff's claim dates back beyond living memory, and he has done all he could by advertisement, &c., to discover other descendants who have a better title than himself, and has failed to do so.

If the plaintiff succeeds, judgment will be given in his favour bidding the sheriff place him in possession of the premises claimed on the writ. Such a judgment, however, will not give the plaintiff an indefeasible title good against all the world, but only a title good at date of writ against those defendants who were served with it. This is a possessory action only, and it is therefore still open to some third person to come forward and prove that he has a better title to possession of the land or to the rents and profits of it, and so oust the successful plaintiff (y).

A judgment for the recovery of the possession of land is enforced by WRIT OF POSSESSION. And where the defendant is by any judgment or order directed to deliver up possession of land, the person prosecuting such judgment may, without any order for that purpose, sue out a writ of possession on filing an affidavit showing due service of the judgment and that the same has not been obeyed (z). The writ, after stating that by the said judgment A B recovered

(x) *Per* Bramwell, B., in *Greaves v. Greenwood* (1877), 2 Ex. D., at p. 291.

(y) *Ibid.*, at p. 291.

(z) Order XLII., r. 5; Order XLVII., rr. 1, 2.

(or E F was ordered to deliver to A B) possession of the land specified, commands the sheriff to “enter the same, and cause the said A B to have possession of the said land and premises with the appurtenances.” A *fi. fa.* for the amount of the mesne profits and costs may be joined in the same writ.

CHAPTER XIX.

TRIAL OF AN ACTION.

THE trial may be by Judge alone, by Judge with assessors, or by Judge and jury, and the jury may be either a special or a common jury. We shall in this chapter deal only with trial by Judge and jury.

If at this juncture the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear, the plaintiff may proceed to prove his claim, so far as the burden of proof lies upon him, and obtain judgment in the defendant's absence; if the defendant has pleaded a counterclaim, the plaintiff is entitled to have that dismissed at once with costs. But if the defendant appears and not the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to judgment at once, dismissing the plaintiff's claim in the action; if he has a counterclaim he may prove his counterclaim as far as the burden of proof lies on him (*a*). Any verdict or judgment obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may be set aside upon terms, if application be made within six days after the trial (*b*).

If, however, both parties appear, it is possible for either party to take objection to the jury which has been summoned by the sheriff for the trial of the action. He may either challenge the array, *i.e.*, object to the whole panel collectively, or he may challenge the poll, *i.e.*, object to individual jurymen. But it very seldom happens in a civil case that a party takes either objection.

As soon as the jury has been sworn, the junior counsel for the plaintiff "opens the pleadings"—that is, he briefly states their effect (*c*). But if the action is brought for unliquidated damages, he must not state the amount which

(*a*) Order XXXVI., rr. 31, 32.

(*b*) Order XXXVI., r. 33.

(*c*) This is not done when the trial is before a Judge alone.

the plaintiff claims. And in no case must he mention the fact that the defendant has paid money into Court, or the amount paid in (d).

Next may arise the question as to which side has the right to begin. In a civil case, this depends entirely on the pleadings. Whenever the plaintiff claims unliquidated damages, he has the right to begin, unless the defendant has expressly admitted that the plaintiff is *prima facie* entitled to recover the full sum which he claims. If the damages claimed be liquidated, still, if the defendant has in his Defence traversed any material allegation which is essential to the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff has the right to begin. If a single issue lie on the plaintiff he has the right to begin; it does not matter that there are others which lie on the defendant. But the defendant may have made admissions in his Defence which entitle him to begin. This may have been done purposely, as it is generally an advantage to have the first word with the jury. Besides, if any evidence is called on the opposite side, the first word means the last word too; and to have the last word is always important. If both parties claim the right to begin, the Judge will decide between them according to the pleadings as they stand.

If the plaintiff is entitled to begin, his leading counsel now "opens his case"; that is, he states in chronological order the facts on which the plaintiff relies; he sometimes also deals with the defences pleaded, discounting them in anticipation. He must not open any fact which he is not prepared with evidence to prove. Counsel for the plaintiff (e) then calls the first witness, who is generally the plaintiff himself, and examines him "in chief," as it is called; he is cross-examined by the defendant's counsel (f), and re-examined by counsel for the plaintiff, who then calls the next witness. The Judge decides as to the admissibility of any evidence, and disallows all improper questions; he

(d) Order XXII., r. 22.

(e) The question as to which counsel is to "take" a witness is decided by the leading counsel. The practice varies greatly.

(f) But if a witness be only called to produce a document, and is not sworn or asked any question in chief, the other side has no right to cross-examine him.

often himself puts questions to the witness when counsel have finished with him. But the Judge has no right to call a witness himself if either party objects, for a Judge has nothing to do with the getting up of a case (*g*).

When all the plaintiff's witnesses have been examined, and all documents material to his case have been put in and read, the plaintiff's case is closed. If the defendant's counsel intimates that he does not intend to call any witnesses, the plaintiff's counsel will at once address the jury, summing up his own evidence, and commenting on the Defence, so far as it has been foreshadowed by the cross-examination, and also no doubt on the fact that the defendant does not venture to go into the box; the defendant's counsel then addresses the jury, criticising the evidence for the plaintiff. If, however, the defendant's counsel intends to call witnesses, or if he has already put in any document, he addresses the jury at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, outlining the Defence. He then calls his witnesses, each of whom may be examined, cross-examined, and re-examined, and he usually makes a second speech for the defendant, at the conclusion of which the leading counsel for the plaintiff replies on the whole case. This disadvantage necessarily attends calling witnesses for the defendant: it gives the plaintiff the last word with the jury; and in a doubtful case this may determine the result of the action. But, on the other hand, the jury like to see the defendant in the box, and to learn from his own lips his reasons for his conduct.

In some cases, at the close of the defendant's case, the plaintiff is allowed to call further evidence in answer to any affirmative case raised by the defendant; but not if he has given any evidence on this issue in the first instance; he will not be permitted to divide his proof.

The rules of evidence are in the main identical in civil and criminal cases (*h*). So, too, are the rules as to the examination of witnesses in chief, and their cross-examination and re-examination (*i*). But there are some particulars

(*g*) *Enoch and Zaretsky, Bock, In re*, [1910] 1 K. B. 327, 332.

(*h*) See *post*, p. 618.

(*i*) See *ante*, pp. 629 *et seq.*

in which they differ, of which the following are the most important. In civil proceedings, the husband or wife of either party can give evidence for or against that party, and either with or without his consent. An admission induced by threats or promises is admissible for what it may be worth, but a dying declaration is not admissible. Stamp objections can be taken in civil, though not in criminal, cases. Leave to take evidence on commission or under letters of request will be readily granted in civil cases. The rules as to evidence of a party's good or bad character differ considerably from those which are in force in criminal proceedings (*k*). All questions as to the admissibility of any piece of evidence tendered or as to the propriety of any question addressed to a witness are for the Judge to decide.

It sometimes happens, however, that before the evidence on both sides has been concluded the proceedings are cut short either by a compromise or by the decision of some point of law. During the progress of the trial it may become clear to both parties that it would be wiser for them to settle the matter amicably than to fight it out in open Court, hence they endeavour to arrange a compromise. If they succeed in coming to terms, a juror is—theoretically, at all events—withdrawn from the jury-box and the action is at an end. The counsel for each party has full authority to make such a compromise, unless expressly forbidden to do so by his client at the time (*l*), provided the compromise does not include or affect matters outside the scope of the action (*m*). The terms of such a compromise will be strictly enforced, if necessary, by an order of the Court.

It is the duty of the Judge to decide all questions of law which arise during the course of the trial. At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff the defendant's counsel sometimes submits as a matter of law that no case whatever has been made out against his client, and asks the Judge to withdraw the case from the jury and direct judgment to be

(*k*) See Powell on Evidence (10th ed.), pp. 119—124.

(*l*) *Neale v. Gordon Lennox*, [1902] A. C. 465.

(*m*) *Kempshall v. Holland* (1895), 14 R. 336.

entered for the defendant without any verdict. But most Judges decline to allow the question to be argued at this stage of the action, unless the defendant's counsel at once announces that he intends to call no witnesses. If he intends to call witnesses, the point is generally reserved till after all the evidence on both sides has been given. Every point of law on which either party intends to rely must, as a rule, be raised before verdict; if it is not raised at the proper time, the party will be deemed to have waived it, and will not be entitled to raise it on appeal (*n*), though the Court may, of its own motion, take a point of law which neither party wishes to raise (*o*). The Judge at the trial has full power to allow either party to alter or amend the indorsement on the writ or any pleading or proceeding on such terms as may be just (*p*), and to add, or strike out, or substitute, a plaintiff or defendant (*q*).

As soon as all the evidence has been heard, and the counsel on both sides have addressed the jury, the Judge sums up the case. He should marshal the facts so as to make them clear to the jury. If there be no evidence to go to the jury on any issue, he should withdraw that issue from the jury and rule against the party on whom the burden of proving that issue lay. If, however, there be conflicting evidence, on which the jury might reasonably find a verdict either way, he should not stop the case; he must leave the issue to the jury. He may, if he thinks fit, state his opinion on the matter. But in such a case, which now rarely happens, he will tell the jury that they are not bound to adopt his view as to any question of fact. They are bound to accept the law as laid down by him, but it is for them to determine the issues of fact according to their own opinion of the evidence given before them, even though it may be contrary to the opinion which the Judge has just expressed.

The Judge may either leave the jury to return a general

(*n*) See *post*, p. 700.

(*o*) *Lockett v. Wood* (1908), 24 T. L. R. 617; *Montefiore v. Menday Motor Co.*, [1918] 2 K. B. 241; and see *Connolly v. Consumers' Cordage Co.* (1903), 89 L. T. 347.

(*p*) Order XXVIII., rr. 1, 6, 12.

(*q*) Order XVI., rr. 11, 12.

verdict for the plaintiff or for the defendant, or ask them to answer certain specific questions; in the latter case it will be for the Judge to determine subsequently what is the legal result of their findings. If either party desires that any other question should be left to the jury besides those which the Judge is proposing to leave, he should ask the Judge to put that question also to the jury before their verdict is given (r). Once the jury has given a general verdict, the Judge is not entitled to ask them any further question (s).

In a civil case it is not necessary, as it is in a criminal prosecution, for either party to establish any fact beyond reasonable doubt; a preponderance of probability will be sufficient; and, except in the case of breach of promise of marriage (t), corroboration is never absolutely required in civil cases, though, of course, the fact that corroborative evidence could have been easily obtained and is not produced will be a most important point for the jury to consider.

If the jury are in favour of the plaintiff, or of the defendant on a counterclaim, they must also assess the damages. In arriving at the amount, the jury must not have regard to any question of costs; that is a matter for the Judge. And they must not be informed that any money has been paid into Court (u). Where the plaintiff's demand is liquidated, the jury determine the amount to which he is entitled by mere arithmetic, or according to a scale of charges or some other accepted rate or percentage. Where, however, the damages are unliquidated, the jury have a freer hand: they may give the plaintiff either "contemptuous," "nominal," or "substantial" damages; in some cases they may award "vindictive" damages. The principles which govern the assessment of damages and determine the "measure of damages," as it is called, are discussed in the next chapter.

(r) *Weiser v. Segar*, [1904] W. N. 93.

(s) *Arnold v. Jeffreys*, [1914] 1 K. B. 512

(t) Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 68), s. 2. The Courts usually require corroboration where a claim is made against the estate of a deceased person.

(u) Order XXII., r. 22.

Where the cause of action is continuing (as in cases of nuisance, non-repair, or continuing trespass), the jury must assess the damages down to the time of assessment (x); and the plaintiff can bring a second action for any subsequent damage, if it continues. But where the cause of action consists of one isolated act or omission (*e.g.*, one assault, one libel, or one piece of negligence), the jury must assess the damages once for all. No fresh action can as a rule be brought for any subsequent damage; hence the jury must now take into their consideration every loss which will naturally result in the future from the defendant's conduct, though they must not speculate on mere contingencies (y).

As soon as the verdict has been returned, the counsel for the successful party asks for judgment (z). Sometimes, if there are important legal questions raised, the Judge does not give judgment at once, but reserves the matter for further consideration at a later date. As a rule, however, the Judge gives judgment then and there, according to the findings of the jury.

If the jury have awarded the plaintiff damages, judgment will be given for the plaintiff for the amount so awarded—unless, indeed, the defendant had the foresight to pay at least that amount into Court, in which case judgment will be given for the defendant, and the Judge may order the difference, if any, to be paid out of Court to him (zz). If however, the sum paid into Court be less than the amount of the verdict, the Judge will order that sum to be paid out of Court to the plaintiff. If the jury find a verdict for a larger amount than that claimed on the writ, judgment cannot be given for that larger amount without an amend-

(x) In an action, however, for the recovery of land the jury may award the plaintiff mesne profits from the date of the defendant's entry till possession of the premises be redelivered to the plaintiff (*Southport Tramways Co. v. Gandy*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 66). And in an action of detinue the jury may give damages for the wrongful detention until the property detained be restored to the plaintiff (*per Bowen, L.J.*, in *Serrao v. Noel* (1885), 15 Q. B. D., at p. 559).

(y) *Lambkin v. S. E. Ry. Co.* (1880), 5 App. Cas. 352; *Tunncliffe v. West Leigh Colliery Co.*, [1906] 2 Ch. 22; [1908] A. C. 27; *George D. Emery Co. v. Wells*, [1906] A. C., at p. 525.

(z) As to when it is necessary to ask for judgment "with costs," see *post*, pp. 615 *et seq.*

(zz) *Gray v. Bartholomew*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 209. There is one exception to this, *viz.*, where the defendant has paid money into Court with a plea under Lord Campbell's Libel Act, 1843, and has failed to prove the rest of his plea: *Oxley v. Wilkes*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 56.

ment of the record; the Judge, however, has power to make such amendment if he thinks fit (a). If a counterclaim has been pleaded and the plaintiff has recovered so much on his claim, and the defendant so much on his counterclaim, only one judgment will, as a rule, be given; that will be in favour of the party who has recovered the larger amount, and merely for the balance of it after deducting the lesser amount from it (b).

A trial by a Judge alone or before an official or a special referee is conducted in the same manner, as nearly as circumstances will admit, as a trial by Judge and jury; but the ceremony of opening the pleadings is omitted.

Costs.

The right of the successful party to be compensated (c) by his opponent for the expense to which he has been put by the litigation now depends on two questions:—

Was the action tried by a Judge with a jury, or by a Judge alone?

Was the action of such a kind that it could have been commenced in the County Court?

If the action be tried by a Judge alone, he has full power to deal with the costs as in his discretion he deems right; but he must exercise his discretion judicially. He generally deals expressly with the costs in his judgment. If he does not, the counsel for the successful party should ask for them.

If, however, the action be tried by a Judge with a jury, as a rule, costs follow the event. If the action was of such a kind that it could not be commenced in the County Court (d) (*e.g.*, if it was an action of breach of promise of marriage, libel, slander, or seduction), a verdict for any amount, however small, will carry costs unless the Judge before whom such action is tried, or the Court, “shall for good cause otherwise order” (e). Hence, however small the verdict in the plaintiff’s favour may be, his counsel need not ask for costs; the plaintiff will have the general costs of the action, if nothing be said (f). It is for the defendant’s counsel

(a) Order XXVIII., r. 1.

(b) Order XXI., r. 17.

(c) For various reasons costs never give a complete indemnity.

(d) See *ante*, pp. 385 *et seq.*

(e) Order LXV., r. 1. See *Reid v. Joseph*, [1918] A. C. 717.

(f) There is an exception to this rule. By section 1 of the Slander of Women Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 51), in any action for words spoken and made actionable by that Act, “a plaintiff shall not recover more costs than damages, unless the judge shall certify that there was reasonable ground for bringing the action.” Hence in this case it is necessary for the plaintiff’s counsel to ask for a certificate, unless the verdict is so large that it clearly exceeds the amount at which the costs of the action will be taxed.

in such a case to apply to the Judge, as soon as the verdict is given, for an order depriving the plaintiff of his costs. As a rule, such an order will only be made where "contemptuous" damages, such as a farthing or a shilling, have been given, and not always then. There must be some good "cause," besides the smallness of the damages, to give the Judge jurisdiction to make such an order; something either in the conduct of the parties or in the facts of the case which, in spite of the finding of the jury, makes it more just that the costs should not follow the event (*g*). A successful defendant may also be deprived of his costs if there be a good cause. But he cannot be made to pay the whole costs of the action under any circumstances.

But if the action be of a class which can be commenced in a County Court, the provisions of the County Courts Acts (*h*) apply, and a verdict for a small amount will not carry costs. If the action was founded on contract, and the plaintiff recovers less than £40, he will be entitled to no costs whatever; if he recovers £40 or more but less than £100, he will be entitled to County Court costs only; if he recovers exactly £100 he will be entitled to County Court costs only—unless in each of these three cases a Judge of the High Court certifies that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in that Court or makes a special order as to costs. If, however, the plaintiff within twenty-eight days after service of the writ, or such further time as may be allowed, obtain an order under Order XIV. to enter judgment for £20 or upwards, he will be entitled to High Court costs. If the action was founded on tort, and the plaintiff recovers less than £10, he will be entitled to no costs whatever; if he recovers £10 or more, but less than £50, he will be entitled to County Court costs only—unless a Judge of the High Court certifies that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in that Court, or makes a special order as to costs (*i*). In all the above cases, therefore (excepting the case of a judgment under Order XIV.), it is the duty of the plaintiff's counsel to apply to the Judge for such a certificate or special order before judgment is entered; and such special order as to costs can only be made "for good cause."

And generally, whatever the nature of the action may be, it may be necessary for counsel before judgment is entered to ask for any special costs, such as the costs of a special jury, of a commission to take evidence abroad, of photographic copies of any document, or any costs reserved to be disposed of at the trial. The party who has incurred these costs will have to bear them, unless the Judge at the trial makes an order for their allowance

(*g*) *Jones v. Curling* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 262; and see *Ritter v. Godfrey*, [1920] 2 K. B. 47. Further, as to what is "good cause," see *Odgers on Pleading and Practice* (9th ed.), p. 368 *et seq.*

(*h*) County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 116, as amended by County Courts Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 42), s. 3; and County Courts Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 73).

(*i*) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 36.

on taxation. Counsel for the unsuccessful party, if he thinks of appealing, should also, at this stage, ask for a stay of execution; for an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution or of other proceedings under the decision appealed from, except so far as may be ordered, and no intermediate act or proceeding will be invalidated, except so far as the Court appealed from may direct (*k*). Stay of execution is generally granted, if at all, on the terms that a sum of money be brought into Court and notice of appeal given within so many days.

(*k*) Order LVIII., r. 16.

CHAPTER XX.

EVIDENCE.

THE law of evidence consists of the rules which govern the admissibility and production of evidence. It can, no doubt, be treated as part of the law of procedure which governs the whole course of proceedings, both civil and criminal. There are, however, two reasons for treating this subject separately: first, because it is, on the one hand, so large as to destroy the proportions of any discussion of the trial of any action or prosecution, and, on the other hand, comparatively easy to deal with separately; secondly, because the rules of evidence are the same in civil and criminal proceedings, though there are many special points peculiar to each; and consequently to include the principles of evidence in the chapters on civil and criminal trials would lead either to avoidable repetition or to a full treatment under one head and an inadequate treatment under the other. In any case, the subject is too large for anything more than a general sketch.

At any trial, civil or criminal, the general burden of proof (*a*) lies as a rule on the plaintiff and always upon the prosecutor; he therefore begins. It is his duty to establish the case against the defendant or the accused, and this he must do by evidence. The rules of evidence are substantially the same whether an action is tried by Judge alone or by Judge and jury, or if a charge of crime is tried summarily by a magistrate or is submitted to the verdict of a jury.

Where there is a jury, the general rule is that the Judge

(*a*) This general burden of proof, which is determined by the consideration: who will fail if no evidence at all is called, must be distinguished from the burden of proof as to particular issues, which must be discharged by the person who substantially asserts it. The *onus* of proof as to particular facts may shift several times at different stages of the trial. See *post*, pp. 639 *et seq.*

decides all questions of law, and the jury all questions of fact. Hence it is for the Judge to determine what facts are admissible in evidence; it is for the jury to weigh the evidence and find the verdict. The Judge must exclude all evidence that is irrelevant and otherwise inadmissible; he will also take care that each relevant fact is proved in a legitimate way. But when once the evidence has been properly admitted, it is for the jury, not the Judge, to determine its value and cogency, and to decide what is the proper inference to be drawn from it. Thus, at a criminal trial, the evidence will be rigorously confined to matters which are relevant to the inquiry whether the prisoner is or is not guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Each of these relevant matters must be proved in the proper way; and then the jury must consider collectively the facts thus proved, and decide whether the prisoner is guilty or not. So, in civil cases, every fact tendered in evidence must be strictly relevant to some one or other of the issues in the case; the Judge will decide the validity of all objections to any proposed method of proving such relevant facts, and the jury the weight to be attached to such facts, when admitted (b).

Hence the law of evidence may be divided into three parts—Relevancy, Proof and Cogency.

Relevancy defines what facts a party will be allowed to prove at the trial of any legal proceeding. The law selects—sometimes rather arbitrarily—certain matters which it accepts as “relevant,” and these alone may be proved in Court; it rejects many others which a layman might deem material.

Proof tells a litigant in what way he will be allowed to prove an admissible statement or fact. Sometimes there are many different ways of proving a relevant fact, all of which are equally permissible. In other cases the law excludes all but the “best” evidence of a fact. Thus, a copy of a letter will not be accepted, if the original is

(b) The ordinary law of evidence must be applied in Courts-martial (Army Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58), s. 128, and Rules of Procedure, r. 73), and by arbitrators (*Enoch and Zaretsky, Bock, In re*, [1910] 1 K. B. 327).

procurable; an eye-witness, if still alive, must himself be called, not a person to whom the eye-witness told what he saw. Proof of course includes disproof.

Cogency determines what value the tribunal should attach to each statement of fact when admitted and proved.

I. RELEVANCY.

As a rule, only those facts can be proved which are in issue or are relevant to an issue. In criminal cases, the issue to be tried is determined by the indictment and the plea which the prisoner has pleaded to it; in civil cases, it is necessary to read the pleadings (if there are any) in order to ascertain what are the issues. Every fact, which directly tends to prove or disprove the matters in issue, is relevant and consequently admissible in evidence. And subject to certain restrictions, every fact which indirectly tends to prove or disprove such matters is also relevant and admissible. The law will not permit the parties to wander off into merely collateral matters.

Firstly, therefore, whatever a party to an action or proceeding has said or done in the transaction (c) is admissible in evidence against him: whatever he said or did in some other transaction is, as a rule, not admissible.

The fact that A in the past has committed another burglary is, as a rule, no proof that he committed the burglary with which he is now charged. Nor is a general tendency to commit crime admitted as relevant to the issue whether the accused has committed the particular crime charged. So, if A gave B permission to pass over his field, that is no evidence whatever that he gave C the same permission. Again, a confession made by a person suspected of crime is admissible in evidence, although he was not cautioned that it might be used against him (d), unless, indeed, it was obtained by threats or promises of benefit in the proceedings made to him by a person in authority. So, too, evidence may be given as to anything found on the prisoner or in his lodgings when he is arrested, if it throws any light on the case (e).

(c) A transaction is "a group of facts so connected together as to be referred to by a single legal name: as a crime, a contract, a wrong, or any other subject-matter of inquiry which may be in issue": Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence, Art. 3.

(d) *R. v. Voisin*, [1918] 1 K. B. 531.

(e) *Thompson v. R.*, [1918] A. C. 221; *R. v. Twiss*, [1918] 2 K. B. 853.

Secondly, evidence of what occurred in other transactions is relevant and admissible whenever it throws material light upon the transaction in issue. Most of the cases in which such evidence is admissible can be grouped under four heads:—

- (i) Acts of ownership.
- (ii) Facts showing system.
- (iii) Facts showing what was the state of mind of the party at the time when he did the material act.
- (iv) General character.

(i) *Acts of Ownership*.—Where the ownership of a particular plot of land is in issue, evidence will be admitted of acts of ownership done by the claimant or his predecessors in title over an adjoining plot of land if the Judge is satisfied that there is such a “unity of character” between the two plots, that the jury may reasonably conclude that the person who owned or possessed such rights over the land to which the evidence relates also owned or possessed those rights over the land which is in dispute in the action (f).

(ii) *Facts showing System*.—Whenever it is necessary to show that a person has pursued a systematic course of conduct, evidence of transactions not in issue will be admissible if they assist the Court in deciding the issue before it.

Thus, on a charge of murder, it was held that, in order to rebut the suggestion that the deceased died a natural death, the prosecution might put in evidence other similar murders alleged to have been committed by the accused (g). Again, where the prisoner was charged with false pretences by means of advertisements which suggested that he was carrying on a flourishing business, evidence was admitted that other persons had been misled by the same advertisement, in order to show that it was part of a scheme to deceive the public (h). But such evidence will not be admitted, if it merely shows that the prisoner was in the habit of committing crimes of a similar nature and no more; for that of itself ought not to weigh with the jury in deciding whether the prisoner is guilty of the particular offence for which he is being tried (i).

(iii) *Facts showing the State of Mind of a Party*.—In those cases where it is material to the issue to ascertain the state of mind of a person, the Court will admit evidence of what happened in

(f) *Stanley v. White* (1811), 14 East, 332; *Hanbury v. Jenkins*, [1901] 2 Ch. 401.

(g) *Makin v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales*, [1894] A. C. 57, 65; *R. v. Smith* (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 2153.

(h) *R. v. Rhodes*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 77; and see also *R. v. Cooper* (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 19; *R. v. Wyatt*, [1904] 1 K. B. 188; *R. v. Barraclough*, [1906] 1 K. B. 201; and cf. *Hales v. Kerr*, [1908] 2 K. B. 601.

(i) *R. v. Fisher*, [1910] 1 K. B. 149.

other transactions, whether before or after the transaction in issue, if such evidence will in any way assist it to come to a conclusion upon the matter.

Thus in cases of arson, where—as may very likely happen—there is no direct evidence that the prisoner set light to the premises deliberately and not accidentally, evidence can be given of other fires caused by the prisoner and of suspicious circumstances connected with them (*k*). The same rule applies to cases of murder by poisoning, in order to show that the poison was not given by accident (*l*). This rule is of especial importance in cases of embezzlement; for it may well be that the clerk or servant has genuinely forgotten to pay over a few small sums, but it is almost impossible to accept this explanation, if such omissions occurred regularly (*m*). So, too, in cases of fraud, if the plaintiff has to show that the defendant knew that the representation was untrue and intended to mislead him, he can do so by showing that the defendant also deceived other people in the same way (*n*). The Legislature has in one case—the offence of receiving stolen goods—made such evidence admissible where it was not allowed at common law (*o*).

(iv) *General Character*.—In criminal cases the prosecution cannot, before conviction, give evidence that the prisoner bears a general bad character, unless the prisoner or his counsel has set up that he bears a good character (*p*), or has attacked the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. If the prisoner elects to go into the witness-box, he is not liable to be cross-examined as to any other offence or conviction, or as to his bad character, except in the cases mentioned in section 1 (*f*) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (*q*).

The character of the prosecutor is also, as a rule, immaterial. In charges of rape and indecent assault, however, the defendant can adduce evidence to show that the prosecutrix is of generally immoral character (*r*), and also to prove that on other occasions she had had voluntary connection with the defendant (*s*), but not with other men (*t*). If the prosecutor goes into the witness-box he can, like every other witness (*u*), be cross-examined with a view

(*k*) *R. v. Gray* (1866), 4 F. & F. 1102.

(*l*) *R. v. Geering* (1849), 18 L. J. M. C. 215.

(*m*) *R. v. Richardson* (1860), 2 F. & F. 343.

(*n*) *Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society* (1879), 4 C. P. D. 94. See also *R. v. Ellis*, [1910] 2 K. B. 746; and cf. *R. v. Ball*, [1911] A. C. 47; *R. v. Boyle*, [1914] 3 K. B. 339. But see *R. v. Fisher*, [1910] 1 K. B. 149, and *R. v. Kurasch*, [1915] 2 K. B. 749.

(*o*) Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50), s. 43. See Vol. 1, pp. 381—386, and *R. v. Harding* (1909), 3 Cr. App. R. 10.

(*p*) *R. v. Rowton* (1865), L. & C. 520.

(*q*) See *post*, p. 629. See also the Prevention of Crime Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 59), s. 10.

(*r*) *R. v. Clay*, 5 Cox, 146.

(*s*) *R. v. Riley* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 481.

(*t*) *R. v. Holmes* (1871), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 334.

(*u*) As to the cross-examination of a prisoner who is giving evidence, see *post*, p. 629.

to showing that he is unworthy of credence, or, as it is termed, be cross-examined "to credit." But the witness's answer to such questions is final and cannot be contradicted (x), except in two or three instances, *e.g.*, if he denies that he has been convicted of a crime; in that case the other side can always adduce evidence to show that he has been so convicted (y).

Thirdly, whatever some one who is not a party to the proceedings said or did is, as a rule, not admissible in evidence against any one who was not present or for any other reason had no opportunity for contradiction or explanation. But whenever A says or does anything in the presence of B which causes B to say or do anything which is material to the issue, evidence of what A said or did is admissible, if without it B's words or conduct would be meaningless. Thus, if A charges B with having committed a crime or questions him as to his share in the transaction, evidence as to B's demeanour and reply is admissible, if it can be regarded as amounting to an admission of the whole or an part of the suggested charge, and what A said must therefore be admitted in order to lead up to and explain B's demeanour and answer. A statement made by A in B's presence is not of itself evidence against B, but only so much of it as B accepts as his own, or as explains his conduct at the time. If, however, B wholly denies every suggestion made against him, the prosecution should not put in evidence either A's statement or B's answer to it, as the latter effaces the former. But B can give evidence of both, if he wishes, to show that he repudiated the imputation (z).

Evidence of a person's acts is always more readily admitted than evidence of his words. In some cases they form part of the transaction in issue. Thus a prosecutor in a trial for burglary can always prove that he locked up his premises securely, leaving certain articles in a particular place, and that next morning he found the premises broken into and the articles gone, although he never saw the prisoner near the place. But at the trial of a charge of receiving stolen goods the theft must be proved against the receiver, and that cannot be done by showing that the thief

(x) *R. v. Holmes*, *supra*.

(y) Denman's Act (28 Vict. c. 18), s. 6.

(z) *R. v. Norton*, [1910] 2 K. B. 497; *R. v. Christie*, [1914] A. C. 545.

has pleaded guilty to stealing them. The prosecution may, however, call the thief as a witness to prove the theft. Although where the only evidence against the alleged receiver is that of the thief the Judge may advise the jury to acquit (a).

What a third person said is admissible, even against a party who was not present, when the words are so connected with the material act as really to form part of the transaction in issue.

Thus, what bystanders said at the moment a shot was fired (b), or a man was run over (c), or when a seditious meeting was held (d), or what the injured person said at the time of the assault (e), is admissible, but only if contemporaneous with the act itself (f). So, too, when the character in which a person signed a contract is in issue, what he said about the matter at the moment when he signed it is admissible (g).

Again, whenever it has been established that two or more persons are engaged in a joint enterprise (whether a crime, or a tort, or a lawful act), whatever any of them said or did in furtherance of the common purpose is admissible against all of them whether the others were present at the time or not.

Thus, when a conspiracy has been proved and it has been shown that A was a party to it, what A said or did in order to promote the common object of the conspiracy will be admissible not only as against himself, but also against all those who were taking part in the crime at the time (h). But such acts or statements will be admissible against himself only, if they were not in furtherance of the common purpose (h), or occurred after the conspiracy had succeeded or been abandoned (i).

On a criminal charge of rape, indecent assault, etc., evidence of statements made by the prosecutrix in the absence of the accused is admissible for the purpose of establishing her credit or, where consent is material, of negating her consent. But such statements must have

(a) *R. v. Robinson*, 4 F. & F. 43; cf. *R. v. Jennings*, 7 Cr. App. R. 242.

(b) *R. v. Fowkes* (1856), Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence, p. 4.

(c) *R. v. Foster* (1834), 6 C. & P. 325.

(d) *R. v. Lord George Gordon* (1781), 21 St. Tr. 485, 535.

(e) *Thompson v. Trevanion* (1692), Skin. 402.

(f) *R. v. Beddingfield* (1879), 14 Cox, 341; *R. v. Christie*, [1914] A. C. 545.

(g) *Young v. Schuler* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 651.

(h) *R. v. Shellard*, 9 C. & P. 277.

(i) *R. v. Blake* (1844), 6 Q. B. 126, 137.

been made voluntarily and at the earliest possible opportunity, and must not have been elicited by suggestive or leading questions (*k*).

Again, statements which a person, since deceased, has made relating to the circumstances which have caused his condition, are admissible on the trial of another person for the murder or manslaughter of the deceased (*l*), but not in other cases, and, even when admissible, only if the statements were made at a time when the deceased was in "settled hopeless expectation" of death (*m*). Such statements are called dying declarations (*n*). The declaration must not be elicited by suggestive questions (*o*). The deceased must at the time have been of such an age and in such a condition as fully to realise the nearness of death (*p*); the length of time which he survived after making the statement is immaterial (*q*).

In any case, civil or criminal, statements made by a person, whether alive at the date of the trial or not, as to his bodily or mental feelings are relevant and admissible whenever his feelings or condition are material to the issue (*r*). The statement is only admissible so far as it describes his symptoms; anything as to the cause of these symptoms will be excluded (*s*).

What a witness believes or thinks is as a general rule irrelevant and inadmissible; he must confine himself to matters of fact; the litigation was commenced in order to obtain not the opinion of a witness, but of the Judge or jury.

In certain cases, however, neither the Judge nor the jury possess the special experience or training necessary to enable them to form a true opinion on the matters before

(*k*) *R. v. Lillyman*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 167; *R. v. Osborne*, [1905] 1 K. B. 551; *R. v. Norcott*, [1917] 1 K. B. 347.

(*l*) *R. v. Welbourn*, 1 East. P. C. 358.

(*m*) *R. v. Woodcock* (1789), 1 Leach, 502; *R. v. Peel* (1860), 2 F. & F. 21; and see *R. v. Jenkins* (1869), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 187.

(*n*) They must be distinguished from "dying depositions" which are taken before a justice in cases where a person is expected to die; see *ante*, p. 415.

(*o*) *R. v. Mitchell* (1892), 17 Cox, 503; but see *R. v. Fagent* (1835), 7 C. & P. 238.

(*p*) *R. v. Pike* (1829), 3 C. & P. 598.

(*q*) *R. v. Mosley* (1825), 1 Moo. C. C. 97; *R. v. Bernadotti* (1869), 11 Cox, 316.

(*r*) *Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird* (1805), 6 East, 188.

(*s*) *R. v. Gloster* (1888), 16 Cox, 473. As to this principle in divorce, see *Trelawney v. Coleman* (1817), 1 B. & Ald. 90.

them without the assistance of some skilled witness. In such cases therefore persons who have that experience or training are allowed to give evidence, not to decide the issue themselves, but to assist the tribunal to come to a right conclusion. Such persons are called "expert witnesses."

An expert may state his opinion on questions relating to medicine (*t*), science, art, the course of business or commerce (*u*), handwriting (*x*), and foreign law (*y*); and to support his opinion he can detail experiments which he made behind the other party's back (*z*), cite books of authority (*a*), and quote other cases and transactions of a like nature (*b*).

Even non-experts may give evidence of opinion as to certain facts, *e.g.*, as to the identity or age of any person or thing, the resemblance between two persons or the distance between two places, questions of size, weight, measure and capacity, whether a man was drunk or sober, &c. But where the guilt of a prisoner depends upon the precise age of his victim, such age must be strictly proved by production of a registrar's certificate of birth coupled with evidence of identity (*c*).

II. PROOF.

The facts by which a party intends to establish his case must not only be relevant; they must also be proved in a proper way. In certain cases no proof is required; the Court will take judicial notice of certain facts, *e.g.*, the constitution, the names and dates of accession and decease of sovereigns, the existence of other states, war, peace, general facts of nature, but particular facts, however well known, will not be judicially noticed: they must be proved.

The methods of proof differ; in some cases he has no choice: he must prove the fact in the prescribed manner or not at all. In most cases, however, he may seek to prove

(*t*) *Att.-Gen. v. Nottingham Corporation*, [1904] 1 Ch. 673.

(*u*) *Bond v. Barrow Hematite Steel Co.*, [1902] 1 Ch. 353.

(*x*) *R. v. Horne Tooke* (1794), 25 St. Tr. 71; *R. v. Silverlock*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 766; *R. v. Turner*, [1910] 1 K. B. 346.

(*y*) See *Castrique v. Imrie* (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. at p. 434; *Wilson v. Wilson*, [1903] P. 157.

(*z*) *R. v. Heseltine* (1873), 12 Cox, 404.

(*a*) *Nelson v. Bridport* (1845), 8 Beav. 527; *Sussex Peerage Case* (1844), 11 Cl. & F. 85.

(*b*) *R. v. Palmer* (1856), Stephen, Hist. Cr. Law, III. 389; 5 E. & B. 1024.

(*c*) *R. v. Rogers* (1914), 10 Cr. App. R. 276.

the fact in a number of ways, all of which are equally permissible.

From the point of view of Proof, evidence may be divided into several cross-heads. Thus evidence is either—

- (i) Oral, *i.e.*, the spoken word of witnesses;
- (ii) Documentary, *i.e.*, the production of documents; or
- (iii) Real, *i.e.*, the production and inspection of things.

Some cases can be tried wholly upon ORAL EVIDENCE, but documents and things usually require certain facts to be proved by witnesses in order to make them admissible in evidence. As a general rule, witnesses can be called to prove any fact, but certain facts can only be proved by documents.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE is required in many cases by statute (*d*); but it is a rule of the common law that whenever the parties to any agreement, grant or disposition have set out its terms in a writing which is intended to be a complete record of the whole transaction, no parol evidence is admissible to contradict or vary its terms. Such evidence, however, is admissible to destroy the right of action altogether, *e.g.*, by showing that the parties never came to a final agreement (*e*), or that the document produced is not the writing to which their agreement was reduced, or that there was a mutual mistake which should be rectified. Again, such evidence is admissible to annex customary incidents not inconsistent with the terms of the document (*f*). And parol evidence is always admissible to show that the contract has been rescinded since it was made (*g*).

REAL EVIDENCE is specially resorted to when a question arises as to the nature, condition, identity or appearance of any particular object. The production or inspection of the thing itself, when properly identified and explained by some competent witness, is obviously the most reliable method of

(*d*) For example, by the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3) or by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71).

(*e*) *Pym v. Campbell* (1856), 6 E. & B. 370; *De Lassalle v. Guildford*, [1901] 2 K. B. 215; *Pattle v. Hornibrook*, [1897] 1 Ch. 30.

(*f*) *Wigglesworth v. Dallison* (1779), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 613.

(*g*) *Goss v. Lord Nugent* (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 58, 64; *Vezey v. Rashleigh*, [1904] 1 Ch. 634; *Morris v. Baron*, [1918] A. C. 1.

settling such a question. In proper cases an order for the inspection of such objects can be obtained, even before trial (*h*).

Witnesses.

When a witness comes into the box to give evidence, he usually is sworn to tell the truth. In former times, no one could give evidence as a witness unless he had a religious belief in the sanctity of an oath, but now-a-days any person, who objects to take an oath because he has a religious objection or because he has no religious belief at all, can make an affirmation, which is made by statute as binding as an oath.

Persons who are unable to understand the nature of an oath were at common law incompetent to give evidence. Such persons are idiots, lunatics and children. But if any party alleges that a proposed witness is an idiot or a lunatic, the burden of proving this will lie on him (*i*).

With regard to children the rule has been altered, and now a child who does not understand the nature of an oath can give unsworn testimony in any criminal case (*k*), subject, however, to two conditions:

(a) The Judge, before allowing the child to give evidence, must be satisfied that the child is of sufficient intelligence to give evidence at all, and also that he or she understands the duty of speaking the truth.

(b) Such unsworn evidence must be "corroborated by some other material evidence in support thereof implicating the accused" (*l*).

In civil cases the parties to the action are competent and compellable witnesses, that is, if one party thinks his case will be assisted by calling the other party as a witness, he can *subpœna* his opponent, who will then be obliged to go into the box and state on oath what he knows about the issues (*m*). In criminal charges, however, although the

(*h*) See *ante*, pp. 582, 583.

(*i*) *R. v. Nicholas* (1846), 2 Car. & K. 246.

(*k*) Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 28, sub-s. 2, which extends the provisions of section 30 of the Children Act, 1908, to all offences, whether mentioned in the latter section or not, but not to any civil action.

(*l*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 67, s. 30.

(*m*) Evidence Amendment Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 99). As the witness is called by his opponent, he cannot be cross-examined by him, and the latter will be bound by his answers, however unfavourable.

prosecutor and his wife or her husband are competent witnesses either for or against the prisoner, the prisoner can be called as a witness for the prosecution in one case only—when the proceedings are brought to enforce a civil right, *e.g.*, an indictment for the obstruction of a public right of way (*n*). In all other cases he can only be called as a witness for the defence, and by his own consent (*o*). It is the duty of the Judge to inform him that he can give evidence if he wishes (*p*), but if he does not choose to avail himself of his right, the counsel for the prosecution is not permitted to draw the attention of the jury to the fact (*q*), but he may comment on the circumstance that before the justices the prisoner made no statement, but simply reserved his defence (*r*). The Judge, however, in his summing up may always comment upon the fact that the prisoner has chosen not to give evidence (*s*).

Should the prisoner elect to go into the box, he is liable to be cross-examined, but only to a limited extent. He cannot refuse to answer any question on the ground that it would criminate him with respect to the offence *for which he is being tried*; but by section 1 (*f*) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (*t*):—

“ A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that where-with he is then charged, or is of bad character, unless—

(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged; or

(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character; or

(iii) the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations (*u*) on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses (*x*) for the prosecution; or

(*n*) Evidence Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 14), s. 1.

(*o*) Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 36). The rules as to a prisoner's wife are similar, but, in certain cases, she is a competent witness for the prosecution, *e.g.*, bigamy. See *post*, p. 631.

(*p*) *R. v. Warren* (1909), 73 J. P. 359.

(*q*) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, s. 1 (*b*).

(*r*) *R. v. McNair* (1909), 25 T. L. R. 228.

(*s*) *R. v. Rhodes*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 77.

(*t*) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36.

(*u*) See the remarks of Lord Alverstone, noted in 69 J. P. (Journal), at p. 556.

(*x*) *R. v. Marshall* (1899), 63 J. P. 37; *R. v. Biggin*, [1920] 1 K. B. 213.

(iv) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence" (y).

But where the cross-examination addressed to the prisoner tends to show that he is guilty of the offence charged, it cannot be excluded merely on the ground that it also shows that he had previously been guilty of other offences (z).

It has been held that a prisoner who denies his guilt—even with emphasis offensive to the prosecutor—does not make an imputation on the character of the prosecutor within the meaning of this section (a). Otherwise, every prisoner whose defence is a denial of the facts would be liable to be cross-examined "to credit." The imputation must be that the conduct of the prosecutor or a witness for the prosecution outside the evidence given by him is such that he cannot be believed on his oath (b). An allegation that the prosecutrix in a charge of rape consented to the deed is not such an imputation (c); but an assertion that a witness for the prosecution is the person who is really guilty of the offence will lay the prisoner open to cross-examination to credit. In other words, so long as the prisoner contents himself with setting up a defence, which, if believed, entitles him to an acquittal, his character cannot be attacked.

The rules as to admitting the evidence of husbands or wives against their spouses differ considerably in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil cases, a husband or wife is fully competent to give such evidence (d), but neither can be compelled to disclose any communication made to the witness by the spouse during marriage (e). As a rule a witness is competent and compellable, *i.e.*, can be called to give evidence against his will. A witness who is competent but not compellable can give evidence if he so desires, but cannot be made to do so. A witness is incompetent when he will not be allowed to give evidence even if he wishes to do so.

In criminal cases, however, the rule is very different from that in civil cases. The husband or wife of a prisoner can

(y) *R. v. Hadwen*, [1902] 1 K. B. 882. See also *R. v. Seigley*, 6 Cr. App. R. 106.

(z) *R. v. Chitson*, [1909] 2 K. B. 945; *R. v. Kennaway*, [1917] 1 K. B. 25.

(a) *R. v. Rouse*, [1904] 1 K. B. 184; *R. v. Grout* (1909), 26 T. L. R. 60. But see *R. v. Westfall* (1912), 107 L. T. 463.

(b) *R. v. Preston*, [1909] 1 K. B. 568, 575; *R. v. Rappolt*, 6 Cr. App. R. 156.

(c) *R. v. Sheean* (1908), 72 J. P. 232; but see *R. v. Fisher*, 34 L. J. (Newsp.) 100, and *R. v. Preston*, *supra*.

(d) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 3; Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 1.

(e) *O'Connor v. Majoribanks* (1842), 4 Man. & G. 435; *Monro v. Twistleton* (1802), Peake, Add. Cas. 219, 221.

now be called as a witness for the defence in all cases, if the prisoner so wishes (*f*). The prosecution cannot comment on the fact that he or she could have been called but was not (*g*), although the Court has a discretion to make such a comment if it thinks fit (*h*).

But a wife cannot give evidence against her husband (*i*) except in the following cases, that is, in criminal proceedings instituted under:—

- (a) the Vagrancy Act, 1824 (*k*);
- (b) the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (*l*), sections 48 to 55;
- (c) the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (*m*);
- (d) the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (*n*);
- (e) the Vagrancy Act, 1898 (*o*), as amended by section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1912 (*p*);
- (f) the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904 (*q*);
- (g) Part II. of the Children Act, 1908 (*r*);
- (h) the Punishment of Incest Act, 1908 (*s*);
- (i) the Children (Employment Abroad) Act, 1913 (*t*);
- (j) in cases of bigamy (*u*);
- (k) Education Act, 1921 (*x*);
- (l) when the proceeding, though criminal in form, is really instituted to enforce a civil right, such as to compel the repair of a highway (*y*); or
- (m) whenever at common law husbands and wives could be compelled to give evidence against one another (*z*), *e.g.*, when a husband was charged with assaulting his wife, but not if he is charged with libelling her (*a*).

But a husband or wife can only be compelled to give evidence for the prosecution against the spouse in cases (*c*), (*l*) and (*m*) (*b*).

When a competent witness is in the box ready to give evidence, he must as a rule answer every question put to him which bears upon the issue to be decided. But there are certain classes of questions which will not be forced

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| (<i>f</i>) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, ss. 1, 4. | (<i>g</i>) <i>Ibid.</i> , s. 1 (<i>b</i>). |
| (<i>h</i>) <i>R. v. Rhodes</i> , [1899] 1 Q. B. 77. | (<i>i</i>) Or a husband against his wife. |
| (<i>k</i>) 5 Geo. 4, c. 83. | (<i>l</i>) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100. |
| (<i>m</i>) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75. | (<i>n</i>) 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69. |
| (<i>o</i>) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 39. | (<i>p</i>) 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 20. |
| (<i>q</i>) 4 Edw. 7, c. 15. | (<i>r</i>) 8 Edw. 7, c. 67, s. 27. |
| (<i>s</i>) 8 Edw. 7, c. 45, s. 4, sub-s. 4. | (<i>t</i>) 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 7. |
| (<i>u</i>) Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 28, sub-s. 3. | |
| (<i>x</i>) 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 51. | |
| (<i>y</i>) 40 & 41 Vict. c. 14, s. 1. | |
| (<i>z</i>) <i>Lord Audley's Case</i> (1631), 3 St. Tr. 401; 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, s. 4, sub-s. 1. | |
| (<i>a</i>) <i>R. v. Lord Mayor of London</i> (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 772. | |
| (<i>b</i>) Married Women's Property Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 14), s. 1, and <i>Leach v. R.</i> , [1912] A. C. 305. | |

to answer unless he pleases, and certain others which he will not be allowed to answer unless some third person permits him to do so.

Such classes are five in number:—

(i) Questions which tend to incriminate the witness. No person will be compelled to answer any question, the answer to which he swears (c) will tend to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture (d).

(ii) Questions tending to prove that the witness has committed adultery (e). But if in any proceeding instituted in consequence of adultery the witness has already denied the adultery in examination in chief, cross-examination intended to disprove that denial is freely admitted.

(iii) Questions the answer to which would disclose the subject-matter of communications between husband and wife (f). The communication must be one which is made during marriage; a third person who overheard it, however, can be compelled to say what he heard (g).

(iv) Counsel, solicitors and their clerks are not entitled to disclose communications made to them by their clients without the consent of the latter (h). Nor will the client himself be compelled to disclose them. This privilege exists whether the communication was made for the purposes of litigation or not (i). But information obtained by a legal adviser, or by the client at his direction, is only protected from disclosure if it is obtained for the purpose of actual or contemplated legal proceedings (k). The privilege can be waived by the client, but not by the legal adviser (l). The privilege is one which protects legal advice only. No other communications in professional or religious confidence are privileged (m).

(v) Questions intended to elicit disclosures prejudicial to the public interest. A witness will not be compelled to answer questions if his answers will tend to disclose affairs of State, which

(c) See *Webb v. East* (1880), 5 Ex. D. at p. 112; *Spokes v. Grosvenor Hotel*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 124.

(d) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 3; *R. v. Boyes* (1861), 1 B. & S. 311; *Reynolds, Ex parte* (1882), 20 Ch. D. 294. It is doubtful whether a witness can refuse to answer because it would criminate his or her spouse: *R. v. All Saints, Worcester* (1817), 6 Maule & S. 194; and see further Powell on Evidence (10th ed.), pp. 221—228.

(e) *Judicature Act*, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49), s. 198.

(f) As to civil actions, see 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, s. 3; as to criminal prosecutions, see 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, s. 1 (d).

(g) *R. v. Smithies* (1832), 5 C. & P. 332; *R. v. Simons* (1834), 6 C. & P. 540.

(h) See *Bolton v. Liverpool Corporation* (1833), 1 Mylne & K. 88, 94.

(i) *Greenough v. Gaskell* (1833), 1 Mylne & K. 98, 101.

(k) *Wheeler v. Le Marchant* (1881), 17 Ch. D. 675; and see *London and Northern Bank, In re*; *Hoyle's Case*, [1902] 2 Ch. 73.

(l) *Wilson v. Rastall* (1792), 4 T. R. 753, 759; cf. *Watson v. Jones*, [1905] A. C. 480.

(m) *Normanshaw v. Normanshaw* (1893), 69 L. T. 468; *Wheeler v. Le Marchant* (1881), 17 Ch. D., at p. 681; and see, on the general principle, *Jones v. Great Central Ry. Co.*, [1910] A. C. 4.

public interest demands should not be disclosed (*n*). And the same rule applies to parliamentary (*o*) and judicial (*p*) proceedings. Nor will he, in a civil case, be allowed to give evidence which outrages decency (*q*). But in criminal and divorce cases, if the evidence is relevant to the issue, it is admissible, however indecent and loathsome it may be.

As a rule, a party may, if he thinks fit, rest his case upon the evidence of a single witness; thus the prisoner is frequently the only witness called for the defence. But if one party is clearly in a position to call other evidence which would corroborate the story of the single witness, if that story were true, and does not call it, the jury may draw the conclusion that such further evidence is not produced because it would not corroborate the story of the witness. Corroborative evidence is usually that of a witness, but not necessarily so. Thus, letters passing between the parties may be the best confirmation of the witness's story; and real evidence may be available for the same purpose. Mere silence, or not answering letters, is not corroboration, unless the person who does nothing is under a duty to speak (*r*); for the best answer to an impertinent letter is most often not to notice it.

In one civil action (breach of promise of marriage (*s*)) and in two quasi-civil proceedings (affiliation (*t*) and the removal of paupers (*u*)) the Legislature has enacted that corroborative evidence is essential to establish the point at issue. In five criminal cases corroborative evidence is also made necessary in order to secure the conviction of an accused person:—

(i) Treason and misprision of treason (*x*).

(ii) Perjury (*y*) and subornation of perjury, and all other offences under the Perjury Act, 1911 (*z*).

(*n*) *R. v. Hardy* (1794), 24 St. Tr. 199, 815; *Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Anglo-Persian Oil Co.*, [1916] 1 K. B. 822.

(*o*) *Plunkett v. Cobbett* (1804), 5 Esp. 136.

(*p*) *Sykes v. Dunbar* (1779), 2 Selw. N. P. 1915.

(*q*) As a rule nothing that is relevant can be excluded on this ground. But neither spouse will be permitted to give evidence tending to bastardise children born during wedlock: *Russell v. Russell*, [1924] A. C. 687.

(*r*) See *Bessela v. Stern* (1877), 2 C. P. D. 265; *Wiedemann v. Walpole*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 534.

(*s*) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 2.

(*t*) 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, s. 4.

(*u*) Divided Parishes and Poor Law Amendment Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61), s. 34.

(*x*) 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, ss. 2, 4. For the exceptions see 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 93; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 56, s. 1; 11 Vict. c. 12.

(*y*) This is the only case where corroboration is required by common law. See *R. v. Yates* (1841), Car. & M. 132; *R. v. Muscot* (1713), 10 Mod. 192.

(*z*) 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6.

(iii) Personation at elections (*a*).

(iv) The offences created by sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (*b*).

(v) The offence created by section 9, sub-section 1 of the Motor Car Act, 1903 (*c*).

Moreover, in any criminal case, in which the unsworn evidence of a child has been admitted either on behalf of the prosecution or the defence, corroboration is necessary (*d*).

In three cases, moreover, the Court, though not insisting upon the production of corroborative evidence, will advise the jury not to act upon the evidence of a single witness, and will not itself so act if sitting without a jury: first, in cases of rape, indecent assault, &c.; next, where the only evidence against a prisoner who is charged with an offence is that of an accomplice (*e*); lastly, where a claim is made against the estate of a deceased person, and there is no evidence to support the claim except the word of the claimant himself (*f*). In such cases the jury, after being properly cautioned by the Judge, may nevertheless accept uncorroborated testimony, and if they do their verdict will not be disturbed.

Documentary Evidence.

Besides calling witnesses, the parties may desire to prove facts by producing documents. Thus, if a person is charged with obtaining goods by false pretences which were contained in a letter which he wrote to the prosecutor, that letter must be produced (unless its absence is satisfactorily accounted for) and proved to have been written by the person charged (*g*). Again, the cheapest and most convenient way of proving a birth, marriage or death is by the production of the registrar's certificate together with evidence of the identity of the parties named in it.

Documents are of two kinds—public and private. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS are such as are made for the purpose of enabling the public to use or refer to them (*h*). It does not necessarily follow that they are open to the inspection of

(*a*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 88; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 33, s. 24.

(*b*) 43 & 49 Vict. c. 69.

(*c*) 3 Edw. 7, c. 36.

(*d*) Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 67), s. 30.

(*e*) *R. v. Stubbs* (1855), 25 L. J. M. C. 16; *R. v. Tate*, [1908] 2 K. B. 680; *R. v. Baskerville*, [1916] 2 K. B. 680; *R. v. Feigenbaum*, [1919] 1 K. B. 431.

(*f*) *Garnett, In re* (1886), 31 Ch. D. 1; *Rawlinson v. Scholes* (1898), 79 L. T. 350; but see *Vavasour v. Vavasour* (1909), 25 T. L. R. 250.

(*g*) See *post*, p. 638.

(*h*) See *Sturla v. Freccia* (1880), 5 App. Cas. at 643; *Mercer v. Denne*, [1905] 2 Ch. 538.

the public, although they generally are so. It is sufficient if they concern a definite portion of the public, such as the ratepayers of a parish or the copyholders of a manor. A PRIVATE DOCUMENT, on the other hand, is for this purpose, any other document, *e.g.*, one which has come into existence for the benefit or information of private persons, and which is not open as of right to the inspection of the public. Such documents as Royal Proclamations, Acts of Parliament, by-laws, judicial records, registers of births, marriages and deaths, probate copies of wills, and letters of administration, and all papers prepared or issued by the authority of Parliament or any department of State, are public documents.

To avoid the risk of loss or destruction of public documents which might be incurred if they had to be produced in Court whenever the facts to which they refer have to be proved, most of them have, by various statutes, been made provable by examined or certified copies, which, if properly authenticated, have all the probative effect of the original documents (*i*). Office copies of judicial records have also been made admissible in evidence (*k*). But whenever the existence or genuineness of the record itself is in dispute, then the original must be produced (*l*).

Even if a public document which is relevant to the issue exists, it cannot always be put in evidence at the trial. The head of the department in whose custody it is may refuse to allow its production on the ground that the public interest would suffer, and, if this is done, no other way of proving its contents will be permitted (*m*).

The method of proving private documents depends upon two considerations:—

(i) Is the document more than thirty years old?

(i) Evidence Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 99), s. 14; Documentary Evidence Acts, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 113), s. 3; 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 37), Schedule; 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 9), s. 3; 1895 (58 Vict. c. 9); Evidence (Colonial Statutes) Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 16), s. 1; Post Office Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 48), ss. 8, 9, 74.

(k) Orders XXXVII., r. 4; LXI., r. 7.

(l) *R. v. Cox* (1864), 4 F. & F. 42; *R. v. Boynes* (1843), 1 Car. & K. 65; and see on the whole question Powell on Evidence (10th ed.), pp. 248—253.

(m) *Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby* (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 744; *Chatterton v. Secretary of State*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 189; *Hargreaves, In re*, [1900] 1 Ch. 347.

(ii) If less than thirty years old, is it required by law to be attested?

A document thirty years old can be proved by simply producing it from a proper custody (n). "Proper custody" means that it comes from a source whence it might reasonably be expected to come, though not strictly the place where in law it should be. Thus on expiry leases should be returned to the lessor, but they often are not, and therefore an expired lease over thirty years old can be proved by producing it from the keeping of either the lessor or the lessee. If such a document is not in a proper custody, it must be proved in the same way as a document less than thirty years old. Ancient documents, which are part of the transaction to which they relate as distinguished from being a mere narrative of the transaction, not only prove themselves, but are evidence of the truth of the statements contained in them (o).

If the document is less than thirty years old, and is not required by law to be attested, all that the party need do is to produce the original (unless secondary evidence is admitted), duly stamped, if necessary, and to prove the handwriting (p). If such a document is required by law to be attested, then he must call at least one attesting witness to prove the execution, but if all the attesting witnesses are dead or insane or beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, it will be sufficient to call evidence to prove the handwriting of any one of the witnesses. The rule is the same both in civil and criminal proceedings.

Where one party desires the production of documents which are in the possession of his opponent, he must give him notice to produce them. The latter may, however, refuse to comply with the notice, in which case secondary evidence of the contents of the document can be given (q).

Again, it is desirable that the parties to a dispute should

(n) *Meath v. Winchester* (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 183; *Doe v. Wolley*, 8 B. & C. 22.

(o) *Malcolmson v. O'Dea* (1862), 10 H. L. Cas. 593; *Heath v. Deane*, [1905] 2 Ch. 86.

(p) In the case of proof of a will in solemn form, the executor can be forced to call both witnesses: *Coles v. Coles* (1866), L. R. 1 P. & D. 70.

(q) *Dwyer v. Collins*, 7 Ex. 639, 647.

be free before trial to enter into negotiations for a settlement; and such negotiations could not be conducted freely, if there were a fear of their being given in evidence at the trial in the event of the negotiations failing. Hence either party may mark his letter "Without prejudice," and any document so marked cannot be given in evidence at the trial against the writer without his consent. This, of course, does not apply to criminal cases, nor after the parties have actually come to an agreement as a result of the negotiations "without prejudice."

It is the province of the Judge to decide what is the true meaning of the words of a written document, though the jury, if there is one, will find any matters of fact necessary to enable the Judge to do so. The Judge always starts with the assumption that the writer meant what he wrote. He will give to ordinary English words their ordinary English meaning, unless there is evidence to go to the jury that the words in this particular case bear some unusual and peculiar meaning. He will give to technical words their technical meaning. To a word which has both a strict and proper meaning, and also a loose popular meaning (*e.g.*, "lands," which may include leaseholds; "children," which may include illegitimate children), he will give the strict and proper meaning, unless it be clear that the writer used the word in its loose popular meaning. Above all, he will construe the document as a whole, not divorcing isolated passages from their context, but giving due weight to every part (*r*). He will avoid, if possible, a construction which will render any portion of the document nugatory or meaningless.

Again, evidence is either DIRECT OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL. Direct evidence goes straight to the matter in issue. Thus an eye-witness who saw A shoot B gives direct evidence when, on the trial of A for the murder of B, he relates in the box what he saw and heard. But circumstantial evidence is merely evidence of certain facts from which the matter in issue can be inferred. Thus persons have been convicted

(*r*) See Vol. 1, p. 69; and Powell on Evidence (9th ed.), pp. 542—581.

even of murder without the evidence of a single eye-witness, the prosecution having proved facts which showed clearly that it must have been the prisoner and no one else who murdered the dead man.

Evidence is also either PRIMARY OR SECONDARY. Thus the person who saw what happen, the deed which conveys the land in question, and the knife used to kill the deceased are each and all primary evidence. No better evidence could be obtained. Secondary evidence, on the other hand, shows on the face of it that there is other evidence superior to itself. Thus, a witness may not have seen the occurrence and can merely repeat what another told him. This is called "hearsay" and, as a rule, is not admissible. Again, a document may be tendered, which is only a copy of the deed in question, or a witness may say that he saw the original and remembers its contents (s). So, too, a surveyor may produce a plan of the place in question, or a model of the house or other thing material to the issue which the jury have to try. In all these cases, the evidence does not profess to be the best that is obtainable; it confesses that it is not original.

As a general rule, the use of one kind of evidence will not prevent a party making use of another. In criminal charges, it is usual to call both direct and circumstantial evidence, if both exist. Neither excludes the other. Nor will oral evidence exclude either documentary or real, and real evidence will not prevent oral or documentary evidence being adduced. But it frequently happens that a fact can only be proved by documentary evidence. Judgments and other records, conveyances and many contracts must be in writing, and even when writing is not required by law, the parties will not be allowed to give evidence to impugn a document which they have drawn up as a record of the final agreement to which they have come (t). Secondary oral evidence—that is, evidence of what a person would say if he were called as a witness—is generally inad-

(s) *Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards* (1876), 1 P. D. 154; but see *Woodward v. Goulstone* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 469.

(t) See *ante*, p. 627.

missible even when the person in question is dead or abroad. In certain cases, however, the rule is relaxed. Secondary documentary evidence is, as a rule, admitted upon proof that the document cannot be produced to the Court. A witness can either state his recollection of the document, or produce a copy of it and prove that he made the copy and compared it with the original. The latter is the better and more usual course.

It often happens that a material witness is not willing to come and give evidence, or a material document is in the possession of a person who will not produce it unless compelled. In such cases, the attendance of the witness can be compelled by serving him with a *subpœna*. If he is required to produce documents as well, then he is served with a *subpœna duces tecum*, which compels him to bring the documents into Court, though it does not follow in every case that he is bound to show them. And, as we have seen, there are many questions which a witness may decline to answer. The Court can always set aside a *subpœna*, which has not been obtained *bona fide* for the purpose of the trial (*u*). In civil cases where a witness is abroad, or too ill to travel, or will go abroad before the date of the trial, arrangements can be made to have his evidence taken on commission or by letters of request (*x*). In criminal cases, however, there is hardly any provision for taking such evidence, apart from the depositions taken at the petty sessions (*y*) and at the coroner's inquest (*z*).

Burden of Proof.

The "burden of proof" is the duty which lies on each party to establish his case. The burden of proving the general or main issue in the proceedings rests, in a criminal trial, on the prosecution: if the prosecution calls no evidence, the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. So, too, in civil cases, the burden lies as a rule upon the party who will lose the case unless he calls some evidence. In criminal cases, therefore, the prosecution always begins: in civil cases, generally, but not always, the plaintiff.

(*u*) *R. v. Baines*, [1909] 1 K. B. 258.

(*x*) See Odgers on Pleading and Practice (9th ed.), p. 312.

(*y*) Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42). See also Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867, s. 6.

(*z*) Coroners Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 71), ss. 4, 5. Other cases occur under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 35), s. 6; the Extradition Acts, 1870 and 1873 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52, s. 14; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 60, s. 5), and the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), s. 691.

But as the case proceeds, the burden of proof may be shifted. The duty of establishing some minor fact in issue may fall on the other side, or the prosecution may have established sufficient facts to cast upon the defence the burden of rebutting the inferences drawn from them; that is called establishing a *prima facie* case. Civil cases differ from criminal trials in this respect—that the tribunal can decide the former on a balance of probabilities, but a prisoner's guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt before he can be found guilty. In either case, however, the party upon whom the *onus* lies may succeed in proving his case in such a manner that the other party is reasonably called upon to destroy it or explain it away. He need not do so unless he likes. He may call evidence or he may simply argue that the Court should not draw the inference, *e.g.*, because the witnesses are not truthful, or that the evidence is too weak for the jury to act upon.

Proof of the surrounding circumstances may be sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case and to throw upon the defence the burden of disproving the inferences drawn from the circumstances. Where an injury is caused to the plaintiff by some occurrence which does not happen in the natural course of events without negligence on the part of somebody, the Court will assume that the person who had it in his power to prevent the mischief is responsible for it, unless he can show that the occurrence took place without any fault on his part; and the plaintiff has only to prove that it did take place. *Res ipsa loquitur* (a).

If a man is found in possession of goods recently stolen, this is sufficient *prima facie* evidence that he either stole them or received them knowing them to have been stolen; but there is no presumption of law on the matter (b). How recent the possession must be to raise such an inference depends on the nature of the goods. Again, if goods be delivered to a carrier to be conveyed to a certain place and on the arrival of the carrier there they are not to be found, it lies upon him to prove that their loss is not due to any negligence on his part (c).

(a) See Vol. 1, pp. 496, 497.

(b) *R. v. Langmead* (1864), L. & C. 427; *R. v. McMahon* (1875), 13 Cox, 275; *R. v. Schama*, *R. v. Abramovitch* (1914), 84 L. J. K. B. 396.

(c) *Phipps v. New Claridge's Hotel* (1905), 22 T. L. R. 49.

So if a passenger is injured by a collision between two trains, which are both at the time exclusively under the management of the same railway company, this is *prima facie* proof of negligence, and it lies upon the defendant company to rebut it if possible (*d*). And there are many other cases in which the facts speak for themselves (*e*).

But where a man was knocked down and killed on a level crossing by a passing train, and there was nothing to show how or why he came to be upon the line, it was held that no *prima facie* case had been established; for the facts were equally consistent with negligence on his part and negligence on the part of the railway company (*f*). So where a passenger was killed in a railway carriage by the explosion of a parcel of fireworks which had been illegally brought into the carriage by a fellow-passenger, it was held that, as a railway company is not an insurer of its passengers (*g*), the *onus* lay on the plaintiff to prove negligence on its part, that it was not the duty of the railway company to search every parcel carried by a passenger, and that, as no evidence had been given to show that there was anything in the appearance of the particular parcel to suggest danger, the railway company was not liable (*h*).

Again, not only can the main issue in the proceedings be established by *prima facie* evidence, but many subsidiary questions of fact which arise incidentally in the course of the trial may be disposed of in the same way.

Thus, if it is proved that a letter properly addressed to A with the postage prepaid was posted and has not been returned through the "Dead Letter Office," it will be taken to have reached A unless he proves the contrary (*i*). So, too, the "Law List" (*k*) and the "Medical Register" (*l*) are *prima facie* proof that the persons whose names appear in them are duly qualified to practise as a solicitor or medical man respectively. Again, a certified copy of an entry in the "Register of Newspaper Proprietors" at Somerset House is *prima facie* evidence of all matters and things contained in it (*m*).

So, on a prosecution for perjury alleged to have been committed on the trial of an indictment, the fact of the former trial may be sufficiently proved by the production of a certificate containing the

(*d*) *Carpue v. L. & B. Ry. Co.* (1844), 5 Q. B. 747, 751.

(*e*) *Byrne v. Boadle* (1863), 2 H. & C. 722.

(*f*) *Wakelin v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1886), 12 App. Cas. 41; and see *Pomfret v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 718; *McDonald v. S.S. "Banana,"* [1908] 2 K. B. 926; *Marshall v. S.S. "Wild Rose,"* [1910] A. C. 486; *Kitchenham v. S.S. "Johannesburg,"* [1911] A. C. 417.

(*g*) See *ante*, pp. 275 *et seq.*

(*h*) *East Indian Ry. v. Kalidas Mukerjee*, [1901] A. C. 396.

(*i*) *Walthamstow U. D. C. v. Henwood*, [1897] 1 Ch. 41.

(*k*) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 22.

(*l*) Medical Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 127), s. 122.

(*m*) Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 60), s. 5.

substance and effect of the indictment and trial, purporting to be signed by the clerk of the Court, without proof of his signature or official character (n).

The fact that a company has carried on business as such is *prima facie* evidence that it has been duly incorporated (o).

Admissions, Presumptions, Estoppels.

It is, however, not always necessary that a party should bring evidence to establish the facts upon which he bases his claim or defence. His task is often lightened by—

- (i) Admissions;
- (ii) Presumptions; and
- (iii) Estoppels.

(i) **ADMISSIONS.**—If a party who has to establish a fact can show that it has been admitted by his opponent, he need do no more. The fact will be taken as proved, unless his opponent can explain away or destroy his admission. Admissions are either formal or informal. In civil proceedings, formal admissions may be made on the pleadings, or in answer to interrogatories or by a party's counsel or solicitor (p) during the litigation; but a prisoner cannot as a rule make any formal admission other than a plea of "Guilty." Informal admissions may be made in any manner, in correspondence or conversation or even by conduct, and at any time, whether litigation is contemplated or not. Negotiations held, or letters written, "without prejudice" cannot, in civil cases, be proved or relied on in any way as admissions.

A party is bound by admissions made by himself, or by a person who is his agent to make them, or by a person through or under whom he claims if such person then had the right or title claimed. But as an infant, lunatic or person of unsound mind cannot be bound by his own admissions, so he cannot be bound by any admission made by any one else on his behalf (q).

(n) Perjury Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6), s. 14.

(o) *R. v. Langton* (1876), 2 Q. B. D. 296; *R. v. May* (1900), 64 J. P. 570.

(p) *Critchell v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.*, [1907] 1 K. B. 860; *Ellis v. Allen*, [1914] 1 Ch. 904.

(q) See, for example, *Stanton v. Percival* (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 369; and see Order XIX., r. 13.

A general agent has authority to do everything that such an agent usually does in the class of business in which he is engaged, and consequently can bind his principal by any admissions he may have made in the usual course of his dealing. But a particular agent can bind his principal by an admission, only if it be made in the course of his employment on the particular matter upon which he is engaged, and also within the scope of his authority therein. A person who fills a representative character can make admissions binding upon the persons whom he represents, provided they are made while he sustains that character, and then he personally is not bound by them. In any other case he alone is bound.

(ii) PRESUMPTIONS.—It often happens that if a party proves certain facts, the law will presume the existence of another fact. This presumption (*r*) is not conclusive; the fact will stand as proved until the opposite party succeeds in disproving it: that is, a presumption shifts the burden of proof.

Thus, if a man leaves home under circumstances which make it probable that he would, if alive, let his relatives or friends know what had become of him, the law will presume that he is dead, if for seven years his friends neither hear from him nor of him. But the law will not presume that he died at any particular moment within that period. Where two or more persons, such as husband and wife, perish in the same catastrophe, the deaths are presumed to have occurred in order of seniority, the younger person surviving the elder (*s*).

Again, the law will presume that a public officer acted with due authority in the capacity in which he professed to act. Thus, even on a trial for murder, it was held that proof of the mere fact that a man had acted as a constable was sufficient proof that he was one (*t*). Persons who have for a long time been living together as man and wife and have been so regarded by their neighbours will be deemed to have been lawfully married until the contrary is shown (*u*). So, too, the law will presume a man to be innocent, until he is proved guilty, of any crime or of fraudulent or immoral motives. A transaction will always be upheld, unless fully proved to have been done with a criminal or fraudulent intent.

But whenever a party to an action has been proved to be a wrongdoer, the Court will presume everything against him. Thus, if a man takes away another's jewel, in any action against him in respect of that taking the jewel will be presumed to have been

(*r*) This word is used here in the sense of "rebuttable presumption of law" or "*præsumptio juris*."

(*s*) L. P. A., 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 20), s. 184.

(*t*) *R. v. Gordon* (1789), 1 Leach, 515.

(*u*) *George v. Thyer*, [1904] 1 Ch. 456.

of the finest quality, unless he produces it, because his own wrongful act is the cause of its value being unknown (x).

There are other presumptions, such as those relating to lost grants (y), and bills of exchange (z), which will be found dealt with in other parts of this work.

(iii) ESTOPPELS.—In some cases a party to an action will not be allowed to set up, or to attempt to prove at the trial, allegations which are directly contrary to that which has already been decided against him, or to that which he has himself deliberately represented to be the fact. He is said to be “estopped.” Such an estoppel is binding not only on the original parties, but also on all who claim through or under them. It must be specially pleaded in a Defence or in any subsequent pleading, as, if not raised, it would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise.

There are three kinds of estoppel—by record (a), by deed (b), and by conduct, with the last of which alone we are here concerned.

If A by word or conduct induces B to believe that a certain state of things exists, and B in that belief acts in a way in which he would not have acted unless he so believed, and is thereby prejudiced, then A cannot, in any subsequent proceeding between himself and B or any one claiming under B, be heard to deny that that state of things existed (c). But A will not be estopped from averring the truth in any other proceeding. The estoppel only arises in favour of some person whom A has induced by word or conduct to do or abstain from doing some particular thing, and who has in consequence suffered loss. It makes no difference, so far as an estoppel is concerned, whether A made the statement fraudulently, negligently or through mere inadvertence,

(x) *Armory v. Delamire* (1721), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), p. 396.

(y) See Vol. 1, pp. 23, 577, 591, 593.

(z) See *ante*, p. 160.

(a) See *ante*, pp. 10 *et seq.*

(b) See *ante*, p. 13.

(c) This third kind of estoppel was formerly called estoppel *in pais* (i.e., in the country). The full phrase was “*in pais dehors* the instrument,” because the estoppel depended on matters outside the four corners of any record or deed. Estoppel by conduct is a clearer phrase. As to what conduct will create an estoppel, see *Pearl Mill Co. v. Ivy Tanery Co.*, [1919] 1 K. B. 78; *Russian Commercial Bank v. Comptoir d’Escompte de Mulhouse*, [1925] A. C. 112.

provided that he knew that B would rely upon it and intended B to act upon it (*d*).

The words may be written or spoken; the conduct may be any act, omission or neglect, provided it be an omission to do something which A ought to do—the neglect of some legal duty which A owes B; provided also that such omission or neglect misleads B and misleads him to his prejudice. Even silence may be sufficient where there is a duty to speak and where silence will create an erroneous impression which causes B to alter his position for the worse (*e*).

III. COGENCY.

The value or cogency of any particular piece of evidence is quite a different question from its admissibility (*f*). Until a relevant fact has been proved in the legitimate way, no one can say what weight should attach to it, or whether it will assist or convince the Court. It is for the Judge or jury to consider the evidence given on both sides and to weigh it in the light of all the circumstances before coming to a conclusion.

The whole object of evidence is to create a conviction in the mind of a reasonable and practical man. He will not require more than what is called a “moral certainty,” but he will not act upon a mere possibility. He will base his conviction upon the facts proved and the inferences which can be legitimately drawn from those facts.

Different kinds of evidence have very different probative force. The law often permits a fact to be proved in several ways, but wherever one way is the usual and accepted mode of proof, it would be unwise to adopt any other method unless it is clear from the circumstances that it would be

(*d*) See *Carr v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 307; *Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke*, [1907] 1 K. B. 794; *Smith v. Prosser*, [1907] 2 K. B. 735; *Fuller v. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co.*, [1914] 2 K. B. 168.

(*e*) As in *Pickard v. Sears* (1837), 6 A. & E. 469, where a man stood by and saw his goods sold to a *bona fide* purchaser. Cf. *Bristol Corp. v. Sinnott*, [1918] 1 Ch. 62; *Gascoigne v. Gascoigne*, [1918] 1 K. B. 223; *London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan*, [1918] A. C. 777.

(*f*) See the judgment of Jessel, M.R., in *Taylor v. Witham* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 605.

unreasonable to expect the party to prove the fact in the usual way.

Direct evidence differs greatly from circumstantial evidence. In the former case, the Court has only to be satisfied that the evidence is true—the conclusion must follow. If A says “I saw B strike C,” then he is either telling the truth or else he is mistaken or lying. But where a number of circumstances are relied upon from which the point to be decided can be inferred, then not only has the truth of each link in the chain to be tested, but the Court must also consider whether the chain of evidence is strong enough—whether the desired inference can properly be drawn from the facts established; if a prisoner is to be convicted of a crime on circumstantial evidence, all the facts must be consistent with his guilt. It is difficult to estimate the relative probative force of direct and circumstantial evidence. It is always more satisfactory to have the direct evidence of an eye-witness, if it can be obtained, but when the circumstantial evidence fits in together and raises a violent presumption of the prisoner’s guilt, circumstantial evidence is as cogent as direct evidence (*g*).

The respective value of oral, documentary and real evidence depends largely on the circumstances of each case. Documents can always be used to check and explain the evidence of a witness. For instance, if the parties have written to one another about the matter before the dispute arose, any statements made in such correspondence are more likely to be true than oral statements made for the first time in the witness-box, as the witnesses are now aware that what they say will influence the result, and may be biassed by the feelings which the dispute has engendered. On the other hand, witnesses can show emotion, can explain or contradict themselves, add to a statement or correct it. But the written word stands unaltered and unalterable, unless it can be shown to be a forgery or to have been tampered with.

Real evidence is of great use, if it is properly brought

(*g*) See *R. v. Burdett* (1820), 4 B. & Ald. at p. 161; and *Loveden v. Loveden* (1810), 2 Haggard’s Consistory Court Cases, at p. 2.

before the Court. It is, however, open to the charge that juries are apt to exaggerate its importance. "Things seen are mightier than things heard." The production of a pistol or a blood-stained garment may influence their minds unfavourably to the prisoner before anything has been proved to connect it with him. The non-production of a material piece of real evidence by the person who is last known to have been in possession of it may give rise to comment or suspicion, but it will not prevent secondary evidence as to it being given by other persons who had previously seen it (*h*).

Primary evidence is more reliable than secondary evidence. Take, for instance, hearsay. What a person told a witness may be correctly stated, but many circumstances may diminish its value. The witness may not have heard properly, or he may have misunderstood or since forgotten what was said, or he may even be inventing the conversation. The person who is put forward as the authority for the statement is not before the Court, and therefore cannot be cross-examined; there is nothing by which the Court can judge of his credibility or accuracy (*i*). A written statement taken at the time by a reliable person is naturally better than another's mere recollection; the danger of admitting secondary oral evidence is so great that it is excluded in all but eight cases where, from the nature of the facts, the persons in question cannot give evidence (*k*). Secondary documentary evidence is, when the absence of the original is duly accounted for, readily admitted, for the same considerations do not apply to it. An accurate copy of a document is almost as valuable as the original.

(*h*) *R. v. Hunt* (1820), 3 B. & Ald. 566; *R. v. Francis* (1874), L. R. 2 C. C. R. 128.

(*i*) See the remarks of Cave, J., in *Scott v. Sampson* (1882), 8 Q. B. D. at pp. 506, 507.

(*k*) See Powell on Evidence (9th ed.), pp. 302—359.

CHAPTER XXI.

DAMAGES AND THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

“ THE assessment of damages is peculiarly the province of the jury ” (a). But the law lays down certain rules to guide them in this duty, and also defines what matters they may and what matters they may not take into their consideration in so doing.

The first great principle is, of course, “ that a plaintiff is entitled to recover by way of damages all that at the commencement of the suit he has lost through the wrongful act for which the defendant is sued ” (b). Nor is the plaintiff always limited to what he has lost at the commencement of the suit; he can in some cases recover for future loss which it is clear he must sustain, though not for any speculative or problematical loss which he may or may not incur. In such cases the “ plaintiff must recover once for all, by one and the same action, all damage, past, present and future, resulting from one and the same cause of action ” (c). The plaintiff is entitled to be placed in the same position as if the contract had not been broken or the tort had never been committed. But this principle is at once qualified and restricted by a second rule, that a defendant is not liable to compensate the plaintiff for any damage which cannot reasonably be said to result from the breach of contract or from the wrong done. Such damage is said to be too remote to be taken into consideration by a jury, for it is not the direct result of the defendant’s conduct.

(a) *Per cur.* in *Davis v. Shepstone* (1886), 11 App. Cas. at p. 191.

(b) *Per Lord Denman, C.J.*, in *Rundle v. Little* (1844), 6 Q. B. at p. 178.

(c) *Per Manisty, J.*, in *Lamb v. Walker* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. at p. 395; but see *Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 127.

In certain cases, however, other matters may be taken into consideration in assessing the amount of damages to be awarded. Surrounding circumstances, such as the relation between the parties, spite or ill-will, the unfeeling conduct of the defendant, are allowed to weigh with the jury. In such cases, "damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself" (d).

The leading rules which now govern damages in England may be stated thus:—

1. In certain actions, such as libel, slander, seduction and breach of promise of marriage, the jury is permitted to award vindictive damages in excess of the amount which would adequately compensate the plaintiff for all injury inflicted (e).

2. In all other actions the damages are limited to the loss which the plaintiff has directly sustained from the breach of contract or tort of which he complains. The jury may only compensate him for—

(i) Any damage which is the natural or the probable consequence of an act such as that done by the defendant.

(ii) Any damage which may reasonably be supposed to have been in the minds of the parties at the time of making the contract as a natural or probable consequence of a breach of that contract.

(iii) Any damage which is the probable result of the defendant's act, provided that, whenever the probability of such a result ensuing depends upon the special circumstances of the particular case, the defendant will not be liable to compensate the plaintiff for such result, unless he had notice of such special circumstances at the time of his making the contract.

3. All other damage which the plaintiff may have sus-

(d) *Per Pratt, C.J., in Wilkes v. Wood* (1763), 19 St. Tr. at p. 1167.

(e) See *post*, p. 656. Probably breach of promise is the only cause of action based on contract in respect of which exemplary damages may be given.

tained the Judge will exclude from the consideration of the jury as being too remote.

By "natural consequence" is meant such a result as must follow from the defendant's act in the ordinary course of nature, in short, a consequence which is physically necessary. By "probable consequence" is meant such a consequence as, human nature being what it is, usually follows from such an act as the defendant's, or so frequently follows that a person of ordinary intelligence and foresight would reasonably anticipate such a result, if he thought about the matter at all (f).

From time to time very various principles of assessing damages have been adopted, and it may be questioned whether we have yet attained in England to any very logical principle, or to any completely satisfactory rule.

At first sight it seems strange that a jury should be allowed to award a plaintiff compensation in excess of any damage which he has actually sustained, still more so that a jury should be directed to do this "as a punishment to the guilty" and "to deter from any such proceeding for the future" (g). By permitting this, is not our law employing a civil action to do the work of an indictment? It is the object of criminal, not civil, proceedings to punish the offender, and to prevent any repetition of the offence.

Traces of the policy of using a civil action for punitive purposes linger in our own laws. A tenant who does not deliver up possession of his holding in obedience to a notice to quit must, by the statute 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 18, pay his landlord double rent; if he holds over after the expiration of his term, he must, under the statute 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 1, pay his landlord double the value of his holding. Then, again, by section 209 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, a tenant who does not "forthwith" inform his landlord that he has been served with a writ in ejectment forfeits three years' rent. And it would seem that the tenant must pay this arbitrary sum even though his landlord had already had notice from the plaintiff's solicitors that such an action was threatened. So, under the statute 2 Will. & Mary, sess. 1, c. 5, ss. 3, 4, he who breaks

(f) It is submitted that, if these words are thus restricted, the paragraphs numbered (i), (ii), (iii) above correctly state what is left of the three rules in *Hadley v. Baxendale* (1854), 9 Exch. 341, after the minute criticism which they have received in the judgments in many subsequent cases, and notably in *British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 499; *Horne v. Midland Ry. Co.* (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 131, 137; *Baxendale v. L. C. & D. Ry. Co.* (1874), L. R. 10 Ex. 35; *Sanders v. Stuart* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 326; *Hydraulic, &c., Co. v. McHaffie* (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 670; *Grébert-Borgnis v. Nugent* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 85; *Hammond v. Bussey* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 79; *Mowbray v. Merryweather*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 640; and *Polemis and Furness, Withy, In re*, [1920] 3 K. B. 560.

(g) See the language of Pratt, C.J., cited on last page.

a pound and rescues goods therefrom must pay treble damages and treble costs, without proof of any special damage suffered by the plaintiff (*h*); and yet it has been held that such a proceeding is not a penal action (*i*). In all these cases it is clear that our law has regard mainly, if not solely, to the injured feelings of the plaintiff, and makes no attempt to assess accurately the damage which the defendant's act has really caused.

Then, as society advanced, men began to see that this was not quite fair to the defendant; and the next stage, apparently, was to let the parties, if they would, assess the damages beforehand, and settle what would be the proper sum to be paid in each event. This sounds fairer, no doubt, because each party has a voice in the matter. But in many cases the apparent fairness of this method is illusory. Borrower and lender are not really on equal terms; nor sometimes are landlord and tenant. If a tenant is really anxious to take a particular farm, he will often sign a lease containing the most stringent conditions, and agree to pay £1,000 as liquidated damages in case he breaks any one of them. And in former days he would have been compelled to pay the £1,000, though the loss resulting from his breach to the landlord was less than half a crown. So, too, under the Tudors and the Stuarts, it was the regular and customary thing for a man who was borrowing £500 for six months solemnly to enter into a bond under seal for £1,000. And if he failed to pay back the £500 on the last day of the six months, he was liable to pay the full £1,000. It was not regarded as at all extortionate for the creditor to insist on cent. per cent. if his debtor was one day behindhand in paying the debt. And this remained the law till the days of Queen Anne (4 & 5 Anne, c. 16); for the borrower had expressly agreed to those terms.

Moral considerations have also been regarded. In some cases, it was felt the plaintiff had a right to be angry, and to exact the uttermost farthing; but in others, *e.g.*, where the injury was done unintentionally, he ought to be reasonable and moderate in his indignation. If the defendant had acted wantonly, callously or brutally, he ought, it was thought, to pay the plaintiff more damages than if he had behaved like a gentleman, although in both cases the actual pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff would be identical. We still have such considerations urged on a jury in actions for breach of promise of marriage. The plaintiff has lost a marriage. If the defendant acted with proper feeling and decorum when he broke off the engagement, the jury would find a verdict for a reasonable sum. If, however, he acted harshly and selfishly, with no regard to the girl's feelings, he may have to pay more. If, again, he is foolish enough to make any imputation on the lady's character which he fails to prove, then the damages will probably rise considerably. In other words, the lady benefits pecuniarily because the man to whom she was once engaged is a brute, whereas

(*h*) *Kemp v. Christmas* (1898), 79 L. T. 233.

(*i*) *Castleman v. Hicks* (1842), 2 Moo. & R. 422.

she ought really to receive less compensation for such a happy escape.

So, too, a plaintiff who has been induced to enter into a contract by means of a deliberate fraudulent misstatement generally recovers more damages than he would if the misrepresentation was made innocently, although the injury done to him is the same in either case. In the latter case, as a rule, he can get no damages but only have the contract rescinded. In cases of underground trespass into the coal mine of an adjoining owner the measure of damages is the actual value at the pit's mouth of the coal wrongfully abstracted, after deducting, in the case of accidental trespass, the cost of severance and "bringing to bank," but in the case of deliberate trespass the cost of bringing to bank only, nothing being allowed for "getting" the coal (*k*); yet the plaintiff's loss is the same whether the trespass was deliberate or accidental. Why should he benefit because the defendant intended to do wrong? In many classes of action besides those already mentioned (*e.g.*, libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction, &c.) the plaintiff is allowed to recover additional damages, over and above his real loss, because the defendant acted recklessly, dishonestly, or maliciously; and this will always be the case so long as damages are assessed by a jury.

Now let us leave out of account all these cases in which vindictive damages may be awarded, and confine our attention to the unimpassioned inquiry: By what principles should the jury be guided in assessing the loss which the plaintiff has, in fact, sustained as the result of the defendant's act? In cases of injury to the person or to the reputation of the plaintiff, there is often no pecuniary loss at all; yet it is clearly right that the defendant should recompense the plaintiff for the insult, the indignity, and the pain caused by a gross libel or a public assault, or by being marched through the streets in custody. In all such cases the jury may compensate the plaintiff for injured feelings and for wounded pride; for this is clearly part of the damage. But in actions for breach of contract, or for injury to property the law requires that the damage recoverable may be, as stated elsewhere, no more than the natural and probable results of the wrong committed.

And even in assessing the actual value of the property injured or not delivered, the law too strictly adheres to the principle of market value. If a man breaks in pieces a gold watch which the Duke of Wellington gave to my grandfather, is he to pay me merely the second-hand price of any other similar old watch? Am I to be allowed nothing for the special value which I attached to that watch because of its history and associations? It does not matter to me whether the defendant knew its history or not; I did, and I have lost it. I would not have sold it for £100. Can I claim, therefore,

(*k*) *Martin v. Porter* (1839), 5 M. & W. 352; *Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. N. E. Ry. Co.* (1877), 4 Ch. D. 845; and see *Phillips v. Homfray*, [1892] 1 Ch. 465.

that the market value of that particular watch is £100? The Judge would probably call that "a fancy value," and allow the history of the watch to affect the damages only so far as experts called before him could swear that it would have enhanced the selling price of the watch at an auction. On the other hand, in some cases the plaintiff may be able to replace more cheaply than any one else the goods which have been destroyed through the negligence or misconduct of the defendant; it may be his trade to manufacture such goods. Nevertheless, our law declares that the measure of damages in such a case is not the sum which it would cost the plaintiff to manufacture other similar goods in the place of those destroyed, but the price for which the plaintiff could have sold the goods in the market on the day on which they were destroyed (*l*).

Yet, of course, there are cases in which special circumstances are allowed to increase the value of the article removed or injured. That article may have a special value as being one of a set, and the value of the set as a whole may be reduced by much more than the market price of the one article, *e.g.*, one volume out of a complete edition; one dish out of a Dresden dinner service; one horse out of a pair used to running in harness together. In each of these cases the defendant must pay for the diminished value of the complete set or pair. So, too, a trespasser in A's coal mine will be liable not only for the coal which he has removed, but also for the coal which he has rendered less valuable by his unskilful working (*m*). The plaintiff is entitled to be replaced so far as money can do it at the expense of the defendant in precisely the same position as he would have occupied if no tort or breach of contract had occurred (*n*): provided that the defendant is not asked to compensate him for a loss which is not a natural result of the wrongful act.

On the other hand, it may be the case that the plaintiff attached no special value to the thing—as in *Armory v. Delamirie* (*o*), he may not know its value—while the possession of it may be of the greatest importance to the defendant. A letter in the plaintiff's possession may be of enormous value to the defendant as a link in his chain of evidence in some lawsuit. Or the plaintiff may own a rare coin, or a valuable china vase, which the defendant desires for his collection to complete his set. Or he may have wrongfully taken possession of a little triangle of the plaintiff's land running up into his, the ownership of which would save him some 400 yards of fencing. Or, again, it may be a matter of the greatest pecuniary importance to the defendant to reach London in five hours: he therefore takes the plaintiff's horse and rides it to death. On what principle should the damages be assessed in such cases as these—at the figure for which the plaintiff might have been willing to sell or

(*l*) *Holden v. Bostock* (1902), 18 T. L. R. 317; *Bostock v. Nicholson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 725.

(*m*) *Williams v. Raggett* (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 849.

(*n*) *Robinson v. Harman*, 1 Ex. 855.

(*o*) (1722), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 396.

at the figure which the defendant in his urgency might have been willing to pay?

In most cases the law would reply, "At neither of those figures, but at the fair market value of the thing taken." There are cases, however, in which our law does take into consideration the fact that for some special reason the property in question is of more value to the defendant than it is to the plaintiff, and compels him to pay that higher value. Thus, where the defendants openly and with the knowledge of the plaintiffs trespassed on the plaintiffs' land by tipping on to it spoil from their colliery, it was held in the Court of Appeal that the value of the land for the purposes for which it was actually used by the defendants ought to be taken into consideration in assessing the damages as to so much of the land as was, in fact, covered with spoil, and that as to the rest of the land the measure of damages was the diminution in its value to the plaintiffs by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendants (*p*).

II. DIFFERENT KINDS OF DAMAGES.

Damages are either liquidated or unliquidated. Whenever the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled can be ascertained by calculation or fixed by any scale of charges or any other positive data, it is said to be **LIQUIDATED** or "made clear." But when the amount to be recovered depends on all the circumstances of the case and on the conduct of the parties, and is fixed by opinion or by an estimate, the damages are said to be **UNLIQUIDATED**.

Thus, in an action on a bill of exchange or a promissory note the amount of the verdict, if it be for the plaintiff at all, can be reckoned beforehand. But in an action of libel it is open to the jury to award the plaintiff any sum, such as a farthing, or forty shillings, or a hundred pounds; and no one can say beforehand what the precise figure will be (*q*).

As a general rule, the damages in an action of tort are unliquidated; in an action of contract they may be either liquidated or unliquidated. Thus in an action for breach of a covenant to repair the damages are necessarily unliquidated, as it is a matter of opinion what is the amount necessary to replace the premises in good repair. Again, although an action for wrongful dismissal is an action for breach of contract, nevertheless the amount of damages depends upon all the circumstances of the case, and especially upon the probability of the plaintiff obtaining another situation equally

(*p*) *Whitwham v. Westminster, &c., Co.*, [1896] 1 Ch. 894; 2 Ch. 538. And see the wayleave cases, *Jegon v. Vivian* (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 742, and *Phillips v. Homfray*, *ibid.* 770.

(*q*) This distinction has been already noticed, *ante*, p. 649.

remunerative; "the jury in assessing the damages would be justified in looking to all that had happened, or was likely to happen, to increase or mitigate the loss of the plaintiff down to the day of trial" (r).

In many cases, as we have seen (s), the plaintiff in an action of contract is entitled to interest under an agreement express or implied, and such interest would be liquidated damages; but in addition to the cases in which interest is payable at common law, interest may also be claimed as damages under section 28 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (t), which enacts that "upon all debts or sums certain, payable at a certain time or otherwise, the jury, on the trial of any issue or on any inquisition of damages, may, if they shall think fit, allow interest to the creditor, at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, from the time when such debts or sums certain were payable, if such debts or sums be payable by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time, or, if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment, provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law" (u). Similarly by section 29 the jury is entitled to give damages in the nature of interest, over and above the money recoverable in all actions on policies of insurance made after the passing of the Act. Interest when awarded under this statute is regarded as unliquidated damages.

In actions where the damages are unliquidated, the Court of Appeal will not grant a new trial on the ground that the amount awarded is insufficient or excessive, unless it is satisfied that the jury either have made an improper compromise, disregarding the real merits of the case, or have proceeded upon a wrong principle in making their assessment, as if they have omitted to take into their consideration some of the elements of damage or have taken into consideration matters which they should have disregarded (x). In all other cases, the Court will not disturb the verdict, unless it be such as no jury could reasonably have found (y).

(r) *Per cur.* in *Hochster v. De la Tour* (1853), 2 E. & B. at p. 691; *Synge v. Synge*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 466.

(s) *Ante*, pp. 483, 484.

(t) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.

(u) See *Macbeth v. Maritime Insurance Co.* (1908), 24 T. L. R. 559.

(x) *Phillips v. S. W. Ry. Co.* (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 78; *Johnston v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, [1904] 2 K. B. 250.

(y) *Praed v. Graham* (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 53; *Banbury v. Bank of Montreal*, [1918] A. C. 626.

Unliquidated damages may be divided into four classes :—

- (i) Contemptuous.
- (ii) Nominal.
- (iii) Substantial.
- (iv) Vindictive (or exemplary or retributory).

A plaintiff will be wise to consider which kind of damages he is likely to recover before he incurs the anxiety and expense of litigation and risks the chance of defeat with the probable penalty of costs.

(i) CONTEMPTUOUS DAMAGES are awarded when the jury consider that the action should never have been brought. The defendant may have just overstepped the line, but the plaintiff is also somewhat to blame in the matter, or has rushed into litigation unnecessarily; so he only recovers a farthing or a shilling (s).

(ii) NOMINAL DAMAGES are awarded where the action was a proper one to bring, but the plaintiff has not suffered any special damage, and does not desire to put money into his pocket; he has established his right or cleared his character, and is content to accept forty shillings and his costs.

(iii) SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES are awarded where the jury seriously endeavour, as men of business, to arrive at a figure which will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the injury which he has in fact sustained.

(iv) VINDICTIVE DAMAGES, sometimes called Exemplary damages, are awarded where the jury, after viewing all the circumstances of the case, and particularly the motive and intention of the defendant, desire to mark their sense of his conduct; they therefore punish him by awarding the plaintiff damages in excess of the amount which would be adequate compensation for the loss or injury which he has actually sustained. The jury are only allowed to give such damages in actions for breach of promise of marriage, assault, trespass, seduction, libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or any similar case (a).

If, however, we regard not so much the amount, but the nature of the claim made, we must divide damages into :—

- (i) General.
- (ii) Special.

(z) See the judgment of Phillimore, J., in *Red Man's Syndicate v. Associated Newspapers* (1910), 26 T. L. R. 394; and *Nicolas v. Atkinson* (1909), 25 T. L. R. 568.

(a) *Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Co.*, 42 Ch. D. 66.

(i) GENERAL DAMAGES are such as the law will presume to be the natural or probable consequences of the defendant's act. They need not be expressly pleaded, or proved by evidence at the trial, for they arise by inference of law, even though no actual pecuniary loss has been, or can be, shown. Whenever the defendant breaks his contract or violates any absolute legal right of the plaintiff, general damage to at least a nominal amount is recoverable (b). In such cases the law presumes that some damage will flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of the plaintiff's right. Thus the owner of a chattel who is temporarily deprived of the use of it through the wrongful act of another may recover substantial damages for the deprivation of it, though he cannot prove that he is out of pocket to any appreciable amount.

(ii) SPECIAL DAMAGES, on the other hand, are such as the law will not infer from the nature of the act complained of; they must therefore be expressly claimed on the pleadings (c), and strictly proved at the trial. Such damages depend upon the special circumstances of the case, upon the position of the plaintiff or the defendant, upon the conduct of third persons, &c. Very probably they would not have been incurred had the same act been done on another occasion, or to a different plaintiff. In some actions of tort, where no actual and positive right of the plaintiff has been infringed, special damage is essential to the cause of action; and if it be not proved, judgment must be entered for the defendant. The term "special damage" has also been used in actions brought for a public nuisance, such as the obstruction of a river or a highway, to denote that actual and particular loss which the plaintiff has suffered beyond what is sustained by the general public; such particular loss is essential to the cause of action (d). Thus an obstruction on a public highway is a nuisance to every

(b) *Ashby v. White* (1704), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), 266; *Marzetti v. Williams* (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 415; *Sanders v. Stuart* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 326.

(c) If not so pleaded, the defendant will be entitled to particulars. No particulars will be ordered of general damages.

(d) See the admirable judgment of Bowen, L.J., in *Ratcliffe v. Evans*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524.

one who is in the habit of using that highway, and the remedy for such a public nuisance is an indictment; but if, when I am driving along the highway in the dark, my horse is thrown down by the obstruction and breaks his knees, I sustain a special damage which entitles me to bring an action at law.

Where, however, special damage is not essential to the cause of action, the plaintiff is entitled to recover general damages without proof of actual pecuniary loss. Still, in this case, if any special damage has in fact been suffered, the plaintiff can claim to be compensated for this in addition to his general damages, provided he has set out such claim in his pleading, so that the defendant may not be surprised at the trial. Should the plaintiff in such a case fail to prove his special damage, he may still resort to and recover general damages. A plaintiff who succeeds in recovering general damages may yet be ordered to pay the costs occasioned by a claim for special damage which he has failed to substantiate (e).

Special Damage, when essential to the Cause of Action.—The law is very strict as to special damage where it is necessary to support the action. In such a case the plaintiff must prove the loss of money, or of some other material temporal advantage. The loss of a marriage, of employment, of income, of custom, of profits, and even of gratuitous entertainment and hospitality, will be special damage if the plaintiff can show that it was caused by the defendant, but not pain of mind, annoyance or vexation, or even physical illness so occasioned. Special damage may be either the loss of some right or position already acquired, or the loss of some future benefit or advantage, the acquisition of which is prevented. Thus, if the defendant causes a servant to lose his situation, or prevents his getting one—if he induces a stranger to abstain from going to the plaintiff's shop, or prevents an old customer from continuing to deal there—in each case there will be sufficient special damage. But a mere apprehension of future loss is not special damage (f).

The plaintiff must also show clearly that the loss is the direct result of the defendant's conduct, and not the consequence of some independent act, some spontaneous resolve, of a third person. As a rule, he can only do this by calling as his witnesses at the trial the persons who ceased to employ him, or who were prevented by the defendant from dealing with him; and they must state in the

(e) *Forster v. Farquhar*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 564.

(f) *Michael v. Spiers & Pond* (1909), 101 L. T. 352.

box their reason for not employing, or not dealing with, the plaintiff. Else it will not be clear that the defendant caused them to act as they did (g).

It is not always necessary, however, for the plaintiff to call those who have ceased to deal with him. He may be able to show, by his account-books or otherwise, a general diminution of business, as distinct from the loss of particular known customers or promised orders. He has still to connect that diminution of business with the defendant; but this is sometimes apparent from the nature of the case. Thus, where the defendant has published a statement about the plaintiff's business, which is intended, or which is reasonably calculated, to produce, and in the ordinary course of things does produce, a general loss of business, evidence of such loss of business is admissible, and sufficient to support the action, even though the words are not actionable *per se*, and although no specific evidence was given at the trial of the loss of any particular customer or order in consequence of such publication (h).

Special Damage, when not essential to the Cause of Action.—Where special damage is not essential to the action, it may still of course be proved at the trial to aggravate the damages, if it has been properly pleaded. The plaintiff must still prove that the special damage alleged is the direct result of the defendant's act. But the law is in this case not quite so strict as to what constitutes special damage as in cases where it is of the gist of the action. Thus the jury may take into their consideration such consequences as mental distress, illness, expulsion from a religious society, &c., which do not constitute special damage, where it is necessary to the cause of action (i).

Again, the plaintiff may in this case allege and prove a general diminution of profits or decline of trade without naming particular customers or proving why they have ceased to deal with him. If, however, he wishes to rely on the loss of particular customers, he must plead such loss specially, either in addition to, or without, the allegation of a general loss of business; and in that case he must call the customers named as witnesses at the trial. Still, if the customers are not called at the trial, or if for any other reason the proof of the special damage fails, the plaintiff may still fall back on the general damage, and prove a general loss of income induced by the defendant's act (k). And for this purpose he may give evidence as to the extent and nature of his business before and after the cause of action arose.

Lastly, where it is clear that the action lies without proof of any special damage, any loss or injury which the plaintiff had sustained

(g) In one exceptional case (*Skinner v. Shew*, [1894] 2 Ch. 581), a letter from a customer was received in evidence; but this must not be regarded as a precedent for other cases.

(h) *Ratcliffe v. Evans*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524.

(i) *Per* Lord Wensleydale in *Lynch v. Knight* (1861), 9 H. L. Cas. at p. 598.

(k) *Evans v. Harries* (1856), 1 H. & N. 251; *Riding v. Smith* (1876), 1 Ex. D.

in consequence of the defendant's act, even after action brought, may be proved to support the legal presumption that damage must necessarily flow from the violation of the plaintiff's right, although, when special damage is necessary to give the plaintiff a right of action, it must of course be proved to have arisen before the issue of the writ.

Another distinction is often drawn between prospective and continuous damage, but the true distinction is between a complete cause of action which may yet produce fresh damage in the future and a continuous cause of action. This distinction is dealt with in the next chapter (l). By Order XXXVI., r. 58, "where damages are to be assessed in respect of any continuing cause of action, they shall be assessed down to the time of assessment."

III. REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE.

The general rule, no doubt, is that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a tort or breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same position as if no such tort or breach of contract had happened (m). But this, as we have already seen, requires some limitation. Certain elements of damage which a plaintiff has in fact sustained will be excluded from the consideration of the jury on the ground that they are "remote." The damage claimed must be the direct result of the defendant's act (n). In some cases the result is clearly the natural and necessary consequence of his act; in other cases it is so obvious and probable a consequence that it may fairly be said the defendant ought to have contemplated it, whether in fact he did so or not. But where the damage sustained by the plaintiff is neither the necessary nor the probable result of the defendant's conduct, it will be excluded as too remote. Evidence cannot be given at the trial of any special damage which would not flow from the defendant's act in the ordinary course of things, unless there are special circumstances in the case which were known to the defendant,

(l) See *post*, pp. 690, 691.

(m) In cases of breaches of trust, the Court will have regard rather to the profit which the trustee has made than to the mere loss which the beneficiary has sustained; see the remarks of Lord Cairns, L.C., in *Parker v. McKenna* (1874), L. R. 10 Ch. 96, at p. 118.

(n) As to cases in which death results from defendant's act, contrast *Osborn v. Gillett* (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. 88, with *Jackson v. Watson*, [1909] 2 K. B. 193. See also *Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy*, [1905] 1 K. B. 608.

and which rendered that result probable. It is not enough that his act has in fact produced such damage, unless it can reasonably be presumed that the defendant, when he made the contract, or committed the tort, either knew, or ought to have known, that such damage would ensue (o). And it will be deemed that he ought to have known it whenever a reasonable man placed as he was, and knowing what he knew and no more, would have recognised that it was a necessary or probable result of such an act.

“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, *i.e.*, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it” (p). Where a contract is made with reference to special circumstances, and such special circumstances are known to both the contracting parties, the damages which might reasonably be contemplated as likely to result from a breach of such contract would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under the special circumstances so known (q). “Where at the time of entering into the contract both parties know and contemplate that if a breach of the contract is committed some injury will accrue, in addition to the natural and ordinary consequences of the breach, the person committing the breach will be liable to give compensation in damages upon the occurrence of that injury; and where the contractee states that he wants the article agreed to be made in order to carry out another contract, the contractor, if he commits a breach in the delivery of the article, is liable for the loss sustained by the contractee, if he becomes unable to carry out that other contract” (r).

In the first place, the law excludes all loss which the parties could not reasonably be expected to foresee, although in the particular case it has in fact occurred. The plaintiff cannot recover for any loss which at the time of the making of the contract was not within the contemplation of the

(o) See *Sanders v. Stuart* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 327.

(p) *Per cur.* in *Hadley v. Baxendale* (1854), 9 Exch. at p. 354; *Bentley v. Metcalfe*, [1906] 2 K. B. 548.

(q) Adopted by Lord Chelmsford in *Bain v. Fothergill* (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. at p. 203. See *Smith v. Green* (1875), 1 C. P. D. 92; and *Skinner v. City of London Insurance Co.* (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 882.

(r) *Per* Bramwell, L.J., in *Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie* (1878), 4 Q. B. D. at p. 674.

parties, or which depended upon a contingency, such, for instance, as the chance that the members of a club might think fit to alter their rules (*s*), or that he might have been awarded a prize if his samples had arrived in time (*t*), or that his ship might have earned certain profits if it had not been injured (*u*) or delayed (*x*). But in cases of tort “given the breach of duty which constitutes the negligence, and given the damage as a direct result of that negligence, the anticipations of the person whose negligent act has produced the damage appear to me to be irrelevant” (*y*).

Where a carrier neglected to deliver to a contractor within a reasonable time a broken mill-shaft, which was to be forwarded as a pattern for a new one, and the plaintiffs could not in the meantime work their mill, it was held by the Court of Exchequer that the damage to the plaintiffs’ trade and the consequent loss of profit was too remote to be recovered in an action against the carrier, because such damage could not have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both parties at the time they entered into the contract (*z*). Again, in assessing the damages in an action of false imprisonment the jury may take into their consideration all the indignities of the ordinary prison routine which the plaintiff has suffered, as, for instance, the fact that he was handcuffed or was compelled to have his hair cut short; but the defendant is not liable for any improper violence or excess on the part of the police (*a*).

So the failure to pay a debt when it falls due may cause the destruction of the creditor’s trade, and the debtor may know that his creditor is in danger of being ruined by such non-payment; yet the true measure of damages is merely a reasonable compensation for the non-payment of the money, which, in the absence of any express stipulation in the contract, will be only the payment of interest at the usual rate (*b*). “If an agent who is bound to render an account and to pay over moneys to his principal at a particular time should omit so to do, whereby the principal should be unable to pay his debts or to fulfil his other contracts, and should stop payment and fail in business, or be injured in his general credit thereby,

(*s*) *Chamberlain v. Boyd* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 407.

(*t*) *Simpson v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 274.

(*u*) *The Columbus* (1849), 3 W. Rob. 158.

(*x*) *The Parana* (1877), 2 P. D. 118; *The Notting Hill* (1884), 9 P. D. 105.

But there is no rigid rule of law that damages for loss of market can never be recovered: *Dunn v. Bucknall*, [1902] 2 K. B. 614.

(*y*) *Per Bankes, L.J.*, in *Polemis and Furness, Withy, In re* [1921] 3 K. B. at p. 572.

(*z*) *Hadley v. Baxendale* (1854), 9 Exch. 341.

(*a*) *Mason v. Barker* (1843), 1 Car. & K. 100.

(*b*) See the remarks of Bovill, C.J., in *British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. at p. 506; and *Prehn v. Royal Bank of Liverpool* (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 92.

the agent would not be liable for such injury; for it is but a remote or accidental consequence of the negligence" (c).

On the other hand, a plaintiff can recover for any loss, which he has in fact sustained, if it was, though not a certain, yet so probable a consequence of the defendant's act that a reasonable man ought to have foreseen it.

Thus, if the defendant turns the plaintiff's horses out of their warm stable without any clothing, they will probably catch cold, and the defendant therefore will be liable for any depreciation in their value caused by such cold (d). So if a tenant, contrary to his covenant, assigns the premises without the consent of the landlord to a person who uses them for a turpentine distillery, and so sets them on fire, the tenant is liable for the damage caused by the fire (e).

The rules as to the remoteness of damage may well be illustrated by cases, in which a passenger complains of having been unduly delayed on his journey, of having failed to make an advertised connection at a certain station, or of having been taken to a wrong station. In such cases the plaintiff can recover damages for the inconvenience caused him and the cost of being conveyed to his proper destination by reasonable means, but not the cost of a special train, nor damages for illness resulting from the inconvenience suffered (f).

Again, the defendant is never liable for consequential loss of the possibility of which he was never informed, and which without such information he had no reason to anticipate. Thus, where a passenger was pulled out of a railway carriage by the company's servants under the mistaken belief that he was riding without a ticket, and left behind him on the seat a pair of race-glasses, it was held that he could not recover for the loss of the race-glasses, because such loss was not a natural or necessary consequence of the assault (g).

But if the loss sustained by the plaintiff be the natural and necessary consequence of the defendant's act, it does not matter that he never either intended or contemplated it.

(c) Story on Agency (9th ed.), 262.

(d) *McMahon v. Field* (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 591; cf. *Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1874), L. R. 10 Q. B. 111.

(e) *Lepla v. Rogers*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 31.

(f) *Le Blanche v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 286; *Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 111; see also *Anglo-Algerian S.S. Co. v. Houlder*, [1908] 1 K. B. 659, which was, however, a case rather of absence of duty than of remoteness of damage.

(g) *Glover v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1867), L. R. 3 Q. B. 25; and see also *Cobb v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, [1894] A. C. 419, and *Sanders v. Stuart* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 327.

This is forcibly illustrated by the case of *The City of Lincoln* (h). A collision took place between a steamer and a barque, the steamer being alone to blame; and the steering compass, charts, log, and log glass of the barque were lost or destroyed. Owing to the loss of these requisites for navigation, and without any negligence on the part of the captain or crew, the barque, while on her way to a port of safety, grounded, and had to be abandoned. The Court of Appeal held that the grounding of the barque was a natural and reasonable consequence of the collision, and that the owners of the steamer were liable for the damage caused thereby.

Again, where a workman lost his eyesight in consequence of an accident, and this so preyed upon his mind that he became insane and committed suicide, it was held that his death was the direct result of the accident (i).

So, too, where A recommended B to employ a stockbroker who, as he ought to have known, was not a fit person to be trusted, A was held liable for all the loss sustained by B through the stockbroker misappropriating money entrusted to him for investment (k).

The damage claimed must be the direct result of the defendant's act. He is not liable for any damage caused by facts or circumstances unconnected with himself, such as the spontaneous action of a third person (l). The defendant's act must, at all events, be the predominating cause of the alleged damage. But if the defendant by his conduct directly causes or compels a third person to do an act which produces damage to the plaintiff, such danger is not too remote, provided the defendant either did contemplate or ought to have contemplated such a result. The defendant is not responsible for any eccentric or foolish, nor *prima facie* for any negligent or illegal, conduct on the part of a third person. But he is responsible for the ordinary and reasonable consequences of his own act; and it may be an ordinary and reasonable consequence of the defendant's act that a third person may do something which injures the plaintiff. Thus, where an innocent third person shifted an obstruction which the defendant had illegally placed in a public highway, and thereby injured the plaintiff, the defendant was held liable for the consequences

(h) (1889), 15 P. D. 15; and see *Sneesby v. Lancs. & Yorks. Ry. Co.* (1875), 1 Q. B. D. 42; *Sapwell v. Bass*, [1910] 2 K. B. 486.

(i) *Malone v. Cayzer*, [1908] S. C. 479.

(k) *De la Bere v. Pearson*, [1908] 1 K. B. 280.

(l) See, for instance, *Speake v. Hughes*, [1904] 1 K. B. 138.

of that third person's act (*m*). And even where the act of the third person is in itself a crime or a tort, still the defendant may, in some cases, be liable for that illegal act, if it was his obvious intention, or the natural result of his conduct, to induce that third person so to act (*n*); and it is immaterial whether the plaintiff has or has not also a right of action against such third person.

Again, a defendant is not, as a rule, liable for any repetition by another of his tortious act. Thus in slander, the special damage must be the direct result of the defendant's words, not of some one else's. If A chooses of his own accord to repeat the defendant's words, this is A's own act, for the consequences of which he alone is liable. But here again comes in a similar exception. If the republication by A be the natural or necessary consequence of the defendant's publication to A, or if the defendant intended or desired A to repeat his words, the defendant is liable for all the consequences of A's republication, for he directly caused it (*o*).

Again, if A's misconduct or breach of contract necessarily involves B in litigation with C, B can in a subsequent action recover from A the damages and often also the costs which he has been compelled to pay (*p*). And if B settles the action by a proper and judicious compromise, he can recover from A the amount which he has paid to C under the compromise, although it is possible that he might have won the action, if he had fought it to the end.

Thus, where the defendant employed the plaintiff to manufacture and mark bricks in such a way that they infringed A's trade mark, the defendant being aware and the plaintiff unaware of the infringement, and A brought an action against the plaintiff for an injunction and damages for such infringement, it was held to be a natural consequence of the defendant's conduct that the plaintiff should be involved in this action; and that, therefore, the plaintiff could recover the amount at which he had compromised the suit, although the fact that he did not know he was infringing any trade mark might have afforded him a good defence to the claim for damages,

(*m*) *Clark v. Chambers* (1878), 3 Q. B. 327; and see *Halestrap v. Gregory*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 561; *Weld-Blundell v. Stephens*, [1920] A. C. 956; *Polemis, In re*, [1921] 3 K. B. 560; *Harnett v. Bond*, [1924] 2 K. B. 517.

(*n*) See the remarks of Lord Alverstone, C.J., in *De la Bere v. Pearson*, [1907] 1 K. B. 483 (affirmed, [1908] 1 K. B. 280).

(*o*) See Odgers on Libel and Slander (5th ed.), pp. 394 *et seq.*; *Weld-Blundell v. Stephens* (*supra*).

(*p*) *Mowbray v. Merryweather*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 640.

though not to the claim for an injunction (*q*). Again, where A supplied sacks to B for the purpose of unloading a cargo from a ship, and, owing to its unfit condition, one sack broke and injured a man who obtained damages from B, it was held that B could recover from A the damages and costs thus incurred (*r*).

It has always been clear law that, if the defendant has by his wrongful act exposed the plaintiff to legal proceedings at the suit of a third person, he must recoup the plaintiff for any damages which he may thus have been compelled to pay in the action. But it was formerly doubted whether the plaintiff could recover the costs which he had been compelled to pay to his successful opponent and further whether he could also recover the costs to which he himself had been put in defending the action. It was urged with some reason that, if he had no answer to the action, he should not have incurred costs by defending it. "No person has a right to inflame his own account against another by incurring additional expense in the unrighteous resistance to an action which he cannot defend" (*s*). Yet in many cases such costs are recoverable as damages. Nay more, he may also, in a proper case, recover the costs which he has had to pay his own solicitor as between solicitor and client (*t*). Thus costs reasonably incurred in defending an action resulting from the default of the defendant can be recovered (*u*), but not the costs of improvidently defending an action brought against the plaintiff by his sub-purchaser for breach of warranty (*x*). But, under a covenant to indemnify against all actions and claims in respect of the covenants of a lease, costs properly incurred in reasonably defending an action brought for a breach of one of the covenants are recoverable as damages (*y*). Where a person makes a contract as agent, he thereby impliedly warrants that he has authority in that capacity to contract, and the costs of an action instituted by plaintiff in reliance upon the agent's representation of authority can be recovered (*z*).

In a similar case, however, the plaintiff was only allowed to recover the costs of the previous action up to the time when the answers to the interrogatories delivered to his opponent had been received and considered by his legal advisers. Such was the nature of these sworn answers that the Court was of the opinion that after receiving them he should have abandoned his defence, and, therefore, that the subsequent costs were not reasonably incurred (*a*).

(*q*) *Dixon v. Fawcus* (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 137.

(*r*) *Vogan v. Oulton* (1899), 81 L. T. 435.

(*s*) *Per* Lord Denman, C.J., in *Short v. Kalloway* (1839), 11 A. & E. at p. 31.

(*t*) *Agius v. Great Western Colliery Co.*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 413; *Prince of Wales Dry Dock Co. v. Fownes* (1904), 90 L. T. 527.

(*u*) *Hammond v. Bussey* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 79, followed in *Agius v. Great Western Colliery Co.*, *supra*. (x) *Wrightup v. Chamberlain* (1839), 7 Scott, 598.

(*y*) *Murrell v. Fysh* (1883), 1 C. & E. 80; but see *Maxwell v. British Thomson Houston Co.*, [1904] 2 K. B. 342.

(*z*) *Collon v. Wright* (1857), 8 E. & B. 647, Ex. Ch.; *Meek v. Wendt* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 126.

(*a*) *Godwin v. Francis* (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 295, 306; and see *Besterman v. British Motor Cab Co.*, [1914] 3 K. B. 181.

IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS OF TORT.

The expression "measure of damages" is used to denote the scale or rule by reference to which in any given case damages are to be assessed, the criterion by which a jury should determine the amount of their verdict. In some actions of tort, as we have seen, the jury is permitted to award vindictive or exemplary damages. In others, special damage is of the essence of the action, and the plaintiff can strictly recover damages only in respect of the special damage pleaded and proved. But between these two extremes lies a large category of actions of tort, in which the guiding rule as to the measure of damages is that the defendant is only liable for such damages as are the natural result of the wrongful act (*b*). Every man is presumed to intend and to know the natural and ordinary consequences of his acts; and this presumption is not rebuttable merely by proof that he did not at the time attend to or think of such consequences, or hoped or expected that they would not follow. Hence the defendant will be liable in every case for the natural and necessary consequences of his act, whether he in fact contemplated them or not. He will be liable also for every consequence which, at the time of committing the tort, he did in fact contemplate as a probable, though it was not a necessary, result of his act. But if a particular result is not a natural or necessary consequence of the defendant's act, and can only be recognised as a probable consequence in the light of certain special circumstances peculiar to the particular case, then the defendant will not be responsible for that result unless he was aware of those special circumstances at the time when he committed the tort. Moreover, "the defendant is not liable for any further damage which could have been avoided or minimised by the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the plaintiff" (*c*).

In most cases of tort, however, the jury have little or nothing to guide them as to the amount of the damages.

(*b*) See Bowen, L.J., in *The Argentino* (1888), 13 P. D. 191, at p. 200.

(*c*) *Per* Lord Shaw in *Grant v. S.S. "Egyptian,"* [1910] A. C. at p. 403.

Thus the pain and suffering caused by personal injuries are not capable of an exact computation in money, nor in cases of defamation can any accurate estimate be formed of the probable loss to the plaintiff. The jury must take into account the social or business position of the parties and the circumstances of the case, including any matters which may tend to aggravate or mitigate the damages, and upon these materials estimate as reasonable men of the world what is a fair recompense to the plaintiff for the wrong and indignity done to him.

It will be convenient to deal separately with those actions of tort which occur most frequently in practice.

Conversion.—In an action of conversion the measure of damages ordinarily is the fair market value of the goods at the date of their conversion (*d*). The price which the goods fetched on a subsequent sale of them by the defendant is no criterion as to this (*e*).

Detention of Goods.—Where the defendants detained from the plaintiff certain cargoes that had been consigned to him, Kay, J., allowed the plaintiff, as damages for such detention, 5 per cent. interest upon the value of the cargoes down to the date of the judgment; and the Court of Appeal (Bowen, L.J., dissenting) approved this method of assessing the damages (*f*). Where corn was improperly detained by the Customs, the jury were allowed to take into account in assessing the damages the fact that in the meantime the price of corn had fallen (*g*). The same rules apply to the detention of a ship, whether a merchant vessel (*h*) or a man-of-war (*i*).

Fraud.—In actions of fraud, the jury are apt to treat the plaintiff liberally, although the law draws no distinction between this and other ordinary actions of tort (*k*). The plaintiff may clearly recover damages for any injury which is the direct and natural consequence of his acting on the faith of the defendant's representations. Thus where a cattle dealer sold the plaintiff a cow, which had foot-and-mouth disease, and fraudulently represented it was free from infectious disease, and the plaintiff placed it with five others, which caught the disease and died, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, as damages, the value of all six cows (*l*). Where

(*d*) *France v. Gaudet* (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 199; *The Racine*, [1906] P. 273.

(*e*) *Thompson v. Pettitt* (1847), 10 Q. B. 101.

(*f*) *Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Co.* (1889), 42 Ch. D. 66; 43 Ch. D. 316; [1892] A. C. 166.

(*g*) *Barrow v. Arnaud* (1846), 8 Q. B. 595.

(*h*) *The Mediana*, [1900] A. C. 113; but see *The Bodlewell*, [1907] P. 286.

(*i*) *The Astrakhan*, [1910] P. 172.

(*k*) See, for instance, *Twycross v. Grant* (1877), 2 C. P. D. 469; *Waddell v. Blockey* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 678.

(*l*) *Mullett v. Mason* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 559; and see *Smith v. Green* (1875), 1 C. P. D. 92.

the plaintiff is induced by the fraud of the defendant to take up shares, the damages recoverable are the difference between the price paid for them and their real value on allotment (*m*). This value is not necessarily the market value; it may be ascertained by the light of subsequent events, *e.g.*, the estimated dividend on the winding-up of the company (*n*).

Infringement of Patent, Copyright, &c.—Where a patent has been infringed, the measure of damages has been declared by the Court of Appeal to be the pecuniary loss actually sustained by the patentee through the infringement, and no more (*o*). Where the copyright in a book has been infringed, the measure of damages, in addition to the delivery up of the copies in the defendant's possession, is the actual amount of the proceeds of the copies sold (*p*).

Personal Injuries.—In an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by the negligence of the defendant, the jury "must not attempt to give damages to the full amount of a perfect compensation for the pecuniary injury, but must take a reasonable view of the case, and give what they consider, under all the circumstances, a fair compensation" (*q*). Thus, if a professional man who is earning a regular income be by a railway accident permanently disabled from earning his living, the jury ought not to give him such a sum as, if invested, would produce the full amount of income which he would probably have earned, but ought in estimating the damages to take into account the accidents of life, &c. (*r*). The jury may, nevertheless, take into account any reasonable prospect of increasing income which the plaintiff had, and of which he has been deprived by the injury (*s*). They should not take into account any sum the plaintiff has received under a policy of insurance against accidents (*t*) or from the charity of benevolent strangers. The plaintiff will be entitled to recover any sum of money reasonably paid or the amount of any liability reasonably incurred for medical attendance, extra nourishment and nursing; or for providing a substitute to attend to the plaintiff's business, and do his work while he is ill; but not for any speculative damage, such as the loss of a prize or of a situation which the plaintiff thinks he would have been sure of gaining, if he had not been injured or detained (*u*).

If the injuries, in the ordinary course of nature, produce disease

(*m*) *Leeds and Hanley Theatre of Varieties, In re*, [1902] 2 Ch. 809.

(*n*) *Derry v. Peek* (1887), 37 Ch. D. 541; (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337; *McConnel v. Wright*, [1903] 1 Ch. 546.

(*o*) *British Motor Syndicate v. Taylor*, [1901] 1 Ch. 122; and see *British Thomson-Houston v. Charlesworth*, [1923] S. C. 599.

(*p*) *Muddock v. Blackwood*, [1898] 1 Ch. 58.

(*q*) *Per Brett, J.*, in *Rowley v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1873), L. R. 8 Ex. at p. 231; and see *Phillips v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 406; 5 Q. B. D. 78.

(*r*) *Johnston v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, [1904] 2 K. B. 250.

(*s*) *Fair v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1869), 10 W. R. 66.

(*t*) *Bradburn v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1874), L. R. 10 Ex. 1; and see 8 Edw. 7, c. 7 (Fatal Accidents Act, 1908).

(*u*) *Hoey v. Felton* (1861), 11 C. B. (N.S.) 142.

or disablement (*e.g.*, if a limb has to be amputated), the defendant must compensate the plaintiff for such consequences. It was decided in 1888 by the Privy Council that damages resulting from a nervous shock, caused by fear of a threatened collision which did not occur, were too remote to be recoverable (*x*). This decision has been much questioned. It would appear now to be settled that a person who suffers physical injury through nervous shock caused by the defendant's negligence has a cause of action, even where there is no physical impact (*y*). Where the defendant's servants so negligently drove a two-horse van along the street that it dashed into a public-house where the female plaintiff was seated behind the bar, and the shock caused her to give premature birth to a child, it was held that the defendants were liable for all the natural consequences of the shock thus given to her, although there was no actual impact. If, however, the shock had produced no physical evil effects upon the plaintiff, but had caused her a merely transitory mental emotion, such a fright would not be damage sufficient to sustain an action for negligence (*z*). Where the defendant falsely and maliciously told a wife that her husband had been seriously injured and was in great danger, and the shock caused by such statement brought on a dangerous and serious illness, and the husband was put to expense for medical attendance, Wright, J., allowed the jury to award the plaintiff £100 damages over and above the out-of-pocket expenses incurred (*a*). In any action for an assault, however slight, the offensive demeanour of the defendant, any insulting words used by him at the time of the assault, and even the rank and social position of the parties may be taken into account by the jury in assessing the damages.

Recovery of Land.—In an action for recovery of possession of land mesne profits may be claimed from the date of the defendant's entry on the premises till possession is obtained by the plaintiff (*b*).

Trespass to Land.—In an action for trespass to land the jury is not restricted to the exact amount of actual damage done by the defendant treading down the grass, injuring the crops or flowers, &c. This would be putting an unlicensed trespasser upon the same footing as one who entered with leave and licence and accidentally did damage (*c*). If an action be brought by a reversioner for injury to his reversionary freehold interest in land by pulling down a house erected upon it, the measure of damages would be ascertained by considering to what extent the value of his reversionary interest in

(*x*) *Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas* (1888), 13 App. Cas. 222.

(*y*) *Dulieu v. White*, [1901] 2 K. B. 669; *Janvier v. Sweeney*, [1919] 2 K. B. 316; *Brandon v. Osborne*, [1924] 1 K. B. 548; *Hambrook v. Stokes*, [1925] 1 K. B. 141; and see *Reavis v. Clan Line*, [1925] S. C. at p. 732.

(*z*) *Dulieu v. White* (*supra*), at p. 673; cf. *Yates v. South Kirby, &c., Collieries*, [1910] 2 K. B. 538.

(*a*) *Wilkinson v. Downton*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57.

(*b*) *Southport Tramways Co. v. Gandy*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 66.

(*c*) See the remarks of Maule, J., in *Williams v. Currie* (1845), 1 C. B. at p. 847; cf. *Lodge Holes Colliery Co. v. Wednesbury Corporation*, [1908] A. C. 323.

the land was lessened by the wrongful act of the defendant (*d*). Again, where the defendant had cut away some soil from land belonging to the plaintiff, it was held that the measure of damages was not the cost of restoring the land to its former condition, but the value to the plaintiff of the soil actually taken away (*e*). The plaintiff may prove circumstances of aggravation, *e.g.*, that the defendant entered his house under a false charge that the plaintiff had stolen goods therein, and the jury may give damages for the trespass, aggravated as it is by such false charge (*f*). If the defendant deliberately persists in "trespassing on the plaintiff's land after notice that he is trespassing, and uses intemperate and offensive language when civilly requested to withdraw, the jury may give damages for the trespass committed under such circumstances far in excess of any damage sustained by the plaintiff (*g*). So where the defendant wrongfully and negligently injured the plaintiff's stable with the object of compelling him to give up possession of it to the defendant, the jury were allowed to take all the circumstances into their consideration in assessing the amount of damages (*h*). "Where a wrongful act is accompanied by words of contumely and abuse, the jury are warranted in taking that into consideration and giving retributory damages" (*i*).

V. MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS OF CONTRACT.

The measure of damages in actions of contract is in most respects identical with that in actions of tort. Yet there are some differences which deserve attention. A contract is founded upon the consent of the parties; the measure of damages in actions of contract may therefore be affected by their stipulations. In actions of tort, on the other hand, where no privity is needed, a wider discretion is often, as we have seen, allowed to the jury, and many elements are rightly deemed material which could not properly affect the verdict in an action of contract. For instance, in an action of tort the jury may, as a rule, take into their consideration the conduct of the defendant, or the motive which induced him to commit the tort. But in estimating the damages in an action of contract the motive or intention of the defendant is immaterial. Should either party commit a breach of his

(*d*) *Batteshill v. Reed* (1856), 18 C. B. 696.

(*e*) *Jones v. Gooday* (1841), 8 M. & W. 146.

(*f*) *Bracegirdle v. Orford* (1813), 2 M. & S. 77.

(*g*) *Merest v. Harvey* (1814), 5 Taunt. 442; *Williams v. Currie* (1845), 1 C. B. 841.

(*h*) *Emblen v. Myers* (1860), 6 H. & N. 54.

(*i*) *Per Byles, J.*, in *Bell v. Midland Ry. Co.* (1864), 10 C. B. (N.S.) at p. 308.

covenant or promise, it is right that he should be compelled to compensate the other party. But as a rule his motive for breaking his contract will be entirely disregarded, and the damages payable will be limited to the pecuniary loss directly resulting to the plaintiff from the breach of contract. Nor can the plaintiff's own conduct be taken into consideration. If, for instance, the plaintiff, after the writ was issued, broke his part of the contract, evidence of this fact cannot be given to reduce the damages, which the defendant must pay for the breach of contract sued on (*k*), though it might be made the subject of a counterclaim. To this rule there is one exception. In an action for breach of promise of marriage (*l*) the jury is given a wide latitude, and assumes, in some sort, to punish the defendant, as well as to compensate the plaintiff.

This distinction between actions of tort and actions of contract may be well illustrated by reference to the rule, *Omnia præsumuntur contra spoliatores* (Everything is presumed against a wrong-doer). Thus in the well-known case of *Armory v. Delamirie* (*m*), where the defendant's apprentice had wrongfully abstracted a valuable jewel from a ring which the plaintiff had found, and the jewel was not produced in Court, it was held that the measure of damages was the value of the jewel of the finest water that would fit the empty socket. But in actions of contract a different rule prevails. If a contract be made in the alternative, so that it can be performed in one or other of two ways at the election of the defendant, and he does neither, the damages will be assessed against him on the alternative which is least profitable to the plaintiff, and least burdensome to the defendant (*n*). But if the defendant by his own act renders performance of the contract in one way impossible, and then fails to perform it in the other, the damages must be measured according to the second alternative, which is the only one left open (*o*).

For a bare breach of contract nominal damages, at all events, will be recoverable. Where a contract stipulates for

(*k*) See the judgment of Jervis, C.J., in *Bartlett v. Holmes* (1853), 13 C. B. at p. 638.

(*l*) *Berry v. Da Costa* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 331, 333, approved in *Millington v. Loring* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 190, 195; and see *Quirk v. Thomas*, [1916] 1 K. B. 516.

(*m*) (1722), 1 Smith, L. C. (12th ed.), p. 396.

(*n*) *Cockburn v. Alexander* (1848), 6 C. B. 791, 814; *Deverill v. Burnell* (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 475.

(*o*) *Mellquham v. Taylor*, [1895] 1 Ch. 53, 62; *Ashmore v. Cox*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 436.

the payment on a day named of a specific sum, the measure of damages *prima facie* will be the sum thus stipulated to be paid, together with interest when recoverable (p). “No matter what the amount of inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff in the case of non-payment of money, the measure of damages is the interest of the money only” (q). “The normal measure of damages for non-payment of money is interest where interest is allowable by contract or by law” (r). So for breach of a promise to lend money nominal damages only can, as a rule, be recovered; but when special damage results and the plaintiff is deprived of the opportunity of getting money elsewhere substantial damages may be recovered (s).

In other cases the general rule as to the measure of damages in actions of contract is that, in the absence of any express stipulation, fixing the amount of damages to be paid on breach of the contract, the plaintiff is *prima facie* entitled to be compensated for the whole of the damage which he has sustained as the direct consequence of the breach, provided that such damage was or ought to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract.

A wider rule was formerly laid down by Parke, B.: “Where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if the contract had been performed” (t). Hence it was formerly laid down that it was the duty of the jury to assess as accurately as they could the difference between the financial position in which the plaintiff found himself with the contract broken and that in which he would have been if the contract had been duly performed. And no doubt in many cases that difference is still *prima facie* the amount to which he is entitled as damages. But it was soon discovered that this rule included

(p) As to the cases in which interest is recoverable, see *ante*, p. 655.

(q) *Per* Willes, J., in *Fletcher v. Tayleur* (1855), 17 C. B. at p. 29.

(r) *Per* Chitty, J., in *English Bank of the River Plate, In re* [1893] 2 Ch. at p. 446.

(s) *Manchester & Oldham Bank v. Cook*, 49 L. T. 674; see the remarks of Jessel, M.R., in *Wallis v. Smith* (1882), 21 Ch. D. at p. 257; and *South African Territories v. Wallington*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 692; [1898] A. C. 309. But a promise to take up debentures can now be specifically enforced under section 105 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908.

(t) *Robinson v. Harman* (1848), 1 Exch. at p. 855. As to damages for breach of a contract for the sale of land, see *Flureau v. Thornhill* (1776), 2 W. Bl. 1078; *Bain v. Fothergill* (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 158; *Morgan v. Russell*, [1909] 1 K. B. 357.

losses which the defendant could not reasonably be expected to anticipate. Thus, in the leading case of *Hadley v. Baxendale* (u), the plaintiffs were owners of a steam flour mill, the shaft of which was broken; they sent it to the defendants, who were carriers, to take to an engineer, to serve as a model for a new shaft. The defendants' clerk was told at the time that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft must be forwarded immediately. But he was not told that the want of the shaft was the only thing which was keeping the mill idle. The delivery of the shaft was delayed for an unreasonable time, and in consequence the plaintiffs could not work their mill. But it was held that they could not recover any damages for their loss of profit while the mill was kept idle, because such loss of profit was not the natural consequence of a delay in forwarding a broken shaft; and the defendants had not sufficient notice of the special facts of the case to make it clear to them that such a loss was a probable result of such delay. It was not, in short, a consequence which might fairly and reasonably be presumed to have been contemplated by the parties when they made the contract. And ever since this decision it has been the rule in England that on a breach of contract the party breaking his contract must pay the other party such damages only as are the natural and necessary consequence of the breach, together with all such further and other damages as, owing to the special circumstances of the particular case, must be taken to have been in contemplation of the parties at the time when the contract was made (x).

Another principle has sometimes been suggested for assessing damages in actions for breach of contract, namely, that if one of the parties omits or refuses to perform his part of it, the other may perform it for him as nearly as may be, and may claim from him as damage the reasonable expense of so doing (y). In many cases, no doubt, the jury may arrive by this method at a figure approximately correct. But the cost of performance is not always the accurate measure of damage (z).

The mere fact that the defendant has broken his contract entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages at least (a). The

(u) (1854), 9 Exch. 341.

(x) *Hinde v. Liddell* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 265; *Bostock v. Nicholson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 725.

(y) *Prehn v. Royal Bank of Liverpool* (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 92; *Hinde v. Liddell* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 265; *Le Blanche v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 286, 313; cf. *Lodge Holes Collieries v. Wednesbury Corporation*, [1908] A. C. 323.

(z) *Wigsell v. School for Indigent Blind* (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 357, 364.

(a) But a subsequent acceptance of the sum due under a contract to pay money is a waiver of any claim to nominal damages for non-payment at the time agreed: *Tetley v. Wanless* (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 275.

difficulty always arises as to the further amount claimed. Damages which would not arise in the usual course of things from a breach of contract, but which do arise from circumstances peculiar to the special case, are not recoverable, unless the special circumstances were known to the defendant at the time when he entered into the contract. If, however, such special circumstances were previously known, or were at that time communicated, to him, and the damage sought to be recovered flows naturally from the breach of contract under these special circumstances, then that damage is recoverable, whether it was in fact contemplated by the parties to the contract or not. It is not necessary that the defendant should expressly undertake to be answerable for such damage, nor is it necessary that he should have express notice that a breach of the contract would in such special circumstances cause such damage; it is enough if he had implied notice of the special circumstances which rendered it necessary or probable that such damage would flow from the breach. Notice of such special circumstances after the contract was made will not avail, as it cannot be inferred from such notice that the defendant ever consented to become liable for such special damage (b). But if after notice of the special circumstances he deliberately enters into the contract, he may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated as the probable result of any breach of it all damage which arises naturally or probably out of such special circumstances (c).

Now let us apply these general rules to certain special classes of action.

Breach of Warranty.—In an action brought for the breach of warranty of a horse, if the horse has been returned, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover the whole price paid; if the horse is not returned, the difference between his real value and the price; or the plaintiff may sell the horse for what he can get, and recover the residue of the price paid in damages (d). If the horse be not

(b) *British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 499, at p. 509.

(c) See *Simpson v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. at p. 277, and *G. W. Ry. Co. v. Redmayne* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 329.

(d) *Caswell v. Coare* (1809), 1 Taunt. 566; and see the remarks of Bramwell, L.J., in *Waddell v. Blockley* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. at p. 681; *Proops v. Chaplin* (1920), 37 T. L. R. 112.

tendered to the vendor, the plaintiff can recover no damages for the expense of his keep. But if he tendered the horse, he may recover for the keep for such time as would be required to sell him to the best advantage (e). So on the sale of other goods. The plaintiff purchased at an auction for £21 an orchid which was really worth only 7s. 6d., but the defendant warranted it to be one of an extremely rare species; if it had been so it would have been worth £50. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover £50 (f). So where the defendant sold to the plaintiff fish which he warranted sound though it was, in fact, unsound, and the plaintiff was in consequence fined £20 and costs, and incurred other costs in his defence, it was held that the plaintiff could recover both the sums which he had paid for costs, but not the fine (g). The law is similar where there is an implied warranty. Thus, on the sale of a chattel there is an implied warranty that it is fit for the purpose for which it is sold. In *Randall v. Newson* (h), the plaintiff bought from the defendant a carriage-pole, which was defective and broke whilst in use. The horses, terrified by this, ran away and were much injured. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the pole, and also for damage to the horses, if the jury, on a second trial, should be of the opinion that the injury to the horses was the natural consequence of the defect in the pole. So on a sale by description where the plaintiffs purchased from the defendants for resale sulphuric acid described as "commercially free from arsenic," and the defendants delivered sulphuric acid which was not free from arsenic, and which was therefore worthless and spoilt other goods of the plaintiffs, it was held that they could recover the price of the acid and the value of the goods spoilt, but not the damages which they were compelled to pay to third parties to whom they had resold it, nor the damage done to their goodwill in consequence (i).

Breach of Covenant to Repair.—The Court of Appeal has decided that the cost of putting the premises into the state of repair required by the covenant was the measure of damages, and that such measure was not affected by the fact that the lessor had granted another lease from the expiration of defendant's term and was no worse off (k). The damages recoverable, however, in an action brought during the tenancy for a breach of a covenant to repair are measured by the loss which the landlord sustains by reason of the depreciation in the saleable value of the reversion (l). But where the premises were held under an underlease, and the under-lessee had notice at the time of entering into his covenant

(e) *M'Kenzie v. Hancock* (1826), Ry. & M. 436.

(f) *Ashworth v. Wells* (1898), 78 L. T. 136.

(g) *Crage v. Fry* (1903), 67 J. P. 240.

(h) (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 102.

(i) *Bostock v. Nicholson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 725.

(k) *Joyner v. Weeks*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 31; but as to whether this rule is an absolute one, see the judgment of Lord Esher, M.R., at p. 43.

(l) *Henderson v. Thorn*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 164.

to repair of a similar covenant in the superior lease, the fact that the lessor was under a liability to yield up the premises in repair was held to be a circumstance to be considered in assessing the damages (*m*).

Carriers.—"The extent of a carrier's liability is to be governed by the contract he has entered into, and the obligations which the law imposes upon him. He is not to be made liable for damages beyond what may fairly be presumed to have been contemplated by the parties at the time of entering into the contract. It must be something which could have been foreseen and reasonably expected, and to which he has assented expressly or impliedly by entering into the contract" (*n*). Where goods are delivered to a carrier to be carried from one place to another and are lost, their owner is entitled to recover the value of the goods at the place at which they ought to have been delivered to the consignee (*o*).

As regards the liability of a carrier by land for delay in the conveyance of goods or live stock, "the principle is now settled that whenever either the object of the sender is specially brought to the notice of the carrier, or circumstances are known to the carrier from which the object ought in reason to be inferred, so that the object may be taken to have been within the contemplation of both parties, damages may be recovered for the natural consequences of the failure of that object" (*p*).

"If goods are sent by a carrier to be sold at a particular market, if, for instance, beasts are sent by railway to be sold at Smithfield, or fish is sent to be sold at Billingsgate, and, by reason of delay on the part of the carrier, they have not arrived in time for the market, no doubt damages for the loss of market may be recovered. So if goods are sent for the purpose of being sold in a particular season when they are sold at a higher price than they are at other times, and if by reason of breach of contract they do not arrive in time, damages for loss of market may be recovered. Or if it is known to both parties that the goods will sell at a better price if they arrive at one time than if they arrive at a later time, that may be a ground for giving damages for their arriving too late and selling for a lower sum" (*q*). There is, however, a difference in this respect between the liability of a carrier by land and a carrier by sea (*r*). Damages for loss of market caused by accident or delay at sea have been held to be too remote to be recovered (*s*).

(*m*) *Conquest v. Ebbetts*, [1896] A. C. 490; but see *Molyneux v. Richard*, [1906] 1 Ch. 34.

(*n*) *Per Bovill, C.J.*, in *British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. at p. 506; *Cory v. Thames Ironworks, &c., Co.* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 181.

(*o*) *Rice v. Baxendale* (1861), 7 H. & N. 96.

(*p*) *Per Cockburn, C.J.*, in *Simpson v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. at p. 277; *Montevideo Gas, &c., Co. v. Clan Line* (1921), 37 T. L. R. 866.

(*q*) *Per Mellish, L.J.*, in *The Parana* (1877), 2 P. D. at p. 121.

(*r*) In the absence of express agreement, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (14 & 15 Geo. 5, c. 22), applies to sea carriage.

(*s*) *The Parana*, *supra*; *The Notting Hill* (1884), 9 P. D. 105 (approved in

Non-delivery of Stock.—In this and some other actions the precise amount of the damages depends on the date at which the stock ought to have been and was not delivered. So, in an action for breach of a contract to replace stock lent, the measure of damages is the price of the stock on the day when it ought to have been replaced, or its price on the day of the trial, at the plaintiff's option. "The true measure of damages in all these cases is that which will completely indemnify the plaintiff for the breach of the engagement. If the defendant neglect to replace the stock at the day appointed, and the stock afterwards rise in value, the plaintiff can only be indemnified by giving him the price of it at the time of the trial. And it is no answer to say that the defendant may be prejudiced by the plaintiff's delaying to bring his action, for it is his own fault that he does not perform his engagement at the time; or he may replace it at any time afterwards, so as to avail himself of a rising market" (t). So in an action for not redelivering mining shares, lent to the defendant upon a contract to return them on a given day, the true measure of damages will, if they have not been replaced, be the market price of the shares at the time of the trial (u).

Non-delivery of Goods.—If goods sold be not delivered at the time and place agreed on, and the plaintiff has not yet paid the price, the measure of damage is merely the difference between the contract price and the market value on or about the day of breach; for the plaintiff is bound to act reasonably, and he might have bought other goods immediately in the open market. If there was a market in which the plaintiff could have purchased similar goods, and no difference is proved between the contract price and the market price on the day of the breach, only nominal damages can be recovered (x). Where, however, no goods of the kind sold can be procured in the market, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price *plus* the expenses which would be incurred in preparing the goods for, and taking them to, the market, and the amount which the plaintiff would have realised by the sale of them (y). Where the prices on the market are falling and the purchaser repudiates the contract, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price on the day when the vendors accepted the purchaser's repudiation of the contract (z), but not if the refusal is anticipatory only and is not accepted by the other party as a final breach of the contract (a).

Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas (1888), 11 App. Cas. 222; *Hawes v. S. E. Ry. Co.* (1884), 54 L. J. Q. B. 174.

(t) *Per* Grose, J., in *Shepherd v. Johnson* (1801), 2 East, at p. 212.

(u) *Owen v. Routh* (1854), 14 C. B. 327.

(x) *Valpy v. Oakeley* (1851), 16 Q. B. 941. See Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 51.

(y) *Schulze v. G. E. Ry. Co.* (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 30 (damages for loss of season).

(z) *Roth v. Taysen* (1896), 1 Com. Cas. 306; *Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co.*, [1905] 2 K. B. 543.

(a) *Michael v. Hart*, [1902] 1 K. B. 482; *Ashmore v. Cox*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 436.

Where the purchaser has made a contract for the resale of the goods, and the vendor is aware of this at the date of the original contract, the purchaser may recover damages for the loss of his profit on such resale, and also in respect of the penalties or other damages for which he is liable to his purchaser, not necessarily to the full extent of his liability over, though the jury may award him the full amount if they deem it reasonable (b).

Not accepting Goods.—In an action for breach of contract in not accepting goods, the difference between the contract price and the market price on the day the contract was broken is the ordinary measure of damages. If the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, the seller may recover the agreed price notwithstanding that there has been no delivery (c). Where goods are to be delivered at a certain time, and while on their way the buyer gives notice that he will not accept them, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price on the day fixed for the delivery, and not that on the day on which the seller received the notice. The measure of damages for not accepting stock sold is the difference between the contract price and the market price on the day of the breach of contract. The measure of damages in the case of railway or other shares in companies is the difference between the contract price and the market value on the day of breach, or the earliest day afterwards on which they could be sold.

Railway Cases.—If a railway company fails to carry a passenger to the destination stated on his ticket, he can claim to be repaid his hotel bill, and the cost of a cab, but not of a special train (d), but he cannot recover any compensation for the worry and annoyance of the delay, or for illness caused by exposure to the cold (e).

Shipping Cases.—If a ship be ordered to be built, or be left for repairs, and be not delivered by, or repaired within, the time stipulated, the measure of damages is *prima facie* the sum which would have been earned by the ship in the ordinary course of trade since the period when it should have been delivered (f). In an action for delay in delivering cargo, the measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the plaintiff's goods at the port of discharge on the date of due delivery and their market value at that port at the date of actual delivery. As a rule damages cannot, in the absence of special circumstances, be given for loss of market on a contract of carriage by sea (g); but there is no rule

(b) *Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie* (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 670; *Mertons v. Home Freeholds Co.*, [1921] 2 K. B. 526.

(c) Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), ss. 49, 50; and see *Williams v. Agius*, [1914] A. C. 510.

(d) *Le Blanche v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 286.

(e) *Hamlin v. G. N. Ry. Co.* (1856), 1 H. & N. 408; *Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 111.

(f) *The Argentine* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 519; *Welch v. Anderson* (1891), 61 L. J. Q. B. 167.

(g) *The Parana* (1877), 2 P. D. 118; *The Notting Hill* (1884), 9 P. D. 105.

of law that such damages can never be recovered (*h*). Where some of the packages of tea shipped by the assured were damaged by sea-water, it was held that the assured could only recover for the damage done to these packages, and not for any loss occasioned by injury to the "reputation of the remainder" (*i*).

Sale of Land.—When a person contracts to sell real property, there is an implied understanding that if, without fraud on his part, he fails to make out a good title, the only damages recoverable, over and above the deposit money paid with interest, will be the expenses to which the purchaser may be put in investigating the title. No damages are recoverable by the purchaser for the loss of his bargain in such a case, *i.e.*, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the vendor.

Upon this point *Flureau v. Thornhill* (*k*) and *Bain v. Fothergill* (*l*) are leading authorities. "It is recognised on all hands that the purchaser knows, on his part, that there must be some degree of uncertainty as to whether, with all the complications of our law, a good title can be effectively made by his vendor; and taking the property with that knowledge, he is not to be held entitled to recover any loss on the bargain he may have made, if in effect it should turn out that the vendor is incapable of completing his contract in consequence of his defective title. All that he is entitled to is the expense he may have been put to in investigating the matter" (*m*).

"If a person enters into a contract for the sale of a real estate knowing that he has no title to it nor any means of acquiring it, the purchaser cannot recover damages beyond the expenses he has incurred by an action for the breach of the contract; he can only obtain other damages by an action for deceit" (*n*). But where the vendor can give a good title, but refuses or knowingly omits to perform his part of the contract, the rule does not apply (*o*). It is not necessary to prove either wilful default or bad faith in the vendor (*p*).

"Under ordinary circumstances, where the purchaser fails to complete without any default on the part of the vendor, the latter is entitled to recover all the expenses he has incurred in preparing for the sale and also the loss incurred upon a resale, that is, the difference of price, if any" (*q*). Where a lessee assigns in spite of

(*h*) *Dunn v. Bucknall Brothers*, [1902] 2 K. B. 614.

(*i*) *Cator v. Great Western Insurance Co. of New York* (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 552.

(*k*) (1776), 2 W. Bl. 1078. This case "establishes that where there is no fraud and no express contract to sell property with a knowledge on the vendor's part that he has not the title to sell . . . no damages for loss of bargain can be recovered"; *per* Cleasby, B., in *Bain v. Fothergill* (1870), L. R. 6 Ex. 69.

(*l*) (1873), L. R. 7 H. L. 158; *Morgan v. Russell*, [1909] 1 K. B. 357.

(*m*) *Per* Lord Hatherley in *Bain v. Fothergill* (1873), L. R. 7 H. L. at pp. 210, 211.

(*n*) *Per* Lord Chelmsford, *ibid.* at p. 207.

(*o*) *Engell v. Fitch* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 659; and see *Braybrooks v. Whaley*, [1919] 1 K. B. 435.

(*p*) *Daniel, In re*, [1917] 2 Ch. 405.

(*q*) *Per* Brett, J., in *Essex v. Daniell* (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. at p. 553.

his covenant not to do so the measure of damages is such sum as represents the difference in value to the lessor of the liability of the assignor and assignee respectively (r).

Wrongful Dismissal.—The measure of damages in actions for wrongful dismissal depends partly upon the period for which the plaintiff was employed or, if not employed for a fixed term, the length of notice required, partly upon the rate of wages to which he was entitled under his agreement with the defendant, and partly upon the length of time which will probably elapse before the plaintiff can obtain similar employment on equally advantageous terms. It is the duty of a servant who is wrongfully dismissed to use all reasonable diligence in seeking another post. If, indeed, the particular employment could not be again obtained without delay, and if the wages stipulated for in the contract broken were higher than usual, the damages should be such as to indemnify him for the loss of wages during that delay, and for the loss of the excess of the wages contracted for above the usual rate; but no allowance would be made for any pain or loss of reputation caused to the plaintiff by his dismissal in consequence of his being attached to the place of his employment (s). If the plaintiff is likely to obtain another similar situation without delay, the damages should be small; if he has actually obtained one, they should be merely nominal (t).

In an action of contract brought for a liquidated amount, *i.e.*, for a sum certain or capable of being reduced to a certainty, the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff is purely a matter of calculation, and can be arrived at by mere arithmetic, or by reference to a scale of charges or some other accepted rate or percentage. Sometimes, moreover, the law itself defines the mode of computing the amount recoverable in an action, as, for instance, where the plaintiff sues his co-contractors for contribution, or where the claim is for general average (u). “The amount which would have been received if the contract had been kept is the measure of damages if it be broken” (x).

But, as we have already stated, the measure of damages in an action of contract may be affected by the stipulations into which the parties have expressly entered. Thus, the

(r) *Williams v. Earle* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 739.

(s) See the remarks of Erle, J., in *Beckham v. Drake* (1849), 2 H. L. Cas. at p. 606.

(t) See the remarks of Crompton, J., in *Emmens v. Elderton* (1853), 13 C. B. at p. 508.

(u) See *Hallett v. Wigram* (1850), 9 C. B. 580; *Atkinson v. Stephens* (1852), 7 Exch. 567.

(x) *Per De Grey, C.J.*, in *Sharpe v. Brice* (1774), 2 W. Bl. at p. 942.

parties may agree that they shall only be liable in certain events (*y*). Frequently, however, the parties have named in their contract a certain sum which is to be paid in the event of its being broken. Where this is the case, a question arises which is often of some difficulty, *viz.* : Do the parties really regard the sum so named as a fair and proper compensation for a breach of the contract, or is it merely a prohibitory figure, which will not be exacted in the case of every breach? This question is usually expressed thus in legal language : Is the sum named liquidated damages, or is it a penalty? By *liquidated damages*, in this connection, is meant the sum which the parties to a contract have themselves agreed on as a fair compensation for a breach of it, whereas a *penalty* is the sum named in a contract to secure its due performance, not as an agreed valuation of the probable consequences of its breach, but as an amount to be forfeited on any breach, however great or small the actual loss to the plaintiff may prove to be.

The fact that the parties state expressly in their contract that the sum named is liquidated damages, and not a penalty, will not prevent the Court from deciding that it is a penalty (*z*). Where the contract contains a variety of stipulations of different importance, and one sum is stated to be payable on breach of performance of any one of them, then, although it be called by the name of liquidated damages, it is in reality a penalty, and the actual damage sustained is alone recoverable (*a*). But where the parties name a sum which is to be paid as liquidated damages in one event only, this will be regarded as liquidated damages and not a penalty, and will then bind both parties.

In deciding, however, whether a sum made payable by way of compensation for breach of a contract is to be treated as liquidated

(*y*) Where there is a statutory duty to enter into contracts, *e.g.*, to carry passengers on a tramway, the persons on whom that duty falls can only limit their liability by giving an option to the passengers to travel at one rate at their own risk, and at another at the carriers' risk : *Clarke v. West Ham Corporation*, [1909] 2 K. B. 858. Contrast *Nunan v. Southern Ry. Co.*, [1924] 1 K. B. 223, with *Hearn v. Southern Ry. Co.* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 305.

(*z*) See *Thompson v. Hudson* (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. at p. 30; and *Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Yzquierdo*, [1905] A. C. 6; *Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills*, [1906] A. C. 368; and see *Dunlop v. New Garage &c., Co.*, [1915] A. C. 79.

(*a*) *Magee v. Lavell* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 107; and see *Jones v. Hough* (1879), 5 Ex. D. 115; *Rayner v. Rederiaktiebolaget Condor*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 289.

damages or as a penalty, the Court must take all the circumstances into consideration, in order to ascertain the intention of the parties. The fact that the sum in question is to be paid on the breach of any one of a variety of stipulations of different degrees of importance does not necessarily oblige the Court to treat it as a penalty, although it raises a presumption that that was the intention of the parties; nor does the fact that the sum in question had been deposited at the making of the contract compel the Court to treat it as liquidated damages, although it forms a material element to be taken into consideration in ascertaining the intention of the parties (b). A penalty is "something which a debtor is to pay, over and above his original liability, as a punishment" (c). "What the Courts look at is the real intention of the parties as it is to be gathered from the language they have used" (d).

Where the Judge is satisfied that the parties intended the sum named in their contract to be a penalty, he will require evidence to be given as to the loss which the plaintiff has in fact sustained, and will direct the jury to restrict their verdict to the amount of such loss. They cannot, however, award the plaintiff a larger sum than the stipulated penalty.

It does not matter that the parties have expressly declared the sum named to be liquidated damages, if the Court can see that it really is a penalty (e).

In *Wallis v. Smith* (f), Jessel, M.R., divides the cases into four classes:—

1. Where a sum of money is stated to be payable either by way of liquidated damages or by way of penalty for breach of stipulations, all or some of which are, or one of which is, for the payment of a sum of money of less amount, that is really a penalty and only the actual damage can be recovered. The Court will not in such cases sever the stipulations, and if any one of them is for the payment of a sum of money of less amount, the proviso will be bad (g).

2. Where the amount of damages is not ascertainable *per se*, but the amount of damages for a breach of one or more of the stipulations either must, or in all human probability will, be small, so that the Court can assume it to be small, in this case there is

(b) *Pye v. British Automobile Syndicate*, [1906] 1 K. B. 425.

(c) *Per Lush, J.*, in *Burden, Ex parte* (1881), 16 Ch. D. at p. 680; and see *Protector Loan Co. v. Grice* (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 592.

(d) *Per Keating, J.*, in *Lea v. Whitaker* (1872), L. R. 8 C. P. at p. 73; and see *Magee v. Lavell* (1874), L. R. 9 C. P. 107, 115.

(e) *Kemble v. Farren* (1829), 6 Bing. 141; and see *Thompson v. Hudson* (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 1, 30; *Beckham v. Drake* (1849), 2 H. L. Cas. 579, 598, 614; *Price v. Green* (1845), 13 M. & W. 695; (1847), 16 M. & W. 646.

(f) (1882), 21 Ch. D. 243, 256 *et seq.*

(g) See *Elphinstone v. Monkland, &c., Co.* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 332.

no express decision whether or not the same rule applies as in the first case, though there are *dicta* on both sides. It probably will do so where some of the covenants are of such a character that obviously the damage which can possibly arise from any breach of them would be very insignificant compared with the sum which has been fixed by the parties.

3. Where the damages for the breach of each stipulation are unascertainable or not readily ascertainable, but the stipulations may be of greater or less importance or of equal importance, there, though there are *dicta* to the contrary, the rule to be collected from the decisions is that, though the stipulations vary in importance, the sum is not treated as a penalty, but as liquidated damages (*h*).

4. Where a deposit is to be forfeited for the breach of a number of stipulations some of which may be trifling, some of which may be for the payment of money on a given day, here too the sum will be treated, not as a penalty, but as liquidated damages.

"One rule which appears to be recognised in the cases as a canon of construction with regard to agreements of this kind is that where the parties to a contract have agreed that, in case of one of the parties doing or omitting to do some one thing, he shall pay a specific sum to the other as damages, as a general rule such sum is to be regarded by the Court as liquidated damages, and not a penalty" (*i*). An exception to such rule is where a larger sum is to be payable upon the non-payment of a smaller one. A further exception is suggested where the sum agreed to be paid is so large with reference to the matter in respect of which it is to become payable as to render the contention that it should be regarded as liquidated damages absurd.

VI. AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.

Where the damages are liquidated, the jury will not be allowed to take into their consideration extraneous matter, such as the motives or conduct of either party.

But the case is different where the damages are unliquidated. Then, whether the action be of tort or of contract, the plaintiff is generally allowed to travel outside the bare facts which constitute his strict cause of action, and to prove extraneous matters to enhance the damages. In the first place, the plaintiff may prove every loss which he has actually sustained, and all expense which he has reasonably incurred, in consequence of the defendant's tort

(*h*) See *Dunlop v. New Garage &c., Co.*, [1915] A. C. 79.

(*i*) *Per* Lord Esher, M.R., in *Law v. Local Board of Redditch*, [1892] 1 Q. B. at p. 130; and see *Strickland v. Williams*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 382.

or breach of contract. Thus, in an action for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff may show in aggravation of damages that the defendant seduced her under the cover of the promise of marriage (*k*). So, if a cattle-dealer sells a diseased cow to a farmer, he is liable for the value, not only of that cow, but also of all other cows that catch the disease from it; and this is so whether the farmer sues in contract for breach of warranty or in tort for a misrepresentation (*l*). Where a lessee had, in breach of covenant, assigned to a person who, as he knew, intended to use, and did in fact use, the premises as a turpentine distillery, and the premises were burnt down by a fire arising from such use, he was held liable to pay to the lessor by way of damages for his breach the amount of the damage done by the fire (*m*).

Moreover, as we have seen (*n*), in certain cases the jury is permitted to award the plaintiff vindictive or exemplary damages.

As a rule, where the damages are liquidated, it is not open to the defendant to give evidence in mitigation of damages. In an action for work and labour done, however, the defendant may if he thinks fit give evidence, in abatement of the claim, that certain portions of the work ordered were badly done, or not done at all (*o*). But in all these cases the defendant will only be allowed to show the extent to which the value of the goods or work is diminished by reason of their not being in accordance with the contract; he cannot prove, in reduction of price, consequential damages which arise from the breach of contract, but do not affect the value of the plaintiff's goods or work. For such damages he must specifically counter-claim or bring a separate action (*p*).

(*k*) *Berry v. Da Costa* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 331; *Millington v. Loring* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 190.

(*l*) *Mullett v. Mason* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 559; *Smith v. Green* (1875), 1 C. P. D. 92.

(*m*) *Lepla v. Rogers*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 31.

(*n*) *Ante*, p. 656.

(*o*) *Davis v. Hedges* (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 687.

(*p*) *Mondel v. Steel* (1841), 8 M. & W. 858; *Rigge v. Burbidge* (1846), 15 M. & W. 598; and see *Street v. Blay* (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 456; *Poulton v. Lattimore*, (1829), 9 B. & C. 259.

But in actions in which the damages are unliquidated, whether actions of contract or of tort, many other considerations are allowed to affect the minds of the jury, and may be urged on them in mitigation of damages. These matters may be roughly grouped under five heads:—

1. That the plaintiff has not in fact suffered the damage which he alleges. The burden lies on the plaintiff of proving all special damage. The defendant generally endeavours by cross-examination or otherwise to controvert or minimise such a claim, and may succeed in showing that certain damage, which the plaintiff has undoubtedly suffered, was not the consequence of any act or default of the defendant, but was due to some extraneous or accidental cause, *e.g.*, the act of a third person (*q*) or even the plaintiff's own neglect to avert the consequences of the defendant's act (*r*).

2. The conduct of the plaintiff in the litigation, or in the events which led up to and caused the litigation, is generally admissible in mitigation of damages. Thus if the defendant can show that the action is not really brought with the object of recovering reasonable compensation, but is brought to levy blackmail on the defendant, or for some political motive, or to assist some one else to bring another action hereafter, or to advertise the plaintiff's goods, or in some other way to gratify the personal vanity or spite of the plaintiff, the jury may award but small damages, if they regard the action as one that ought never to have been brought. So if the plaintiff has himself attacked the defendant and provoked him to commit the assault or to publish the libel complained of, or otherwise invited or challenged the commission of the act for which he now claims damages (*s*). Again, if the plaintiff has asserted his rights harshly or with undue severity, if he acted indiscreetly or unbecomingly in the matters which led up to and brought about the litigation, these circumstances tend to mitigate the damages, *e.g.*, where the plaintiff has by his own innocent

(*q*) *Harrison v. Pearce* (1858), 1 F. & F. 567; and see *Wyatt v. Gore* (1816), Holt, N. P. 299; *Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus*, [1892] A. C. 166.

(*r*) *Grant v. S.S. "Egyptian"*, [1910] A. C. 400; *The Bruxellesville*, [1908] P. 312.

(*s*) *Kelly v. Sherlock* (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 686; *O'Connor v. Star Newspaper Co.* (1893), 68 L. T. 146.

but foolish conduct subjected himself and others to misconception (*t*). But cross-examination with such an object is extremely dangerous since, if the jury do not like the way in which the defence is conducted, it will aggravate, instead of mitigate, the damages.

3. Evidence of the plaintiff's general bad character—*i.e.*, in matters unconnected with the litigation—is, as a rule, inadmissible. If the defendant owes the plaintiff £500, the plaintiff is entitled to recover that amount, whether his private character be good or bad.

In actions of defamation the plaintiff is seeking compensation for injury to his reputation, and, even though the defendant does not venture to justify, he is allowed, under certain restrictions, to give evidence of the plaintiff's general bad character in mitigation of damages (*u*). Only general evidence of the plaintiff's bad character may be given with this object; the defendant may not go into particular instances: still less he may prove a general report or rumour that the plaintiff had been guilty of the alleged or any similar misconduct (*x*). Such evidence cannot be given at the trial without the leave of the Judge, unless the defendant has justified, or unless, seven days at least before the trial, he has given the plaintiff particulars under Order XXXVI., r. 37 (*y*), of the matters which the defendant intends to prove.

This rule, however, in no way restricts the right of cross-examination; in every action, if the plaintiff goes into the witness-box, he may be cross-examined "to credit" on every detail of his previous life which can conceivably affect his credit. But, unless such details are relevant to the issue, the defendant must accept the plaintiff's answer; he cannot call evidence in chief to contradict it.

4. The conduct of the defendant may also be relevant. If the defendant acted honestly, on a reasonable suspicion, or under a mistaken impression as to his rights or as to the facts, the jury will naturally (*z*) award less damages against him than if he acted fraudulently, maliciously or deliberately. For this purpose the defendant may generally show "the surrounding circumstances" which induced him to

(*t*) *Harnett v. Vise* (1880), 5 Ex. D. 307.

(*u*) *Wood v. Earl of Durham* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 501.

(*x*) *Scott v. Sampson* (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 491; *Mangena v. Wright*, [1909] 2 K. B. 958; and see *Wood v. Earl of Durham*, *supra*.

(*y*) The defendant is entitled to administer interrogatories to the plaintiff as to the matters referred to in such particulars: *Scaife v. Kemp*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 319.

(*z*) Though perhaps illogically.

act as he did. The absence of all malice ought to tell in the defendant's favour. So, too, the defendant's subsequent conduct may tend to mitigate the damages, *e.g.*, if he has shown himself open to argument, has listened to any explanations offered him, has restored the goods which he removed, has expressed regret or apologised for his mistake, has stopped the sale of any book or paper complained of, or otherwise done all in his power to remedy or reduce the mischief caused by his act (a).

5. The words and conduct of third persons are, as a general rule, inadmissible, even in mitigation of damages, except when such evidence is necessary to explain the conduct of the parties to the action in the course of, or in the circumstances leading up to, the litigation.

Thus the fact that other persons besides the defendant have on other occasions uttered the same slander as he did is inadmissible. But if the defendant heard the slander from A, and believed it to be true, and, when repeating it, named A as his informant, then these facts may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages, for they place the defendant's act in a better light (b). The fact that other persons who were similarly slandered on the same occasion have accepted an apology from the defendant and not brought actions is not admissible in evidence in an action brought by the plaintiff, especially if no apology was offered to him (c). That the plaintiff might have, but has not, brought other actions for similar wrongs is wholly immaterial. He may sue whom he pleases, and when he pleases. Thus in an action of libel evidence that others had previously published similar libels on the plaintiff and have not yet been sued is not admissible. It is no justification for the defendant's republication; still less is it any evidence of the truth of such charges (d). It is wholly immaterial that the plaintiff omitted to contradict or complain of such previous publications (e). But this is only admissible as showing that the defendant acted innocently and without malice; it comes really under head 4 above (f). And, generally, if the present defendant

(a) See *Gathercole v. Miall* (1846), 15 M. & W. 319; *Smith v. Scott* (1847), 2 Car. & K. 580; *Davis v. Cutbush* (1859), 1 F. & F. 487; *Harle v. Catherall* (1866), 14 L. T. 801. As to an apology in actions of defamation, see *Odgers on Libel and Slander* (5th ed.), pp. 404—406.

(b) *Bennett v. Bennett* (1834), 6 C. & P. 588; *Davis v. Cutbush* (*supra*).

(c) *Tait v. Beggs*, [1905] 2 Ir. R. 525.

(d) *R. v. Newman* (1853), 1 E. & B. 268, 558.

(e) *R. v. Holt* (1793), 5 T. R. 436; *Pankhurst v. Hamilton* (1886), 2 T. L. R. 682; and see the remarks of Maule, J., in *Ingram v. Lawson* (1839), 9 C. & P. at p. 333.

(f) See *Hunt v. Algar* (1833), 6 C. & P. 245; *Creevy v. Carr* (1835), 7 C. & P. 64; *Davis v. Cutbush* (1859), 1 F. & F. 487.

is liable, the fact that some one else is liable to be sued in another action for a similar wrong is not only no defence to the present action: it is not admissible even in reduction of damages. Evidence that such other actions have in fact been brought was also inadmissible for every purpose at common law. But now "at the trial of an action for a libel contained in any newspaper the defendant shall be at liberty to give in evidence in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff has already recovered, or has brought actions for, damages, or has received or agreed to receive compensation in respect of a libel or libels to the same purport or effect as the libel for which such action has been brought" (*g*).

(*g*) Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 64), s. 6.

CHAPTER XXII.

PROCEEDINGS AFTER JUDGMENT.

NO SECOND ACTION.

A JUDGMENT finally disposes of all controversy as to any of the matters in issue in the action. The rights of the parties as to any such matter depend in future wholly on the judgment. As long as that judgment stands (*a*), none of the issues raised in the action can be re-tried. The judgment not only defines the rights of the parties; it also modifies them. The plaintiff's original cause of action, whether of contract or of tort, disappears; if he has failed, it is barred; if he has won, it is merged in a judgment debt; *transit in rem judicatam*. Hence no second action can be brought on the same cause of action, even though in the first action the plaintiff by a mistake claimed too small a sum (*b*). But it must be clear that the cause of action is the same in both cases (*c*). "The principle is, that where there is but one cause of action, damages must be assessed once for all" (*d*).

But it is necessary to distinguish carefully between a complete cause of action which may yet produce fresh damage in the future and a continuing cause of action from which continuous damage steadily flows. The plaintiff may be injured in a railway accident, and recover substantial damages from the company, and subsequently consequences may develop which are solely due to the accident. He cannot bring a second action, or claim further damages in the first action. But where the cause of action is a continuing

(*a*) *Boaler v. Power*, [1910] 2 K. B. 229. An action may be brought to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud.

(*b*) *Sanders v. Hamilton* (1907), 23 T. L. R. 389.

(*c*) *Serrao v. Noel* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 549.

(*d*) *Per Bowen, L.J.*, in *Serrao v. Noel*, *supra*, at p. 559.

one (as, for instance, an action for breach of covenant by a master to teach his apprentice, or breach of covenant to keep premises in repair, or for a continuing trespass), a fresh cause of action arises every day that such breach or injury continues (*e*). By Order XXXVI., r. 58, “Where damages are to be assessed in respect of any continuing cause of action, they should be assessed down to the time of the assessment.” Should the act or omission complained of be repeated after the assessment, it is open to the plaintiff to bring a fresh action.

But where the act or omission complained of in the action happened once and has not been repeated (*e.g.*, where the defendant has committed one isolated breach of contract, or has published one libel (*f*) or struck the plaintiff one blow), there, as we have seen, the cause of action is not continuing, and the jury must assess the damages once for all; and no fresh action can, as a rule, be brought for any subsequent damage that may hereafter arise from that act or omission (*g*).

To this rule there is one exception, *viz.*, where special damage is essential to the cause of action. In such cases the jury should confine their consideration to the special damage which is specifically alleged and proved in the action before them. Hence it follows that if any fresh damage arise in the future, that will constitute a fresh ground of action, because it was not included in the first (*h*).

EXECUTION.

The simplest form of a judgment is “that the defendant do pay the plaintiff £——”; it is not usual to specify any time within which payment must be made; and in the absence of such a limitation the unsuccessful party can be called upon to pay the money forthwith. The judgment creditor is naturally anxious to obtain the fruits of his victory as speedily as he may; hence, as a rule, he promptly proceeds to enforce the judgment which he has obtained. The process by which a judgment of the Court is enforced is

(*e*) *Hole v. Chard Union*, [1894] 1 Ch. 293.

(*f*) *Macdougall v. Knight* (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 1.

(*g*) *Brunsdon v. Humphrey* (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 141.

(*h*) *West Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunncliffe*, [1908] A. C. 27.

called "execution." It is generally effected by a writ directed to the sheriff or other proper person, commanding him to carry into effect the judgment of the Court. There are several such writs; and it is impossible to describe them here in detail. Thus the successful party may sue out a writ either of *fiery facias* or *elegit* under Order XLIII., or in some cases he can apply for equitable execution by means of a receiver. If he knows of any one who owes money to the judgment debtor, he can proceed to attach the debt under Order XLV. (i) If the judgment debtor be a beneficed clerk, the profits of the living may be sequestered under rules 3 and 4 of Order XLIII. Imprisonment for debt is abolished; but a judgment debtor who can pay, and will not, may be committed to prison for six weeks (k); such imprisonment does not extinguish the debt.

The most ordinary form of execution is by writ of *fiery facias*. This writ commands the sheriff to *cause to be made* out of the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor the sum recovered by the judgment, together with interest at the rate of £4 per cent., and immediately after the execution of the writ to bring the money and interest before the Court, to be paid to the judgment creditor. By the authority thus given him, the sheriff may enter the house of the execution debtor and seize whatever goods can be found there belonging to the debtor; he must not seize goods which are the property of some one else. He may also enter the house of a third person, if the goods of the debtor be actually therein; but there is always the risk that the house may contain nothing belonging to the debtor, and then the sheriff would be liable to an action of trespass.

The sheriff may seize and sell all the personal goods and chattels belonging to the execution debtor that he can find on the premises, with the exception of the wearing apparel and bedding of the judgment debtor or his family, and the tools and implements of his trade, provided the value of such excepted articles does not exceed in the whole £5 (l). He can also seize and sell the debtor's choses in action, such as bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, bonds, and other securities for money (m). But he may not seize or sell goods which are already in the custody of the law, *e.g.*, goods which the landlord had already distrained for rent in arrear.

A writ of *fiery facias* or other writ of execution binds the property

(i) See *post*, p. 695.

(k) Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 5.

(l) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 127, s. 8.

(m) 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 12. An order charging stock or shares belonging to the judgment debtor may also be applied for under Order XLVI., r. 1.

in all goods of the execution debtor which the sheriff is entitled to seize as from the time when the writ is delivered to the sheriff or other officer charged with the enforcement of the execution. It is the duty of the sheriff, without fee, upon the receipt of any such writ to indorse upon the back thereof the hour, day, month, and year when he received the same. The title to such goods acquired by any person in good faith and for valuable consideration is not prejudiced by such writ, unless such person had at the time when he acquired his title notice that such writ, or any other writ by virtue of which the goods of the execution debtor might be seized or attached, had been delivered to and remained unexecuted in the hands of the sheriff (n).

Under a *fi. fa.*, the sheriff has no power to seize or sell an estate in fee, or for life, or an equitable interest such as an equity of redemption, or things which are fixed to the freehold and which would pass on death to the heir, and not to the executor, of the owner. Moreover, no judgment affects land so as to be a charge on it until it has actually been taken in execution by the sheriff (o). Hence it is sometimes necessary for the judgment creditor to issue a second writ called a writ of *elegit*, under which the sheriff places the execution creditor in possession of the whole of the debtor's land, which he holds till the judgment is satisfied.

If the plaintiff succeeds in an action for the recovery of land, the judgment will be "that the plaintiff do recover possession of the land in the Statement of Claim described as —"; and the plaintiff is entitled at once to a *writ of possession*, bidding the sheriff to enter on the same, and without delay to "cause the plaintiff to have possession of the said land and premises with the appurtenances." A *fi. fa.* for the amount of the mesne profits and costs may be joined in the same writ. One *fi. fa.* only can be issued on a judgment (p).

If a plaintiff has recovered judgment for the recovery of any property other than land or money, he must wait fourteen days before issuing execution, unless he can obtain special leave to issue it at an earlier date (q). The defendant is allowed this interval in which to comply voluntarily with the order of the Court. If he does not obey the judgment within that period, a *writ of delivery* will issue, as to which see Order XLVIII. Such a judgment may also be enforced by writ of attachment, or writ of sequestration (r).

In some cases in which execution could not be had at law, equitable relief could be obtained by the appointment of a receiver. This process still continues, and is still called "equitable execution," though "it is not execution, but a substitute for execution" (s). Thus a receiver will be appointed to receive a fund

(n) Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), s. 1.

(o) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, ss. 1 and 3, amending 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38. See also 51 & 52 Vict. c. 51, and Land Charges Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 22).

(p) *Forster v. Baker*, [1910] 2 K. B. 636.

(q) Order XLII., r. 19.

(r) *Ibid.*, r. 6.

(s) *Per Bowen, L.J., Shephard, In re* (1889), 43 Ch. D. at p. 137.

in Court, or a legacy not yet payable, or a share of the proceeds of the sale of land not yet sold. In this way, too, an execution creditor can sometimes secure payment of his debt out of an equity of redemption or any other interest in land which could not be reached by the ordinary process of execution at law (*t*). In determining whether it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution, the Court will always have regard to the amount of the debt claimed by the applicant, to the amount which may probably be obtained by the receiver, and to the probable cost of his appointment (*u*). The appointment of such a receiver operates as an injunction to restrain the judgment debtor from himself receiving the moneys, and prevents his dealing with them to the prejudice of the execution creditor (*x*).

INTERPLEADER.

It often happens that when a sheriff seizes goods under an execution some third person intervenes and claims that the goods are his, or that he has a charge on them under a bill of sale or otherwise. In such cases, the sheriff applies to a Master at Judges' chambers for protection. He takes out a summons, called an interpleader summons, and serves it on both the claimant and the execution creditor. All three parties then appear before the Master, who may dispose of the case then and there, if the amount in dispute is not large, and no difficult question of law or fact arises. In other cases, he directs an "issue" to be tried between the claimant and the execution creditor. If the claimant will pay into Court a reasonable amount to abide the event of the issue, the sheriff will be ordered to withdraw from possession of the goods; if not, the Master may order so many of the goods to be sold as will realise the amount of the judgment, or the sheriff may remain in possession. The procedure on an interpleader summons and issue is now regulated by Order LVII. (*y*).

(*t*) See *Holmes v. Millage*, [1893] 1 Q. B. at p. 558; *Harris v. Beauchamp*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 801; *Goldschmidt v. Oberrheinische Metallwerke*, [1906] 1 K. B. 373.

(*u*) Order L., r. 15A.

(*x*) *Marquis of Anglesey, In re*, [1903] 2 Ch. 727; see also *Giles v. Kruyer*, [1921] 3 K. B. 23.

(*y*) This is called "a sheriff's interpleader," to distinguish it from an analogous proceeding called "a stakeholder's interpleader," which has nothing to do with the execution of a judgment. A stakeholder's interpleader arises in this way: an action is sometimes brought against a person to recover money or

GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS.

It may be, however, that a judgment creditor has discovered that there is a third person, within the jurisdiction of the Court, who owes the judgment debtor money. He may compel payment of that debt to himself towards the satisfaction of his judgment by a process known as ATTACHMENT OF DEBTS. In order to ascertain what debts are owing to the debtor, it is often necessary to obtain an order for his examination. If the judgment debtor disobeys the order, he is liable to be committed to prison. Either before or after any oral examination of the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor may apply *ex parte* to a Master for an order, which is technically known as a "garnishee order nisi." He must come prepared with an affidavit showing that judgment has been recovered, and is still unsatisfied, and to what amount, and that a certain person named, within jurisdiction, owes the judgment debtor money. The Master thereupon may make an order attaching the debt owing or accruing to the judgment debtor from such person (who is henceforth called "the garnishee"), and ordering the garnishee to appear and show cause why he should not pay such debt to the judgment creditor, or so much of it as may suffice to satisfy his claim (z). This order should, as a rule, be personally served upon the garnishee, and, as soon as it is served on him, it binds the debt in his hands; he becomes custodier for the Court of the whole fund attached (a). The garnishee, on being served, must appear as the order directs, if he wishes to dispute the debt or his liability to be thus garnished. If the garnishee does not appear in obedience to the order *nisi*, or does not dispute his liability, and does

goods in which he himself claims no interest, but which is claimed by some one besides the plaintiff. It is obviously unjust that the defendant should, under these circumstances, be put to the expense of defending an action in which he has no interest, while, on the other hand, if he pays the debt, or hands over the goods, to the plaintiff, he may expose himself to an action at the suit of the other claimant. Such a defendant is allowed to take out an interpleader summons under Order LVII., on the hearing of which the action will be summarily stopped against the defendant, and the two adverse claimants will be made parties to an interpleader issue, and so fight out the matter between themselves.

(z) Order XLV., r. 1.

(a) *Ibid.*, r. 2; *Edmunds v Edmunds*, [1904] P. 362; *Rogers v. Whiteley*, [1892] A. C. 122.

not pay into Court forthwith the amount due from him to the judgment debtor, or an amount equal to the judgment debt, the Master may order execution to issue against the garnishee without any previous writ or process, to levy the amount due from him, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt. If the garnishee appears and disputes his liability, the Master, instead of ordering that execution shall issue, may direct that any issue or question necessary for determining his liability be tried (*b*). Payment into Court by, or execution levied on, the garnishee under any such order is a valid discharge to him of his debt to the judgment debtor up to the amount paid or levied, even though such order be subsequently set aside, or the judgment reversed (*c*). The debt must be an absolute one, although not necessarily one which is payable immediately (*d*). Pensions in respect of past services are attachable unless a statute provides otherwise (*e*). The wages of manual workmen are not attachable.

ATTACHMENT OF THE DEBTOR.

Where a judgment directs the performance of any specific act other than the payment of money, such as the removal of a nuisance or the production of an account, or requires any one to abstain from doing anything, it may be enforced by proceedings against the person, and sometimes also the land or goods of the person, involved (*f*). Wilful disobedience to a judgment directing any person to do a specific act is a contempt of Court, and is punished by stringent process. A copy of the judgment must first be personally served on that person, indorsed with a special memorandum in the form given in Order XLI., r. 5, unless, indeed, he has already had notice of the judgment and is evading formal service of it (*g*). The plaintiff must then wait till the time

(*b*) Order XLV., rr. 3, 4.

(*c*) *Ibid.*, r. 7.

(*d*) *Tapp v. Jones* (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 591.

(*e*) *Lucas v. Harris* (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 127; *Crowe v. Price* (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 429.

(*f*) Order XLII., r. 7.

(*g*) *Kistler v. Tettmar*, [1905] 1 K. B. 39.

specified in the judgment for doing the act has elapsed, or, if no such time be specified, till a reasonable time has elapsed. He may then apply for a *writ of attachment* commanding the sheriff to arrest the person, and bring him before the Court to answer for his contempt. The leave of the Court must be obtained before issuing a writ of attachment; and notice of the application for leave must be given to the party proposed to be attached (*h*). The writ cannot be enforced against a defendant who is outside the jurisdiction. The person attached, in general, remains in prison until he has purged his contempt by doing the act required. When the act is the execution of a deed the Court has power to appoint some one to execute the deed in the name of the recalcitrant party. A judgment for the payment of money into Court may in some cases be enforced by attachment, but more generally by a *writ of sequestration* (*i*). This is a writ directed to certain commissioners, called sequestrators, bidding them enter on the lands of the person in contempt and sequester and receive into their hands the rents and profits of all his real estate, and all his goods and chattels, and to detain them until the contempt is cleared.

THE COURT OF APPEAL.

While the victorious party in thus endeavouring to obtain the fruits of his victory, his defeated opponent, on the other hand, may be considering whether he cannot set aside the judgment signed against him and have judgment entered in his favour, or at least secure a new trial of the action. To obtain either, he must now apply to the Court of Appeal. He can only obtain judgment in his favour by proving that the Judge was wrong on a point of law. He can only, as a rule, obtain a new trial by showing that the Judge or the jury took a wholly unreasonable view of the facts. He may ask both for judgment and for a new trial in his notice of motion, if he wishes; and indeed the Court of Appeal may

(*h*) Order XLIV., r. 2; *Evans, In re*, [1893] 1 Ch. 252.

(*i*) Order XLII., r. 4.

grant him either, whatever the terms of his notice of motion may be.

Every appeal from a final judgment and every motion for a new trial after a final judgment must, except by consent of all parties, be heard by not less than three Judges of the Court of Appeal. The application may be granted either absolutely or upon such conditions as may seem just. The Court of Appeal has, over any action or matter brought before it on appeal, all the powers, authority and jurisdiction of the High Court. It can order the appellant to give security for the costs of the appeal. It can amend the pleadings, enlarge time, receive fresh evidence (*k*), draw inferences of fact, direct issues to be tried, or accounts and inquiries to be taken or made, and generally it has power to give any judgment and make any order which ought to have been made, and to make such further or other order as the case may require, including any order as to costs. If there was any miscarriage of justice at the trial below, the Court of Appeal may grant a new trial as to so much of the matter as the miscarriage affects, without interfering with the decision on any other question. So, too, the Court may grant a new trial as against one defendant without granting it as to all.

The appellant must give notice in writing of his intention to appeal to all parties, or at all events to all who will be affected by it. If he is appealing from an interlocutory order, or from any order in a matter which is not strictly speaking an action, he must serve his notice of appeal within fourteen days from the date of the order: if he is appealing from a final judgment or final order in an action, within six weeks from the time when judgment in the action is signed, entered, or otherwise perfected (*l*). The notice must state the grounds of the application, and whether all or part, and what part, of the findings are complained of (*m*). It is not enough for the appellant merely to say that he complains of "misdirection"; the notice must state how and in what manner he contends that the jury were misdirected.

The student should carefully distinguish between—

- (i) A motion for judgment, and
- (ii) A motion for a new trial.

(i) The appellant may move to set aside a final judgment on the ground that there was no evidence to go to the jury on some material issue which has been found against

(*k*) *Sanders v. Sanders* (1881), 19 Ch. D. 373, 381. But such evidence will not be received, if it could have been given in the Court below had due diligence been observed: *Evans v. Benyon* (1887), 37 Ch. D. 329, 345; *Nash v. Rochford Rural Council*, [1917] 1 K. B. 384; and see *post*, pp. 701, 702.

(*l*) Order LVIII., r. 15. As to the Mayor's Court practice, see *Milch v. Frankau* (1909), 100 L. T. 1002, and *Newman v. Klausner*, [1922] 1 K. B. 228.

(*m*) Order XXXIX., r. 3.

him; this, as we have seen (n), is a question of law for the Judge. Or he may contend that on the findings as entered the judgment directed against him is wrong; this also is a matter of law,

(ii) A new trial, on the other hand, may be asked for on several grounds, of which the commonest is—

(a) That the verdict was against the weight of evidence; this clearly is a question of fact. An appeal on a matter of law has, as a rule, a greater chance of success than an appeal on any question of fact. If matters of fact only are involved, the Judges of the Court of Appeal are naturally very reluctant to disturb the finding of the Judge or jury below, who saw the witnesses, and had the opportunity of judging of their demeanour in the box (o). Where the action was tried by a Judge without a jury, the Court of Appeal will start with the presumption that the decision of the Court below on the facts was right, and that presumption must be displaced by the appellant. If he satisfactorily makes out that the Judge below was wrong, the decision will be reversed; if the matter is left in doubt, the Court of Appeal will not alter the decision of the Court below (p). And where the action was tried by a Judge with a jury, it is still more difficult to disturb an adverse finding of fact. If there was any evidence to go to the jury on that issue, and no misdirection on any point of law, the Court will not, as a rule, set aside the finding, unless it be such as twelve reasonable men could not honestly have found on the evidence before them. “The verdict ought not to be disturbed unless it was one which a jury, viewing the whole of the evidence reasonably, could not properly find” (q). “If reasonable men might find the verdict which has been found, I think no Court has jurisdiction to disturb a decision of fact which the law has confided to juries, not to Judges” (r). Wherever there is evidence on both sides fit

(n) *Ante*, p. 619.

(o) See the remarks of Cozens-Hardy, M.R., in *Wagstaff, In re* (1908), 98 L. T., at p. 151.

(p) *Colonial Securities Trust Co. v. Massey*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 38; *Coghlan v. Cumberland*, [1898] 1 Ch. 704.

(q) *Per* Lord Herschell, L.C., in *Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Wright* (1886), 11 App. Cas., at p. 154.

(r) *Per* Lord Halsbury, 11 App. Cas., at p. 156.

to be submitted to a jury, it is for the jury, not the Court, to decide the issue; and the verdict once given must stand (s).

Hence it is generally safer to rely on a point of law. But it must be a point of law which was raised at the trial below, unless the appellant was taken by surprise or there are other special circumstances which excuse the omission (t). If either party at the trial deliberately elects to fight one question only on which he is beaten, he cannot afterwards on appeal raise another question, although that question was at the trial open to him on the pleadings and on the evidence (u). But it is the duty of every Court to prevent any abuse of its process; hence the Court may at any stage of the proceedings raise of its own motion the question of the illegality of the contract sued on, although the point had not been raised in the argument before it (x).

An application for a new trial may also be made on the following grounds:—

(b) That the Judge misdirected the jury or that he improperly received or rejected evidence; but it will not be granted on either of these grounds unless some substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned in the trial (y).

(c) If the Judge who tried the case was disqualified by reason of pecuniary interest in the subject-matter before the Court.

(d) If any officer of the Court, or the jury, or the successful party, was guilty of misconduct which prevented the other party having a fair trial, *e.g.*, where the respondent fraudulently contrived to keep away from Court a necessary witness for the appellant (z).

(s) *Commissioner for Railways v. Brown* (1887), 13 App. Cas. 133.

(t) *Firth, Ex parte* (1882), 19 Ch. D., at p. 429; *The Tasmania* (1890), 15 App. Cas., at p. 225.

(u) *Martin v. G. N. Ry. Co.* (1855), 16 C. B. 179, approved in *Browne v. Dunn* (1893), 6 R. 67.

(x) *Connolly v. Consumers' Cordage Co.* (1903), 89 L. T. 347; *North Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co.*, [1914] A. C. 461; *Montefiore v. Menday Motor Components Co.*, [1918] 2 K. B. 241; *Rawlings v. General Trading Co.*, [1921] 1 K. B. 635.

(y) Order XXXIX., r. 6; *Bray v. Ford*, [1896] A. C. 44; *Lionel Barber & Co. v. Deutsche Bank*, [1919] A. C. 304.

(z) See also *Shrager v. Dighton*, [1924] 1 K. B. 274 and *Pringle v. Hales*, [1925] 1 K. B. 573, at p. 580.

(e) If the damages awarded by the jury be glaringly excessive, or palpably insufficient.

Where the damages are unliquidated, the Court seldom grants a new trial on the ground that the amount awarded by the jury is either too small or too great. "The assessment of damages is peculiarly the province of the jury" (a). The Court will not grant a new trial on the ground of excessive damages, unless it thinks that, having regard to all the circumstances, the damages are so large that no jury could reasonably have given them (b). But a new trial will be granted if the Court comes to the conclusion that the Judge misdirected the jury as to the damages, or that the jury applied a wrong measure of damages, or must have taken into consideration matters which they ought not to have considered (c). The Court of Appeal, on an application for a new trial, has no power, without the consent of both parties, to alter the amount of damages awarded by the jury (d).

Still rarer are the cases in which a new trial has been granted on the ground that the amount of the verdict is too small (e). The rule is that where there has been no misconduct on the part of the jury, no error in the calculation of figures, and no mistake in law on the part of the Judge, a new trial will not be granted (f). That the jury intended their verdict to carry costs, but have returned an amount insufficient in law to do so, is no ground for granting a new trial (g). But a new trial will be granted if it can be shown that the jury wholly omitted to consider some substantial element of damage which they ought to have taken into their consideration (h).

(f) If the verdict was obtained by "surprise." Surprise is the term used to cover cases in which either party has been prevented from having a fair trial through no fault of his own, *e.g.*, if the case was unexpectedly called on when he was reasonably absent, or took a wholly unexpected turn which could not reasonably have been anticipated (i).

(g) If fresh evidence has been discovered subsequently

(a) *Per cur.* in *Davis v. Shepstone* (1886), 11 App. Cas., at p. 191.

(b) *Praed v. Graham* (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 53.

(c) *Johnston v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, [1904] 2 K. B. 250.

(d) *Watt v. Watt*, [1905] A. C. 115; overruling *Belt v. Lawes* (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 356. But see *Lionel Barber & Co. v. Deutsche Bank*, [1919] A. C. 304.

(e) *Phillips v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 78.

(f) *Rendall v. Hayward* (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 424; *Forsdike v. Stone* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 607.

(g) *Mears v. Griffin* (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 796; *Kilmore v. Abdoolah* (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 307.

(h) *Phillips v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 78; *Johnston v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, [1904] 2 K. B. 250.

(i) See *Isaacs v. Hobhouse*, [1919] 1 K. B. 398; and see *Golden v. Swift* (1924), 40 T. L. R. 315.

to the trial which is now available to the appellant. But a new trial will only be granted on this ground when such fresh evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before the trial, and, further, when it is so conclusive as to make it practically certain that the verdict would have been different if it had been adduced (*k*).

THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

From the Court of Appeal an appeal lies to the House of Lords. The appellant must file a petition humbly praying that the matter of the judgment appealed against may be reviewed before His Majesty the King in his Court of Parliament, and reversed, varied or altered; or that such other relief may be given as to that Court may seem meet. This petition must be printed on parchment, and must be signed by two counsel who "humbly conceive this to be a proper case to be heard before your Lordships by way of appeal" (*l*).

Within one week after the presentation of this petition the appellant must give security for the costs of the appeal by recognisance for £500 and a bond for £200, or in lieu of such bond by payment of £200 into the Security Fund Account of the House of Lords. Each party then lodges his case. A case is a printed statement prepared and signed by counsel informing the Lords of the points in controversy and the reasons on which each party relies. The parties generally agree on an Appendix which contains copies of all material documents used in evidence in the Court below and often a transcript of the shorthand notes of the oral evidence.

The appeal must be heard before not less than three Lords of Appeal. The House has power to summon the Judges of the High Court of Justice to attend and state their opinion on points of law; but this is only done in cases of great importance (*m*). If no party appears when

(*k*) *Young v. Kershaw* (1900), 81 L. T. 531; *Turnbull v. Deval*, [1902] A. C. 429.

(*l*) In some cases a previous petition for leave to appeal is necessary.

(*m*) See *Allen v. Flood*, [1898] A. C. 1.

the appeal is called on for hearing, it will be dismissed without costs on either side. At the hearing the House will proceed on the facts proved at the trial, and will not allow new issues of fact to be raised (*n*); but the House will take notice of a question of law raised before it for the first time as to the construction of documents which are in evidence before the House, and of a question of law arising out of facts which have been admitted or proved beyond controversy (*o*). The House of Lords has power to hear witnesses, but this power is seldom exercised. On the conclusion of the arguments of counsel the lords present state their reasons for advising the House to give judgment. The Lord Chancellor then puts the question to the House, and declares either that "the contents have it," or that "the non-contents have it," as the case may be. The decision thus arrived at becomes the judgment of the House, and is entered as such in its Journals. If the votes of the House are equally divided, the judgment below is affirmed, but without costs (*p*). Again, if the appeal succeeds on a point not raised below, no costs are awarded (*q*). In all other cases the successful party will, in the absence of special circumstances, be entitled to costs (*r*).

(*n*) See *Huxley v. West London Ry. Co.* (1889), 14 App. Cas., at p. 39.

(*o*) *Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh*, [1892] A. C. 473, 480.

(*p*) *Paquin v. Beauclerk*, [1906] A. C. 148.

(*q*) *Cooper v. Cooper* (1888), 13 App. Cas. 88.

(*r*) For further information as to the practice on appeals to the House of Lords, see the Appellate Jurisdiction Acts, 1876 and 1887 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59; 50 & 51 Vict. c. 70); the Appeal (*Forma Pauperis*) Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 22); the Annual Practice, 1918, Vol. II., Part VII., pp. 2421—2448; and Denison and Scott's House of Lords Practice.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PROCEDURE IN THE COUNTY COURT.

THE procedure in a County Court is regulated by the County Courts Act, 1888 (*a*) (as amended by the County Courts Acts, 1903 and 1919 (*b*)), and the rules and orders made under it. An ordinary action is commenced by the entry of a plaint in the books of the Court. The Registrar thereupon issues a summons under the seal of the Court, which states the names of the parties and the substance of the claim, and also names a day, called "the return day," on which the defendant must appear for the trial of the action. This summons must, if possible, be served by the high bailiff of the Court at least ten days before the return day (*c*). If before the return day the defendant confesses the plaintiff's claim, he will save half the hearing fee and subsequent costs for which he would otherwise be liable (*d*).

If the claim for debt or damages exceeds 40s., there must be annexed to the summons the plaintiff's particulars of demand. These also are under the seal of the Court, and are treated as part of the summons. They must specify the cause of action and state the amount claimed, with all such detail as the defendant can reasonably require to enable him to defend the action, but with as little technicality as is consistent with brevity and precision. A specimen is subjoined:—

	No. of Plaint.....
In the County Court of, holden at	
Between A B	Plaintiff,
and	
C D	Defendant.

PARTICULARS OF DEMAND.

Particulars of plaintiff's claim for damages suffered by the plaintiff through the negligence and breach of contract of the defendant, and for money received by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.

(*a*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43.

(*b*) 3 Edw. 7, c. 42; 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 73.

(*c*) As to proof of service, see 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 78.

(*d*) County Courts Act, 1919, s. 5.

In the month of September, 1926, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant a Turkey carpet, which had cost him £28, to be cleaned by the defendant; and the defendant agreed to clean the same with due skill and care. Yet the defendant cleaned the said carpet so negligently and unskilfully that it was utterly spoilt, and is now of no use or value whatever to the plaintiff; wherefore the plaintiff claims damages £20 0 0

The plaintiff also claims the return of the sum of £1 18s. which he paid to the defendant under protest, being the amount demanded by him for cleaning the said carpet, work which, through the default of the defendant, has been of no value or benefit whatever to the plaintiff 1 18 0

£21 18 0

Dated the 24th day of November, 1926.

E F,

Solicitor for the above-named plaintiff,
who will accept service of proceedings on behalf of the plaintiff at his office,

15, Old Square,

Lincoln's Inn, W.C.

To the Registrar of the Court,
and to C D, the defendant.

Where the claim is for a debt or liquidated demand, the plaintiff, if not suing as an assignee, may, instead of the ordinary summons, issue a "default" or a "special default" summons (*e*). For this purpose he must file an affidavit verifying the debt; if the amount claimed exceeds £5, or is for the price of goods sold or let on hire to the defendant in the way of his trade, no leave is required; in other cases leave must be obtained. A default summons must be served on the defendant personally; if the defendant to a default summons does not within eight days give written notice, signed by himself or his solicitor, of his intention to defend the action, the plaintiff may, after eight days and within two months of service, upon proof of service sign judgment for his debt and costs.

To an ordinary summons, however, the defendant need not, as a rule, enter any appearance, or give any notice either to the Court or to the plaintiff of his intention to defend the action, still less of the nature of his defence. But if the defendant relies upon any of the following defences, *viz.*, infancy, coverture, tender, Statute of Limitations, discharge in bankruptcy, in an action for libel or slander that the words are true, or any statutory or

(*e*) See County Courts Act, 1919, s. 8, and C. C. Rules, Order VII., rr. 29—39.

equitable defence, or if he intends to rely upon a set-off or counterclaim, he must, five clear days before the return day, send a concise statement of the same to the Registrar, who will communicate it to the plaintiff (f). Such notice and statement, omitting the official headings and endings, may be as follows:—

NOTICE OF SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.

Take notice that the defendant intends at the hearing of this action to claim a set-off and to set up a counterclaim against the plaintiff's demand, the particulars of which are annexed hereto.

SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.

The defendant claims £23 12s. 6d., being the price of goods sold and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff as under:—

	£	s.	d.
Aug. 2, 1926. Brass bedstead with spring mattress	7	7	0
4 pillows	1	10	0
2 Turkey rugs	7	0	0
Brass fender	3	3	0
Fire-irons to match	1	15	0
Coal box	2	17	6
	<u>£23 12 6</u>		

Either party can in a proper case obtain discovery of documents, and also leave to administer interrogatories to his opponent. The County Court has power, whenever it appears to be just and convenient, to grant an injunction or to appoint a receiver (g). But there is in the County Court nothing analogous to an originating summons. In common law cases either party may, by giving at least ten days' notice, obtain a jury, which consists of eight persons, who are summoned from those qualified and liable to serve as jurors at the Assizes; otherwise the Judge decides all questions both of fact and law. A special jury cannot be had in the County Court.

If neither party appears, the case will be struck out; if the defendant appears and does not admit the claim, and the plaintiff does not appear, the case will be struck out,

(f) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 82; 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 73, s. 24.

(g) Judicature Act, 1925, ss. 202, 203. As to claims for injunctions and declarations without damages, see *R. v. Cheshire Co. Ct. Judge*, [1921] 2 K. B. 694, and *Smith v. Smith*, [1925] 2 K. B. 144.

and the defendant may be awarded costs (*h*); but if the plaintiff does not appear and the defendant admits the claim to the full amount, he may pay the fees and have judgment entered against him as if the plaintiff had appeared (*i*). If the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear in any action where plaintiff has proceeded on a default summons, judgment may be entered without further proof. In any action founded on contract where the defendant does not appear the Registrar may, by leave of the Judge upon proof of service of the summons and of the debt, enter judgment for the plaintiff and make an order for payment by instalments; or he may direct judgment of nonsuit or strike out the case, and, subject to the Judge's power to grant a new trial, such judgment will be final (*k*). In an action of tort, however, such powers can be exercised only by the Judge (*l*).

Where both parties appear, the Registrar, at the request of the parties and by leave of the Judge, may hear and determine any disputed claim up to £5 (*m*).

The procedure at the hearing is similar to the trial of an ordinary High Court action, except that the advocate for the defendant is only entitled to make one speech whether he has called witnesses or not (*n*).

At the end of the case judgment is given for the plaintiff or defendant and entered on the minutes of the Court. The Judge also directs the mode of payment of any sum to which he may find the plaintiff entitled. In certain cases he will direct payment by instalments, and then execution will not issue till after default be made in payment of an instalment; on such default execution can issue for the whole sum due (*o*). The costs of the action abide the event, unless the Judge in his discretion otherwise orders, and execution may issue for the recovery of any such costs in the same manner as for the debt or damages recovered in the action.

The Judge of a County Court, moreover, has in a case

(*h*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, ss. 88, 89.

(*i*) *Ibid.*, s. 88.

(*l*) *Ibid.*, s. 91.

(*k*) *Ibid.*, s. 90.

(*m*) *Ibid.*, s. 92.

(*n*) *Dymock v. Watkins* (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 451; *Clack v. Clack*, [1906] 1 K. B. 483.

(*o*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, ss. 105, 149.

within his jurisdiction power to grant an injunction against a nuisance, and to commit to prison for disobedience thereto (p).

When the judgment has been entered up, it may be enforced by execution against the goods, leviable by writ of *feri facias*; and it may be worth notice that the wearing apparel and bedding of the judgment debtor or his family, and the tools and implements of his trade, to the value of £5, are protected from seizure (q).

Payment of money under a judgment or order of the County Court may sometimes be enforced by committing the defaulting debtor to prison for a period not exceeding six weeks (r). The order of commitment must be made by the Judge in open Court on the hearing of a judgment summons; it must state on its face the ground on which it is issued.

Where a debtor has once been so committed, though for a period short of six weeks, a second warrant of commitment cannot be issued against him in respect of the same debt. Where, however, the debt has been made payable by instalments, the debtor may be committed for the full period of six weeks for default in payment of each instalment (s).

A County Court Judge has also in some cases power to commit for contempt of Court (t). Moreover, if he thinks that any person who has given evidence before him has committed perjury, he may direct him to be prosecuted and commit him for trial at the proper Court (u).

The Judge of a County Court has power, whether within the district of any of his Courts or not, to make any order or exercise, on *ex parte* application, any jurisdiction in an action pending in any Court of which he is Judge, which in the High Court could be made or exercised by a Judge at chambers. With the consent of both parties, he may hear and decide a cause or matter at any place (x). Otherwise the action comes on for trial in the place in which it is begun.

(p) *Martin, Ex parte* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 212; *Martin v. Bannister* (1879), *ibid.* 491.

(q) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 147. As to interpleader where the goods taken in execution are claimed by a third person, see section 157, and *ante*, p. 694.

(r) Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 5.

(s) *Evans v. Wills* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 229.

(t) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 162; and see *R. v. Lefroy* (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 134; and Vol. 1, pp. 220—223.

(u) Perjury Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6), s. 9, sub-s. 1.

(x) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 9.

The judgment of a County Court Judge is final and binding between the parties, so long as it remains unreversed. Neither party will be allowed to fight the same question over again in a subsequent action in any Court (*y*). Nevertheless, any party who is dissatisfied with the decision may apply to the County Court Judge (*z*) to grant a new trial. Where the action was heard in the absence of the defendant, the Judge may grant a new trial on such terms as he thinks fit. But if both parties were present at the hearing, an application for a new trial can only be made on grounds which would be sufficient in the High Court (*a*). A new trial will only be ordered if the Judge thinks it just to do so, and upon such terms as he shall think reasonable. The application is most frequently made on the ground of surprise, or that fresh evidence is now forthcoming which could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before the trial (*b*). It may be made and determined on the day of trial if both parties are present, or at the first Court held next after the expiration of twelve clear days from the day of trial. In the latter case the party intending to apply must, seven days before the holding of the Court, deliver to the Registrar and serve on his opponent a notice in writing of his intention to apply for a new trial, and state in it his grounds for so doing. The Judge may in his discretion order that the new trial, if he thinks fit to grant one, shall take place before a jury, although the action was not originally so tried (*c*).

But if either party be dissatisfied with the determination or direction of a County Court Judge on any point of law or equity, or as to the admission or rejection of any evidence, he has another remedy (*d*). He can on any of these grounds appeal to a Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice,

(*y*) *Stephenson v. Garnett*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 677; but see 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 61.

(*z*) Contrast the fact that in the Supreme Court such an application is made to the Court of Appeal.

(*a*) *Brown v. Dean*, [1910] A. C. 373.

(*b*) *Young v. Kershaw* (1900), 81 L. T. 531; *Turnbull v. Deval*, [1902] A. C. 429.

(*c*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 93.

(*d*) *Ibid.*, s. 120. An action commenced in the County Court may before trial be removed into the High Court by a writ of *certiorari*: see *Harrison v. Bull*, [1912] 1 K. B. 612.

whose decision is final, unless leave to appeal be given by that Court or by the Court of Appeal (e). He can on any of these grounds appeal even against an interlocutory order, such, for instance, as the refusal to grant a new trial. "There is no power to review the decision of fact arrived at in the County Court by any other tribunal than the County Court itself. A matter of law can be made the subject of appeal, but then only when the point has been raised at the trial before the learned Judge" (f). If either party is dissatisfied at the trial with the decision of the Judge on any point of law that is raised, the proper course is for him to request the Judge to take a note of the point of law, of the facts in evidence relating thereto and of his decision thereon. A copy of such note must be furnished to the party requiring the same for the purpose of appeal (g). This note may be made by the Judge even after the hearing of the suit (h), but in the absence of such note the Court may act on any other evidence or statement which it deems sufficient (i). But the fact that no such request was made to the Judge is not an absolute bar to an appeal. If the appellant can satisfactorily explain why such request was not made, the Court will decide the appeal upon any other evidence or statement, which the Court may deem sufficient, of what occurred before the Judge (k).

In some cases, however, an appeal will not lie without the leave of the County Court Judge. Where the debt or damages claimed in an action of contract or tort does not exceed £20, neither party can appeal without the leave of the County Court Judge, unless an injunction was also claimed and has been granted (l). Again, no appeal lies without leave in any interpleader proceeding, where the money claimed or the value of the goods or chattels claimed

(e) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 31, sub-s. 1 (f), s. 63, sub-s. 1 (6).

(f) *Per* Lord Halsbury, L.C., in *Smith v. Baker*, [1891] A. C., at p. 333; *The Delano*, [1895] P. 40; see also *Simpson v. Crowle*, [1921] 3 K. B. 243; *Nelson v. Wood* (1922), 126 L. T. 745.

(g) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, ss. 120, 121.

(h) See *Turner v. G. W. Ry. Co.* (1877), 2 Q. B. D., at pp. 125, 126.

(i) R. S. C., Order LIX., r. 8.

(k) R. S. C., Order LIX., r. 8; *Wohlgemuthe v. Coste*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 501.

(l) *Brune v. James*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 417; *Dixon v. Brown*, [1915] 2 K. B.

or their proceeds does not exceed £20, or in any action for the recovery of tenements, where the yearly rent or value of the premises does not exceed £20. But in all other actions of ejectment, in all equity actions or matters, in all actions in which the title to any corporeal or incorporeal hereditament is in issue, and in all cases where jurisdiction to try the action in the County Court has been given by consent, either party can appeal without leave, whatever the amount in dispute may be (*m*). But if before the decision of the Court is pronounced both parties agree in writing, signed by themselves or their solicitors or agents, that the decision of the Judge shall be final, all right of appeal is lost (*n*).

The appellant must give notice of appeal to his opponent within twenty-one days from the date of the judgment, order or finding complained of; and he must within the same period enter the appeal in the Crown Office of the High Court of Justice. But the time for appealing can be extended by the High Court, if good grounds be shown. The notice of motion must state the grounds of they appeal and whether all or part only of the judgment, order or finding is complained of (*o*).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES.

A "workman" who claims to have been injured by any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment must give his employer notice orally or in writing of the accident (*p*), as soon as practicable after it occurred and before he has voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured. If the accident be fatal, notice of it must be given by the legal personal representative of the workman or by those who were dependent on him (*q*). Such notice

(*m*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, s. 120. The plaintiff cannot at the trial abandon the excess of his claim over £20 so as to deprive the defendant of his right of appeal: *North v. Holroyd* (1867), L. R. 3 Ex. 69.

(*n*) *Ibid.*, s. 123.

(*o*) R. S. C., Order LIX., r. 10.

(*p*) Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84), s. 14. This Act replaces the Act of 1906.

(*q*) The person who most usually claims as a dependant is of course the widow of the deceased workman; she need not take out letters of administration for this purpose: *Clatworthy v. Green* (1902), 86 L. T. 702. Whether she was or was not dependent upon her husband during his lifetime is a question of fact

must give the name and address of the person injured and the date of the accident, and must state in ordinary language the cause of the injury. The absence of a notice or any defect or inaccuracy in one which is given will not be a bar to a claim unless the employer is prejudiced by such absence, defect or inaccuracy.

A claim for compensation must also be made on the employer within six months from the occurrence of the accident, or, in the case of death, within six months from the death; else the claim will not be maintainable, unless the delay be occasioned by mistake, absence from the United Kingdom or other reasonable cause. This claim may be oral, if it is sufficiently explicit; but it is often included in the written notice of the accident. It need not be a claim for a specific sum (*r*).

If the employer disputes his liability or the amount or duration of the compensation payable by him, the question will be settled by arbitration, not by an action at law. The first step which the injured workman must take is to file an application for arbitration with the Registrar of the County Court of the district in which either he or his employer resides. This document must be in the following form :—

APPLICATION FOR ARBITRATION BY INJURED WORKMAN WITH RESPECT
TO THE COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO HIM.

In the County Court of Middlesex, holden at Bloomsbury.

In the Matter of the Workman's Compensation Act, 1925 (*s*).

No. of Matter, 24 of 1926.

In the Matter of an Arbitration between

THOMAS JONES, of 185, Cleveland Street, Fitzroy Square,

London, W., Coachman - - - - - *Applicant,*
and

WILLIAM SMYTH, of 118, Portland Place, London, W.,

Gentleman - - - - - *Respondent.*

1. On September 26, 1926, personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment was caused to Thomas Jones, a workman employed by William Smyth.

and not of law. If she loses her husband and son by the same accident, she can claim compensation as dependent upon both of them, if both did in fact contribute to the maintenance of the family: *Hodgson v. West Stanley Colliery*, [1910] A. C. 229; and see *New Monckton Collieries v. Keeling*, [1911] A. C. 648.

(*r*) *Thompson v. Goold*, [1910] A. C. 409.

(*s*) See the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1926 (Stat. Rules and Orders, No. 448).

2. Questions have arisen as to the liability of the said William Smyth to pay compensation and as to the amount and duration of the compensation payable by the said William Smyth to the said Thomas Jones under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the said injury.

3. An arbitration under the above-mentioned Act is hereby requested between the said Thomas Jones and the said William Smyth for the settlement of the said questions.

4. Particulars are hereto appended :—

PARTICULARS.

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Name and address of applicant ... | 1. Thomas Jones, 185, Cleveland Street, Fitzroy Square, London, W. |
| 2. Name, place of business, and nature of business of respondent. | 2. William Smyth, 118 Portland Place, London, W., gentleman. |
| 3. Nature of employment of applicant at time of accident, and whether employed under respondent or under a contractor with him. | 3. Coachman in the employ of the respondent. |
| 4. Date and place of accident, nature of work on which workman was then engaged, and nature of accident and cause of injury. | 4. On September 26, 1926, the applicant whilst cleaning the respondent's carriage at the respondent's stable in Cleveland Mews, Fitzroy Square, W., caught his foot in the wheel and was thrown to the ground, and violently twisted his knee. |
| 5. Nature of injury. | 5. Severe injury to the knee, which produced synovitis. |
| 6. Particulars of incapacity for work, whether total or partial, and estimated duration of incapacity. | 6. Total incapacity; duration indefinite. |
| 7. Average weekly earnings during the twelve months previous to the injury, if the applicant has been so long employed under the employer by whom he was immediately employed, or if not, during any less period during which he has been so employed. | 7. 18s. per week, and board and lodging. |
| 8. Average weekly amount which the applicant is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident. | 8. None. |
| 9. Payment, allowance or benefit received from employer during the period of incapacity. | 9. Nothing. |
| 10. Amount claimed as compensation. | 10. 15s. per week during incapacity. |
| 11. Date of service of statutory notice of accident on respondent, and whether given before workman voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured. (<i>A copy of the notice, if any, to be annexed.</i>) | 11. October 24, 1926 (<i>copy annexed</i>). |
| 12. If notice not served, reason for omission to serve same. | 12. |

The names and addresses of the applicant and his solicitors are :—

Of the applicant,

THOMAS JONES,

185, Cleveland Street, Fitzroy Square, London, W.;

Of his solicitors,

HUGHES & WILLIAMS,

98, Great Portland Street, London, W.

The name and address of the respondent to be served with this application are :—
William Smyth, Esq., 118, Portland Place, London, W.

Dated this 14th day of December, 1926.

(Signed) HUGHES & WILLIAMS,

98, Great Portland Street, London, W.

Applicant's solicitors.

The Judge then fixes a day for the arbitration, and the Registrar gives notice of the date to both parties. The Registrar also forwards a copy of the above application and particulars to the respondent. The respondent, unless he admits the claim, must file an answer to it within ten clear days before the day fixed for the arbitration. Such answer may be in the following form :—

[Heading as in application for arbitration.]

ANSWER.

TAKE NOTICE that the respondent, William Smyth, states that the applicant's particulars filed in this matter are inaccurate or incomplete in the particulars hereto annexed.

[E.g. The said particulars are inaccurate in stating :

- (a) That the applicant met with any accident whilst in the employment of the respondent;
- (b) That the alleged accident happened at the time and in the manner stated by the applicant, and that the alleged injuries were caused by such accident;
- (c) That the stable at which the alleged accident happened is the respondent's stable;
- (d) That the injuries, if any, sustained by the applicant caused synovitis, or any permanent disablement or total incapacity.]

That the respondent desires to bring to the notice of the Judge [*or arbitrator*] the facts stated in the particulars hereto annexed.

[E.g. That the applicant refuses to submit himself to medical examination as required by the respondent in accordance with the Act.

That the respondent intends at the hearing of the arbitration to give evidence, and rely on the facts stated in the particulars hereto annexed.

E.g. That notice of the alleged accident was not given to the respondent as required by the Act;

That the claim for compensation was not made on the respondent within the time limited by the Act.]

That the respondent denies his liability to pay compensation under the Act in respect of the injury to the applicant mentioned in the applicant's particulars, on the grounds stated in the particulars hereto annexed.

[E.g. That the injury to the applicant was not caused by any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

That such injury was attributable to the serious and wilful misconduct of the applicant, and did not result in death or serious and permanent disablement;

That at the time of the alleged accident the applicant was not in the employ of the respondent, but was then employed by Simon Clarke, jobmaster, of Cleveland Mews, Fitzroy Square, W.

Or, if the claim be made under section 8—

That the disease mentioned in the applicant's particulars was not con-

tracted whilst the applicant was in the employment of the respondent;

That the disease mentioned in the applicant's particulars was not due to the nature of the employment in which the applicant was employed by the respondent.]

And further take notice that the names and addresses of the said respondent and his solicitors are :—

Of the respondent,

WILLIAM SMYTH,

118, Portland Place, London, W.;

Of his solicitors,

BLACK & WHITE,

80, Bedford Row, London, W.C.

Dated this 11th day of January, 1927.

(Signed) BLACK & WHITE,

Solicitors for the respondent.

To the Registrar of the Court, and

To the applicant, Thomas Jones.

Unless the parties agree upon a private arbitrator, the case will be heard either by the County Court Judge himself, or by an arbitrator appointed by him with the consent of the Lord Chancellor. The Arbitration Act, 1889 (*t*), does not apply to such an arbitration (*u*). The amount of compensation is regulated by sections 8—13 of the Act. Except in the case of death, the award directs a weekly payment to be made by the respondent; it does not award a lump sum payable immediately to the applicant. The award can be enforced in the same way as a County Court judgment. The employer may subsequently apply to determine or diminish the weekly payment on the ground that the applicant has wholly or in part recovered from his injuries and is earning some wages. And generally, whenever the circumstances have altered, the County Court Judge has power to vary the award.

It is the duty of the arbitrator to ascertain whether on the day of the hearing the applicant is disabled from doing his ordinary work by reason of injuries caused by an accident which arose out of and in course of his employment. If so, he must make an award in his favour; and in such award he cannot fix a date at which the weekly payments should cease. "It is not competent for an arbitrator to make such an award. It has two defects, and it has two results. One is that the arbitrator is taking upon himself the function of a prophet, which is not what he ought to do; and the

(*t*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49.

(*u*) Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, Sched. II. (4).

next is this, which to my mind is a more serious matter: it shifts the *onus* of proof in a mode which is, or which may be, very unfair to the workman. The duty of the arbitrator is to say what, upon the evidence adduced before him at the time of the hearing for a review, is the condition of the workman, and on that footing he ought to make an award of so much per week during the incapacity. Then if there is a change, if the man is getting better, it is for the employer to seek to review the weekly payments on the ground that the incapacity has ceased or determined, or whatever the cause may be. The burden is thus thrown upon the employer to show that there is a change of circumstances" (x).

The award, therefore, is now usually in the following form:—

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BETWEEN A B AND C D.

Having duly considered the matter submitted to me, I do hereby make my award as follows:—

1. I order that the respondent, C D, do pay to the applicant, A B, the weekly sum of fifteen shillings as compensation for personal injury caused to the said A B on the 1st day of January, 1926, by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as a workman employed by the said respondent, such weekly payment to commence as from the 23rd day of February, 1926, and to continue during the total or partial incapacity of the said A B for work, or until the same shall be ended, diminished, increased or redeemed in accordance with the provisions of the above-mentioned Act.

2. And I order that the said C D do forthwith pay to the said A B the sum of £15 15s., being the amount of such weekly payments calculated from the 23rd day of February, 1926, until the 20th day of July, 1926, and do thereafter pay the said sum of fifteen shillings to the said A B on Wednesday in every week.

3. And I order that the said C D do pay to the Registrar of this Court, for the use of the applicant, his costs of and incident to this arbitration, such costs, in default of agreement between the parties as to the amount thereof, to be taxed by the Registrar under column B of the scales of costs in use in the County Courts, and to be paid by the said C D to the Registrar within fourteen days from the date of the certificate of the result of such taxation.

4. And I direct that either party have liberty from time to time to apply as he or they may think fit.

Dated this 25th day of July, 1926.

X Y Z,
Arbitrator.

The decision of an arbitrator appointed by the County Court Judge with the consent of the Lord Chancellor to settle any claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, cannot be reviewed in any way, unless such arbitrator thinks fit to submit a question of law to the County Court Judge. If, however, the County Court Judge himself acts as arbitrator, or if he gives any decision on a question of law

(x) *Per Cozens-Hardy, M.R.*, in *Baker v. Jewell*, [1910] 2 K. B., at pp. 674, 675; and see *Ball v. Hunt*, [1912] A. C. 496.

submitted to him by an arbitrator, there is no appeal on any question of fact; but the decision of the County Court Judge can be reviewed on either of the following grounds :—

- (a) that there is no evidence to support his finding;
- (b) that he proceeded upon an erroneous view of law, *i.e.*, having ascertained the facts, he applied the law wrongly.

The appeal on these grounds lies direct to the Court of Appeal, and not to a Divisional Court; and from the decision of the Court of Appeal an appeal lies to the House of Lords.

BOOK VI.

THE LAW OF PERSONS.



So far we have dealt with the subject-matter on the general assumption that the individuals concerned are under no disability and can sue or be sued in their own right. In this Book we deal specially with rights and liabilities arising from personal disability or special personal relations with others, both in civil and criminal cases. The relation of master and servant, and of principal and agent, which arise, as a rule, out of a contract, have been, for that reason, already discussed. We proceed here to treat of :—

- I. The King and his Officers.
- II. Natural Persons ; (a) Husband and wife.
 (b) Parent and child.
 (c) Infants.
 (d) Lunatics.
 (e) Bankrupts.
 (f) Executors and Administrators.
- III. Artificial Persons : Corporations and Companies.
- IV. The Legal Profession.

CHAPTER I.

THE KING, HIS OFFICERS AND HIS SUBJECTS.

The King and his Family.

THE KING is the supreme head of the realm (a). He represents the State in its relations with other countries; the administration of the affairs of the nation is carried out by officers in his name; he is the head of the Legislature, and without his assent no measure can pass into law; he is also the head of the Navy and Army. Justice is administered by the Courts of Law in his name, and the prerogative of mercy is vested in him (b).

From very early times the King has been regarded as a corporation (c). "The King never dies," although the person who was King yesterday may not be alive to-day. The King, therefore, can hold property both as King and as a private individual. He cannot dispose of the property of the Crown by will, but his own property passes under his will or by intestacy according to the ordinary law of the land (d).

The King frequently appears as a litigant in his own Courts. All criminal prosecutions are undertaken in the King's name; and he must bring actions in the Courts to enforce most of his claims in contract or in tort.

Nevertheless, the King is not bound in all cases to take proceedings to enforce them. Debts due to the King by record or by specialty and debts due from persons liable to account to him can

(a) The succession to the Crown is vested in the descendants of the Electress Sophia of Hanover in tail general, being Protestants, by the Bill of Rights (1 Wm. & M., st. 2, c. 2), and the Act of Settlement (12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2), as amended by the Accession Declaration Act, 1910 (10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, c. 29).

(b) There are, however, certain crimes which the King cannot pardon: see Vol. 1, p. 140.

(c) See *post*, pp. 796 *et seq.*

(d) For the separation of private estates of the Crown from the public estates, and the law generally on the subject, see 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 88; 4 Geo. 4, c. 18; 10 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 127; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 37; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 61; and 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67, s. 4, sub-s. 1.

be recovered by execution without any previous judgment of any Court. The process is called a writ of "immediate extent" (e), by which the sheriff is commanded to seize the debtor's chattels. If the debtor is dead, his property is still liable to be seized under a writ known as "*diem clausit extremum*," no matter into whose hands such property may have passed (f). Until seizure the lands of the debtor are subject to a lien for such debts, but he can convey them free from the lien unless the debts have been duly registered against him (g).

The King is not capable of committing a crime; he cannot be sued for any tort or breach of contract. Nevertheless, when it is alleged that the King or any officer of his has broken a contract, or wrongfully detains property or money belonging to a subject, it is usual for the King to consent to the question being tried by the Courts, and proceedings are then instituted by a Petition of Right or *Monstrans de droit* (h).

The immunity of the King from criminal and civil process does not extend to the members of his family. The Queen Consort has, indeed, always been entitled to own property and to sue and be sued as a *feme sole*; but no member of the Royal family other than the eldest son and daughter and the eldest son's wife (i) has any position in law other than that of a subject (k).

The Officers of the Crown.

Although "the King can do no wrong," he cannot authorise any other person to commit wrongs. If the King commands one of his subjects to commit a crime or a tort in the British dominions, the King's command affords that subject no immunity. High officers of State and their

(e) 33 Hen. 8, c. 39; and 13 Eliz. c. 4.

(f) See *R. v. Pridgeon*, [1910] 2 K. B. 543.

(g) 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35; and the Crown Suits Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 104).

(h) For these proceedings, see *ante*, pp. 514 *et seq.*

(i) It is treason to compass the eldest son's death or to violate the chastity of his wife or of the eldest daughter unmarried of the King and Queen: see Vol. 1, pp. 141—153.

(k) In order to contract a valid marriage, they must either obtain the consent of the King or fulfil certain onerous conditions: Royal Marriages Act, 1772 (12 Geo. 3, c. 11). Their marriages are regulated by the common law in force before Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act, 1753 (26 Geo. 2, c. 33), for such marriages are specially excepted from that and the subsequent Marriage Acts.

subordinates must answer to the law for any crime or wrong committed by them. They cannot plead that they acted in obedience to royal commands or in exercise of their administrative functions; "for the warrant of no man, not even of the King himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act" (l).

The governor of a colony is such an officer of State; he does not possess the immunity of a Sovereign. Consequently he may be prosecuted or sued for any crime or tort which he may have committed, and that either in the Courts of this country or in the Courts of his own colony (m). Thus, if a colonial governor or his deputy is guilty of oppression, extortion or any other crime abroad, he may be tried for the same in this country (n). And so can any other person employed in the service of the Crown abroad who commits a crime in the pretended execution of his office (o).

We have already dealt with the immunity of Judges of superior and inferior Courts respectively for acts done or words spoken in the course of their judicial functions (p), and with their power of committal for contempt of Court (q). The law also affords special protection to justices of the peace (r) and to police constables (s).

If an act *prima facie* wrongful, which affects the person or property of an alien, is done in a foreign country by a representative of the Crown, and either was previously sanctioned or has been subsequently ratified by the Crown, no action lies here against that officer, nor will a petition of right be entertained against the Crown. Thus, in *Buron v. Denman* (t), the defendant, while engaged as a

(l) *Per cur.* in *Sands v. Child* (1693), 3 Lev., at p. 352; *Entick v. Carrington* (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1030, 1067.

(m) *Mostyn v. Fabrigas* (1774), 1 Cowp. 161; *Cameron v. Kyte* (1835), 3 Knapp, P. C. C. 332; *Phillips v. Eyre* (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 1; *Musgrave v. Pulido* (1879), 5 App. Cas. 102. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland is an exception: *Tandy v. Earl of Westmoreland* (1792), 27 St. Tr. 1246; *Sullivan v. Earl Spencer* (1872), 6 Ir. R. C. L. 176. As to the proclamation of "martial law," see *Marais v. General Officer Commanding*, [1902] A. C. 109; *Mgomini, Ex parte* (1906), 94 L. T. 558; see also *R. v. Allen*, [1921] 2 I. R. 241; *R. v. Governor of Internment Camp*, [1924] 1 I. R. 32.

(n) 11 Will 3, c. 12; and see *Phillips v. Eyre* (1868), L. R. 6 Q. B. 1.

(o) 42 Geo. 3, c. 85, s. 1.

(p) See Vol. 1, pp. 429—431.

(q) See Vol. 1, pp. 220—223.

(r) See Vol. 1, p. 489.

(s) See Vol. 1, pp. 486, 487.

(t) (1859), 2 Exch. 167; see also *Cook v. Sprigg*, [1899] A. C. 552; *Salaman v. Secretary of State for India*, [1906] 1 K. B. 613; and cf. *West Rand Mining Co. v. R.*, [1905] 2 K. B. 391; *Johnson v. Pedler*, [1921] 2 A. C. 262.

naval officer in suppressing the slave trade, burnt down the plaintiff's buildings which were on a foreign shore, and released the slaves who were confined in them, and it was held that no action lay. The representative of the Crown would, however, be liable if his trespass was committed against a British subject (*u*).

Again, officers of state are not liable for the acts or defaults of their servants unless done by their command. Thus, if a subordinate official in the course of his duty commits a trespass, he alone will be liable for it (*x*). "The head of a Government department is not liable for the neglect or torts of officials in the department, unless it can be shown that the act complained of was substantially the act of the head himself" (*y*).

British Subjects.

The law as to British nationality has been consolidated and amended by the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Acts, 1914, 1918 and 1922 (*z*). British subjects may be—

- (i) natural-born British subjects,
- (ii) naturalized British subjects,
- (iii) denizens, or
- (iv) the wives of any such persons.

(i) *Natural-born British subjects*.—This term includes—

(a) Any person born within His Majesty's dominions and allegiance (*a*), no matter what the nationality of his father may have been (*b*), except the child of a foreign Sovereign, of an ambassador or other minister accredited to this country, or of his suite or staff (*c*), or the child of an alien enemy who, at the time of its birth, is in hostile occupation of the place where the child is born (*d*); and

(*u*) *Walker v. Baird*, [1892] A. C. 491.

(*x*) *Raleigh v. Goschen*, [1898] 1 Ch. 73; cf. *Bainbridge v. Postmaster-General*, [1906] 1 K. B. 178; *R. v. Earl of Crewe*, [1910] 2 K. B. 576.

(*y*) *Per Romer, J.*, in *Raleigh v. Goschen*, [1898] 1 Ch., at p. 77; and see *Hosier v. Earl of Derby*, [1918] 2 K. B. 671.

(*z*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17; 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 38; and 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 44; see also Naturalization Regulations, 1922.

(*a*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, s. 1, sub-s. 1. The child of a British subject is born within His Majesty's allegiance "if born in a place where by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, or other lawful means, His Majesty exercises jurisdiction over British subjects," e.g., in Constantinople.

(*b*) *Calvin's Case* (1608), 7 Rep. 5 a; but see *Isaacson v. Durant* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 54.

(*c*) Westlake, *Private International Law* (4th ed.), pp. 348—351.

(*d*) *Calvin's Case* (1608), 7 Rep. 18 a, 18 b.

(b) Any person born out of His Majesty's dominions whose father was a British subject at the time of that person's birth and either was born within His Majesty's allegiance, or was a person to whom a certificate of naturalization had been granted (e), or had become a British subject by reason of any annexation of territory, or was at the time of that person's birth in the service of the Crown (f); and

(c) Any person born out of His Majesty's dominions whose father was at the time of his birth a British ambassador or minister accredited to the country in which such person was born, or a member of the suite or staff of such ambassador or minister (g); and

(d) Any person born on board a British ship, whether in foreign territorial waters or not (h).

(ii) *Naturalized British Subjects*, who enjoy all the rights and privileges of natural-born British subjects.—The term includes—

(a) Any person who has obtained a certificate of naturalization in the United Kingdom in accordance with the laws in force when such certificate was granted (i); and

(b) Any foreign-born child of a person naturalized under the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 (k);

(c) Any foreign-born child whose father was at the time of birth a British subject and whose birth was registered at a British consulate within one year. The conditions are complied with if the father was born within His Majesty's allegiance or has become naturalized or become a British subject by reason of an annexation of territory, or was at the time of birth in the service of the Crown (l).

(e) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, s. 1, sub-s. 1. The proviso regarding the children of naturalized persons is an innovation, and therefore affects only children born after January 1, 1915 (the date when this Act came into force). See also *R. v. Albany Street Police Station Superintendent*, [1915] 3 K. B. 716.

(f) 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 38, s. 2, sub-s. 1.

(g) *Calvin's Case*, *supra*; but see *De Geer v. Stone* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 243.

(h) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, s. 1, sub-s. 1. The converse also holds good: a person born on board a foreign ship is not a British subject by reason only that the ship was in British territorial waters at the time of his birth: *ibid.*, s. 1, sub-s. 2.

(i) See, however, section 3, sub-section 2 of the Act of 1918, which forbids for ten years the naturalization of former enemies of this country.

(k) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, s. 5, sub-s. 1.

(l) *Ibid.*; or in special circumstances two years.

(iii) *Denizens*.—An alien may obtain from the Crown letters patent which make him (either permanently or for a specified time) a British subject. Such letters are called letters of denization, and the grant of them is an exercise of the royal prerogative and is subject to no restrictions whatever. Prior to the Naturalization Act of 1870 (*m*) a denizen might acquire land by purchase, which an alien might not, but could not inherit land. Now during the period of his denization he is in much the same position as a naturalized British subject, except that he cannot be a member of the Privy Council or of either House of Parliament.

(iv) *Wives*.—The wife of a British subject is a British subject, and the wife of an alien is an alien, wherever they may have been born. Where, however, a man during the continuance of his marriage ceases to be a British subject, his wife may make a declaration that she desires to retain British nationality and will thereupon remain a British subject (*n*). But she cannot do this if the Secretary of State has revoked her husband's certificate of naturalization and directed that she shall cease to be a British subject (*o*).

A person ceases to be a British subject, firstly, on becoming Sovereign of another State (*p*); secondly, if he is born a British subject, but under the laws of another State, and after attaining his majority elects to be the subject of that other State, and makes a declaration of alienage (*q*); thirdly, if he becomes naturalized in a foreign country (*r*); and fourthly, a woman, who is a British subject and marries an alien, takes her husband's nationality.

A naturalized British subject will also lose British nationality on the revocation of his certificate of naturalization. The law regarding such revocation is governed by section 7 of the Act of 1914 as amended by section 1 of the Act of 1918. The Secretary of State may by order revoke a

(*m*) See now the Acts cited above.

(*n*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, s. 10.

(*o*) *Ibid.*, ss. 7 and 7A. See now section 1 of the Act of 1918.

(*p*) As, for example, when H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh became Duke of Saxe Coburg Gotha, a State of the German Empire.

(*q*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, s. 14; see also section 15.

(*r*) *Ibid.*, s. 13.

certificate if he is satisfied that it was obtained by fraud or that the person naturalized has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal to His Majesty, and in other cases which are set out in section 7, sub-section 2.

The Secretary of State may also direct that the wife and children of a person whose certificate of naturalization is revoked shall cease to be British subjects, but such an order cannot be made unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that had she herself held a certificate of naturalization in her own right, this certificate could properly have been revoked (*s*).

Where any British subject ceases to be a British subject, he is not thereby discharged from any obligation in respect of any act done before he ceased to be a British subject (*t*).

Various disabilities affecting both natural and artificial persons have been dealt with in the preceding chapters of this Book. It only remains here to discuss the disabilities of subjects who have come under the ban of the law. A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanour, as a rule, suffers no loss of status. He is still as capable of exercising his rights as any other person, but, of course, if sentenced to imprisonment he cannot, without leave, do any act which necessitates his presence outside the prison in which he is confined. A person who has been convicted of a felony and sentenced to penal servitude is in a very different position. While undergoing his sentence, he cannot bring an action "for the recovery of any property, debt or damage whatsoever" (*u*), or make a valid contract; but he can do so when he is out on "ticket-of-leave" (*x*). His property on his conviction may be entrusted to the care of the Administrator of Felons' Property, who has "absolute power to let, mortgage, sell, convey or transfer any part of such property as to him shall seem fit" (*y*). After

(*s*) British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 38), s. 7A.

(*t*) *Ibid.*, s. 16.

(*u*) It is doubtful whether the word "damage" includes a tort which is not based on actual damage to property.

(*x*) Forfeitures Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23), ss. 8, 30.

(*y*) *Ibid.*, s. 12; *Gaskell, In re*, [1906] 1 Ch. 440, 2 Ch. 1, C. A., for powers of the administrator.

serving his sentence a convicted person resumes his ordinary civil rights.

Outlawry was formerly the ordinary process by which a person was compelled to appear before a Court of justice to answer a criminal charge or a civil claim made against him. If after formal summons he did not appear, he was declared to be an outlaw, that is, he was placed outside the protection of the law, and, at one time, it was even said that he could be slain with impunity (z). An outlaw's chattels were forfeited to the Crown (a) and he was incapable of doing any legal act, of suing or being sued, of giving evidence or of serving as a juror (b). Outlawry in civil cases was abolished in 1879 (c); but it is still possible for a person who is accused of a criminal offence to be made an "outlaw," though this course has not been taken for many years (d).

Aliens.

Foreign Sovereigns and their representatives are not subject to the jurisdiction of the English criminal Courts. If they commit crimes while in England, the only remedy is to require them to leave the country (e).

They can, however, enforce their civil rights by action in our Courts, but by so doing they submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and so enable it to adjudicate upon any claim which the defendant has against them arising out of the subject-matter of the action (f), but not upon a mere cross-claim (g). As to all other claims against them they are outside the jurisdiction of the Courts (h). Unless they voluntarily submit to that jurisdiction (i), the Court has

(z) See Vol. 1, p. 270.

(a) Specially excepted from the Forfeitures Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23), s. 1.

(b) *Juries Act*, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 77).

(c) 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, s. 3.

(d) 25 Edw. 1, c. 29; 18 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. 1; 18 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 4. The last proceeding in outlawry was in the case of Lord Ernest Vane Tempest in 1859.

(e) Westlake, *International Law*, Part I., p. 266.

(f) *Yzquierdo v. Clydebank Engineering Co.*, [1902] A. C. 524; *U.S.A. v. Prioleau* (1865), 2 H. & M. 559; *U.S.A. v. McRae* (1867), L. R. 3 Ch. 79.

(g) *Imperial Japanese Government v. P. & O. Co.*, [1895] A. C. 644; *Strousberg v. Republic of Costa Rica* (1880), 29 W. R. 125; *S. A. Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge*, [1898] 1 Ch. 190.

(h) *Mighell v. Sultan of Johore*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149; *The Parlement Belge* (1880), 5 P. D. 197, followed in *The Jassy*, [1906] P. 270; *Macartney v. Garbutt* (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 368; *Musurus Bey v. Gaddan*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 533.

(i) *Taylor v. Best* (1854), 23 L. J. C. P. 89; *Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, In re*, [1914] 1 Ch. 139; *Suarez, In re*, [1917] 2 Ch. 131.

no power to try an action brought against them. Again, if any person does an act within the territory of a foreign Sovereign by his authority, our Courts will not inquire into its legality; such an act will be regarded here as justified by the law of that country (*k*).

We have already discussed the position of companies incorporated in a foreign country (*l*). It now remains to deal with an alien, that is, a natural person who does not owe allegiance to the Crown. It has been said that no alien has a legal right to enter this country, but as a matter of all aliens were freely admitted until the passing of the Aliens Act, 1905 (*m*), which excluded aliens who, by reason of their physical defects or poverty, were undesirable immigrants into this country. Much larger powers of restriction and deportation were conferred on the Home Secretary during the war by the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914 (*n*); and many of these powers are retained under the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1919 (*o*), which repeals and replaces the Act of 1905. Every foreigner who enters the realm, for however short a time, owes the King local allegiance during his stay, and is subject to our laws (*p*). He will be liable, therefore, for every crime or tort which he commits within the jurisdiction of the English Courts. If he leaves England before he is prosecuted for a crime which he is alleged to have committed, he may, as a rule, like any British subject, be brought back under the Extradition Acts, 1870 and 1873, or the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 (*q*). But in the case of a tort committed by an alien who has left England before the writ is issued, the plaintiff will have great difficulty in obtaining leave under Order XI. to issue a writ to be served on him abroad (*r*). An alien will also be liable civilly for any tort committed abroad, if the tort is also either a tort

(*k*) *Dobree v. Napier* (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 781; *R. v. Lesley* (1860), Bell's C. C. 220; *Carr v. Francis Times*, [1902] A. C. 176.

(*l*) See *post*, p. 796.

(*m*) Repealed as from 1920 by Order in Council authorised by section 16 of the Act of 1919.

(*n*) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12.

(*o*) 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 92.

(*p*) *R. v. de la Motte* (1781), 21 St. Tr. 688.

(*q*) See note (*g*), *ante*, p. 401.

(*r*) *Bree v. Marescaux* (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 434; but see *Tozier v. Hawkins* (1886), 15 Q. B. D. 650, 680.

or a crime by the law of the place where it was committed, provided he is now within jurisdiction and can be served with a writ (s).

An alien is not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Courts of the British Empire, unless he commits a crime within the British dominions or on board a British ship. Thus, if a foreigner kills another foreigner, or even a British subject, on the high seas on board a foreign ship, he is in no way amenable to the law of England, or triable in England except in a case of piracy (t).

The rights of an alien enemy are quite different from those of an alien whose country is at peace with us; the term "alien enemy" includes "not only the subjects of any State at war with us, but also any British subjects or the subjects of any neutral State *voluntarily* residing in a hostile country" (u). An alien enemy is in a similar position to an outlaw; he is protected from being wantonly killed or outraged (x). An alien enemy cannot maintain an action in our Courts, unless he be licensed to do so by the Crown: the burden is upon him to establish the licence under which he claims to sue. An alien enemy who is sued here has a right to defend the action and to appeal against any adverse decision (y). British subjects "adhering to the King's enemies" are treated as alien enemies (z).

It is doubtful whether the defendant can waive the plaintiff's incapacity, for "the objection being one based on considerations of public policy affecting the Sovereign, his Courts should be held bound to take notice of the inability to sue" (a). The *onus* in any case where a question arises whether a person is an alien or not, rests upon that person to show that he is not an alien (b). Upon the resumption of peace, his rights again become those of an alien friend; they are not extinguished by the war.

All private trading with an alien enemy is illegal without the

(s) *Machado v. Fontes*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231; *Carr v. Francis Times*, [1902] A. C. 176; *Evans v. Stein* (1905), F. 65.

(t) *R. v. De Mattos* (1836), 7 C. & P. 458; *R. v. Serva* (1845), 1 Cox, 292; *R. v. Lewis* (1857), Dears. & B. 182.

(u) Dicey on Parties to an Action, p. 3, cited with approval by Lord Reading, C.J., in *Porter v. Freudenberg*, [1915] 1 K. B., at p. 869.

(x) See Vol. 1, p. 270.

(y) *Porter v. Freudenberg*, [1915] 1 K. B. 857.

(z) *Netherlands S. A. R. C. v. Fisher* (1901), 18 T. L. R. 116.

(a) *Per Lord Davey in Janson v. Driefontein Mines*, [1902] A. C., at p. 499.

(b) *R. v. Kakelo*, [1923] 2 K. B. 793.

King's licence (c). "Undertaking by contract to indemnify the King's enemies against loss inflicted by the King's forces is also illegal" (d). "If a loss has taken place before the commencement of hostilities, the right of action on a policy of insurance, by which the goods lost were insured, is suspended during the continuance of war and revives on the restoration of peace" (e). A corporation incorporated in a country at war with Great Britain is an alien enemy, even if all its members are subjects of the British Crown (f).

An alien friend, on the other hand, has the same right to the protection of the law as a British subject (g). Thus an alien friend residing abroad may sue in England on any contract made with him or for any tort committed on him in England (h). In contract the jurisdiction depends upon the nature and terms of the contract itself. In tort the place where the tort was committed is the test of jurisdiction, not the domicile of the plaintiff or the defendant. But any plaintiff whose ordinary place of residence is not in the British Isles will, as a rule, be ordered to give security for costs, unless he either has real property within jurisdiction available in execution, or is co-plaintiff with others resident in England (i).

(c) *The Hoop* (1799), 1 Rob. (C.) 196. See *Dunn v. Bucknall*, [1902] 2 K. B. 614.

(d) *Per* Earl of Halsbury, L.C., in *Janson v. Driefontein Mines*, [1902] A. C., at p. 494.

(e) *Per* Lord Davey, *ibid.*, at p. 499.

(f) See the remarks of Lord Macnaghten, *ibid.*, at p. 497.

(g) Except as mentioned Vol. 1, p. 135. As to when an alien can be made a bankrupt, see *post*, pp. 778, 779.

(h) *Pisani v. Lawson* (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 90

(i) Order LXV., r. 6A; 31 & 32 Vict. c. 54, s. 5.

CHAPTER II.

NATURAL PERSONS.

(A) *Husband and Wife.*

THE common law of England placed a married woman under grave disabilities. Although she could commit both crimes and torts, she could not make a contract, or appoint an agent. She could hold lands as tenant in fee-simple, in tail, or for life; but her husband was entitled to the income, unless the land was settled on her for her separate use. The husband also on the marriage became absolutely entitled to all her chattels personal in possession, and also to such of her choses in action as he reduced into possession during the coverture. He had, moreover, the right to dispose of her chattels real; but if he died before reducing her choses in action into possession or alienating her chattels real, they survived to her; he had no right to dispose of these by will.

In most other matters the rule was that “a husband and wife are one”—a rule which, while it often protected the wife, generally benefited the husband at her expense; though in a few cases, as we shall see, it imposed upon him serious liabilities.

By the custom of the City of London, however, a married woman from early times could carry on a trade. The Court of Chancery, at a later date, permitted her to enjoy her separate property independently of her husband, though it recognised as valid a proviso forbidding her to anticipate her income, which would not be valid in the case of a man, a spinster or a widow. And now by the successive Married Women’s Property Acts, 1870 to 1908 (a), she has

(a) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63; 8 Edw. 7, c. 27.

been placed practically in the position of a *feme sole*, so far as her property is concerned. In other respects, however, certain disabilities still remain (b).

The validity of a marriage depends upon the law of the domicile of the parties, so far as their personal capacity to marry is concerned, and upon the law of the place of celebration, so far as the form of the ceremony is concerned. If either party at the time of the marriage is an idiot, or if the parties are within the prohibited degrees of relationship, the marriage is invalid.

The validity of an English marriage now mainly depends upon statute (c). Marriages within the forbidden degrees of affinity and consanguinity are prohibited not only by ecclesiastical law, but also by express statute (d). These invalid marriages are actually void—that is, they will be treated as null by any Court where evidence is given of the circumstances that invalidate them. There are others which are only voidable. A marriage is voidable when the cause of its invalidity is merely one for which a Court of matrimonial jurisdiction may set it aside, if called upon to do so whilst both the parties are still alive, as, for instance, where either party to the marriage is sexually impotent. But, until thus set aside, such a marriage must be treated by all Courts as valid. Marriage with a deceased wife's sister or a deceased husband's brother is now valid (e).

A husband can obtain a divorce on proof that his wife has been guilty of adultery, and a wife may obtain similar relief when the husband has since July, 1923, been guilty of such misconduct (f). Formerly it was necessary for a wife to prove in addition that he had been guilty of desertion, cruelty, rape or like offences.

A judicial separation is only a divorce from bed and board; the spouses live apart, but are still husband and wife. Either party can obtain a judicial separation on proof of adultery, desertion, cruelty or the commission of an unnatural offence by the other. There is another remedy in the case of desertion—the party deserted may apply for an order for the restitution of conjugal rights, but such an order is now seldom applied for, as disobedience to it can no longer be punished by imprisonment for contempt of Court,

(b) For instance, she cannot sue or be sued by her husband in the same way as either can sue or be sued by a stranger (see *post*, p. 734). A judgment against a man, a spinster or a widow is a judgment against them personally, but a judgment against a married woman is a judgment against her separate property, not against her (see *post*, p. 736). A married woman cannot be a guardian *ad litem*: *Duke of Somerset, In re* (1887), 34 Ch. D. 465. As to when a married woman can be made a bankrupt, see *post*, p. 778.

(c) 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 21; 6 & 7 Will 4, c. 85, s. 39.

(d) 5 & 6 Will 4, c. 54.

(e) 7 Edw. 7, c. 47. See *R. v. Dibdin*, [1910] P. 57; [1912] A. C. 593; and see as to deceased brother's widow's marriages, the Deceased Brother's Widow's Marriage Act, 1921 (11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 24).

(f) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923, now incorporated in the Judicature Act, 1925.

though it may be made the ground for a judicial separation under the Judicature Act, 1925.

In all the above cases, application must be made to the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. That Court has jurisdiction to dissolve any marriage, whether celebrated in England or not, if the parties are domiciled in England at the time when the proceedings for a divorce are commenced; in all other matrimonial causes "residence, not domicile, is the test of jurisdiction" (g). But there are two cases in which power to grant a judicial separation has been conferred by statute on justices of the peace:—

- (a) In the case of an aggravated assault committed by a husband upon his wife, but not apparently if committed by a wife upon her husband (h);
- (b) Where the wife or husband of the applicant is an habitual drunkard (i).

A husband is entitled to his wife's society. She must live where he wishes and in the house he provides for her, unless the Court has judicially separated them (k) or they have agreed to live apart. But the husband is not entitled to exercise force to claim his rights (l). If either party declines cohabitation, the remedy is to obtain a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, but if the decree is not obeyed it is now only enforced by judicial separation. A husband, however, is not bound to maintain his wife, if without cause she refuses to live with him (m).

As against third persons the husband's right to the society of his wife can be enforced by action. It is true that since the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (n), he can only claim damages for adultery in proceedings in the Divorce Court, the old common law action of criminal conversation being abolished. But for other wrongs done to her, such as assault or false imprisonment, if they actually cause him for a time to lose her society, he can

(g) See also *Stathatos v. Stathatos*, [1913] P. 46; *Casdagli v. Casdagli*, [1919] A. C. 145.

(h) Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39), s. 4. Appeal in such cases lies to a Divisional Court of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, not to the King's Bench Division.

(i) Licensing Act, 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. 28), s. 5.

(k) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 16; Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39), s. 5.

(l) *R. v. Jackson*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 671.

(m) See *post*, p. 740.

(n) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 59.

sue (o). She also has a right of action for the same wrongs and can sue in her own right in respect of them.

The fiction that a husband and wife are but one person still lingers in our criminal law. Thus a husband and wife cannot be guilty of a conspiracy, unless some third person conspires with them. A wife does not—at all events apart from the provisions of the Married Women's Property Acts—commit a crime if she receives from her husband goods which she knows to have been stolen. Except in very special circumstances (p), a wife cannot steal from her husband or a husband from his wife. But a wife can have separate possession of articles which are her separate property, even though they are in the common residence of herself and husband (q).

There are some cases in which a wife derives assistance from the fact that she is supposed to be in subjection to her husband. The ancient presumption in the case of most crimes that a wife who committed an offence in the presence of her husband was coerced by her husband, has been abolished, but on a charge for any offence other than murder or treason, it is a good defence to prove that in fact the offence was committed in the presence and under the coercion of the husband (r). If she did the act, in his absence but by his express command, she will be liable as a principal (x) and he as an accessory before the fact. And coverture, of course, is no defence where the husband had nothing to do with the crime committed by his wife (y).

For the purpose of raising the defence that the prisoner acted under her husband's coercion, the marriage need not be strictly proved; evidence of reputation is admissible, and may be sufficient to satisfy the jury. If the woman is charged in a joint indictment as the wife of the man, no kind of proof is necessary. Mere cohabitation will not, however, suffice to discharge the woman from liability. A wife, who has incited her husband to the commission

(o) See the judgment of Parke, B., in *Norris v. Seed* (1849), 3 Exch., at p. 791; cf. *Watson v. Jackson*, [1909] 2 K. B. 193.

(p) See *R. v. Streeter*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 601.

(q) See *R. v. Murray*, [1906] 2 K. B. 385.

(r) Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 47.

(x) *R. v. Morris* (1814), Russ. & Ry. 270.

(y) *R. v. Hughes* (1813), 2 Lewin, 229; *R. v. Carlile* (1819), 3 B. & Ald. 167.

of a felony, can be indicted and convicted as an accessory before the fact, if the felony be committed; if not, she can be convicted of the misdemeanour of inciting. But although she knows that he has committed a felony, she has a right to receive and screen him (z).

If a tort be committed against a married woman, she has now two courses open to her. She may either sue alone, or she may join her husband as co-plaintiff; in the latter case the husband will be entitled to recover in the same action (a) any special damage that may have accrued to him. But where special damage is essential to the cause of action, she cannot sue alone unless she can show special damage to herself. That her husband has sustained special damage in consequence of the tort committed against her will not avail her. In cases of libel or slander, however, the husband will be allowed to sue for and recover any such special damage, although his character was not defamed; for the reputation of a husband is so intimately connected with that of his wife that, whenever words spoken of her have caused damage to him, he has always been allowed to sue as though the words had been spoken of himself (b).

By the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (c), s. 1, sub-s. 2, a married woman is now capable "of suing and being sued, either in contract or in tort, or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a *feme sole*, and her husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, or be made a party to any action or other legal proceeding brought by or taken against her; and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such action or proceeding shall be her separate property; and any damages or costs recovered against her in any such action or proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property, and not otherwise."

A married woman, therefore, may now sue for a tort without her husband or any next friend; and she cannot be ordered to give security for the costs of the action, even although she has at the

(z) For the rules regulating the evidence of a husband or wife against his or her spouse, see *ante*, pp. 630, 631.

(a) Order XVIII., r. 4.

(b) *Riding v. Smith* (1876), 1 Ex. D. 91; and see Odgers on Libel and Slander (5th ed.), p. 568.

(c) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.

time of action no separate estate, and there is nothing upon which, if she fails, the defendant can issue available execution (*d*).

The damages recovered in any action brought by the wife alone under this Act are to be her separate property; she, therefore, still cannot recover for any loss which her husband has suffered. "The Act does not destroy the husband's right, but only relieves the woman from incapacity" (*e*).

If a tort be committed against the wife before the marriage, the husband may still be joined as a co-plaintiff with her; if she marry pending action, the husband may be made a party (*f*), though this is not necessary (*g*). The right of action survives to the wife on her husband's death, whether he was a party or not; the action does not abate. If, however, the wife dies before final judgment, the action ceases; it cannot be continued by her husband either *jure mariti*, or as her administrator. If a married woman fails in an action she may be condemned in costs, although her husband was joined as a co-plaintiff (*h*).

By section 12 of the same Act, "every woman, whether married before or after this Act, shall have in her own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the same civil remedies, and also (subject, as regards her husband, to the proviso hereinafter contained) the same remedies and redress by way of criminal proceedings, for the protection and security of her own separate property, as if such property belonged to her as a *feme sole*, but, except as aforesaid, no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other for a tort" (*i*).

This section does not enable a married woman to take criminal proceedings against her husband for a tort upon herself (*k*). Nor can either spouse sue the other for a purely personal tort, such as malicious prosecution (*l*) or slander (*m*). And this rule applies, even after divorce or judicial separation, to matters which occurred during the time that they were living together (*n*).

But a wife, living apart from her husband under a separation order obtained by virtue of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married

(*d*) *Isaac, In re; Jacob v. Isaac* (1885), 30 Ch. D. 418; *Threlfall v. Wilson* (1883), 8 P. D. 18; *Severance v. Civil Service Supply Association* (1883), 48 L. T. 485.

(*e*) *Per Bowen, L.J.*, in *Weldon v. Winslow* (1884), 13 Q. B. D., at p. 788.

(*f*) Order XVII., r. 4.

(*g*) *Ibid.*, r. 1.

(*h*) *Newton v. Boodle* (1849), 4 C. B. 359; and see 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63, s. 2.

(*i*) See *Webster v. Webster*, [1916] 1 K. B. 714; *Hulton v. Hulton*, [1917]

1 K. B. 813.

(*k*) *R. v. Lord Mayor of London* (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 772 (defamatory libel).

(*l*) *Tinkley v. Tinkley* (1908), 25 T. L. R. 264.

(*m*) *Young v. Young* (1903), 5 F. 330 (Ct. of Sess.).

(*n*) *Phillips v. Barnet* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 436.

Women) Act, 1895 (o), can maintain an action of libel against him (p).

We pass now to those cases in which a tort has been committed by, not against, a married woman. Her separate estate is liable in damages for such a tort (q). But her husband is also liable for all torts committed by her during coverture. "They are the torts of her husband, and therefore she creates as against her husband a liability" (r). And there is nothing in any of the Married Women's Property Acts removing or affecting this liability (s).

Hence, although a plaintiff may now, if he wishes, sue the wife alone, he generally sues the husband as well. For if he sue the wife alone, he can only obtain execution against her separate estate in the form settled by the Court of Appeal in *Scott v. Morley* (t). Moreover, the judgment against the wife, if sued alone, will release the husband from all liability for the same tort; the plaintiff cannot proceed against him in case the separate property prove insufficient; whereas if he join both husband and wife as defendants on his writ, he can obtain judgment against the wife's separate estate, and also against the husband for the residue of damages and costs not recovered out of her separate estate.

When husband and wife are both made defendants, they must both be served, unless the Court or a Judge shall otherwise order (u). But "there can only be one Defence and one judgment" (x). Hence if either husband or wife pay money into Court, the other cannot plead any defence denying liability (y). In the case of a wife's ante-nuptial tort there is an express provision that, as between her and her husband, her separate estate shall be deemed to be primarily liable for damages and costs recovered. There is, however, no such provision in the case of a post-nuptial tort, and a husband who has had to pay damages for such a tort will have no remedy over against her separate estate. But the plaintiff may, of course, enforce his joint judgment against the separate property of the wife, and not against the husband (z).

(o) 58 & 59 Vict. c. 39.

(p) *Robinson v. Robinson* (1897), 13 T. L. R. 564.

(q) Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), s. 1.

(r) *Per Jessel, M.R.*, in *Wainford v. Heyl* (1875), L. R. 20 Eq., at p. 325.

(s) *Seroka v. Kattenburg* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 177, *Earle v. Kingscote*, [1900] 2 Ch. 585; *Edwards v. Porter*, [1925] A. C. 1.

(t) (1887), 20 Q. B. D., at p. 132. A bankruptcy notice may now be founded on such a judgment, see *post*, p. 778.

(u) Order IX., r. 3.

(x) *Per Romer, L.J.*, in *Beaumont v. Kaye*, [1904] 1 K. B., at p. 294.

(y) *Ibid.*, and Order XXII., r. 1.

(z) *Morris v. Freeman* (1878), 3 P. D. 65. It is not necessary for this purpose that the trustees of her marriage settlement should be made parties to the action: *Davies v. Jenkins* (1877), 6 Ch. D. 728. An inquiry will be directed to ascertain of what her separate estate consists, and in whom it is vested, as in

At common law a husband was liable to the full extent for damages resulting from torts committed by his wife before they were married. But the law in this respect has been modified by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. A husband is now liable for such wrongs, only "to the extent of all property whatsoever belonging to her which he shall have acquired or become entitled to from or through his wife, after deducting therefrom any payments made by him, and any sums for which judgment may have been *bona fide* recovered against him in any proceeding at law, in respect of any debts, contracts, or wrongs for or in respect of which his wife was liable before her marriage as aforesaid" (a).

Moreover, all sums recovered against a married woman in respect of wrongs committed by her before her marriage or for any costs relating thereto are now "payable out of her separate property; and, as between her and her husband, unless there be any contract between them to the contrary, her separate property shall be deemed to be primarily liable for all such wrongs, and for all damages or costs recovered in respect thereof" (b).

If a husband and his wife join in suing for any injury done to the wife, and one of them dies, the action will not abate, so far as the causes of action belonging to the survivor are concerned (c). If they are both defendants in an action brought for a tort committed by the wife, and the husband dies before judgment, the action continues against the widow; if, however, the wife dies in the lifetime of her husband before judgment, the action immediately abates, whether it was for a post-nuptial or an ante-nuptial tort (d), unless he himself joined in or authorised it. If they be divorced or judicially separated, the wife must be sued alone; the husband is released from all liability, even though the tort was committed before the divorce or judicial separation (e). But if the husband and wife voluntarily live apart under a separation deed, the common law rule prevails, and the husband may be joined as a defendant (f).

At common law a married woman could not contract with her husband, nor with any one else except as agent for her husband. But this absurdity has been remedied by the various Married Women's Property Acts (g); and now any

Collett v. Dickenson (1879), 11 Ch. D. 687; and on such inquiry the solicitor to the trustees will be bound to state their names, and to produce the deed of settlement: *Bursill v. Tanner* (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 1; and see *Chaldecott v. C. and Carpenter* (1920), 64 Sol. Jo. 242.

(a) Section 14, and see section 15.

(b) Section 13.

(c) Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), s. 40.

(d) *Bell v. Stocker* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 129.

(e) *Capel v. Powell* (1864), 17 C. B. (n.s.) 743; *Cuenod v. Leslie*, [1909]

1 K. B. 880; Judicature Act, 1925, s. 194.

(f) *Head v. Briscoe* (1833), 5 C. & P. 484; *Uttley v. Mitre Publishing Co.* (1901), 17 T. L. R. 720.

(g) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63; 8 Edw. 7, c. 27.

woman married since 1882 can possess separate property over which her husband has no control, and may contract so as to bind such separate property. She can sue and be sued on such contracts as though she were a single woman. So can a woman, married before 1883, in respect of property, the title to which has vested in her since 1882. Indeed, if the contract be made since December 5, 1893, it is wholly immaterial whether at the date of the contract she had any separate property or not. Should an action be successfully brought against her for damages for breach of contract, the judgment against her can be enforced against any separate property of which she is possessed at the date of judgment. The other party to the contract can only make the husband liable for his wife's contracts on the ground that she was his agent. Such agency may be implied from the circumstance that the parties are living together (*h*); but in such a case the agency is limited to "necessaries" (*i*). What things are "necessaries" is a question of fact, to be determined according to the social and financial position of the parties, as to which their mode of living is a test. But things which are ordinarily necessary are not "necessaries," if ordered in excessive quantities or if the married woman is already sufficiently supplied with them (*k*).

The implied agency may be revoked by the husband (*l*). Tradesmen, who have already supplied goods on the order of the wife for which the husband has paid, may continue to act upon such authority until they have received express notice of its determination (*m*); in other cases, however, the revocation is sufficient, though only communicated to the wife. If the husband pays a definite sum of money regularly to the wife for household and other necessities, no implied agency arises (*n*). A married woman must pay

(*h*) *Manby v. Scott* (1659), 2 Sm. L. C. (12th ed.) 432.

(*i*) *Montague v. Benedict* (1825), 2 Sm. L. C. (12th ed.) 463.

(*k*) *Seaton v. Benedict* (1828), 2 Sm. L. C. (12th ed.) 469. The costs incurred by a wife in divorce proceedings are regarded as necessities: see *Maconochie v. Maconochie* (1916), 115 L. T. 790.

(*l*) *Jolly v. Rees* (1864), 15 C. B. (N.S.) 628, *Sabine v. Legge* (1921), 152 L. T. 364; *Gray v. Earl Cathcart* (1922), 38 T. L. R. 562.

(*m*) *Debenham v. Mellon* (1880), 6 App. Cas. 24.

(*n*) *Slater v. Parker* (1908), 24 T. L. R. 621; *Seymour v. Kingscote* (1922), 38 T. L. R. 586; and see *Callot v. Nash* (1923), 39 T. L. R. 292. Savings made

for goods supplied to her after marriage on a continuing contract made before marriage (o).

If the wife in fact contracted as agent for her husband, the tradesman cannot sue her; it is immaterial that he did not know that she contracted as agent (p). If, however, she contracted otherwise than as agent, she may be liable, but in the absence of some express promise her husband cannot be. The tradesman cannot look to both. If he sues the wife and recovers judgment against her, he cannot afterwards sue the husband (q).

As to contracts made by a woman before her marriage, her husband is liable to the extent of all property acquired through her (r).

The jury have not to decide whether the goods supplied were "necessaries" proper to the wife's station in life, but whether in the particular case she had authority to pledge her husband's credit (s). "If husband and wife are living together, that is a fact from which the jury may infer that the husband really did give his wife such authority. But even then I do not think that the authority would arise so long as he supplied her with the means of procuring the articles otherwise" (t). The fact that she was already supplied with similar goods would be admissible evidence (u).

Where husband and wife live together, and he will not supply her with necessaries or the means of obtaining them, she has at common law the right to pledge his credit for her own support (x), and in equity the right to borrow money to buy necessaries (y).

Where husband and wife live apart by mutual consent, the husband is not liable to tradesmen for goods supplied to the wife, if he makes her a sufficient allowance; it is immaterial whether the tradesman knows of the allowance or not (z). But even where the wife has *prima facie* no authority to pledge her husband's credit, evidence may be given to show that he has sanctioned or adopted the

by the wife out of such an allowance belong to the husband: *Birkett v. Birkett* (1908), 98 L. T. 540.

(o) *Lea Bridge Gas Co. v. Malvern*, [1917] 1 K. B. 803.

(p) *Paquin v. Beauclerk*, [1906] A. C. 148.

(q) *Morel v. Earl of Westmoreland*, [1904] A. C. 11; *French v. Howie*, [1905] 2 K. B. 580; *Moore v. Flanagan*, [1920] 1 K. B. 919; *Debenham's v. Perkins* (1925), 133 L. T. 252.

(r) See section 14.

(s) See *Reid v. Teakle* (1853), 13 C. B. 627.

(t) Per Lord Blackburn in *Debenham v. Mellon* (1880), 6 App. Cas., at p. 36.

(u) *Reneaux v. Teakle* (1853), 8 Exch. 680.

(x) See the judgment of Bayley, J., in *Montague v. Benedict* (1825), 2 Sm. L. C. (12th ed.), at pp. 465, 466.

(y) *Deare v. Soutten* (1869), L. R. 9 Eq. 151. As to the common law on this point, see *Knox v. Bushell* (1857), 3 C. B. (N.S.) 334.

(z) *Dixon v. Hurrell* (1838), 8 C. & P. 717; *Reeve v. Marquis of Conyngham* (1847), 2 C. & K. 444.

transaction, and so ratified the contract (a). Where husband and wife live apart, there is no presumption that she has authority to bind her husband "even for necessities suitable to her degree in life; it is for the plaintiff to show that, under the circumstances of the separation or from the conduct of her husband, she had such authority" (b). Where husband and wife separate by mutual consent, and the income agreed to be paid to the wife proves insufficient for her support, she has no authority to pledge her husband's credit (c). There can be no agency, if he provides for her or if she has the means to provide for herself.

Whenever a wife is living apart from her husband, her authority to bind him for necessities is determined by her adultery (d), unless the husband forgives her and takes her back again (e), or has connived at the adultery (f), or has expressly authorised her to procure the goods (g).

If the husband has deserted his wife (h), or turned her out of doors, or has caused her, from reasonable apprehension of cruelty, to leave him, or by his indecent conduct has precluded her from living with him (i), and does not give her adequate means of subsistence according to his degree in life and his fortune, the law gives her authority "to order such things as are reasonable and necessary for herself, but not to go into any extravagance, or to pledge his credit for anything beyond what would be reasonable and necessary for her subsistence" (k). "If a man turns his wife out of doors, he sends with her credit for her reasonable expenses" (l). In such circumstances it will be of no avail for the husband to give notice to any tradesman not to supply goods to his wife. Moreover, a husband is, under such circumstances, bound to repay to a third person any money advanced by him to the wife to be expended by her in the purchase of necessities (m). In neither case, however, will the husband be liable if the wife has been guilty of adultery.

On the other hand, if a "wife voluntarily abandons and relinquishes her family, by this conduct she places herself without the

(a) *Emmett v. Norton* (1838), 8 C. & P. 506; *Waithman v. Wakefield* (1807), 1 Camp. 120.

(b) *Mainwaring v. Leslie* (1826), 2 C. & P. 507; and see *Clifford v. Laton* (1827), 3 C. & P. 15.

(c) *Eastland v. Burchell* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 432.

(d) *Wilson v. Glossop* (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 354; *Durnford v. Baker*, [1924] 2 K. B. 587.

(e) *Cooper v. Lloyd* (1885), 6 C. B. (N.S.) 519.

(f) *Wilson v. Glossop*, *supra*.

(g) See the remarks of Cockburn, C.J., in *Atkyns v. Pearce* (1857), 2 C. B. (N.S.), at p. 767.

(h) *Bolton v. Prentice* (1745), 2 Stra. 1214.

(i) *Bazeley v. Forder* (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 559, 562.

(k) *Per* Lord Abinger, C.B., in *Emmett v. Norton* (1838), 8 C. & P., at p. 510.

(l) *Per* Lord Eldon in *Rawlyns v. Vandyke* (1800), 3 Esp., at p. 250; and see the passages quoted from the judgments in *Read v. Legard* (1851), 6 Exch. 636, below.

(m) *Harris v. Lee* (1718), 1 P. Wms. 482; *Deare v. Soutten* (1869), L. R. 9 Eq. 151.

pale of her husband's maintenance" (n). A tradesman, therefore, cannot recover from the husband the price of necessities supplied to his wife whilst she is living apart from him against his will, unless proof be given that he has expressly assented to his wife's contract (o).

Where upon a judicial separation alimony has been decreed or ordered to be and is not paid by the husband to the wife, he is liable for necessities supplied to her (p).

In most of the decisions which we have quoted above, the husband and wife are regarded as though they stood to each other merely in the relation of principal and agent. The wife, it was said, was an agent who expressly divested herself of personal liability (q). Yet, as we have just seen, a husband is often held liable on a contract made by his wife in cases where she clearly was not his agent to make it—where, for instance, he had expressly forbidden her to pledge his credit or had driven her from his house.

The husband takes on himself the duty of supplying his wife with necessities according to his estate and condition in life. "If she is compelled by his misconduct to procure the necessary articles for herself—as, for instance, if he drives her from his house, or brings improper persons into it, so that no respectable woman could live there—according to the decided cases, he gives her authority to pledge his credit for her necessary maintenance elsewhere, which means that the law gives that authority by force of the relation of husband and wife. So, if a husband omit to furnish his wife with necessities while living with him, she may procure them elsewhere, otherwise she would perish. . . . If the husband becomes lunatic by the visitation of God and therefore unable to provide his wife with necessities, he is in the same situation as a husband omitting to furnish them; and as by the relation which he originally contracted he undertook to provide her with them himself, he becomes liable to any person who does it for him" (r). "The true principle seems to be that when a man marries he contracts an obligation to support his wife; and, in point of law, he gives her authority to pledge his credit for her support, if circumstances render it necessary, she herself not being in fault" (s).

On somewhat similar grounds it has been held that a husband is liable for the necessary expenses for the interment of his wife, who at the time of her death was living separate from him, although

(n) *Manby v. Scott* (1659), 2 Sm. L. C. (12th ed.) 432.

(o) *Hindley v. Marquis of Westmeath* (1827), 6 B. & C. 200.

(p) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 194.

(q) *Smout v. Ilbery* (1842), 10 M. & W. 1, 12.

(r) *Per Alderson, B.*, in *Read v. Legard* (1851), 6 Exch., at p. 642.

(s) *Per Pollock, C.B.*, *ibid.*, at p. 642.

such expenses were incurred, and in the first instance defrayed, by a mere volunteer, without any communication with the husband, so that he was in no sense the agent of the husband. "An undertaker who conducts a funeral may recover from the executor of the deceased (having assets) the reasonable and necessary expenses of such funeral without any specific contract. That liability in the executor is founded upon the duty imposed upon him by the character which he fills, and a proper regard to decency and to the comfort of others. . . . The same reasons cast an equal responsibility upon the husband of a deceased wife," such responsibility being directly referable to the character with which he is invested (*t*). So a widow, even though an infant, has been compelled to pay the expenses of the funeral of her husband, who left no property (*u*).

In the well-known case of *Smout v. Ilbery* (*x*) the law of principal and agent was too strictly applied to a case of husband and wife, and serious injustice followed. There the plaintiff, a tradesman, had supplied goods to Mrs. Ilbery with her husband's consent, and continued to do so after her husband had left home. He died abroad and goods were subsequently supplied without either party being aware of his death. It was held that Mrs. Ilbery was not personally liable for the price of goods supplied under such circumstances. But the Court also expressed the opinion that her agency was determined immediately on the death of her husband, and that therefore his estate also was not liable (*y*).

In the subsequent case of *Drew v. Nunn* (*z*), however, where goods were supplied to the defendant's wife after he had become insane, but before the plaintiff was aware of the fact, it was held that the husband was liable although agency is revoked by insanity as well as by death (*a*). It may be doubted, therefore, whether the *dicta* in *Smout v. Ilbery* (*b*) are good law (*c*). It might be argued on the authority of *Yonge v. Toynbee* (*a*) that Mrs. Ilbery was liable on a warranty of authority.

Before the Married Women's Property Act, 1870 (*d*), a married woman was not liable for the maintenance of her husband, children or relations. The law is now contained in the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 (*e*) and 1908 (*f*), which enact that a married

(*t*) *Per* Jervis, C.J., in *Ambrose v. Kerrison* (1851), 10 C. B., at p. 779 (citing *Jenkins v. Tucker* (1788); 1 H. Bl. 90); and see *Bradshaw v. Beard* (1862), 12 C. B. (N.S.) 344.

(*u*) *Chapple v. Cooper* (1844), 13 M. & W. 252, 258.

(*x*) (1842), 10 M. & W. 1.

(*y*) See also *Blades v. Free* (1829), 9 B. & C. 167.

(*z*) (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 661.

(*a*) *Yonge v. Toynbee*, [1910] 1 K. B. 215.

(*b*) (1842), 10 M. & W. 1.

(*c*) See *Salton v. New Beeston Cycle Co.*, [1900] 1 Ch. 43; *Richardson v. Du Bois* (1869), L. R. 5 Q. B. 51.

(*d*) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93, ss. 13, 14.

(*e*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 20, 21; and see *Griffiths v. Fleming*, [1909] 1 K. B. 805.

(*f*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 27, s. 1, thus destroyed the rule laid down in *Guardians of Pontypool v. Buck*, [1906] 2 K. B. 896.

woman having separate estate shall be liable for the maintenance of her husband, children, grandchildren or parents in all respects as if she were a *feme sole*, should any of them become chargeable to the parish.

At common law a husband and wife could not contract with each other, for they were deemed to be one person. But this disability was removed in equity so far as concerned the wife's separate estate or in respect of contracts relating to matrimonial rights. A husband and wife can make a valid contract for immediate separation, but a contract for future separation was, and is, illegal and void. Where a wife enters into contract for the benefit of her husband, it is the duty of the other party to the contract, if he seeks to enforce it, to show that the wife did not act under the undue influence of her husband (g).

A judgment against a man, a spinster or a widow, is a judgment against them personally; but a judgment against a married woman is against her separate property, not against her, and only against such portion of her separate property as is liable to be taken in execution. Such a judgment, therefore, cannot be enforced against any property which is subject to a restraint on anticipation, whether her interest in such property be legal or equitable, whether created by the Married Women's Property Acts or not (h). The judgment creditor cannot even touch accumulations of income subject to such restraint which have accrued due since the date of the judgment (i), though he can seize income which had accrued due at the time when judgment was recovered (k). Thus the clause restraining anticipation, which was devised to protect a married woman from her husband, became a means of unfairly defeating her creditors.

But now, by the Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (l), "Every married woman who carries on a trade or business, whether separately from her husband or not, shall be subject to the bankruptcy laws as if she were a *feme sole*. Where a married woman carries on a trade or business and a final judgment or order for any amount has been obtained against her, whether or not expressed to be payable out of her separate property, that judgment or order shall be available for bankruptcy proceedings against her by a bankruptcy notice as though she were personally bound to pay the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid" (m).

(g) *Chaplin v. Brammall*, [1908] 1 K. B. 233.

(h) See the form of the judgment in *Scott v. Morley* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 120; and see *Downe v. Fletcher* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 11.

(i) *Whiteley v. Edwards*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 48.

(k) *Hood-Barrs v. Heriot*, [1896] A. C. 174. See *Wood v. Lewis*, [1914] 3 K. B. 73.

(l) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59.

(m) Section 125.

“ Where a married woman who has been adjudged bankrupt has separate property the income of which is subject to a restraint on anticipation, the Court shall have power, on the application of the trustee, to order that during such time as the Court may order the whole or some part of such income be paid to the trustee for distribution among the creditors; and in the exercise of such power the Court shall have regard to the means of subsistence available for such woman and her children ” (n).

“ Where a married woman has been adjudged bankrupt, her husband shall not be entitled to claim any dividend as a creditor in respect of any money or other estate lent or entrusted by him to his wife for the purposes of her trade or business, until all claims of the other creditors of his wife for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied ” (o).

Moreover, by section 169 of the Law of Property Act, 1925 (p), “ Where a married woman is restrained from anticipation or from alienation in respect of any property or any interest in property belonging to her, or is by law unable to dispose of or bind such property or her interest therein, including a reversionary interest arising under her marriage settlement, the Court may, if it thinks fit, where it appears to the Court to be for her benefit, by judgment or order, with her consent, bind her interest in such property.” And where a married woman brings an action or counterclaim and fails, the Court may order the costs of her opponent to be paid out of property subject to a restraint on anticipation (q).

(n) Section 52.

(o) Section 36, sub-section 1.

(p) 15 Geo. 5, c. 20.

(q) See Married Women's Property Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 63), s. 2; *Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart* (No. 2), [1895] 1 Q. B. 873.

CHAPTER III.

NATURAL PERSONS.

(B) *Parent and Child.*1. *Guardianship and Custody of Children.*

THE general rule is that a father has jurisdiction over, and a right to the custody of, his child during infancy (a). But where any question comes before a Court as to the custody or upbringing of an infant, or the administration of any property belonging to or held on trust for an infant, the Court looks to the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration and makes order accordingly whether the father's claim to custody, upbringing or administration is superior to that of the mother or not (b). Either parent may apply to the Court in respect of any matter affecting the infant. Applications may be made either to the High Court (c) or to the County Court or to a Court of summary jurisdiction. A Court of summary jurisdiction is competent to hear all applications except those relating to an infant over the age of sixteen years who is physically and mentally capable of self support or involving the dealing with any property of any infant (d). A father has the right to restrain and control the conduct of his infant children and to correct them by personal or other chastisement or detention. Such chastisement must however, be reasonable (e). This right may be delegated to a schoolmaster or other person (f).

(a) Co. Litt. 88 b., note (12), by Hargrave; *Agar-Ellis, In re* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 317.

(b) Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 45), s. 1; *Thain, In re*, [1926] 1 Ch. 676.

(c) The Chancery Division: Order 55a, R. S. C.

(d) Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, s. 7.

(e) *R. v. Hopley* (1860), 2 F. & F. 202, *per* Cockburn, C.J., at pp. 206, 207.

(f) 1 Bl. Comm. 453; *Fitzgerald v. Northcote* (1865), 2 F. & F. 656.

A parent may use personal violence in defence of his child and may undertake actions at law on his behalf or assist him in any lawsuit.

On the death of the father of an infant the mother, if surviving, becomes the guardian, either alone or jointly with any guardian appointed by the father. Similarly the father is the guardian on the death of the mother of the infant (*g*).

A parent who is entitled to the custody of an infant may enforce that right, by a writ of *habeas corpus*. The application of a parent to the Court for the custody of a child may be refused if the Court is of opinion that the parent has been guilty of such conduct that the Court ought to refuse to enforce the right (*h*).

A parent or other guardian may be divested of all authority over an infant girl, when there has been a failure to protect her against seduction or prostitution (*i*). Any person having the custody, charge or care of an infant under sixteen years of age, if (1) convicted of any offence of cruelty against the child or (2) bound over to keep the peace towards the infant, may be deprived of such custody, charge or care (*k*).

In any proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage or judicial separation, the Court may make provision with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of the children (*l*).

2. Adoption.

Until the Adoption of Children Act, 1926 (*m*), actual adoption of children, in the sense of the transfer of parental rights and duties in respect of a child to another person and their assumption by him, was not recognised by the law of England. The High Court or a County Court or a Court of summary jurisdiction may now make an order,

(*g*) Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, s. 4.

(*h*) Custody of Children Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 3), s. 1.

(*i*) Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 69), s. 12.

(*k*) Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 67).

(*l*) Judicature Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49), s. 193.

(*m*) 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29. The Act came into force on January 1, 1927. It does not apply to Scotland or Northern Ireland.

called an *adoption order*, authorising any person who applies in the prescribed manner to adopt an infant. The infant whom it is desired to adopt must never have been married, nor must the applicant be less than twenty-one years older than the infant in respect of whom the application is made. When, however, the applicant and the infant are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, the Court may make the order notwithstanding that the applicant is less than twenty-one years older than the infant. Except in special circumstances the Court will not make an adoption order where the sole applicant is a male and the infant is a female, or without the consent of every person or body, who is a parent or guardian, or who has the actual custody of or is liable to contribute to the support of the infant (*n*). Except where two spouses apply for an adoption order, the Court will not authorise more than one person to adopt an infant, nor authorise one of two spouses without the consent of the other. The Court must be satisfied that every person whose consent is necessary, understands the nature and effect of the order, for which application is made and that the order will be for the welfare of the infant. Further, the applicant must prove that he has not received or agreed to receive any payment or reward in consideration of the adoption—except such as the Court may sanction. The Court may impose terms and conditions upon the adopter and may require him or her to make provision, by bond or otherwise, for the adopted child (*o*).

The effect of an adoption order is to transfer all rights, duties, obligations and liabilities, in relation to the adopted child's future custody, maintenance and education, from its parent or guardian, to the adopter, and thenceforward all such rights, duties, obligations and liabilities are exercisable by and enforceable against the adopter as though the adopted child was a child born to him or her in lawful wedlock. Where two spouses have adopted a child they stand to each other, and the adopted child stands to

(*n*) 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29, s. 2.

(*o*) Adoption of Children Act, 1926, s. 4.

them, in the same relation as though they were the child's lawful father and mother. An adoption order does not deprive an adopted child of any right to, or interest in property to which, but for the order, the child would have been entitled under any intestacy or disposition, but it does not on the other hand confer upon the child any right to or interest in property as a child of the adopter (p).

It is not lawful for any adopter or for any parent or guardian to receive any payment or reward in consideration for the adoption of any infant without the sanction of the Court, or for any person to make or agree to make or give to any adopter or to any parent or guardian, any such payment or reward (q).

Where, for at least two years before the commencement of the Act, any infant has been brought up and educated by any person or by two spouses as his, her or their own child, under any *de facto* adoption, the Court may make an adoption order notwithstanding that the applicant is a male and the infant a female, or that the consent of the parents or guardians has not been obtained, provided that in all the circumstances, such an order will be for the welfare of the infant (r).

A Register called the *Adopted Children Register* is kept at the General Register Office by the Registrar-General, in which the making of every adoption order is recorded by entry in a special form (s). If the date of birth of the infant is proved upon the application for the adoption order and also the identity of such infant with a child to which any entry in the Register of Births relates, the order directs the Registrar-General to cause such birth entry to be marked with the word "Adopted" (t). The public have a right to inspect the index to the Adopted Children Register and to have a certified copy of any entry on payment of a small fee.

An adopted child cannot as a result of the adoption succeed to a title or transmit to his children the right of succession to it.

(p) Adoption of Children Act, 1926, s. 5.

(r) *Ibid.*, s. 10.

(s) *Ibid.*, Schedule.

(q) *Ibid.*, s. 9.

(t) *Ibid.*, s. 11.

3. Religion.

Normally a father has the right to decide in what religion his child shall be brought up, and the right continues until the child attains full age. The father may be precluded from asserting his right if he has allowed his child to be brought up in a different religion (*u*). The right continues after his death, even if the mother be of a different religion, but the Court may interfere with it if, for example, the welfare of the infant renders such a step desirable (*x*). In considering such welfare the Court may take into account the views of the infant and may examine him in order to ascertain the extent of his religious impressions (*y*).

4. Maintenance and Education.

A parent who wilfully refuses or neglects to maintain his children or who deserts them so that they become chargeable to a Union or a Parish is liable to punishment under the criminal law (*z*). There is a moral, though no actual legal, obligation upon the parent to maintain his infant children (*a*), and also those of his wife by a former marriage where he has put himself *in loco parentis* to them (*b*). Further, a person with whom his children are living with his consent is authorised to contract debts on his behalf to provide them with necessaries (*c*).

Under the poor law the father and the mother after his death, and also the grandfather and grandmother if able to do so, are bound to maintain a child who cannot support himself (*d*). A husband of a woman who at the time of marriage had children, whether legitimate or otherwise, is liable to maintain them as part of his family

(*u*) *Lyons v. Blenkin* (1821), Jac. 245, *per* Lord Eldon, at p. 260.

(*x*) *Ward v. Laverly*, [1925] A. C. 101.

(*y*) *Newton, In re*, [1896] 1 Ch. 740, 743, 751.

(*z*) Vagrancy Act, 1824 (5 Geo. 4, c. 83), ss. 3, 4.

(*a*) *Mortimore v. Wright* (1840), 6 M. & W. 482, *per* Lord Abinger, C.B., at p. 486.

(*b*) *Stone v. Carr* (1799), 3 Esp. 1.

(*c*) *Stone v. Carr*, *supra*.

(*d*) Poor Relief Act, 1601 (43 Eliz. c. 2).

until they attain the age of sixteen or until the death of the woman (e).

It is the duty of a parent of a child, including a blind or deaf child, between the ages of five and fourteen to provide the child with an efficient elementary education (f).

A father is not liable to pay a debt incurred by an infant child or money expended on the child's behalf, even in respect of necessities (g), unless he has expressly or impliedly contracted to do so or has given authority for the incurring of the debt or for the expenditure of the money (h). The authority will be implied where he knowingly consents to a stranger's maintaining the child (i).

5. *Marriage.*

The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, prescribes the consents which are required to the marriage of an infant, both in the case of legitimacy or illegitimacy (k). In the case of a legitimate child where both parents are living together, the consent of both is required. If they are living apart, then the parent who has the custody of the child must consent; or if one parent has deserted the other, the consent of the deserted parent must be obtained by the infant. Where both parents have been deprived of the custody by an order of the Court, the person to whose custody the infant was committed by the Court must consent. In cases where one parent is dead and there is no other guardian, the surviving parent and, where there is a guardian also, the surviving parent and the guardian jointly must consent. Where both parents are dead, the right of consent belongs to the guardians or guardian appointed by the deceased or by the Court.

In the case of an illegitimate infant, the consent of the mother, if alive, is requisite. If she is dead the right passes

(e) Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834 (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76), s. 56.

(f) Education Acts, 1870—1921.

(g) *Urmston v. Newcomen* (1863), 4 Ad. & El. 899; *Thelton v. Springett* (1851), 11 C. B. 452.

(h) *Rolfe v. Abbott* (1833), 6 C. & P. 286.

(i) *Hesketh v. Gowing* (1804), 5 Esp. 131.

(k) Schedule to the Act.

to the guardian appointed by her, if she has made an appointment.

6. *Property.*

Parents have no rights over the real estate of their infant child (l). If the father has been appointed guardian of his child's estate by the Court or otherwise, he must account for all rents and profits received by him. He may not apply the rents or profits in maintaining the infant without the express sanction of the Court, but the Court may in a proper case ratify his having done so (m). So far as the personal estate of an infant is concerned, a father cannot without express authority give a valid receipt or discharge for property belonging to the child (n). He is, however, entitled to the earnings of an infant living with and maintained by him (o).

The relationship in respect of dealings between a parent and his child is a strictly fiduciary one, and therefore when any question arises as to transactions such as gifts between the one and the other it is invariably construed favourably towards the child. There is always a presumption in cases where a father purchases real or personal estate in the name of his child alone, or in the joint names of his child and of himself or a stranger, that he intended to advance the child (p). It arises also in the case of a purchase in the name of a person to whom the purchaser has put himself *in loco parentis*. The intention must, however, be to confer a present benefit: such a purchase with a view to an ultimate benefit will not constitute an advancement (q).

An infant legatee under the will of his parent, or of a person *in loco parentis*, and who was maintained by such parent or person, is entitled, for purposes of maintenance, to interest on or income from his legacy from the date of the

(l) Co. Litt. 88b., Hargrave's note (12).

(m) *Thomas v. Thomas* (1855), 2 K. & J. 79; *Smith v. Smith* (1857), 23 Beav. 554.

(n) *Dagley v. Tolferry* (1715), 1 P. Wms. 285.

(o) 1 Bl. Com. 453.

(p) *Grey v. Grey* (1677), 2 Swan. Appendix 594; *Stamp Duties Commissioner v. Byrnes*, [1911] A. C. 386.

(q) *Forrest v. Forrest* (1865), 13 W. R. 380.

testator's death instead of from the expiration of one year from that date (r).

7. *Illegitimate Children.*

An illegitimate child or bastard is one born out of lawful wedlock (s). Although a bastard, being a *nullius filius*, cannot take property by inheritance, yet the relationship which in fact exists between himself and his parents has several legal aspects. It is, for example, sufficient to bring parties within the prohibited degrees of marriage (t). A bastard cannot be compelled to support his parents (u). But he may recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, 1906 to 1925 (x), but not under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (y). The mother of a bastard child must maintain it till it attains the age of sixteen or, if a female, marries. She has a right to its custody and to determine its religion. The father of an illegitimate child is under no obligation to maintain it unless he has adopted it. An order may, however, be made against him under affiliation proceedings (z) compelling him to make payments to the mother, or to such other person as the justices may order, not exceeding twenty shillings a week for the maintenance of the child (a).

Legitimation. An illegitimate child may become legitimate by the subsequent marriage of his parents, provided that at the date of the marriage the father is domiciled in England or Wales, and that at the time of the birth of the child neither parent was married to a third person (b). Legitimation under the Act entitles the legitimated person and his spouse and children or remoter issue to take any interest in the estate of an intestate dying

(r) *Harvey v. Harvey* (1722), 2 P. Wms. 21; *Pett v. Fellows* (1818), 1 Swan. 561.

(s) Co. Litt. 244a.

(t) *R. v. Brighton* (1861), 1 B. & S. 447.

(u) *Westminster v. Gerrard* (1621), 2 Bulst. 346.

(x) See *ante*, pp. 222 *et seq.*

(y) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (Lord Campbell's Act); *Dickinson v. N. E. Ry. Co.* (1863), 2 H. & C. 735.

(z) See *ante*, p. 396.

(a) Bastardy Act, 1923 (13 & 14 Geo. 5, c. 23).

(b) Legitimacy Act, 1926 (16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 60).

after the date of legitimation or under any disposition, such as a will, coming into operation after such date or by descent under an entailed interest created after such date, as though the legitimated person had been born legitimate (c). The provisions of the Act cover the case of an illegitimate person with spouse or children who dies before his parents marry. In such an event the spouse and children stand as though the deceased had been a legitimated person.

A legitimated person has the same personal rights and obligations in respect of the maintenance and support of himself or of any other person as if he had been born legitimate (d). The Registrar-General is authorised upon proper information to re-register the birth of any legitimated person whose birth has already been registered and it is declared to be the duty of parents of such legitimated person to furnish all necessary information for the purpose. The neglect of the parent to re-register the birth, or to take steps to enable it to be re-registered, does not affect the legitimation (e).

(c) Legitimacy Act, 1926, s. 3.

(d) *Ibid.*, s. 6.

(e) *Ibid.*, Schedule.

CHAPTER IV.

NATURAL PERSONS.

(C) *Infants.*

By the law of England every person under the age of twenty-one is an infant (a). No means exist, short of an Act of Parliament, whereby an infant can attain his majority before or after that age.

The liability of an infant for crimes committed by him depends mainly on the age to which he has attained. He is liable as a rule for his torts. Some contracts made by an infant are valid, some are void; others are voidable at his option. He may be employed by an adult as his agent, and in that capacity he can bind his principal as fully as if he himself were of age. He can be a bailee and a partner in a firm, but he cannot be made bankrupt (b). He cannot make a binding admission, nor can he "settle an account" (c). A boy over the age of fourteen years, and a girl over the age of twelve, can contract a valid marriage, even without the consent of their parents; but they will be liable to penal consequences if they obtain a marriage licence by swearing falsely that they are of full age (d).

An infant is incapable of acquiring or of holding a legal estate in land (e); he cannot make a will or execute a deed (f); he cannot act as an executor or administrator. An infant is always under guardianship (g). He cannot bring or defend an action without the assistance of an adult.

(a) The King attains his majority at the age of eighteen.

(b) See *post*, p. 778.

(c) *Trueman v. Hurst* (1785), 1 T. R. 40.

(d) See Vol. 1, p. 214; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, ss. 2, 18; and *R. v. Birmingham (Inhabitants)* (1828), 8 B. & C. 29.

(e) Law of Property Act, 1925, s. 1.

(f) To this there are some statutory exceptions. A young man over twenty, and a girl over seventeen, years of age may, with the sanction of the Court, make a valid settlement in contemplation of marriage: *Infants' Settlements Act*, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 43); and see 2 *Williams' Vendor and Purchaser*, p. 792.

(g) See *Guardianship of Infants Act*, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 45), and the preceding chapter.

The disabilities of an infant differ in their nature from those of a married woman. The latter's position is always considered with relation to her husband. An infant, on the other hand, is considered as an individual standing alone, who by reason of his age and inexperience requires the protection of the law. This protection is afforded to him in many ways, among which we may notice the provisions of the Betting and Loans (Infants) Act, 1892 (*h*), which make it a misdemeanour for anyone to send to any infant circulars or other documents inviting him to make any bet or wager or to borrow money.

We proceed to deal more in detail with the liability of an infant for his crimes and torts and on his contracts.

An infant because of his immaturity is often exempted from responsibility for acts which would be criminal if done by an adult. Thus an infant under seven years of age cannot be guilty of a crime; he is presumed to be incapable of forming a criminal intent, and this presumption cannot be rebutted. Between the years of seven and fourteen an infant is still presumed to be incapable of forming a criminal intention, but such presumption may be rebutted; for, if the prosecution can establish that the infant knew that what he was doing was wrong, he may be convicted (*i*). In such a case, it is said, "*malitia supplet aetatem*." "Whenever a person committing a felony is under fourteen years of age, the presumption of law is that he or she has not sufficient capacity to know right from wrong, and such person ought not to be convicted unless there be evidence to satisfy the jury that the party, at the time of the offence, had a guilty knowledge that he or she was doing wrong" (*k*). In other words, it is not to be presumed that a boy under fourteen intended or even contemplated the necessary consequences of his act. It does not follow from proof that a criminal act was done that there was a criminal intention in the infant's mind. Further evidence must be given to

(*h*) 55 Vict. c. 4, ss. 1, 2 and 3; *Milton v. Studd*, [1910] 2 K. B. 118.

(*i*) He can no longer be sentenced to death (Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 67), s. 103), nor to penal servitude (section 102); see also sections 104—107, 111 and 112, and *R. v. Lydford*, [1914] 2 K. B. 378.

(*k*) *Per* Littledale, J., in *R. v. Owen* (1830), 4 C. & P., at p. 237.

show that the infant knew that he was doing wrong; such evidence may be afforded by the particular circumstances of the case before the Court. But the law deems a boy under fourteen incapable of committing a rape or an assault with intent to commit a rape. If, however, he assists a third person to commit a rape, he may be convicted as a principal in the second degree if he be over seven years of age (*l*). An infant between the age of fourteen and twenty-one years is responsible to the criminal law to the same extent as an adult (*m*). To this rule there are two exceptions: where the offence with which he is charged consists of a mere non-feasance, such as the non-repair of a highway, he is exempt from liability because he has not yet command of his fortune. Again, as an infant cannot be made a bankrupt, he cannot be convicted of any crime which can only be committed by a bankrupt (*n*).

Where an infant is responsible for a criminal act, it is no defence for him to plead that he did it under the coercion of his father or mother.

An infant may always sue to recover damages for a tort committed against him. Although he is not liable on many of his contracts, he may lawfully trade, and if he does so he can recover damages for a slander on him in the way of his trade (*o*). So he is liable to an action whenever he commits a tort. Infancy is no defence to an action of tort (*p*), except perhaps where a particular intention is an essential ingredient in the cause of action and the defendant is too young to be capable of forming such an intention.

A plaintiff whose cause of action is really founded on contract will not be allowed to frame his action in tort, so as to evade the difficulty created by the infant's non-liability on a contract.

Thus, where an infant hired a horse and injured it by over-riding, the owner of the horse was not allowed to sue in tort for damages, which were caused by the infant's breach of an implied term of the

(*l*) See Vol. 1, p. 328.

(*m*) Thus he can be a bailee, and is liable for any offence he may commit in such capacity: *R. v. McDonald* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 323. But he will not be punished as an adult, unless he is over sixteen.

(*n*) *R. v. Wilson* (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 28.

(*o*) *Wild v. Tomkinson* (1827), 5 L. J. K. B. 265.

(*p*) *Defries v. Davis* (1835), 1 Scott, 594.

contract (*q*). But the case is different where an infant hires a horse for riding and injures it by putting it at a fence, although he has been expressly forbidden by the owner to do so; for here the tort does not arise out of the contract, but is independent of it (*r*).

The fact that an infant has been assaulted, seduced or defamed does not of itself give the parents any right of action. If, however, the tort deprives the parent of services which the infant should render, an action on the case may lie for the special damage thus wrongfully inflicted on the parent, provided it be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's act or words. "It is sufficient that the daughter was living with her father, forming part of his family and liable to his control and command." "The right to the service is sufficient" (*s*).

The law divides contracts entered into by infants into three separate classes:—

(i) Contracts for the supply of necessities. Such contracts are not affected by the Infants Relief Act, 1874 (*t*), and therefore remain valid as they were at common law.

(ii) Contracts "for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessities) and all accounts stated with infants." Such contracts under the common law were voidable at the option of the infant, and were declared absolutely void by section 1 of the Infants Relief Act, 1874.

(iii) Other contracts to which section 1 of the Infants Relief Act, 1874, does not refer.

(i) If an infant is party to a contract, it is not necessarily void or even voidable. The law has always recognised that the protection which is necessary to the welfare of an infant may be defeated, if all contracts with him could be repudiated as he pleased. An infant might be denied the necessities of life if the persons who supply such wants had no right to require payment for necessities supplied on credit.

An infant may bind himself by a contract for the supply of food, raiment, lodging and the like. Instruction in art or trade, and intellectual, moral, and religious education may

(*q*) *Jennings v. Rundall* (1799), 8 T. R. 335.

(*r*) *Burnard v. Haggis* (1863), 14 C. B. (N.S.) 45. See *Fawcett v. Smethurst* (1914), 84 L. J. K. B. 473.

(*s*) *Per Littledale, J.*, in *Maunder v. Venn* (1829), Moo. & M. 323.

(*t*) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62.

also be necessities (*u*). Again, the retainer of a solicitor or the attendance of a medical man or of a servant may be the subject of a valid contract by an infant; and the expenses of the marriage settlement of an infant may properly be deemed necessities (*x*). An infant is not liable on a contract which includes articles which are necessities and a substantial number of articles which are not necessities (*y*). But a contract by an infant for necessities cannot be repudiated by him on the ground that it is partly executory (*z*).

Though things which fall within any of the classes above mentioned may be necessities, yet there is wide variance according to the condition in life of the infant in each particular case. His clothes may be fine or coarse, according to his rank or the probable extent of his means when he comes of age; his education may vary according to the station he is to fill; and the medicines chargeable to him as necessities will depend on the illness with which he is afflicted (*a*). The Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (*b*), enacts that where goods of the nature of necessities are sold to an infant he must pay a reasonable price therefor, and defines "necessaries" as goods suitable to the condition of life of the infant, and to his actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery.

Hence when an infant is sued for goods supplied to him on credit, evidence may be given that he was already sufficiently supplied for the purpose of showing that they were not necessities, and it is immaterial whether the plaintiff did or did not know of such supply (*c*).

The extent of necessary attendance will similarly depend on the infant's position in society: a rich infant may be allowed a servant in livery. "Articles of mere luxury are always excluded, though luxurious articles of utility are in some cases allowed" (*d*).

(*u*) *Co. Litt.* 172a; *Walter v. Everard*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 369; *Green v. Thompson*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 1.

(*x*) *Helps v. Clayton* (1864), 17 C. B. (N.S.) 553; *Jones, In re*, [1883] W. N. 14.

(*y*) *Stocks v. Wilson*, [1913] 2 K. B. 235.

(*z*) *Roberts v. Gray*, [1913] 1 K. B. 520.

(*a*) *Hart v. Prater* (1837), 1 Jur. 623.

(*b*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 2.

(*c*) See *Johnstone v. Marks* (1887), 19 Q. B. D. 509; *Barnes v. Toye* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 410; and see *Fawcett v. Smethurst* (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 473.

(*d*) *Chapple v. Cooper* (1844), 13 M. & W. 252, 258.

“ All such articles as are purely ornamental are not necessary, and are to be rejected because they cannot be requisite for any one; and for such matters, therefore, an infant cannot be made responsible. But if they are not strictly of this description, then the question arises, whether they were bought for the necessary use of the party, in order to support himself properly in the degree, state and station of life in which he moved; if they were, for such articles the infant may be responsible ” (e). At the trial the jury must decide whether they are such as reasonable persons of the age and station of the infant would require for real use. The defence of infancy must always be specially pleaded. In an action against an infant for necessaries it is for the plaintiff to prove, not only that the goods supplied were suitable to the condition in life of the infant, but that he was not sufficiently supplied with goods of that class at the time of the sale and delivery (f). There may be a preliminary question for the Judge whether there is any evidence on which the jury can properly find for the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof lies; if not, the Judge should direct a verdict for the defendant (g).

Contracts for charitable assistance to others, though praiseworthy, cannot be enforced, because they do not relate to the infant's own personal advantage.

(ii) Certain contracts made by an infant have been declared void by the Infants Relief Act, 1874, which enacts that “ all contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, henceforth entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all accounts stated with infants shall be absolutely void: provided always that this enactment shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may by any existing or future statute, or by the rules of common law or equity, enter, except such as now by law are voidable ” (h).

It is submitted that as these contracts are declared by the statute to be “ absolutely void,” they are not binding on either party, they cannot be ratified by either party (i),

(e) *Per Parke, B.*, in *Peters v. Fleming* (1840), 6 M. & W. 47, followed in *Ryder v. Wombwell* (1868), L. R. 4 Ex. 32.

(f) *Nash v. Inman*, [1908] 2 K. B. 1.

(g) *Ryder v. Wombwell*, *supra*; and see *Nash v. Inman*, *supra*.

(h) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, s. 1. The Act does not extend to contracts outside the three classes (accounts stated, loans and supply of goods): *Edwards v. Carter*, [1893] A. C. 360; but applies to contracts which at the time of its passing were by law voidable.

(i) *Onslow's Trusts, In re* (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 677.

and the property in the goods to which they relate will not pass to the infant.

It is immaterial that the other party to the contract was not aware that he was contracting with an infant, and so far as the contract is concerned it is immaterial that the infant expressly represented himself to be of full age, though by so doing he may expose himself to an action of tort for fraudulent misrepresentation (*k*).

(iii) Contracts, which are not for the supply of necessities and which do not fall within the scope of section 1 of the Infants Relief Act, 1874, were as a rule voidable at common law. But they were voidable only at the instance of the infant or those who claimed under him. If an infant made such a contract with an adult, the adult was bound by it, though the infant was not (*l*); and it is still law that the infant can sue him, though he cannot succeed in an action against the infant if the latter pleads his infancy (*m*). An infant cannot, however, obtain specific performance of the contract; for specific performance will never be granted where the remedy for any breach of contract is not mutual (*n*).

An infant cannot avoid a contract of which he has enjoyed the benefit (*o*), or which, at the time of his entering into it, was clearly for his benefit. "The fact that a person under age may be in full possession of his faculties and earning the wages of a man does not affect the law applicable to a contract made by him. Whenever such a contract comes before a Court of law, the question whether it was for the benefit of the infant has to be considered, and the contract will not be enforced unless the Court is of opinion that it was for the benefit of the infant" (*p*). The contract, however, may be severable, and in such a case it will only

(*k*) But only where the tort is not directly founded upon a contract upon which he cannot be sued.

(*l*) *Holt v. Ward Clarencieux* (1733), 2 Str. 937.

(*m*) *Prince v. Haworth*, [1905] 2 K. B. 768.

(*n*) *Flight v. Bolland* (1828), 4 Russ. 298.

(*o*) *Valentini v. Canali* (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 166; *Steinberg v. Scala* (Leeds), [1923] 2 Ch. 452.

(*p*) *Per Collins, M.R., in Stephens v. Dudbridge Ironworks Co.*, [1904] 2 K. B., at p. 229; and see *Shears v. Mendeloff* (1914), 30 T. L. R. 387; 108 L. T. 232 (C. A.).

be voidable as to such part as is not for the benefit of the infant (q).

Where an infant in the way of his trade sold goods to A, for which A paid him, but he never delivered any of the goods, it was held that an action for money had and received would not lie against the infant unless it could be shown that he had acted fraudulently (r). But if an infant obtains property by means of a contract which he had no power to make it may be followed into his possession and recovered (s).

Thus, if an infant binds himself with a penalty to pay even for necessities, that obligation will not bind him, although an action may lie against him for the price of the necessities; it is not for the benefit of an infant that he should bind himself to pay a penalty. "An infant cannot make himself liable by the custom of merchants either by a bill of exchange or a promissory note." If he gives a bill to secure payment for necessities, he cannot be sued on it, though he may be sued on the original contract for the supply of them (t).

A contract by an infant, binding him to serve during a certain time for wages, but enabling the master to stop the work whenever he chose, and to retain the wages during stoppage, was held void against the infant (u). Again, in *Flower v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (x), an infant was held not to be bound by a contract to forgo any right of action he might have against the defendants, if they were guilty of negligence in carrying him as a passenger.

But, on the other hand, in *Clements v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (y), an infant's contract to become a member of, and to be bound by the rules of, the insurance society formed among the defendant's employees, under which rules the amounts payable were less than the amounts recoverable under the Employers' Liability Act, was held to be a proper one for an infant to have entered into.

An infant cannot be sued on a covenant to serve his master contained in an apprenticeship deed (z), hence it is usual to add his father or some other person who enters into engagements on his behalf; but a contract of employment under which he earns his living may be enforced against him (a). The Workmen's Compensa-

(q) *Bromley v. Smith*, [1909] 2 K. B. 235.

(r) *Cowern v. Nield*, [1912] 2 K. B. 419. But see *R. Leslie v. Shiell*, [1914] 3 K. B. 607.

(s) *Per Lush, J.*, in *Quirk v. Thomas*, [1915] 1 K. B., at p. 805.

(t) *Soltykoff, In re*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 413; see *Co. Litt.* 172a.

(u) *R. v. Lord* (1849), 12 Q. B. D. 757.

(x) [1894] 2 Q. B. 65.

(y) [1894] 2 Q. B. 482.

(z) *De Francesco v. Barnum* (1889), 45 Ch. D. 430; see also *Gadd v. Thompson*, [1911] 1 K. B. 304.

(a) *Evans v. Ware*, [1892] 3 Ch. 502.

tion Act, 1925, which includes apprentices under the general word "workman," does not affect the law as to infants' contracts. Where an infant recovers the maximum amount payable to him by his employers for personal injuries caused by their negligence, his acceptance of that sum is no bar to the bringing of a subsequent action for negligence; for an infant is not bound by any compromise into which he enters, unless it is clearly for his benefit (*b*).

By section 2 of the Infants Relief Act, 1874, it is provided that "no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full age of any promise or contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age."

This section applies to all voidable contracts, *inter alia* to a promise of marriage. Thus, where an infant promises to marry, and on attaining his majority, merely continues his affectionate conduct and maintains his engagement, this is a mere ratification, and no action for breach of promise can be sustained (*c*). But a new contract identical with the old would be binding (*d*).

An infant, who with two others became indebted to brokers, was sued on attaining his majority. He compromised the action by giving two acceptances for £50, one of his co-defendants giving an acceptance for £80, and the other being discharged from the action. One of the defendant's bills to the brokers was endorsed by them to plaintiff, who took it with full notice of the circumstances. It was held that the transaction was void (*e*).

The Betting and Loans (Infants) Act, 1892 (*f*), which seeks "to make penal the inciting infants to betting or wagering or to borrowing money," enacts that where an "infant who has contracted a loan which is void in law agrees after he comes of age to pay any money which in whole or in part represents or is agreed to be paid in respect of any such loan, and is not a new advance, such agreement (and any instrument given in pursuance of and for carrying into effect such agreement or otherwise in relation to the payment of money representing or in respect of such loan) shall, so

(*b*) *Stephens v. Dudbridge Ironworks Co.*, [1904] 2 K. B. 225 (decided under the W. C. A., 1897). The amount which he had received under the Act was deducted from the damages awarded him by the jury.

(*c*) *Coxhead v. Mullis* (1878), 3 C. P. D. 489.

(*d*) *Ditcham v. Worrall* (1880), 5 C. P. D. 410; and see *Northcote v. Doughty* (1879), 4 C. P. D. 385.

(*e*) *Smith v. King*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 543; and see *Kibble, Ex parte; Onslow, In re* (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 373.

(*f*) 55 Vict. c. 4, s. 5.

far as it relates to money which represents or is payable in respect of such loan and is not a new advance, be absolutely void."

On the other hand, there are other kinds of contracts made by an infant which are binding upon him unless he repudiates them before, or within a reasonable time after, he attains his majority. These are contracts under which the infant has acquired some permanent property or interest, such as a contract for the purchase of shares in a company (*g*), or to enter into a partnership (*h*), or to become a member of a building society (*i*). And the same rule applies to benefits which an infant takes under a marriage settlement (*k*). Agreements of this kind, which involve continuing obligations, are binding unless repudiated within a reasonable time after the infant comes of age (*l*). What is a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each case: in cases where the infant has received no benefit from the agreement and where delay has not injured the position of other parties, a considerable period may be allowed. In one case a lady, who had made during infancy a marriage settlement from which she never received any benefit, was allowed to repudiate it thirty-seven years afterwards (*m*).

If an infant avoids a contract before receiving consideration, he is entitled to recover any money paid by him thereunder (*n*). Thus an infant, who subscribed for shares in a company, but received no dividend and repudiated the contract, was permitted upon the liquidation of the company to prove for the amount which she had paid (*o*). On the other hand an infant, who had paid money for the use of a

(*g*) *N. W. Ry. Co. v. M'Michael* (1850), 5 Exch. 114.

(*h*) *Goode v. Harrison* (1821), 5 B. & Ald. 147.

(*i*) *Whittingham v. Murdy* (1889), 60 L. T. 956; but see *Nottingham Building Society v. Thurstan*, [1903] A. C. 6.

(*k*) *Edwards v. Carter*, [1893] A. C. 360.

(*l*) *Dublin, &c., Ry. Co. v. Black* (1852), 8 Exch. 181; and see *Steinberg v. Scala (Leeds)*, [1923] 2 Ch. 452.

(*m*) *Jones, In re; Farrington v. Forrester*, [1893] 2 Ch. 461; but see *Edwards v. Carter*, [1893] A. C. 360, and *Carnell v. Harrison*, [1916] 1 Ch. 328. Marriage settlements made with the sanction of the Court are binding: see 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43. The Act also applies to post-nuptial settlements: *A B, In re*, [1914] W. N. 140.

(*n*) *Corpe v. Overton* (1833), 10 Bing. 252, overruling *Holmes v. Blögg* (1817), 8 Taunt. 508; and see *Steinberg v. Scala (Leeds)*, [1923] 2 Ch. 452.

(*o*) *Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin, &c., Co.*, [1894] 3 Ch. 589; but see *Steinberg v. Scala (Leeds)*, *supra*.

furnished house and had used the house, was not allowed to recover the money although the contract was void (*p*).

An infant sues by his next friend and defends by a guardian *ad litem* (*q*). The next friend is personally liable for the costs of the action, but the infant is liable to indemnify him against costs properly incurred on behalf of the infant, if the Court is "satisfied that the litigation has been prompted by motives of benevolence towards the infant, and has been conducted in his interest and with diligence and propriety" (*r*). And when any property of the infant is being administered by the Court, a declaration can be made charging such property with all costs properly incurred by the next friend (*s*). The guardian *ad litem* is not personally liable for costs, unless he has been guilty of misconduct.

"In any cause or matter in the King's Bench Division, in which money or damages is or are claimed by or on behalf of an infant or a person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, suing either alone or in conjunction with other parties, no settlement or compromise or acceptance of money paid into Court, whether before or at or after the trial, shall, as regards the claim of any such infant or person of unsound mind, be valid without the sanction of the Court or a Judge, and no money or damages recovered or awarded in any such cause or matter, in respect of the claims of any such infant or person of unsound mind, whether by verdict or by settlement, compromise, payment into Court or otherwise, before or at or after the trial, shall be paid to the next friend of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's solicitor unless the Court or a Judge shall so direct (*t*). All money or damages so recovered are, subject to the directions of the Judge, generally paid into and kept in the High Court or transferred by the High Court to a County Court for the maintenance and education, or otherwise for the benefit of such infant or person of unsound mind. The provisions of this rule shall also apply to all actions in which damages are claimed or awarded or recovered by or on behalf of an infant or person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition under the Fatal Accidents Acts, 1846 to 1908. Similar provision is made by the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, to protect the interests of infant workmen who are entitled to compensation under the Act.

(*p*) *Valentini v. Canali* (1889), 24 Q. B. D. 166.

(*q*) Order XVI., rr. 18, 19; Order LXV., r. 13.

(*r*) *Per Eve, J.*, in *Steeden v. Walden*, [1910] 2 Ch., at p. 400.

(*s*) *Taner v. Ivie* (1752), 2 Vesey, senr., 466; *Nalder v. Hawkins* (1833), 2 Mylne & K. 243, 247; *Pritchard v. Roberts* (1873), L. R. 17 Eq. 222.

(*t*) Order XXII., r. 15.

CHAPTER V.

NATURAL PERSONS.

(D) *Lunatics.*

As a general rule, no conveyance, transfer or contract is binding in law upon any person whose mind did not go with his act. Still less will a man be bound by his act if he had no mind capable of understanding the transaction or of forming an intention. No will or grant of property is valid if the person who made it was incapable of understanding the nature of his act. It will be a defence even to criminal proceedings if the person who committed the criminal act did not know what he was doing, or did not know that what he was doing was wrong. But a still greater degree of insanity—different in character as well as in extent—is necessary before the law will deprive the insane person of his liberty and order him to be confined in an asylum.

Another distinction has always been recognised by both the legal and medical professions. Some persons are born of unsound mind and remain so all their lives without any lucid interval; these are called idiots. Others are born of sound mind, but subsequently become deranged by some disease or accident; these are called lunatics. In the latter case the derangement often is not permanent; there are frequent lucid intervals (*a*). And the derangement at other times is not always total; the lunatic may be insane upon one or more subjects, but sane on others.

As to these cases of "partial delusion" a decided difference of opinion exists between the legal and the medical professions (*b*).

(*a*) Special statutes have been passed for the protection from outrage of female idiots and imbecile women and girls: Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 69), s. 5; Lunacy Act, 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5), s. 324. The word "imbecile" in these statutes includes a lunatic during a lucid interval: *R. v. F*— (1910), 74 J. P. 384.

(*b*) See an excellent treatise on the Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics, by H. Oppenheimer, M.D., LL.D., who strives to reconcile the opposing views of the two professions.

Medical men as a rule assert that no man whose mind is unhinged in any particular should be regarded as responsible—or, at all events, as criminally responsible—for his acts. If such delicate machinery is out of gear at all, the whole machine, they say, must be out of gear. And of this opinion apparently was Lord Brougham, who held in the case of *Waring v. Waring* (c), “that the mind is one and indivisible,” and that therefore any degree of mental unsoundness, however slight and however unconnected with the testamentary disposition in question, must be held fatal to the capacity of a testator. Lord Penzance took the same view in *Smith v. Tebbitt* (d). But these cases are not now binding on this point. It was decided in the leading case of *Banks v. Goodfellow* (e), that partial unsoundness, not affecting the general faculties and not operating on the mind of a testator in regard to testamentary disposition, is not sufficient to render him incapable of disposing of his property by will. Brett, J., at the trial of the action, left to the jury the question whether, at the time of making the will, the testator was capable of having such a knowledge and appreciation of facts, and was so far master of his intentions, free from delusions, as would enable him to have a will of his own in the disposition of his property, and to act upon it; and then further directed that the mere fact of the testator’s being able to recollect things, or to converse rationally on some subjects, or to manage some business, would not be sufficient to show he was sane; while, on the other hand, slowness, feebleness and eccentricities would not be sufficient to show he was insane; and that the whole burden of showing that the testator was fit at the time was on the party claiming under the will. On appeal it was held that this direction was substantially correct. It is, therefore, the law that the mere existence of a delusion in the mind of a person making any disposition of his property is not sufficient to avoid it, even though the delusion is connected with the subject-matter of such disposition, and it will be a question for the jury whether the delusion did in fact affect such disposition (f). A man, who is capable of transacting business of a complicated and important kind, may yet be subject to delusions so as to be unfit to make a will; nevertheless, if the delusions are such that they could not reasonably be supposed to have affected the dispositions made by his will, it will be valid (g).

The law cannot undertake to measure the validity of contracts by the greater or less strength of the understanding of the contracting parties, and if a party be of sound mind the mere weakness of his mental powers does not incapacitate him. Weakness of understanding may, however, be a material circumstance in establishing

(c) (1848), 6 Moo. P. C., at p. 349.

(d) (1867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 398.

(e) (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 549; followed in *Smee v. Smee* (1879), 5 P. D. 84.

(f) *Jenkins v. Morris* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 674.

(g) *Smee v. Smee* (1879), 5 P. D. 84.

an inference of unfair practice or imposition, and it will naturally awaken the attention of a Court of justice to every unfavourable appearance in the case (*h*).

From very early times the Crown undertook the care and custody of idiots and lunatics and of their estates (*i*). From the sixteenth century this jurisdiction has been vested in persons appointed for the purpose (*k*). Under the Lunacy Acts, 1890—1922 (*l*), it is now exercised by the Lord Chancellor or one of the Judges of the Supreme Court, who is appointed for the purpose by commission under the Sign Manual and is called the Judge in Lunacy (*m*). He also acts as an additional Judge of the Chancery Division whenever an application in lunacy requires the exercise of the Chancery jurisdiction (*n*)—to the exclusion of the Judges of that Division, except as to matters relating to a lunatic mortgagee or trustee who is also an infant (*o*).

Among the matters which are entrusted to the jurisdiction of the Judge in Lunacy is the making of orders for the custody of a lunatic so found and the management of his estate (*p*). He will not make an order as to the custody of the lunatic unless his condition actually requires it (*q*). The person who has the custody of the lunatic is called the committee of his person, and the person who has the management of his estate is called the committee of his estate. The jurisdiction of the Judge in Lunacy is not limited to lunatics who have been found by inquisition to be insane. It extends to all persons who he is satisfied are of unsound mind, even though they have not been so found nor are detained under

(*h*) See the remarks of Lord Cranworth, L.C., in *Boyse v. Rossborough* (1857), 6 H. L. Cas., at p. 45.

(*i*) See the statute *De prerogativa regis* (1323), 17 Edw. 2, st. 1, cc. 9, 10; and *Holliday, In re*, [1922] 2 Ch. 698.

(*k*) By the Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 70), s. 2, the Lord Chancellor and the Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery (now Lords Justices of Appeal).

(*l*) 53 Vict. c. 5, s. 108; 8 Edw. 7, c. 47; 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 40; 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 60.

(*m*) As a rule the Lords Justices are selected for this purpose.

(*n*) *Platt, In re* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 410.

(*o*) Lunacy Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 40).

(*p*) Lunacy Act, 1890, s. 108, sub-ss. 2 and 4.

(*q*) *Ibid.*, s. 108, sub-s. 3.

a reception order (*r*). Appeal from any order made by the Judge in Lunacy lies to the Court of Appeal (*s*).

Under the Judge in Lunacy is the Master in Lunacy, who holds inquisitions and conducts inquiries and performs all other duties assigned to him by the Lunacy Acts, or the rules made under them.

The supervision of asylums and houses licensed for the reception of lunatics in order to secure the proper treatment of the inmates and the due observance of the law is secured by the appointment of a Board of Control (*t*). Lunatics whose affairs are under the control of the Judge in Lunacy are visited by Chancery Visitors (*u*), whose duties are very similar. The Act also provides that visitors shall be appointed to supervise every asylum (*x*) and house licensed for the reception of lunatics (*y*).

The chief method of determining whether a person is a lunatic or not is by an inquisition, which may be directed to be had before a jury (*z*). This method is, however, somewhat expensive, and when the only object of declaring a person a lunatic is to confine him for his own welfare, the Act provides that, upon the prescribed certificates of medical practitioners that he is a lunatic, a "judicial authority" (*a*) may grant a "reception order" (*b*), which will justify his detention in an asylum or house licensed for the reception of lunatics. If the lunatic recovers, he may be discharged if he is detained under a reception order, but if he has been found by inquisition to be a lunatic, then a writ of *supersedeas* is necessary to set aside the inquisition (*c*).

So much for lunatics. But there are other classes of persons who are mentally deficient: By the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913 (*d*), "defectives" are divided into four classes:—

"(a) Idiots; that is to say, persons so deeply defective in mind

(*r*) *Ibid.*, s. 116; Lunacy Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 47), s. 1; see also the Act of 1922, s. 2, sub-s. 1.

(*s*) Judicature Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49), s. 26; and see *Cathcart, In re*, [1893] 1 Ch. 466; *Cathcart, In re*, [1902] W. N. 80.

(*t*) Mental Deficiency Act, 1913 (3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 28).

(*u*) Lunacy Act, 1890, ss. 163—168, 183—186.

(*x*) *Ibid.*, ss. 169—176, 194, 195, 196; see also Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, ss. 28, 66.

(*y*) *Ibid.*, ss. 177—182, 193, 194—197; see also Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, s. 40.

(*z*) *Ibid.*, ss. 90—100. In a proper case the Judge in Lunacy may direct that the question be tried as an issue before a Judge of the High Court and a jury: sections 94, 104. A person dissatisfied with the finding of an inquisition can apply for a traverse within three months in order to re-try the question: sections 101—103.

(*a*) The "judicial authority" is defined as the County Court Judge of the district or certain justices of the peace for the county or borough where the lunatic resides: sections 9, 10. For reception orders by Commissioners in Lunacy, see section 23. Communications to the judicial authority for the purpose of obtaining a reception order are absolutely privileged: *Hodson v. Pare*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 455; and see *Harnett v. Bond*, [1925] A. C. 669.

(*b*) *Ibid.*, ss. 4—8. For cases of urgency, see section 11. Lunatics, who are not under proper care or control or who are ill-treated or neglected, are provided for by sections 13—22.

(*c*) *Ibid.*, ss. 105, 106.

(*d*) 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 28.

from birth or from an early age as to be unable to guard themselves against common physical dangers;

“(b) Imbeciles; that is to say, persons in whose case there exists from birth or from an early age mental defectiveness not amounting to idiocy, yet so pronounced that they are incapable of managing themselves or their affairs, or, in the case of children, of being taught to do so;

“(c) Feeble-minded persons; that is to say, persons in whose case there exists from birth or from an early age mental defectiveness not amounting to imbecility, yet so pronounced that they require care, supervision and control for their own protection or for the protection of others, or, in the case of children, that they by reason of such defectiveness appear to be permanently incapable of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in ordinary schools;

“(d) Moral imbeciles; that is to say, persons who from an early age display some permanent mental defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities on which punishment has had little or no deterrent effect.”

The Act provides for defectives being dealt with either by being sent to an institution or placed under guardianship (*e*). The general superintendence of matters relating to their supervision, protection and control is vested in a central body styled “the Board of Control” (*f*), and County Councils and Borough Councils are constituted committees for the purposes of the Act (*g*). The Idiots Act, 1886, is repealed (*h*), and full provision is made for the care and protection in every way of the persons to whom the Act applies and for the management and administration of their property.

The law presumes every person to be sane and accountable for his actions until the contrary is proved. The defence of insanity is often raised both in criminal proceedings and in civil actions, whether of tort or contract. The principles which regulate this defence in criminal charges may now be regarded as settled (*i*); in actions of contract, too, the authorities are clear, but in actions of tort the extent to which insanity affects the nature of the act complained of is not yet adequately defined.

Any one who is proved to have committed a criminal act will be found guilty and punished, unless he can show

(*e*) Section 2.

(*f*) Sections 21 *et seq.*

(*g*) Sections 27 *et seq.*

(*h*) Section 67.

(*i*) See *R. v. Beard*, [1920] A. C. 479; *R. v. True* (1922), 127 L. J. 561, C. C. A.

clearly that at the time he did that act he was "labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong" (*k*). If he was conscious that the act in question was one which he ought not to do, he is punishable. "It is essential to constitute responsibility for crime that a man shall understand the nature and quality of the thing he is doing, or that he shall be able to distinguish in the act he is doing right from wrong. Now a very small degree of intelligence is sufficient to enable a man to judge of the quality and nature of the act, and whether he is doing right or wrong when he kills another man; accordingly he is responsible for the crime committed if he possesses that amount of intelligence" (*l*).

If the accused labours under a partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he will be under the same degree of responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. Whenever the prisoner is shown to have acted under some insane delusion as to the surrounding circumstances which concealed from him the true nature of the act which he was doing, the test is this: assuming the facts to have been as they appeared to him to be, do they afford him any defence to the indictment? If not, he must be convicted, because his crime in that case was not the result of his delusion.

Thus, "if, under the influence of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he will be exempt from punishment. But if his delusion were that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury on his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment" (*m*).

The law on the subject is thus stated in the answers given by the Judges (*n*) to the questions put to them by the House of Lords in 1843, after the acquittal of M'Naghten, who had been tried for the

(*k*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., in *M'Naghten's Case* (1843), 10 Cl. & F., at p. 210; and see *R. v. Coelho* (1914), 30 T. L. R. 535, C. C. A.

(*l*) *Per* Hannen, P., in *Boughton v. Knight* (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D., at p. 72.

(*m*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., in *M'Naghten's Case* (1843), 10 Cl. & F., at p. 211.

(*n*) One Judge declined to answer on constitutional grounds.

murder of Mr. Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel (o). Their answer to the first question was as follows:—

A person labouring under such partial delusion only, and not being in other respects insane, although he did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, is nevertheless punishable according to the nature of the crime committed, “if he knew at the time of committing such crime that he was acting contrary to law,” *i.e.*, to the law of the land.

HABITUAL DRUNKENNESS, although not in itself affording excuse for crime, may induce insanity, which will render the individual affected by it wholly irresponsible for his acts; and *delirium tremens*, caused by drinking, if it produces such a degree of madness, even for a time, as to render a person incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, relieves him from criminal responsibility (p). But in other cases “if a man voluntarily makes himself drunk, that is no excuse for any crime which he may commit whilst in that state; he must take the consequence of his own act, or many crimes would otherwise be unpunished” (q). Nevertheless, the fact that the accused was drunk at the time he committed the crime may be taken into consideration in cases where some special intention in the mind of the accused is a necessary element of the crime charged against him; for a person may be so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all. Such considerations might arise in cases of murder, or of threatened violence, or of an attempt to commit suicide (r). It is also of importance where any question arises as to whether the act was wilful or accidental—for instance, whether a house was set on fire designedly or by accident. But if it be proved that the accused had previously formed an intention to commit the crime, the mere fact that he was drunk at the time when

(o) These answers were given extra-judicially and their authority has been doubted: see *R. v. Francis* (1849), 4 Cox C. C. 57; Stephen, *Hist. of Criminal Law*, Vol. II., p. 153, but they have been uniformly acted upon ever since.

(p) *R. v. Davis* (1881), 14 Cox, 563.

(q) *Per* Parke, B., in *R. v. Thomas* (1887), 7 C. & P., at p. 820; *Advocate (H.M.) v. Campbell*, [1921] S. C. (J.) 1.

(r) See the judgment of Lord Birkenhead, L.C., in *R. v. Beard*, [1920] A. C. 479, at p. 490; and vol. i, pp. 124, 125.

he did commit it would furnish no excuse, unless he were so drunk that the above considerations might apply.

It is for the accused to prove that he was insane at the time of committing the offence charged against him; the *onus* of doing so rests on him. If, however, the jury are satisfied that at the time in question the accused was insane, they must return a special verdict that he was guilty of the act but was so insane at the time as not to be responsible in law for it; and the Judge will then order him to be kept in custody as a criminal lunatic in such place and in such manner as the Court shall direct till His Majesty's pleasure shall be known (*s*). It sometimes happens that, upon arraignment, the accused appears manifestly to be unable to understand the proceedings or to instruct any one in his defence; when this is so, he will not be allowed to plead; the question as to his fitness to plead will have to be tried by a jury returned *instantly* for that purpose, and if he be found to be unfit to plead, the Judge will order him to be detained during His Majesty's pleasure (*t*).

A person who is admittedly a lunatic can both sue and be sued in civil actions, whether of tort or contract (*u*). If he has not been found a lunatic by inquisition, he must sue by his next friend; if he has been so found, then by his committee (*x*), who before commencing proceedings must obtain the sanction of the Master and Judge in Lunacy (*y*). A lunatic defends an action by his committee if one has been appointed, unless the interests of the lunatic and committee be adverse; in other cases a guardian *ad litem* must be appointed.

A lunatic can bring an action for any tort committed against him, but it is not yet settled to what extent he is liable for torts committed by him. In cases where the intention of the offender is quite immaterial it is obvious that a lunatic cannot escape liability. It has been said, too,

(*s*) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 38, s. 2, sub-ss. 1, 2; and see 47 & 48 Vict. c. 64, ss. 5, 16. Evidence of mental deficiency will not necessarily entitle a jury to return a verdict of "Guilty, but insane"; see *R. v. Alexander* (1914), 109 L. T. 745; 23 Cox, 604.

(*t*) 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, s. 2. See *R. v. Pritchard* (1836), 7 C. & P. 303; *R. v. Goode* (1837), 7 A. & E. 536. A person who is deaf and dumb and unable to communicate with anybody at all is within this rule: *R. v. Stafford Prison (Governor)*, [1909] 2 K. B. 81. The cost of maintenance in such a prison is a Crown debt and recoverable accordingly: *J., In re*, [1909] 1 Ch. 574.

(*u*) Order XVI., r. 17.

(*x*) *Lord Townshend v. Robins*, [1908] 1 Ch. 201; *Hunt, In re*, [1906] 2 Ch. 295.

(*y*) Lunacy Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 65), s. 27, sub-s. 1; *Hinchcliffe, In re* (1895), 73 L. T. 522; and see Order XXII., r. 15.

that a lunatic is liable for any defamatory words he may have published (z); but in America insanity has been held to be a defence where the derangement is so great and notorious that the lunatic's words would produce no effect on the hearers (a). In cases where the intention must go with the act, the liability of a lunatic to pay damages would probably be held to be governed by principles similar to those which are applied in criminal cases.

As in the case of infants (b), contracts for the supply of necessaries to a lunatic or to his wife and family (c) during his lunacy differ from other contracts. He is liable to pay a reasonable price for such necessaries, whether or not the person who supplied them knew at the time they were ordered that he was a lunatic (d). The authority of a wife to bind her husband for necessaries is the same whether he be a lunatic or sane (e). Moreover, "if a person finds necessaries for a lunatic, and intends to be repaid for so doing and to constitute a debt against the lunatic, I do not doubt that the law implies an obligation on the part of the lunatic's estate to repay the amount spent on such necessaries" (f). To be necessaries the goods must be suitable to the condition in life of the lunatic and to his actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery (g).

As to all contracts other than those for the supply of necessaries, the rule is now that "when a person enters into a contract and afterwards alleges that he was so insane at the time that he did not know what he was doing, and proves the allegation, the contract is as binding on him in every respect, whether it is executory or executed, as if he

(z) See the remarks of Kelly, C.B., in *Mordaunt v. Mordaunt* (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 103, at p. 142.

(a) *Dickinson v. Barber* (1812), 9 Tyng. (Mass.), 215, 218; *Yeates v. Reed* (1838), 4 Blackford (Ind.), 463; *Gates v. Meredith* (1856), 7 Porter (Ind.), 440.

(b) See *ante*, pp. 759 *et seq.*

(c) *Read v. Legard* (1851), 6 Exch. 636; and see *Richardson v. Du Bois* (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 51.

(d) Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 2; *Rhodes, In re* (1890), 44 Ch. D. 94; and see also *E. G., In re*, [1914] 1 Ch. 927. The costs connected with a lunacy commission may be necessaries: *Wentworth v. Tubb* (1841), 1 Y. & C. (Ch.) 171.

(e) *Richardson v. Du Bois, supra.*

(f) *Per Lopes, L.J., in Rhodes, In re* (1890), 44 Ch. D., at p. 108; and see the judgment of Lindley, L.J., *ibid.*, at p. 107.

(g) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 2.

had been sane when he made it, unless he can prove further that the person with whom he contracted knew him to be so insane as not to be capable of understanding what he was about'' (h).

We have here an exception to the rule that there cannot be a contract unless the minds of both the contracting parties are agreed on the same thing; for in the case of lunacy or excessive drunkenness the mind of one party is incapable of forming an agreement, and yet the contract is enforceable, unless it can be shown that the plaintiff knew that the defendant was insane when he entered into the contract. It is not enough for the lunatic or his representative to prove that he was in fact insane at the date of the contract.

Thus, in *Molton v. Camroux* (i) a lunatic purchased certain annuities, and paid the consideration money and a premium in respect thereof. After his death an action was brought for recovery of these moneys by his administratrix. The jury found by a special verdict that at the time of the granting of the annuities and payment of the moneys the deceased was a lunatic and of unsound mind, so as to be incompetent to manage his affairs, but of this the other party had not, at that time, any knowledge, and that the transaction took place in the ordinary course of business, and was fair and *bona fide*, as the grantee appeared to the company to be of sound mind, and the company fully intended to pay the annuities. It was held that the contract could not be set aside.

An action will lie to recover money paid by a lunatic under a contract, if at the time of the making of the contract the fact of the plaintiff's insanity was known to the defendant; and in such an action evidence will be admissible of the plaintiff's conduct upon various occasions, both before and after the transaction, to show that his malady was such as would make itself apparent to the defendant when the parties were dealing together (k).

It has been said that "all acts done during a lucid interval are to be considered done by a person perfectly capable of contracting, managing, and disposing of his affairs at that period," and that therefore a deed executed by a lunatic during a lucid interval will bind him (l). But it is now decided, that a person once found lunatic by inquisition cannot, while the inquisition continues in force, execute a deed dealing with his property, even in a lucid interval. Such a deed will be treated as void (m).

(h) *Per* Lord Esher, M.R., in *Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone*, [1892] 1 Q. B., at p. 601; see also *York Glass Co. v. Jubbs* (1925), 42 T. L. R. 1.

(i) (1848), 4 Exch. 17. See also *Price v. Barrington* (1851), 3 Mac. & G., at p. 498.

(k) *Beavan v. M'Donnell* (1854), 10 Exch. 184.

(l) *Per* Sir W. Grant, M.R., in *Hall v. Warren* (1804), 9 Ves., at p. 610. See *Beverley's Case* (1603), 4 Rep. 125 a.

(m) *Walker, In re*, [1905] 1 Ch. 160. He can apparently make a valid will: see *ante*, p. 766.

A contract made during sanity is not avoided by subsequent insanity unless it thereby becomes impossible of performance (n).

It is settled law that the lunacy of the principal determines the authority of his agent (o). Hence, where an authority given to an agent has, without his knowledge, been determined by the lunacy of the principal, and subsequently the agent has, in the belief that he was acting in pursuance thereof, made a contract or transacted some business with another person, representing that, in so doing, he was acting on behalf of the principal, the agent is liable, as having impliedly warranted the existence of the authority which he assumed to exercise.

Thus, in *Yonge v. Toynbee* (p), solicitors were instructed by a client to conduct his defence to an action which was then threatened and was afterwards commenced against him. Before the commencement of the action the client became, and was certified as being, of unsound mind. In ignorance of his unsoundness of mind, and of his having been so certified, the solicitors entered an appearance for him, and delivered a Defence, and other interlocutory proceedings took place. Before the trial the plaintiff became aware that the defendant had been certified as being of unsound mind. The Court thereupon ordered that the appearance and all subsequent proceedings in the action should be struck out, and that the solicitors who had assumed to act for the defendant should be ordered personally to pay the plaintiff's costs of the action up to date, on the ground that they had so acted without authority, and had impliedly warranted that they had authority.

But where a committee is authorised by the Judge in Lunacy to carry on a lunatic's business, he is thereby constituted the agent of the lunatic and consequently cannot be made personally liable on any contract into which he may enter in carrying out the order of the Court (q).

The effect of DRUNKENNESS upon capacity to contract is now in law much the same as the effect of lunacy. A person who has contracted, even by deed (r), whilst so intoxicated

(n) *Hall v. Warren*, *supra*. As to contracts of marriage, see *Durham v. Durham* (1885), 10 P. D. 80.

(o) *Drew v. Nunn* (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 661. The lunacy of a husband, however, does not determine the authority of his wife to pledge his credit for necessities: *Read v. Legard* (1851), 6 Exch. 636.

(p) [1910] 1 K. B. 215.

(q) *Plumpton v. Burkinshaw*, [1908] 2 K. B. 572; followed in *E. G., In re*, [1914] 1 Ch. 927; see also *E. D. S., In re*, [1914] 1 Ch. 618.

(r) *Per* Sir W. Grant, M.R., in *Cooke v. Clayworth* (1811), 18 Ves. 15, 16.

as to be deprived of his reason and therefore not to know the consequences of his act, may successfully dispute his liability in respect of such transaction, particularly if the other contracting party was aware of his condition (s).

The contract of a man too drunk to know what he is about is voidable only, not void, and is therefore capable of being ratified by him when he becomes sober (t), and if so ratified will bind him to perform it. A tradesman who supplies a drunken man with goods may recover the price of them, if the party keeps them when he becomes sober, and by section 2 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, a drunken man must pay a reasonable price for necessities.

A state of partial intoxication merely—less in degree than that indicated above—would seem, in the absence of fraud or unfair dealing, to afford no defence to an action founded upon contract, though the fact that a man took an obligation from one whom he knew to be drunk is always some evidence of fraud.

(s) *Gore v. Gibson* (1845), 13 M. & W. 623, which "was no doubt rightly decided, but some of the *dicta* of the Judges cannot be supported in all their fulness since the decision in *Molton v. Camroux*" (*ante*, p. 774) : *per* Pollock, B., in *Matthews v. Baxter* (1873), L. R. 8 Ex., at p. 134.

(t) *Matthews v. Baxter*, *supra*.

CHAPTER VI.

NATURAL PERSONS.

(E) *Bankrupts.*

BANKRUPTCY in England dates from the reign of Henry VIII. The first statute on the subject was passed in 1543 (a). Originally bankruptcy was treated as a crime; even now "what the petitioner seeks by his petition is in the highest degree penal in its consequences. It amounts to loss of civil status, carrying with it grave disqualifications" (b).

The object of the law of bankruptcy is two-fold:—

- (a) Firstly, to secure the equitable division of the debtor's assets among his creditors—in other words, to protect the creditors from one another.
- (b) Secondly, to protect a debtor who honourably assists in such division from future claims, so that he may start life anew, freed from antecedent liability.

But the Legislature has made careful provision to secure that the discharge of a debtor from his liabilities should not be sought or used fraudulently, that no secret arrangements should be made by the debtor with one creditor to the prejudice of the others, and that secured creditors should not be deprived of the full benefit of their securities.

It is impossible in this work to deal in more than the barest outline with our present law of bankruptcy. Nearly the whole of it will be found codified in the Bankruptcy Acts, 1914 and 1926 (c). There are, however, still in force certain rules of practice and administration which are not contained in that statute.

(a) 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4.

(b) *Per Moulton, L.J., in A Debtor, In re*, [1910] 2 K. B., at p. 66.

(c) 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59; and the Amendment Act, 1926 (16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 7). In the rest of this chapter, references to sections, no Act being specified, are references to the Act of 1914.

The Courts which now have jurisdiction in bankruptcy are the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice (*d*) and the provincial County Courts (*e*). They have power to adjudicate a debtor bankrupt, to distribute his estate among his creditors and then to discharge him from all future liability for the debts due to such creditors. Generally any man or woman, who is within the jurisdiction of any one of these Courts, can be made a bankrupt if he or she owes a personal debt of £50 or more for which an action will lie in a Court of law, and which he or she cannot, or will not, pay. So far as liability to be made bankrupt is concerned there is no longer, except in the case of married women, any distinction between traders and non-traders.

Every married woman who carries on a trade or business, whether separately from her husband or not, is subject to the bankruptcy laws in the same way as if she were unmarried (*f*). She can be made a bankrupt in respect of her separate trading, although she has sold her business, so long as any of her trade liabilities remain undischarged (*g*).

An infant cannot be made a bankrupt, unless possibly for debts incurred for necessaries (*h*). "There is nothing illegal or improper in an infant's carrying on a trade," but he cannot present a petition against himself. He cannot be made bankrupt on the petition of persons who have supplied him with goods on credit for trade purposes (*i*). Where, however, an infant falsely represented himself to be of full age, and became bankrupt on attaining full age, it was held that the creditor might prove his debt in the bankruptcy (*k*). If an action is brought against a firm, one member of which is an infant, for goods supplied to the firm, judgment cannot be recovered against the firm simply; nor can a receiving order be made against the firm simply. Both a judgment and a receiving order must be made against the members of the firm "other than the infant partner" (*l*). A lunatic, on the other hand, can be made a bankrupt (*m*).

A foreigner will not be liable to bankruptcy proceedings in

(*d*) See *ante*, pp. 370 *et seq.* Bankruptcy business is now assigned to Chancery Judges.

(*e*) See *ante*, p. 385.

(*f*) See section 125, sub-section 1, and *ante*, p. 743; and *Allen, In re; Shaw, ex parte*, [1915] 1 K. B. 285.

(*g*) *Dagnall, In re*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 407.

(*h*) *Soltyskoff, In re*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 413; and see *R. v. Wilson* (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 28.

(*i*) *Jones, Ex parte; Jones, In re* (1881), 18 Ch. D. 109, 121.

(*k*) *Unity Banking Association, Ex parte* (1858), 3 De G. & J. 63. At common law it was otherwise: see *Bartlett v. Wells* (1862), 1 B. & S. 836.

(*l*) See *Lovell and Christmas v. Beauchamp*, [1894] A. C. 607.

(*m*) *Farnham, In re*, [1895] 2 Ch. 799.

England unless "at the time when any act of bankruptcy was done or suffered by him he—

- (a) was personally present in England; or
- (b) ordinarily resided or had a place of residence in England; or
- (c) was carrying on business in England personally or by means of an agent or manager; or
- (d) has been a member of a firm or partnership which carried on business in England."

Further, he must be domiciled in England; or within a year before the presentation of the bankruptcy petition have ordinarily resided or had a dwelling-house or place of business in England; or within that period have carried on business in England personally or by an agent or manager, and not be domiciled in Scotland or Ireland; or within the said period have been a member of a firm or partnership which has carried on business in England and whose principal place of business is not in Scotland or Ireland (n).

The first step in any bankruptcy proceeding is to present a *bankruptcy petition* against the debtor. This may be done by the debtor himself or by a creditor or creditors, the amount of whose debts is at least £50. The petition must be based upon an act of bankruptcy which has been committed within three months before its presentation (o). It must be presented in the High Court, if the debtor has been resident in the London Bankruptcy District (p), or is resident abroad, or cannot be found. In any other case it must be presented in the County Court of the district where the debtor has resided or carried on business for the last six months or for the longest period out of the last six months.

A debtor may commit an *act of bankruptcy* in eight different ways (q):—

(i) If in England or elsewhere he makes a conveyance or assignment of his property to a trustee or trustees for the benefit of his creditors generally.

(ii) If in England or elsewhere he makes a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery or transfer of his property or of any part thereof.

(iii) If in England or elsewhere he makes any conveyance or transfer of his property or any part thereof, or creates any charge

(n) Section 1, sub-section 2, and section 4, sub-section 1 (d).

(o) The bankruptcy commences at the actual time of day when the act of bankruptcy is committed: section 37, sub-section 1; *Bumpus, In re; White, ex parte*, [1908] 2 K. B. 330.

(p) This area is defined in section 99.

(q) Section 1, sub-section 1.

thereon which would under any Bankruptcy Act be void as a fraudulent preference if he were adjudged bankrupt.

(iv) If with intent to defeat or delay his creditors he departs out of England or being out of England remains out of England, or departs from his dwelling-house or otherwise absents himself or begins to "keep house."

(v) If execution against him has been levied by seizure of his goods under process in an action in any Court or in any civil proceeding in the High Court and the goods have either been sold or held by the sheriff for twenty-one days (r).

(vi) If he files in the Court a declaration of his inability to pay his debts or presents a bankruptcy petition against himself.

(vii) If a creditor obtains final judgment against him for any amount and, execution not having been stayed, serves upon him a "bankruptcy notice," *i.e.*, a notice requiring him to pay the judgment debt or to secure or compound for it, and within seven days after service (s) he neither complies with the notice nor satisfies the Court that he has a counterclaim or set-off, equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt, which could not have been set up in the action.

(viii) If he gives notice to any of his creditors that he has suspended or is about to suspend payment of his debts.

Unless the debtor successfully disputes (i) the act of bankruptcy upon which the petition is based, or (ii) the debt (t), or (iii) the jurisdiction of the Court, a receiving order will be made upon the hearing of the petition; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed.

The *receiving order* does not make the debtor a bankrupt, and, indeed, it is not necessarily followed by an order of the Court adjudging the debtor to be bankrupt. But as soon as a receiving order is made, the duties of the Official Receiver commence (u). He becomes at once *interim* receiver of the bankrupt's property. It is his duty at once to call upon the debtor to prepare a "statement of affairs," which is submitted to the creditors. The Official Receiver tests the accuracy of this statement and investigates all other matters that come to his knowledge affecting the estate; he

(r) If interpleader proceedings are taken, the time occupied in disposing of the questions raised in them is not included.

(s) If service is effected abroad, the Court may fix any other period for complying with the notice.

(t) Proceedings are stayed until the debt is established: section 5, subsection 5; *Gentry, In re*, [1910] 1 K. B. 825.

(u) As to this officer, see *ante*, p. 367. Another effect of a receiving order is that all dealings with the bankrupt, even *bona fide* and without knowledge of the order, cease to be protected.

conducts the public examination of the debtor before the Registrar. He then calls a meeting of the creditors, at which a resolution may be carried to the effect that the debtor be adjudicated a bankrupt.

An *adjudication order* must be made, if the creditors at their meeting pass such a resolution, or if they pass no resolution at all, or if they do not meet (*x*). The order may be made, if the debtor fails to prepare a statement of affairs within seven days from the date of the receiving order or within such further time as may be allowed, or generally whenever in the opinion of the Court it ought to be made (*y*). A decree of a competent Court declaring a debtor to be bankrupt is a judgment *in rem* affecting his status; it will be recognised and accepted by all Courts in England and Wales and the colonies.

At a meeting of the creditors, it often happens that some composition or scheme of arrangement is proposed by the debtor or his friends. If such a scheme be carried at the meeting, it must be submitted to the Court, and if accepted, the debtor will not be made a bankrupt, or if an adjudication order has been made, it will be annulled (*z*). If, however, the scheme, though accepted by the creditors, be subsequently rejected by the Court, an adjudication order must be made. An adjudication order will also be annulled, if in the opinion of the Court it ought never to have been made, or if the debts are paid in full, that is, paid in cash to the amount of 20s. in the pound (*a*).

If a friend of the bankrupt buys up the debts for less than their nominal value and is repaid his price in full by the debtor, this will not be payment in full (*b*).

As soon as an adjudication order has been made, a trustee of the bankrupt's estate is appointed by a resolution of the creditors. Such resolution must be passed by a majority in value of the creditors present at the meeting. At the same time not more than five, nor less than three, creditors may be appointed to act as a committee of inspection, to assist the trustee in the realisation and distribution of the assets (*c*). The appointment of the trustee and of the committee of inspection, if any, must be sanctioned

(*x*) Section 18.

(*z*) Sections 16, 21.

(*b*) *Burnett, In re* (1894), 1 Mans. 89.

(*y*) Section 14.

(*a*) *Keet, In re*, [1905] 2 K. B. 666.

(*c*) Section 20.

by the Board of Trade. Until a trustee is appointed or during any vacancy in the office, the Official Receiver acts as trustee (d).

Immediately upon the adjudication, and not before, all the property of the bankrupt, whether at home or abroad, which is by law divisible amongst his creditors, passes to the trustee, whose title to it will thenceforward be recognised by every Court in the British dominions. And it is the duty of the bankrupt at once to disclose and hand over to his trustee all such property (e). If he omits either to disclose or to hand over to his trustee any portion of such property with intent to defraud his creditors the bankrupt is guilty of a misdemeanour; and the burden of proving that such an omission was not fraudulent rests upon the bankrupt (f). The phrase "property divisible amongst his creditors," roughly speaking, includes all his movable property, wherever situated, all his land within the British dominions, and most of his "things in action." It does not include property which he holds as trustee, nor property the title to which he lost by his adjudication, nor tools, wearing apparel and bedding of himself and family to a value not exceeding £20. But it may include property which does not belong to him, if he has possession of it under such circumstances that he is the "reputed owner" of it (g).

Questions of some difficulty have often arisen as to what "things in action" pass to the trustee on a bankruptcy (h). Nearly every claim arising out of a breach of contract, even for unliquidated damages, passes to the trustee in bankruptcy and can be sold by him (i), and so can a right to be relieved against forfeiture of a lease for non-payment of rent (k); but a right of action for any personal wrong, such as a trespass to his person or his land, or a right of action for libel or slander, remains in the bankrupt. In short, no right of action passes to a trustee in bankruptcy where the damages are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain

(d) Sections 19, 20.

(e) Section 22.

(f) See Vol. 1, p. 268.

(g) Section 38. See *Neal, In re*, [1914] 2 K. B. 910.

(h) Section 48, sub-section 5; *Boaler v. Power*, [1910] 2 K. B. 229; and see *Colonial Bank v. Whinney* (1886), 11 App. Cas. 426, and *ante*, pp. 114 *et seq*.

(i) *Ogdens v. Weinberg* (1906), 121 L. T. J. 338; but see *Bailey v. Thurston*, [1903] 1 K. B. 137.

(k) *Howard v. Fanshawe*, [1895] 2 Ch. 581.

felt by the bankrupt in respect of his body, mind or character, and without immediate reference to his rights of property (*l*).

If consequential damage to the personal estate follows from the injury to the person, it may be so dependent upon the personal injury, which is the primary cause of action, that no right to maintain a separate action in respect of such consequential damage will pass to the trustee. Moreover, the primary cause of action being personal, the right to maintain it would die with the bankrupt.

There are a few contracts, as to which the right of action does not pass to the trustee, such as a promise of marriage or other contract of a purely personal character. The rights of the bankrupt under all other contracts pass to his trustee in bankruptcy. If they be profitable, the trustee will see that they are duly performed and the proceeds paid into the estate; *e.g.*, he may complete a building contract or carry on the debtor's trade, if he thinks that it will be to the interest of the creditors that he should do so. But if in the opinion of the trustee the contract is an unprofitable one, he may, as a rule, repudiate it, leaving the other party to prove in the bankruptcy for damages for its non-performance.

If, however, other persons entered into the contract jointly with the bankrupt, these other persons may sue or be sued on the contract without the bankrupt being made a party to the action (*m*). Nor does the bankruptcy of one party to a contract necessarily deprive the other party of his right, if any, to rescind the contract. Thus, where a buyer obtained goods under a contract of sale by false representations and then was adjudicated bankrupt, it was held that the seller was nevertheless entitled to disaffirm the contract and resume possession of the goods (*n*).

When a trustee in bankruptcy brings an action to recover any debt or other property belonging to his debtor, he sues in his own name, stating explicitly that he claims as "trustee under the bankruptcy of A B" (*o*). He cannot in such an action join any claim which he makes in his own right (*p*). He may compromise such an action with the consent of the committee of inspection, if there be one; if there be no such committee the Board of Trade must consent to the compromise (*q*).

It is the duty of the trustee to get in all the assets of the bankrupt—bringing actions, when necessary, to recover them—and then to divide the assets rateably among those creditors who have proved their debts in the bankruptcy.

(*l*) See *Beckham v. Drake* (1849), 2 H. L. Cas. 579.

(*m*) Section 118; and see *ante*, pp. 474—476.

(*n*) *Eastgate, In re; Ward, ex parte*, [1905] 1 K. B. 465; *Tilley v. Bowman*, [1910] 1 K. B. 745.

(*o*) R. S. C., Appendix A, Part III., s. VII.

(*p*) Order XVIII., r. 3.

(*q*) *Pilling, In re; Salaman, ex parte*, [1906] 2 K. B. 644; and see section 20, sub-section 10, section 56, sub-section 7.

There are, however, a few classes of debts which are entitled to priority (r). Not all the debts of a bankrupt are provable in his bankruptcy; for instance, debts the value of which is incapable of being fairly estimated, or demands in the nature of unliquidated damages which arise otherwise than under a contract or breach of trust (s), are not provable. A secured creditor—that is, a person who holds a mortgage, charge or lien on any property of the debtor as security for a debt due to him from the debtor (t)—cannot prove in the bankruptcy for the whole of his debt and at the same time retain his security. He may, if he thinks fit, realise his security or put a value upon it and prove for the balance of his debt after deducting the proceeds of the realisation or the value which he has put upon it. The trustee is, of course, not bound to accept the value put upon it by the creditor. He may, however, if he wishes, buy it at that value. Or the secured creditor may either hand over his security to the trustee and prove in the bankruptcy for his whole debt, or he may retain his security and not prove at all. In no event, however, can any creditor receive more than 20s. in the pound and such interest as is allowed by the Act (u).

The bankrupt can apply for his discharge at any time after the making of the adjudication order (x). The Court may either

- (i) grant the discharge absolutely; or
- (ii) grant it but suspend its operation for a period (y); or
- (iii) grant it but suspend its operation until a certain sum in the pound has been paid (z); or
- (iv) grant it upon condition that the bankrupt shall have judgment entered up against him for a certain amount to be discharged out of his future assets (a); or
- (v) refuse the discharge altogether (b).

(r) Sections 33—35.

(s) Section 30.

(t) Section 167; and see *Pawson, In re*, [1917] 2 K. B. 527.

(u) Schedule II., rr. 10—18.

(x) Section 26, sub-section 1.

(y) In certain cases, for at least two years, as in *Shaw, In re*, [1917] 2 K. B. 734: see section 1, sub-section 1 of Act of 1926.

(z) In certain cases, until 10s. in the pound is paid: see section 26, sub-section 2, as amended by section 1 of Act of 1926.

(a) Execution cannot issue without the leave of the Court.

(b) The discharge may be granted subject to suspension and to conditions.

An *order of discharge* releases the bankrupt from all debts provable in his bankruptcy (c); and unless there be a new consideration, a discharged bankrupt cannot make a binding promise to pay the debts from which he has thus been released (d). But an order of discharge does not release the bankrupt from any debt on a recognisance or Crown debt or debt due in respect of a revenue offence or on a bail bond relating to revenue offences, or from any debt or liability incurred by fraud or fraudulent breach of trust, or from any debt whereof he obtained forbearance by fraud. Nor does it release him from any liability under a judgment in an action for seduction or under an affiliation order or under a judgment in a matrimonial cause, unless the Court expressly so orders (e).

It only remains to add a few words as to the status of a bankrupt who has not yet applied for, or who has failed to obtain, an order of discharge. If such a bankrupt "either alone or jointly with any other person obtains credit to the extent of ten pounds or upwards from any person without informing that person that he is an undischarged bankrupt, or engages in any trade or business under a name other than that under which he was adjudicated bankrupt without disclosing to all persons with whom he enters into any business transaction the name under which he was adjudicated bankrupt, he is guilty of a misdemeanour" (f). An undischarged bankrupt may, however, contract for his own work and labour, and recover money which he thus earns, as well as for materials incident and necessary to such work (g). In doubtful cases the burden will be upon the bankrupt to prove that the money sought to be recovered does not pass to the trustee.

So if a personal tort be committed against an undischarged

(c) Section 28, sub-section 2.

(d) See *Heather v. Webb* (1876), 2 C. P. D. 1; *Barrow, Ex parte* (1881), 18 Ch. D. 464.

(e) Section 28, sub-section 1.

(f) Section 155; even where an agent carries out the transaction and neglects to inform the third party of the principal's bankruptcy: *R. v. Duke of Leinster*, [1924] 1 K. B. 311.

(g) But see *Emden v. Carte* (1881), 17 Ch. D. 169, 768; *Vine, Ex parte; Wilson, in re* (1878), 8 Ch. D. 364.

bankrupt, he can sue for and recover damages and expend them in the maintenance of himself and his family. The trustee cannot intercept such damages, though, if the bankrupt invests them in the purchase of property, the trustee may perhaps be entitled to the property (*h*). The defendant in such an action is not entitled to claim security for costs—at all events, not on the ground merely that the plaintiff is an undischarged bankrupt (*i*). On the other hand, if an undischarged bankrupt commits a tort, he is personally liable in damages, and his bankruptcy will afford him no defence.

(*h*) *Vine, Ex parte, supra.*

(*i*) *Rhodes v. Dawson* (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 548; *Cook v. Whellock* (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 658.

CHAPTER VII.

NATURAL PERSONS.

(F) *Executors and Administrators.*

DEATH determines all criminal responsibility (a); it puts an end to liability for most torts; it leaves unaffected, as a rule, the contractual obligations incurred by the deceased.

Under some systems of law the personality of the deceased continues after his death, and is regarded as a separate legal entity. *Hæreditas defuncti personam sustinet*. This is not yet so in England, although our law has for the last hundred years or more been gradually approaching a somewhat similar position. We do not adopt the fiction by which a dead man's estate is regarded as a legal *persona*. But when any question arises as to the disposal of his property, real or personal, our Courts insist upon the presence of a "legal representative" of the deceased (b).

The duties of such representative are very various. In the first place, he must bury the deceased (c); next he must prove the will or take out letters of administration and pay the funeral and testamentary expenses, then collect or realise the estate and pay the debts of the deceased so far as the proceeds permit. Lastly, he must divide the estate and effects (if there be any surplus) according to the directions of the will, if there be one, or if not, according to the rules of intestate succession. The succession to personal property upon its owner's death is

(a) Suicide is theoretically felony; an attempt to commit suicide is, as we have seen (Vol. 1, p. 309), a misdemeanour.

(b) See Order XVII., rr. 2, 4.

(c) This duty is usually performed by the family before any question arises as to administration. If any one other than the personal representative buries the deceased, he can recover the reasonable expenses of the funeral: *Ambrose v. Kerrison* (1851), 10 C. B. 776; and see Vol. 1, pp. 11, 14.

governed by the law of the country in which he was then domiciled; but succession to land is governed by the law of the country where it is situated (*d*).

The personal representative of the deceased may be either an executor or an administrator. The person named in a will as the executor becomes entitled, from the moment of the death of the testator, to all his personal property, which, after payment of the debts of the deceased, he is bound to apply according to the directions of the will. By the Administration of Estates Act, 1925 (*e*); a testator's freehold estate also vests in his executor on his death, and will not pass to his heir or devisee without the assent of the executor (*f*). If, as is usual, two or more persons be named as executors, an one of them who is of full age may, as a rule, perform any of the ordinary acts of administration without the concurrence of the others. Nevertheless, in any legal proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased person all executors who have proved the will must be joined as parties (*g*); it is not necessary to add any of the persons beneficially interested in the estate (*h*). Nor is it necessary to make the representative of a deceased executor a party to an action if there be any executor surviving (*i*).

If however a person dies intestate, or has not appointed an executor by his will or codicil, or for some reason the executor cannot act or renounces probate, it is necessary to apply to the Probate Division of the High Court of Justice to appoint some one to administer his effects (*k*). Such person is called an administrator, and is usually the wife, the child or a creditor of the deceased. He has when appointed the same right to, and power over, all the estate of the intestate as an executor would have had if there had been a will, and this right and power relate back to the date of the decease

(*d*) But see Wills Act, 1864 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 114); see generally the Administration of Estates Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 23).

(*e*) 15 Geo. 5, c. 23.

(*f*) See Vol. 1, p. 21.

(*g*) See *Latch v. Latch* (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 464.

(*h*) Order XVI., r. 8.

(*i*) *Harrison, In re*; *Smith v. Allen*, [1891] 2 Ch. 349; and see *Bowden, In re*; *Andrew v. Cooper* (1890), 45 Ch. D. 444.

(*k*) See, however, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 52; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 27.

of the intestate as soon as the administrator is duly appointed.

The Court can grant administration for a limited time or purpose (*l*). If the sole executor named in a will be under age, or if the next-of-kin of an intestate entitled to letters of administration be under age, the Court will grant letters of administration to some one else till he attains the age of twenty-one years; this is called administration *durante minore ætate*. So if the executor or next-of-kin should be out of the realm at the time of the decease of the testator or intestate and there is no prospect of his speedy return, the Court will grant a limited administration *durante absentia* which will expire immediately on the return of such executor or next-of-kin. And if the executor should prove the will, or if any person should obtain letters of administration, and afterwards go to reside out of the jurisdiction of the English Courts, the Court can grant administration to another at the end of a year from the death of the testator or intestate (*m*). Again, when a suit concerning the right of administration is pending in the Probate Division of the High Court, the Court may appoint an administrator *pendente lite*, who will have all the rights and powers of an ordinary administrator, except the right of distributing the residue of the personal estate; and the administrator so appointed may receive such reasonable remuneration for his trouble as the Court may think fit (*n*). So if the executor named in a will renounces probate, or dies before the testator, the Court will appoint the person having the greatest interest in the effects, generally the residuary legatee, to administer the estate according to the directions of the will; such an administration is termed an administration *cum testamento annexo* (*o*). Where letters of administration have been granted, any act done by the administrator while they are in force will be valid, although they may be afterwards recalled in consequence of the subsequent discovery of a will (*p*).

If any person who has not been appointed either an executor or an administrator intermeddles with the goods of the testator, or does any other act relating to the office of executor, he thereby becomes an executor of his own wrong, or, as it is called, an executor *de son tort*. Such a person is liable to the same demands from the creditors of the deceased as if he had been regularly appointed an executor—but only to the amount of the assets of the testator which have come to his hands.

As a general rule, all the property of a deceased person passes to his executor at the moment of his death, to his

(*l*) Administration of Estates Act, 1925, s. 13; and see Judicature Act, 1925, s. 162.

(*m*) Administration of Estates Act, 1925, s. 18.

(*n*) Judicature Act, 1925, s. 161.

(*o*) *Ibid.*, s. 166.

(*p*) *Hewson v. Shelley*, [1914] 2 Ch. 13.

administrator as soon as one is appointed. "The will becomes operative so far as its dispositions of personalty are concerned only if and when the executor assents to those dispositions" (q). Among such property will be included *prima facie* all his choses in action and all his contractual obligations, but not as a rule any obligation arising out of a tort. With respect to nearly every action of tort the maxim *actio personalis moritur cum persona* applies, and this is so whether the action is brought in the Chancery or King's Bench Division (r). Thus, if a person be assaulted or libelled during his life, no action for such a wrong can be commenced after his death, and the converse is equally true—if the deceased himself committed an assault or published a libel, his representatives cannot be sued for it after his death.

There are, however, the following exceptions. We will deal first with the cases in which the deceased person, if still alive, would have been plaintiff.

(i) An executor can sue for damage done to the testator's personal estate, and by a later statute the executor of an executor can do so (s). Thus, whenever a tort has been committed which has depreciated the value of any personal property of the deceased, his executor can sue for and recover the amount of such depreciation, but not, it is submitted, any collateral damages for any personal affront or injury done to the deceased apart from the damage to his property (t).

(ii) An executor can sue for a wrong done to the testator's realty, provided the damage was done within six months before, and the action was brought within one year after, the death (u).

(iii) Under the Fatal Accidents Acts, 1846 to 1908, when a person dies through the act or neglect of another, which, if he had not died, would entitle him to sue the latter, his personal representatives may within twelve months bring an action for damages caused by such death to the parent, child, wife or husband of the deceased for their benefit (x).

(q) *Per Visct. Haldane, L.C., Attenborough v. Solomon*, [1913] A. C. at p. 82.

(r) *Peek v. Gurney* (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. 377.

(s) Administration of Estates Act, 1925, s. 26.

(t) *Hatchard v. Mege* (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 771.

(u) A. E. Act, 1925, s. 26, sub-s. 2.

(x) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95; 8 Edw. 7, c. 7. The Act of 1846 is commonly called Lord Campbell's Act. The amount of damages recoverable is not limited by any agreement which the deceased may have made with the defendants restricting their liability to him to a named sum: *Nunan v. Southern Ry.*, [1924] 1 K. B. 223; cf. *Hearn v. Same* (1925), 41 T. L. R. 305.

(iv) By the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (*y*), where under that Act an employee himself could have claimed if the injury had not caused death, his executor can claim in his stead. Notice of the accident must be given within six weeks, and the action brought within twelve months after the death.

(v) Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925 (*z*), the "dependants" of a workman who has been killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment may also claim compensation. The word "dependants" is defined in the Act as including "such of the members of the workman's family as were wholly or in part dependent upon the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, or would but for the incapacity due to the accident have been so dependent, and where the workman, being the parent or grandparent of an illegitimate child, leaves such a child so dependent upon his earnings, or, being an illegitimate child, leaves a parent or grandparent so dependent upon his earnings, shall include such an illegitimate child and parent or grandparent respectively."

These last three cases are not so much exceptions to the rule as instances of rights which are given by statute by reason of the death of the individual in question.

Next, we will deal with those cases in which, if still alive, the deceased would have been defendant.

(i) Whenever property or the proceeds of property belonging to another have been appropriated by the deceased wrongdoer, and added to his own estate or moneys, an action lies against the executor of the wrongdoer; but this rule is limited to the recovery of specific acquisitions, or their value, and can only be maintained if there is some beneficial property or value capable of being measured, followed and recovered. Thus, an action will lie against the executor in respect of ore wrongfully dug or timber wrongfully felled by the testator, but not for an assault, or for ploughing up a meadow (*a*).

(ii) An action may be brought against the executors or administrators of the deceased for any wrong done by him in respect of real or personal property of the plaintiff, provided—

- (a) the injury was committed within six calendar months of the wrongdoer's death; and
- (b) the action is brought within six months of the appointment of executors or administrators (*b*).

We proceed to discuss the effect of death upon the contracts of the deceased. A contract is not necessarily determined, nor is a vested right of action for breach of con-

(*y*) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42, s. 1.

(*z*) 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 84.

(*a*) *Bishop of Winchester v. Knight* (1717), 1 P. Wms. 406; *Phillips v. Homfray* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 439; *Peek v. Gurney* (1873), L. R. 6 H. L. 377; *Duncan, In re*; *Terry v. Sweeting*, [1899] 1 Ch. 387.

(*b*) Administration of Estates Act, 1925, s. 26.

tract abated, by the death of either party. The personal representative of that party, though not named or referred to in the contract, can sue or be sued on all breaches of contract committed in the lifetime of the deceased. He can also sue or be sued on all contracts which are broken after the death, unless the skill or taste of the deceased was required for the performance of the contract, or unless it was expressly stipulated that it should be performed by the deceased himself, or unless the contract was expressly limited to his lifetime. In all other cases the contract survives; and the executor will be liable for the non-performance of anything which his testator had contracted to do. For such breaches of contract, however, he can only be sued as executor, and he is liable only to the extent of the assets which have come into his hands, though the plaintiff can obtain a judgment binding future assets as soon as they come into the hand of the executors (c).

But in addition to this, which may be described as the derivative liability of an executor, he may also make himself personally liable on the contracts of his testator, or in the course of administration he may, necessarily or unnecessarily, enter into contracts to which the testator was never a party. On such contracts the executor is liable to the full extent, but, if he has acted honestly, the Court will usually permit him recoup himself out of the estate. Either an executor or an administrator may compromise any claims made on behalf of or against the estate of the deceased (d).

If a party contract for himself and his executors to build a house, and die before it is completed, the executors must proceed with the work; else they will be held responsible *qua* executors for breach of contract. If they thus proceed, the work and labour will be done by them as executors, they may recover for it as executors, and the remuneration thus recovered will be assets in their hands (e). But executors and administrators cannot sue or be sued on executory contracts which are strictly personal to the deceased. Thus, an action for breach of promise of marriage will not survive against the personal representative unless there has been special damage, which must be to the property, not to the person, of the promisee, and

(c) This is therefore called a judgment *quando acciderint*.

(d) Trustee Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 19), s. 15.

(e) *Marshall v. Broadhurst* (1831), 1 Cr. & J. 403, 405.

which must have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of making the promise. Even then, the action will be only for the special, not for the general, damage (f). Conversely, no action can be brought by the personal representative of the promisee (g).

Again, it would seem that "all contracts for personal services which can be performed only during the lifetime of the party contracting are subject to the implied condition that he shall be alive to perform them; and should he die, his executor is not liable to an action for the breach of contract occasioned by his death" (h).

If, however, money be lent to or received by an executor or administrator, or if work and labour be performed at his request, or goods be sold and delivered to him, he will be held to have contracted in his individual character and will be personally liable. So if an executor request a creditor to forbear suing him in respect of a debt due from the testator, and promise to pay interest thereon, such promise will be evidence of a personal contract between the executor and that creditor. To make him liable for interest as executor, there must be evidence of a promise by the testator to pay interest so long as the debt should be forborne (i). It will be remembered that, before an executor or administrator can be sued "upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate," there must by section 4 of the Statute of Frauds be an agreement in writing signed by the party to be charged (k). An executor has no authority to carry on the business of the deceased. Therefore, unless protected therein by the Court, he would be personally liable for debts contracted since the testator's death, if assets failed (l). If, however, he carries on the business with the consent of the creditors, he is entitled to be indemnified in priority to them for his proper expenses (m). A claim by or against an executor or administrator as such cannot be joined with any claim by or against him personally, unless the latter claim is alleged to arise with reference to the estate of which he is executor or administrator (n).

Covenants, bonds and obligations or contracts under seal bind the real as well as the personal estate of the person making the same unless in the document the contrary intention is clearly expressed. A creditor is not bound, however, to sue both the real and personal representatives of the deceased obligor; he may proceed against either or both. But if he elect to proceed against the real estate, and the deceased debtor by his will devised it away, then he must sue both the personal representative and the devisee (or, if necessary, the devisee of such devisee) in one action (o).

(f) *Chamberlain v. Williamson* (1814), 2 Maule & S. 408.

(g) *Finlay v. Chirney* (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 494; *Quirk v. Thomas*, [1916] 1 K. B. 516.

(h) *Per Pollock, C.B.*, in *Hall v. Wright* (1859), E. B. & E. 765, at p. 794.

(i) *Bignell v. Harpur* (1850), 4 Exch. 773, 775.

(k) See *ante*, pp. 40, 41.

(l) *Johnson, In re* (1880), 15 Ch. D. 548.

(m) *Dowse v. Gorton*, [1891] A. C. 190.

(n) Order XVIII., r. 5.

(o) 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 47; 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65; see also the Law of

An executor cannot maintain an action for a debt which accrued to his testator, and for which he might have sued more than six years before the issuing of the writ (*p*). But, under the equity of the statute, where an action has been commenced within the period of limitation and the defendant dies, the plaintiff can bring a new action against the executor or administrator within a reasonable time, although the time limited by the statute may have elapsed (*q*).

Lastly, we will briefly state how pending legal proceedings are affected by the death of one of the parties.

In criminal cases on the death of the accused the proceedings drop, and no order as to costs can be made either against him or against the prosecutor. The death of the prosecutor, on the other hand, does not affect the proceedings. The rule is the same in *quasi*-criminal matters. For example, the liability of the putative father under a bastardy order is purely personal; and if the father dies, the mother has no right to claim against his estate either arrears or future payments (*r*).

In civil proceedings, on the other hand, the death of either the plaintiff or defendant does not end the action, if the right of action survives (*s*). This is so, whether the action be of contract or of tort. If, however—as is the case in most actions of tort—the cause of action does not survive the death of either party, it depends upon the stage which the action has reached at the time of the death whether the proceedings can be continued by or against the executor or administrator. If either party dies before verdict, the action abates and each party must bear his own costs. There will, however, be “no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the verdict or finding of the issues of fact and the judgment, but judgment may in such case be entered, notwithstanding the death” (*t*). If interlocutory judgment be signed and a writ of inquiry issue, and then plaintiff die, final judgment cannot be

Property Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20), s. 80; and the Administration of Estates Act, 1925.

(*p*) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3; *Penny v. Brice* (1865), 18 C. B. (N.S.) 393.

(*q*) *Swindell v. Bulkeley* (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 250.

(*r*) *Harrington, In re*, [1908] 2 Ch. 687.

(*s*) Order XVII., r. 1.

(*t*) *Ibid.*

entered, unless the cause of action is one that survives (*u*). If, however, final judgment has once been entered in the plaintiff's favour, and then he dies and the defendant appeals, the action will not abate; but the executors or administrators of the late plaintiff may appear as respondents to the appeal and sustain the judgment (*x*). So, if either party die after final judgment, execution can issue under Order XLII., r. 23.

(*u*) *Chapman v. Day* (1883), 49 L. T. 436; *Phillips v. Homfray* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 439; and see *Bowker v. Evans* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 565.

(*x*) *Twycross v. Grant* (1878), 4 C. P. D. 40.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARTIFICIAL PERSONS.

Corporations and Companies.

So far we have dealt with human beings. The law also recognises certain artificial entities, called corporations or companies, and treats them as persons, though they only exist in theory. A CORPORATION consists of a number of persons, who have been formed into one body for certain definite purposes, and who have the right to sue and be sued in our Courts under a corporate name as though they were one person. Such a corporation almost invariably has a seal, as it can only make important contracts under seal. And what is even more important, a corporation has the right of possessing its property in perpetuity; its individual members may die or retire, but the corporation continues and retains its property without the necessity of any transfer or conveyance from member to member.

It is usual to class among corporations certain legal persons which consist of one member only. These are called *corporations sole* to distinguish them from all other corporations, which are termed *corporations aggregate*.

It was thought necessary in some cases to regard a man in his capacity as the temporary holder of certain offices as having a legal personality, distinct from his own as a private individual, to enable him to sue and be sued in that capacity on behalf of himself and his successors in that office. When he is so enabled, he becomes a corporation sole in his official capacity, remaining a private individual for all other purposes (a). The earliest known corporation sole was the parish priest, whether rector or vicar; soon afterwards the Crown (b) and the bishop of a diocese were held to be corporations.

This device was resorted to in order to distinguish the private property of the individual occupant from the property of the see or

(a) Corporations sole seem to be peculiar to English law; and even here the distinction between the holder and his office is not carried to its logical conclusion.

(b) See *ante*, p. 719.

benefice. The glebe land, for instance, passes from one incumbent to another in succession without any conveyance from his predecessor; the private property of the deceased clergyman passes of course to his personal representative. These ancient corporations sole exist merely by prescription; but latterly certain high officers of state, such as the Postmaster-General (c) and the Public Trustee (d), have been made corporations sole by statute.

There are many municipal and other corporations which carry on local and even colonial government; there are also charitable corporations; but by far the greater number are trading corporations or companies. Corporations exist by common law, by royal charter, by statute, by prescription or by custom but not otherwise (e). In modern times, however, corporations—especially companies carrying on trade—are usually created under the authority of Acts of Parliament. According to their origin, therefore, corporations may be classified as follows:—

- (i) *Chartered corporations*, which are created by letters patent, and enjoy all the powers of a natural person. The Hudson Bay Company and the British South Africa Company are chartered companies. Municipal corporations are created by charter, but the grant of such charter is regulated by statute (f).
- (ii) *Prescriptive corporations*, which have no charter but have the same powers as chartered corporations.
- (iii) *Statutory corporation* and companies. There is an infinite variety of these; but they may be classed under three heads:—

(a) Those created by special statutes which completely define their powers; for example, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England (g) and the Treasury Solicitor (h).

(b) Those created by a special statute, which incorporates a general statute. This class includes most of the companies which require compulsory powers in order to carry on business; for

(c) Post Office Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 48), s. 45.

(d) Public Trustee Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 55).

(e) *River Tone Conservators v. Ash* (1829), 10 B. & C. 349, at p. 383; *Byrd v. Wilford* (1596), 2 Cro. Eliz. 464; *Sutton's Hospital Case* (1612), 10 Co. Rep. 23 a, 29 b.

(f) See Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), ss. 210—218; cf. *Chartered Associations Act*, 1926 (16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 26).

(g) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 55.

(h) Treasury Solicitor Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 18).

example, railway and canal companies, and companies for the supply of water, gas and electricity.

(c) Those created under the provisions of a general statute. The earlier statutes are not altogether repealed, and there are a few joint stock banking companies still in existence (i).

The most important Act, under which all companies which do not require compulsory powers are now formed, is the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (k). It provides that no association or partnership for carrying on any business having as its object the acquisition of gain (l) by the association or partnership, or by its individual members, shall consist of more than twenty members (m) unless it is incorporated as a company (n).

Companies formed under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, are of three kinds (o) :

Companies limited by shares;

Companies limited by guarantee; and

Unlimited companies.

In the first class, the capital of the company is divided into shares, and the liability of the members is limited to the amount unpaid on their shares. In the second class, each member guarantees a certain amount—and his liability is limited to the amount which he has so guaranteed. In the third class, the liability of each member is unlimited, and such companies only differ from partnerships in that (i) they have a separate legal existence; (ii) they may have more than ten or twenty members; and (iii) the members may assign their shares without the consent of the other members.

In order to form a company, seven persons at least (p)

(i) Country Bankers Act, 1826 (7 Geo. 4, c. 46); Bank Charter Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c. 113), s. 47; Joint Stock Banking Companies Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 49), s. 12.

(k) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69.

(l) This definition includes a number of associations which do not carry on business in the ordinary sense. Provision is made whereby such associations are not required to have the word "Limited" as a part of their name: section 20; *Cyclists' Touring Club v. Hopkinson*, [1910] 1 Ch. 179; *Wilkinson v. Levison* (1925), 42 T. L. R. 97.

(m) Ten members only if the business is banking.

(n) Section 1; *Padstow Total Loss Association, In re* (1882), 20 Ch. D. 137; *Jennings v. Hammond* (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 225; but see *One & All, &c., Association, In re* (1909), 25 T. L. R. 674; *Greenberg v. Cooperstein*, [1926] 1 Ch. 657. As to Trade Unions, see *post*, pp. 810 *et seq.*

(o) Section 2.

(p) Two will be sufficient if the company is a "private company"—that is, one which restricts the right of members to transfer shares, limits the number of members (other than employees) to fifty, and prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for its shares or debentures: section 121, amended by the Companies Act, 1913 (3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 25).

must execute a Memorandum of Association (*q*), which sets out the name of the company (*r*) and its objects (*s*), declares where the registered office is to be situated, and the amount of its capital, and, if the liability of the members is to be limited, states that fact. The signatories must also undertake to accept allotment of at least one share each in the company. The Memorandum is then stamped and lodged with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (*t*), who issues a certificate of incorporation (*u*).

The Memorandum of Association corresponds to the charter of a company incorporated by letters patent. The company has no powers other than those set out in the Memorandum. Any act done by the company or its agents outside the scope of those powers is therefore *ultra vires* (*x*) and void. The Memorandum can only be altered for the purposes laid down in the Act, and every alteration must be sanctioned by a Judge of the Chancery Division (*y*).

A company usually makes provisions regulating the exercise of its powers and defining the duties of its officers. These are embodied in a document known as the Articles of Association (*z*), which is filed with the Registrar at the same time as the Memorandum of Association. If the company dispenses with Articles of Association, then the exercise of the company's powers is regulated by "Table A" (*a*), which is a statutory model form of Articles of Association set out in the First Schedule to the Act.

Upon the issue of the certificate of incorporation the company acquires a separate legal existence, and, if it is a

(*q*) Sections 2—9.

(*r*) If the liability of the members is limited, then the last word of the name must be "Limited": sections 3, 4; but see section 20.

(*s*) See *Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co.*, [1921] 1 Ch. 359.

(*t*) Sections 15—17.

(*u*) See *Hammond v. Prentice*, [1920] 1 Ch. 201; *Jubilee Cotton Mills v. Lewis*, [1924] A. C. 958.

(*x*) An act is *ultra vires* when it is one "which the company in general meeting could not authorise, and which, if every individual incorporator assented to it, would still remain illegitimate": per Buckley, L.J., in *Peel v. L. & N. W. Ry.*, [1907] 1 Ch., at p. 17; and see *Parker and Cooper v. Reading*, [1926] 1 Ch. 975.

(*y*) Sections 7—9. An alteration in the name of the company, however, requires the consent of the Board of Trade, not of the Court: section 8, sub-section 3.

(*z*) Sections 10—15.

(*a*) Section 11.

private company, it may at once commence business. All other companies, however, must allot shares before commencing business—a provision intended to secure that companies shall have an adequate working capital.

If the public are to be invited to subscribe for shares, the company must either issue a prospectus (b), which is filed with the Registrar, or else file a document in lieu of a prospectus (c). Both documents must contain certain particulars as to the company so that the public may be able to form a correct opinion as to its merits. The company cannot proceed to allot the shares unless at least the minimum number of shares fixed by the Memorandum or Articles has been subscribed for. If no such minimum is fixed, then the whole issue must be subscribed for (d). The Act also imposes certain conditions upon the allotment of shares, in order to secure as far as possible that shares shall only be allotted for money or money's worth (e).

After allotment, an officer of the company must make and file with the Registrar a statutory declaration that the shares have been duly allotted in accordance with the requirements of the Act, and that the directors have duly paid for their qualification shares (if any) (f). The Registrar then issues a certificate that the company is entitled to commence business (g).

If, however, the prospectus contains untrue statements, or material omissions, any person who has subscribed for shares on the faith of the prospectus may refuse to accept the shares allotted to him, avoid his contract, and apply to have his name taken off the register (h). He must do this as soon as possible after he becomes aware of the circumstances, or he may be held to have lost his remedy by *laches*. It is sufficient if he proves that he was misled. The Court will not inquire into the exact amount of importance which he attached to each separate statement in the prospectus (i).

These circumstances also give him a cause of action against

(b) Sections 80—84.

(c) Section 82.

(d) Sections 85, 86.

(e) Sections 88—90.

(f) Section 87, sub-section 1.

(g) Section 87, sub-sections 2, 3.

(h) *First National Re-insurance Co. v. Greenfield*, [1921] 2 K. B. 260.

(i) *Macleay v. Tait*, [1906] A. C. 24; but see *Wimbledon Olympia, In re*, [1910] 1 Ch. 630.

every director or promoter (*k*) or person, who is named in the prospectus as about to become a director or who has authorised the issue of the prospectus, for any loss he has thereby sustained by subscribing for shares (*l*). The defendant will not be liable if he can prove that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the statement was true or that the statement was a correct extract from or summary of a public official document or from the report of an expert, but in the last case he will not escape liability if it be shown that he had no reasonable ground for believing that the expert was competent (*m*).

A director may also escape liability if he can show that he ceased to be a director before the prospectus was issued and that it was issued without his knowledge or consent; or that as soon as he became aware that it was so issued, he gave public notice that it was issued without his knowledge or consent; or that after the issue he became aware of the falsity of the statements and gave public notice of the fact. Every person who by reason of his being, or named as, or having agreed to become, a director, or of his having issued the prospectus, becomes liable to make any payment, may recover contribution from the other directors, and so will a person who was held out as a director without his knowledge or consent (*n*). This section creates an exception to the rule in *Merryweather v. Nixan* (*o*); for a defendant who becomes liable to pay damages under such circumstances has a right to contribution from any other of those liable, as in cases of contract, unless he has personally been guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and the other has not (*p*).

The business of a company is usually managed by the directors, whose powers are subject to the Articles of Association and resolutions passed at meetings of the shareholders. The directors engage and dismiss such servants and agents as the company may require. Certain things, however, can only be done in pursuance of resolutions of the members called together for the purpose, *e.g.*, an alteration in the Memorandum or Articles of Association.

(*k*) "Promoter" means only such promoter of the company as is a party to the issue of the prospectus or of that portion of it which contains the untrue statements. It does not include a person who is merely acting professionally for the persons who are engaged in promoting the company: section 84, sub-section 5; and see *Jubilee Cotton Mills v. Lewis*, [1924] A. C. 958.

(*l*) Section 84.

(*m*) It is not enough to show that he actually believed the statements to be true. The decision to this effect in *Derry v. Peek* (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337, was overruled by the Directors' Liability Act, 1890, which is now repealed and replaced by section 84; see, *ante*, p. 800.

(*n*) Section 84, sub-section 3.

(*o*) (1799), 8 T. R. 186; and see Vol. 1, pp. 635, 636.

(*p*) Section 84, sub-section 4, cf. section 84, sub-section 3. And see *Gerson v. Simpson*, [1903] 2 K. B. 197; *Shepherd v. Bray*, [1906] 2 Ch. 235; [1907] 2 Ch. 571.

A company ceases to exist if it be wound up. A winding-up may be either compulsory or voluntary, or subject to the supervision of the Court (*q*).

A compulsory winding-up is equivalent to a bankruptcy, and is carried out under provisions in the Act similar to those in the Bankruptcy Acts (*r*).

A voluntary winding-up takes place when the period, if any, fixed by the Articles for the duration of the company has expired; or when the articles provide that the company shall cease to exist upon the happening of a certain condition which has happened, and a general meeting has passed a resolution for winding-up; or when a meeting of the company by "special resolution" (*s*) has resolved that it be wound up; or when a meeting of the company by "extraordinary resolution" (*t*) has resolved that by reason of its liabilities the company cannot continue its business and that it is advisable to wind it up (*u*). Creditors may, however, apply to the Court for an order for a compulsory winding-up, and the Court may grant the order, or refuse it, or order that a voluntary winding-up already commenced shall continue subject to the supervision of the Court (*x*).

However the winding-up may be conducted, the duty of the liquidators who are appointed to carry out the winding-up is very similar (*y*). They must realise the assets, call upon the members to contribute according to the extent of their liability, and with the funds so raised pay the costs of the winding-up and the company's debts and liabilities (*z*), the surplus (if any) being distributed among the shareholders. Upon completion of the winding-

(*q*) Section 122.

(*r*) Sections 123—181. For bankruptcy, see *ante*, pp. 777 *et seq.*

(*s*) A special resolution is one passed at a duly convened meeting by a majority of not less than three-quarters of the members present in person (or by proxy, if voting by proxy is allowed) and confirmed by a simple majority at another meeting held not less than fourteen days or more than a month after the first meeting: section 69, sub-section 2.

(*t*) An extraordinary resolution is one passed at a meeting duly convened in like manner as a special resolution, but is not confirmed: section 69, sub-section 1.

(*u*) Section 182.

(*x*) Sections 197, 199—204; see as to grounds on which Court will make an order: *Loch v. Blackwood*, [1924] A. C. 783.

(*y*) See *Wigzell, In re*, [1921] 2 K. B. 835; *Farrow's Bank, In re*, [1921] 2 Ch. 164; *City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., In re*, [1925] 1 Ch. 407.

(*z*) The priority of debts is much the same in bankruptcy: section 209.

up the name of the company is removed from the register and it ceases to exist (a). The Registrar has also power to remove from the register the names of companies which have ceased to carry on business (b).

The law recognises the existence of companies incorporated in foreign States or the colonies, but such companies must on establishing a place of business within the United Kingdom file with the Registrar a certified copy of the company's charter, statutes, Memorandum and Articles, or equivalent documents (c), a list of the directors, and the name and address of a person resident in the United Kingdom who is authorised to accept service of process and receive notices on behalf of the company (d).

As we have seen, a corporation has a distinct personality in law; consequently the liability of any corporation whether civil or criminal must be carefully distinguished from that of its members. If they do any act in the name of the corporation which is *ultra vires* of the corporation, the individual members are liable and not the corporation. Moreover, an individual member can sue and be sued by the corporation, either in his capacity as a member to secure that the business of the corporation shall be transacted in a manner which is within its powers (e), or in the same way as a stranger to the corporation seeking to enforce his rights against it (f).

As a corporation cannot be said to have anything in the nature of *mens rea* and moreover cannot be physically punished, in ordinary cases it cannot be guilty of a criminal offence (g).

To this rule, however, there are exceptions:—

A corporation can be indicted for misdemeanours which are, in fact, merely civil wrongs, such as the non-repair of a highway. As the corporation can only appear by attorney, it seems that it is

(a) The Act also provides for the winding-up of unregistered companies: sections 267—273; but see *Londonderry Equitable Co-operative Society, In re*, [1910] 1 Ir. R. 69.

(b) Section 242.

(c) If such documents be in a foreign language, they must be accompanied by a translation certified to be correct.

(d) Section 274; see also Companies (Particulars of Directors) Act, 1917, ss. 1, 3.

(e) *Stroud v. Lawson*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 44.

(f) *Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins* (1859), 4 H. & N. 87.

(g) *Pearks, Grimston & Tee v. Ward*, [1902] 2 K. B. 1; but see *R. v. Grubb*, [1915] 2 K. B. 683. See also Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 33.

necessary in such a case, after preferring the indictment in the ordinary way, to remove it into the King's Bench Division of the High Court by *certiorari* (*h*). The provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, however, as to summoning offenders before a Court of summary jurisdiction to answer an information for a penalty, apply to corporations as well as to natural persons (*i*).

There are many summary offences punishable by fine, for which a corporation may be prosecuted, *e.g.*, for breaches of the Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (*k*); the payment of the fine imposed is enforced by distress (*l*).

It has been held, however, that a company cannot be convicted of holding a lottery, but the decision was based on the terms of the Lotteries Act, 1823 (*m*), and the Court expressed an opinion that proceedings for a penalty might lie at the suit of the Attorney-General (*n*). Again, it has been held that a company is a "person" within the meaning of the Dentists Act, 1878, and can therefore at the suit of the Attorney-General be enjoined from practising as a dentist (*o*).

A corporation cannot be bound over to appear and prosecute, and consequently prosecutions on its behalf are undertaken in the name of one of its officers or servants. A company cannot sue for a penalty as a common informer unless expressly authorised by statute so to do (*p*).

A corporation may sue for any tort which affects its property, or injures its trade or business (*q*). It may maintain an action for slander of its title, whether the slander be uttered by one of its own members or by a stranger (*r*). Whether it can sue for wrongs which merely affect its honour or dignity is not clear; the better opinion is that it cannot (*s*). But it clearly cannot sue for any wrong which has been committed, not against it, but against

(*h*) See *R. v. Birmingham, &c., Ry. Co.* (1842), 3 Q. B. 223; *R. v. G. N. Ry. Co.* (1846), 9 Q. B. 315, and also the judgment of Lord Blackburn in *Pharmaceutical Society v. London, &c., Supply Association* (1880), 5 App. Cas., at pp. 869, 870.

(*i*) *Evans & Co. v. London County Council*, [1914] 3 K. B. 315; see also Criminal Justice Act, 1925, s. 33.

(*k*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, s. 6; *Pearks v. Ward*, [1902] 2 K. B. 1; and see *Booth v. Helliwell*, [1914] 3 K. B. 252.

(*l*) See *R. v. Gardner* (1774), Cowp., at pp. 84, 85; *R. v. Birmingham, &c., Ry. Co.* (1840), 9 C. & P. 469.

(*m*) 4 Geo. 4, c. 60, ss. 41, 62, 67.

(*n*) *Hawke v. E. Hulton & Co.*, [1909] 2 K. B. 93.

(*o*) *Att.-Gen. v. Smith*, [1909] 2 Ch. 524; cf. *Att.-Gen. v. Churchill*, [1910] 2 Ch. 401.

(*p*) *St. Leonards (Shoreditch) Guardians v. Franklin* (1878), 3 C. P. D. 377.

(*q*) *South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News Association*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 133.

(*r*) *Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins* (1859), 4 H. & N. 87.

(*s*) *Mayor, &c., of Manchester v. Williams*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 94. But see *South Hetton Coal Co. v. North-Eastern News Association*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 133.

its members individually. Nor can it bring an action, if a person publishes words which impute to it conduct of which a corporation is physically incapable (*t*). The law is the same with regard to unincorporated trading companies, which may sue in the manner directed by the special Act creating them, or any statute applicable to them.

A corporation is clearly liable for torts committed by its servants or officers within the scope of their authority, *e.g.*, for a libel published in a newspaper which it owns; and the servant or officer will also be liable (*u*). The corporation may still be liable although the wrongful act was done in defiance of its express orders (*x*). The agent may in some cases be liable when the corporation is not, as where the performance of certain conditions is a condition precedent to the liability of the company (*y*).

In those cases in which the existence of an improper motive is an essential ingredient in tort, it was formerly thought that a corporation could not be liable for the act or default of its servant or agent. Thus Lord Selborne, in *Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley* (*z*), suggested that a corporation could not be held liable for maintenance. It is, however, now established that a corporation is liable for the malice of its officers and servants (*a*).

Thus, in *Citizens' Life Assurance Co. v. Brown* (*b*), the superintendent of a life assurance company sent to several persons insured in the company a circular libelling the plaintiff, who had formerly been in its employ, but who was now canvassing for a rival company. He wrote this circular in answer to attacks made upon the company by the plaintiff: but it contained statements which he

(*t*) See the judgment of Pollock, C.B., in *Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins* (1859), 4 H. & N., at p. 90.

(*u*) See Vol. 1, pp. 497—501; and contrast *Bayley v. Manchester, &c., Ry. Co.* (1873), L. R. 7 C. P. 415, and *Goff v. G. N. Ry. Co.* (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 65, with *Allen v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.* (1861), 3 E. & E. 672, and *Edwards v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.* (1870), L. R. 5 C. P. 445. See also *Abrahams v. Deakin*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 516, and *Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated Co.*, [1906] A. C. 439. Judgments against a corporation are enforced by sequestration: Order XLII., r. 31.

(*x*) *Limpus v. L. G. O. Co.* (1862), 1 H. & C. 526.

(*y*) *Hirst v. West Riding Bank*, [1901] 2 K. B. 560 (false representations decided under Lord Tenterden's Act. See *Pearson v. Dublin Corporation*, [1907] A. C. 351).

(*z*) (1885), 10 App. Cas., at p. 218: see also the remarks of Alderson, B., in *Stevens v. Midland Ry. Co.* (1854), 10 Exch., at p. 356; and of Lord Bramwell in *Abrath v. N. E. Ry. Co.* (1886), 11 App. Cas., at pp. 250, 253, 254.

(*a*) See, for instance, *Edwards v. Midland Ry. Co.* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 287; *Cornford v. Carlton Bank*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 22.

(*b*) [1904] A. C. 423; and see the remarks of Lord Halsbury in *Pearson v. Dublin Corporation*, [1907] A. C., at pp. 358, 359; *Pratt v. B. M. A.*, [1919] 1 K. B. 244.

knew to be untrue. The jury found that in publishing the libel he was acting "within the scope of his employment and in the course of his employment," and awarded the plaintiff damages. On appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that, although the occasion was privileged, and although the superintendent had no actual authority, express or implied, to write the libel, still the company was liable as in so doing he was acting in the course of his employment.

We have already dealt with those classes of persons who are wholly or partly unable to contract, or are temporarily disabled from so doing by lunacy or drunkenness. Corporations from their artificial character are also under certain disabilities as to their capacity to contract. A chartered or prescriptive corporation has a contractual capacity limited only by the terms of its charter, if any, and by the restrictions imposed by the fact that it is an artificial, and not a natural, person. "But it must not be assumed that, if a chartered company does some act which it is forbidden to do by its charter, that act is necessarily void as *ultra vires*" (c). "A statutory corporation, created by Act of Parliament for a particular purpose, is limited as to all its powers by the purposes of its incorporation, as defined in that Act" (d). In the case of companies governed by the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, "the memorandum of association is their fundamental law, and they are incorporated only for the objects and purposes expressed in that memorandum. . . . Contracts for objects and purposes foreign to, or inconsistent with, the memorandum of association are *ultra vires* of the corporation itself. . . . No agreement of shareholders can make that a contract of the corporation which the law says cannot and shall not be so" (d). In consequence of this rule of law, the memorandum of association is nowadays framed to include every purpose which is reasonably compatible with the main object of the company's existence (e). All persons, whether shareholders or not, are

(c) *Per* Swinfen Eady, J., in *British S. A. Co. v. De Beers*, [1910] 1 Ch., at p. 374.

(d) *Per* Lord Selborne, in *Ashbury Ry., &c., Co. v. Riche* (1875), L. R. 7 H. L., at pp. 693—695. As to the reasonable application of the doctrine of *ultra vires*, see *Att.-Gen. v. G. E. Ry. Co.* (1887), 5 App. Cas. 473. See also *L. C. C. v. Att.-Gen.*, [1902] A. C. 165.

(e) In *Cotman v. Brougham*, [1918] A. C., at p. 523, Lord Wrenbury complains

taken to have notice of its constitution as appearing in its memorandum and articles of association (f).

At common law, the contracts of a corporation or company are not binding unless made under seal; for "the seal is the only authentic evidence of what the corporation has done or agreed to do" (g).

Thus, a solicitor who had been employed by the corporation of Poole to conduct suits on their behalf, but had not been appointed under seal, was held unable to recover his bill of costs against the corporation (h). So, too, where a contractor entered into an agreement not under seal with a railway company to do certain work upon their railway, and, having done some of the work, was then ordered to discontinue it by the company, it was held that he could not recover for any portion of the work so done (i).

The general rule, however, has from early times been subject to exceptions. "Convenience amounting almost to necessity" may excuse the absence of the seal. "Wherever to hold the rule applicable would occasion very great inconvenience, or tend to defeat the very object for which the corporation was created, the exception has prevailed; hence the retainer by parol of an inferior servant, the doing of acts very frequently recurring, or too insignificant to be worth the trouble of affixing the common seal, are established exceptions" (k). So also where the acts are such that "an overruling necessity requires them to be done at once" (l).

A second exception occurs in cases of "accepting bills of exchange and issuing promissory notes by companies incorporated for the purposes of trade, with the rights and liabilities consequent thereon" (m). For contracts occur-

that memoranda of association are now framed "to bury beneath a mass of words the real object or objects of the company with the intent that every conceivable form of activity shall be found included somewhere within its terms."

(f) *Marshall v. Glamorgan Iron Co.* (1868), L. R. 7 Eq. 129, 137.

(g) *Per cur.* in *Mayor of Ludlow v. Charlton* (1840), 6 M. & W., at p. 823; and see *ante*, pp. 14—16.

(h) *Arnold v. Mayor of Poole* (1842), 4 Man. & Gr. 860.

(i) *Diggle v. London & Blackwall Ry. Co.* (1850), 5 Exch. 442; and see *Mayor of Kidderminster v. Hardwick* (1873), L. R. 9 Ex. 13.

(k) *Per Lord Denman, C.J.*, in *Church v. Imperial Gas Co.* (1838), 6 A. & E., at p. 861.

(l) *Per Alderson, B.*, in *Diggle v. London & Blackwall Ry. Co.* (1850), 5 Exch., at p. 450.

(m) *Per Lord Denman, C.J.*, in *Church v. Imperial Gas Co.*, *supra*.

ring in the ordinary course of a trading company's business, the seal is no longer required (*n*). This exception has received statutory recognition (*o*).

Thirdly, where a corporation has power by a contract under seal to order work to be done or goods to be supplied, and does so order but not under seal, nevertheless it will be held liable if it accepts the benefit of the executed order.

Thus, by the direction of the defendant union and with their approbation given at a regular meeting, the plaintiff did certain work upon the union's workhouse premises. In an action of debt for goods sold and work and labour done, the plaintiff succeeded, although the contract was not under seal (*p*). This view of the law was subsequently upheld in two similar cases (*q*), and now stands established by the decision in *Lawford v. Billericay R. D. C.* (*r*). There the plaintiff, acting as defendants' engineer by agreement under seal, was instructed by them (not under seal) to act as engineer in respect of works not within his contract; the defendants did not deny that they instructed him or that the works were necessary, but relied upon the defence that the contract with him in relation to those works was not under seal. They were, nevertheless, held to be liable. If he had been dismissed before the completion of the work, he could have recovered on a *quantum meruit* (*s*).

In the case of a company incorporated under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (*t*), contracts may be made by persons acting under the express or implied authority of the company by writing or by parol in the same manner as would bind private individuals. If, however, the contract is of a kind that must be under seal even if made between private individuals, it must be executed by the company under its seal in the usual manner (*u*).

These exceptions, however, do not apply if a statute prescribes a particular formality. The Public Health Act, 1875, invalidates any contract of a value exceeding £50 made by an urban authority, unless made under seal (*x*). This provision in effect fixes a limit at which corporate

(*n*) *South of Ireland Colliery Co. v. Waddle* (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 617.

(*o*) Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), s. 76, 77; and see Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 59), s. 91.

(*p*) *Clarke v. Cuckfield Union* (1852), 21 L. J. Q. B. 349.

(*q*) *Haigh v. North Bierley Union* (1858), 28 L. J. Q. B. 62; *Nicholson v. Bradfield Union* (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 620.

(*r*) [1903] 1 K. B. 722; *Mackay v. Toronto*, [1920] A. C. 208.

(*s*) See *Hodge v. Matlock Bath U. D. C.* (1910), 26 T. L. R. 617.

(*t*) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69.

(*u*) Section 76.

(*x*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 174, sub-s. 1.

contracts cease to be so trifling as to make the seal unnecessary.

Thus, where an architect, on the verbal instructions of the surveyor of an urban authority, prepared plans for certain offices (which plans and offices the jury found to be necessary), it was held that, even assuming the contract was founded on an executed consideration, the architect could not succeed, as his claim was for more than £50 (*y*). Similarly, where an urban authority contracted without seal with X and Company to finish works for the execution of which they had given a sealed contract to Z, X and Company failed in their action. "The Legislature," said Lord Bramwell, "has made provisions for the protection of ratepayers, shareholders and others, who must act through the agency of a representative body, by requiring the observance of certain solemnities and formalities which involve deliberation and reflection. That is the importance of the seal. It is idle to say there is no magic in a wafer. It continually happens that carelessness and indifference on the one side, and the greed of gain on the other, cause a disregard of these safeguards. . . . The decision may be hard in this case on the plaintiffs, who may not have known the law. They and others must be taught it, which can only be done by its enforcement" (*z*).

A corporation is not bound by contracts which have been made on its behalf before it was incorporated (*a*). It cannot, for example, merely by adopting a contract made before its incorporation, enter into contractual relations with the other party (*b*). Even if the company takes the benefit of services rendered under such a contract, it does not become liable in equity to pay for them (*c*). If it is desired to make such a contract binding in law, the company, after it comes into existence, must make a new contract in the terms of the old one (*d*).

If a company incorporated under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, enters into a contract before it becomes entitled to commence business (*e*), it is only provisional and is not binding until the company actually

(*y*) *Hunt v. Wimbledon Local Board* (1878), 4 C. P. D. 48.

(*z*) *Young v. Corporation of Leamington* (1883), 8 App. Cas., at p. 528.

(*a*) *Kelner v. Baxter* (1866), L. R. 2 C. P. 174.

(*b*) *Johannesburg Hotel Co., In re*, [1891] 1 Ch. 119; *North Sydney Investment Co. v. Higgins*, [1899] A. C. 263.

(*c*) *English and Colonial Produce Co., In re*, [1906] 2 Ch. 435; and see *National Motor Mail Coach Co., In re*, [1908] 2 Ch. 515.

(*d*) *Natal Land Co. v. Pauline Colliery*, [1904] A. C. 120.

(*e*) See *ante*, 799,800.

becomes so entitled (f). Consequently, if the company be wound up before that date, the other party to the contract has no claim on it (g).

Questions may arise as to the liabilities of shareholders, directors, promoters and others concerned with projected companies or associations. The rule is that when a person is engaged to act with others for the purpose of establishing a particular scheme, there is no partnership, nor even such a *quasi*-partnership as will make any of such persons agent for the others, for the purpose of attaining the common object (h). If, however, by consent, conduct or ratification they authorise any one to act for them, and work is done and credit given on the faith of their responsibility, they will be liable on any contracts so made (i).

In addition to corporations proper (that is, those which have an existence in law separate and distinct from their members), there are associations of a permanent character, which have some of the attributes of a corporation but no personality apart from that of their members, such as Trade Unions, and partnerships and associations of a less permanent character which have none of the attributes of a corporation, such as social and political clubs (k).

Parliament has passed many statutes in order to foster thrift and providence. It has authorised the formation of Building Societies, Friendly Societies, Cost-book mining companies, &c., which have many privileges conferred upon them. We can here only deal shortly with the most important of them, *viz.*, Trade Unions (l).

Until 1871 all associations of masters or workmen were illegal, if their objects included anything which tended to the restraint of trade, and consequently the members were liable to be indicted for conspiracy. By the Trade Union

(f) 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, s. 87, sub-s. 3.

(g) *Otto Electrical Manufacturing Co., In re*, [1906] 2 Ch. 390; cf. *Eller v. Sternberg* (1911), 27 T. L. R. 127.

(h) *Reynell v. Lewis* (1846), 15 M. & W. 517; *Wilson v. Viscount Curzon*, *ibid.*, 532.

(i) See *Barnett v. Lambert* (1846), 15 M. & W. 489, 493; *Walstab v. Spottiswoode*, *ibid.*, 501.

(k) Legal recognition and protection is secured for these last-named associations by vesting the joint property in trustees for the benefit of the members: see *One and All, &c., Association, In re* (1909), 25 T. L. R. 674.

(l) Some unions are incorporated by registration under the Friendly Societies Act, 1893. See *Catt v. Wood*, [1910] A. C. 404.

Act, 1871 (*m*), this liability was removed and provisions were made establishing a register of trade unions (*n*), and vesting their property in trustees (*o*); but many contracts of trade unions were declared void, in the sense of not being enforceable in a Court of law. The Act was amended in 1876 (*p*), and a trade union was defined as being "any combination, whether temporary or permanent, for regulating the relations between workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or between masters and masters, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, whether such combination would or would not (before 1871) have been deemed to have been an unlawful association by reason of some one or more of its purposes being in restraint of trade" (*q*).

It was formerly thought that trade unions were in no way liable for torts committed on their behalf, but it was decided in 1901 that a trade union whether registered or not can be sued in its own name (*r*), and that it can even be sued by one of its own members, so long as such action is not brought to enforce the payment of benefits and the like (*s*). The law was altered by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (*t*), which enacted that "an action against a trade union whether of workmen or masters, or against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all other members of the trade union in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any Court" (*u*). This section applies whether the tortious act was done in

(*m*) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 31, s. 2.

(*n*) Sections 7—10.

(*o*) Who are bound by law to execute their trusts: sections 13—18.

(*p*) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 22.

(*q*) Section 16; and see *Rickards v. Bartram* (1908), 25 T. L. R. 181; *Davies v. Thomas*, [1920] 1 Ch. 217; 2 Ch. 189; *Performing Right Soc. v. London Theatre of Varieties*, [1924] A. C. 1.

(*r*) *Tuff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants*, [1901] A. C. 426; cf. *Russell v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants*, [1912] A. C. 421, at pp. 430, 438. And see Order XVI., r. 9, and *Wood v. McCarthy*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 775.

(*s*) *Yorkshire Miners' Association v. Howden*, [1905] A. C. 256; see Trade Union Act, 1871, s. 4; *Cope v. Crossingham*, [1909] 2 Ch. 148.

(*t*) 6 Edw. 7, c. 47.

(*u*) Section 4; and see *Vacher v. London Society of Compositors*, [1913] A. C. 107. For a review of the law, see *Sorrell v. Smith*, [1925] A. C. 700.

contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute or not (x). But a trade union can be restrained from employing its funds for purposes not within its powers, *e.g.*, for the payment of Members of Parliament (y).

(x) Section 4; and see *Ware and De Freville v. Motor Trade Association*, [1921] 3 K. B. 40 (where an injunction against a threatened tortious act was refused).

(y) *Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne*, [1910] A. C. 87; unless it has a political fund set up under the Trade Union Act, 1913 (2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 30). See also *National Sailors' and Firemen's Union v. Reed*, [1926] 1 Ch. 536.

CHAPTER IX.

THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

THE early history of the legal profession in England is involved in obscurity. At first every free man had to be his own advocate in any litigation, civil or criminal, unless he had express permission to appoint a deputy, who was called his "attorney" (a). Sometimes this deputy had literally to fight for his principal. Such champions or attorneys acted without remuneration each for his own friend, and probably on one or two occasions only in his life. There were no professional lawyers; and advice on legal matters could only be obtained, for what it was worth, from priests.

In 1207, however, the clergy were prohibited by their canons from practising in the Secular Courts; and in 1215 the Court of Common Pleas was fixed by Magna Carta "in one certain place." Thereupon many persons made a habit of attending the sittings of this Court and noting its decisions. They thus acquired a knowledge of the procedure of the Court as well as of the law of the land, and were willing to act as advocates in Court and also to assist suitors in matters preliminary to the hearing. Dugdale tells us that "King Edward I., in the twentieth year of his reign (1292), did especially appoint John de Metingham (then Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas) and the rest of his fellow Justices (of that Court) that they, according to their discretions, should provide and ordain from every county certain attorneys and 'apprentices in the law,' of the best and most apt for their learning and skill, who might do service to his Court and people: And that those, so

(a) Statute of Westminster II., 1285 (13 Edw. 1, c. 10); Statute of Merton, 1235 (20 Hen. 3, c. 10); see also the so-called Ordinance of Liberties, 1299 (27 Edw. 1, c. 5).

chosen onely, and no other, should follow his Court, and transact the affairs therein: the said King and his Council, then deeming the number of seven score to be sufficient for that imployment; but it was left to the discretion of the said Justices, to add to that number, or diminish, as they should see fit. So that, soon afterwards, though we have no memorial of the direct time, or absolute certainty of the places; we may safely conclude, that they settled in certain Hostels or Inns, which were thenceforth called Inns of Court ” (b).

This, if it be accurate, would be the first formal recognition by the State of a professional class of advocates, on whom apparently was conferred at this early date the exclusive right of audience in cases where the parties themselves desired legal assistance, and in that Court in which at that time actions between private persons could alone be brought. But there are no records to support this statement. We know that previously to this time students of the law had gathered around certain churches in London, living in hostels in the immediate neighbourhood and arguing questions of canon law with the priests. And although the Courts were subsequently held at Westminster, the students and apprentices of law continued to occupy their former homes just outside the walls of the City of London. They gradually formed themselves into private societies, closely resembling the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, and governed by their Benchers as those colleges were by their Fellows. These societies consisted of:—

1. Two (if not three) Serjeants’ Inns, membership of which was restricted to the Judges of the Superior Courts of Law at Westminster and to Serjeants-at-law. These Inns no longer exist.

2. Inns of Court, which comprised advocates in the Courts, who had not arrived at the degree of Serjeants-at-law, and also the more advanced apprentices.

3. Inns of Chancery, where dwelt the “ Clerks of the Chancery,” who prepared the original writs which issued

(b) *Origines Juridicales*, 1666, p. 141.

from the Chancery, and also the younger apprentices who acquired some elementary knowledge of civil procedure by copying those writs.

And in spite of what Dugdale tells us above, it is clear that, from the first days of which we have knowledge, it was the Benchers of the four Inns of Court, and not the Judges of the Common Pleas, who possessed the exclusive right of making a man a barrister (c).

How the Inns of Court acquired this privilege it seems now impossible to discover. Nor is it clear why the Inns of Chancery did not possess it also; for some of these—Thavies' Inn, for instance—appear to have existed before any of the present Inns of Court. But the four Inns of Court in some way acquired the mastery; they are described by James I. in his charter of August 13, 1608, as "those four colleges, the most famous in all Europe." The Inns of Chancery, on the other hand, fell into the second rank, and were indeed eventually parcelled out among the Inns of Court. Thus to the Inner Temple were attached Clifford's Inn, Lyon's Inn, and Clement's Inn; to the Middle Temple, the Strand Inn, New Inn, and a third, of which even the name is now forgotten; to Lincoln's Inn, Thavies' Inn and Furnival's Inn; and to Gray's Inn, Staple Inn and Barnard's Inn.

There being no printed books in early times, instruction in law was given orally. Each Inn of Court appears to have periodically sent a reader to every Inn of Chancery attached to it. The reader was accompanied by two "utter barristers," who discussed points of law and presided over "moots." This committee of three had the power of bringing over each term the two most promising students of the Inn of Chancery and passing them into the Inn of Court. Hence, many students entered an Inn of Chancery in the first instance and were thence transferred to an Inn of Court. But by the time of Sir Matthew Hale this custom had become obsolete. The Inns of Chancery gradually fell into the possession of solicitors, and now have all ceased to exist (d).

The legal profession now comprises three classes of practitioners:—

(i) Barristers-at-law. These may be either "utter barristers" (now more frequently called "junior barristers") or King's counsel. An utter barrister is a person who was formerly a student of an Inn of Court and who

(c) See the "Pension Book of Gray's Inn," Introduction by Rev. Reginald J. Fletcher, D.D., at pp. xiii, xiv.

(d) See *Smith v. Kerr*, [1902] 1 Ch. 774.

has been "called to the Bar" by the Benchers of his Inn and at his Inn. A King's counsel is a barrister whom the King has been graciously pleased to make one of his counsel learned in the law, and whom, therefore, the Judges have called "within the Bar" at the Royal Courts of Justice.

(ii) Solicitors. Until the year 1875 the term "solicitor" was restricted to persons who conducted suits in the Court of Chancery, while those who so acted in the Courts of common law were called "attorneys," and those who practised in the Admiralty, Probate, Divorce and other Ecclesiastical Courts were known as "proctors." But now these gentlemen are all "Solicitors of the Supreme Court," and can transact business in any of the above-mentioned Courts.

(iii) Notaries Public.

(i) Barristers.

No person can be called to the Bar, and therefore no person can become a Judge, unless he is a member of an Inn of Court. A woman can now become a member of an Inn of Court, and can therefore be called to the Bar (*e*). The Benchers of the four Inns of Court in London possess the monopoly of calling students to the English Bar. They have also power, in their discretion, to disbar barristers of their Inn who in their opinion have been guilty of professional misconduct or have been convicted of crime. No one has in strict law a right to be admitted as a student (*f*), to be called to the Bar (*g*), or to be restored if disbarred (*h*). The Inns of Court are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of law, but only to the control of the Judges as visitors (*i*).

A man who desires to enter an Inn of Court must, as a rule, have passed an examination at some University in the British Dominions, approved by the Council of Legal Education (*k*), which

(*e*) Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 71).

(*f*) *R. v. Benchers of Lincoln's Inn* (1825), 4 B. & C. 855.

(*g*) *R. v. Benchers of Gray's Inn* (1780), 1 Doug. 353.

(*h*) *Booreman's Case* (1642), March, 177.

(*i*) See *Neate v. Denman* (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 127.

(*k*) A body the members of which are appointed in equal numbers by the four Inns of Court.

entitles him to a degree, or some other of the examinations set out in the Schedule to the Consolidated Regulations of the four Inns. He must also lodge certificates of good character and make a declaration in the prescribed form. He will then be admitted to his Inn, where he must "keep," as a rule, twelve terms. He must pass both parts of the Bar Examination, be proposed for call by a Benchers of his Inn, and duly "screened" in the Hall of each of the four Inns. If no valid objection be made, he will then in due course be called to the Bar. There are certain fees and stamp duties which he must pay on prescribed occasions.

Any solicitor who was admitted a solicitor in England, and has since then been "in practice for not less than five consecutive years, either in England or in any Colony or Dependency," and who desires to be called to the Bar, must in the first place give at least twelve months' notice in writing to each of the four Inns of Court, and to the Law Society, of his intention to seek call to the Bar, and produce a certificate that he is a fit and proper person to be called to the Bar. Such certificate must be signed, if his practice was in England, by two members of the Council of the Law Society, and, if his practice was in a Colony or Dependency, by the Chief Justice of such Colony or Dependency. Next, he must cease to be a solicitor and then enter as a student at one of the Inns of Court. This he can do at any time during the currency of his notice. He must pay the same fees as are payable by other Bar students, make the usual deposit and pay the sum of five guineas for the above-mentioned notice in addition to the usual student's fees. As soon as the twelve months have expired, he may present himself for the Bar Examination. He must pass both parts of this examination; and he can then be called to the Bar without having kept any terms (l).

All barristers, whether King's counsel or juniors, can act as advocates in all law Courts (m) and advise on questions of law. Junior counsel can also draft wills, conveyances, pleadings, affidavits and other legal documents, and can take pupils. The practice of a barrister is a purely personal one, and does not admit of anything in the least resembling partnership. A barrister has an exclusive right of audience as advocate in the House of Lords, Privy Council, Supreme Court of Judicature, Central Criminal Court and Assizes. In Courts of County and Borough Quarter Sessions exclusive audience is given to barristers whenever a sufficient number

(l) Consolidated Regulations of the Inns of Court, r. 45.

(m) Except at inquiries by Royal Commissioners, or under the Charitable Trusts Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 136), &c., unless special leave is granted.

regularly attend the Court (*n*). In County Courts, Sheriffs' Courts, Coroners' Courts, Ecclesiastical Courts and Courts of Petty Sessions, they have no exclusive right of audience; solicitors may also act as advocates in these Courts, as well as at chambers in the High Court of Justice.

By the etiquette of the Bar a barrister should not undertake any paid professional work for a lay-client except on the instructions of a solicitor. But there are some exceptions to this rule. On the trial of an indictment or on the hearing of an appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, a barrister in Court may be instructed directly by the prisoner from the dock, and the same exception holds good where a Judge in a criminal trial requests a barrister to give his honorary services to a prisoner. Again, counsel may appear before parliamentary committees on the instructions of parliamentary agents who need not be solicitors, and in inquiries under the Local Government Acts, the Public Health Acts or the Light Railways Act on the instructions of clerks to local authorities. A barrister can with or without remuneration make a will for another person, and also advise in non-contentious business, without the intervention of a solicitor, though neither practice is as a rule desirable.

At the trial of an action in the High Court, any party who does not wish to conduct his case himself must employ both a solicitor and a barrister: in cases of importance he generally retains two barristers, a King's Counsel, as well as a junior. The solicitor prepares the case for trial, and instructs the barrister by delivering a "brief" to him. A barrister must accept any brief offered to him at a proper professional fee in any of the Courts in which he professes to practice, unless there are special circumstances which justify his refusal to do so. He can demand the payment of the fee when the brief is delivered, and in the event of it not being paid may refuse to accept the brief. But a barrister cannot bring an action to recover any fee which he has earned by professional services; for it is an *honorarium* (*o*). This is so, even if the fee has been paid by the lay-client to the solicitor.

The brief is the visible sign of the barrister's authority

(*n*) See *Evans, Ex parte* (1846), 9 Q. B. 279.

(*o*) *Kennedy v. Broun* (1863), 13 C. B. (N.S.) 677; and see the remarks of Lindley, L. J. in *Le Brasseur and Oakley, In re*, [1896] 2 Ch., at pp. 493, 494.

to appear and act for the lay-client at the trial; and the lay-client, having thus instructed counsel, cannot himself be heard unless, before the case comes on for hearing, he revokes the barrister's authority by withdrawing the brief. A barrister is entitled, unless he knows the contrary, to assume that every fact stated in the brief is true, and to fight the case boldly and fearlessly on that assumption. No action will lie against him for any words, however defamatory, spoken by him as advocate in the course of any judicial proceeding with reference thereto. This is so, whether such words be an attack upon the opposite party, upon any witness or upon an absent third person—and even though it be alleged that the words were spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse and were irrelevant to every question of fact which was in issue before the tribunal (p).

The delivery of a brief to a barrister gives him “complete authority over the suit, the mode of conducting it and all that is incident to the management of the trial; but he has not by virtue of this retainer in the suit any power over matters that are collateral to it” (q). It is for him to decide what witnesses he will call or not call. He can consent to a reference of all, or any, of the issues in the action. He has authority to make all such admissions, as in the honest exercise of his discretion he may think proper in the conduct of the case; and such admissions will bind his client so far as that action is concerned, though not necessarily in any subsequent action. Again, counsel has full authority to compromise the action in which he is instructed either by consenting to judgment, withdrawing a juror or in any other way, unless he be expressly forbidden to do so by his client, or unless the compromise includes or affects matters outside the scope of the action (r). The terms of the compromise should be indorsed on the brief of each of the opposing counsel, and each indorsement signed

(p) *Munster v. Lamb* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 588; see also *Lyle-Samuel v. French* (1919), *The Times*, November 1.

(q) *Per cur.* in *Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford* (1860), 29 L. J. Ex., at p. 397.

(r) *Strauss v. Francis* (1866), L. R. 1 Q. B. 379; *Neale v. Gordon Lennox*, [1902] A. C. 465; *Welsh v. Roe* (1918), 87 L. J. K. B. 520; *Shepherd v. Robinson*, [1919] 1 K. B. 474; cf. *Little v. Spreadbury*, [1910] 2 K. B. 658.

by them both. All parties to the action are subsequently entitled to inspect the indorsement made by any counsel on his brief, though not, of course, to see its contents, which are privileged from the inspection of any opponent (s). The terms of such a compromise will be strictly enforced, if necessary, by an order of the Court.

Thus where, in an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant's counsel, in the absence and without the express authority of his client, consented to a verdict for the plaintiff with costs, and to a withdrawal of all imputations against the plaintiff, it was held that the settlement was within the apparent general authority of counsel and was binding on the client (t). On the other hand, where in a suit in Chancery an order was made for the trial at Assizes of an issue as to the validity of a will under which the plaintiff claimed an estate, and counsel for the plaintiff, in her absence and without any express authority from her, agreed in Court to a compromise that the estate should be conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant in fee and that the defendant should secure an annuity to the plaintiff, it was held that her counsel had no authority to enter into such a compromise without express instruction from the client and that it did not therefore bind her (u).

So, where counsel settled an action for breach of promise of marriage without the express consent of the plaintiff upon the terms that a sum of money should be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, that the letters written by the defendant to the plaintiff should be returned to him, and that the plaintiff should not molest the defendant, it was held that the plaintiff's counsel had no authority to consent to the two latter terms on the ground that they were outside the scope of the action (x).

We may mention further that a practising barrister possesses certain minor privileges. He is exempt from serving on any jury, or as a constable. He cannot be compelled under *subpœna* to give evidence as to what was stated by him in a former case. Should, however, he consent to do so, the correct course is for him to make his statement from his place in Court without being sworn (y). He cannot be arrested on civil process when on circuit or when going to or returning from the Supreme Court.

(s) *Walsham v. Stainton* (1863), 2 Hem. & Mil. 1.

(t) *Matthews v. Munster* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 141.

(u) *Swinfen v. Swinfen* (1857), 1 C. B. (N.S.) 564.

(x) *Kempshall v. Holland* (1895), 14 R. 336.

(y) *Baillie's Case* (1778), 21 St. Tr. 340; *Hickman v. Berens*, [1895] 2 Ch. 638, 641; *Kempshall v. Holland*, *supra*.

Barristers alone are eligible for certain judicial and other offices; on the other hand, they are disqualified from acting either directly or indirectly in the capacity of a solicitor, notary public, patent agent, land agent, surveyor, consulting engineer or accountant, and from holding certain appointments which are regarded as the exclusive property of solicitors (z). Any dealings between members of the Bar and solicitors as regards sharing costs or profits in any shape are incompatible with the discipline of the Bar (a).

(ii) *Solicitors.*

It has been said of solicitors that no other profession "is so stringently regulated or so jealously supervised by the State. From the first day of his apprenticeship to the last day of his practice every action of the solicitor is subject to regulations laid down by Parliament; his education, his right to practise, his relations, to his employers, his remuneration, all are minutely prescribed by the Legislature" (b).

Their chief organisation is the Law Society, whose headquarters are in Chancery Lane. This Society was founded in 1825; it has been incorporated by five successive charters dated respectively 1831, 1845, 1872, 1903, and 1909. It conducts the examinations which an articled clerk must pass before he or she (c) can be admitted and entered on the roll of solicitors; it has a staff of lecturers and tutors who give instruction in law; and its disciplinary committee hears complaints made against solicitors and applications made to strike them off the roll (d).

No one is qualified to be a solicitor, unless he or she is a British subject and has—

(i) Duly served as clerk to a practising solicitor under binding articles for a period varying from three to five years.

(ii) Passed all necessary examinations. There are three of these: the preliminary, the intermediate, and the final; but other examinations may be accepted in lieu of the first two.

(z) See rules 3, 10 and 41 of the Consolidated Regulations of the Inns of Court.

(a) *Ibid.*, r. 46.

(b) See "A Short History of Solicitors," by Mr. E. B. V. Christian.

(c) A woman can now become a solicitor (Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 71), s. 2).

(d) Solicitors Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 65), ss. 12—15, as amended by the Act of 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 56).

(iii) Attended (in the case of a person first articulated after December 31, 1922) a law school provided or approved by the Society (*e*).

(iv) Been duly admitted and entered on the roll of solicitors, which is kept by the secretary of the Law Society, in his capacity as registrar of solicitors.

The solicitor of a Public Department of State need not be a solicitor, or admitted or enrolled as a solicitor, or take out any certificate to practise (*f*). Any barrister of not less than five years' standing, who has procured himself to be disbarred with a view to becoming a solicitor, and has obtained from two of the Benchers of the Inn to which he belonged a certificate that he is a fit and proper person to practise as a solicitor, is not required to serve under any articles or to pass any examination except the final examination. On passing this, he is entitled to be at once admitted and enrolled as a solicitor (*g*).

Although a solicitor has been duly admitted and his name entered on the roll, he cannot practise unless he annually takes out a certificate and causes it to be duly stamped. This certificate is given by the registrar of solicitors, who is the secretary of the Law Society. The certificate of a country solicitor does not enable him to practise in town. Hence nearly every country solicitor employs a London solicitor to act as his town agent. The ordinary rules of the law of principal and agent apply to such a case (*h*).

A solicitor who practises without having first taken out such a certificate is liable to a penalty of £50 (*i*). Moreover, he cannot recover from his client any costs, fees, rewards, or disbursements for any work done or proceeding taken while he was without a certificate (*k*). The certificate ought strictly to be taken out on November 16 in each year. A solicitor is, however, allowed a whole month from that date in which to take it out. If he takes out a certificate on or before December 16, it will bear date and relate back to November 16. If he does not take it out till after December 16, he is disqualified till he does take one out; and the certificate when taken out will not relate back, so that for work done in the interval the solicitor cannot recover any remuneration (*l*).

A solicitor who neglects for a whole twelvemonth to renew his certificate is no longer entitled to renew it as of right; he must

(*e*) Solicitors Act, 1922 (12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 57).

(*f*) See Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 43, sub-s. 3.

(*g*) Solicitors Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 25), s. 12.

(*h*) See *post*, p. 834.

(*i*) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 43.

(*k*) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 68, s. 12; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 43.

(*l*) *Kent v. Ward* (1896), 70 L. T. 612; *Sweeting, In re*, [1898] 1 Ch. 268.

apply for leave to the registrar of solicitors, who then has a discretion to grant or refuse the application (*m*). The registrar has a similar discretion whenever the solicitor applying for a fresh certificate or the renewal of a certificate to practise is an undischarged bankrupt (*n*). Except in these two cases the registrar has no power to refuse a certificate to any duly qualified solicitor who is on the roll, who has applied in proper time, and who has complied with all other requirements of section 23 of the Solicitors Act, 1843 (*o*). In both the above cases if the registrar refuses leave, the solicitor can appeal to the Master of the Rolls, who has the same discretion as the registrar. Neither the registrar nor the Master of the Rolls can give him more than a certificate for the current year. The King's Bench Division has no jurisdiction in the matter (*p*). But the Court of Appeal has power to make an order restraining a solicitor from applying to the registrar to renew his certificate without the leave of the Court (*q*).

Every solicitor, who has been duly admitted, whose name is entered on the roll of solicitors and who has taken out his certificate for the current year (*r*), is entitled to give advice on all matters of law, to do all kinds of conveyancing business, to act on behalf of a client in any Court—civil, criminal or ecclesiastical—and to charge for such services according to the recognised scale of charges.

But before he can act as a solicitor in any of these Courts, he must be retained by a client. A retainer is an authority given to a solicitor to act on behalf of a client, either generally or in relation to some particular matter. In most cases, a solicitor may be retained either by word of mouth or in writing; but for his own protection he should obtain a written retainer. When he is about to act for a local authority, a retainer under seal is necessary (*s*). A special authority should be obtained from the client before the solicitor issues a writ or commences any legal proceeding, though authority may be implied from the subsequent

(*m*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 65, s. 16.

(*n*) Solicitors Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 24), s. 1; Solicitors Act, 1922, s. 6.

(*o*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73; *A Solicitor, In re*, [1902] 1 K. B. 128, overruling *An Application under the Solicitors Act, In re* (1899), 80 L. T. 720.

(*p*) *Chaffers, In re* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 467.

(*q*) *Whitehead, In re* (1885), 28 Ch. D. 614.

(*r*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, ss. 27, 31; 40 & 41 Vict. c. 25, s. 17.

(*s*) See *ante*, p. 15, and *Hunt v. Wimbledon Local Board* (1878), 3 C. P. D. 208; 4 *ibid.*, 48; *Newington Local Board v. Eldridge* (1879), 12 Ch. D., at p. 360. As to the employment of a solicitor by a trustee in a bankruptcy, see the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, ss. 56, 83.

conduct of the client (*t*). Any action commenced by a solicitor without authority will be dismissed or stayed, and the solicitor will be ordered to pay the costs of all parties (*u*). Similarly, an appearance entered for a defendant without his authority will be struck out with costs against the solicitor (*x*). On the other hand, if a writ bearing the name of a solicitor be issued without his authority or consent, all proceedings thereon will be stayed (*y*).

The relation of solicitor and client may be determined at any time by the death or lunacy (*z*) of either; or by the client withdrawing his retainer; or by the solicitor discharging himself. But when a solicitor is retained to conduct or defend an action in the nature of a common law action, he is, as a rule, bound to carry it on till its termination, for it is an entire contract. But he can cease to act if the client refuses to supply him with the funds necessary for out-of-pocket expenses, or for any other good reason (*a*). So long as the relation of solicitor and client exists, all communications passing between them and all communications made by a solicitor in defence of his client's rights or asserting for him any title, which he honestly believes his client to possess, are *prima facie* privileged, although the words employed be defamatory of a third person (*b*).

In the High Court of Justice (*c*), in the Court of Appeal, in the House of Lords and before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council a solicitor does not himself conduct his client's case; a barrister must be employed as well as a solicitor. The solicitor prepares the case for trial, and instructs the barrister to conduct the case. But in other Courts a solicitor can act as an advocate. He can appear and argue before justices or any magistrate, before a coroner, under-sheriff or secondary, in every County Court, in

(*t*) See *Morgan v. Blyth*, [1891] 1 Ch., at p. 355.

(*u*) *Fricke v. Van Grutten*, [1896] 2 Ch. 649; *Geilinger v. Gibbs*, [1897] 1 Ch. 479.

(*x*) *Yonge v. Toynbee*, [1910] 1 K. B. 215; *ante*, p. 523.

(*y*) Order VII., r. 1.

(*z*) *Yonge v. Toynbee*, [1910] 1 K. B. 215; *ante*, pp. 765 *et seq.*

(*a*) See *Underwood v. Lewis*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 306.

(*b*) See *Browne v. Dunn* (1893), 6 R. 67; *Baker v. Carrick*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 838; *Bozsius v. Goblet Frères*, *ibid.*, 842; *Campbell v. Cochrane* (1906), 1 F. 205 (Ct. of Sess.). Such communications are also privileged from discovery and from production at the trial (see para. 3 of the form of an affidavit of documents, *ante*, p. 574).

(*c*) Except in chambers and in some bankruptcy matters; but see *Doxford v. Sea Shipping Co.* (1897), 14 T. L. R. 111.

revenue matters (*d*) and before the Income Tax Commissioners (*e*). To this there is one exception:—If a solicitor be appointed, as he now may, a justice of the peace for any county, neither he nor any partner of his may practise directly or indirectly before the justices for that county or any borough within the county (*f*). A solicitor has, however, no right of audience in the Mayor's Court, London. He can only be heard in the Court of Quarter Sessions for those counties or towns in which no Bar regularly attends, such as Cornwall and Chichester. Moreover, a solicitor cannot appear in the County Court as advocate for the client of another solicitor. He must be the solicitor “acting generally in the action or matter for such party” (*g*). All words spoken by a solicitor, when properly acting in Court as an advocate, are absolutely privileged (*h*).

No person who is not a solicitor, duly qualified and enrolled, can act as a solicitor, or sue out any process, or carry on or defend any action (*i*). Solicitors have, moreover, acquired under various statutes a *quasi*-monopoly in all non-litigious legal business. Conveyancing work was formerly done solely by scriveners, but in 1760 the London solicitors broke down this monopoly. Such work, if done for payment, can now only be done by a solicitor (*k*) or a barrister (*l*). Various statutes also require certain documents and deeds to be attested by a solicitor (*m*).

A solicitor has a very extensive authority, especially in litigious matters. Any admission which he makes in the action will bind his client, unless it be made “without prejudice.”

He may compromise an action on such terms as he thinks right, unless his client expressly forbids him so to do, so long as the compromise does not include or affect matters outside the action (*n*). A client, who induces his solicitor to believe that he has authority to compromise an action upon certain terms, is bound by such compromise if the solicitor in making it reasonably believes that he has

(*d*) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 28, s. 38.

(*e*) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 10, s. 16.

(*f*) 6 Edw. 7, c. 16, s. 3.

(*g*) *R. v. Judge of County Court of Oxfordshire*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 440; County Courts Act, 1888, s. 72.

(*h*) *Munster v. Lamb* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 588.

(*i*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 2; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 26; and see 37 & 38 Vict. c. 68, s. 12; Legal Practitioners Act, 1877 (40 & 41 Vict. c. 62), s. 2; Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 43.

(*k*) 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 44.

(*l*) See *ante*, p. 818.

(*m*) See, for instance, section 10 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31), and rules 7, 46, 55, made under the Land Transfer Acts, 1875 and 1897 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 87; 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65).

(*n*) *Matthews v. Munster* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 141; *Kempshall v. Holland* (1895), 14 R. 336; *A Debtor, In re*, [1914] 2 K. B. 758; and see *ante*, pp. 206, 207.

authority to do so, although the client did not in fact intend to authorise a compromise upon those terms, and did not understand the terms upon which it was proposed that the compromise should be effected (o). But a solicitor employed to act for a client in regard to his claim against a third person has, before action brought, no implied authority to effect a compromise (p). He has, to a like extent, power to refer an action to arbitration (q); no authority under seal is necessary for this purpose, even though his client be a corporation (r). So, too, during the progress of an action, service of all notices and communications upon the solicitor is good service on the client. And, generally, the client is bound by and liable for all acts of his solicitor done in the action in the regular course of practice, and without fraud, although contrary to the client's orders (s). But he is not liable for any wilful trespass committed by his solicitor, or for any act of his which is outside the usual and regular procedure of the Courts. And the solicitor is not liable to third persons for any act done by him in the proper course of procedure under a regular judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction. But he may render himself liable if he takes upon himself to interfere unduly in the matter, *e.g.*, by giving special directions to the officer of the Court where to levy execution, or if he illegally detains deeds till a claim is satisfied, which his client had no right to make, and in this case he will not escape liability even though he has paid over the money to his client (t).

At any time during the progress of an action for a debt, the solicitor on the record has authority to receive payment or tender of the debt, and payment or tender to him is equivalent to payment or tender to the plaintiff himself.

(o) *Little v. Spreadbury*, [1910] 2 K. B. 658.

(p) *Macaulay v. Polley*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 122. A London agent, who has the general conduct of a cause on behalf of a country solicitor, possesses the same general authority as he would in any action in which he was the only solicitor employed; he has, therefore, power to compromise the action in any *bona fide* and reasonable manner, unless such general authority has been expressly limited: *Newen, In re*, [1903] 1 Ch. 812.

(q) *Faviell v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co.* (1848), 2 Exch. 344.

(r) *Ibid.*

(s) *Latuch v. Pasherante* (1696), 1 Salk. 86.

(t) *Oates v. Hudson* (1851), 6 Exch. 346.

In other words, the payment to the solicitor discharges the debtor, and if the money be not handed over, the client's only remedy is to sue the solicitor. But payment to a clerk or agent of the plaintiff's solicitor is not, as a rule, a good payment to the plaintiff.

In non-litigious matters the authority of the solicitor is more restricted. It depends largely on the nature of his retainer. Still, on a sale of land by auction, the payment of the deposit to the vendor's solicitor is equivalent to a payment to the vendor (*u*). And now, where a solicitor produces a deed which has in its body, or indorsed upon it, a receipt for the consideration money, and the deed is executed or the indorsed receipt is signed by the person entitled to receive the money, the deed is a sufficient authority for payment to that solicitor (*x*). But a solicitor has no implied authority to hand over the deeds in exchange for a cheque (*y*), or to alter the bargain which his client has made by consenting to terms to which his client has not agreed, or by waiving terms on which his client insists. The written approval by a solicitor of the form of a draft lease, or conveyance, is not a signature by an agent "thereunder lawfully authorised" sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (*z*). And where a solicitor is employed not to negotiate, but merely to reduce a contract into writing, or to carry it into effect by drafting the proper instruments, notice to him of a fact is not constructive notice to his client (*a*).

So far we have dealt with the privileges of a solicitor; but he is also subject to important disabilities. He cannot, as a rule, fix his own price for his labour. The law fixes for him what payment he may receive. The value of each item of his work is either determined by a statutory scale of charges or is liable to be appraised by an officer of the Court. And he cannot recover more from his client than the law thus allows. He cannot insist on being paid as soon as his work is done. He must first deliver to his client a bill of costs—a statement setting out what work he has done in full detail, and stating what amount he charges for each item of his work. And then he must wait a full calendar

(*u*) *Ellis v. Goulton*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 350; see also *Blackburn v. Walker* (1920), 150 L. T. Jo. 73.

(*x*) L. P. A., 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 20), s. 69.

(*y*) *Blumberg v. Life, &c., Corporation*, [1897] 1 Ch. 171; [1898] 1 Ch. 27.

(*z*) *Forster v. Rowland* (1861), 7 H. & N. 103; *Smith v. Webster* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 49; but see *North v. Loomas*, [1919] 1 Ch. 378.

(*a*) *Saffron Walden Building Society v. Rayner* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 406; *Thorne v. Heard*, [1895] A. C. 495. See also section 45, sub-section 8, section 94, sub-section 2, and section 199 of the L. P. A., 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 20).

month after delivery of the bill before he can claim payment by issuing a writ (*b*).

Again, a solicitor may not receive from his client, during the existence of a suit, anything beyond his regular charges allowed by law. If a present be made him by a grateful client while the relation of solicitor and client subsists, the Court will presume that the gift was the result of undue influence owing to the fiduciary relation between them; and this presumption continues so long as the relation of solicitor and client continues for other purposes outside the gift (*c*). This presumption, however, is not irrebuttable; but the *onus* is on the solicitor to prove clearly that the gift was not influenced by that relation. The application to have the gift declared invalid must be made within a reasonable time after the relation of solicitor and client has ceased to exist. A bequest to a solicitor by will stands upon a different footing from a gift *inter vivos*. Yet even here, if the solicitor himself drew the will by which he benefits, the *onus* lies on him to prove the *bona fides* of the transaction. He must by affirmative evidence remove all suspicion, and satisfy the Court that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will (*d*).

There is no objection to a solicitor openly selling his property to a former client after the relation of solicitor and client is at an end. But if he openly sells to a present client while still acting for him, the sale will be set aside, unless the solicitor can show that he made a full and fair disclosure of every fact affecting the transaction. If, however, the solicitor conceals the fact that he is the vendor and sells to his client through the agency of some

(*b*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, ss. 37, 48; and see *Plummer, In re*, [1917] 2 Ch. 432. An important exception is made to this rule by section 2 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 79), which enables any Judge of the High Court to authorise a solicitor to commence an action for the recovery of his fees, although one month has not expired since he delivered his bill of costs, if the Judge is satisfied that there is probable cause for believing that the client is about to quit England, or to become a bankrupt, or a liquidating or compounding debtor, or to take any other steps, or do any other act, which, in the opinion of the Judge, would tend to defeat or delay the solicitor in obtaining payment.

(*c*) For an extreme instance of the application of this rule, see *Liles v. Terry*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 679.

(*d*) *Fulton v. Andrew and Wilson* (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 448.

trustee or nominee, the transaction is wholly invalid, and will at once be set aside.

A similar rule applies, though with less stringency, to cases in which a solicitor purchases from a client; for, even though the relationship of solicitor and client may now be at an end, the solicitor may have acquired valuable information about his client's property while the relationship existed. If, therefore, the solicitor was ever employed in connection with the property purchased, or on any business which in any way affected that property, the transaction will be set aside if the client subsequently calls it in question, unless the solicitor can satisfy the Court that, during the negotiation for the purchase he gave his client all reasonable advice against himself which he would have given against a third person. But the purchase will be upheld if the solicitor satisfies the Court that the client was fully informed, that he had competent independent advice, and that the price given was a fair one (*e*). If, however, the solicitor conceals the fact that he is the real purchaser, and purchases in the name of a third person, the transaction will in every case be set aside (*f*). The purchase by a solicitor of the subject-matter of the suit from the client for whom he is acting in that suit is on every ground objectionable.

A solicitor is bound to bring reasonable skill and learning to the management of his client's affairs; he will be liable for even an innocent misrepresentation made to his client in the course of his duty (*g*). He will not be expected to know the law on doubtful points, or on such matters as are usually sent to counsel for their opinion. But he should be acquainted with the general rules of law, with the practice of conveyancing, and with the practice and procedure of the various Courts, superior and inferior.

(*e*) *Wright v. Carter*, [1903] 1 Ch. 27. The law on this point is admirably summed up by Stirling, L.J., in *Haslam & Hier-Evans, In re*, [1902] 1 Ch., at pp. 769, 770. As to a mortgage given by a client to his solicitor, see *Cockburn v. Edwards* (1881), 18 Ch. D., at p. 455; see also *Imeson v. Lister* (1920), 149 L. T. Jo. 446.

(*f*) *McPherson v. Watt* (1877), 3 App. Cas. 254.

(*g*) *Nocton v. Lord Ashburton*, [1914] A. C. 932.

He must personally apply due diligence and attention to his client's affairs. It is his duty to note carefully his client's instructions, and read the documents which his client lays before him. He must watch the progress of any litigation, inform his client thereof, and be ready to take the proper step at each stage; he must always inform his client of any offer of compromise. In many cases a solicitor will not be allowed to recover certain extra costs, unless he consults his client before incurring them, and warns him that they cannot be recovered from his opponent (*h*). He must do all that is necessary to prepare the case for trial; he must procure the necessary evidence, inform the client and his witnesses of the day fixed for the hearing and be in attendance on that day himself, or by some proper person on his behalf, with all necessary witnesses and papers (*i*).

He must give his client his personal advice and judgment on all matters both of law and expediency (*k*). He must safeguard his interests both by securing for him, as far as possible, that to which he is entitled, and also by preventing him from prejudicing his position by giving away his rights or from acting either precipitately or oppressively. If the client is a trustee or an executor, the solicitor must not allow him to commit a breach of trust, or enter into covenants for title, or otherwise render himself personally liable. Every solicitor must always act in the interests of his client, and not put the law in motion for private ends of his own (*l*).

He is also bound to manage the business entrusted to him with fidelity and good faith. He must keep his client's secrets, and not disclose any information given him by his client for the purposes of his case, even though unnecessarily. Where it appeared that the same solicitor was employed on both sides in an action at law, the Court set aside the proceedings and ordered the solicitor to pay the

(*h*) *Blyth & Fanshawe, In re* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 207; *Roney & Co., In re*, [1914] 2 K. B. 529.

(*i*) Order LXV., r. 5.

(*k*) He may, of course, leave purely ministerial acts to his clerks.

(*l*) *Harbin v. Masterman*, [1896] 1 Ch. 351.

costs (m). But in non-litigious matters the same solicitor is often employed by all parties and may act for all whose interests do not necessarily clash. And, indeed, in the administration of estates and the execution of trusts the same solicitor may often act for all parties even though their interests conflict, and, if proceedings be taken, may instruct separate counsel to represent their different interests. A solicitor must keep clear and accurate accounts of all moneys received by him for and on behalf of his client. He should keep such moneys apart from his own. He is liable at any moment to be called on to render an account. He must keep clear and accurate accounts of his own charges against his client, and of the work for which each item is charged. He should also keep for reference a copy of every letter which he writes on his client's behalf (n).

But a solicitor is not merely a professional man retained by a client. He is also an officer of the Court, and as such owes duties to the Court, of which a few instances only can be given here. He must never be guilty of "sharp practice"; he must never attempt to mislead the Court himself, nor allow his client so to do (o). He must never permit any unqualified person to practise in his name (p).

No solicitor may commence any legal proceeding without instructions from his client. Every solicitor whose name is indorsed on any writ of summons is bound to state on demand whether such writ was issued with his authority or not (q). A solicitor who has issued a writ in the name of a firm must, on demand, declare in writing the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting that firm (r).

Every solicitor who has accepted service of a writ must appear thereto in due course in accordance with his undertaking, or he will be liable to be attached (s). And, generally, every solicitor must loyally fulfil every undertaking which he has given in his character as an officer of the Court, whether to his client or to a third person,

(m) *Berry v. Jenkins* (1826), 11 Moo. 308; *R. v. Alderson* (1839), 11 A. & E. 3.

(n) *Boxsius v. Goblet Frères*, [1894] 1 Q. B., at p. 845.

(o) *Ezart v. Lister* (1842), 5 Beav. 585; *Dangar's Trusts, In re* (1889), 41 Ch. D. 178.

(p) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 32.

(q) Order VII., r. 1.

(r) Order XLVIII., r. 2; *Abrahams v. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 46.

(s) Order XII., r. 18; *Kerly, In re*, [1901] 1 Ch. 467.

and promptly pay all moneys due from him in that character, or he will be liable to be committed (*t*).

The solicitor on the record is personally liable for the Court fees and the jury fees (*u*), and for the fees payable to an official referee (*x*). But he is not liable to the sheriff for his fees or possession money (*y*); nor is he liable to the witnesses for their expenses (*z*), unless he has done some act to bring upon himself such additional liability.

Solicitors frequently enter into partnership. Only qualified solicitors can carry on their business in partnership. Any agreement or arrangement, which is in fact a partnership between a solicitor and an unqualified person, is illegal; and the solicitor may be struck off the roll, and the unqualified person may be prosecuted under section 32 of the Solicitors Act, 1843 (*a*).

The death of a partner immediately puts an end to any existing partnership. And a dissolution, caused thus or in any other way, at once puts an end to all retainers, as every client is in theory entitled to the services of each individual member of the firm (*b*). The partnership deed usually disposes of the "goodwill" on the dissolution of a firm of solicitors and provides for the apportionment among its members of the clients of the old firm with their papers. But such an arrangement is, of course, not binding on the clients, who are free to consult and retain whomsoever they choose, whether a member of the former firm or not (*c*). In fact, "the term 'goodwill' seems wholly inapplicable to the business of a solicitor, which has no local existence, but is entirely personal, depending upon the trust and confidence which persons may repose in his integrity and ability to conduct their legal affairs" (*d*).

The liability of one partner for the act or default of

(*t*) *Swyny v. Harland*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 707; *A Solicitor, In re*, [1895] 2 Ch. 66; *Coolgardie Goldfields, In re*, [1900] 1 Ch. 475; *D. v. A. & Co.*, *ibid.*, 484; *A Solicitor, In re*, [1907] 2 K. B. 539.

(*u*) *Langridge v. Lynch* (1876), 34 L. T. 695.

(*x*) Order XXXVI., r. 55D.

(*y*) *Royle v. Busby & Son* (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 171.

(*z*) *Robins v. Bridge* (1837), 3 M. & W. 114.

(*a*) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73.

(*b*) *Rawlinson v. Moss* (1861), 30 L. J. Ch. 797.

(*c*) Subject, of course, to the terms of any binding restrictive covenant.

(*d*) *Per* Lord Chelmsford, L.C., in *Austen v. Boys* (1858), 27 L. J. Ch., at p. 718.

another during the partnership is very extensive. A solicitor, is, of course, liable for every act or default of his partner of which he has knowledge, and to which he consents. But he is also liable for every act or default done or committed by his partner within the scope of the ordinary business of the firm, although he had no notice of it; for each partner is the agent of the other with regard to all matters within that scope (*e*).

Thus, one member of a firm of solicitors has no implied authority to bind his partner by a promissory note in the name of the firm, though given for their debt; or by a post-dated cheque; or by drawing or indorsing a bill of exchange; or by a guarantee. So one partner is not liable for money borrowed without his knowledge by another, even though borrowed in the name of the firm (*f*).

If a solicitor receives money from a client to be invested on mortgage, either ministerially to complete an advance which the client has already agreed to make on a certain security, or to find securities which he is to submit to his client, who, if he approves of them, will then invest his money thereon, his partner will be liable for any misappropriation of the money (*g*). But if he receives his client's money to hold it till he can find a proper security, and then to invest it for his client thereon, he is employed to do the work of a scrivener rather than a solicitor, and his innocent partner will therefore not be liable (*h*).

Again, as it is part of the ordinary business of a firm of solicitors that has the conduct of a sale by the Court to pay the deposits into Court for the auctioneer, if one member of such a firm receives a deposit from the auctioneer and misappropriates it, his partners are liable (*i*). But it is not part of the ordinary business of a solicitor to receive purchase-money belonging to his client, or the repayment of mortgage-money; and one partner is therefore not liable for the misapplication of money so received by his partner without his knowledge (*k*). For the same reason, if a solicitor receives on deposit to hold for his client bonds payable to bearer, his partner, in the absence of clear notice of such deposit, will not be responsible for their safe custody (*l*).

(*e*) *Blyth v. Fladgate*, [1891] 1 Ch. 337. The liability of an innocent solicitor for a debt or liability incurred through any fraud or breach of trust committed by his partner is not discharged by his bankruptcy: Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 28, sub-s. 4.

(*f*) *Plumer v. Gregory* (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 621.

(*g*) See *Dooby v. Watson* (1888), 39 Ch. D. 178; *Stokes v. Prance*, [1898] 1 Ch. 212.

(*h*) *Harman v. Johnson* (1853), 2 E. & B. 61.

(*i*) *Biggs v. Bree* (1882), 51 L. J. Ch. 363.

(*k*) *Bourdillon v. Roche* (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 681; *Sims v. Brutton* (1850), 5 Exch. 802.

(*l*) *Cleather v. Twisden* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 731; (1884), 28 Ch. D. 340; *Rhodes v. Moules*, [1895] 1 Ch. 236; and see *Mara v. Browne*, [1896] 1 Ch. 199; and *Marsh v. Joseph*, [1897] 1 Ch. 213.

The country solicitor is alone answerable to the client, the London agent is answerable only to the country solicitor, for any negligence or misconduct (*m*). The London agent owes no direct duty to the lay client, whose only remedy, therefore (at all events in the absence of fraud), is against the country solicitor (*n*). There is no privity between the client and the London agent; hence the client cannot sue the agent for money received to his use (*o*), or on any other implied contract. The country solicitor is, in fact, the client of the London agent; the lay client is the client of the country solicitor alone.

If a solicitor be guilty of a breach of his duty to his client, the client has different remedies according to the circumstances:—

(i) He may sue the solicitor for damages for negligence, or for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff, or for the delivery up of papers, or for an account. A solicitor is liable to his client for damages arising from his own negligence in the course of his employment, or from the negligence of his clerk, his partner, or his London agent, provided they were acting within the limits of the authority conferred on them by him. It does not matter whether the solicitor was to be paid for his services or not; it is immaterial whether he was or was not certificated at the time he was employed (*p*).

(ii) The client may refuse to pay the whole or part of his solicitor's bill of costs.

(iii) He may, in very grave cases, take criminal proceedings against the solicitor. Thus, a solicitor may be indicted for the fraudulent conversion of money or of a security entrusted to him for safe custody, or with a written direction as to its application (*q*).

(iv) He may apply to the Court for a summary order to compel the solicitor to do his duty. It is by a similar motion that a solicitor is called in question for a breach of his duty to the Court (*r*).

(*m*) *Farman, In re* (1897), 14 T. L. R. 20; and see *Wilde, In re*, [1910] 1 Ch. 100.

(*n*) *Simmons v. Rose* (1862), 31 Beav. 1.

(*o*) *Collins v. Brook* (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 255.

(*p*) *Brown v. Tolley* (1874), 31 L. T. 485.

(*q*) Larceny Act, 1916, s. 20; *R. v. Cooper* (1874), L. R. 2 C. C. R. 123; *R. v. Fullagar* (1879), 14 Cox, 370; *R. v. Newman* (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 706; and *Bellencontre, In re*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 122.

(v) He may apply to strike the name of the solicitor off the roll, or to make him answer the matters contained in an affidavit.

The Disciplinary Committee of the Law Society has power either to strike a solicitor off the roll or to suspend him from practice for such period as it may think fit. This power will, as a rule, only be exercised where the solicitor has been guilty of grave professional misconduct, or of a crime, or of some act so dishonest as to render him unfit to continue to be an officer of the Court (s). Thus, - a solicitor will be struck off the roll if he has been guilty of an offence against section 32 of the Solicitors Act, 1843 (t), or has put before the Court an affidavit which he knows to be false, or has fraudulently appropriated moneys due to his client or of which he was a trustee. In 1905 a solicitor who had become a bookmaker was struck off the roll (u). In many cases the first step towards striking a solicitor off the roll is to call on him to answer the allegations contained in a certain affidavit.

The procedure is regulated by the Solicitors Act, 1888 (x). The application, whether at the instance of the solicitor himself or of any other person, is now made to a committee which consists of not less than three nor more than seven members of the council of the Law Society, selected for the purpose by the Master of the Rolls. The application will be heard by not less than three members of the committee. The committee is a Court; its proceedings are judicial, and are therefore absolutely privileged (y). It has power to make any such order as to striking a solicitor off the rolls, or suspending him from practice or payment of costs as the Court formerly had under the Act of 1888.

An application to the committee to strike a solicitor off the roll, or to require him to answer an affidavit, must be in writing signed by the applicant, whose address and occupation must be stated. He must also make or join in an affidavit, stating concisely, and with all material dates, the matters of fact on which he relies in support of his application. He may attach a copy of any material correspondence as an exhibit to his affidavit. The applicant is not

(r) See *ante*, pp. 516, 517; and *Seldon v. Wilde*, [1910] 2 K. B. 9; *United Mining, &c., Corporation v. Becher*, [1910] 2 K. B. 296.

(s) *Weare, In re*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 439.

(t) *Kelly, In re*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 180.

(u) *A Solicitor, In re* (1905), 93 L. T. 838.

(x) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 65, as amended by the Act of 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 56); and see Stat. Rules and Orders, 1924, No. 1582.

(y) *Lilley v. Roney* (1892), 61 L. J. Q. B. 727.

necessarily the client of the solicitor; any person aggrieved, or any one having official cognisance of the matter (such as, for instance, an official receiver, or even the Law Society itself), may apply to the committee. When an application against a solicitor has once been lodged, it cannot, under any circumstances, be withdrawn without the leave of the committee.

If the case made by the affidavit appear to the committee to require an answer from the solicitor, they appoint a day for hearing the application. A copy of the application and of the affidavit, together with notice of the day fixed for the hearing, is sent by the registrar to the solicitor at his last known place of abode or business. Notice of the day fixed is also sent to the applicant. If the case made by the affidavit does not appear to the committee to call for an answer from the solicitor, the applicant is so informed. If dissatisfied with the decision, he can renew his application to the committee upon additional evidence.

At the hearing either party may appear in person or by counsel or solicitor. The committee may proceed in the absence of either party, if they are of opinion that such absence is the result of gross negligence or of an intention to avoid or delay proceedings. If the solicitor does not appear at the hearing and the committee determine to proceed in his absence, and in any other case with the consent in writing of the solicitor, the committee may receive and act upon evidence given by affidavit, including the affidavit or affidavits upon which the application is made. In all other cases the evidence is given orally, and either on oath or affirmation. The chairman administers the oath, and the witnesses are examined and cross-examined, and the whole hearing is conducted, so far as possible, like an ordinary action at *nisi prius*. The committee may at any moment stop the proceedings on the ground that no *prima facie* case of professional misconduct has been made out by the affidavit or evidence which calls for an answer (z).

At the close of the inquiry the committee make their order in writing, prefacing it with a statement of their findings. This order is filed, and when it strikes a solicitor off the rolls or suspends him from practice is also advertised in the "London Gazette." An appeal lies from any order of the committee at the instance either of the applicant or of the solicitor (a).

An order striking a solicitor off the roll is not made in a "criminal cause or matter" within the meaning of section 47 of the Judicature Act, 1873 (b), hence the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the solicitor against such an order (c).

(z) *R. v. Incorporated Law Society*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 327.

(a) Solicitors Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 56), s. 8; and see Stat. Rules and Orders, 1923, No. 329.

(b) Now section 31 of the Judicature Act, 1925.

(c) *Eede, In re* (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 228. On appeal the Court will not lightly interfere with the exercise of the committee's discretion: *A Solicitor, In re* (No. 2) (1924), 93 L. J. K. B. 761. A solicitor may be struck off the roll at his own request, *e.g.*, if he wishes to be called to the Bar, *ante*, p. 817.

In Ecclesiastical Courts, the place of solicitors is taken by proctors. Formerly they were a distinct profession, and were admitted to practise by the Dean of Arches after serving an apprenticeship of seven years' duration. By the Attorneys and Solicitors Acts, 1870 and 1877 (*d*), solicitors were permitted to act as proctors in all Ecclesiastical Courts, and proctors are not now a separate profession.

(iii) *Notaries Public.*

A notary public is a person who attests deeds or writings in order that they may be received as authentic in foreign countries. He also authenticates and certifies copies of documents for use abroad. At the request of the holder he will note and protest a bill of exchange, the acceptance or payment of which has been refused. He may also prepare wills, contracts and other documents, although this class of work is more frequently performed by solicitors. Notaries are appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury through the Master of the Court of Faculties (*e*), who also has power to strike a notary public off the roll (*f*). In the provinces they must be solicitors or have been apprenticed to a notary for five years. In the City of London they must have been so apprenticed and also be freemen of the Scriveners' Company.

(*d*) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 28, s. 20; 40 & 41 Vict. c. 25, s. 17.

(*e*) See *Bailleau v. Victorian Society of Notaries*, [1904] P. 180; *Hudson v. Boutflower*, [1910] W. N. 228. The Lord Chancellor appoints notaries in Wales: Welsh Church Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 91).

(*f*) *Charles Goble Champion, In re*, [1906] P. 86.

APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS OF INDICTMENTS (a).

1. Arson.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Arson, contrary to section 2 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , maliciously set fire to a dwelling-house, one F.G. being therein.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Arson, contrary to section 3 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , maliciously set fire to a house with intent to injure or defraud.

2. Arson with an Accessory before the Fact (b).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCES.

A.B., arson, contrary to section 3 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861;

C.D., accessory before the fact to same offence.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCES.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , set fire to a house with intent to injure or defraud.

(a) These indictments, with the exception of Nos. 9, 24 and 29, are taken from the rules contained in the Schedule to the Indictments Act, 1915, as amended by the Rule Committee in March, 1916. For the formal heading of an indictment, see the precedent on p. 425.

(b) Note that charges against a principal and an accessory respectively can now be included in the same count of the same indictment.

C.D., on the same day, in the county of did counsel, procure and command the said *A.B.* to commit the said offence.

3. Bankruptcy Offences.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Bankruptcy offence contrary to section 154, sub-section 1 of Bankruptcy Act, 1914.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B. has been adjudged bankrupt, and on the day of in the county of , did not fully and truly discover to the trustee all his property, and how and to whom and for what consideration and when he had disposed of a piano, part thereof.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Bankruptcy Offence contrary to section 154, sub-section 3 of Bankruptcy Act, 1914.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B. has been adjudged bankrupt, and on the day of , in the county of , did not deliver up to the trustee a book called a ledger, relating to his property or affairs.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Third Count.

Bankruptcy offence contrary to section 154, sub-section 5 of Bankruptcy Act, 1914.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , and within six months next before the presentation of a bankruptcy petition against him upon which he was adjudged bankrupt, in the county of , fraudulently removed a piano, value £20, part of his property.

4. Bankruptcy Offences with an Accessory before the Fact.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCES.

A.B., undischarged bankrupt, obtaining credit contrary to section 155 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914;

C.D., being accessory to same offence.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCES.

A.B., on the day of in the county of , being an undischarged bankrupt obtained credit to the extent of twelve pounds from *H.S.* without informing the said *H.S.* that he then was an undischarged bankrupt.

C.D. at the same time and place did aid, abet, counsel and procure *A.B.* to commit the said offence.

5. Burglary and Larceny.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Burglary and larceny, contrary to section 25 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., in the night of the day of , in the county of , did break and enter the dwelling-house of *C.D.* with intent to steal therein, and did steal therein one watch, the property of *S.T.*, the said watch being of the value of ten pounds.

6. Conspiracy to Defraud (c).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Conspiracy to defraud.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B. and *C.D.* on divers days between the day of and the day of , in the county of , conspired together and with other persons unknown to defraud such persons as should thereafter be induced to part with money to the said *A.B.* and *C.D.*, by false representations that *A.B.* and *C.D.* were then carrying on a genuine business as jewellers at and that they were then willing and prepared to supply articles of jewellery to such persons.

7. Conspiracy to Commit Crime.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Conspiracy to incite women to procure their own miscarriage.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B. and *C.D.* on divers days between the day of and the day of , in the county of

(c) This form is taken from the rules of March, 1916. The original form was annulled, probably because it assigned an exact date for the commencement of the conspiracy, and also limited the means to be employed to carry out the conspiracy to a single advertisement in one particular paper.

, conspired together and with other persons unknown to incite women being with child to administer to themselves noxious things with intent to procure their own miscarriage.

8. Cruelty to Children.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Cruelty to a child, contrary to section 12 of the Children Act, 1908.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., between the day of and the day of , in the county of , being a person over the age of sixteen years having the custody, charge, or care of *C.D.*, a child, ill-treated or neglected the said child, or caused or procured the said child to be ill-treated or neglected in a manner likely to cause the said child unnecessary suffering or injury to its health.

9. Embezzlement.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

B. feloniously embezzled £20, money received by him for and on account of his master *D.*, contrary to section 17 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

On the day of , in the county of *B.*, being then a clerk in the employ of *D.*, was directed by *D.* to call upon *N.* and obtain payment of a sum of £20 which *N.* then owed to *D.* *N.* paid this sum to *B.*, but *B.* never handed over any portion of it to *D.*

10. False Pretences.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Obtaining goods by false pretences, contrary to section 32 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , with intent to defraud, obtained from *S.P.* five yards of cloth by falsely pretending that he, the said *A.B.*, was a servant to *J.S.*, and that he, the said *A.B.*, had then been sent by the said *J.S.*, to *S.P.* for the said cloth, and that he, the said *A.B.*, was then authorised by the said *J.S.* to receive the said cloth on behalf of the said *J.S.*

11. Falsification of Accounts.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Falsification of accounts, contrary to section 1 of Falsification of Accounts Act, 1875.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , being clerk or servant to C.D., with intent to defraud, made or concurred in making a false entry in a cash book belonging to the said C.D., his employer, purporting to show that on the said day £100 had been paid to L.M.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Same as first count.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , being clerk or servant to C.D., with intent to defraud, omitted or concurred in omitting from or in a cash book belonging to the said C.D., his employer, a material particular, that is to say, the receipt on the said day of £50 from H.S.

12. Forgery.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Forgery, contrary to section 2, sub-section 1 (a) of the Forgery Act, 1913.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , with intent to defraud, forged a certain will purporting to be the will of C.D.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Uttering forged document, contrary to section 6, sub-sections 1 and 2 of the Forgery Act, 1913.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , uttered a certain forged will purporting to be the will of C.D., knowing the same to be forged and with intent to defraud.

13. Fraudulent Conversion.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Fraudulent conversion of property, contrary to section 20, subsection 1 (iv) (a) of Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , fraudulently converted to his own use and benefit certain property, that is to say, £100 entrusted to him by H.S., in order that he, the said A.B., might retain the same in safe custody.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Fraudulent conversion of property, contrary to section 20, subsection 1 (iv) (b) of Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , fraudulently converted to his own use and benefit certain property, that is to say, the sum of £200 received by him for and on account of L.M.

14. Larceny and Receiving (d).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Larceny.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , stole a bag, the property of C.D.

(d) This form is taken from the rules of March, 1916. The original form was annulled because the allegation of the previous conviction was contained in the first count of the indictment, and might therefore be read to the jury at the commencement of the trial.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Receiving stolen goods contrary to section 33 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , did receive a bag, the property of *C.D.*, knowing the same to have been stolen.

A.B. has been previously convicted of felony, to wit, burglary, on the day of at the Assizes held at Reading.

15. Larceny by Clerk or Servant.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Larceny, contrary to section 17 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , being clerk or servant to *M.N.*, stole from the said *M.N.* ten yards of cloth.

16. Libel (e).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Libel.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , 1916, in the county of , published a defamatory libel concerning *W.Y.*, in the form of a letter addressed to *J.B.*, which said letter contained the following defamatory matters concerning the said *W.Y.*:—

1. Do you know that about the year 1886 your friend *W.Y.* was in the employ of *L.* and *J.*, and that his accounts were found to be all wrong? (meaning thereby that *W.Y.* was guilty of acts of dishonesty and falsification of accounts whilst he was in the employ of *L.* and *J.*).

2. As soon as his defalcations were discovered and a warrant was applied for, he fled to Rio (meaning thereby that the said *W.Y.* was a fugitive from justice).

3. Some time after this he appears to have returned to England, for he was found to be keeping a disorderly house in the East End of London (meaning thereby that the said *W.Y.* had committed the criminal offence of keeping a disorderly house).

(e) Note that the libellous words must be set out in the indictment.

16a. Plea of Justification of A.B. in answer to the Indictment against him for Libel.

A.B. says he is not guilty, and for a further plea he says that all the defamatory matters alleged in the indictment are true.

PARTICULARS.

1. On the day of , 1886, W.Y. received the sum of £2 8s. 6d. from T.S., and on the day of , 1886, W.Y. received the sum of £1,100 from C.F. and the sum of £500 from W.D. on behalf of his employers, L. and J., which he fraudulently omitted to enter in their books or to account for in any way.

2. On the day of , 1886, soon after W.Y.'s defalcations were discovered and a warrant was applied for against him upon charges of embezzling his employers' money and falsifying their books, W.Y. left England on a ship called the *Eagle* bound for Rio de Janeiro.

3. On September 19 and on other days in the year 1911 W.Y. kept a house at Street, Mile End, for the purpose of betting, contrary to the Betting Act, 1853.

And A.B. says it was for the public benefit that the defamatory matters charged in the said indictment should be published by reason of the fact that W.Y. was at the time of the publication thereof a candidate for the public office of councillor of the borough of .

16b. Replication to the Plea of Justification of A.B.

H.S., clerk of assize, joins issue on behalf of our Lord the King.

17. Malicious Damage.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Offence under section 35 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , displaced a sleeper belonging to the Great Western Railway with intent to obstruct, upset, overthrow, injure or destroy any engine, tender, carriage or truck using the said railway.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Obstructing railway, contrary to section 36 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , by unlawfully displacing a sleeper belonging to the Great Western Railway did obstruct or cause to be obstructed an engine or carriage using the said railway.

18. Malicious Damage to Trees.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Damaging trees, contrary to section 22 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , maliciously damaged an oak tree there growing.

A.B. has been twice previously convicted of an offence under section 22 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861, namely, at , on the day of , and at , on the day of .

19. Manslaughter.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Manslaughter.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , unlawfully killed J.S.

20. Murder (f).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Murder.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , murdered J.S.

21. Murder, Accessory after the Fact to (g).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Accessory after the fact to murder.

(f) Technical words (*e.g.*, "malice aforethought") are no longer necessary (rule 4 (3)), and are omitted in the above form.

(g) This form is taken from the rules of March 18, 1916. The original form was annulled, because it appeared to impose upon the prosecution the burden of proving that a prisoner who is charged with being an accessory after the fact to a murder knew precisely when and where the murder was committed.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., well knowing that H.C. had murdered C.C., did on the _____ day of _____ and on other days thereafter, in the county of _____, receive, comfort, harbour, assist and maintain the said H.C.

22. Obscene Libel.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Publishing obscene libel.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

E.M., on the _____ day of _____, in the county of _____, sold, uttered and published, and caused or procured to be sold, uttered and published, an obscene libel the particulars of which are deposited with this indictment.

[Particulars to specify pages and lines complained of where necessary, as in a book.]

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Procuring obscene libel [or thing] with intent to sell or publish.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

E.M., on the _____ day of _____, in the county of _____, procured an obscene libel [or thing], the particulars of which are deposited with this indictment, with intent to sell, utter or publish such obscene libel [or thing].

23. Obstructing a Coroner.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Obstructing coroner in the execution of his duty.
(Common law misdemeanour.)

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B. and G.C., on the _____ day of _____, in the county of _____, intending to prevent the coroner of _____ from holding an inquest in the execution of his duty upon view of the dead body of S.C., who died a violent or an unnatural death or a sudden death of which the cause was unknown, or intending to obstruct the said coroner in the holding of such inquest, did bury the said dead body in a certain place called Hampstead Heath.

24. Obtaining Credit by Fraud.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

A., in incurring a debt, obtained credit by means of fraud, contrary to section 13 of the Debtors Act, 1869.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

On the day of , in the county of ,
A., being then insolvent, fraudulently induced M. to sell him a diamond ring for £50 and to hand the ring over to him without receiving any part of the price, by falsely pretending that he was the son of *Sir X.Y.*

25. Perjury.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Perjury, contrary to section 1 (i) of the Perjury Act, 1911.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of ,
being a witness upon the trial of an action in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in England, in which one, , was plaintiff, and one, , was defendant, knowingly falsely swore that he saw one, *M.N.*; in the street called the Strand, London, on the day of .

26. Rape.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Rape.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of ,
had carnal knowledge of *E.F.* without her consent.

27. Robbery with Violence.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Robbery with violence, contrary to section 23 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of ,
robbed *C.D.* of a watch, and at the time of or immediately before or immediately after such robbery did use personal violence to the said *C.D.*

28. Threatening Letter.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Sending threatening letter, contrary to section 29 of the Larceny Act, 1916.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , sent, delivered or uttered to or caused to be received by C.D., a letter accusing or threatening to accuse the said C.D. of an infamous crime with intent to extort money from the said C.D.

29. Treason (h).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

C. committed treason by adhering to the King's enemies elsewhere than in the King's realm, to wit, in the Empire of Germany, contrary to the Treason Act, 1351 (25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2).

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

On the day of , in the county of C., being then a British subject, and whilst an open and public war was being carried on by the German Emperor and his subjects against our Lord the King and his subjects, then traitorously contriving and intending to aid and assist the said enemies of our Lord the King against our Lord the King and his subjects, did traitorously adhere to and aid and comfort the said enemies in parts beyond the seas without this realm of England, to wit, in the Empire of Germany.

[Here set out the overt acts alleged.]

30. Uttering.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Uttering counterfeit coin, contrary to section 9 of the Coinage Offences Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , at the public-house called "The Red Lion," in the county of , uttered a counterfeit half-crown, knowing the same to be counterfeit.

(h) This precedent is framed on the indictment in the case of *R. v. Casement*, [1917] 1 K. B. 98.

31. Uttering.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Uttering counterfeit coin, contrary to section 12 of the Coinage Offences Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , at a public-house called "The Red Lion," in the county of , uttered a counterfeit sovereign, knowing the same to be counterfeit.

A.B. has been previously convicted of a misdemeanour under section 9 of the Coinage Offences Act, 1861, on the day of at .

32. Wounding (i).

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

First Count.

Wounding with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , wounded C.D., with intent to do him grievous bodily harm, or to maim, disfigure or disable him, or to resist the lawful apprehension of him the said A.B.

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE.

Second Count.

Wounding, contrary to section 20 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861.

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE.

A.B., on the day of , in the county of , maliciously wounded C.D.

(i) Charges alleging in the alternative that the same criminal act was done with different intents may now be included in the same count of the indictment.

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